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THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD, IN FIVE BOOKS.

By Sir WALTER RALEGH, Kt.

The ELEVENTH EDITION, *printed from a Copy revis'd by* HIMSELF.

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To which is PREFIX'D,

The LIFE of the AUTHOR,

NEWLY COMPIL'D,

From Materials more ample and authentick than have yet been publiſh'd;

By Mr. *OLDYS.*

Alſo his TRIAL, with ſome Additions:

TOGETHER WITH

A new and more copious INDEX *to the whole* WORK.

VOLUME II.

LONDON:

Printed for G. CONYERS, J. J. and P. KNAPTON, D. MIDWINTER, A. BETTESWORTH and C. HITCH, B. SPRINT, R. ROBINSON, B. MOTTE, J. WALTHOE, A. WARD, J. CLARKE, S. BIRT, T. WOTTON, T. LONGMAN, H. WHITRIDGE, H. LINTOT, and J. and R. TONSON.

MDCCXXXVI.

THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD

INTREATING of the

Times from the Deſtruction of JERUSALEM *to the Time of* PHILIP *of* MACEDON.

The THIRD BOOK.

CHAP. I.

Of the Time paſſing between the Deſtruction of Jeruſalem, *and the Fall of the* Aſſyrian *Empire.*

SECT. I.

Of the connection of ſacred and prophane hiſtory.

THE courſe of time; which in prophane hiſtories might rather be diſcerned thro' the greateſt part of his way, hitherto paſſed in ſome outworn foot-ſteps, than in any beaten path, having once in *Greece* by the *Olympiads*, and in the eaſtern countries by the account from *Nabonaſſar*, left ſurer marks, and more appliable to actions concurrent, than were the war of *Troy*, or any other token of former date; begins at length in the ruin of *Jeruſalem* to diſcover the connection of antiquity foreſpent, with the ſtory of ſucceeding ages. Manifeſt it is, that the original and progreſs of things could ill be ſought in thoſe that were ignorant of the firſt creation: as likewiſe that the affairs of kingdoms and empire afterwards grown up are not to be found among thoſe, that have now no ſtate nor policy remaining of their own. Having therefore purſued the ſtory of the world unto that age, from whence the memory of ſucceeding accidents is with little interruption of fabulous diſcourſe derived unto us, I hold it now convenient briefly to ſhew, by what means and circumſtances the hiſtory of the *Hebrews*, which of all other is the moſt ancient, may be conjoined with the following times, wherein that image of ſundry metals, diſcovered by God unto *Nebuchadnezzar*, did reign over the earth, when *Iſrael* was either none, or an unregarded nation.

Herein I do not hold it needful, to inſiſt upon thoſe authorities, which give, as it were by hearſay, a certain year of ſome old *Aſſyrian* king unto ſome

ſome action or event, whereof the time is found expreſſed in ſcripture: for together with the end of *Ninus*'s line in *Sardanapalus*, if not before, all ſuch computations were blotted out; the ſucceſſion of *Belochus* and his iſſue that occupied the kingdom afterwards, depending upon the uncertain relations of ſuch, as were neither conſtant in aſſigning the years of his beginning, nor of credit enough for others to rely upon. Let it therefore ſuffice, that the conſent and harmony, which ſome have found in the years of thoſe overworn monarchs, doth preſerve their names, which otherwiſe might have been forgotten. Now concerning the later kings of that nation, howſoever it be true that we find the names of all or moſt of them in ſcriptures, which are recorded by prophane hiſtorians, yet hereby could we only learn in what age each of them lived, but not in what year his reign began or ended, were it not that the reign of *Nebuchadnezzar* is more preciſely applied to the times of *Jehoiakim* and *Zedekiah*. Hence have we the firſt light whereby to diſcover the means of connecting the ſacred and prophane hiſtories. For under *Nebuchadnezzar* was the beginning of the captivity of *Juda*, which ended when 70 years were expired; and theſe 70 years took end at the firſt of *Cyrus*, whoſe time being well known, affords us means of looking back into the ages paſt, and forwards into the race of men ſucceeding. The firſt year of *Cyrus*'s reign in *Perſia*, by general conſent, is joined with the firſt year of the 55th *Olympiad*, where, that he reigned 23 years before his monarchy, and 7 years afterwards, it is apparent, and almoſt out of controverſy. Giving therefore 408 years unto the diſtance between the fall of *Troy*, and the inſtauration of the *Olympiads* by *Iphitus*; we may eaſily arrive unto thoſe antiquities of *Greece*, which were not merely fabulous. As for princes ruling the whilſt in ſundry parts of the world, St. *Auguſtine* and others may be truſted in ſetting down their times, which they had by tradition from authors of well-approv'd faith and induſtry.

From *Cyrus* forwards, how the times are reckoned unto *Alexander*, and from him to the battel of *Actium*, it were (peradventure) in this place impertinent to ſet down. But ſeeing that the beginning and end of the *Babylonian* captivity are marks whereby we are chiefly directed, in paſſing from the firſt unto the lateſt years of the world, thro' any ſtory, with leaſt interruption, it is very expedient that we take ſome pains to inform our ſelves truly of the 70 years, during which it continued, even from *Nebuchadnezzar* unto *Cyrus*.

SECT. II.

A brief rehearſal of two opinions, touching the beginning of the captivity: with an anſwer to the cavils of Porphyry, *inveighing againſt St.* Matthew, *and* Daniel, *upon whom the later of theſe opinions is founded.*

MANY commentators, and other hiſtorians and chronologers find, that the captivity then began when *Jechonias* was carried priſoner into *Babylon*, 11 years before the final deſtruction of *Jeruſalem* under *Zedekias*. This they prove out of divers places in [a] *Ezekiel*, eſpecially out of the 14th chapter, where he makes a plain diſtinction between the beginning of the captivity, and utter deſtruction of *Jeruſalem* by *Nabuzaradan*, in theſe words: *In the five and twentieth year of our being in captivity in the beginning of the year, in the tenth day of the month, in the fourteenth year after that the city was ſmitten.* In which words he beginneth the captivity in plain terms, 11 years before the city was deſtroy'd. *Beroaldus* is of opinion that it began in the firſt of *Nabuchodonoſor*, and the 4th of *Joakim*, which he endeavours to prove out of the 2d of *Chronicles*, but more eſpecially out of St. *Matthew* and *Daniel*, whoſe words afford matter of long diſputation, but ſerve not to make good ſo much as *Beroaldus* would enforce. That place of St. *Matthew*, and the whole book of *Daniel*, have miniſtred occaſion of ſcoffing and railing at the Chriſtian religion to that wretched man *Porphyry*, who, not underſtanding how the ſons of king *Joſias* were called by divers names, as *Epiphanius* hath ſhew'd at large, thought that the apoſtle had ſpoken he knew not what in reckoning the ſons, or, according to ſome tranſlations, the ſons and nephews of that good king, begotten about the time of the captivity. Upon *Daniel* alſo the ſame *Porphyry* doth ſpend the 12th of his malicious books written againſt the Chriſtians, affirming that theſe prophecies and viſions remembred by *Daniel*, were written long after his death, and at, or near the time of *Antiochus Epiphanes*. This fond ſuppoſition of his, *Euſebius*, *Apollonius*, and others, have ſufficiently anſwer'd. For the 70 interpreters, who converted the *Old Teſtament* about 100 years before *Epiphanes*, did alſo turn this book of *Daniel* out of *Hebrew* into *Greek*, as a part of ſcripture received. And were there no other argument to confound *Porphyry*, than that of [b] *Alexander Macedon*, it were ſufficient, who lived divers years before *Antiochus Epiphanes*. For *Jaddus* the high prieſt ſhew'd that great conqueror, when he came towards [c] *Jeruſalem* to have deſtroy'd it, this book of *Daniel*, wherein he beheld his own glory foretold, as the ſame was plainly expounded unto him; which not only ſtay'd his hand from the harm of that city and people, but his aſſurance and reſolution was ſo confirm'd and ſtrengthned thereby, as deſpiſing all future peril and reſiſtance, he conquered *Darius*, and the eaſtern empire in a ſhorter time than *Nabuchodonoſor* had done one city, to wit, *Tire* in *Phenicia*.

It is true indeed, that the *Jews* themſelves give leſs authority to *Daniel*, than to *Moſes*, and the prophets, accounting his book among thoſe which they call *Cetaphim*, or *Hagiographa*, or holy writings, which they ſay *Eſdras* and the ſeniors of the ſynagogue compiled after their return from *Babylon*. But firſt, that the book of *Daniel* (I mean ſo much as is found in the *Hebrew*) is canonical: Secondly, that it was written by *Daniel* himſelf, and not by *Eſdras* and the ſeniors; we may aſſure ourſelves by teſtimony of councils, and fathers. For in the council of *Laodicea* held about the year of our Lord 368, after the death of *Jovinian* the emperor, and after the *Nicene* council 43 years, this book of *Daniel* was received, verified and confirmed among the other canonical ſcriptures, as in the epitome of the ſame council it may be ſeen, and ſo doth *Meliton* the moſt ancient biſhop of *Sardis* number it, witneſs *Euſebius* in his eccleſiaſtical hiſtory, the 4th book, and 25th chapter, ſo doth the ſame author in the catalogue of canonical books upon *Origen*, ſo doth *Hilarius* in his preface upon the *Pſalms*, and *Epiphanius* in his book of *Weights and Meaſures*, *&c.* To theſe I may add St. *Jerome*, *Gregory Nazianzene*, and others. For the *Hagiographæ* books, or holy writings, the *Jews* and *Rabbins* reckon to be theſe, *Daniel*, *Pſalms*,

[a] Ezek. 1. 2. & 3. 11, 15. [b] 1 Mac. 11. [c] Joſ. Ant. 11.

Proverb.

Proverbs, Job, Canticles, Ruth, Lamentations, Eccleſiaſtes, Heſter, Eſra, Nehemiah, and the Chronicles. And that it was *Daniel*, and not *Eſdras*, that wrote this book, God's commandment unto him by his angel, to ſeal up the ſame to the time appointed, is an unanſwerable teſtimony. Yea, that which exceedeth all ſtrength of other proof, our Saviour Chriſt who citeth no apocryphal ſcripture, in *Matth.* xxiv. 15. and *Mark* xiii. 14. alledgeth *Daniel* the prophet, to wit, the laſt verſe of his 19th chapter. Further, in *John* v. Chriſt diſtributeth the riſen from the dead, as in *Daniel* xii. 2. St. *Paul* deſcribeth *Antichriſt* out of *Daniel*, and the *Revelation* is wholly an interpretation of *Daniel*'s viſions.

SECT. III.

That the 70 years of captivity are to be numbred from the deſtruction of Jeruſalem; *not from the migration of* Jechonia.

HAving thus far digreſſed, in maintaining that authority, which muſt often be cited in the preſent argument, it is now convenient, that we return unto the differences of opinion, concerning the beginning of theſe 70 years. Neither will I ſtand to trouble my ſelf and others with laying open the grounds or weakneſs of that which *Euſebius* and ſome few nameleſs authors, have ſometimes held in this point, which is lately revived by *Beroaldus*; but will forthwith enter into conſideration of that opinion, which many both ancient and late writers have ſo earneſtly maintained, that it wants not much of being common.

Four kings of *Juda* were carried away captives to *Babylon*: firſt *Manaſſes*; then *Jehoiakim*, and with him among others, *Daniel* the prophet: thirdly *Jechonias*, and with him *Ezekiel*: laſtly, *Zedekias*, at which time the city and temple were deſtroy'd. To the firſt of theſe captivities the beginning of the 70 years is referr'd by none that I have read; to the ſecond by few and with weak proof; to the third by very many and with much confidence. For beſides thoſe places of *Ezekiel* already cited, there is a ſtrong argument gather'd out of *Jeremy* xxix. 10. which may ſeem to make the matter plain; for the prophet in comforting the people that were carried away with *Jechonias*, uſed theſe words: *Thus ſaith the Lord: after 70 years be accompliſhed at Babel, I will viſit you, and perform my good promiſe towards you, and cauſe you to return to this place.*

But it ſtands indeed with little reaſon that we ſhould ſeek the interpretation of a prophecy out of circumſtances, when the prophecy is ſuch as doth ſufficiently expound it ſelf. *Jeremiah* had already in the 4th year of *Jehoiakim*, denounced the judgment of God againſt the land, for the ſins and impenitency of that obſtinate people, in theſe words: [a] *Behold, I will ſend and take to me all the families of the north, ſaith the Lord, and Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babel, my ſervant, and will bring them againſt this land, and againſt the inhabitants thereof, and againſt all theſe nations round about, and I will deſtroy them, and make them an aſtoniſhment, and an hiſſing, and a continual deſolation. Moreover, I will take from them the voice of mirth, and the voice of gladneſs, the voice of the bridegroom, and the voice of the bride, the noiſe of the mill-ſtones, and the light of the candle, and this whole land ſhall be deſolate, and an aſtoniſhment, and theſe nations ſhall ſerve the king of Babel 70 years. And when 70 years are expired, I will viſit the king of Babel.* Here we ſee preſcribed unto the captivity the term of 70 years, which were to commence, neither when the prophecy was uttered; nor when *Jehoiakim*, who then reign'd, was taken by *Nebuchadnezzar*; nor yet in the time of *Jechonia*; but with the utter deſolation of the city, whereof *Jeremiah* did again give notice to thoſe that were already in *Babylon*, at ſuch time as he ſent them the comfort of deliverance before rehearſed. And ſo did the people underſtand this prophecy, in thoſe times when they ſaw it accompliſhed, beginning the 70 years at the time of the deſolation, as manifeſtly appears in the end of the hiſtory of *Juda*, where it is ſaid thus: [b] *They burnt the houſe of God, and brake down the wall of Jeruſalem, and burnt all the palaces thereof with fire, and all the precious veſſels thereof, to deſtroy all: and they that were left by the ſword, carried he away to Babel, and they were ſervants to him and to his ſons, until the kingdom of the Perſians had rule, to fulfil the word of the Lord by the mouth of Jeremiah, until the land had her fill of her ſabbaths: for all the days that ſhe lay deſolate, ſhe kept ſabbath, to fulfil 70 years. But in the firſt year of Cyrus king of Perſia (when the word of the Lord, ſpoken by the mouth of Jeremiah, was finiſhed) the Lord ſtirred up the ſpirit of Cyrus.* We ſeldom find one piece of ſcripture ſo preciſely and plainly expounded by another, as in this prophecy, to have afterwards been the ſubject of altercation. For one can hardly deviſe, how either the deſolation could have been expreſs'd more ſenſibly than it was by the prophet, or the event of the prophecy have been more exactly ſet down, than it was in the place now laſt of all cited. If it be requiſite that we bring more proof in ſo evident a caſe, the 9th chapter of *Daniel* yields teſtimony ſufficient, unto this expoſition of *Jeremiah*'s prophecy, that *Jeruſalem* was to lie waſte 70 years. For in the firſt year *Darius* the *Mede*, which was the laſt of the 70, *Daniel* obtained of God the deliverance that had been promiſed by prayer, which he made upon conſideration of the time that was expired: as he telleth us in theſe words: [c] *In the firſt year of his reign, I Daniel underſtood by books the number of the years, whereof the Lord hath ſpoken unto Jeremiah the prophet, that he would accompliſh 70 years in the deſolation of Jeruſalem.* So that howſoever the time of *Daniel*'s own captivity be reckon'd from the taking of *Jehoiakim*, and that the people carried away with *Jechonia*, did account, as well they might, the years of their own captivity; yet with the general deſolation of the country, wherein were few or none of the *Iſraelites* left remaining to inhabit, began in the 19th year of *Nabuchodonoſor* the great captivity, which by God's appointment continued unto the end of 70 years. This I will not further ſeek to prove, by the authority of *Joſephus* and others affirming the ſame; foraſmuch as that which already hath been produced, is enough to ſatisfy any man that hath not fully determined to hold the contrary.

SECT. IV.

Sundry opinions of the kings which reigned in Babylon *during the 70 years.*

WHAT kings reign'd in *Babylon*, during theſe 70 years of the captivity, and how long each of them did wear the diadem, it is a matter of no great importance to know, for as much

[a] Jer. 29. 16, 17, 18. [b] 2 Chron 36. 19, &c. [c] Dan. 9. 2.

as neither their acts were notable in the age wherein they lived, nor the length of their reigns any way helpful to the concordance of times, foregoing or succeeding. The conquests recounted by [a] *Xenophon* of *Syria*, *Arabia* (or rather some part of it) *Hyrcania*, *Bactria*, and perhaps of some other countries, may seem fruits of the victories obtain'd by *Nebuchadnezzar* the great (or by some of his ancestors) in the former part of his life, before he betook himself to ease, and to the sumptuous building of his great *Babel*, for the house of his kingdom, and for the honour of his majesty, where it may seem that he and his heirs kept a great state, and did very little. The idle behaviour of the *Assyrian* soldiers, in such skirmishes as afterwards they had with the *Medes*, doth argue no less. For whereas under *Nebuchadnezzar*, they were so stout and industrious, that (to omit other proofs) they attempted, and finish'd, that hardy piece of work, of winning the strong city of *Tyre*, by joining it unto the continent, filling up the deep and broad channel of the sea, dividing it from the main with a mole, or peer of earth, and other matter, the reparation whereof, when the sea had washed it away, was the very greatest of *Alexander*'s works; in the times following, they became timorous, that they durst not approach nearer to the enemy than their bows would carry, but were ready to turn their backs as soon as any, tho' inferiour in numbers, adventuring within the distance offered to charge them.

Now as their actions, from the end of [b] *Nebuchadnezzar*'s wars, till the ruin of their empire, were not worthy to be recorded; so was the distinction of their times, and reign of their several kings, unworthy of the great labour that hath in vain been taken in that business. For when it is granted, that the captivity of *Juda*, ending with that empire, lasted 70 years, we may as reasonably forbear to search into the particular continuance of two or three slothful kings, as we are contented to be ignorant of the ages of the patriarchs, and their children, living in the *Egyptian* servitude; resting satisfy'd in both with the general assured sum.

Yet for as much as many have travelled in this business, upon desire (as I take it) to approve the beginning and end of the 70 years, not only by the reigns of other princes, ruling elsewhere, but by the times of the *Assyrians* themselves: I will not refuse to take a little pains in collecting their opinions, and shewing what I think may best be held for likely, if the certain truth cannot be found.

The opinions are many, and greatly repugnant, both in recounting the kings themselves, and in setting down the years of their several reigns. The first (as I take it) the surest, is theirs, who meerly follow the authority of the scriptures, without borrowing any help from others. These name only three kings, *Nebuchadnezzar*, *Evilmerodach*, and *Balthasar*. Neither have they only the silence of *Daniel*, who names none other, to be their warrant, but the prophecy of *Jeremiah* precisely, and in a manner purposely teaching the very same. For God, by the mouth of that prophet, shewing that he being absolute lord of all would dispose of all, according to his own will, and making it known that he had put some countries here named, into the hands of the king of *Babel*, saith thus: [c] *And all nations shall serve him, and his son, and his sons son, until the very time of his land come also; then many nations and great kings shall serve themselves of him.* These words expressing the continuance of the *Chaldean* empire, and number of the kings, will hardly be qualify'd with any distinction. But indeed I find no other necessity of qualification to be used herein than such as may grow out of mens desire to reconcile the scriptures unto prophane authors. And this desire were not unjust, if the consent of all histories were on the one side, and the letter of the holy text were single on the other side.

But contrariwise, the authors which are cited in this case, are so repugnant one to the other, and the proofs of their different reports are so slender and unsufficient, that the succession of these princes, had it not been thus delivered in scriptures, but only set down by some author of equal credit with the rest, might very well have found and deserved as good belief, as any of those things which they have delivered in this point. For some there are, who following [d] *Josephus*, derive that empire, as by descent from father to son, thro' five generations; beginning with *Nabuchodonosor* the great, and giving to him 43 years, to *Evilmerodach* 18, to *Nigliſar* the son of *Evilmerodach* 40, to *Labosardach* the son of *Nigliſar* 9 months, and lastly to *Balthasar* (whom *Josephus* intimates to be of the race of *Nabuchodonosor*, without naming his father) 17 years. And this opinion (save that he forbears to reckon the years, and plainly calls *Balthasar* the son of *Labosardach*) St. *Jerome* doth follow, alledging *Berosus*, and *Josephus* as a sectator of *Berosus*, for his authors; tho' *Berosus*, as he is cited by [e] *Josephus*, reports the matter far otherwise. For he tells us that *Evilmerodach* the son of *Nabuchodonosor* did reign but two years, being for his wickedness and lust, slain by his sister's husband *Nizigliſſoroor*, who occupied the kingdom after him four years, and left it to his own son *Labosardach*, who being an ill-conditioned boy, was at the end of 9 months slain by such as were about him, and the kingdom given to one *Nabonidus*, who held it by the election of the conspirators, and left it unto *Cyrus* after 17 years. This relation ill agrees with that of *Josephus*, and both of them as bad with the scriptures, in number either of years, or of generations; yet the particularities which they handle, have procured unto them some authority, so that the names which they have inserted, are taken as it were upon trust. There is a third opinion, which makes the three last kings brethren, and sons of *Evilmerodach*; and this may well enough agree with the scripture: tho' I had rather believe [f] *Xenophon*, who saith that the last king of *Babylon* was immediate successor to his father. But whereas the author of the scholastical history, who is founder of this opinion, placeth between him that took *Jerusalem*, and *Evilmerodach*, another *Nabuchodonosor*: plain enough it is that he hath, out of any history sacred or prophane, as little warrant to guide him, as we have reason to follow him. *Eusebius*, *Sulpitius Severus*, and *Theodoret*, upon better ground, have supposed, that *Evilmerodach* and *Balthasar* were brethren and sons of the great *Nabuchodonosor*. This is built on the 5th chapter of *Daniel*, wherein *Balthasar* (for of *Evilmerodach* there is none that ever doubted) is often called *Nabuchodonosor*'s son. And so common grew this explication, that St. *Jerome* called it the vulgar opinion. But the place of *Jeremiah* before cited, proves that *Balthasar* was not the son indeed, but the grand-child of that great conqueror, tho' by the phrase very common in scriptures, and familiar in those eastern languages, he was called the son.

[a] Xenoph. Cyropæd. l. 1. [b] Xenoph. Cyropæd. 1. & l. 3. Appion. l. 1. [f] Xenoph. Cyropæd. l. 4.

[c] Jer. 27. 7. Jos. Ant. l. 10. c. 12. [e] Jos. contr.

Annius's

Annius's *Metaſthenes* hits very rightly the 70 years of captivity, giving to *Nabuchodonoſor* 45 years, to *Evilmerodach* 30 years, and to the 3 ſons of *Evilmerodach*, nephews of *Nabuchodonoſor*, 14 years; that is, to *Reg-Aſſer* the eldeſt ſon 3 years, to *Lab-Aſſer Datch* the 2d ſon 6 years, and to *Balthaſar* the 3d ſon 5.

To this account agreeing with the ſcriptures, both in the whole ſum of years, and in the number of generations, I have ſometime ſubſcribed, as not caring to reject an appearance of truth, upon no greater reaſon than becauſe the author was of *Annius*'s edition. Yet could I not ſatisfy my ſelf herein; both for that none of the ancient, and few ſuch of the modern writers as deſerve to be regarded, have conſented with this *Metaſthenes*; and for that making *Balthaſar* to ſucceed unto his brother in the kingdom, and not unto his father, he is wholly againſt *Xenophon*, whoſe hiſtory of the elder *Cyrus* in his *Aſſyrian* war I cannot ſlightly value in many reſpects, and eſpecially becauſe it is very agreeable to the ſcriptures, in the taking of *Babylon*, while the king was at his drunken feaſt.

Seeking therefore diligently into all circumſtances that might give any light in this obſcurity, I found manifeſt proof, that the time allotted unto [a] *Balthaſar*, by *Annius*'s *Metaſthenes*, was far ſhort of the truth, which is enough to render all ſuſpected that he hath ſaid in diſtributing what part of the 70 years he pleaſed among the reſt. For in the 3d year of *Balthaſar*, *Daniel* ſaw a viſion, after which he was ſick certain days, but when he roſe up, he did the king's buſineſs: from which buſineſs, that he did afterwards withdraw himſelf, and lived retired, ſo long that he was forgotten in the court, it appears plainly, both by the many words which the old queen uſed to ſet out his ſufficiency, and by the king's asking of him, *when* he came into his preſence, *whether he were* [b] *Daniel*. Now to *think* that a man of ſuch account and place as [c] *Daniel* had held, could in two years have been worn out of remembrance, were in my judgment a very ſtrange conceit, which rather than I would entertain, I can well be contented to think the whole ſtory (thus related) a part of *Annius*'s impoſtures.

Out of theſe reports of *Joſephus*, *Beroſus*, and others, many new opinions are framed, by conjectures of late writers. For the endurance of the captivity being 70 years, and theſe years extending unto the firſt of *Cyrus*, in which courſe of time *Nebuchadnezzar*, his ſon and grand-child, muſt have reigned; it hath ſeemed needful to ſupply the years of theſe three deſcents, by inſerting ſome whoſe reigns might fill up the whole continuance of the captivity, with which the time allotted by *Beroſus* and others, to *Evilmerodach* and *Balthaſar*, joined unto the years following the 19th of *Nebuchadnezzar* (wherein *Jeruſalem* was laid deſolate) are nothing even.

Therefore *Mercator*, and others following him, faſhion the years of *Evilmerodach* in this ſort. They ſay, that the 18 years given to him by *Joſephus* in the 10th of his antiquities, ſhould be read and numbred 28 years, and the 2 years that *Beroſus* hath allowed to *Evilmerodach* ſhould be written 23: in the firſt number the figure of [1] is miſtaken for the figure of [2] and in the latter there ſhould have been added the figure of [3] to that of [2:] this granted [to wit] that *Evilmerodach* reigned 28 years, whereof 5 together with his father, and 23 after his death, and the ſame number of 23 added to the 25 which *Nabuchodonoſor* lived after the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*, make 49, then 4 years of *Nigliſar* according to *Beroſus*, 9 months of *Labaſſardach* his ſon, and 17 years of *Labonidus* or *Balthaſar*, make up the number of 70 years to the firſt of *Cyrus*. But whether by error in figures or in words, the numbers be utterly miſtaken, in all copies extant; upon how weak a foundation do they build; who having nothing to help them, ſave only the bare names of two unknown kings, found in authors manifeſtly corrupted, and ſuch as if they had been entirely extant, were not worthy to have that place of *Jeremiah* called into diſpute, in regard of their authority?

SECT. V.

A more particular examination of one opinion touching the number, perſons, and reigns of the Babylonian *kings.*

OTHER ſuppoſitions, little different in ſubſtance from this of *Mercator*, I purpoſely forbear to rehearſe, as falling under the ſame anſwer. That of *Joſeph Scaliger* I may not forget, as deſerving to be conſider'd apart from the reſt. He gives to *Nebuchadnezzar* 44 years, to *Evilmerodach* 2, to *Belthaſar* 5, and to *Nabonidus* 17. So that from the 19th of *Nebuchadnezzar*, in which *Jeruſalem* was deſtroy'd, unto the time of *Cyrus*, he accounteth only 59 years; beginning as (many do) the captivity 11 years ſooner, from the tranſportation of *Jechonia*. But hereof enough hath been ſaid already. That which we are now to conſider, is his diſtribution of the time running between the 19th of *Nebuchadnezzar*, and the fall of the *Chaldean* empire: wherein if he have erred, then is all further inquiſition frivolous.

Concerning the length of *Nebuchadnezzar*'s reign, I ſhall hereafter upon better occaſion deliver my opinion. The time which he gives to *Evilmerodach* is very ſhort, and more preciſely agreeing with *Beroſus* than with the ſcriptures. For we find in *Jeremiah*, that this *Evilmerodach* in the firſt of his reign, ſhewing all favour to *Jechonia*, did among other things take order for him at his table; and that he did continually eat bread before him all the days of his life. His portion was a continual portion given him of the king of [d] *Babel*, every day a certain, all the days of his life until he died. The very ſound of theſe words (which is more to be eſteemed, than the authority of *Beroſus*, were he perfectly extant) imports a far longer time than two years, wherein *Jechonia*, under this gentle prince, enjoy'd the comfort ſent by God, whoſe commandment he had obey'd in yielding himſelf to *Nebuchadnezzar*. Indeed how long *Jechonia* did live it cannot be proved; but plain it is hereby that all his remaining days he eat bread before this king. Now that he lived not ſo ſhort a while after this as two years, it is more than likely, for he was but 55 years old when he was ſet at liberty, having been 37 years in the priſon, whereinto he was caſt at the age of 18 years; after which time it ſeems plain that he begat *Salathiel*, as well by the age of *Zorobabel*, who is ſaid to have been but a young man, and one of *Darius*'s pages threeſcore years after this, as by other circumſtances of his impriſonment it ſelf.

Of *Belthaſar*, to whom *Scaliger* gives the next five years, naming him alſo *Laboroſoardoch*, I ſhould wonder why he calls him *Nebuchadnezzar*'s daugh-

[a] Dan. 8. 1. & 27. [b] Dan. 5. 11, 12, 13, Dan. 2. 49. [d] Jer. 52. 33, 34.

ter's

ter's ſon, were it not that herein I find him very careful to help out *Beroſus*, by ſhifting in his *Nirigliſſoroor*, as husband to *Nebuchadnezzar*'s daughter, and protector of his ſon four of theſe years; by which means there remains about one year to *Balthaſar* alone, agreeing nearly with the nine months aſſigned by *Beroſus* to the ſon of *Nigliſar*. But *Jeremy* hath told us that it was to *Nebuchadnezzar*, and to his ſon, and to his ſon's ſon (not to his daughter's ſon) that the empire was promis'd: which difficulty, if *Scaliger* could not help it, was well done of him, to paſs it over with ſilence.

Nabonidus the laſt of theſe, whom others (deſirous to reconcile *Beroſus* to the ſcriptures) have judged to be all one with *Balthaſar*, is by *Scaliger* thought to be *Darius* of the *Medes*. But herein *Scaliger* is no firm *Beroſian*: for *Beroſus* makes him of the ſame ſtock or race, a *Babylonian*. I ſpeak not this to diſgrace the travel of that moſt learned man (for it highly commends his diligence and judgment, that he was not ſo wedded to any author, as affected with the love of truth) but to ſhew that he himſelf having in ſome points diſliked thoſe writers, whom in general he approveth, might with greater reaſon have wholly reformed them by the ſcriptures, wherein can be no error. Two things there are which chiefly did breed to confirm this opinion in *Scaliger*, that he whom *Beroſus* calls *Nabonidus*, was the ſame whom *Daniel* had called *Darius* of the *Medes*: Firſt, the phraſe ſcripture, which ſignifies unto us, that *Darius* took the kingdom, not ſaying that he won it by force of arms. Secondly, a fragment of *Megaſthenes* found in *Euſebius*, wherein this *Nabonidus* is called the *Median*. Touching the word of the original, or of the *Greek* tranſlation, which expreſſing no force of arms doth only ſignify, that *Darius* took or received the kingdom; I ſee no reaſon why we ſhould thereupon infer, that the next king enter'd by election; ſeeing *Daniel* relateth not the means and circumſtances of *Balthaſar*'s death, but only the ſwift accompliſhment of his own prophecy. Neither could it indeed have properly been ſaid (if *Daniel* had car'd to uſe the moſt expreſſive terms) that *Darius* of the *Medes* breaking into the city, did win the kingdom; ſeeing this was performed by *Cyrus* in the abſence of *Darius*, though by his forces, and to his uſe. Now concerning the fragment of *Megaſthenes*, true it is, that in *Euſebius*'s works printed at *Baſil*, in the year 1599, I find only thus much of *Megaſthenes*, cited out of *Alpheus*; that *Nabuchodonoſor*, was more valiant than *Hercules*; that he ſubdued all *Libya*, and the reſt of *Aſia* as far as to the *Armenians*; and that, as the *Chaldeans* report, being return'd into this kingdom, and wrapt with a divine fury, he cry'd with a loud voice, *O* Babylonians, *I foretell ye of a great calamity that ſhall come upon you, which neither* Bel, *nor any of the Gods ſhall avert: There will come a* Perſian, *half an aſs, that ſhall bring ſlavery upon ye:* and that this and the like when he had ſpoken, he vaniſh'd. Of all this I believe little or nothing, ſaving that *Nabuchodonoſor* knew before-hand, that this empire ſhould be tranſlated, as *Daniel* had foretold, from the golden-head, to the ſilver breaſt. But that he won all *Africa* or *Libya*, I hold it neither true nor probable.

If *Scaliger*'s copy of *Euſebius* were the more perfect, out of which *Megaſthenes* tells us that *Nabuchodonoſor* won both *Africa* and *Spain*, I believe the fragment ſo much the leſs; and am as little moved with the authority of it, where it calls a *Median* the pride and confidence of the *Aſſyrians*, as where it tells of *Nebuchadnezzar*'s own vaniſhing away. Indeed that ſame title of half an aſs, by which he calleth *Cyrus*, makes me to ſuſpect the fable as cunningly forged out of *Apollo*'s oracle, wherein he termeth him a *mule*, becauſe his parentage was more noble on the mother's ſide, than on the father's; as *mules* are begotten by *aſſes* upon *mares*. And thus much in anſwer of the two principal foundations whereon this opinion is built. As for the concinnity and coherence which it hath within it ſelf, I eaſily allow it. But this proves nothing, for meer fictions have not wanted theſe commendations: neither can any man believe that one ſo judicious, induſtrioufly and deeply learned as *Joſeph Scaliger*, would ove-ſhoot himſelf in ſetting down repugnancies.

It now remaineth to examine the agreement of this with the ſcriptures, from which there is no appeal. And herein it ſeems that *Scaliger*, well knowing his own ſufficiency, hath been little careful to ſatisfy men that would frame arguments againſt him. For if the prophecy of *Daniel* were true, that the kingdom of *Balthaſar* was divided, and given to the *Medes* and *Perſians*, either we muſt think that *Darius* of the *Medes* was not *Nabonidus*, or elſe we muſt bethink our ſelves what *Perſian* it might be that ſhared the kingdom with him. For it is not more certain, that *Balthaſar* loſt his life and kingdom, than that his kingdom was divided and given to the *Medes* and *Perſians*. Neither did the *Medes* and *Perſians* fall out and fight for it, as by ſuppoſing *Nabonidus* to have been *Darius*, they ſhould be thought to have done; but theſe two nations did compound the body of that empire, and were accounted as lords over all the ſubject proprovinces, inſomuch that the *Greek* hiſtorians did commonly call thoſe wars which *Darius*, and after him *Xerxes*, made upon *Greece*, the wars of the *Medes*. Yea, to clear this point, even [a] *Daniel* himſelf reſembles that king, with whom *Alexander* fought, unto a ram with two horns, calling him the king of the *Medes* and *Perſians*. Wherefore the whole nation of *Chronologers* were not to have been condemned by *Joſeph Scaliger*, for maintaining upon ſuch good grounds, that *Darius* of the *Medes* was partner with *Cyrus* in his victories, and not a *Chaldean* king by him ſubdued. Neither was *Joſephus* to be the leſs regarded for affirming that *Balthaſar* was deſtroyed by *Darius* of the *Medes*, and his nephew *Cyrus*, though herein he varied from *Beroſus*, and others, whoſe authority elſewhere he gladly citeth. For *Joſephus* had no reaſon to believe any man's faith or knowledge of thoſe times, half ſo well as *Daniel*'s, whom I believe that he underſtood as far as was needful in this caſe. Lawful it was for him to alledge all authors that had any mention, though unperfect, of the ſame things that were contain'd in the writings of the *Jews*, to whoſe hiſtories thereby he procured reputation in the *Roman* world, where they were ſtrangers, and might ſeem fabulous. Even ſo do *Euſebius*, and other Chriſtian writers, willingly embrace the teſtimonies of heathen books making for the truth in ſome particulars; yet will they not therefore be tried in general by the ſelf-ſame *Ethnick* philoſophers, but leave them where they are againſt the truth; as *Joſephus* in this caſe hath left *Beroſus*. And thus much I thought it meet to ſay of *Scaliger*'s opinion in this point; holding nevertheleſs in due regard his learning and judgment, which if in ſome things it had not failed, the miracle had been very great.

[a] Daniel 8. 20.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

What may be held as probable of the persons and times of Nabuchodonosor's *successors.*

IT now remains that I freely acknowledge mine own weakness, who cannot find how the 70 years of captivity are to be divided among them which reigned in *Babylon*, tho' I find that the distribution made of them, in such wise as already is rehearsed, be ill agreeable to the holy scriptures. Wherefore I may duly say with *Pererius*, that we ought liberally to pardon those whose feet have failed them in the slippery ways of chronology, wherein both learning and diligence are subject to take a fall at one time or other, by ignorance, forgetfulness, or heedless reckoning. Yet will I adventure to deliver my opinion, wherein the judgment of *Lyra* and others (holding those only to have reign'd over *Chaldeans*, whose names are found in the scriptures) appears more conformable to reason and account of time, than any of the other sentences or conjectures before rehearsed. Not that I will take upon me to defend *Lyra*'s conjectures, when he supposeth by *Nigliſar* and *Labosardach* to be meant the same persons which are called in scripture *Evilmerodach* and *Balthasar* (for this can by no good colour be maintained) but only to shew that the kings by him cited, are likely to have occupied the whole time of 70 years. First therefore, let us consider the reign of *Nebuchadnezzar*, in whose 18th year *Jerusalem* was taken and sack'd, but in his 19th laid utterly desolate.

Most writers have given to him 43 years of reign, following therein *Berosus*. There are who have added one year more; and some have made it up 45. To dispute about the certainty were needless: for in shewing by what length *of time* the scriptures measure *him*, *we shall* shew the certain truth.

Manifest it is, that the 19th year of [a] *Nebuchadnezzar*, is joined with the 11th of *Zedekia*; as also that his 8th year, was the first year of *Jechonia*'s captivity; the reign of *Zedekia* occupied all the mean space, being of 11 years. This is generally agreed upon, so that it needs no further proofs: As for the beginning of his successor [b] *Evilmerodach*, it was in the 37th year of *Jechonia*'s captivity; so that *Nebuchadnezzar* after his 8th year (which was the first of *Jechonia*'s bondage) reigned 35 whole years, and peradventure a good part of the 36th, forasmuch as *Jechonia* was inlarged with so great favour, not until the end of the year. Subtracting therefore out of these 44, which *Nebuchadnezzar*'s reign did well near occupy, those 18 years of his which passed away before the captivity of *Juda*, and ruin of the city, we have remaining 26 years of the 70, that were almost wholly spent, when his son began to reign.

It is now to be considered how the remainder of the 70 years were divided between the kings ruling in *Babylon* until the first of *Cyrus*. A question more difficult (as I said before) than greatly needful: the whole sum being certain, and the distinction of times affording no benefit in knowledge of their actions, who were slothful princes. Neither can any man the more justly suspect the beginning or end of the whole 70 years, for that the distribution of some part of them is only conjectural; seeing that none who gives any other terms to their beginning or end, hath refused to follow both unlikely and desperate conjectures in dividing them. I will therefore be bold to do as others have done; knowing well before-hand, that whosoever shall discover my error, must do me the pleasure (which I could rather wish in a case more material) of making me to understand the truth.

Of the 44 years remaining in account at *Nebuchadnezzar*'s death, we are to take away the last, which was the first of *Darius* the *Mede*, and then having authority good enough to warrant us from blame of presumption, in giving us 17 years to *Balthasar*, we find left in our hands to bestow upon *Evilmerodach* 26 years. Of the year belonging to *Darius* the *Mede*, I have already spoken what I thought sufficient, in delivering my opinion of the beginning and continuance of this captivity. That *Balthasar* did reign 17 years, we have the authority of *Josephus*, before cited in express words; we have also the general consent of all, or the most late writers, interpreting *Berosus*'s *Nabonidus*, who reigned so long; and *Balthasar* to have been one. But nothing moved me so much to believe this tradition, as first those evident places in [c] *Daniel*, shewing that in the 3d year of *Balthasar*, he followed the king's business, and yet was forgotten ere the end of his reign (a proof sufficient of no few years passing under this man, especially seeing it is no where found that *Daniel*'s employments took end either that year or the next.) Secondly, the consideration of *Cyrus*'s wars against the *Assyrians*, which beginning with the death of this man's father, and being always prosperous, could hardly have occupied any longer time, tho' we make large allowance to his deeds in the lower *Asia*, which fell out in the mid way: I have already shewed, that there appears in the scriptures likelihood enough to make it credible that the reign of *Evilmerodach* was not short; and that men of great judgment have found it most probable that he was a king 23 years. More, I think, they would have allowed him, had not the desire of satisfying *Berosus* caused them to rest content with this. And surely it were greatly to be wished, that books of such antiquity, as those of *Berosus*, were extant without corruption; a great light (no doubt) they would yield in many dark passages of antiquity. I will yet confess, that were his works never so excellent, and in all things else unquestionably true, I would not therefore condescend unto him in some one point, wherein the scriptures were his open enemy. How much less ought I to obey a broken fragment of his, containing only 7 or 8 lines, and part even of the title corrupted, as they believe that follow him in the rest? The scriptures have told us, that God gave the empire to [d] *Nebuchadnezzar*, to his son, and to his sons son: how long each of them held it, we find not express'd; yet would we gladly know it of *Berosus*, or of any other that would teach us; provided always, that helping us in a particularity, he destroy not thereby the general truth. More words are needless. It is enough to say with others, that *Berosus*, or *Josephus* who cited him, hath been wronged by the carelessness of scribes; and that it was as easy for those scribes to err in writing 2 for 26, as for 23, or perhaps more easy. For the omission of the 2d figure, was as likely the one way as the other; and the character ϛ signifying 6, hath a nearer resemblance of β that stands for 2, than hath γ which is used for 3. So that the numeral notes βϛ expressing 26, were not safe enough from being mistaken in the true copy, and might be al-

[a] 2 Kings 2. 5, 8. Jer. 51. 12. 2 Kings 24. 12. [b] 2 Kings 25. 27. Jer. 52. 31. [c] Dan. 8. 1, 27. & 1. 11, 12, 13. Jer. 27. 7.

tered, as ill written, if ſome crooked hand, or other miſchance not unuſual, had omitted the firſt ſtroke of the former letter, or added a daſh to the latter, which might cauſe them to ſeem not two different figures, but the one a correction of the other, which how it could be ſuppoſed in ℔ ſtanding for 23, I do not well perceive. As for the arithmetical figures now in uſe, they were long after the time of *Joſephus* brought in by the *Arabians*, and therefore do not appertain to this buſineſs; unleſs we ſhould gueſs that his works were corrupted in that unlearned age, which following the *Saracen* conqueſt, was little occupied in the ſtudies of humanity, but in a ſort wholly given over to the doctrine of *Ariſtotle*. If this will ſerve to make *Beroſus* our friend, ſo let it be; if not, I will not purchaſe the favour of his authority, by forſaking *Jeremiah* and *Daniel*; when they ſeem to be his oppoſites.

SECT. VII.

Of the victories which Nabuchodonoſor *obtained between the deſtruction of* Jeruſalem *and conqueſt of* Egypt.

WITH what actions this time of 70 years was entertained by the *Babylonian* kings, few have written, or little is remaining in record. Which may peradventure have been ſome cauſe that the time it ſelf was, and is yet ſought to be abridged, as not having left ſufficient matter to witneſs the length of it. But by ſuch an argument we might as well deny to many people even their being. For every nation (I know not whom I ſhould except) between the beginning and laſt end of it, hath in ſome ſlothful age rather dream'd away the time, than ſpent it. It is therefore no marvel, if the poſterity of *Nabuchodonoſor*, finding all things ready to their hand, which their hearts could have deſired, betook themſelves to their eaſe and pleaſures, thinking perhaps, like the prodigal ſons of greedy fathers, their own wiſdom greater, which knew how to enjoy, than that of their anceſtors, which wearied away their days in the reſtleſs travel of purchaſing. Tho' indeed the reign of *Nabuchodonoſor* was ſo divided, that his youthful and ſtronger years having been exerciſed in victorious arms, no ſmall part of his life was remaining to be ſpent in eſtabliſhing what was gotten, and gathering the fruit of his worthy labours paſt. The 19th year of his reign it was, when deſtroying utterly the great and mighty city of *Jeruſalem*, he enrich'd himſelf with abundance of ſpoil, and terrified all that would offer to reſiſt him, by that fearful example. From that time forward, until his 23d year, he labour'd in the conqueſt of thoſe adjoining regions, which God had expoſed unto his ſword, and commanded to wear his yoke; namely the *Edomites*, *Moabites*, *Ammonites*, *Tyrians*, *Sidonians*, and *Egyptians*, tho' ſome of theſe were already become his followers, and ſerved under him, when *Jeruſalem* was beaten down and burnt. But the *Tyrians*, whoſe city was founded on an iſland, ſafe enough from any danger of a land army, and whoſe fleet was ſo ſtrong that they needed not to fear any enemy at ſea, were neither daunted with the fall of their neighbour cities, nor with the obſtinate reſolution of this mighty prince, imploying all his power to their ſubverſion.

That the city of *Tyre* was rather well pleaſed than any way diſcouraged with the fall of *Jeruſalem* (which had held the ſame courſe that *Tyrus* did, and endured all that might be in the ſame quarrel againſt the common enemy) it appears by the words which *Ezekiel* condemneth as the common voice of *Tyrus*; [a] *Aha, the gate of the people is broken, it is turned unto me; for ſeeing ſhe is deſolate, I ſhall be repleniſhed.* Yet at length, even in the 19th year of *Nabuchodonoſor*, that great work of his, whereof we have already ſpoken, began to appear above the waters, and threaten them with inevitable miſchief.

But thoſe prophecies of [b] *Jeremiah* and of *Iſaiah*, which appoint unto this deſolation of *Tyre* the ſame term of 70 years, that was preſcribed unto the reign of the *Chaldeans*, do plainly ſhew, that ſhe followed *Jeruſalem*, the ſame 19th year of *Nabuchodonoſor*, in the ſame, or a very like fortune. The particulars, which doubtleſs were memorable in the iſſue of ſo great and laborious a ſiege, are in a manner utterly loſt. Thus much we find, that the citizens perceiving the town unable to hold out, embarked themſelves, and fled into the iſle of *Cyprus*. Nevertheleſs it ſeems that this evaſion ſerved only the principal men, who eſcaping with their goods, abandon'd the poorer ſort unto the enemies fury. For not only ſuch people of *Tyre* as dwelt on the continent (who were called her daughters in the field) were put to the ſword; but the like execution was done in the ſtreets, into which with exceſſive labour the *Aſſyrian* made way for his horſes and chariots. Thus [c] *Nabuchodonoſor cauſed his army to ſerve a great ſervice againſt Tyrus, wherein every head was made bald, and every ſhoulder was made bare, yet had he no wages, nor his army*; but was fain to reſt contented with the honour of having deſtroy'd that city, which in all mens judgments had been held invincible.

The deſtruction of theſe two great and powerful cities, having made the name of the *Chaldeans* dreadful in the ears of all the nations thereabout, *Nabuchodonoſor* uſed the advantage of that reputation which he had obtain'd by victories already gotten, to the getting of more, and more profitable, with leſs pain. The kingdom of *Egypt* was the mark at which he aimed; a country ſo abounding in all riches and pleaſures, that it might well have tempted any prince, finding himſelf ſtrong enough, to ſeek occaſion of quarrel againſt it; and ſo far an enemy to the crown of *Babylon*, that had it been poorer, yet either it muſt have been ſubdu'd, or the conqueſt of *Syria* could ill have been eſtabliſhed. Nevertheleſs it was needful that before he entred into this buſineſs, the countries adjacent ſhould be reduc'd into ſuch terms, that either they ſhould wholly ſtand at his devotion, or at leaſt be unable to work him any diſpleaſure. And herein the decree of God concurr'd, as in all proſperous enterpriſes, with reaſon of ſtate. For the people of *Moab*, *Ammon*, *Edom*, *Damaſcus*, *Kedar*, *Hazor*, and other adjoining regions, whom God for their ſins had condemn'd to fall under the *Babylonian* ſwords, were ſuch, as regarding only their own gain, had ſome of them, like ravens, follow'd the *Chaldean* army, to feed upon the carcaſſes that fell by the cruelty thereof; others taking advantage of their neighbours miſeries, occupied the countries which were by his victories belonging to *Nabuchodonoſor*; all of them thinking, that when the *Aſſyrian* had ſatisfy'd his fury, he ſhould be fain to forſake thoſe deſolate parts, and leave the poſſeſſion to thoſe that could lay hand upon it. Particularly the [d] *Edomites* and *Philiſtines* had ſhewed much malice to the *Jews* when their city was taken. What good ſervice they

[a] Ezek. 26. 2. [b] Jer. 25. Iſa. 23. 15. [c] Ezek. 29. 18. [d] Ezek. 25. 12, 15.

had

had done to the *Chaldeans*, I find not; if they did any, it is likely to have been with reference to their own purposes, wherein they were disappointed. The[a] *Ammonites* were not contented to rejoice at the fall of *Jerusalem*, but presently they entred upon the country of *Gad*, and took possession, as if not the *Assyrians*, but they had subdu'd *Israel*. Neither can I perceive what other ground that practice had, of [b]*Baalis* king of the *Ammonites*, when he sent *Ismael*, a prince of the blood of *Juda*, to murder *Godolia*, whom the king of *Babel* had left governour over those that remain'd in *Israel*, and to carry captive into the *Ammonites* country the people that abode in *Mispah*, than a desire of embroiling *Nabuchodonosor* with so many labours at once, as should make him retire into his own country, and abandon those wasted lands to himself and others, for whom they lay conveniently. Such or the like policy the *Moabites* did exercise; whose pride and wrath were made frustrate by God, and their dissimulation condemn'd, as not doing right.

All these nations had the art of ravening, which is familiar to such as live or border upon deserts; and now the time afforded them occasion to shew the uttermost cunning of their thievish wits. But *Nebuchadnezzar* did cut asunder all their devices by sharp and sudden war, overwhelming them with unexpected ruin, as it were in one night; according to the prophecies of [c]*Isaiah*, *Jeremiah*, and *Ezekiel*, who fore-told with little difference of words, the greatness and swiftness of the misery that should come upon them. With which of them he first began, I find not; it seems that *Moab* was the last which felt his hand: for so do many good authors interpret the prophecy of *Isaiah*, threatning *Moab* with destruction after 3 years, as having reference to the third year following the ruin of *Jerusalem*; the next year after it being spent in the *Egyptian* expedition. This is manifest, that all the principal towns in these regions were burnt, and the people slain, or made slaves, few excepted, who being preserv'd by flight, had not the courage to return to their habitations over-hastily, much less to attempt any thing against *Nabuchodonosor*, but liv'd as miserable out-laws, or at least oppressed wretches, until the end of the 70 years, which God had prescrib'd unto the desolation of their countries, as well as of the land of *Juda*.

SECT. VIII.

That Egypt *was conquer'd, and the king therein reigning slain by* Nabuchodonosor, *contrary to the opinion of most authors: who following* Herodotus *and* Diodorus, *relate it otherwise.*

WHEN by a long course of victory *Nabuchodonosor* had brought into subjection all the nations of *Syria*, and the bordering *Arabians*, in such wise that no enemy to himself, nor friend of the *Egyptians*, was left at his back, that might give impediment unto his proceeding, or take advantage of any misfortune; then did he forthwith take in hand the conquest of *Egypt* himself, upon which those other nations had formerly been depending. Of this expedition, and the victorious issue thereof, the three great prophets *Isaiah*, *Jeremiah*, and *Ezekiel*, have written so plainly, that I hold it altogether needless to look after more authority, or to cite for proof half of that which may be alledg'd out of these. Nevertheless we find many and good authors, who, following *Herodotus* and *Diodorus Siculus*, are well contented to strain these prophecies with unreasonable diligence unto such a sense, as gives to *Nabuchodonosor* little more than the honour of having done some spoil in *Egypt*, omitting the conquest of that land by the *Babylonian*, and referring the death of *Apries* or *Hophra* to a chance long after following, which had no coherence with these times or affairs. So preposterous is the delight which many men take in the means and second helps conducing to their purpose, that oftentimes they prefer the commentator before the author; and to uphold a sentence giving testimony to one clause, do carelesly overthrow the history it self, which thereby they sought to have maintain'd. The reports of *Herodotus* and *Diodorus*, concerning the kings of *Egypt*, which reign'd about these times, are already rehearsed in the former book: but that which they have spoken of *Apries*, was purposely reserv'd unto this place. [d]*Herodotus* affirms, that he was a very fortunate king, but wherein he telleth not (unless we should understand that he was victorious in the war which he is said to have made upon *Tyrus* and *Sidon*) that he reign'd 25 years, and was finally taken and put to death by his own subjects; who did set up *Amasis* as king, which prevail'd against him. The rebellion of the *Egyptians* he imputeth to a great loss which they receiv'd in an expedition against the *Cyrenians*, by whom almost their whole army was destroy'd. This calamity the people of *Egypt* thought to be well pleasing to their king, who had sent them on this dangerous expedition, with a purpose to have them consum'd, that so he might with greater security reign over such as stay'd at home. So they who escap'd, and the friends of such as were slain, rebell'd against *Apries*, who sent *Amasis* to appease the tumult; but *Amasis* became captain of the rebels, and was by them chosen king. Finally, the whole land consented unto this new election; whereby *Apries* was driven to trust unto his foreign mercenaries, the *Ionians* and *Carians*, of whom he kept in readiness 30000 good soldiers that fought valiantly for him, but were at length vanquish'd by the great numbers of the *Egyptian* forces, amounting unto 250000, which were all by birth and education men of war. *Apries* himself being taken prisoner, was gently intreated by *Amasis* for a while, until the *Egyptians* exclaiming upon him as an extream enemy to the land, got him deliver'd into their hands, and strangled him, yet they gave him honourable burial. Such is the report of *Herodotus*, with whom [e]*Diodorus Siculus* nearly agrees, telling us that *Apries* did vanquish the *Cyprians* and *Phenicians* in battel at sea, took by force and demolish'd *Sidon*, won the other towns of *Phenicia*, and the isle of *Cyprus*, and finally perished, as is before rehearsed, when he had reign'd 22 years. This authority were enough (yet not more than enough) to inform us of *Apries*'s history, if greater authority did not contradict it. But the destruction of *Egypt* by the *Babylonian*, fore-told by the prophets, which hath no coherence with these relations, hath greater force to compel our belief, than hath the traditions of *Egyptian* priests (which the *Greek* historians followed) and greater probabilities to perswade those that look only into human reasons. For [f]*Isaiah* propheſy'd long before of the shameful captivity of the *Egyptians*, whom the king of *Assur* should carry away naked, young and old, in such wise that the *Jews*, who fled unto them for deliverance from the *Assyrian*, should be

[a] Ezek. 25. 3. Jer. 49. 1. [b] Jer. 40. 14. & 41. 2, 10. [c] Isa. 16. 14. Jer. 28. 27, &c. [d] Herod. l. 2. & l. 4. [e] Diod. Sic. l. 1. c. 2. [f] Isa. 20. 4, 5, 6.

ashamed

aſhamed of their own vain confidence in men ſo unable to defend themſelves.

But *Ezekiel* and *Jeremiah*, as their prophecies were nearer to the time of execution, ſo they handled this argument more preciſely. For *Ezekiel* telleth plainly, that *Egypt* ſhould be given to *Nebuchadnezzar*, as wages for the ſervice which he had done at *Tyre*: alſo he recounteth particularly all the chief cities in *Egypt*, ſaying, that theſe by name ſhould be deſtroy'd and go into captivity; yea, that [a] *Pharaoh and all his army ſhould be ſlain by the ſword.* Wherefore it muſt needs be a violent expoſition of theſe prophecies, which by applying the iſſue of ſuch threatnings to an inſurrection and rebellion, concludes all, without any other alteration in *Egypt*, than change of the king's perſon, wherein *Amaſis* did ſucceed unto *Apries*, by force indeed, but by the uniform conſent of all the people. Certainly, if that notable place of *Jeremiah*, wherein he foretelleth how the [b] *Jews* in *Egypt* ſhould ſee *Pharaoh Hophra* delivered into the hands of his enemies, as *Zedekia* had been, were to be referred unto the time of that rebellion whereof *Herodotus* hath ſpoken, as the general opinion hath over-ruled it, then was it vainly done of the ſame prophet (which God forbid that any Chriſtian ſhould think, ſeeing he did it by the appointment of God himſelf) to hide in the clay of a brick-kiln, thoſe very ſtones, upon which the throne of *Nabuchodonoſor* ſhould be ſet, and his pavilion ſpread. Yea, then was that prophecy no other than falſe, which expreſs'd the end of *Pharaoh* thus: [c] *Behold, I will viſit the common people of No, and Pharaoh and Egypt, with their gods and their kings, even Pharaoh, and all that truſt in him: and I will deliver them into the hands of thoſe that ſeek their lives, and into the hand of Nebuchadnezzar king of Babel, and into the hands of his ſervants.* The clearneſs of this prophecy being ſuch as could not but refute that interpretation of many other places, which referred all to the rebellion of *Amaſis*, it cauſed me to wonder what thoſe commentators would ſay to it, who are elſewhere ſo diligent in fitting all to the *Greek* hiſtorians. Wherefore looking upon *Junius*, who had in another place taken the enemies of *Pharaoh Hophra* to be *Amaſis*, and his followers, I found him here acknowledging that the *Egyptian* prieſts had notably deluded [d] *Herodotus* with lies, coin'd upon a vain-glorious purpoſe of hiding their own diſgrace and bondage. And ſurely it may well be thought, that the hiſtory of *Nebuchadnezzar* was better known to the *Jews* whom it concern'd, than to the *Greeks* that ſcarcely at any time heard of his name. Therefore I ſee no cauſe why we ſhould not rather believe *Joſephus*, reporting that *Nabuchodonoſor* in the 23d year of his reign, and the 5th year of the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*, did conquer *Egypt*, kill the king thereof, and appoint another in his ſtead, than *Herodotus* or *Diodore*; who being meer ſtrangers to this buſineſs, had no greater reaſon to labour in ſearching out the truth, but might reſt contented with any thing that the prieſts would tell them. Now, if ſetting aſide all advantage of authority, we ſhould only conſider the relations of [e] *Joſephus*, and of the *Greek* hiſtorians, as either of them might be verified of it ſelf by apparent circumſtances, without reflecting upon the *Hebrew* prophets or *Egyptian* prieſts; methinks the death of *Apries* can no way be approved, as having been wrought by conſent of the people, but affords great matter of ſuſpicion; yea, tho' no man had oppoſed the reports of *Herodotus* and *Diodore*. For the great love and honour which the *Egyptians* did bear unto their kings, is notorious by the uniform teſtimony of all others that have handled the matters of that country, as well as by the report of *Diodore* himſelf. How then can we think it probable, that *Apries* having won great victories, did for one only loſs fall into the hatred of all his people, or which may ſerve to perſuade us, that a king of *Egypt* would ſeek, or ſo demeam himſelf, that he might be thought to ſeek the deſtruction of his natural ſubjects? As for that army of 30000 ſoldiers *Carians* and *Ionians*, which the king of *Egypt*, whom *Amaſis* took priſoner, is ſaid to have kept for his defence: doth it not argue that he was a foreigner, and one that armed himſelf againſt the *Egyptian*, wiſhing them few and weak; rather than any of the *Pharaohs*, who accounted the force of the country, as aſſuredly their own, as the ſtrength of their own bodies? It were more tedious than any way needful, to uſe all arguments that might be alledged in this caſe. The very death of this ſuppoſed *Apries*, which the clamours of the people obtained of *Amaſis*, who fought to have kept him alive, doth intimate that he was ſome foreign governour, not a natural prince; otherwiſe the people would have deſired to ſave his life, and *Amaſis* to take it quickly from him. I will not labour any further to diſprove that opinion, whereunto I ſhould not have yielded, tho' it ſtood upon great appearance of truth, conſidering that the voice of truth it ſelf cries out againſt it; but leave the circumſtances proving the conqueſt of *Egypt* by *Nabuchodonoſor* to be obſerv'd, where due occaſion in courſe of the ſtory following ſhall preſent them.

SECT. IX.

How Egypt *was ſubdued and held by* Nebuchadnezzar.

IT is a great loſs, that the general hiſtory of the world hath ſuffer'd, by the ſpoil and waſte which time hath made of thoſe monuments, that ſhould have preſerved the memory of ſuch famous actions as were accompliſhed by this mighty prince *Nabuchodonoſor*; wherein, whether his virtue or fortune were greater, it is now uncertain. That his victories following the conqueſt of *Syria*, and the neighbour provinces, were ſuch as did more enlarge his dominion, than all the former wars had done, it may eaſily be gathered out of *Ezekiel*: who reckons up in his 30th chapter (beſides the whole country of *Egypt*) *Phut* and *Lud*, with other nations that may ſeem to have reach'd out into *Mauritania*, as people ſubdu'd by this great *Babylonian*. The circumſtances of theſe wars are in a manner utterly loſt; but that the victory was eaſy and ſwift, any man ſhall find, who will take the pains to confer the places, wherein the three great prophets touch this argument. Thus much I think worthy of more particular obſervation; that *Pharaoh*, who (as is already noted in the former book) thought himſelf moſt ſafe in *Egypt* by the well defenced ſituation of his country, did very unwiſely in ſuffering his enemies to ſweep the way clean unto his own doors, by conſuming all his friends and adherents in *Syria*. For as the labour of this buſineſs did more harden than weary the *Chaldean* army, ſo the confidence and vain ſecurity of the *Egyptians*, relying upon the difficult paſſages which the

[a] Ezek. 29. 20. Ezek. 30. Ezek. 32. 31. [b] Jer. 44. 30. Jer. 43. 10. [c] Jer. 46. 25, 26. [d] Jun. in Jer. 44. 30. [e] Joſep. de Antiq. Jud. l. 10. c. 11.

enemy

enemy was to make through the *Arabian* deſarts, and the much advantage which the great river of *Nilus* would afford unto themſelves, did little avail them in proviſion for the war, and much aſtoniſh them (as may juſtly be thought) in the time of execution: it being uſually ſeen, that the hearts of men fail when thoſe helps fail, in which they had repoſed more confidence than in their own virtue. Hitherto the kingdom of *Egypt* had flouriſhed under the rule of the *Pharaohs*, about a thouſand and five hundred and fourſcore years; but from this time forward it remained forty years without a king, under the ſubjection of the *Babylonians*; and then at length it began to recover by little and little the former greatneſs, yet ſo, that it was never dreadful unto others, God having ſaid of that people, [a] *I will diminiſh them that they ſhall no more rule the nations.* For whereas it hath been ſaid of *Pharaoh*: [b] *I am the ſon of the wiſe, I am the ſon of the ancient kings*; and whereas he had vaunted, [c] *The river is mine, and I have made it*; the princes of *Egypt* now became fools, the river failed them, the king himſelf was taken and ſlain, and that ancient lineage quite extinguiſhed. This came to paſs in the firſt year after the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*, and the 23d of *Nebuchadnezzar*, at which time (ſaith [d] *Joſephus*) *He ſlew the king then reigning, placed another in his room, and carried captives thence to Babylon, the Jews whom he found in that country.* Now concerning the time which *Joſephus* gives unto this buſineſs, and the buſineſs it ſelf, I have already ſhewn that it is warranted by all the prophecies which inſinuate the ſame. As likewiſe the laſt deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*, and carrying away thoſe unto *Babel*, who inhabited the miſerable ruin of that great city; which was in the ſame [e] *three and twentieth of Nebuchadnezzar*, is not improbably thought by good authors to have been at the *return* from this *Egyptian* expedition. But whereas *Joſephus* tells us that there was another king put in the room of *Apries* by *Nebuchadnezzar*, we muſt underſtand, that he was only a viceroy, and not (as ſome have miſtaken it) think that this was *Amaſis*. For to place the beginning of *Amaſis*'s reign in the 23d of *Nebuchadnezzar*, were as well repugnant unto the prophecies before alledged, as to all chronology and hiſtory. Some there are, which to help this inconvenience imagine that there were two ſucceſſively bearing the name of *Amaſis*; others that there were two *Apries*, the one ſlain by *Nebuchadnezzar*, the other by *Amaſis:* a queſtion of ſmall importance, becauſe the difference is only about a name, it being once granted that the perſon mention'd in ſcriptures, was deprived of life and kingdom by the *Aſſyrians*. Yet for any thing that I can perceive, that *Apries*, of whom the *Greek* hiſtorians wrote, could not be the deputy of *Nebuchadnezzar*, ſeeing that he was the grandchild of *Pharaoh Neco*, and made war (as they report) upon the *Phenicians*, who were, before the *Egyptians*, become ſubject unto the crown of *Babylon*. I might add perhaps, that he whom *Nebuchadnezzar* left as governour of *Egypt*, was more likely to have had ſome *Chaldean* or *Aſſyrian* than *Egyptian* name; unleſs we ſhould think that he had been a traitor to his natural prince, and ſo rewarded by the conqueror with lieutenantſhip of the country: about which it were but frivolous to diſpute. Thus much in brief we ought to believe, that *Nabuchodonoſor* made an abſolute conqueſt of *Egypt*; that he was not ſo fooliſh as to give it away, any man may gueſs; that he appointed one to rule the country, it is conſequent unto the former, and hath authority of *Joſephus*; that this governour (or ſome ſucceſſor of his) was afterwards taken and ſlain by *Amaſis*, I ſee probability enough to perſuade my ſelf; and yet can well be content, that others uſe their liberty, and believe what they liſt. As for the army which the *Egyptian* king *Apries* is ſuppoſed to have kept of *Ionians* and *Carians*; I hold them to be none other than the garriſons of mercenary ſoldiers which were left by the *Aſſyrian* for the guard of his viceroy, and cuſtody of the new ſubdued province: as likewiſe the company returning from *Cyrene* and *Barce*, who together with the friends of ſuch as were ſlain in that expedition, remembred before out of the *Greek* hiſtorians, depoſed and ſlew *Apries*, I take them to have been the *Egyptian* fugitives which then recovered their own country. Sure it is that this prophecy of *Ezekiel* was verified, [f] *At the end of forty years will I gather the Egyptians from the people where they were ſcattered, and I will bring again the captivity of Egypt, and will cauſe them to return into the land of Pathros into the land of their habitation, and they ſhall be there a ſmall kingdom.* If the *Egyptian* prieſts alluded hereunto in the tale which they made of *Amaſis*'s obtaining the kingdom, then are they to be help'd with this or the like interpretation; if they deviſed matter that had no ſhadow of truth, only to keep the *Greeks* from knowledge of their country's diſgrace; then are they little to be regarded, ſince we know the truth with them.

SECT. X.

Of the ſundry accounts drawn from ſundry acts of Nebuchadnezzar, *and of the deſtruction of* Nineveh *by him; the time of which action is uncertain.*

THESE victories brought the greatneſs of the *Aſſyrian* empire to the full, and from them was reckoned the time of *Nebuchadnezzar*'s reign in ſundry places of ſcripture. To ſpeak any more of the queſtions ariſing about the ſupputation of *Nebuchadnezzar*'s times, might ſeem to be the overhandling of one argument: yet thus much I will note; that whereas [g] *Daniel* was carried captive in the 3d year of *Jehoiakim*'s reign (which ran along with ſome part of *Nebuchadnezzar*'s firſt year) and was kept in diet 3 years more, before he was brought into the king's preſence; it could not be the 2d of *Nebuchadnezzar*'s kingdom, wherein he interpreted the forgotten dream of the great image, foreſhewing the ſucceſs of monarchies, but the 2d of his empire. The ſame or the like may be ſaid of divers places which refer ſundry matters unto their ſet years; as that of *Ezekiel* before cited, where he foretells that *Egypt* ſhould be given in reward for the ſervice done before *Tyrus*, dating his prophecy in the 27th year; and that of *Daniel*, placing the erection of the golden image in the 18th year: for theſe years held no dependance upon either the beginning of *Nebuchadnezzar*'s kingdom, or of his empire, nor yet upon any of the captivities, but had reference to ſome memorable actions omitted in ſcripture, and therefore not eaſy to be found, nor worth the labour of uncertain ſearch.

Of any war made by *Nebuchadnezzar* after ſuch time as he returned from the conqueſt of *Egypt*, I do not read: excepting that againſt *Nineveh*, the deſtruction whereof was fore-told by the prophet *Nahum*. *Nineveh* had long before been taken by *Merodach* (as in due place hath been ſhewed) and together with the reſt of *Aſſyria* made

[a] Ezek. 29. 13, 14, 15. [b] Iſa. 19. 11. [c] Ezek. 29. 9. [d] Joſ. Ant. Jud. l. 10. c. 11. [e] Jer. 52. 30. [f] Ezek. 30. 13, 14. [g] Dan. 1. 2.

ſubject to *Babylon*. Yet was it left under a peculiar king, who rebelling againſt the *Chaldean*, as *Jehoiakim* and *Zedekias*, tributary kings of *Juda*, had done, taſted likewiſe of the ſame fortune. That the deſtruction of *Nineveh* followed the conqueſt of *Egypt*, it appeareth by the compariſon which [a]*Nahum* the prophet made between this city that was to fall, and the city of *No* in *Egypt* that was fallen already. But how long after this came to paſs, it is (methinks) impoſſible to find out. For whereas it is found in an *Hebrew* chronology, that it was in the firſt of *Nebuchadnezzar*'s reign; the place of *Nahum* laſt cited is enough to diſprove it. Whereas it is referred by ſome unto the firſt of his monarchy, which began at the end of the *Egyptian* wars; the whole prophecy of *Nahum*, which went between the one and the other, argueth ſtrongly, that there was a longer ſpace of time intercurrent. So that to enquire into the very year of this deſtruction, or other circumſtances of the war, whether managed by *Nabuchodonoſor* in perſon, or by his lieutenants, were ſomewhat like unto the vain curioſity of *Tiberius Ceſar*, enquiring who was the mother of *Hecuba*; or to the like idle pains which he ſhould take, who would ſeek to learn what woman that *Huzzab* queen of *Nineveh* was, whoſe woful captivity the ſame prophet *Nahum* likewiſe did foretell.

SECT. XI.

Of the latter time of Nebuchadnezzar; *his buildings, madneſs, and death.*

OF the time which this great monarch ſpent in quiet, I think there are no monuments extant; ſave thoſe which we find among the prophecies of *Daniel*. Among theſe we may reckon his great works at *Babylon*, wherewith he pleaſed himſelf ſo well, that he broke out into theſe glorious words: [b] *Is not this great Babel that I have built for the houſe of the kingdom, by the might of my power, and for the honour of my majeſty?* Surely if thoſe things be true that are by *Joſephus* rehearſed of him out of *Beroſus* and *Megaſthenes*, he might well delight himſelf with the contemplation of ſuch goodly and magnificent buildings. For it is ſaid, that he fortified *Babylon* with a triple wall; that beſides other ſtately works, he raiſed thoſe huge arches wherewith were borne up the high orchards, hanging as it were in the air, and equalling the tops of mountains, which moſt ſumptuous frame, that outlaſted all the remainder of the *Aſſyrian*, and all the *Perſian* empire, is ſaid to have been reared, and finiſhed in 15 days.

But of all this, and other his magnificence, we find little elſe recorded, than that (which indeed is moſt profitable for us to conſider) his over-valuing of his own greatneſs abaſed him unto a condition, inferiour to the pooreſt of men. And not undeſervedly fell theſe judgments of God upon him. For whereas God had honoured him, not only with many victories, and much happineſs in his own life, but with a diſcovery of things to come after him, yea, and had approved the certainty of his dream, by the miraculous reducing of it into his memory, and interpretation thereof by *Daniel* the prophet: he nevertheleſs became ſo forgetful of God, whoſe wonderful power he had ſeen and acknowledged, that he cauſed a golden image to be ſet up and worſhipped: ordaining a cruel death as reward unto them that ſhould dare to diſobey his kingly will and pleaſure, which was utterly repugnant to the law of him that is *the King of kings*. Hereof St. *Jerome* hath well noted; *Velox oblivio veritatis, ut qui dudum ſervum Dei quaſi Deum adoraverat, nunc ſtatuam ſibi fieri jubeat, ut ipſe quaſi Deus in ſtatua adoraretur:* A haſty forgetfulneſs of the truth, that he who ſo lately had worſhipped (*Daniel*) the ſervant of God, as if he had been God himſelf, ſhould now command a ſtatua to be erected unto himſelf, wherein himſelf might be worſhipped as God. From this impiety it pleaſed God to reclaim him, by the ſtrange and wonderful delivery of thoſe bleſſed ſaints out of the fiery furnace; who being thrown into it bound, for refuſing to commit idolatry, were aſſiſted by an angel; preſerved from all harm of the fire; looſened from their bands; and finally called out with gracious words, and reſtored to their former honour, by the king: who, amazed at the miracle, made a decree tending to the honour of God, which by erection of his image he had violated. Yet this devotion of *Nebuchadnezzar* was not ſo rooted in him, that it could bring forth fruit anſwerable to his haſty zeal. Therefore was he forewarned by God in a dream of the terrible judgment hanging over his head, which *Daniel* expounding, adviſed him to *break off his ſin by righteouſneſs, and his iniquity by mercy towards the poor, that there might be an healing of his error.* Hereby it ſeems injuſtice and cruelty were the faults, for which he was threatened, but this threatning ſufficed not unto his reformation. For that ſo great a monarch ſhould be driven from among men (according to the tenor of the dream and interpretation) yea compelled to dwell with the beaſts of the field, and made to eat graſs as the oxen, was a thing ſo incredible in man's judgment, that eaſily it might be thought an idle dream, and much more eaſily be forgotten at the year's end. One whole year's leiſure to repent was given to this haughty prince: which reſpite of the execution may ſeem to have bred in him a forgetfulneſs of God's ſentence. For at the end of 12 months; walking in the royal palace of *Babel*, he was ſo overjoy'd and tranſported with a vain contemplation of his own ſeeming happineſs, that without all fear of God's heavy judgment pronounced againſt him, he uttered thoſe lofty words before rehearſed, in vaunting of the majeſtical works which he had reared, as well beſeeming his majeſtical perſon. But his high ſpeeches were not fully ended, when a voice from heaven, telling him that his kingdom was departed from him, rehearſed over unto him the ſentence again, which was fulfilled upon him the very ſame hour.

That *Solomon* and many other princes and great ones, have taken delight in their own buildings, it cannot any way be doubted; yet I do not remember that ever I have read of any, that were puniſhed for rejoicing in works of this kind (tho' it is hard in joy, or any paſſion of the mind, to keep a juſt meaſure) excepting only this *Nebuchadnezzar*.

The like may be ſaid of *David:* for other (and ſome very godly) kings have muſtered all their forces to the very laſt man; but few or none have been known to have been puniſhed as *David* was. Surely I not only hold it lawful to rejoice in thoſe good things, wherewith God hath bleſſed us; but a note of much unthankfulneſs to entertain them with a ſullen and unfeeling diſpoſition. Yet as all human affections, wherein due reference to God is wanting, are no better than obſcure clouds, hindring the influence of that bleſſed light, which

[a] Nahum 3. 8. [b] Dan. 4. 27.

clarifies

clarifies the ſoul of man, and prediſpoſeth it unto the brightneſs of eternal felicity; ſo that inſolent joy, which man in the pride of his vain imagination conceiveth of his own wrath, doth above all other paſſions blaſt our minds, as it were with lightning, and make us to reflect our thoughts upon our ſeeming inherent greatneſs, forgetting the whilſt him, to whom we are indebted for our very being. Wherefore theſe *malamentis gaudia*; *the evil joys of the mind*, were not unaptly, by the prince of *Latin* poets, beſtowed in the entrance of *hell*, and placed further inward than ſorrows, cares, and fears; not far from the iron cabbins of the *furies*. And certainly it is no unlikely token of vengeance near at hand, when theſe unreaſonable fluſhes of proud and vain joy, do rage in a mind, that ſhould have been humbled with a juſt repentance and acknowledgment of ill deſerving.

This was verified upon *Nebuchadnezzar*, whoſe puniſhment was ſingular and unexampled. For he ran among beaſts in the fields and woods, where for ſeven years he lived, not only as a ſavage man, but as a ſavage beaſt, for a beaſt he thought himſelf *ſecundum ſuam imaginationem*, as [a] *Thomas* noteth, and therefore fed himſelf in the ſame manner, and with the ſame food that beaſts do; not that he was changed in figure external according to [b] *Mediana*, in ſo much as he appeared a beaſt to other men's eyes, as St. *Jerome* in the life of *Hilarius* (how true God knows) ſpeaks of a woman that appeared to all other men's ſight a cow, but to *Hilarius* only a woman; neither was he changed as *Iphigenia* the daughter of *Agamemnon* was ſaid to be, into a hind, nor made a monſter as [c] *Dorotheus* and *Epiphanius* dreamed: but according to St. *Jerome*'s expoſition of theſe words. *At the ſame time was my underſtanding reſtored unto me, &c. Quando dicit* (ſaith St. *Jerome*) *ſenſum ſibi redditum, oſtendit non formam ſe amiſiſſe ſed mentem*; when he ſaith that his ſenſe was reſtored unto him, he ſheweth that he had not loſt his human ſhape, but his underſtanding. Seven years expired, it pleaſed God to reſtore *Nebuchadnezzar*, both to his underſtanding, and to his eſtate, for which he acknowledged and praiſed God all the reſt of his life, [d] confeſſing his power and everlaſting being; that he was the Lord of heaven and earth, and wrought without reſiſtance what he pleaſed in both; that his works were all truth, and his ways righteous. Which gave argument to many of the fathers, and others, not to doubt of his ſalvation; namely St. *Auguſtine*, *Theodoret*, *Lyra*, *Carthuſianus*, and others. And for that place of *Eſay* the fourteenth, out of which his perdition may be gathered, the aforenamed authors apply the ſame to *Balthaſar*, becauſe *Eſay* both in the thirteenth and fourteenth chapter ſpeaketh of the king, and the deſtruction of *Babylon* jointly.

SECT. XII.

Of EVILMERODACH.

HAving already ſpoken what I could of the ſucceſſion and years of *Nebuchadnezzar*'s poſterity; the moſt that may be ſaid of him, is ſaid of *Evilmerodach*, which I will not here again rehearſe.

He loſt ſome part of that which his father had gotten; and left his kingdom burning in a war that conſumed it to aſhes. He loſt *Egypt* by rebellion of the people, in the nineteenth year of his reign, which was forty years after his father had conquered it. But this agrees neither with the account of *Herodotus*, who allows to *Amaſis* four and forty years of reign; nor with that of *Diodorus*, who gives him five and fifty, ſaying that he died in the third year of the threeſcore and third *Olympiad*, when *Cambyſes* did conquer *Egypt*. There were indeed but ſeven and thirty years, which paſſed between the ſecond year of the four and fiftieth *Olympiad* (which was the nineteenth of *Evilmerodach*, and the firſt of *Amaſis*) and the fifth of *Cambyſes*'s reign wherein he won *Egypt*; of which ſeven and thirty years it is credibly held that *Pſammenitus*, the ſon of *Amaſis*, reigned three: ſo that *Amaſis* could be no longer king than four and thirty years. But ſeeing that theſe two *Greek* hiſtorians have been abuſed by *Egyptian* prieſts, in the ſubſtance of that which was ſpoken of *Amaſis*, it is no marvel though they were alſo deceived in the length of his reign. This is the plain anſwer to this objection. For to ſay either that the numbers were miſwritten, and four and forty ſet down inſtead of four and thirty, or that *Amaſis* did temporiſe a while with the *Aſſyrians*, and not bear himſelf as abſolute king of *Egypt*, until the nineteenth of *Evilmerodach* (at which time, and not before, it hath been proved out of *Ezekiel*, that *Egypt* became again a kingdom) I hold it a ſuperfluous excuſe.

Whether theſe *Egyptian* troubles did animate the king of the *Medes* to deal with *Evilmerodach*, as with a prince greater in fame, and reputation, gotten by the decayed valour of his people, than in preſent forces; or rather (as I think) ſome foil received by the *Aſſyrian* invading *Media*, emboldened the *Egyptians* to rebel againſt him: I will neither undertake, nor ſeek to define. [e] *Xenophon* tells, that the firſt ſervice of young *Cyrus* in war was under *Aſtyages* king of the *Medes*, his grandfather, in a proſperous fight againſt the *Aſſyrian* prince, who did ſet upon him; at which time *Cyrus* was fifteen or ſixteen years old. If therefore *Cyrus* lived threeſcore and three years (as he is ſaid to have died well ſtricken in years) which is held to be the ordinary term of no ſhort life, then was this encounter in the third year of *Evilmerodach*'s reign. Yet by the ſame reckoning it ſhould follow, that the war began more early between theſe nations, for as much as the manner of their fight in former times, with other circumſtances inſinuating as much, are found in the ſame place of [f] *Xenophon*. And it may well be, that the death or deſtruction of *Nabuchodonoſor* gave courage unto thoſe that had felt him a troubleſome neighbour, to ſtand upon prouder terms with the *Aſſyrians*, than in his flouriſhing eſtate they durſt have uſed. Howſoever the quarrel began, we find that it ended not before the laſt ruin of the *Aſſyrian* monarchy. For the *Babylonian*, being too proud to digeſt the loſſes which he received by the *Medes* and their allies the *Perſians*, drew unto his party the *Lydians*, and all the people of the leſſer *Aſia*, with gifts and ſtrong perſuaſions, hoping ſo to overwhelm his enemies with a ſtrong invaſion, whom in vain he had fought to weary out with a lingring war.

This happen'd after the death of *Aſtyages*, who left the world in the nineteenth year of *Evilmerodach*, at which time *Amaſis* took poſſeſſion of *Egypt*. So that the *Aſſyrian* having his hands already full of buſineſs, which more earneſtly did affect him, ſeems thereby to have given the better means unto the *Egyptians*, of new erecting their kingdom, which by long diſtance of place did ſundry times find occaſion to rebel in after-ages, and ſet up a king within it ſelf, againſt the far more mighty *Perſian*.

[a] L. 2. de Reg. pri. [b] Med. l. 2. de recta in Deum fide, cap. 7. [c] Dor. in Synopſi. Ep. in vit. Dan. [d] Dan. 4. 32, 34. [e] Xenoph. Cyropæd. l. 1. [f] Xenoph. Cyropæd. l. 8.

The

The iſſue of theſe great preparations made by *Evilmerodach* againſt the *Medes*, was ſuch as opened the way unto the fulfilling of thoſe prophecies, which were many years before uttered againſt *Babel*, by *Eſay* and *Jeremy*.

For the *Aſſyrians*, and their confederates, who, truſting in their numbers, thought to have buried the *Medes* and *Perſians*, under their thick ſhowers of arrows and darts, were encountered with an army of ſtout and well-trained men, weightily armed for cloſe fight, by whom they were beaten in open battle, wherein *Evilmerodach* was ſlain. So that great frame of empire which *Nabuchodonoſor* had raiſed and upheld, being ſhaken and grievouſly crack'd under his unfortunate ſon, was left to be ſuſtained by his unworthy nephew: a man more likely to have overthrown it, when it was greateſt and ſtrongeſt, than to repair it, when it was in way of falling.

SECT. XIII.

A private conjecture of the author; ſerving to make good thoſe things, which are cited out of Beroſus, *concerning the ſucceſſors of* Evilmerodach, *without wrong to the truth, the quality, and death of* Balthaſar.

THough I have already (as it ſeems to me) ſufficiently proved that *Balthaſar* was the ſon and immediate ſucceſſor to *Evilmerodach*, yet conſidering earneſtly the conjectures of thoſe writers, which following *Beroſus*, inſert *Nigliſar* or *Nirigliſſoroor*, and his ſon *Labaſſardach* between them: as alſo that which I find in *Herodotus* of *Nitocris* a famous queen of *Babylon*, who greatly adorned and fortified that city; I have thought it not ſuperfluous here in this place to ſhew, by what means it was poſſible that ſome error might have crept into the hiſtory of thoſe times, and thereby have brought us to a needleſs trouble of ſearching out the truth, as it were by candle-light, in the uncertain fragments of loſt authors, which we might have found by day-light, had we adher'd only to the ſcriptures. Firſt therefore I obſerve, that the time which *Beroſus* divides betwixt *Evilmerodach*, and the two next kings, agrees with the years in which *Nebuchadnezzar* lived wild among brute beaſts in the open field. Secondly, that the ſuddenneſs of this accident, which came in one hour, could not but work much perturbation in that ſtate, wherein doubtleſs the honour of ſo noble a prince was highly regarded, his calamity pity'd, and his reſtitution hop'd; the prediction of *Daniel* finding reputation in that clauſe which promiſed his recovery, as being verified in that which had been more incredible. Now if we do in common reaſon judge, what courſe was like to be taken by the great ones of the kingdom, for ſettling the government, whilſt the king was thus diſtracted, we ſhall find it moſt likely, that his ſon and heir did occupy the royal throne, with condition to reſtore it unto his father, when God ſhould enable him to repoſſeſs it. In this his rule *Evilmerodach* being to ſupply the utter want of underſtanding in his father, as [a]*protectors* do the unripeneſs of it in young, but reaſonable kings, might eaſily either commit the inſolencies, or fall into the troubles, incident to ſuch an office. That he had in him very ſmall ability of government, it appears by his ill maintaining the empire, when he held it in his own right. That his ſiſter *Nitocris* (if *Nitocris* were his ſiſter) was a woman of an high ſpirit, it appears by that which *Herodotus* reports of her, ſaying that ſhe was more cunning than *Semiramis*, as appear'd in her magnificent and uſeful works about the river of *Euphrates*, and her fortification of *Babylon* againſt the *Medes*, who had gotten many towns from the *Aſſyrians*, and amongſt them *Nineveh*. Wherefore it were not unreaſonable to think, that ſuch a woman, ſeeing how the empire went to decay through her brother's miſgovernment, uſed practices to get the rule into her own hands, and afterwards, as a mother, to leave it unto her ungracious ſon. Other time than this, wherein *Nitocris* could have reigned, we do not find; but we find in *Beroſus* (as *Joſephus* hath cited him) that *Nigliſar*, who got the kingdom from *Evilmerodach*, was his ſiſter's husband; which argues this to have been the ſame woman. As for *Labaſſardach* the ſon of *Nigliſar*, if at the end of nine months reign he were for his lewd conditions ſlain by the nobility, as the ſame *Beroſus* reporteth, it ſeems that God prepared here by the way for *Nebuchadnezzar*'s reſtitution (whoſe term of puniſhment was then expired) by raiſing ſuch troubles as ſhould make him the more deſired, both of the princes and the people. I will not here uſe many words to confute that which *Beroſus* hath further ſet down of *Evilmerodach*, telling us that he was ſlain by his ſiſter's husband: for the plain words of ſcripture naming the year wherein he gave liberty to *Jechonia*, do plainly teſtify that he out-lived the three or four and fortieth year of his father's reign, which was the laſt of his life.

This may ſuffice to ſhew, that they who are ſaid to have ſucceeded *Evilmerodach* in the kingdom, might indeed have ſo done, though not when he held it in his own right. Of *Balthaſar*, who was his ſon and heir, we find, that he had ſuch conditions, as God permitted to be in a king for the ruin of the people. He was from his young years of a miſchievous nature; having in his father's time ſlain a noble young man that ſhould have married his ſiſter, only for ſpight and envy to ſee him kill two wild beaſts in hunting, at which himſelf having thrown his javelin had miſſed them. Another great lord he had gilded, becauſe a gentlewoman commending his beauty, ſaid it were a happy woman that ſhould be his wife. Such barbarous villanies cauſed many which had loved his father (as a good and gracious, though unfortunate prince) to revolt from him unto the enemy as ſoon as he was king. Neither do I find that he perform'd any thing worthy of record, but as a coward and a fool he loſt all; ſitting ſtill, and not once daring to give battle to them that daily took ſomewhat from him; yet careleſly feaſting when danger had hemm'd him in on every ſide, and when death arreſted him by the hands of thoſe whom he had wronged in his father's life. So the end of him was baſe and miſerable; for he died as a fool taken in unexcuſable ſecurity, yet had not that happineſs (ſuch as it is) of a death free from apprehenſion of fear, but was terrified with a dreadful viſion, which had ſhewed his ruin not many hours before, even whilſt he was drinking in that wine, which the ſwords of his inſulting enemies drew out of him, together with his lateſt blood. It is therefore in this place enough to ſay of him, That after a diſhonourable reign of ſeventeen years, he periſhed like a beaſt, and was ſlain as he deſerved. The reſt that concerneth him in queſtion of his time, hath been ſpoken heretofore; in matter of his affairs, ſhall be handled among thoſe of *Cyrus*, to whoſe ſtory that of *Balthaſar* is but an appendix.

[a] Herodotus, lib. 1.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the original and firſt greatneſs of the Perſians.

SECT. I.

That the Medes *were chief actors in the ſubverſion of the* Babylonian *empire.*

THE line of *Belochus* being now extinguiſhed in *Balthaſar*, the empire of *Babylon*, and of *Aſſyria*, was joined firſt to that of *Media*, which then was governed by *Cyaxares* or *Darius Medus*, after whom *Cyrus* became lord and monarch both of *Aſſyria* and of *Media* itſelf.

Of the race of *Phul Belochus* there were ten kings beſides himſelf, and of *Arbaces* as many are found by *Metaſthenes*. Theſe two provincial governours, having cut down the laſt branch of *Ninus* in *Sardanapalus*, divided between them the eaſtern empire. *Cyaxares* (whom the ſcriptures call *Darius Medus*) the laſt of the race of *Arbaces* dying about two years after that the line of *Belochus* was ended in *Balthaſar*; the dominions as well of the conqueror, as of the conquered, fell to a third family, namely, to *Cyrus* of the houſe of *Achemenes*, the princes of which blood reigning in *Perſia* had formerly been dependants on the *Medes*, and were of as little power at home, as of fame abroad in the world.

Of the family of *Achemenes*, and line of the *Perſian* kings, we ſhall hereafter find occaſion in due place to intreat.

The nation of the *Medes* deſcended from *Madai* the third ſon of *Japhet*; that they had kings ſoon after the flood, *Lactantius* and *Diodorus* have found record; for *Lactantius* rememembreth an ancient king of the *Medes* called *Hydaſpes*, and *Diodore* ſpeaketh of *Pharnus* with his ſeven ſons, ſlain by the *Aſſyrian* in the beginning of their empire.

But of theſe who ſucceeded *Arbaces* the firſt, that freed his nation from the *Aſſyrians*; I take the liſt and number from *Euſebius*, adding *Darius Medus*: of whom I have ſpoken in their proper places heretofore; and they are theſe:

Arbaces	Who reigned	28 years
Soſarmus		30 years
Medidus		40 years
Cardiceas		13 years
Diocles		53 years
Phraortes		24 years
Cyaxares		32 years
Aſtyages		38 years
Darius Medus		

And though the *Greeks* aſcribe the conqueſt of *Babylon* to *Cyrus* alone, yet the ſcriptures teach us that *Darius* was not only king of *Media*, and had the *Perſians* his followers, but that the army victorious over *Balthaſar* was his; as the *Aſſyrian* and *Babylonian* empire alſo was during his own life. For we find in *Daniel*, that *Darius* of the *Medes* took the kingdom being threeſcore and two years old: And further, what officers it pleaſed him to ſet over the kingdom. And ſo was it propheſied by *Iſaiah* long before: [a] *Behold I will ſtir up the Medes againſt them*, &c. And by *Jeremy*, [b] *The Lord hath raiſed up the ſpirit of the king of the Medes, for his purpoſe is againſt Babel to deſtroy it*; and in the eight and twentieth verſe, *Prepare againſt her the nations, with the king of the Medes, the dukes thereof, the princes thereof, and all the land of his dominion.* Theſe ſcriptures *Julius Africanus* doth well open, who taking authority from *Diodore*, *Caſtor*, *Thallus*, and others, delivereth that *Babylon* was taken before *Cyrus* began to reign, which alſo agreeth with [c] *Strabo*, where he ſaith, That as the *Medes* were ſubjugated by the *Perſians*, ſo before that, both the *Babylonians* and *Aſſyrians* were maſter'd by the *Medes*. And therefore the reports of *Juſtin* and *Herodotus* are not to be received, who attribute the taking of *Babylon* to *Cyrus* alone.

SECT. II.

By what means the empire was tranſlated from the Medes *to the* Perſians.

HOW the kingdom of the *Medes* fell into the hands of *Cyrus*, it is a doubt not ſufficiently clear'd by hiſtorians: but rather their different relations of his beginnings have bred the former opinion of thoſe who give the conqueſt of *Babel* to the *Perſian* only. For ſome there are who deny that *Aſtyages* had any other ſucceſſor than *Cyrus* his grand-child by *Mandane*. Whereas *Cteſias* on the contrary ſide affirmeth, that *Cyrus* was no way deſcended from *Aſtyages* (whom he calleth *Aſtygas* or *Apama*) but only that having vanquiſhed him in battle, and confined him to *Bactria*, he married his daughter *Amytis*. But I find the relations of *Cteſias* often cited and ſeldom followed, and himſelf ſometimes very juſtly reproved of wilful untruth.

Viginier, a diligent and learned hiſtorian of this age, produceth many probable reaſons that *Aſtyages* had no ſuch ſon as *Cyaxares*, or *Darius Medus*; and to confirm his opinion the more, he citeth *Diodore*, *Juſtin*, *Strabo*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Iſocrates*, and before them *Caſtor*, *Thallus*, and *Phlegon*, who do not find any ſuch ſucceſſor. Neither do *Tatianus*, *Theophilus Antiochenus*, *Julius Africanus*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Juſtin Martyr*, *Lactantius*, *Euſebius*, St. *Jerome*, or St. *Auguſtine*, make report out of any faithful author by them read, that hath given other ſon or ſucceſſor to *Aſtyages* than *Cyrus*.

Yet ſeeing that this manner of argument, *ab authoritate negative*, doth never inforce conſent; we may be the bolder (all this great liſt of noble writers by him alledg'd notwithſtanding) to affirm, that either *Aſtyages* himſelf muſt have been *Darius* of the *Medes*, which cannot agree with his place in the courſe of time: or elſe, to give him ſome other ſucceſſor, according to *Joſephus* and [d] *Xenophon*, the ſame whom *Daniel* calleth *Darius*. For it is manifeſt, and without diſpute, that the king of the *Medes* commanded in chief, and was abſolute lord of that conqueſt, *Cyrus* during his life being no other than the lieutenant of his army, and ſubject to his authority; the ſtrength of both nations, to wit, the *Medes* and *Perſians*, with other the vaſſals of *Darius*, being joined together to compound it.

But it is very certain, that the honour of that great victory over *Babylon* was wholly given to *Cyrus*, who was the inſtrument pre-ordained and forenamed by God himſelf, not only for this action, but for the delivery of his church; a greater work

[a] Iſa. 13. 17. [b] 51. 11, & 28. [c] Lib. 16. [d] Zon. l. 1. c. 19. Joſ. Ant. l. 10. c. 13. Xen. l. 8. ped.

in the eyes of God, than the ſubverſion of any ſtate or monarchy, how powerful ſoever.

And it may well be thought, that the ſoldiers imployed in that ſervice did rather aſcribe the glory to him that was the beſt man of war, than to the *Median*, who was greateſt in riches and power. All which alſo falling upon *Cyrus* by ſucceſſion, and continuing in his poſterity, did much augment the fame of his virtue, which among prophane hiſtorians over-grew altogether the honour due to *Cyaxares*, both becauſe he was old, and did nothing in perſon; as alſo becauſe he ſoon after quitted the world, and left *Cyrus*, who was poſſeſs'd of whatſoever belonged to *Darius*, before the fame of any ſuch king or conqueror was carried far off.

And for the *Greek* hiſtorians, they took all things from the relation of the *Perſians*, who gave to *Cyrus* all the praiſe of a moſt excellent prince, making none his equal. Only *Daniel* in the firſt, fifth, and ſixth chapters of his prophecies, makes it plain that himſelf not only lived a great officer under king *Darius*, but that he continued in that eſtate to the firſt of *Cyrus*, which, being the year of *Daniel*'s death, could not have been diſtinguiſhed from the reign of *Darius*, if they had begun together and reigned jointly; neither can it be imagined that *Darius* held the kingdom by *Cyrus*'s permiſſion, conſidering that *Cyrus* began after him.

SECT. III.

Xenophon's *relation of the war which the* Medes *and* Perſians *made with joint forces upon the* Aſſyrians *and others.*

THESE teſtimonies of the ſcriptures, which need no other confirmation, are yet made more open to our underſtanding, by that which *Xenophon* hath written of theſe wars: the cauſe whereof, according to his report, was this.

When the *Aſſyrian* had enlarged his empire with victories, and was become lord of all *Syria*, and many other countries, he began to hope that if the *Medes* could be brought under his ſubjection, there ſhould not then be left any nation adjoining able to make head againſt him. For the king of the *Medes* was able to bring into the field threeſcore thouſand foot, and above ten thouſand horſe, to which the forces of *Perſia* being joined made an exceeding ſtrong army.

The *Aſſyrian* conſidering the ſtrength of ſuch a neighbour, invited *Creſus* king of *Lydia*, a prince very mighty both in men and treaſure, and with him other lords of *Aſia* the leſs to his aſſiſtance, alledging that thoſe eaſtern nations were very powerful, and ſo firmly conjoin'd by league and many alliances, that it would not be eaſy, no not poſſible, for any one nation to reſiſt them. With theſe incitements, and ſtrengthned with great preſents, he drew to himſelf ſo many adherents as he compounded an army of two hundred thouſand foot, and threeſcore thouſand horſe; of which, ten thouſand horſe, and forty thouſand foot were led by *Creſus*, who had great cauſe of enmity with the *Medes*, in regard of the war made by them againſt his father *Alyattes*; but this great army was by *Cyaxares* king of the *Medes*, and by *Cyrus* general of the *Perſian* forces, utterly broken; upon which defeat, the *Aſſyrian* king being alſo ſlain, ſo many of the *Aſſyrians* revolted as *Babylon* it ſelf could not longer be aſſured without the ſuccours of mercenaries, waged with great ſums of money out of *Aſia* the leſs, *Egypt*, and elſewhere. Which new-gathered forces were alſo ſcattered by *Cyrus*, who following his advantage, poſſeſs'd himſelf of a great part of the leſſer *Aſia*, at which time it was, as I take it, that *Creſus* himſelf was alſo made priſoner.

The attempt of *Babylon* following ſoon after, the army lying before it being paid by *Darius*, whom *Xenophon* calleth *Cyaxares*, and led by *Cyrus*'s ſiſter's ſon, prevailed againſt *Balthaſar*, as in due time ſhall be ſet down.

Thoſe *Perſians* which followed *Cyrus*, and by him levied, are number'd thirty thouſand foot-men, of which a thouſand were armed gentlemen, the reſt of the common ſort were archers, or ſuch as uſed the dart and the ſling. So far *Xenophon*. Of whom in this argument, as it is true, that he deſcribed in *Cyrus* the pattern of a moſt heroical prince, with much poetical addition: ſo it cannot be denied, but that the bulk and groſs of his narration was founded upon mere hiſtorical truth.

Neither can it indeed be affirmed of any the like writer, that in every ſpeech and circumſtance he hath preciſely tied himſelf to the phraſe of the ſpeaker, or nature of the occaſion, but borrowed in each out of his own invention, appropriating the fame to the times and perſons of whom he treated. Putting therefore apart the moral and political diſcourſe, and examining but the hiſtory of things done, it will eaſily appear that *Xenophon* hath handled his undertaken ſubject in ſuch ſort, that by beautifying the face thereof, he hath not in any ſort corrupted the body.

SECT. IV.

The eſtate of the Medes *and* Perſians *in times foregoing this great war.*

FOR it is commonly agreed upon, that *Achemenes* the ſon of *Perſes* being governour of *Perſia*, did aſſociate himſelf with *Arbaces*, who commanded *in Media* in that rebellion againſt *Sardanapalus*, and that each of them after the victory obtained, held for himſelf the dominion of thoſe countries which he had formerly ruled for the *Aſſyrians*; as alſo that they conveighed over the ſame honour and power to their poſterity; which in *Media* was not abſolutely regal, but with ſome reſtraint limited, until ſuch time as *Deioces* took upon him the full authority and majeſty of a kingdom. From the death of *Sardanapalus* to the reign of *Deioces*, are uſually accounted about an hundred and forty years, in the laſt ſixty whereof there reigned in *Aſſyria* mighty princes, namely *Salmanaſſar* and his ſucceſſors, whoſe great atchievements in *Syria* and elſewhere witneſs, that the *Medes* and *Perſians* found it not for their advantage to undertake any offenſive war againſt thoſe victorious kings, it being alſo probable that the league continued as yet between theſe the ſucceſſors of *Belochus*, and *Arbaces*, who had formerly ſhared the empire.

Now from the beginning of *Deioces* to the firſt of *Aſtyages*, there paſs'd above ninety years, in which if *Herodotus* have written truly, that *Phraortes* conquered *Perſia*, and how he and other the kings of *Media* by many victories greatly enlarged their dominions, and commanded many parts of *Aſia*, it had been but an unadviſed enterpriſe of the *Aſſyrians* and *Babylonians*, to have waſted themſelves againſt the *Syrians* and *Egyptians*, leaving ſo able and victorious a nation on their backs. But that the *Medes* had done nothing upon the ſouth parts of *Perſia*, and that the *Perſians* themſelves were not maſters of *Suſiana* in *Nabuchodonoſor*'s time, it is manifeſt in *Daniel*, who was then governour for the *Babylonians* in *Suſa* or *Suſan*, the chief city thereof. It is true indeed, that the *Medians*, either under *Cyaxares* or *Aſtyages*, or both, had quarrel with *Halyattes*

lyattes the father of *Creſus*, which after ſome ſix years diſpute was compounded.

How the affairs of *Perſia* ſtood in ſo many ages, I do not find any memory. It ſeemeth that the roughneſs of the mountainous country which they then poſſeſs'd, with the confederacy which they continued with the *Medes*, gave them more ſecurity than fame: For if their kings, being the poſterity of *Achemenes*, had done any memorable acts, the greatneſs which they afterward obtained would not have ſuffer'd any forgetfulneſs thereof. But as we find all *Xenophon*'s reports, both of theſe wars and the ſtate of thoſe countries to be very conſonant and agreeable to the relation of many other good authors, ſo it appears, that the race of *Achemenes* held the principality of *Perſia* from father to ſon for many deſcents. And therefore we may better give credit to *Xenophon*, who affirmeth, that *Cambyſes* the father of *Cyrus* was king of *Perſia*: than to thoſe that make him a mean man, and ſay, that *Aſtyages* gave him his daughter *Mandane* in marriage, to the end that her ſon (whoſe nativity he feared) might be diſabled from any great undertaking by his father's ignobility.

For what cauſe of grief could it be to *Aſtyages*, that the ſon of his daughter ſhould become lord of the beſt part of *Aſia*? No; it was more likely, that upon ſuch a prophecy his love to his grandchild ſhould have encreaſed, and his care been the greater to have married her to ſome prince of ſtrength and eminent virtue.

Yea, the ſame *Herodotus*, who is the firſt author, and, as I think, the deviſer of the miſchief intended againſt *Cyrus* by his grand-father, doth confeſs, That the line of the *Achemenidæ* was ſo renowned, that the great king *Xerxes* in the height of his proſperity did thence derive himſelf, and vaunt of it: which he would never have done, had they been ignoble, or had they been the vaſſals of any other king or monarch.

For in this ſort *Xerxes*, in the ſeventh of *Herodotus*, deriveth himſelf.

Achemenes
Cambyſes
Cyrus
Teiſpeus
Ariaramnes
Arſamnes
Hyſtaſpes
Darius
Xerxes.

Of the *Achemenidæ* there were two races: of the firſt was *Cyrus* the great, whoſe iſſue-male failed in his two ſons, *Cambyſes* and *Smerdis*. This royal family is thus ſet down by the learned *Reineccius*.

Achemenes the ſon of *Perſes*, firſt king of *Perſia*.
Darius.
Cyrus, the firſt of that name, had *Cambyſes* and *Atoſſa*, who, married to *Pharnaces*, king of *Cappadocia*, had *Artyſtona* and other daughters.
Cambyſes had
Cyrus the great; *Cyrus* had
Cambyſes, who ſucceeded him, and *Smerdis* ſlain by his brother *Cambyſes*.

Of the ſecond were thoſe ſeven great princes of *Perſia*, who having overthrown the uſurped royalty of the *Magi*, choſe from among themſelves *Darius* the ſon of *Hyſtaſpes* king.

This kingdom of *Perſia* was firſt known by the name of *Elam*, ſo called after *Elam* the ſon of *Sem*, and the people therein inhabiting *Elamitæ*; by *Elianus*, *Elymæ*; by *Joſephus*, *Elymi*.

Suidas derives this nation ſometimes from *Aſſur*, ſometimes from *Magog*, of whom they were called *Maguſæi*; which *Maguſæi*, according to [a] *Euſebius*, are not to be taken for the nation in general, but for thoſe who were afterward called the *Magi*, or wiſe men. So do the *Greeks*, among many other their ſayings of them, affirm, that the *Perſians* were anciently written *Artæi*, and that they called themſelves *Cephenes*. But that they were [b] *Elamitæ*, *Moſes*, and the prophets, *Iſaiah*, *Jeremiah*, *Ezekiel*, *Daniel*, and *Eſdras*, in many places confirm: which alſo St. *Jerome* upon *Jeremiah* the 25th, upon *Daniel* the 8th, and in his *Hebrew* queſtions approveth, ſaying, *Elam a quo Elamitæ principes Perſidis*; *Elam*, of whom were the *Elamites* princes of *Perſia*.

And that city which the author of the 2d book of the [c] *Maccabees* calleth *Perſepolis*, is by the author of the [d] 1ſt called *Elimais*, but is now called *Siras*, being the ſame, which *Antiochus*, for the great riches thereof, twice attempted in vain, and to his great diſhonour. And yet this city, now called *Siras*, was not the old *Perſepolis*; for *Alexander*, at the requeſt of *Thais* the harlot, burnt it.

The firſt king of *Perſia* to us known, if we follow the current of authors interpreting the 14th chapter of *Geneſis*, was *Chedorlaomer*, who lived with *Amraphel* or *Ninias*, and joined with him in the war againſt thoſe *Arabians*, who was afterwards extinguiſhed by the forces of *Abraham*.

[a] Euſeb. l. 6. c. 8. de Præp. Evang. [b] Gen. 10. Iſ. 11. 21, 22. Jer. 25, & 29. Ezek. 32. Dan. 8. Eſd. 4. [c] 2 Mac. 9. [d] 1 Mac. 6.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of CYRUS.

SECT. I.

Of Cyrus's *name and firſt actions.*

AS touching the name of *Cyrus*, [a] *Strabo* ſaith, that the ſame was taken from a river which watereth *Perſia*; this great prince having *Agradatus* for his proper name. But the great *Cyrus* was not the firſt of that name. *Herodotus* otherwiſe; and that *Cyrus* ſignifieth a father in the *Perſian* tongue, and therefore ſo intitled by the people.

It is true, that for his juſtice and other excellent virtues he was indeed called a father; but that the name of *Cyrus* had any ſuch ſignification, I think it be miſtaken.

[b] *Plutarch* hath a third opinion, affirming, that *Cyrus* is as much as to ſay the ſun, in the ſame language. Howſoever it be, yet the prophet *Iſaiah*, almoſt 200 years before *Cyrus* was born, gives him that name, *Thus ſaith the Lord unto Cyrus*, &c.

Before the conqueſt of *Babylon*, the victories which *Cyrus* obtained were many and great: among which, the conqueſt of *Lydia*, and other provinces thereto ſubject, together with the taking of *Creſus* himſelf, are not recounted by *Euſebius*, *Oroſius*, and others, but placed among his later atchievements, whoſe opinion for this difference of time is founded upon two reaſons; namely, that of the *Median* there is no mention in that laſt war againſt *Creſus:* and that the obtaining of *Sardis* is referr'd to the 58th *Olympiad*, and the glorious victory which *Cyrus* had over *Babylon*, to the 55th *Olympiad*.

The former of which might have been uſed (and was by the *Greeks*) to exclude the *Medes* from the honour of having won *Babylon* it ſelf, which in due place I have anſwered. The later ſeems to have reference to the ſecond war which *Cyrus* made upon *Lydia*, when it rebelled; at which time he ſo eſtabliſhed his former conqueſt, as after that time theſe nations never offered to revolt. Wherefore I like better in this particular to believe with *Herodotus*, whom the moſt of chronologers follow, and find the enterpriſe of *Sardis* to precede that of *Babylon*.

SECT. II.

Of Creſus *the king of* Lydia, *who made war upon* Cyrus.

I Have in the laſt book ſpoken ſomewhat of *Creſus*, of his race and predeceſſors, as alſo of thoſe kings which governed *Lydia* in more ancient times: of which the firſt (to prophane authors known) was *Lydus*, the ſon of *Atys:* which family extinguiſhed, the kingdom was by an oracle conferred upon *Argon*, deſcended from *Hercules*, whereof there were 22 generations, *Candaules* being the laſt, who, by ſhewing his fair wife naked to *Gyges* his favorite, was by the ſame *Gyges* (thereto urged upon peril of his own life by the queen) the next day ſlain. Which done, *Gyges* enjoy'd both the queen and kingdom of *Lydia*, and left the ſame to *Atys* his ſon, who was father to *Sadyattes*, the father of *Halyattes* (who thruſt the [c] *Cimmerians* out of *Aſia*) and *Halyattes* begat *Crœſus:* which five kings, of a third race, enjoy'd that kingdom 170 years. *Halyattes* the father of *Creſus* was an undertaking prince, and after he had continued a war againſt *Cyaxares* the *Median*, a prince very powerful, and maintained it 6 years, a peace was concluded upon equal conditions between them.

Aſtyages, the ſon of *Cyaxares*, and grand-father to *Cyrus*, thought himſelf greatly honoured by obtaining *Aryenes*, *Creſus*'s ſiſter, whom he married.

But *Creſus* ſo far enlarged his dominions after his father's death, as he was nothing inferior in territory to any king or monarch of that age: of which, about that time, there were four in effect of equal ſtrength; to wit, the *Median*, the *Babylonian*, the *Egyptian*, and the *Lydian:* only *Nabuchodonoſor*, after he had joined *Phenicia*, *Paleſtina*, and *Egypt* to his empire, had thenceforward no competitor during his own life.

But *Creſus*, notwithſtanding the men and treaſure ſpent in the quarrel of the *Babylonians*, yet maſtered *Æolis*, *Doris*, and *Ionia*, provinces poſſeſs'd by the *Greeks* in *Aſia* the leſs, adjoining to *Lydia*; gave law to the *Phrygians*, *Bithynians*, *Carians*, *Myſians*, *Paphlagonians*, and other nations. And that he alſo inforced the *Epheſians* to acknowledge him, notwithſtanding they compaſſed their city with *Diana*'s girdle, [d] *Herodotus* witneſſeth. Moreover, [e] *Athenæus* out of *Beroſus* (which alſo *Strabo* confirmeth) makes report of a ſignal victory which *Creſus* obtain'd againſt the *Saceans*, a nation of the *Scythians*, in memory whereof the *Babylonian*'s allies did yearly celebrate a feaſt, which they called *Sacæa:* all which he perform'd in 14 years.

And being now confident in the continuance of his good fortune, and envious of *Cyrus*'s fame, doubting alſo, that his proſperous undertakings might in the end grow perilous to himſelf, he conſulted with the oracle of *Apollo*, whom he preſented with marvellous rich gifts, what ſucceſs he might hope for againſt *Cyrus*, if he undertook him: from whom he received this riddle, Creſus *paſſing over the river* Halys, *ſhall diſſolve a great dominion.* For the devil, being doubtful of the ſucceſs, paid him with merchandiſe of both ſides like, and might be inverted either way to the ruin of *Perſia*, or of his own *Lydia*.

SECT. III.

Creſus's *expedition againſt* Cyrus.

HEreupon *Creſus* being reſolved to ſtop the courſe of *Cyrus*'s fortunes, if he could, deſpiſed all the arguments uſed by *Sandanes* to the contrary, who deſired him to forethink, that he urged a nation inhabiting a barren and mountainous region, a people not covered with the ſoft ſilk of worms, but with the hard ſkins of beaſts; not fed with ſuch meat as they fancied, but content with what they found; drinkers of water, not of wine: and in a word, a nation warlike, enduring, valiant and proſperous; over whom if he became victorious, he could thereby enrich himſelf in nothing but fame, in which he already excelled: and if by them beaten, and ſubjected, ſo great would his loſs appear of all things which the world hath in account, as the ſame could neither haſtily be told, nor readily conceived.

[a] Strab. l. 15. [b] Plut. in vit. Arta. [c] Herod. l. 1. p. 3, 4, 5. [d] Herod. l. 5. [e] Athen. l. 14. c. 17.

Not-

Notwithſtanding this ſolid counſel, *Creſus* having prepared a powerful army, he led the ſame towards *Media*, but in his paſſage he was arreſted at *Pterium*, a city of great ſtrength in *Cappadocia*; which while he ſought by all means to ſurprize or to force, *Cyrus* came on, and found the *Lydians* encamped before it. That each was inferior to other in ſtrength or opinion, I do not find: for out of doubt, *Creſus* as he excell'd any prince of that age in riches and ability; ſo was he not under any in territory and fame that then lived.

But as *Cratippus* of *Mitylene* anſwer'd *Pompey* when he complain'd againſt the Gods, becauſe they favour'd a diſturber and uſurper of the commonwealth againſt him who fought for the *Roman* liberty, That kingdoms and commonwealths had their encreaſe and period from divine Ordinance: ſo at this time was the winter of *Creſus*'s proſperity at hand, the leaves of his flouriſhing fortune ready to fall, and that of *Cyrus* but in the flower and firſt ſpring. The God of all power, and not *Admetis Herdman*, *Apollo*, had given date to the one, and a beginning of glory to the other.

When theſe two armies were in view of each other, after the entertainment of divers skirmiſhes, the *Perſians* and *Lydians* began to join in groſs troops: ſupplies from both kings thruſt on upon the falling off and advancement of either nation: and as the *Perſians* had ſomewhat the better of the day, ſo when the dark veil of night had hidden each army from the other's view, *Creſus* doubting what ſucceſs the riſing ſun would bring with it, quitted the field to *Cyrus*, and with all ſpeed poſſible retir'd, and taking the next way into *Lydia*, recover'd *Sardis* his firſt city and regal ſeat, without any purſuit made by *Cyrus* to retard him. Where being arrived, and nothing ſuſpecting *Cyrus*'s approach, or any other war for that winter, he diſmiſſed the ſoldiers, and ſent the troops of his ſundry nations to their own provinces, appointing them to reaſſemble at the end of five months, acquainting his commanders with his intents for the renewing of the war at the time appointed.

SECT. IV.

The conqueſt of Lydia *by* Cyrus.

CYRUS in the following morning finding the *Lydians* departed, put his army in order to purſue them, yet not ſo haſtily, and at their heels, as to be diſcovered. But having good intelligence of *Creſus*'s proceeding, he ſo meaſured his marches, as he preſented not himſelf before *Sardis*, till ſuch time as *Creſus* had diſpoſed his army to their wintering garriſons: when being altogether unlook'd for, and unfeared, he ſurrounded *Sardis* with his army: wherein *Creſus* having no other companies than his citizens and ordinary guards, after fourteen days ſiege the ſame was enter'd by aſſault, and all executed that reſiſted. *Creſus* having now neither arms to fight, nor wings to fly, *Sardis* being on all parts ſtrongly encompaſſed, [a]thruſt himſelf into the heap and miſerable multitude of his vaſſals, and had undergone the common fortune of common perſons vanquiſhed, had not a ſon of his, who had been dumb all his life ([b]by extremity of paſſion and fear enabled) cried out to the ſoldiers to ſpare *Creſus*. Who thereupon being taken and impriſoned, deſpoiled of all things but the expectation of death, he was forthwith tied in fetters, and ſet on the top of a great and high heap of wood, to be conſumed to aſhes thereon. To which when the fire was ſet and kindled, remembering the diſcourſe which he had had with the *Athenian* law-giver, he thrice cried out on his name, *Solon*, *Solon*, *Solon*: and being demanded what he meant by that invocation, he firſt uſed ſilence; but urg'd again, he told them, That he had now found it true which *Solon* had long ſince told him, That many men in the race and courſes of their lives might well be accounted fortunate, but no man could diſcern himſelf for happy indeed, till his end.

Of which anſwer [c]*Cyrus* being ſpeedily inform'd, remembering the changes of fortune and his own mortality, he commanded his miniſters of juſtice to withdraw the fire with all diligence to ſave *Creſus*, and to conduct him to his preſence: which done, *Cyrus* demanded of him who it was that had perſuaded him? or what ſelf-reaſon had conducted him to invade his territory, and to make him of a friend an enemy? To whom he thus anſwer'd, it was thy proſperous and my unproſperous deſtiny (the *Grecian* God flattering therewithal my ambition) that were the inventors and conductors of *Creſus*'s war againſt *Cyrus*.

Cyrus being pierc'd with *Creſus*'s anſwer, and bewailing his eſtate, though victorious over it, did not only ſpare his life, but entertained him ever after as a king and his companion, ſhewing therein a true effect of mercy indeed. *Quæ non cauſam, ſed fortunam ſpectat.*

And herein is the real difference diſcerned between that behaviour which we call *Beneficium latronis, & gratiam principis:* A thief ſometimes ſparing the life of him which is in his power, but unjuſtly: A king that giveth breath, and a continuance of being, to him that was the cauſe and author of his own evil.

The report made by *Xenophon* is, That *Cyrus* did friendly entertain *Creſus* at the firſt ſight, not mentioning that which *Herodotus* delivers, and is here already ſet down, that he ſhould have been burnt alive. It may well be, that *Xenophon* pourtraying (in *Cyrus*) an heroical prince, thought an intent ſo cruel fitter to be forgotten than rehearſed, as too much miſbeſeeming a generous nature. And it is very likely, that nearneſs of alliance might withhold *Cyrus* (had he been otherwiſe vicious) from ſo cruel a purpoſe againſt his grand-mother's brother. Howſoever it was, the moral part of the ſtory hath given much credit and reputation to the report of *Herodotus* (as to many the like it often doth) and made it paſs for current, though the truſt repoſed in *Creſus* afterwards may ſeem to argue, that *Cyrus* did not uſe him inhumanely at the firſt.

For as *Herodotus* himſelf telleth us, when *Cyrus* paſs'd with his army over *Araxes* into *Scythia*, he left *Creſus* to accompany and adviſe his ſon *Cambyſes*, governour of the empire in his abſence, with whom he lived all the time of *Cyrus*, and did afterwards follow *Cambyſes* into *Egypt*, where he hardly eſcaped his tyrannous hand. What his end was I do not find.

But in this time the races of three of the greateſt kings in that part of the world took end; to wit, of the *Babylonians*, *Medians*, and *Lydians*; in *Balthaſar*, *Cyaxares*, and *Creſus*.

SECT. V.

How Cyrus *won* Babylon.

AFTER this *Lydian* war enſued the great conqueſt of *Babylon*, which gave unto *Cyrus* an

[a] In communi calamitate ſuam quiſque habet fortunam, Curt. Solin. c. 7. [c] Homo qui in homine calamitoſo miſericors eſt meminit ſui, Caſſ. [b] Memoriam metus perimit: timor vocis eſt incitamentum, &c.

empire ſo large and mighty, that he was juſtly reputed the greateſt monarch then living upon earth. How long time the preparations for this great action took up, it is uncertain; only it ſeems, that ten whole years did paſs between his taking thoſe two cities of *Sardis* and *Babylon*, which nevertheleſs I do not think to have been wholly occupied in proviſion for the *Aſſyrian* war, but rather to have been ſpent in ſettling the eſtate which he had already purchaſed. And hereunto perhaps may be referr'd that which *Cteſias* hath in his fragments, of a war made by *Cyrus* upon the *Scythians*, though related as foregoing the victory obtain'd againſt *Creſus*. He telleth us, that *Cyrus* invaded *Scythia*, and being victorious over that nation, took *Amorges* their king priſoner: but being in a ſecond battle overthrown by the wife of *Amorges*, *Sparetha*, and therein taken, the one king was deliver'd for the other.

Likewiſe it may be thought that no ſmall part of thoſe troubles which aroſe in the lower *Aſia*, grew ſoon after the departure of the victorious army, before the conqueſt was fully eſtabliſhed.

For after *Cyrus* was returned out of *Aſia* the leſs, many nations, conquered formerly by *Creſus*, and now by *Cyrus*, revolted from him; againſt whom he employed *Pactias*, and then *Harpagus*, who firſt reduced the *Phocians* under their former obedience, and then the reſt of the *Greeks* inhabiting *Aſia* the leſs, as the *Ionians*, *Carians*, *Eolians*, and *Lycians*, who reſolvedly (according to the ſtrength they had) defended themſelves. But in the attempt upon *Babylon* it ſelf, it is not to be doubted, that *Cyrus* employed all his forces, having taken order beforehand, that nothing ſhould be able to divert him, or to raiſe that ſiege, and make fruſtrate the work upon which he did ſet all his reſt. And great reaſon there was, that he ſhould bend all his care and ſtrength unto the taking of that city, which beſide the fame and reputation that it held, as being head of an empire thereon depending, was ſo ſtrongly fenced with a treble wall of great height, and ſurrounded with waters unfoordable, ſo plentifully victualled for many years, that the inhabitants were not only free from all doubt and fear of their eſtate, but deſpiſed and derided all purpoſes and power of their beſiegers.

The only hope of the *Medes* and *Perſians*, who deſpaired of carrying by aſſault a city ſo well fortified and man'd, was, in cutting off all ſupplies of victuals and other neceſſaries: whereof though the town was ſaid to be ſtored ſufficiently for more than twenty years, yet might it well be deemed, that in ſuch a world of people as dwelt within thoſe gates, one great want or other would ſoon appear, and vanquiſh the reſolution of that unwarlike multitude. In expecting the ſucceſs of this courſe, the beſiegers were likely to endure much travail, and all in vain, if they did not keep ſtrict watch and ſtrong guards upon all quarters.

This was hard to do, in regard of the vaſt circuit of thoſe walls which they were to gird in, with numbers neither great enough, nor of men ſufficiently aſſured unto their commander: The conſideration whereof miniſtered unto the *Babylonians* matter of good paſtime, when they ſaw the [a]*Lydians*, *Phrygians*, *Cappadocians*, and others, quartered about their town to keep them in, who having been their ancient friends and allies, were more likely to join with them, if occaſion were offered, than to uſe much diligence on the behalf of *Cyrus*; who had, as it were yeſterday, laid upon their necks the galling yoke of ſervitude. Whilſt the beſieged were pleaſing themſelves in this deceitful and vain gladneſs, which is the ordinary fore-runner of ſudden calamity, *Cyrus*, whom the ordinance of God made ſtrong and conſtant, and inventive, deviſed by ſo many channels and trenches as were ſufficient and capable of *Euphrates*, to draw the ſame from the walls of *Babylon*, thereby to make his approach the more facile and aſſured: which when by the labour of many hands he had perform'd, he ſtayed the time of his advantage for the execution: for he had left certain banks or heads uncut, between the main river which ſurrounded the city, and his own trenches.

Now *Balthaſar*, finding neither any want or weakneſs within, nor any poſſibility of approach for his enemies without, prepared an exceeding ſumptuous feaſt, publick plays, and other paſtimes; and thereto invited a thouſand of his princes or nobility, beſides his wives, curtizans, and others of that trade. This he did either to let the beſiegers know, that his proviſions were either ſufficient, not only for all needful uſes, but even for jollity and exceſs; or becauſe he hoped that his enemies, under the burthen of many diſtreſſes, were well near broken; or in honour of *Bel* his moſt reverenced idol; or that it was his birth or coronation-day; or for many or all theſe reſpects. And he was not contented with ſuch magnificence as no prince elſe could equal, but (uſing *Daniel*'s words) *he lifted himſelf up againſt the Lord of heaven:* for he and his princes, wives and concubines, made carouſing cups of the veſſels of God, in contempt of whom he praiſed his own puppets, made of ſilver and gold, of braſs, iron, wood and ſtone; *Quanta fuit ſtultitia in vaſibus aureis bibentes, ligneos & lapideos deos laudare!* How great a fooliſhneſs was it (ſaith St. *Jerome*) drinking in golden cups, to praiſe Gods of wood and ſtone! Whilſt *Balthaſar* was in this ſort triumphing, and his brains well filled with vapours, he beheld a hand, which by divine power wrote on the wall oppoſite unto him, certain words which he underſtood not: wherewith ſo great a fear and amazement ſeized him, as [b]*the joints of his loins were looſed, and his knees ſmote one againſt the other.* Which paſſion, when he had in ſome part recovered, he cryed out for his *Chaldeans*, aſtrologians, and ſoothſayers, promiſing them great rewards, and the third place of honour in the kingdom to him that could read and expound the writing: but it exceeded their art. In this diſturbance and aſtoniſhment, the queen hearing what had paſt, and of the king's amazement, after reverence done, uſed this ſpeech: *There is a man in thy kingdom, in whom is the ſpirit of the holy Gods, and in the days of thy father, light and underſtanding, and wiſdom, like the wiſdom of the Gods was found in him, whom the king* Nabuchodonoſor, *thy father, the king (I ſay) thy father made chief of the inchanters, aſtrologians,* Chaldeans, *and ſoothſayers, becauſe a more excellent ſpirit, and knowledge, and underſtanding,* &c. *were found in him, even in* Daniel, *&c. Now let* Daniel *be called, and he will declare the interpretation.*

This queen, *Joſephus* takes for the grandmother; [c]*Origen* and *Theodoret*, for the mother of *Balthaſar*; either of which may be true; for it appeareth that ſhe was not any of the king's wives, becauſe abſent from the feaſt; and being paſt the age of dancing, and banqueting, ſhe came in upon the bruit of the miracle, and to comfort the king in his diſtraction. And whereas *Daniel* was forgotten and neglected by others both of younger years and times, this old queen remembered well what he had done in the days of *Nabuchodonoſor*, grandfather to this

[a] *Xenoph. Cyropæd. l. 7.* [b] *Dan. 5. 6.* [c] *Orig. & Theod. in Dan. Joſeph. Ant. 10.*

Balthaſar,

Balthaſar, and kept in mind both his religion and divine gifts.

When *Daniel* was brought to the king's preſence, who acknowledg'd thoſe excellent graces wherewith God had inriched him, he pray'd him, together with promiſes of reward and honour, to read and interpret thoſe words miraculouſly written; to whom *Daniel* made anſwer in a far different ſtyle from that he uſed towards his grandfather: for, the evil which he foretold *Nabuchodonoſor*, he wiſhed that the ſame might befall his enemies; but to this king (whoſe neglect of God, and vice, he hated) he anſwered in theſe words, *Keep thy rewards to thy ſelf, and give thy gifts to another; yet will I read the writing unto the king, and ſhew him the interpretation.* Which before he had performed, he gave him firſt the cauſe of God's juſt judgment againſt him, and the reaſon of this terrible ſentence, whereof the king and all his wiſe men were utterly ignorant. Which being written at large in *Daniel* v. 18, 19, 20. hath this effect, that forgetting God's goodneſs to his father, whom all nations fear'd and obey'd, and that for his pride and neglect of thoſe benefits, as he deprived him of his eſtate and underſtanding, ſo upon the acknowledgment of God's infinite power he reſtored him to both. This king, notwithſtanding, lifted himſelf up againſt the ſame God; and preſuming both to abuſe thoſe veſſels dedicated to holy uſes, and neglecting the Lord of all power, praiſed and worſhipped the dead idols of gold, ſilver, braſs, iron, ſtone and wood: and therefore thoſe words, from the oracle of a true God delivered (to wit) *Mene Tekel, Upharſin*, gave the king knowledge, that God had numbred the time of his kingdom, and finiſhed it; that he was weighed in the ballance of God's juſtice, and found too light; and that his empire was divided, and given to the *Medes* and *Perſians*.

The very evening or night of this day, wherein *Balthaſar* feaſted and periſhed, *Cyrus*, either by his ſpies, according to *Xenophon*; or inſpired by God himſelf, whoſe enſign he followed in this war, found the time and opportunity to invite him: and therefore while the king's head, and the heads of his nobility were no leſs filled with the vapours of wine, than their hearts with the fear of God's judgment, he cauſed all the banks and heads of his trenches to be opened and cut down with that diligence, as by them he drew the great river of *Euphrates* dry for the preſent, by whoſe channel running, his army made their entrance, finding none to diſturb them. All the town lay buried (as the poet ſaith) in ſleep and wine: ſuch as came in the *Perſians* way were put to the ſword, unleſs they ſaved themſelves by flight, as ſome did, who ran away crying, and filling the ſtreets with an uncertain tumult.

Such *Aſſyrian* lords as had revolted from *Balthaſar*, and betaken themſelves to the party of *Cyrus*, did now conduct a ſelected company to the king's palace; which having eaſily forced, they ruſhed into the chamber where the king with his princes were banqueting, ſlew both him and them without any mercy, who ſtruggled in vain to keep thoſe lives which God had newly threatned to take away. And now was the prophecy of *Jeremiah* xxvii. fulfilled, and that of *Iſaiah* xlvii. 200 years before this ſubverſion; who in his 47th chapter, and elſewhere, writeth this deſtruction ſo feelingly and lively, as if he had been preſent both at the terrible ſlaughter there committed, and had ſeen the great and unfeared change and calamity of this great empire; yea, and had alſo heard the ſorrows and bewailings of every ſurviving ſoul thereunto ſubject. His prophecy of this place he beginneth in theſe words; *Come down, and ſit in the daſt, O virgin daughter of* Babel: *ſit on the ground, there is no throne*, &c. And again, *Sit ſtill, and get thee into darkneſs, O daughter of the* Chaldeans; *for thou ſhalt no more be called the lady of kingdoms.* For, tho' it cannot be doubted, that God uſed *Nabuchodonoſor*, and the *Chaldeans*, to puniſh the idolatry of the *Judeans*; yet [a] *Iſaiah* teacheth us in this place, that he did not yet forget, that the execution of his judgments was mix'd with a rigorous extremity. For (ſaith *Iſaiah*) in the perſon of God, *I was wroth with my people, I have polluted mine inheritance, and given them into thine hand: thou didſt ſhew them no mercy, but thou didſt lay thy very heavy yoke upon the ancient. I will riſe up againſt them, ſaith the Lord of hoſts, and will cut off from Babel the name, and the remnant, and the ſon, and the nephew.* And in the 13th, *Every one that is found, ſhall be ſtricken thorough: whoſoever joineth himſelf, ſhall fall by the ſword, their children alſo ſhall be broken in pieces before their eyes, their houſes ſpoiled, and their wives raviſhed.* So as there is no hiſtorian who was either preſent at this victory of *Cyrus*, or that received the report from others truly as it was, that could better leave the fame to poſterity after it happen'd, than *Iſaiah* had done in many places of his prophecies, which were written 200 years before any thing attempted.

The greatneſs and magnificence of *Babylon*, were it not by divers grave authors ſet down, might ſeem altogether fabulous: for, beſides the reports of St. *Jerome*, *Solinus*, and *Oroſius*, *Ariſtotle* in the 3d of his *Politicks*, the 2d chapter, received the report for true, that one part of the city knew not that the reſt was taken three days after. Which is not impoſſible, if the teſtimony of [b] *Diodorus Siculus* may be taken; who finds the compaſs thereof at 360 ſtadia or furlongs, which makes forty-five miles: the walls whereof had ſo great a breadth, that ſix chariots might paſs in front thereon. And of height, according to *Cteſias* and *Clitracus*, three hundred threeſcore and five foot, garniſhed with an hundred and fifty towers. *Strabo*, in the beginning of his 16th book of geography, gives it a greater circuit, adding twenty-five furlongs more to the former compaſs, reckoning the ſame at three hundred fourſcore and five furlongs, which make forty-eight miles and one furlong, but finds the wall far under that which *Diodore* reports: and ſo doth *Curtius* meaſure their thickneſs but at thirty-two foot, and their height at an hundred cubits, which is alſo very much; every cubit containing a foot and a half of the large meaſure, tho' to the whole circuit of the city he gives the ſame with *Siculus*, and eight furlongs more. [c] *Herodotus* finds a greater content than *Strabo* doth, namely, four hundred and fourſcore furlongs circle; the thickneſs of the wall he meaſures at fifty cubits, and the the height at two hundred of the ſame regal cubit. For entrance, it had an hundred gates of braſs, with poſts and hooks to hang them on of the ſame metal: and therefore did the prophet [d] *Iſaiah* rightly intitle *Babylon*, *The princeſs and glory of kingdoms.*

But when *Cyrus* had won her, he ſtripp'd her out of her princely robes, and made her a ſlave, dividing not only all her goodly houſes, and her whole territory, with all the riches therein contained,

[a] Iſa. 14. *To wit*, Evilmerodach *and* Balthaſar. [b] Diod. l. 3. [c] Her. l. 1. [d] Iſa. 47. 13.

among

among his ſoldiers; but beſtowing the inhabitants themſelves as bond-ſlaves upon thoſe that had taken poſſeſſion of their goods.

Touching the reign of *Cyrus*, and the time which he enjoy'd in reſt and pleaſure, I can ſay no more of it, than that it is generally agreed by all chronologers to have laſted only ſeven years: in which time he made ſuch conſtitutions as differ little from the ordinances of all wiſe kings that are deſirous to eſtabliſh a royal power to themſelves and their poſterity.

SECT. VI.

The end of Cyrus.

THE laſt war, and the end of this great king *Cyrus*, is diverſly written. *Herodotus* and *Juſtin* deliver, that after the conqueſt of *Aſia* the leſs, *Cyrus* invaded the *Maſſagetes*, a very warlike nation of the *Scythians*, governed by *Tomyris* their queen: and that in an encounter between the *Perſians* and theſe northern *Nomades*, *Tomyris* loſt her army, and her ſon *Spargapiſes* that commanded it: in revenge whereof, this queen making new levies of men of war, and following the war againſt *Cyrus*, in a ſecond battel, beat the *Perſian* army, and taking *Cyrus* priſoner, cut off his head from his body, and caſt the ſame into a bowl of blood, uſing theſe words, *Thou that haſt all thy life time thirſted for blood, now drink thy fill and ſatiate thy ſelf.*

It ſhould hereby ſeem, that *Cyrus*, knowing the ſtrength and multitude of thoſe frozen nations, was perſuaded to abate their fury by ſome forcible invaſion and depopulation, becauſe in the time of *Cyaxares*, father to *Aſtyages*, thoſe *Scythians* invaded *Media* and *Aſia* the leſs, and held the ſame in a ſervile ſubjection 28 years.

This war, which *Metaſthenes* calleth *Tomyrique*, laſted (ſaith he) ſix years, and took end at the death of *Cyrus*.

But in this particular I believe with *Viginier*, that this *Scythian* war was rather the ſame which *Cyrus* made againſt the *Sacians*, before the conqueſt of *Lydia*, according to *Cteſias* before cited, who calleth *Tomyris*, *Sparetha*, tho' he deliver the ſucceſs of that war otherwiſe than *Herodotus* doth: the rather (ſaith [a] *Viginier*) becauſe *Strabo* in his 11th book reciteth, that *Cyrus* ſurprized the *Sacians* by the ſame ſtratagem by which *Juſtin* ſaith, he defeated the ſon of *Tomyris*. And the ſame [b] *Cteſias* alſo reporteth, that the laſt war which *Cyrus* made, was againſt *Amorrhæus* king of the *Derbicians*, a nation (as the reſt) of *Scythia*; whom tho' he overcame, yet he then received the wound of his death, which he ſuffered three days after.

[c] *Strabo* alſo affirmeth, that he was buried in his own city of *Paſagardes*, which himſelf had built, and where his epitaph was to be read in his time; which is ſaid to have been this: *O vir, quicunque es, & undecunque advenis, neque enim te adventurum ignoravi: ego ſum* Cyrus *qui* Perſis *imperium conſtitui, puſillum hoc terræ quo meum tegitur corpus mihi ne invidias*; O thou man, whoſoever thou art, or whenceſoever thou comeſt; for I was not ignorant that thou ſhould'ſt come: I am *Cyrus* that founded the *Perſian* empire, do not envy unto me this little earth, with which my body is covered.

This tomb was opened by *Alexander*, as *Quintus Curtius*, *l.* 1. reporteth, either upon hope of treaſure, ſuppoſed to have been buried with him (or upon deſire to honour his dead body with certain ceremonies) in which there was found an old rotten target, two *Scythian* bows, and a ſword. The coffin wherein his body lay, *Alexander* cauſed to be covered with his own garment, and a crown of gold to be ſet upon it. Theſe things well conſidered, as they give credit to the reports of [d] *Xenophon* and *Zonaras*, ſo they derogate much from *Herodotus*, who leaves his body in the hands of *Tomyris*.

And ſurely, had *Cyrus* loſt the army of *Perſia* in *Scythia*, it is not likely, that his ſon would ſo ſoon have tranſported all his remaining forces into *Egypt*, ſo far off from that quarter; the *Scythian* nation then victorious, and bordering *Media*: neither had *Cambyſes* been able in ſuch haſte to have undertaken and performed ſo great a conqueſt. Wherefore I rather believe *Xenophon*, ſaying, that *Cyrus* died aged, and in peace: and that finding in himſelf, that he could not long enjoy the world, he called unto him his nobility, with his two ſons *Cambyſes* and *Smerdis*; or, after *Xenophon*, *Tanaoxares*: and, after a long oration, wherein he aſſured himſelf, and taught others, of the immortality of the ſoul, and of the puniſhments and rewards following the good and ill deſerving of every man in this life; he exhorted his ſons by the ſtrongeſt arguments he had, to a perpetual concord and agreement. Many other things he uttered, which make it probable, that he received the knowledge of the true God from *Daniel*, when he governed *Suſa* and *Perſia*, and that *Cyrus* himſelf had read the prophecy of *Iſaiah*, wherein he was expreſly named, and by God (for the delivery of his people) preordained. Which act of delivering the *Jews* from their captivity, and of reſtoring the holy temple and city of *Jeruſalem*, was in true conſideration the nobleſt work that ever *Cyrus* performed. For in other actions he was an inſtrument of God's power, uſed for the chaſtiſing of many nations, and the eſtabliſhing of a government in thoſe parts of the world, which was not long to continue. But herein he had the Grace to be an inſtrument of God's goodneſs, and a willing advancer of his kingdom upon earth; which muſt laſt for ever, tho' heaven and earth ſhall periſh.

SECT. VII.

Of Cyrus's *decree for building the temple of God in* Jeruſalem.

HAving therefore ſpoken of his great victories, mention'd by ſundry hiſtorians, the glory of all which was a reward of this his ſervice done unto him that was author of them and of all goodneſs: I hold it meet at length to ſpeak of the decree made in the firſt of his reign, being perhaps the firſt that ever he made after his poſſeſſion of the *Babylonian* empire: that the captive *Jews* ſhould return again into their own territory, and re-build the houſe of God in *Jeruſalem*, having now endured and finiſhed 70 years captivity, by the prophets foretold. For the accompliſhing whereof, he gave order to his treaſurers to furniſh them with all things neceſſary and wanting. He alſo reſtored unto them 5469 veſſels of gold and ſilver, whereof *Nabuchodonoſor*, the grandfather of *Balthaſar*, had formerly robbed the temple.

The number of the *Jews* which returned out of *Chaldea* under their leader [e] *Zorobabel*, the ſon of *Salathiel*, and nephew to king *Jeconias*, and *Jeſus* or *Joſua* the ſon of *Joſadak*, were about 50000; where, as ſoon as they arrived, they built an altar to the living God, and ſacrificed thereon, accord-

[a] Vig. prim. part. Bib. [b] Cteſ. l. 15. hiſt. part. [c] Strab. l. 15. [d] Xen. pæd. 8. Zon. l. 1. c. 20. [e] 1 Eſd. 2. 2 Eſd. 7. Philo in bre.

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ing to their own law, and afterwards bethought themſelves how to prepare materials for the rebuilding of the temple.

But no ſooner did the *Jews* begin to lay any one ſtone, than the *Samaritans* and other idolatrous nations adjoining, gave all the impediment they could. So did the governours of thoſe provinces under *Cyrus* altogether countenance the diſturbers, and in no ſort favoured the *Jews*, nor the labours nor purpoſes they had in hand. And not only thoſe which were but provincial lieutenants, and other officers of leſs place, but *Cambyſes* himſelf; who having the charge of the whole empire, while *Cyrus* was buſied otherwiſe, countermanded the building begun. And whereas ſome authors make doubt, that whatſoever *Cambyſes* did when himſelf had obtained the empire, yet during the life of *Cyrus* there was no ſuch impediment or prohibitition: they may herein reſolve themſelves out of *Eſdras*, that by the conſpiracies of the neighbouring nations, the building was hindred all the time of king *Cyrus*'s life, *&c.* And therefore it is true, what the *Jews* themſelves affirm, as it is written in the 2d of *John*, that the temple was 46 years in ſetting up, having received ſo many hinderances from the firſt foundation to the ſecond of *Darius*.

And if we ſeek the natural and politick courſes which moved *Cambyſes* to withſtand his father's decree, as well while he governed under him, as when himſelf became ſole and ſoveraign monarch, we ſhall find them in that epiſtle remembred by *Eſdras*, written by *Belemus*, *Mithridates*, and the reſt, preſidents and counſellors in *Phenicia*, wherein they complain that the *Jews* were evermore rebellious and troublers of kings; that their city being once built, they would then refuſe to pay tribute, and fall from the obedience of the empire, as they had formerly done in the times of other kings.

But that which for that preſent ſeemed the moſt forcible impediment, was, that *Cambyſes* having it in his reſolution to invade *Egypt*, and that it was a common opinion, that the *Jews* were deſcended of thoſe nations, becauſe they iſſued thence under *Moſes*, when they conquered *Judea*; their city being once repaired and fortified, they might return to their old vomit, and give the ſame diſturbance to *Cambyſes*'s conqueſt, which they did to *Sennacherib*, *Nabuchodonoſor*, and other kings of *Babylon*. For, as it is written in *Ezekiel*, [b] *Egypt was the confidence of the houſe of Iſrael.*

But it is to be underſtood, as *Codoman* and others have obſerved, that *Artaxerxes*, to whom the counſellors and governors of *Phenicia* complained againſt the *Jews*, did not precede, but ſucceed *Darius Hyſtaſpes*, as in the 6th and 7th chapters of *Eſdras*, it is made plain: and alſo that thoſe governours (whoſe epiſtle ſheweth as much) did not withſtand the building of the temple, but the fortifying and encloſing of the city, as by the reaſons given in the ſaid epiſtle, and by the king's anſwer, it is evident.

Alſo in the 6th of *Ezra*, the 14th verſe, the kings are named in order as they governed, and *Artaxerxes* written after *Darius*; as: *And they built and finiſhed it* (to wit the temple) *by the appointment of the God of* Iſrael, *and by the commandment of* Cyrus *and* Darius, *and* Artahſhaſte *kings of* Perſia. Laſtly in the 7th of *Ezra* it is written, *Now after theſe things, in the reign of* Artahſhaſte *king of* Perſia: which was as much as to ſay, after the finiſhing of the temple in *David*'s time. And therefore *Artaxerxes* in the 2d of *Eſdras* is there named by anticipation, not in his own time and place.

And thus much concerning the re-building of the city and temple of *Jeruſalem*. Which action, tho' proſpered by the hand of God, was very ſlowly purſued by the men whom it moſt concerned, but firſt ſet on foot by *Cyrus*. The other ordinances of *Cyrus*, with his form and manner of government, are to be found in *Xenophon*. At his death, he bequeathed the empire unto his eldeſt ſon *Cambyſes*, appointing *Smerdis* or *Tanaoxares* his younger ſon to be ſatrapa, or lieutenant of *Media*, *Armenia*, and *Caduſia*; and then died, after he had reigned (ſaith *Herodotus*) thirty-one years, or (according to *Juſtin*) but thirty.

SECT. VIII.

Of Cyrus's *iſſue: and whether* Atoſſa *were his daughter, or (as ſome think) were the ſame with queen* Eſther.

CYRUS had iſſue two ſons, *Cambyſes* and *Smerdis*, with three daughters, *Atoſſa*, *Meroe*, and *Artyſtona*: *Cteſias* addeth to theſe, *Amytis*. *Atoſſa* and *Meroe* their brother *Cambyſes* married; *Artyſtona*, *Darius Hiſtaſpes* obtained; ſo did he *Atoſſa*, *Cambyſes* being dead: who (as ſome writers have ſuppoſed) inflamed both her husbands, *Darius* and *Xerxes* after him, to invade *Greece*, to be avenged of the whole nation for the cruel intent that *Aman* (whom the old tranſlation calleth a *Macedonian*) had againſt the *Jews*, tho' the opinion of *Joſephus* be more probable, who finds *Aman* to be an *Amalekite*. But it is hard to be underſtood how *Atoſſa*, the daughter of *Cyrus*, ſhould have been *Eſther*, whoſe hiſtory ſeems rather to appertain to the time of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, than of *Darius* the ſon of *Hyſtaſpes* or *Xerxes*. The deſire of *Atoſſa* to have *Greece* brought under the yoke of *Perſia*, was partly grounded upon the honour which thereby ſhe thought her husband might obtain, partly upon a feminine humour of getting many brave dames, *Corinthians*, *Athenians*, and others of that nation to be her bond-women. Wherefore I cannot give aſſent to the opinion of *Codoman*, who upon the near ſound of the two names, *Atoſſa* and *Hadaſſa* (by the latter of which *Eſther* was alſo called) makes them to have been one perſon. For tho' it be true that *Eſther* concerning her parentage, a while might be taken for a great lady; yet *Codoman*'s inference is nothing probable, that ſhe ſhould therefore, and for the great affection which the king bare unto her, be thought the daughter of *Cyrus*. Certain it is, that *Eſther* did at length diſcover her kindred and nation; whereby, if hiſtories could be kept free from this error, yet the people, and eſpecially the nobility, muſt needs have underſtood the truth: who nevertheleſs did ſo well know the parentage of *Atoſſa*, that for her ſake, as being daughter of *Cyrus*, her ſon *Xerxes* was preferred to the kingdom before his elder brother, againſt whom alſo he could have pretended a very weak claim. But of theſe things more hereafter in fitter place.

[a] Eſd. 3. 3. Eſd. 5. Eſd. 4. & 5. Joſ. l. Ant. 11. 1 Eſd. 2. 16. Eſd. 2. 16. 1 Eſd. 5. 33. 1 Eſd. 4. 5. 1 Eſd. 4.
[b] Ezek. 29.

CHAP. IV.

The eſtate of things from the death of Cyrus *to the reign of* Darius.

SECT. I.

Of the number and names of the Perſian *kings.*

OF the ſucceſſors of *Cyrus*, and the continuance of the *Perſian* empire, there are many opinions; as that of *Metaſthenes*, who hath numbred the *Perſian* kings and their times as followeth.

Darius Medus, and *Cyrus* jointly	2 years.
Cyrus alone	22
Priſcus Artaxerxes	20
Darius Longimanus	37
Darius Nothus	19
Artaxerxes Mnemon	55
Artaxerxes Ochus	26
Arſes, or *Arſames*	4
Darius, the laſt, conquered by *Alexander*	6

To which *Philo* agreeth; which number of years added, make in all 191. But in this catalogue *Metaſthenes* hath left out *Cambyſes* and *Xerxes*, and names *Artaxerxes Aſſuerus*, for the immediate ſucceſſor of *Cyrus*; in place (ſaith *Melanctbon*) of *Darius* the ſon of *Hyſtaſpes*: for *Metaſthenes*, as *Melanctbon* conjectureth, doth not account *Cambyſes* in the catalogue, becauſe his reign was confounded with that of *Cyrus*.

There is a 2d opinion, tho' ridiculous, of *Sedar Olam*, who finds but four *Perſian* kings from the beginning to the end of that empire.

Genebrard, *Schubert*, and *Beroaldus*, have alſo a differing account from the *Greeks*; whom nevertheleſs *Euſebius*, and moſt of the *Latins* follow, and ſo doth [a] *Krentzheim*, who hath fully anſwered, and as I take it, refuted all the former authors varying from that account. For in this ſort do the *Greeks* marſhal the *Perſian* kings with the times of their reigns.

[b] *Cyrus* in all	30 years.
Cambyſes with the *Magi*	8
Darius Hyſtaſpes	36
[c] *Xerxes*	21
Artaxerxes Longimanus	40
Darius Nothus	19
[d] *Artaxerxes Mnemon*	43
[e] *Artaxerxes Ochus*	23
Arſames	3
[f] *Darius* the laſt	6

Which numbers put together, make in all two hundred and thirty.

This account (as I have ſaid) the moſt chronologers and the beſt learned approve. Theſe *Perſian* princes, being all warranted by the authority of the ſcriptures, as *Peucer* in his hiſtorical animadverſions, hath gathered the places; finding firſt *Cyrus* in 2 *Chron.* xxxvi. 22, 23. *Ezra* i. 1. and often elſewhere.

Secondly, *Cambyſes* in the 11th of *Daniel*, who may indeed be well eſteemed for one of thoſe three kings in the 2d verſe named, and ſo the marginal commentator upon the *Geneva* underſtands that place; but under correction, miſtakes the matter greatly, when he ſaith in the ſame note, that *Darius Hyſtaſpes* was an enemy to the people of God, and ſtood againſt them: his great favour and liberality to the *Jews* being elſewhere proved.

Thirdly, Is *Darius Hyſtaſpes* found in 1 *Ezra* iv. 5. who in the 6th verſe is alſo named *Ahaſſuerus*.

Fourthly, In the 11th of *Daniel*, verſe the 2d, *Xerxes* is plainly foretold and deſcribed, and the great war which he ſhould make againſt the *Greeks* by *Daniel* remembred.

Fifthly, *Artaxerxes Longimanus* in *Ezra* ch. iv. verſe 7. who is alſo called *Arthaſaſta*, *c.* 4. *l.* 1. *Ezra* 7. and vii. 7.

Sixthly, *Darius Nothus*, *Ezra* iv. 24. and v. 6. *Nehem.* xii. 22.

Seventhly, *Artaxerxes Mnemon* in *Nehem.* ii. 1. who was father to *Artaxerxes Ochus*, and *Arſames*: for *Darius* the laſt, he was of another family, the line of *Cyrus* the great ending in *Ochus*, who deſcended from *Xerxes* the ſon of *Atoſſa*, *Cyrus*'s daughter; and the iſſue-male of *Cyrus* failing with his own ſons.

But to proceed, *Euſebius*, with the *Latins*, following the *Greeks*, apply the beginnings and ends of every *Perſian* king with their acts, to ſome certain *Olympiad*; as the war of *Aſtyages* (*Cyrus*'s maternal grandfather) and *Alyattes* (*Creſus*'s father) to the 49th *Olympiad*; the beginning of *Cyrus*'s reign, to the beginning of the 55th *Olympiad*; the taking of *Sardis* by *Cyrus*, to the 58th *Olympiad*; the invaſion of *Egypt* by *Cambyſes*, to the 3d year of the 63d *Olympiad*; and ſo of the reſt. Which reference with good agreement between ſeveral forms of computation, add the more credit unto both.

Again, this hiſtorical demonſtration is confirmed by the aſtronomical computation of [g] *Ptolemy*, who refers the death of *Alexander* the great, who died the 12th of *November*, in the beginning of the 140th *Olympiad*, to the 424th year after *Nabonaſſar*. And the *Æra* of *Nabonaſſar* began on the 26th of *February*: which, conferred with the *Olympiad*, was in the 9th month of the 1ſt year of the 8th *Olympiad*; ſo that whether we follow the accounts of the *Olympiads*, as do the *Greek* hiſtorians, or that of *Nabonaſſar* with *Ptolemy*, we ſhall find every memorable accident to fall out right with each computation.

For *Ptolemy* reckons the time anſwerable to 224 *Julian* years, and 140 days from *Nabonaſſar* to the 16th of *July*, in the 7th year of *Cambyſes*.

The *Greeks*, and namely *Diodorus Siculus*, place the taking of *Egypt* by *Cambyſes* in the 2d or 3d year of the 63d *Olympiad*, and the beginning of *Cambyſes*'s 7th year, in the 1ſt of the 64th *Olympiad*: which 1ſt of the 64th *Olympiad* runs along with part of the 22d of *Nabonaſſar*. The like agreement is conſequently found about the beginning and end of *Cyrus*.

Likewiſe the 20th of *Darius*, who ſucceeded *Cambyſes*, is according to *Ptolemy* the 246th of *Nabonaſſar*, which (obſerving the differences of *Nabonaſſar*'s *Æra* and the *Olympiad*, *viz.* 28 years) agrees with the 3d of the 69th *Olympiad*, wherein it is placed by the *Greeks*. In this *Joſephus* agrees with

[a] Chro. Kren. fol. 135. [b] Melanct. *gives* Cyrus *but* 22. [c] Melanct. *but* 20. [d] Melanct. *but* 40. [e] Melanct. 26. [f] Melanct. 4. [g] Alm. l. 3. c. 6.

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the *Greeks* throughout, ſaving that he joineth *Darius Medus*, whom *Xenophon* calleth *Cyaxares*, with *Cyrus* in the deſtruction of *Babylon*; which is true, and not contrary to the *Greek* computation, but may very well ſtand with it.

Laſtly, The diſagreements and confuſed accounts of thoſe that follow the other catalogue of the *Perſian* kings formerly rehearſed, doth give the greater credit to this of the *Greeks*, which being conſtant in it ſelf, accordeth alſo with the computation of other hiſtorians, and aſtronomers, and likewiſe with the holy ſcriptures.

SECT. II.

Of Cambyſes, *and the conquering of* Egypt *by him.*

WE will therefore, according to the truth, give the empire of *Perſia* to *Cambyſes*, the ſon of *Cyrus*, though degenerate in all things, ſaving the deſire to encreaſe the greatneſs of his empire; whereof he was poſſeſs'd in his father's time, while *Cyrus* made war in the north. *Cteſias* with others give him a longer reign than agreeth with the *Grecian* account before received.

In the fifth year of his ſole reign, and in the third year of the threeſcore and third *Olympiad*, according to [a]*Diodore* and *Euſebius*, he invaded *Egypt*, and having overthrown the king thereof, *Pſammeniticus*, he not only cauſed him to be ſlain, but alſo did put to death all his kindred and dependents, with the moſt of his children.

Herodotus and *Cteſias* give for cauſe of this war (being no other indeed than the ambition of *Cambyſes*) that when he ſent to *Amaſis* king of *Egypt*, to have his daughter in marriage, *Amaſis* preſented him with *Nitetis* the daughter of *Apries*, his predeceſſor, which *Cambyſes* diſdained.

Howſoever it were; true it is, that *Cambyſes* gathered an army fit for ſuch an enterpriſe and cauſed the ſame to march. But before they enter'd *Egypt*, *Amaſis* died, and left *Pſammeniticus*, whom *Cteſias* called *Amyrteus*, his ſucceſſor; who enjoyed *Egypt* after his father (according to the beſt copies of *Herodotus*) but ſix months, though other chronologers give him ſix years.

But how long ſoever he held the crown, in one battle he loſt it, and was himſelf taken priſoner.

It is ſaid that *Cambyſes*, following therein the example of *Cyrus*, did not only ſpare life to the conquered king, but that he alſo truſted him with the government of *Egypt*, and that upon ſome revolt, or ſuſpicion thereof, he cauſed him to be ſlaughter'd.

But the race of this king was not ſo extirpated, if we may believe *Herodotus* and *Thucydides*, but that he left a ſon called *Inarus*, who cauſed the *Egyptians* to revolt both from *Xerxes* and *Artaxerxes*.

That *Pſammeniticus*, was at the firſt entreated gently by *Cambyſes*, I hold it very improbable, if it be true which is alſo written of him, That he ſo much hated *Amaſis* the king of *Egypt*, who died before his arrival, that he cauſed his body to be drawn out of the grave, and after divers indignities uſed, commanded the ſame to be burnt, contrary to the cuſtom both of the *Egyptians* and *Perſians*. For the *Egyptians* uſed to powder their dead bodies with ſalt and other drugs, to the end the worms might not devour them. The [b]*Perſians* durſt not conſume them with fire, which they eſteemed as a God, and therefore feared to feed it with carrion.

SECT. III.

The reſt of Cambyſes's *acts.*

AFTER this victory obtained in *Egypt*, *Cambyſes* ſent an army into *Cyprus*, and conſtrained *Evelthon* king thereof to acknowledge him who before held that iſland of the *Egyptians*.

While *Cambyſes* yet buſied himſelf in *Egypt*, he ſo much deteſted the idolatry of that nation, as he cauſed the images themſelves, with the temples wherein they were worſhipped, to be torn down and defaced. This done, he directed a part of his army into *Libya* to overturn the temple of *Jupiter Ammon*; but the devil, in defence of his oratory, raiſed ſuch a tempeſt of Sand, wherewith the greateſt part of the country is covered, as the *Perſians* were therewith choaked and overwhelmed.

Notwithſtanding which miſadventure, *Herodotus* and *Seneca* report, that diſdaining to be reſiſted, he prepared the reſt of his army, which himſelf meant to conduct into thoſe parts, but that finding a beginning of thoſe incommodities, which his firſt-ſent troops had try'd, he chang'd his purpoſe. For tho' conquering kings have power over men, yet the elements do not obey them; according to that old *Engliſh* proverb: *Go, ſaith the king; ſtay, ſaith the tide.*

After his return from the attempt of *Ethiopia*, he cauſed *Apis*, the *Egyptian* bull, worſhipped by that nation as God, to be ſlain: a deed very commendable, had it proceeded from true zeal, and been executed as in ſervice of him that only is, and liveth. But ſoon afterwards, when in a dream it ſeemed unto him that *Smerdis* did ſit in the royal throne of *Perſia* (which apparition was verified in *Smerdis* the *Magus*) he gave it in charge to his favourite *Praxaſpes*, to murder *Smerdis* his brother. And having married his own ſiſters, contrary to the *Perſian* laws, he committed a moſt cauſeleſs and moſt deteſtable murder upon the one of them called *Meroe*, then by himſelf with child, becauſe ſhe bewailed the death of her brother *Smerdis*. I find it [c]written of this *Cambyſes*, That becauſe his predeceſſors obſerved religiouſly the ordinances of the empire, he aſſembled his judges and enquired of them, whether there were any law among the *Perſians* that did permit the brother to marry his own ſiſter; it being his own intent ſo to do: the judges (who had always either laws or diſtinctions in ſtore to ſatisfy kings and times) made anſwer, That there was not any thing written allowing any ſuch conjunction, but they notwithſtanding found it in their cuſtoms, that it was always left to the will of the *Perſian* kings, to do what beſt pleaſed themſelves; and ſo, as *Nauclerus* terms it, *invenerunt occaſionem:* that is as much as to ſay, The judges found a ſhift to pleaſe the king, and to ſecure themſelves. And yet, where it concerned not the king's private ſatisfaction, he cauſed *Siſamnus*, one of his judges, and perchance one of thoſe which favoured his inceſtuous match, to be flay'd alive, for an unjuſt judgment given, and his hide to be hung up over the judgment-ſeat. After which, beſtowing the father's office on his ſon, he willed him to remember that the ſame partiality deſerved the ſame puniſhment.

Among other his cruelties, that which he exerciſed againſt the ſon of his beloved *Praxaſpes*, was very ſtrange and ungrateful. For when he deſired to be truly informed by him what the *Perſians*

[a] Lib. 2. c. 2. Her. l. 3. p. 83, 84, 85. [b] *Neither did the* Romans *ever conſume their dead to aſhes, till the time of* Sylla *dictator; who cauſed his own to be devoured by that element, fearing the law called* Talionis, *or like for like, becauſe himſelf had untombed the carcaſe of* Caius Marius *after his death.* Her. l. 3. Plin. l. 6. c. 54. Stra. & Juſt. l. 1. pag. 87, 88. Her. l. 3. Sen. l. 7. [c] Her. p. 89, 90.

thought

thought of his conditions, *Praxaſpes* anſwer'd, That his virtues were followed with abundant praiſe from all men, only it was by many obſerv'd, that he took more than uſual delight in the taſte of wine: with which taxation inflamed, he uſed this replication: And are the *Perſians* double-tongu'd, who alſo tell me, that I have in all things excelled my father *Cyrus?* Thou *Praxaſpes* ſhalt then witneſs, whether in this report they have done me right: for if at the firſt ſhot I pierce thy ſon's heart with an arrow, then is it falſe that hath been ſpoken; but if I miſs the mark, I am then pleaſed that the ſame be accounted true, and my ſubjects believed. This being ſpoken, he immediately directed an arrow towards the innocent child, who falling down dead with the ſtroke, *Cambyſes* commanded his body to be opened, and his heart being broached on the arrow, this monſtrous tyrant greatly rejoicing, ſhew'd it to the father, with this ſaying inſtead of an epitaph: *Now* Praxaſpes *thou may'ſt reſolve thy ſelf, that I have not loſt my wits with wine, but the* Perſians *theirs, who make ſuch report.*

Many other barbarous cruelties he exerciſed, till at the laſt, according to the phraſe of our law, he became *felon de ſoy.* For when he was inform'd, that *Patizites*, and *Smerdis* the *Magi* (*Cedrenus* writeth them *Sphendanis* and *Cimerdius*) miniſters of his domeſtical affairs, taking advantage of the great reſemblance between *Smerdis* the king's brother, and *Smerdis* the *Magus*, poſſeſs'd themſelves of the empire, he made all haſte towards *Perſia*; and in mounting haſtily on horſe-back, his ſword diſ-ſheathing, pierced his own thigh, wherewith deadly wounded, falling into an over-late and remedileſs repentance of the ſlaughter which he had executed upon his own brother, he ſoon after gave up his wicked ghoſt, when he had reigned 8 years, accounting therein thoſe 7 months in which the *Magi* govern'd while he was abſent.

In *Cambyſes* the male-line of *Cyrus* failed. For he had no iſſue either by *Atoſſa* or *Meroe:* yet [a] *Zonaras* out of *Jerome* gives him a daughter called *Pantaptes*, and a ſon called *Orontes*; who being drowned in the river *Ophites* by *Antioch*, the ſame was afterwards in memory of the princes death, called *Orontes*.

He built the city of *Babylon* in *Egypt*, in the place where *Latopolis* was formerly ſeated, and that of *Meroe* in the Iſland of *Nilus*, calling it by the name of his ſiſter *Meroe*.

SECT. IV.

Of the Inter-regnum *between* Cambyſes *and* Darius.

CYRUS and his two ſons being now dead, and the kingdom in the poſſeſſion of one of the *Magi*, the counterfeit of *Smerdis*, the princes, or ſatrapa's, or provincial governours of the empire, (to wit *Otanes*, *Intaphernes*, *Gobrias*, *Megabyſus*, *Aſphatines*, *Hidarnes*, and *Darius*, who were all deſcended from *Achemenes* the firſt *Perſian* king) having diſcovered the fraud of this impoſture, joined their forces together, ſurprized and rooted out the conſpirator with his companions and aſſiſtants. In which action (ſaith *Juſtin*) *Intaphernes*, and *Aſphatines* were ſlain; but *Herodotus* otherwiſe, that they were only wounded; for he avoweth, that all the ſeven princes were preſent at the election following.

For the empire being now without a governour, theſe princes grew into conſultation how the ſame might be ordered from thenceforth. *Otanes* (one of the ſeven) did not fancy any election of kings, but that the nobility and cities ſhould confederate, and by juſt laws defend their liberty in equality, giving divers reaſons for his opinion, being, as it ſeemed, greatly terrified by the cruelties of *Cambyſes*: As firſt, that it was not ſafe to give all power to any one, ſeeing greatneſs it ſelf, even in good men, doth often infect the mind with many vices, and that liberty and freedom in all things is moſt apt to inſult, and to commit all manner of wicked outrage. Again, that tyrants do commonly uſe the ſervice of wicked men, and favour them moſt; they uſurp upon the laws of their country, take other men's wives by force, and deſtroy whom they pleaſe, without judgment.

Megabyſus was of another opinion, affirming that the tyranny of a multitude was thrice more intolerable than that of one. For the multitude do all things without judgment, run into buſineſs and affairs with precipitation, like raging and over-bearing floods.

He therefore thought it ſafeſt to make election of a few, and thoſe of the beſt, wiſeſt, and moſt virtuous, becauſe it is ever found that excellent counſels are ever had from excellent men.

Darius gave the third judgment, who perſwaded the creation of a king, becauſe even among few diuturnity of concord is ſeldom found, and in great empires it doth ever happen, that the diſcord of many rulers hath enforced the election of one ſupreme. It were therefore, ſaith *Darius*, far ſafer to obſerve the laws of our country, by which kingly government hath been ordained.

The other four princes adhered to *Darius* and agreed to continue the ſame imperial government, by God eſtabliſhed and made proſperous. And to avoid partiality, it was accorded that the morning following, theſe ſeven princes ſhould mount on horſe-back, and on him the kingdom ſhould be conferr'd, whoſe horſe, after the ſun riſing, ſhould firſt neigh or bray. [b] In the evening after this appointment was made, it is ſaid, that *Darius* conſulted with the maſter of his horſe *Oebarus*, who, in the ſuburbs of the city, where the election was reſolv'd of, cauſed the ſame horſe, whereon in the morning *Darius* was mounted, to cover a mare, who, as ſoon as he came into the ſame place, was the firſt horſe that brayed. Whereupon the other ſix princes deſcended from their horſes, and acknowledged *Darius* for their lord and king.

Plato, in the third of his laws, affirmeth, that in memory of the ſeven princes, whereof *Darius* himſelf was one, that deliver'd the empire from the uſurpation of the *Magi*, he divided the whole into ſeven governments; *Herodotus* ſaith, into twenty ſatrapies.

[a] Zon. Com. 2. p. 117.

[b] Her. 3. p. 100, 101.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of DARIUS, *the ſon of* Hyſtaſpes.

SECT. I.

Of Darius's *lineage.*

DARIUS was deſcended of the ancient *Perſian* kings, to wit, of the *Achæmenidæ*, of which *Cyrus* the great was the lineal ſucceſſor. For in this ſort *Herodotus* deriveth him, as before:

Cyrus the firſt, who had
Theiſpius, who begat
Ariaramnes, who was father of
Arſamnes, the father of
Hyſtaſpes, the father of
Darius, ſirnamed *Celus*, the father of *Xerxes*.

[a]*Hyſtaſpes* accompanied *Cyrus* the great in the wars againſt the *Scythians*; at which time *Cyrus* being made jealous of *Darius* by a dream of his own, cauſed him to be ſent into *Perſia*; others ſay, to be impriſoned, from whence by the death of *Cyrus* he was deliver'd, and made governour of the *Perſian Magi*. He afterwards followed *Cambyſes* into *Egypt*; he then join'd with the reſt of the princes againſt the *Magi*, and either by the [b] neighing of his horſe, or, as others affirm, by ſtrong hand, he obtained the empire, which he the more aſſured to himſelf, by taking two of *Cyrus*'s daughters, and as many of his nieces for his wives.

Hyſtaſpes, according to [c] *Herodotus*, had, beſides *Darius*, theſe three ſons, who were great commanders in the war which *Darius* made in *Aſia* the leſs, *Thrace*, *Macedon*, and *Greece*; *Atarnes*, *Artaphernes*, and *Artabanus*, who diſſuaded *Xerxes* from the ſecond *Grecian* war. *Hyſtaſpes* had alſo a daughter married to *Gobrias*, the father of *Mardonius*, who commanded the army of *Darius* in *Macedon*, and married the daughter of *Darius Artoſoſtre*, his couſin-german.

Reineccius gives to *Hyſtaſpes* five ſons, *Darius* who ſucceeded *Cambyſes*, *Artabanus*, *Artaphernes*, *Otanes*, and *Atarnes*, with two daughters.

SECT. II.

Of Darius's *government, and ſuppreſſing the rebellion of* Babylon.

DARIUS deviſed equal laws whereby his ſubjects might be governed, the ſame being formerly promiſed by *Cyrus*. He gave acceſs to all his ſubjects, and behaved himſelf ſo mildly to all men, that many nations deſired and offered themſelves to become his vaſſals: Only he laid divers payments and taxes on the people, which had not been accuſtomed in *Cyrus*'s time, to the value of fourteen thouſand five hundred and threeſcore talents, ſaith *Herodotus*.

The war which *Cambyſes* made afar off in *Egypt*, and the contention between the *Magi* and the princes of *Perſia* for the empire, gave heart to the *Babylonians* to recover their liberty, and to ſhake off the *Perſian* yoke; whereof *Darius* being advertiſed, he prepared an army to recover that city and ſtate revolted. But finding the ſame a difficult work, he uſed the ſervice of *Zopyrus*, who for the love he bare *Darius*, did cut off his own ears and noſe, and with other wounds yet freſh bleeding, he ſeemed to fly to the *Babylonians* for ſuccour, to whom he accuſed the cruelty of *Darius*; who, for having given him advice to give over the ſiege of their city, had in this ſort diſmember'd and deform'd him; whereupon the *Babylonians* gave him that credit, as they truſted him with the diſpoſition and commandment of their greateſt forces: which when *Zopyrus* had obtained, after ſome ſmall colourable overthrows given to the *Perſians* upon ſallies, he [d] delivered the city into *Darius*'s hands, who had lain before it twenty months.

SECT. III.

Of Darius's *favour to the* Jews, *in building the temple.*

IN the ſecond year of *Darius*, he gave order that the building of the temple at *Jeruſalem* ſhould go on, and commanded that the ſame ſhould be finiſhed at his own charge, and out of the revenues of the crown. And whereas the governours of thoſe provinces, which are ſituate between *Euphrates* and the *Phenician* and mid-land ſea (whom [e] *Ezra* calleth the captains beyond the river) had hinder'd the work in *Cambyſes*'s time, *Darius* gave commandment, that they ſhould not thenceforth come near unto *Jeruſalem*, to give any impediment to the building; but that they ſhould withdraw themſelves, and get them far off, till all were finiſh'd and at an end. In the old *Latin* it is written, *Procul recedite ab illis*, *Withdraw yourſelves far from them*; in our *Engliſh*, *Be ye far from thence*, to wit, from the city and temple now in building.

He alſo made a decree which concern'd his own ſubjects, that [f] *Whoſoever ſhould thenceforth hinder the ſetting up of the temple of God, that his houſe ſhould be torn down, and the diſturber hanged on the gallows made of the timber therof.* He alſo in the ſame decree maketh invocation to God; [g] *That hath cauſed his name to dwell there, (to) deſtroy all kings and people that put their hands to alter and to deſtroy this houſe of God which is in Jeruſalem*, &c. In four years after which decree (the *Jews* being really furniſh'd with money and all things neceſſary from *Darius*) the temple was in all finiſh'd, to wit, in the beginning of the ſpring, in the ſixth year of *Darius Hyſtaſpes*, and in the two and fortieth after their firſt return.

SECT. IV.

Of Darius's Scythian *war.*

AFTER the recovery of *Babylon* he invaded the *Scythians*, whoſe king [h] *Juſtin* calleth *Lauthinus*, and ſaith, that *Darius* undertook this war againſt him, becauſe he refuſed him his daughter in marriage. The better to convoy his army into *Scythia*, he built a bridge of ſmall veſſels over the river *Iſter* or *Danubius*, and gave the cuſtody

a Curt. l. 4. b Her. l. 1, 3. c Herodot. p. 154. p. 130. p. 101. and 202. p. 108, 109. Her. l. 6. p. 180. p. 186, 190. p. 179. p. 200, 204, and 213, 285, 286, p. 214, 254. De Reg. Perſar. fol. 32. d Her. l. 3. e Ezra c. 6. f Ib. 6. 11. g Ib. 6. 12. h Her. l. 4. Juſt. l. 2.

of the ſame in charge (among others of *Aſia* the leſs) to the *Ionians* and *Eolians*, among whom was *Miltiades*, who perſuaded the *Aſian Grecians* to break down the bridge, to the end *Darius* might not return thereby, and if by any other way, then not without great difficulty; but the ſame was reſiſted by *Hiſtiæus* prince of *Milet*, a city of *Ionia*, which nation, being a colony of the *Greeks*, [a] *Diodorus* calleth traytors to their country, becauſe they joined themſelves to *Darius*. But the *Scythians* more elegantly termed them good ſlaves, foraſmuch as they would not run away from their maſter, but were more mindful of doing their duties, than of ſhaking off their bondage, when they were preſented with as fair an occaſion of liberty as could have been deſir'd. For the great army of *Darius* entring the deſart country call'd *Beſſarabia*, found in it neither people to reſiſt them, nor any ſuſtenance to relieve them. For the *Scythians* were then, as are the *Chrim Tartars*, their poſterity, at this day, all horſe-men, uſing the bow and ſword. They were not ploughmen, but graſiers, driving their herds from one place to another, as opportunity of paſture led them. Standing towns they had none, but uſed for houſes the waggons wherein they carried their wives and children. Theſe waggons they place at every ſtation in very good order, making ſtreets and lanes in the manner of a great town, removeable at their pleaſure. Neither hath the emperor himſelf, call'd now the great *Chrim*, any other city than ſuch as *Agora* (as they name it) or town of carts. When as therefore *Darius* had wearied himſelf, and waſted his proviſion in thoſe deſolate regions, wherein he found neither ways to direct him, victuals to refreſh him, nor any houſes, fruitful trees or living creatures, nor any thing at all, which either he himſelf might make uſe of, or by deſtroying it might grieve his enemies, he began to perceive his own folly, and the danger into which he had brought himſelf. Yet ſetting a good face upon a bad game, he ſent brave meſſages to the *Scythian*, bidding him to ceaſe his flight, and either to make trial of his valour and fortune in plain battle; or, if he acknowledged himſelf the weaker, then to yield by fair means, and become his ſubject, giving him earth and water, which the *Perſians* uſed to demand as a ſign that all was yielded unto them. To this challenge the *Scythian* returned an hieroglyphical anſwer; ſending a bird, a frog, a mouſe, and five arrows: which dumb ſhew *Darius* interpreting by his own wiſh, thought that he did yield all the elements wherein thoſe creatures live, and his weapons withal into his hands. But *Gobryas*, one of the ſeven princes, who had ſlain the *Magi*, conſtrued their meaning aright, which was thus: *O ye Perſians, get ye wings like birds, or drive under the water or creep into holes in the earth, for elſe ye ſhall not eſcape our arrows.* And this interpretation was ſoon verified by the *Scythians* themſelves, who aſſailed the *Perſian* camp, drove the horſe-men into the trenches, and vexed the army with continual allarms day and night; were ſo fearleſs of this great monarch, and ſo little regarded him, that within his hearing, and even in his ſight, they did not forbear the paſtime of courſing a hare, which they had ſtarted by chance. By this boldneſs of theirs, *Darius* was ſo diſcouraged, that he forſook his camp by night, making many fires, and leaving all that were ſick, and weak behind him, and ſo with all ſpeed marched away towards the river *Iſter*. He was purſued hardly by the *Scythians*, who miſs'd him; yet arriving at the bridge before him, perſwaded the *Ionians* to depart, aſſuring them that the *Perſian* king ſhould never more be able to do them either good or harm. Which words had certainly been proved true, had not *Hiſtiæus* the *Mileſian* prevailed with his people, to attend the coming of *Darius*, whom the *Scythians* did likewiſe fail to meet, when they returned from *Iſter* to ſeek him out.

SECT. V.

Some actions of the Perſians *in* Europe, *after the* Scythian *war.*

DARIUS having thus eſcaped out of *Scythia*, determined the invaſion of *Thrace* and *Macedon*, in which war he employed *Megabaſus*, who maſter'd the *Peonians*, and tranſplanted them, and poſſeſs'd *Perinthus*, *Chalcedon*, *Byzantium*, and other places, being alſo ſoon after ſubjected, and added to the *Perſian* empire by *Otanes* the ſon of *Syſamnes*, whom *Cambyſes* had excoriated for falſe judgement. So were the cities of [b] *Selybria*, and [c] *Cardia* likewiſe taken in from the *Perſian*, who having now reduced under his obeiſance, the beſt part of *Thrace*, did ſend his ambaſſadors to *Amintas* king of *Macedon* adjoining, demanding of him by the earth and water, the ſoveraignty over that kingdom. *Amintas* doubting his own ſtrength, entertain'd the embaſſadors with gentle words, and afterwards invited them to a ſolemn and magnificent feaſt; the *Perſians* greatly deſired that the *Macedonian* ladies might be preſent: which being granted, the embaſſadors, who were well filled with wine, and preſumed upon their greatneſs and many victories, began to uſe ſuch embracings, and other laſcivious behaviour, towards thoſe noble ladies, as *Alexander* the king's ſon, great grandfather to *Alexander* the Great, diſdaining the *Perſians* barbarous preſumption, beſought his father to withdraw himſelf from the aſſembly, continuing notwithſtanding all honourable reſpect towards the embaſſadors, whom withal he entreated that the ladies might refreſh themſelves for a while; promiſing their ſpeedy return. This being obtained, *Alexander* cauſed the like number of well-favoured young men to cloath themſelves in the ſame garments, and to uſe the ſame attires which the ladies had worn at the feaſt, giving them in charge, that when the *Perſians* offered to abuſe them, they ſhould forthwith tranſpierce them with their long knives, of which they were provided for that purpoſe, which was accordingly perform'd. Charge was ſoon after given by *Darius* for a ſevere revenge of this murder: But *Alexander* ſomewhat before the death of *Amintas*, gave his ſiſter *Gygea* in marriage to *Bubaris*, a principal commander of *Darius*'s forces on that ſide, who perſuaded her huſband how helpful the alliance of *Macedon* would prove for the invaſion of *Attica* intended, ſo prevail'd, as *Alexander* eſcaped that tempeſt, which threaten'd to fall upon him very ſuddenly; the war of *Aſia* the leſs, called *Ionic*, falling out at the ſame time.

SECT. VI.

The firſt occaſion of the war which Darius *made upon* Greece, *with a rehearſal of the government in* Athens, *whence the quarrel grew.*

NOW the better to underſtand the reaſon and motives of that great war, which followed ſoon after, between the *Perſians* and *Grecians*, it is neceſſary to make a ſhort repetition of the ſtate of *Athens*, which city endured the hardeſt and worſt

[a] Diod. l. 11. [b] Her. l. 5. [c] *A maritime city of* Thrace *of the ſouth of* Conſtantinople a Cardia, *a city upon the* Cherſoneſus *of* Thrace, *afterwards* Lyſimachia. Pto. Pauſ.

brunt

brunt of *Darius*'s invaſion on that ſide the ſea, with admirable ſucceſs. Neither do I hold it any impertinence to be large in unfolding every circumſtance of ſo great a buſineſs as gave fire to thoſe wars which never could be thoroughly quenched, until in the ruin of this great *Perſian* monarchy, *Perſepolis* the capital city of the empire, was at the requeſt of an *Athenian* harlot conſumed with a flame, as dreadful, as, in the pride of their greatneſs, the *Perſians* had raiſed in *Athens*.

Now therefore as out of the former books it may be gathered how *Athens*, and other parts of *Greece*, were anciently governed, the ſame being already ſet down, tho' ſcatteringly, and in ſeveral times among other the contemporary occurrents of the eaſtern emperors, and the kings of *Judea*; ſo I thought it very pertinent in this place to remember again the two laſt changes in the ſtate of *Athens*. As for the *Lacedemonians*, they maintained ſtill their ancient polity under kings, tho' theſe alſo after ſome fifteen deſcents were bridled by the *Ephori*.

Codrus king of the *Athenians*, in the former books remember'd, who willingly died for the ſafety of his people, was therefore ſo honoured by them, as (thinking none worthy to ſucceed him) they changed their former government from monarchical to princes, for term of life, of which *Medron* the ſon of *Codrus* was the firſt, after whom they were called *Medontidæ*; and of theſe were twelve generations beſides *Medon*, to wit,

Ageſtus

Archippus, in whoſe times the *Greeks* tranſported themſelves into *Ionia*, after *Troy* an hundred and fourſcore years, according to *Euſebius*: which migration all other chronologers (ſuch as follow *Euſebius* herein excepted) find in the year after *Troy* fallen one hundred and forty.

Therſippas

Phorbas

Mezades

Diogenetus, in whoſe time *Lycurgus* gave laws to the *Spartans*.

Pheredus

Ariphron

Theiſpius, in whoſe time the *Aſſyrian* empire was overthrown by *Belochus* and *Arbaces*

Agamneſtor

Eſchylus, in whoſe time the *Ephori* (according to [a]*Euſebius*) were erected in *Lacedemon*.

Alcamenon, the laſt prince for life, after whoſe death the *Athenians* elected *decennial* governours: the former princes for life having continued in all three hundred and ſixteen years. The firſt of thoſe that governed for ten years, or the firſt *Archon* was

Charops, then

Eſymedes

Elydicus

Hippomenes

Leocrates

Abſander

Erixias was the laſt *Archon* of the *decennial* governours, which, from continuing threeſcore and ten years, was then changed into *annual* magiſtrates, mayors, and burg-maſters, of which *Theſeus* was the firſt, according to *Pauſanias*: others find *Leoſtratus*; and then

Anthoſtenes

Achimedes

Miltiades

Damiſtas

Draco

Megacles

Solon, and others who are the leſs to be regarded, by reaſon of the yearly change.

This *Solon* being a man of excellent wiſdom, gave laws to the *Athenians*, which were publiſhed, according to *Gellius*, in the three and thirtieth year of *Tarquinius Priſcus*, and were in after-ages derived unto the *Romans*, and by the *Decemviri* (magiſtrates in *Rome* created for that purpoſe) reduced into twelve tables, which were the ground of the *Roman* laws. But theſe goodly ordinances of *Solon* were in his own days violated, and for a while almoſt quite extinguiſhed. For whereas they were framed unto the practice and maintenance of a popular government, the ſtate of *Athens* was very ſoon changed into a monarchy by *Piſiſtratus* the ſon of *Hippocrates*; who finding the citizens diſtracted into two factions, whereof *Megacles* and *Lycurgus*, two citizens of noble families, were become the heads, took occaſion by their contention and inſolency to raiſe a third faction more powerful than the other two, and more plauſible, for that he ſeemed a protector of the citizens in general. Having by this means obtained love and credit, he wounded himſelf, and feigned that by malice of his enemies he had like to have been ſlain for his love to the good citizens; he procured a guard for his defence, and with that band of men ſurpriſing the ſtate-houſe, or citadel of *Athens*, he made himſelf lord of the town, *Hegeſiſtratus* being then governour. But the citizens, who in every change of government had ſought to remove themſelves further and further from the form of a monarchy, could ſo ill brook this uſurpation of *Piſiſtratus*, that he was driven, for lack of help, to fly the town, as ſoon as *Megacles* and *Lycurgus* (joining their forces) attempted his expulſion. Yet, as the building of his tyranny, founded upon the diſſenſion of the citizens, was ruined by their good agreement; ſo was it ſoon after well re-edified by the new breaking out of the old factions. For when *Megacles* found the power of *Lycurgus* to grow greater than his own, he did (as is the uſual practice of the weaker ſide) call in the common enemy *Piſiſtratus*, to whom he gave his daughter in marriage; by which alliance the family of the *Alcmæonidæ*, whereof *Megacles* was chief, became very powerful, yet ſo, that *Piſiſtratus* by their power was made maſter both of them and all the reſt. But this agreement held not long; the *Alcmæonidæ*, and eſpecially *Megacles*, being incenſed againſt *Piſiſtratus* for his miſdemeanour towards his wife. Wherefore they practiſed with the ſoldiers of the town, proceeding in their treaſon ſo ſecretly, and ſo far, that *Piſiſtratus* (upon the firſt diſcovery of their intent) perceived no other remedy for his affairs, than to withdraw himſelf from [b]*Eretria*, where he remained eleven years. Which time being expired, having hired ſoldiers out of many parts of *Greece*, he again recovered the principality of *Athens*, after which third obtaining his eſtate, he governed *Athens* ſeventeen years, according to *Ariſtotle*, and reigned in all thirty and three years, ſaith *Elianus*; but as *Juſtin* hath it, four and thirty; accounting the time belike as well before as after his ſeveral expulſions. *Herodotus* gives the father and the ſon ſix and thirty years; *Ariſtotle* five and thirty. But *Thucydides* affirmeth, that he died very old, leaving for his ſucceſſors his two ſons, *Hippias* and *Hipparchus*, who governed the *Athenians* with ſuch moderation,

[a] Pauſ. pag. 159. Dyonif. l. 3. Pauſ. p. 169. Pauſ. 170. pag. 331. [b] Her. l. 12. Eretria *a city of* Eubœa, *by others called* Melane. *&* Stephanus Eretria. Pol. 5. Heraclid. apud Elian. pag. 262. Juſt. p. 28. Her. l. 6. Thucyd. l. 6. c. 10.

as

as they rather ſeem'd the lineal ſucceſſors of a natural prince than of a tyrant. But in the end, and ſome three years before *Hippias* was expell'd out of *Athens*, his brother *Hipparchus* was murder'd by *Harmodius* and *Ariſtogiton*. The cauſe why, and the manner how perform'd, *Thucydides* hath written at large. And, tho' *Hipparchus* was charged with unnatural luſt after *Harmodius*, yet *Plato*, in his dialogue entitled *Hipparchus*, doth greatly magnify him, affirming that he was a prince of as many eminent virtues as that age had any, altogether condemning the murderers, and authors of that ſcandal. *Hippias* fearing that this enterpriſe upon his brother had more and deeper roots than were apparent, firſt ſought to diſcover the further intents of *Harmodius* and *Ariſtogiton*, by a harlot of theirs call'd *Lemnia*; who becauſe ſhe would not reveal her companions, did cut out her own tongue. Then did *Hippias*, the better to ſtrengthen himſelf, enter into a ſtrait amity with *Æantides*, tyrant of the city [a] *Lampſacus*, whom he knew to be greatly favour'd by *Darius*, to whoſe ſon *Hypoclus* he gave one of his daughters in marriage. But ſome three years after the death of his brother, doubting I know not what ſtrong practice againſt himſelf, he began to uſe the citizens with great ſeverity, which neither *Piſiſtratus* the father, nor *Hippias* himſelf had ever exerciſed, during their uſurpation, till this time. And therefore the *Athenians*, fearing that this diſeaſe might rather increaſe than diminiſh in *Hippias*, they ſtirred up *Cliſtines*, one of the nobleſt and beſt able of their city, to practiſe their delivery: who, calling to his aſſiſtance the baniſh'd *Alcmænidæ*, together with an army of the *Lacedemonians*, led by *Cleomenes* their king, ſo affrighted *Hippias*, as by compoſition he gave over his eſtate, and the poſſeſſion of *Athens*, and from thence embarking himſelf, took land at [b] *Sigeum*, whence he went to *Lampſacus* in *Myſia*, govern'd by *Æantides*, who preſented him to *Darius*. He was deprived of his eſtate, as *Herodotus* and *Thucydides* agree, twenty years before the battle of *Marathon*: all which time he continued, partly with *Æantides*, at other times with *Artaphernes*, lieutenant for *Darius* in *Sardis*, the metropolis of *Lydia*; perſuading and practiſing the enterpriſe upon *Athens*, which *Darius* in the end to his great diſhonour undertook, twenty years after *Hippias* had reſign'd his eſtate.

Thus far I have digreſſed from *Darius*, to the end the reader may conceive the better the cauſes and motives of this war: whereof the hope that *Hippias* had to be reſtored to *Athens* by the help of *Darius*, which made him ſollicit and perſuade the *Perſians* to conquer *Greece*, was one, but not the moſt urgent.

SECT. VII.

Of the Ionian *rebellion, which was the principal cauſe of the wars enſuing between* Greece *and* Perſia.

ANother, and a ſtrong motive to this expedition was the *Ionic* war, breaking out into *Aſia* about the ſame time. The colonies tranſported out of *Greece* into *Aſia*, which occupied the greateſt part of the ſea-coaſt, having enjoyed their liberty about 500 years, even from the *Ionic* migration, to the time of *Creſus*, were by this *Lydian* king made tributaries, and afterwards as parcel of his dominions were taken in by *Cyrus*, and left as hereditary ſervants to the crown of *Perſia*.

But as it is the cuſtom of nations half-conquer'd (witneſs *Ireland*) to rebel again upon every advantage and opportunity; ſo did the *Ionians*, and other *Grecians*, both in *Cyrus*'s life, and after him, ſeek by all means poſſible to free themſelves.

At this time they found ſuch men ready to ſpur them into rebellion, as had by the *Perſian* been given unto them for bridles to hold them in ſubjection. Every one of thoſe towns had a lord to rule it, whom they (abhorring the government of one man) called their tyrants. Theſe lords were very true to the *Perſian*, by whoſe only might they held the people in ſubjection. And this their dutiful affection they had well declared, when *Darius*, being in great extremity, they uſed all means to deliver him and his army (that otherwiſe had been loſt) out of the *Scythians* hand. Of this great piece of ſervice *Hiſtiæus*, the tyrant of *Miletus*, expected the chief thanks, as having been chief author of their expecting *Darius*, when the reſt, either perſuaded by the *Scythians*, or carried away with their own deſires, were ready to have abandon'd him. But it came ſo to paſs, that *Darius* being more fearful of the harm that *Hiſtiæus* (being powerful and crafty) might do to him in the future, than mindful of the good which he had already received at his hand, found means to carry him along to *Suſa*, where he detain'd him with all kind uſage of a friend, yet kept ſuch good eſpial upon him, as an enemy, he could not ſtart away. *Hiſtiæus* had ſubtilty enough to diſcover the king's purpoſe, which ill agreed with his own deſires. For he thought it more pleaſant, and more honourable, to rule as a prince in one fair city, having a ſmall territory, than to ſit and feaſt at the great king's table, and hear the counſels by which a large empire was managed; being himſelf an idle beholder, and enjoying with much reſtraint of liberty, none other pleaſures than a private man might beſtow upon himſelf.

Wherefore he bethought himſelf of raiſing of ſome tumults in the lower *Aſia*, to pacify which if he might be ſent, as one that had great experience and authority in thoſe quarters, it would afterwards be in his power to ſtay at home, and either ſatisfy the king with excuſes, or deal as occaſion ſhould require. Reſolving upon this courſe, he ſent very ſecret inſtructions to *Ariſtagoras* his kinſman, whom he had left his deputy at *Miletus*, adviſing him to ſtir up ſome rebellion. Theſe directions came ſeaſonably to *Ariſtagoras*, who having fail'd in an enterpriſe upon the iſle of *Naxos*, through the falſe dealing of a *Perſian*, his aſſociate, ſtood in fear of diſgrace, if not of ſome further ill that might befall him, as one that had waſted the king's treaſures to no good purpoſe.

Therefore he readily embraced the counſel: and the better to draw the whole country of *Ionia* into the ſame courſe which he determined to run, he abandon'd his tyranny, and ſet *Miletus* at liberty. This plauſible beginning won unto him the hearts of the *Mileſians*; and his proceeding with other *Ionian* tyrants (of whom ſome he took, and ſold as ſlaves to their citizens, others he chaſed away) cauſed the whole nation to be at his command. The *Perſian* fleet, whereof he lately had been admiral, in the enterpriſe of *Naxos*, he had ſurpris'd in his firſt breaking out, together with the principal officers and captains; ſo that now he thought himſelf able to deal with the great king's forces, lying thereabout either by land or ſea. But likely it was that the power of all *Aſia* would ſhortly be upon

[a] Lampſacus, *a city of* Myſia, *upon the* Helleſpont. Her. l. 5. Thucyd. l. 6. c. 1. [b] Sigeum, *a promontory oppoſite to the iſle of* Tenedos, *which* Ariſt. in 5. Animal. *calls* Idæ promontorium.

his

his neck, and cruſh both him and his aſſiſtants to pieces, unleſs he were able to raiſe an army that might hold the field, which the *Ionians* alone were inſufficient to perform. Therefore he took a journey to *Sparta*, where having aſſayed in vain with many arguments, and the offer of fifty talents, to win to his party *Cleomenes*, king of the *Lacedemonians*; he went from thence to *Athens*, and with better ſucceſs beſought the people to lend him their aſſiſtance. The *Athenian* embaſſadors, which had been ſent to the *Perſian* king's lieutenants in the lower *Aſia*, deſiring them not to give countenance to *Hippias*, now a baniſh'd man, and lately their tyrant, were a while before this return'd with ill anſwers, having found very churliſh entertainment. So that the evil which they were to expect in all likelihood from the *Perſian*, made them willing to begin with him. To which purpoſe, their conſanguinity with the *Ionians*, and the perſuaſions of *Ariſtagoras*, drew them on apace, if perhaps his treaſure were not helping. Twenty ſhips the *Athenians* furniſhed for this voyage; to which the *Eretrians* furniſh'd five more, in regard of the ancient kindneſs that had paſſed between the *Ionians* and them. With theſe and their own forces join'd, the *Ionians* enter'd the river *Caiſtrus*, which falleth into the ſea by *Epheſus:* by which advantage they ſurpriſed *Sardis*, when no enemy was heard of, or ſuſpected; inſomuch as *Artaphernes*, who ruled as vice-roy in thoſe parts, had no other hope of ſafety, than by retreating himſelf into the caſtle, which the *Grecians* could not force: from whence he beheld the ſlaughter of the citizens, and the city flaming.

The *Perſians* at length, mix'd with the burgers, began to encourage them to defence, and recover'd the market-place, ſtrengthen'd by the river *Pactolus*, which ran through it; and borrowing courage from deſperation, they both defended themſelves, and charged their enemies; who well adviſing themſelves, made all the haſte they could towards the ſea-ſide. But *Artaphernes*, having gather'd all the ſtrength he could, purſued the *Grecians*, and found them near *Epheſus*; where ſetting reſolvedly upon them, he ſlaughter'd a great part of their army, the reſt ſaving themſelves in *Epheſus*. In this fight *Evalcides*, captain of the *Eritreans*, periſh'd; but his fame and memory was by that excellent poet *Simonides* preſerv'd. After this overthrow, the *Athenians*, which were before ſent unto *Ariſtagoras*, and to the *Ionians*, could by no arguments of theirs, no not by their tears, be perſuaded to make any ſecond trial of their fortunes on that ſide the ſea.

Yet the burning of *Sardis* made a greater noiſe in the world, than the late good ſucceſs which the *Perſians* had in one or two ſkirmiſhes, could raiſe. Wherefore the *Ionians* bravely proceeding, won a great part of *Caria*; and ſending their fleet into the *Helleſpont*, got *Bizantium* and other towns into their hands. Yea, the *Cyprians*, lately ſubdued by *Cambyſes*, began hereupon to take heart; and entring into confederacy with the *Ionians*, who were able to give them aid by ſea, rebelled againſt the *Perſians*.

Theſe news coming to the ear of *Darius*, filled him with great indignation, and with an extreme hatred of the *Athenians*, upon whom he vowed to take ſharp revenge. As for the *Ionians*, his contempt of them, and their knowledge of his power, made him to think, that they would not have dared to attempt ſuch things, but by the inſtigation of thoſe to whom the ignorance of his great might had afforded the courage to provoke him. This was the main ground of the war commenced by *Darius*, and purſued by *Xerxes*, againſt *Athens:* To which the ſollicitation of *Hippias*, before remember'd, gave only ſome form and aſſiſtance; the buſineſs, when once it was thus far on foot, being like enough to have proceeded, tho' he had periſh'd ere it were advanced any further.

Some other occurrences in this *Ionian* commotion extended the quarrel of *Darius* againſt many of the iſlanders, if not againſt the whole nation of the *Greeks*; for all of them gave to his rebels free harbour: the iſlanders moreover did help to furniſh out a navy of three hundred and ſixty ſail againſt him. Theſe provocations did rather breed in him a deſire to abate their pride, than any fear of harm that they were like to do him. For what they had done at *Sardis* was but by ſurpriſe. In every fight they were beaten by the *Perſians*, who had not yet loſt the fruits of their diſcipline wherein *Cyrus* had trained them, nor all their ancient captains. In one ſea-fight by the iſle of *Cyprus*, the *Ionians* indeed had the upper-hand; but they were *Phenicians*, *Egyptians*, and *Cilicians*, whom they vanquiſh'd: neither was that victory of any uſe to them; the *Cyprians*, in whoſe aid they came, being utterly beaten by the *Perſian* army at land, and reduced into their old ſubjection. So had the *Perſians* likewiſe by open war and fair force overthrown the *Carians* in two battles, and reclaim'd that nation; as alſo they had recover'd the towns upon *Helleſpont*, with ſome *Eolian* and *Ionian* cities, when *Ariſtagoras* with his friends quitting *Miletus*, fled into *Thrace*, deſirous to ſet himſelf in *Amphipolis*, a colony of the *Athenians*. But the *Edonians*, on whoſe territory belike he landed, overthrew him, and cut his troops in pieces.

About the ſame time *Hiſtiæus*, the firſt mover of this inſurrection, came down into thoſe quarters; who having undertaken the performance of great matters to *Darius*, was glad to flee from his lieutenants, by whom his double-dealing was detected.

But this evaſion preſerv'd him not long. For after many vain attempts that he made, he was taken in fight by the *Perſians*, and haſtily beheaded, leſt the king ſhould pardon him, upon remembrance of old good-turns; as it ſeems that he would have done, by the burial which he commanded to be given to his dead body that was crucified, and by his heavy taking of his death.

Hiſtiæus had ſought to put himſelf into *Miletus*; but the citizens, doubting his conditions, choſe rather to keep him out, and make ſhift for themſelves, without his help. The ſtrength of their city by land, which had in old time withſtood the *Lydian* kings, and their good fleet, which promiſed unto them the liberty of an open ſea, embolden'd them to try the uttermoſt, when very few friends were left upon that continent to take their part. But their navy was broken as much by threatnings as by force; many of their companions and fellow-rebels forſaking them upon hope of pardon, and many being daunted with the cauſeleſs flight of thoſe that ſhould have aſſiſted them. Neither was it long before the town itſelf, being aſſaulted both by land and ſea, was taken by force, the citizens ſlain, their wives and children made ſlaves, and their goods a booty to the *Perſians*, whom for ſix years ſpace they had put to ſo much trouble.

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SECT. VIII.

The war which Darius *made upon* Greece, *with the battle of* Marathon, *and* Darius's *death.*

THIS war with good ſucceſs finiſh'd by the *Perſians*, and ſome attempts made on *Europe* ſide with variable ſucceſs; *Darius*, obſtinate in the enterpriſe and conqueſt of *Greece* (tho' at firſt he pretended to make the war but againſt the *Athenians* and *Eritreans*, who jointly aſſiſted the *Ionians* againſt him, and burnt *Sardis* in *Lydia*) did now by his embaſſadors demand an acknowledgment from them all: among whom, ſome of them not ſo well reſolv'd as the reſt, ſubmitted themſelves; as the [a] *Æginets*, and others. Againſt theſe the *Athenians* being inflamed (by the aſſiſtance of the *Lacedemonians*) after divers encounters forced them to give pledges, and to relinquiſh the party of the *Perſians*. *Cleomenes* led the *Lacedemonians* in this war, and caus'd his companion king *Demantus* to be depos'd: who thereupon fled to *Darius*, far the more confident of victory, by reaſon of theſe diſcords, alienations and civil wars among the *Greeks*. He therefore gave order to *Hippagoras* to prepare a fleet of ſhips, fit to tranſport his army over the *Helleſpont*; the ſame conſiſting of an hundred thouſand foot, and ten thouſand horſe. The charge in chief of his army he committed to *Datis*, accompanied and aſſiſted by *Hippias*, the ſon of *Piſiſtratus*, expell'd out of *Athens* twenty years before, and by *Artaphernes* his brother, governour of *Sardis*, and the ſea-coaſt of *Aſia* the leſs. Theſe commanders having their companies brought down to the ſea-ſide, embark'd themſelves in ſix hundred gallies and other veſſels; and firſt of all attempted the iſlands, call'd *Cyclades*, which lay in the mid-way between *Aſia* the leſs and *Greece*. For (obtaining thoſe places) the *Perſians* had then nothing to hinder the tranſportation of their forces over the *Ægean* ſea; but on the contrary, they might always both relieve themſelves in their paſſage, and ſhroud themſelves from all ſudden tempeſts and outrage.

To this end, they firſt poſſeſs'd themſelves of *Samos*; ſecondly, they attempted *Naxos*; which iſland the inhabitants, deſpairing of their own forces, abandon'd. So did the people of *Delos*, of which *Apollo* was native: which iſland *Darius* did not only forbear to ſack, but recalling the inhabitants, he gave order to beautify the places and altars of ſacrifice to *Apollo* erected. And having recover'd theſe and other iſlands, the *Perſians* directed their courſe for *Eretria* in *Eubœa*, for [b] that city (as already hath been ſhew'd) had aſſiſted the *Ionians* at the taking and firing of *Sardis*. In this iſland the *Perſians* took ground, and beſieged *Eretria* very ſtraitly; and after ſix days aſſault, partly by force, and in part by the treaſon of *Euphabus* and *Philagius*, they took it, ſack'd it, and burnt it to the ground. Thus far the winds of proſperous fortune fill'd their ſails. From *Eubœa* the *Perſians* paſs'd their army into *Attica*, conducted and guided by *Hippias*, late prince of *Athens*, and marching towards it, they encamp'd at *Marathon*, in the way from the ſea, where they landed, towards *Athens*.

The *Athenians*, finding the time arriv'd wherein they were to diſpute with their own virtues againſt fortune, and to caſt lots for their liberty, for their wives, their children, and their lives, put themſelves in the beſt order they could to make reſiſtance, and withal ſent away with ſpeed to the *Lacedemonians* for ſuccour, employing in that negotiation one *Phidippides*; who paſſing through *Arcadia*, encounter'd in the way a familiar devil, which he ſuppos'd to be *Pan*, who will'd him to aſſure the *Athenians* of victory, promiſing that ſome one of the gods ſhould be preſent at the battle, to aſſiſt them and defend them againſt the multitude of their enemies. *Phidippides* at his return, ſeeing he could not bring with him any preſent ſuccours from *Sparta*, yet he thought it greatly availing to bring news from the gods, and promiſe of aſſiſtance from heaven, which no doubt (tho' the device was ſomewhat likely to be his own, yet) it greatly encouraged the multitude and common people, who in all ages have been more ſtir'd up with fond prophecies, and other like ſuperſtitious fooleries, than by any juſt cauſe or ſolid reaſon.

The *Athenians* being now left to themſelves, with one thouſand only of the *Plateans* (who having been formerly defended by the *Athenians* againſt the *Thebans*, did in this extremity witneſs their thankfulneſs and grateful diſpoſition) began to diſpute, whether it were moſt for their advantage to defend the walls of *Athens*, or to put themſelves into the field with ſuch forces as they had, the ſame conſiſting of ten thouſand *Athenians*, and one thouſand of the *Plateans*. In the end, and after great diverſity of opinions, *Miltiades*, who perſuaded the trial by battle, prevail'd.

The armies being now in view, and within a mile of each other, the *Athenians* diſpos'd themſelves into three troops; two wings or horns, as they term them, and the body of a battle. The *Perſians*, when they perceiv'd ſo ſmall a troop advancing towards them, thought the *Athenians* rather diſpoſſeſs'd of their underſtandings, than poſſeſs'd with the reſolution whereof they made ſhew. So invincible and reſiſtleſs the *Perſians* eſteem'd their own numbers to be, and that ſmall troop of their enemies then in view, rather to be deſpis'd than to be fought withal. But in concluſion, the victory being doubtfully ballanced for a while, ſometimes the virtue of the *Grecians*, and ſometimes the numbers of the *Perſians* prevail'd; the *Grecians* fighting for all that they had, the *Perſians* for that they needed not: theſe great forces of *Darius* were diſorder'd, and put to rout, the *Athenians* following their victory even to the ſea-ſhore; where the *Perſians*, ſo many of them as loſt not their wits with their courage, ſav'd themſelves in their ſhips.

The *Perſian* army conſiſted of an hundred thouſand foot, and ten thouſand horſe; of which there were ſlain in the place ſix thouſand three hundred, and of the *Grecians* an hundred fourſcore and twelve. For howſoever it came to paſs, either by ſtrange viſions, which were afterwards call'd *Pannici terrores*, or by ſome other affright, it ſeemeth that the invading army, after the firſt encounter, fought with their backs towards their enemy, and loſt that number, by *Herodotus* ſet down, in their diſorderly retreat, or rather in their flat running away. As for *Juſtin*'s report, That two hundred thouſand of the *Perſian* army were ſlain, the ſame hath no appearance nor poſſibility of truth. In this fight *Hippias*, the perſuader of the enterpriſe, was ſlain, ſaith *Juſtin* and *Cicero*; but [c] *Suidas* tells, that he eſcaped, and died moſt miſerably in *Lemnos*.

The greateſt honour of this victory was caſt upon *Miltiades*, who both perſuaded the trial by battle,

[a] Herod. l. 6. *Whether this city or people were of* Peloponneſus *in* Sicyonia, *or of* Ægæa *between* Theſſalia *and* Macedon, *I do not know; but thoſe borderers, and next the enemy, were more likely to compound than the reſt far off. There is alſo a city call'd* Æginum, *not far from* Ægæa, Liv. 32, 33, &c. [b] In Herod. [c] Ad Att.

and

and behaved himſelf therein anſwerably to the counſel which he gave. *Themiſtocles* had his firſt reputation in this fight, being but young and of the firſt beard. Thoſe of the *Grecians*, of mark and commendment, that fell in the firſt encounter, were *Callimachus* and *Steſileus*. It is alſo ſaid, That *Cynegyrus* following the *Perſians* to their embarking, laid hands on one of their gallies, to have held it from putting off the ſhore; and having his right hand cut off, he yet offered to arreſt it with his left; of which alſo being deprived, he took hold of it with his teeth. This encounter happened in the firſt year of the threeſcore and twelfth *Olympiad*, about the time of the war made by *Coriolanus* againſt his fellow *Romans*: *Alexander* the ſon of *Amintas* being then king of *Macedon*, and *Phanippus* then governour of *Athens*, according to [a] *Plutarch*, or *Hybilides*, after *Halicarnaſſeus*.

This great fray thus parted, and the *Perſians* returned back into the leſſer *Aſia*, *Miltiades* ſought and obtained an employment againſt the iſlanders of *Paros*, one of the *Cyclades*, and paſſing over his companies in threeſcore and ten gallies, after ſix and twenty days aſſault, he broke his thigh, in ſeeking to enter it by the temple of *Ceres*, wherewith himſelf being made unable, and his companies diſcourag'd, he return'd to *Athens*: where thoſe ungrateful citizens forgetting all his ſervices paſt, and that of all other the moſt renowned at the battel of *Marathon*, did, by the perſwaſion of *Xantippus*, the father of *Pericles* (who envied his fame) caſt him into priſon, and ſet on him a fine of fifty talents; where his weak and wounded body being not able to endure the one, nor his eſtate to pay the other, he after a few days ended his life.

Which envy of the better ſort to each other, with their private factions, aſſiſted by the unthankful and witleſs people, brought them, not many years after, from a victorious and famous nation, to baſe ſubjection and ſlavery. *Miltiades* left behind him one ſon called *Cymon*, begotten on *Hegeſipila*, daughter of *Olorus* king of *Thrace*, who (ſaith *Plutarch*) was neither inferior to his father in valour, nor to *Themiſtocles* in underſtanding, but exceeded them both in juſtice and good government.

Now *Darius* taking greater care how to recover his honour, than ſorrow for the loſs he received in *Greece*, gave order for new levies of men, and all other warlike proviſions. But the *Egyptians* revolting from his obedience (a kingdom of great ſtrength and revenue) greatly diſtracted his reſolution for the re-invaſion of *Greece*. The diſſenſion alſo among his ſons, of whom the younger being born after he was king, and by ſo great a mother as *Atoſſa*, diſdained to give place to his elder brother, born before *Darius* obtained the empire, greatly vexed him. And laſtly, death, who hath no reſpect of any man's affairs, gave end to all his conſultations and enterpriſes, and joined him to the earth of his anceſtors, about a year after the battel of *Marathon*, and after that he had reigned ſix and thirty years. He left behind him five ſons, namely, *Artabaſanes*, born before he obtain'd the kingdom; *Xerxes*, who ſucceeded him; *Achemenes*, governour of *Egypt*; *Maſiſtes* and *Ariabignes*.

[a] In vita Ariſt.

CHAP. VI.

Of XERXES.

SECT. I.

The preparations of Xerxes *againſt* Greece.

XERXES received from his father, as hereditary, a double war, one to be made againſt the *Egyptians*, which he finiſhed ſo ſpeedily, that there is nothing remaining in writing how the ſame was performed: the other againſt the *Grecians*, of which it is hard to judge, whether the preparations were more terrible, or the ſucceſs ridiculous. In the conſultation for the proſecution of this war, which was chiefly bent againſt the *Athenians*, the princes of *Perſia* were divided in opinion. *Mardonius*, who had formerly commanded in *Thrace* and *Macedon*, under *Darius*, and had alſo *Hyſtaſpes* for his grandfather, as *Xerxes* had, and married *Xerxes*'s ſiſter *Artozoſtres*, perſwaded by many arguments the *European* war. But *Artabanus*, brother to the late *Darius*, and uncle to *Xerxes*, maintained the contrary counſel, laying before *Xerxes* the lamentable and ridiculous ſucceſs of the two late invaſions which *Darius* had made contrary to his counſel: the one in perſon upon the *Scythians*, the other by his lieutenants upon the *Greeks*; in each of which *Darius* left to his enemies both his army and his honour.

He therefore beſought *Xerxes* to be right well adviſed before he did too far imbark himſelf in this buſineſs. For whatſoever undertaking hath deliberate and found counſel for conductor, tho' the ſucceſs do not always anſwer the probability, yet hath fortune nothing elſe thereof to vaunt, than the variableneſs of her own nature, which only the divine Providence, and not any human power, can conſtrain.

But ſo obſtinate was the reſolution of *Xerxes* in proſecution of his former intent, that *Artabanus*, whether terrified by viſions (as it is written of him) or fearing the king's hatred, which he made known to all thoſe that oppoſed his deſire to this war (changing opinion and counſel) aſſiſted the *Grecian* expedition with all the power he had.

After the war of *Egypt* was ended, four years were conſumed in deſcribing and gathering an army for this invaſion: which being compounded of all nations ſubject to the *Perſian* empire, conſiſted of ſeventeen hundred thouſand foot, and eighty thouſand horſemen, beſides chariots, camels, and other beaſts for carriage, if we may believe [b] *Herodotus*: for of this multitude, *Trogus* finds the number leſs by ſeven hundred thouſand foot-men.

The commanders of the ſeveral nations were the princes of the blood of *Perſia*, either by marriage in the king's houſe or otherwiſe; for to theſe were all commandments of this nature given, ſome few people excepted, who had of their own leaders.

[b] Her. l. 7.

The

The charge of the whole army was beſtowed on *Mardonius*, the ſon of *Gobrias*, by a ſiſter of *Darius*, to whom were joined ſome others of *Xerxes*'s neareſt kindred, as generals over all; ſaving that the charge of ten thouſand ſelect *Perſians*, called the immortal regiment (becauſe if any one of the whole number died or were ſlain, there was another preſently choſen in his ſtead) was given to *Hydarnes*; the eighty thouſand horſemen were led by the ſons of *Datis*, who commanded the late army of *Darius* in *Greece*.

The fleet of gallies were two thouſand two hundred and eight, furniſhed by the *Phenicians*, who had commanders of their own nation, and by the *Cypriotes*, *Cilicians*, *Pamphilians*, *Lycians*, *Dorians*, *Carians*, *Ionians*, *Eolians*, and *Helleſpontines*; who were truſted with the furniſhing of their own veſſels, tho' commanded by the princes of *Perſia*, as by *Ariabignes*, the ſon of *Darius* and others. The reſt of the veſſels for tranſportation were three thouſand. There were alſo certain gallies furniſhed by *Artemeſia*, the daughter of *Lygdames*, princeſs of *Halicarnaſſeus* and the iſlands adjoining, which her ſelf commanded. Thoſe gallies by her prepared and furniſhed, exceeded all the reſt of the fleet, excepting thoſe of *Zidon*, in which *Xerxes* himſelf was imbarked.

SECT. II.

Xerxes's *army entertained by* Pythius: *his cutting off mount* Athos *from the continent: his bridge of boats over the* Helleſpont: *and the diſcourſe between him and* Artabanus *upon the view of the army.*

WHEN this world of an army was thoroughly furniſhed, he cauſed all the nations, of which it was compounded, to make their rendezvous, and repair at *Sardis* in *Lydia*. And when he had aſſembled to the number of ſeventeen hundred thouſand foot, as he enter'd the border of *Celenas*, he was by one *Pythius* a *Lydian* entertained, who out of his flocks and herds of cattel gave food to *Xerxes* and his whole army. The feaſt ended, he alſo preſented him with two thouſand talents of ſilver, and in gold four millions, wanting ſeven thouſand of the *Perſian Darici*; which make ſo many of our marks.

The king, overcome with the exceeding liberality of *Pythius*, did not only refuſe his treaſure offered, but commanded that ſeven thouſand *Darici* ſhould be given him to make up his four millions, of which ſo many thouſands were wanting when he made the preſent. But ſoon after, when *Pythius* beſought him to ſpare one of his five ſons from his attendance into *Greece* (becauſe himſelf was old and had none whom he could ſo well truſt as his own ſon) *Xerxes* moſt barbarouſly cauſed the young man, for whom his father ſought exemption, to be ſundered into two parts, commanding that the one half of his carcaſe ſhould be laid on the right, and the other half on the left hand of the common way by which the army marched.

Two things he commanded to be done before he came to the ſea-ſide. The one was a paſſage for gallies to be cut behind mount *Athos*, making the ſame (with the half-iſland or head-land, whereon it ſtood) to be an entire iſland, ſundering thereby from the continent of *Thrace* five cities, beſides the mountain and the *Cherſoneſus*, or neck of land it ſelf; a work of more oſtentation, than of uſe, and yet an enterpriſe of no great wonder, the valley which held it to the continent having but twelve furlongs (which make about a mile and a half) to cut through, and the ditch being broad enough only for two gallies to paſs in front. The cities ſo ſevered from the main, were *Dion*, *Olophyxus*, *Acrothoon*, *Thyſus* and *Cleonæ*.

He alſo gave order, that a bridge upon boats ſhould be made over the *Helleſpont* between *Abidus* and *Seſtos*, the ſea there having a mile of breadth, wanting an eighth part; which after the finiſhing, was by a tempeſt torn aſunder and diſſevered: wherewith *Xerxes* being more enraged than diſcouraged, commanded thoſe to be ſlain that were maſters of the work, and cauſed ſix hundred threeſcore and fourteen gallies to be coupled together, thereon to frame a new bridge; which, by the art and induſtry of the *Phenicians*, was ſo well anchored to reſiſt both winds blowing into and from the *Euxine* ſea, as the ſame being well boarded and railed, the whole army of ſeventeen hundred thouſand foot, and fourſcore thouſand horſe, with all the mules and carriages, paſs'd over it into *Europe* in ſeven days and ſeven nights, without intermiſſion. This tranſportation of armies did *Ceſar* afterwards uſe. And *Caligula*, that mad emperor, in imitation of *Xerxes*'s bridge, did build the like.

The bridge finiſhed, and the army brought near to the ſea-ſide, *Xerxes* took a view of all his troops, aſſembled in the plains of *Abidus*, being carried up, and ſeated on a place over-topping the land round about it, and the ſea adjoining: and after he had gloried in his own happineſs, to behold and command ſo many nations and ſo powerful an army and fleet, he ſuddenly (notwithſtanding) burſt out into tears, moved with this contemplation, that in one hundred years there ſhould not any one ſurvive of that marvellous multitude: the cauſe of which ſudden change of paſſion when he uttered to *Artabanus* his uncle, *Artabanus* ſpake to the king to this effect: That which is more lamentable than the diſſolution of this great troop within that number of years remember'd by the king, is, that the life it ſelf which we enjoy is yet more miſerable than the end thereof: for in thoſe few days given us in the world, there is no man among all theſe, or elſewhere, that ever found himſelf ſo accompanied with happineſs, but that he oftentimes pleaſed himſelf better with the deſire and hope of death, than of living; the incident calamities, diſeaſes and ſorrows whereto mankind is ſubject, being ſo many and inevitable, that the ſhorteſt life doth oftentimes appear unto us over-long; to avoid all which, there is neither refuge nor reſt, but in deſired death alone.

With this melancholy diſcourſe *Xerxes* being not much pleaſed, prayed *Artabanus* not to overcaſt thoſe joys which they had now in purſuit, with ſad remembrances. And holding ſtill a doubtful conceit, that *Artabanus* utterly condemned the invaſion of *Greece*, againſt which he had formerly given many ſtrong reaſons, deſired him to deal freely with him, whether he were return'd to his firſt reſolution, that the enterpriſe of *Greece* could not be proſperous; or whether, according to the change of mind put into him by his late viſion, he was confident of good ſucceſs? *Artabanus*, notwithſtanding that he aſſured himſelf of the king's reſolution to go on, and dared not by any new arguments to batter the great purpoſe it ſelf, yet he told the king, that there were two things which marvellouſly affrighted him, and which the king ſhould find, as he feared, to be moſt adverſe; to wit, the ſea and the land: the ſea, becauſe it had no-where in that part of the world any port capable of ſo great a fleet; inſomuch, as if any tempeſt ſhould ariſe, all the continent of *Greece* could hardly receive them, nor all the havens thereof afford them any ſafety: and therefore

fore when any ſuch ſhelter ſhall be wanting unto them, he prayed him to underſtand, that in ſuch a caſe of extremity, men are left to the will and diſpoſition of fortune, and not fortune to the will and diſpoſition of men. The land, beſides other incommodities, will be found by ſo much the more an enemy, by how much the unſatiate deſire of man to obtain more and more thereof, doth lead him forward: for were there no man found to give reſiſtance, yet the want of means to feed ſuch an army, and the famine which cannot be prevented, will, without any other violence offered, diſenable and conſume it. By theſe arguments *Artabanus* hoped to have diverted *Xerxes*, not daring perchance to utter what indeed he moſt feared, to wit, the overthrow of the army it ſelf, both by ſea and land, which ſoon after followed. Theſe cautions were exceeding weighty, if *Xerxes*'s obſtinancy had not miſpriſed them. For to invade by ſea upon a perilous coaſt, being neither in poſſeſſion of any port, nor ſuccoured by any party, may better fit a prince preſuming on his fortune, than enriched with underſtanding. Such was the enterpriſe of *Philip* the ſecond upon *England* in the year 1588, who had belike never heard of this counſel of *Artabanus* to *Xerxes*, or forgotten it.

Now concerning the ſecond point; it is very likely that *Xerxes*'s army, which could not have in it leſs than two millions of ſouls, beſides his beaſts for ſervice and carriage, ſhould after a few days ſuffer famine; and uſing *Machiavel*'s words, *Mourire ſans couſteo*; *die without a knife*. For it was impoſſible for *Greece*, being a ragged, ſtrait, and mountainous country, to yield food (beſides what ſerved themſelves) for twenty hundred thouſand ſtrangers whom they never meant to entertain, but with the ſharpned points of their weapons, deſtroying withal whatſoever they could not well incloſe and defend. Nay, if we may believe *Herodotus*, the army of *Xerxes*, being reviewed at *Thermopylæ*, conſiſted of five millions, two hundred eighty-three thouſand, two hundred and twenty men, beſides landreſſes, harlots and horſes, and was therefore likely to endure a ſpeedy famine.

The effect of *Xerxes*'s anſwer, was, that it was impoſſible to provide for all things; and that whoſoever ſhould enterpriſe any great matter, if he gave the hearing to all that could be objected of accidental inconveniencies, he ſhould never purſue the ſame farther than the diſpute and conſultation: which if his predeceſſors, the *Perſian* kings, had done, they had never grown to that greatneſs, or poſſeſs'd ſo many kingdoms and nations, as they now did; and therefore concluded, that great enterpriſes were never undertaken without great peril. Which reſolution of *Xerxes* was not to be condemned, if any neceſſity had inforced him to that war. But ſeeing the many nations newly conquered, which he already commanded, were more than could be conſtrained to obedience any longer than the powerful proſperity of the *Perſians* endured, and that *Greece* were ſeparated by the ſea from the reſt of *Xerxes*'s dominions (of whoſe reſolution his father *Darius* had made a dear experience) the fruit of this war was anſwerable to the plantation, and the ſucceſs and end agreeable to the weak counſel whereon it was grounded. Furthermore, thoſe millions of men which he tranſported, and yet in his own judgment not ſufficient (for he gathered, in marching on, all the ſtrength of *Thrace* and *Macedon*) were an argument, that he rather hoped to affright the *Greeks* by the fame of his numbers, than that he had any confidence in their valour and reſolution whom he conducted. For it is wiſely ſaid of thoſe unaccountable multitudes: *Non vires habent, ſed pondus*; & *impedimenta potius ſunt, quam auxilium*; They are great in bulk, but weak in forces, and rather a luggage than an aid.

Beſides, as it was impoſſible to marſhal ſuch a world of men in one army, ſo the divers nations, ſpeaking divers languages, bred the ſame confuſion among the *Perſian* commanders when they came to fight, as it did to the builders of *Babel*, when they came to work. Whereas, if *Xerxes* had of his five millions compounded ten armies of fifty thouſand choſen ſoldiers in each, and ſent them yearly into *Greece* well victualled and furniſhed, he had either prevailed by the ſword, or forced them to forſake their territory, or brought them into obedience by neceſſity and famine, which cannot be reſiſted. But while *Xerxes* reſolved to cut down the banks of *Greece* and to let in a ſea of men upon them, he was deceived both of his own hopes, and in their hearts whom he employed, and beaten by the *Greeks* both by land and ſea; yea, he himſelf, conducted by his fear, fled ſhamefully into *Aſia*. A great part of his army was buried in *Greece*: the remainder whereof, which winter'd in *Theſſaly*, and led by *Mardonius* who perſwaded the enterpriſe, was in the ſummer following utterly defeated, and himſelf ſlain.

SECT. III.

Of the fights at Thermopylæ *and* Artemiſium.

AFTER ſuch time as *Xerxes* had tranſported the army over the *Helleſpont*, and landed in *Thrace* (leaving the deſcription of his paſſage along that coaſt, and how the river of *Liſſus* was drunk dry by his multitudes, and the lake near to *Piſſyrus* by his cattel, with other accidents in his marches towards *Greece*) I will ſpeak of the encounters he had, and the ſhameful and incredible overthrows which he receiv'd. As firſt at *Thermopylæ*, a narrow paſſage of half an acre of ground, lying between the mountains, which divide *Theſſaly* from *Greece*, where ſometime the *Phocians* had raiſed a wall with gates which was then for the moſt part ruined. At this entrance *Leonidas*, one of the kings of *Sparta*, with three hundred *Lacedemonians*, aſſiſted with one thouſand *Tegeatæ* and *Mantineans*, one thouſand *Arcadians*, and other *Peloponneſians*, to the number of three thouſand one hundred in the whole, beſides one thouſand *Phocians*, four hundred *Thebans*, ſeven hundred *Theſpians*, and all the forces (ſuch as they were) of the bordering *Locrians*, defended the paſſage two whole days together, againſt that huge army of the *Perſians*. The valour of the *Greeks* appeared ſo excellent in this defence, that in the firſt day's fight, *Xerxes* is ſaid to have three times leaped out of his throne, fearing the deſtruction of his army by one handful of thoſe men, whom not long before he had utterly deſpiſed; and when the ſecond day's attempt upon the *Greeks* had proved in vain, he was altogether ignorant how to proceed further: and ſo might have continued, had not a runagate *Grecian* taught him a ſecret way, by which part of his army might aſcend the ledge of mountains, and ſet upon the backs of thoſe who kept the ſtraits. But when the moſt valiant of the *Perſian* army had almoſt encloſed the ſmall forces of the *Greeks*, then did *Leonidas*, king of the *Lacedemonians*, with his three hundred, and ſeven hundred *Theſpians*, which were all that abode by him, refuſe to quit the place which they had undertaken to make good, and with admirable courage not only reſiſt that world of men which charged them on all ſides; but iſſuing out of their ſtrength, made ſo great a ſlaughter of their enemies, that they might well be called vanquiſhers, tho' all of them were ſlain upon the place. *Xerxes*, having

having loſt in this laſt fight, together with twenty thouſand other ſoldiers and captains, two of his own brethren, began to doubt what inconvenience might befal him by the virtue of ſuch as had not been preſent at theſe battels, with whom he knew that he ſhortly was to deal. Eſpecially of the *Spartans* he ſtood in great fear, whoſe manhood had appeared ſingular in this trial, which cauſed him very carefully to enquire what numbers they could bring into the field. It is reported of *Dieneces* the *Spartan*, that when one thought to have terrified him by ſaying, that the flight of the *Perſian* arrows was ſo thick as would hide the ſun, he anſwered thus: *It is very good news, for then ſhall we fight in the cool ſhade.*

Such notable reſolution having as freely been expreſſed in deeds, as it was uttered in words, cauſed the *Perſian* to ſtand in great doubt, when he heard that the city of *Sparta* could arm well-nigh eight thouſand men of the like temper, and that the other *Lacedemonians*, tho' inferiour to thoſe, were very valiant men. Wherefore he asked counſel of *Demaratus*, a baniſhed king of the *Spartans*, who had always well adviſed and inſtructed him in the things of *Greece*, what courſe was fitteſt to be taken in his further proceedings. The opinion of *Demaratus* was, that all the land-forces ſhould aſſemble together to defend *Iſthmus*, that ſtreight neck of ground which joineth *Peloponneſus* to the continent. For which cauſe he adviſed, that three hundred ſhips well manned, ſhould be ſent unto the coaſts of *Laconia*, to ſpoil the country, and to hold the *Lacedemonians* and their neighbours buſied at home; whilſt *Xerxes*, at his leiſure having ſubdued the reſt, might afterwards bring his whole power upon them, who remaining deſtitute of ſuccour, would be too weak alone to make reſiſtance. To this purpoſe alſo the ſame *Demaratus* further adviſed; that the ſaid fleet of three hundred ſhips ſhould ſeize upon the iſland then call'd *Cythera*, now *Cerigo*, which lying near to the coaſt of *Laconia*, might ſerve as a fit place of rendezvous upon all occaſions, either of their own defence, or endamaging the enemy: whereby that ancient ſpeech of *Chilon* the *Lacedemonian* ſhould be verified, that it were better for his countrymen to have that iſle drowned in the ſea, than ſtand ſo inconveniently for them as it did. What effect this counſel might have taken, had it been followed, it is not eaſy to gueſs. But a contrary opinion of *Achemenes*, brother to king *Xerxes*, was preferred as the ſafer. For the *Perſian* fleet had been ſorely vexed with a grievous tempeſt, which continued three whole days together, wherein were loſt upon the coaſt of *Magneſia*, four hundred ſhips of war, beſides other veſſels innumerable, accordingly as *Artabanus* had foreſeen, that if any ſuch calamity ſhould overtake them, there would not be found any harbour wide enough to give them ſuccour. Therefore *Achemenes* perſuaded his brother not to diſperſe his fleet; for if (ſaid he) after the loſs of four hundred ſhips we ſhall ſend away other three hundred to ſeek adventures, then will the *Greeks* be ſtrong enough by ſea to encounter the reſt of the navy, which, holding all together, is invincible. To this counſel *Xerxes* yielded, hoping that his land-army and fleet, ſhould each of them ſtand the other in good ſtead, whilſt both held one courſe, and lay not far aſunder. But herein he was far deceived; for about the ſame time that his army had felt the valour of the *Greeks* by land, his navy likewiſe made a ſorrowful proof of their ſkill and courage at ſea. The *Grecian* fleet lay at that time at *Artemiſium*, in the ſtraits of *Eubœa*, where the *Perſians* thinking to encompaſs them, ſent two hundred ſail about the iſland to fall upon them behind, uſing a like ſtratagem to that which their king did practiſe againſt *Leonidas*, in a caſe not unlike, but with far different ſucceſs. For that narrow channel of the ſea, which divideth *Eubœa* from the main, was in the ſame ſort held by a navy of two hundred and ſeventy-one ſail againſt the huge *Perſian* armada, as the ſtraits of *Thermopylæ* had formerly been maintained by *Leonidas*, till he was circumvented, as this navy might have been, but was not. The departure of thoſe two hundred ſhips, that were ſent about the iſland, and the cauſe of their voyage, was too well known in the *Perſian* fleet, and ſoon enough diſcloſed to the *Greeks*, who ſetting ſail by night, met them with a counter-ſurpriſe, taking and ſinking thirty veſſels, inforcing the reſt to take the ſea; where, being overtaken with foul weather, they were driven upon the rocks, and caſt all away. Contrariwiſe, the navy of the *Greeks* were increaſed by the arrival of fifty-three *Athenian* ſhips, and one *Lemnian*, which came to their party in the laſt fight. As theſe new forces encouraged the one ſide, ſo the fear of *Xerxes*'s diſpleaſure ſtirr'd up the other to redeem their loſs with ſome notable exploit. Wherefore ſetting aſide their unfortunate policy, they reſolved in plain fight to repair their honour, and caſting themſelves into the form of a creſcent, thought ſo to incloſe the *Greeks*, who readily did preſent them battel at *Artemiſium*.

The fight endured from noon till night, and ended with equal loſs to both parties. For, tho' more of the *Perſians* ſhips were ſunk and taken, yet the leſſer loſs fell altogether as heavy upon the *Grecian* fleet, which being ſmall, could worſe bear it. Herein only the *Barbarians* may ſeem to have had the worſe, that they forſook the place of fight, leaving the wrack and ſpoils to the enemy, who nevertheleſs were fain to abandon preſently even the paſſage which they had undertaken to defend; both for that many of their ſhips were ſorely cruſh'd in the battel, and eſpecially becauſe they had received advertiſement of the death of *Leonidas* at *Thermopylæ*. Before they weigh'd anchors, *Themiſtocles*, general of the *Athenians*, engrav'd upon a ſtone at the watering-place an exhortation to the *Ionians*, that either they ſhould revolt unto the *Greeks* or ſtand neutral; which perſuaſion, he hoped, would either take ſome place with them, or at the leaſt make them ſuſpected by the *Perſians*.

SECT. IV.

The attempt of Xerxes *upon* Apollo's *temple: and his taking of* Athens.

WHEN *Xerxes* had paſs'd the ſtraits of *Thermopylæ*, he waſted the country of the *Phocians*, and the regions adjoining: as for the inhabitants, they choſe rather to fly, and reſerve themſelves to a day of battel, than to adventure their lives into his hands, upon hope of ſaving their wealth, by making proffer unto him of their ſervice. Part of his army he ſent to ſpoil the temple of *Delphi*, which was exceeding rich by means of many offerings that had been made by divers kings and great perſonages; of all which riches it was thought that *Xerxes* had a better inventory than of the goods left in his own palace. To make relation of a great aſtoniſhment that fell upon the companies which arrived at the temple to have ſack'd it, and of two rocks that breaking from the mount *Parnaſſus*, overwhelmed many of the *Barbarians*, it were peradventure ſomewhat ſuperſtitious. Yet *Herodotus*, who lived not long after, ſaith, that the broken rocks remained, even to his memory in the temple of *Minerva*, whither they rolled in their fall. And ſurely this attempt

attempt of *Xerxes* was impious; for ſeeing he believ'd that *Apollo* was a god, he ſhould not have dared to entertain a covetous deſire of enriching himſelf by committing ſacrilege upon his temple. Wherefore it may poſſibly be true, that licence to chaſtiſe his impiety, in ſuch manner as is reported, was granted unto the devil, by that holy one, who ſaith, [a] *Will a man ſpoil his gods?* and elſewhere, [b] *Hath any nation changed their gods, which yet are no gods? Go to the iſles of Kittim, and behold, and ſend to Kedar, and take diligent heed, and ſee whether there be any ſuch things.* Now this impiety of *Xerxes* was the more inexcuſable, for that the *Perſians* alledg'd the burning of *Cybele*'s temple by the *Athenians*, when they ſet fire on the city of *Sardis* in *Aſia*, to be the ground and cauſe of the waſte which they made in burning of cities and temples in *Greece*. Whereas indeed, in the enterpriſe againſt *Delphos*, this vizzor of holy and zealous revenge falling off, diſcover'd the face of covetouſneſs ſo much the more ugly, by how much the more themſelves had profeſſed a deteſtation of the offence which the *Athenians* had committed in that kind by mere miſchance.

The remainder of that which *Xerxes* did may be expreſſed briefly thus: *He came to Athens, which finding forſaken, he took and burnt the citadel and temple which was therein.* The citadel indeed was defended a while by ſome of more courage than wiſdom, who literally interpreting *Apollo*'s oracle, *That Athens ſhould be ſafe in wooden walls*, had fortify'd that place with boards and paliſſadoes; too weak to hold out long, tho' by their deſperate valour ſo well maintain'd at the firſt aſſault, that they might have yielded it upon tolerable conditions, had they not vainly relied upon the prophecy; whereof (being ſomewhat obſcure) it was wiſely done of *Themiſtocles*, to make diſcretion the interpreter, applying rather the words to the preſent need, than faſhioning the buſineſs to words.

SECT. V.

How Themiſtocles *the* Athenian *drew the* Greeks *to fight at* Salamis.

THE *Athenians* had, before the coming of *Xerxes*, remov'd their wives and children into *Trœzene*, *Ægina*, and *Salamis*, not ſo highly prizing their houſes and lands, as their freedom, and the common liberty of *Greece*. Nevertheleſs this great zeal, which the *Athenians* did ſhew for the general good of their country, was ill requited by the other *Greeks*, who with much labour were hardly intreated to ſtay for them at *Salamis*, whilſt they remov'd their wives and children out of the city. But when the city of *Athens* was taken, it was preſently reſolv'd upon, that they ſhould forſake the iſle of *Salamis*, and withdraw the fleet to *Iſthmus*; which neck of land they did purpoſe to fortify againſt the *Perſians*, and ſo to defend *Peloponneſus* by land and ſea, leaving the reſt of *Greece* as indefenſible to the fury of the enemy. So ſhould the iſlands of *Salamis* and *Ægina* have been abandon'd, and the families of the *Athenians* (which were there beſtow'd as in places of ſecurity) have been given over into mercileſs bondage. Againſt this reſolution, *Themiſtocles*, admiral of the *Athenian* fleet, very ſtongly made oppoſition, but in vain. For the *Peloponneſians* were ſo poſſeſs'd with fear of loſing their own, which they would not hazard, that no perſuaſions could obtain of them, to regard the eſtate of their diſtreſſed friends and allies. Many remonſtrances *Themiſtocles* made unto them, to allure them to abide the enemy at *Salamis*; as firſt in private unto *Eurybiades* the *Lacedemonian*, admiral of the whole fleet, That the ſelf-ſame fear, which made them forſake thoſe coaſts of *Greece*, upon which they then anchor'd, would afterwards (if it found no check at the firſt) cauſe them alſo to diſſever the fleet, and every one of the confederates to withdraw himſelf to the defence of his own city and eſtate; then to the council of war, which *Eurybiades* upon this motion did call together (forbearing to object what want of courage might work in them hereafter) he ſhew'd that the fight at *Iſthmus* would be in an open ſea, whereas it was more expedient for them, having the fewer ſhips, to determine the matter in the ſtraights; and that, beſides the ſafeguard of *Ægina*, *Megara*, and *Salamis*, they ſhould, by abiding where they then were, ſufficiently defend *Iſthmus*, which the *Barbarians* ſhould not ſo much as once look upon, if the *Greeks* obtain'd victory by ſea: which they could not ſo well hope for elſewhere, as in that preſent place which gave them ſo good advantage. All this would not ſerve to retain the *Peloponneſians*, of whom one, unworthy of memory, upbraided *Themiſtocles* with the loſs of *Athens*, blaming *Eurybiades* for ſuffering one to ſpeak in the council, that had no country of his own to inhabit. A baſe and ſhameful objection it was, to lay as a reproach that loſs, which being voluntarily ſuſtain'd for the common good, was in true eſtimation by ſo much the more honourable, by how much it was the greater. But this indignity did exaſperate *Themiſtocles*, and put into his mouth a reply ſo ſharp, as avail'd more than all his former perſuaſions. He told them all plainly, That the *Athenians* wanted not a fairer city, than any nation of *Greece* could boaſt of; having well-near two hundred good ſhips of war, the better part of the *Grecian* fleet, with which it was eaſy for them to tranſport their families and ſubſtance into any part of the world, and ſettle themſelves in a more ſecure habitation, leaving thoſe to ſhift as well as they might, who in their extremity had refuſed to ſtand by them. Herewithal he mention'd a town in *Italy*, belonging of old to the ſtate of *Athens*, of which town he ſaid an oracle had foretold, That the *Athenians* in proceſs of time ſhould build it anew, and there (quoth he) will we plant ourſelves, leaving unto you a ſorrowful remembrance of my words, and of your own unthankfulneſs. The *Peloponneſians*, hearing thus much, began to enter into better conſideration of the *Athenians*, whoſe affairs depended not, as they well perceiv'd, upon ſo weak terms, that they ſhould be driven to crouch to others; but rather were ſuch, as might enforce the reſt to yield to them, and condeſcend even to the uttermoſt of their own demands.

For the *Athenians*, when they firſt embraced that heroical reſolution of leaving their grounds and houſes to fire and ruin, if neceſſity ſhould enforce them ſo far, for the preſervation of their liberty; did employ the moſt of their private wealth, and all the common treaſure, in building a great navy. By theſe means they hoped (which accordingly fell out) that no ſuch calamity ſhould befall them by land, as might not well be counterpois'd by great advantages at ſea: knowing well, that a ſtrong fleet would either procure victory at home, or a ſecure paſſage to any other country. The other ſtates of *Greece* held it ſufficient, if building a few new ſhips they did ſomewhat amend their navy.

[a] Malac. 3. 8. [b] Jerem. 2. 9, 10.

Whereby

Whereby it came to paſs, that, had they been vanquiſh'd, they could not have expected any other fortune, than either preſent death, or perpetual ſlavery; neither could they hope to be victorious without the aſſiſtance of the *Athenians*, whoſe forces by ſea did equal all theirs together; the whole conſiſting of more than three hundred and fourſcore bottoms. Wherefore theſe *Peloponneſians*, beginning to ſuſpect their own condition, which would have ſtood upon deſperate points, if the fleet of *Athens* had forſaken them, were ſoon perſuaded, by the greater fear of ſuch a bad event, to forget the leſſer, which they had conceiv'd of the *Perſians*; and laying aſide their inſolent bravery, they yielded to that moſt profitable counſel of abiding at *Salamis*.

SECT. VI.

How the Perſians *conſulted about giving battle; and how* Themiſtocles *by policy held the* Greeks *to their reſolution; with the victory at* Salamis *thereupon enſuing.*

IN the mean ſeaſon the *Perſians* had enter'd into conſultation, whether it were convenient to offer battle to the *Greeks*, or no. The reſt of the captains giving ſuch advice as they thought would beſt pleaſe the king their maſter, had ſoon agreed upon the fight; but *Artemiſia*, queen of *Halicarnaſſus*, who follow'd *Xerxes* to this war in perſon, was of a contrary opinion. Her counſel was, that the king himſelf directly ſhould march towards *Peloponneſus*, whereby it would come to paſs, that the *Greek* navy (unable otherwiſe to continue long at *Salamis* for want of proviſion) ſhould preſently be diſſever'd; and every one ſeeking to preſerve his own city and goods, they ſhould, being divided, prove unable to reſiſt him, who had won ſo far upon them when they held together. And as the profit will be great in forbearing to give battle, ſo on the other ſide the danger will be more (ſaid ſhe) which we ſhall undergo, than any need requireth us to adventure upon; and the loſs, in caſe it fall upon us, greater than the profit of the victory which we deſire. For if we compel the enemies to fly, it is no more than they would have done, we ſitting ſtill; but if they, as better ſeamen than ours, put us to the worſt, the journey to *Peloponneſus* is utterly daſh'd, and many that now declare for us will ſoon revolt unto the *Greeks*. *Mardonius*, whom *Xerxes* had ſent for that purpoſe to the fleet, related unto his maſter the common conſent of the other captains, and withal, this diſagreeing opinion of *Artemiſia*. The king was well pleaſed with her advice, yet reſolved upon following the more general, but far worſe counſel of the reſt; which would queſtionleſs have been the ſame which *Artemiſia* gave, had not fear and flattery made all the captains utter that as out of their own judgment, which they thought moſt conformable to their prince's determination. So it was indeed that *Xerxes* had entertained a vain perſuaſion of much good, that his own preſence upon the ſhore, to behold the conflict, would work among the ſoldiers. Therefore he incamped upon the ſea-ſide, pitching his own tent upon the mount *Egaleus*, which is oppoſite unto the iſle of *Salamis*, whence at eaſe he might ſafely view all which might happen in that action, having ſcribes about him to write down the acts and behaviour of every captain. The near approach of the *Barbarians*, together with the news of that timorous diligence, which their countrymen ſhewed in fortifying *Iſthmus*, and of a *Perſian* army marching apace thither, did now again ſo terrify and amaze the *Peloponneſians*, that no intreaty nor conteſtation would ſuffice to hold them together. For they thought it mere madneſs to fight for a country already loſt, when they rather ſhould endeavour to ſave that which remained unconquered; propounding chiefly to themſelves what miſery would befall them, if loſing the victory, they ſhould be driven into *Salamis*, there to be ſhut up, and beſieged round in a poor deſolate iſland.

Hereupon they reſolved forthwith to ſet ſail for *Iſthmus:* which had preſently been done, if the wiſdom of *Themiſtocles* had not prevented it. For he perceiving what a violent fear had ſtop'd up their ears againſt all good counſel, did practiſe another courſe, and forthwith labour to prevent the execution of this unwholſome decree; not ſuffering the very hour of performance to find him buſy in wrangling altercation. Aſſoon as the council broke up, he diſpatched ſecretly a truſty gentleman to the *Perſian* captains, informing them truly of the intended flight, and exhorting them to ſend part of their navy about the iſland, which incompaſſing the *Greeks*, might prevent their eſcape; giving them withal a falſe hope of his aſſiſtance. The *Perſians* no ſooner heard than believed theſe good news, well knowing that the victory was their own aſſured, if the *Athenian* fleet joined with them, which they might eaſily hope, conſidering what ability their maſter had to recompenſe, for ſo doing, both the captains with rich rewards, and the people with reſtitution of their city and territories. By theſe means it fell out, that when the *Greeks* very early in the morning were about to weigh anchor, they found themſelves incloſed round with *Perſians*, who had laboured hard all night, ſending many of their ſhips about the iſle of *Salamis*, to charge the enemy in rear, and landing many of their men in the iſle of *Pſyttalea*, which lieth over-againſt *Salamis*, to ſave ſuch of their own, and kill ſuch of the *Grecian* party, as by any misfortune ſhould be caſt upon the ſhore. Thus did mere neceſſity enforce the *Grecians* to undertake the battle in the ſtraights of *Salamis*, where they obtained a memorable victory, ſtemming the foremoſt of their enemies, and chaſing the reſt, who falling foul one upon another, could neither conveniently fight nor fly. I do not find any particular occurrences in this great battle to be much remarkable. Sure it is, that the ſcribes of *Xerxes* had a weariſome task of writing down many diſaſters that befell the *Perſian* fleet, which ill acquitted itſelf that day, doing no one piece of ſervice worthy the preſence of their king, or the regiſtering of his notaries. As for the *Greeks*, they might well ſeem to have wrought out that victory with equal courage, were it not that the principal honour of that day was aſcribed to thoſe of *Ægina*, and to the *Athenians*, of whom it is recorded, That when the *Barbarians* did fly towards *Phalerus*, where the land-army of *Xerxes* lay, the ſhips of *Ægina* having poſſeſs'd the ſtraights, did ſink or take them, whilſt the *Athenians* did valiantly give charge upon thoſe that kept the ſea, and made any countenance of reſiſting.

SECT. VII.

Of things following after the battle of Salamis; *and of the flight of* Xerxes.

AFTER this victory, the *Greeks* intending, by way of ſecurity, to determine which of the captains had beſt merited of them, in all this great ſervice; every captain, being ambitious of that honour, did in the firſt place write down his own name, but in the ſecond place, as beſt deſerving

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next unto himſelf, almoſt every ſuffrage did concur upon *Themiſtocles*. Thus private affection yielded unto virtue, as ſoon as her own turn was ſerved. The *Perſian* king, as not amazed with this calamity, began to make new preparation for continuance of war; but in ſuch faſhion, that they, which were beſt acquainted with his temper, might eaſily diſcern his faint heart, through his painted looks. Eſpecially *Mardonius*, author of the war, began to caſt a wary eye upon his maſter, fearing leſt his counſel ſhould be rewarded according to the event. Wherefore, purpoſing rather to adventure his life in purſuit of the victory, than to caſt it away by undergoing his prince's indignation, he adviſed the king to leave unto him three hundred thouſand men; with which forces he promiſed to reduce all *Greece* under the ſubjection of the *Perſian* ſcepter. Herewithal he forgot not to ſooth *Xerxes* with many fair words, telling him, that the cowardiſe of thoſe *Egyptians*, *Phenicians*, and *Cilicians*, with others of the like metal, nothing better than ſlaves, who had ſo ill behaved themſelves in the late ſea-ſervice, did not concern his honour, who had always been victorious, and had already ſubdued the better part of *Greece*, yea, taken *Athens* itſelf, againſt which the war was principally intended. Theſe words found very good acceptance in the king's ear, who preſently betook himſelf to his journey homewards, making the more haſte, for that he underſtood, how the *Greeks* had a purpoſe to ſail to *Helleſpont*, and there to break down his bridge, and intercept his paſſage. True it was, that the *Greeks* had no ſuch intent, but rather wiſhed his haſty departure, knowing that he would leave his army not ſo ſtrong, as it ſhould have been had he in perſon remained with it. And for this cauſe did *Eurybiades* give counſel, that by no means they ſhould attempt the breaking of that bridge, leſt neceſſity ſhould inforce the *Perſians* to take more courage, and rather to fight like men, than die like beaſts. Wherefore *Themiſtocles* did, under pretence of friendſhip, ſend a falſe advertiſement to this timorous prince, adviſing him to convey himſelf into *Aſia* with all ſpeed, before his bridge were diſſolved: which counſel *Xerxes* took very kindly, and haſtily followed, as before is ſhewed. Whether it were ſo that he found the bridge whole, and thereby repaſſed into *Aſia*; or whether it were torn in ſunder by tempeſts, and he thereby driven to embark himſelf in ſome obſcure veſſel, it is not greatly material; though the *Greeks* did moſt willingly embrace the latter of theſe reports. Howſoever it were, this flight of his did well eaſe the country, that was thereby diſburdened of that huge throng of people, which, as locuſts, had before overwhelmed it.

SECT. VIII.

The negotiations between Mardonius *and* the Athenians, *as alſo between the* Athenians *and* Lacedemonians, *after the flight of* Xerxes.

MARDONIUS, with his three hundred thouſand, had withdrawn himſelf into *Theſſaly*, whence he ſent *Alexander*, the ſon of *Amyntas* king of *Macedon*, as embaſſador to the *Athenians*, with promiſe of large amends for all their loſſes received, and of extending their territories as far as their own deſires; allowing them to retain their liberty and laws, if they would make peace with *Xerxes*, and aſſiſt him in that war.

The *Athenians* had now re-enter'd their city, but not as yet brought back their wives and children; foraſmuch as they well perceived that the place could not be ſecure till the army of *Mardonius* were broken and defeated. Wherefore the *Lacedemonians*, underſtanding what fair conditions this embaſſador would propound, were perplexed with very great fear, leſt he ſhould find good and ready acceptance. Hereupon they likewiſe very ſpeedily diſpatched their embaſſadors for *Athens*, who arriving before the *Macedonian* had audience, uſed the beſt of their perſwaſion to retain the *Athenians* firm. They alledged that neither *Xerxes* nor *Darius* had any pretence of war againſt the reſt of *Greece*, but had only threatened the ſubverſion of *Athens*, till they and all their confederates, arming themſelves in defence of that city, were drawn into the quarrel, wherein the *Athenians*, without much cruelty of injuſtice, could not leave them. We know, ſay they, that ye have endured great calamities, loſing the fruit of the grounds, and being driven to forſake the town, the houſes whereof be ruined, and unfit for your habitation; in regard whereof, we undertake to maintain, as our own, your wives and children amongſt us, as long as the war ſhall continue, hoping that ye, who have always procured liberty to others, will not now go about to bring all *Greece* into ſlavery and bondage. As for the *Barbarians*, their promiſes are large, but their words and oaths are of no aſſurance. It was needleſs to uſe many arguments to the *Athenians*, who gave anſwer to *Alexander* in preſence of the *Spartan* embaſſadors: that whilſt the ſun continued his courſe they would be enemies to *Xerxes*, regarding neither gold nor any riches, with which he might ſeek to make purchaſe of their liberty. Concerning the maintenance of their wives and children, it was a burden which they promiſed to ſuſtain themſelves, only deſiring the *Lacedemonians*, that with all ſpeed they would cauſe their army to march; foraſmuch as it was not likely, that *Mardonius* would long ſit ſtill in *Theſſaly*, having once received ſuch a peremptory anſwer. In this their opinion of *Mardonius*'s readineſs to invade *Attica*, they found themſelves nothing deceived. For he, as ſoon as *Alexander* had returned their obſtinate purpoſe of reſiſtance, did forthwith lead his army towards them and their city; they having now the ſecond time quitted it, and conveyed themſelves into places of more ſecurity abroad in the country, where they expected the arrival of their confederates.

From *Athens* he ſent his agent unto them with inſtructions, not only to perſwade them to acceptance of the conditions before to them propounded, but with great promiſes to allure the principal of them to his party. His hope was, that either the people wearied with forſaking their houſes ſo often, would be deſirous to preſerve them from fire, and to have thoſe which were already laid waſte, re-edified at the king's charges: or, if this affection took no place with them, but that needs they would rely upon their old confederates, whoſe ſuccours did very ſlowly advance forwards; yet perhaps the leaders might be won with great rewards, to draw them to his purpoſe: all which projects if they ſhould fail, the deſtruction of *Athens* would be a good means to pleaſe his maſter king *Xerxes*, who muſt thereby needs underſtand, that *Mardonius* kept his ground, and feared not to confront the whole power of *Greece*, in the ſtrongeſt part of their own country. But his expectation was beguiled in all theſe. For the *Athenians* ſo little regarded his offers, that when one *Lycidas*, or (as *Demoſthenes* calls him) *Cyrcilus* adviſed the ſenate to accept the conditions, and propound them to the people; all the ſenators, and as many as abiding without the coun-

cil-houſe heard what he had ſaid, immediately ſet upon him and ſtoned him to death; not examining whether it were fear or money, that had moved him to utter ſuch a vile ſentence. Yea, the women of *Athens*, in the iſle of *Salamis*, hearing of his bad counſel, and bad end, aſſembling together, did enter his houſe there, and put his wife and children to the like execution. All this bravery notwithſtanding, when they perceived the ſlackneſs of the *Peloponneſians* in giving them aid, they were fain to betake themſelves to *Salamis* again, the old place of their ſecurity. Remaining there, and ſeeing little forwardneſs in thoſe whom it moſt concerned to aſſiſt them, they ſent very ſevere meſſages to *Sparta*, complaining of their ſlackneſs, and threatning withal to take ſuch courſe as might ſtand beſt with their own good, ſeeing that the common eſtate of all was ſo little regarded. Theſe meſſengers were at the firſt entertained with dilatory anſwers, which every day grew colder, when as the *Peloponneſian* wall, built athwart the *Iſthmus*, was almoſt finiſhed. But as the *Lacedemonians* waxed careleſs and dull, ſo the *Athenians* hotly preſſed them to a quick reſolution, giving them plainly to underſtand, that if they ſhould hold on in thoſe dilatory courſes, it would not be long ere the city of *Athens* took a new courſe, that ſhould little pleaſe them. All this while the *Perſian* fleet lay upon the coaſt of *Aſia*, not daring to draw nearer unto *Greece*, as being now too weak at ſea. Likewiſe the *Grecian* navy contained it ſelf within the harbours upon *Europe* ſide; both to do ſervice where need ſhould require at home, and withal to ſhun the danger which might have befallen any part of it, that being diſtracted from the reſt had adventured over-far. So mutual fear preſerved in quiet the iſlands lying in the midſt of the *Egean* ſeas. But it was well and ſeaſonably obſerved by a counſellor of *Sparta*, that the wall upon *Iſthmus* would ſerve to little purpoſe for the defence of *Peloponneſus*, if once the *Athenians* gave ear to *Mardonius*: conſidering that any doors would be opened into that demi-iſland, as ſoon as the enemy ſhould, by winning the friendſhip of *Athens*, become the maſter of the ſeas about it. The *Lacedemonians* upon this admonition, making better peruſal of their own dangers, were very careful to give ſatisfaction to the *Athenian* embaſſadors, who not brooking their delays, were upon point of taking leave, yea, as it ſeemed, of renouncing their alliance. Wherefore, diſpatching away five thouſand *Spartans* in the evening, under conduct of *Pauſanias*, they gave audience the next day to the embaſſadors, whoſe complaints they anſwered with vehement proteſtations of their readineſs; deeply ſwearing, that the army of *Sparta* was already far upon the journey; and giving them leave to take up other five thouſand *Lacedemonians* out of the region adjoining, to follow after them.

The *Athenians*, though diſtaſting ſuch want of gravity, in a matter ſo important, were nevertheleſs contented with the final concluſion; and levying the number appointed of *Lacedemonian* ſoldiers, made what haſte they could to encamp in *Attica*. The other *Grecians* were nothing ſlack in ſending forth companies, whoſe near approach cauſed *Mardonius* to forſake *Attica* as a rough country, and therefore of much diſadvantage to horſe, wherein conſiſted the beſt of his power. Before his departure he burnt the city of *Athens*, beating down the walls of it, and ruining all that had formerly eſcaped the fury of war.

SECT. IX.

The great battel of Platææ.

IT were too long a rehearſal to ſhew all that happened in many ſkirmiſhes between the *Greeks* and him, in the country of *Bœotia*, which *Mardonius* had choſen to be the ſeat of that war. Much time was ſpent before the quarrel was decided by the tryal of one main battel: for both parties did ſtand upon their guard, each expecting when the other ſhould aſſail them.

The army of *Mardonius* contained about three hundred thouſand, which were by him choſen out of *Xerxes*'s army; to whom were adjoined the forces of *Thebes*, *Macedon*, *Theſſaly*, and other parts of *Greece*, that now ſiding with the *Perſian*, furniſhed his camp with fifty thouſand men. Againſt theſe the *Lacedemonians*, *Athenians*, and their confederates, had levied an army of one hundred and ten thouſand, of which forty thouſand were weightily armed, the reſt were only aſſiſtants to theſe forty thouſand, being armed more ſlightly, as rather to make excurſions, and give chaſe, than to ſuſtain any ſtrong charges.

Theſe two armies, having eleven days confronted one the other, without performing any memorable piece of ſervice; *Mardonius*, whoſe victuals began to fail, reſolved to begin the fray. The *Greeks* were promiſed the victory by an oracle, if they fought in the land of the *Athenians*, and in the plain of *Ceres* and *Proſerpina*, making prayers unto certain gods, demi-gods, and nymphs. But it was hard to find the certain place which the oracle deſigned. For the plain of *Ceres* was indeed in the territory of *Athens*; but there was alſo an old temple of *Ceres* and *Proſerpina*, near unto the place where they lay at that time encamped, as likewiſe the memorials of thoſe nymphs, and demi-gods, were in the ſame place, upon mount *Citheron*, and the ground ſerved well for foot-men againſt horſe; only the land belonged unto the *Plateans*, and not unto the *Athenians*.

Whilſt the *Greeks* were perplexed about the interpretation of this doubtful oracle, the *Platean*, to make all clear, did freely beſtow their land on that ſide the town upon the *Athenians*.

This magnificence of the *Plateans* cauſed *Alexander* the Great, many ages after, to re-edify their city, which was ruined in the *Peloponneſian* wars.

All things being ready for battel; the *Lacedemonian* general thought it moſt meet, that the *Athenians* ſhould ſtand oppoſite that day to the *Medes* and *Perſians*, whom they had formerly vanquiſhed at *Marathon*; and that he, with his *Spartans*, ſhould entertain the *Thebans* and other *Greeks* which followed *Mardonius*, as better acquainted with their fight, and having beaten them oftentimes before. This being agreed upon, the *Athenians* changed place with the *Lacedemonians*; which *Mardonius* underſtanding (whether fearing the *Athenians*, of whoſe valour the *Medes* and *Perſians* had felt heavy proof, or deſiring to encounter the *Spartans*, as thinking them the braveſt ſoldiers in *Greece*) he did alſo change the order of his battel, and oppoſe himſelf to *Pauſanias*. All the *Greeks* might well perceive how the enemy did ſhift his wings, and *Pauſanias* thereupon returned to his former ſtation; which *Mardonius* noting, did alſo the like. So one whole day was ſpent in changing to and fro. Some attempt the *Perſians* made that day with their archers on horſeback, who did ſo moleſt the *Greeks* at their watering-place, that they were fain to enter into conſultation of retiring; becauſe they could not, without much loſs to themſelves, and none to the enemy,

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lie near to that fountain which did ſerve all the camp. Having therefore concluded among themſelves to diſlodge, and part of the army being ſent away before day-light, *Mardonius* perceived their departure in the morning, and thereupon being encouraged by their flight (which to him ſeemed to proceed out of meer cowardiſe) he charged them in the rear with great violence. It may well be recorded as a notable example of patient valour, that the *Lacedemonians* being overtaken by the enemy's horſe, and overwhelmed with great flights of arrows, did quietly ſit ſtill, not making any reſiſtance or defence, till the ſacrifices for victory were happily ended, tho' many of them were hurt and ſlain, and ſome of ſpecial mark loſt, before any ſign of good ſucceſs appeared in the entrails.

But, as ſoon as *Pauſanias* had found in the ſacrifice thoſe tokens, which the ſuperſtition of that age and country accounted fortunate, he gave the ſignal of battel: and thereupon the ſoldiers, who till then did ſit upon the ground, as was their manner, aroſe altogether, and with excellent courage received the charge of the *Barbarians*, that came thronging upon them without any fear of ſuch notable reſiſtance. The reſt of the *Greek* army that was in march, being revoked by *Pauſanias*, came in apace to ſuccour the *Lacedemonians:* only that part of the army, which was led by the *Athenians*, could not arrive unto the place of the great battel, becauſe the *Thebans*, and other *Greeks* confederated with the *Perſians*, gave them check by the way. Nevertheleſs, the *Spartans*, with other their aſſiſtants, did ſo well acquit themſelves, that the *Perſians* were vanquiſhed, and *Mardonius*, with many thouſands more, ſlain in the field; the reſt fled into the camp, which they had fortified with wooden walls, and there defended themſelves with ſuch courage as deſperate neceſſity enforced them unto, holding out the longer, becauſe the *Lacedemonians* were not acquainted with the manner of aſſaulting fortreſſes, and walls. In the mean time the *Athenians*, having found ſtrong oppoſition of the *Thebans* and *Theſſalians*, did with much labour and courage obtain victory, which having not long purſued, they came to help the *Lacedemonians*, whom they found wearily buſied in aſſaulting the camp, with more valour than ſkill. Wherefore they themſelves undertook it, and in ſhort ſpace forced a paſſage thro' the wall, at which breach firſt, and then on all ſides, the *Greeks* entred, with ſuch fury, and juſt deſire of vengeance, that of three hundred thouſand they are ſaid not to have left three thouſand alive, excepting thoſe who fled away with *Artabazus*, when the *Perſian* army firſt fell to rout.

If the execution were ſo great, as is reported, an eſpecial cauſe of it was the fooliſh retreat, or rather flight into the camp. For tho' it were ſo, that the place was well fortified, and the number of thoſe who caſt themſelves into it, greater than any of the aſſailants; yet they being of ſeveral nations and languages, and, having loſt their general with other principal commanders, it was impoſſible that they in ſuch a terror and aſtoniſhment ſhould make good that piece of ground, lying in the heart of an enemy's country, againſt an army of men far more valiant than themſelves, and inflamed with preſent victory. Therefore the ſame wall, which for a few hours had preſerv'd their lives, by holding out the enemy, did now impale them, and leave them to the ſlaughtering fury of unpitiful victors. *Artabazus* fled into *Thrace*, telling the people of *Theſſaly* and other countries in his way, that he was ſent by *Mardonius* upon ſome piece of ſervice: for he well knew, that had they underſtood any thing of that great diſcomfiture, all places would have been hoſtile unto him, and ſought with his ruin to purchaſe favour of the vanquiſhers. Therefore making ſo large marches, that many of his ſoldiers being feeble were left behind and loſt, he came to *Byzantium*, whence he ſhipped his men over into *Aſia*. Such was the end of the vain-glorious expedition, undertaken by *Xerxes* againſt the *Greeks*, upon hope of honour and great conqueſt; tho' ſorting otherwiſe, accordingly as *Artabazus* had foreſeen, and rather worſe; foraſmuch as it began the quarrel, which never ended, before the ruin of the *Perſian* empire was effected, by that nation of the *Greeks* deſpiſed and ſought to have been brought into ſlavery. Hereby it may ſeem, that the viſion appearing to *Xerxes*, was from God himſelf, who had formerly diſpoſed of thoſe things, ordaining the ſubverſion of the *Perſian* monarchy by the *Greeks*, who thus provoked, enter'd into greater conſideration of their own ſtrength, and the weakneſs of their enemies.

SECT. X.

The battel of Mycale, *with a ſtrange accident that fell out in the beginning of it: and examples of the like.*

THE ſame day, on which the battel was fought at *Platææ*, there was another battel fought at *Mycale*, a promontory, or head-land, in *Aſia*, where the *Perſian* fleet rode.

Leutychides the *Spartan*, with *Xantippus* the *Athenian*, admirals of the *Greek* navy, at the requeſt of ſome iſlanders and *Ionians*, did ſail into thoſe parts, to deliver the *Samians*, and procure the *Ionians* to revolt from the *Perſian*. *Xerxes* himſelf at this time lay at *Sardis*, a city in *Lydia*, not far from the ſea ſide, having left threeſcore thouſand under the command of *Tigranes*, for defence of *Ionia* and the ſea-coaſt. Therefore, when *Artayntes* and *Ithramitres*, admirals of the *Perſian* fleet, underſtood that the *Greeks* bent their courſe towards them; they did forthwith draw their ſhips a-ground, fortifying with paliſſadoes and otherwiſe, as much ground as was needful for the encamping of all their land and ſea-forces. *Leutychides*, at his arrival, perceiving that they meant to keep within their ſtrength, and reſolving to force them out of it, rowed with his gally cloſe aboard the ſhore, and called upon the *Ionians* (who more for fear than good-will were encamped among the *Perſians*) exhorting them in the *Greek* tongue to remember liberty, and uſe the fair occaſion which they now had to recover it. Herein he did imitate *Themiſtocles*, who had done the like at *Eubœa*; truſting that either theſe perſuaſions would prevail; or, if the *Perſians* did happen to underſtand them, that it would breed ſome jealouſy in them, cauſing them to fight in fear of their own companions. It need not ſeem ſtrange, that this very ſame ſtratagem, which little or nothing availed *Themiſtocles*, did now very happily ſucceed. For *Xerxes* being in his full ſtrength, it was a matter of much difficulty, to perſuade thoſe inhabitants of *Aſia* to revolt; who now, in his declining eſtate, gave a willing ear to the ſweet ſound of liberty. The *Perſians* likewiſe, who in their former bravery little regarded, and leſs feared, any treaſon to be contrived by their ſubjects, were now ſo wary, that from the *Samians*, which were amongſt them, they took away their arms; the *Mileſians*, whom they did ſuſpect, but would not ſeem to miſtruſt, they placed far from them, as it were for defence of the ſtraight paſſages of *Mycale*; pretending that theſe *Mileſians* did beſt of all

all others know thoſe places. But theſe devices little availed them. For the *Samians*, perceiving that they were held as traitors, took courage in the heat of the fight, and, laying hold upon ſuch weapons as came to hand, aſſailed the *Perſians* manfully within the camp; which example the *Ionians* preſently followed, being very glad to have found ſome that durſt begin. It is ſaid, that whilſt the *Greeks* were yet in march towards the enemy's camp, a rumour ſuddenly ran in the army that *Mardonius* was overthrown in *Greece*, which (tho' perhaps it was given out by the captains to encourage the ſoldiers) was very true. For the battel of *Platææ* was fought in the morning, and this of *Mycale* in the evening of the ſame day.

The like report, of that great battel, wherein *Paulus Æmilius* overthrew *Perſeus* the laſt king of *Macedon*, was brought to *Rome* in four days, as *Livy* with others do record. And *Plutarch* hath many other examples of this kind. As that of the battel by the river *Sagra* in *Italy*, which was heard of the ſame day in *Peloponneſus*: that of the battel againſt the *Tarquinians* and the *Latins*, preſently noiſed at *Rome*: and (which is moſt remarkable) the victory obtained againſt *Lucius Antonius*, who was rebel to *Domitian* the emperor. This *Lucius Antonius*, being lieutenant of the higher *Germany*, had corrupted his army with gifts and promiſes, drawing the barbarous people to follow him, with great hope to make himſelf emperor; which news much troubling the city of *Rome*, with fear of a dangerous war, it was ſuddenly reported that *Antonius* was ſlain, and his army defeated.

Hereupon many did offer ſacrifice to the gods, and ſhew all manner of publick joy, as in ſuch caſes was accuſtomed. But when better inquiry was made, and the author of theſe tidings could not be found, the emperor *Domitian* betook himſelf to his journey againſt the rebel; and, being now with his army in march, he received advertiſement by poſt, of the victory obtained, and the death of *Antonius*: whereupon remembring the rumour noiſed before in *Rome*, of the ſelf-ſame victory, he found that the report and victory were born upon one day, tho' 20000 furlongs (which make about 2500 miles) aſunder. It is truly ſaid of *Plutarch*, that this laſt example gives credit unto many the like. And indeed it were very ſtrange, if among ſo many rumours, begotten by forgery or miſtakings, and foſtered by credulous imagination, there ſhould not be found (as happens in dreams among many thouſand vain and frivolous) a few preciſely true. Howbeit we may find, that God himſelf doth ſometimes uſe to terrify thoſe who preſume upon their own ſtrength, by theſe light means of tumultuous noiſes; as he raiſed the ſiege of *Samaria*, by cauſing a ſound of horſes and chariots to affright the *Aramites*; and as he threaten'd *Sennacherib*, ſaying: [a] *Behold, I will ſend a blaſt upon him, and he ſhall hear a noiſe, and return to his own land.* Wherefore it may well have been true, that God was pleaſed by ſuch means as this, to animate the *Greeks*; who (as *Herodotus* notes) went towards the enemies with heavy hearts, being in great fear, leſt their own adventure ſhould by no means fall out well; conſidering in what danger they had left their own country of *Greece*, which was ready to be ſubdued by *Mardonius*, whilſt they went wandering to ſeek out enemies afar off, upon the coaſt of *Aſia*. But the fame of the battel fought at *Platææ* being noiſed among them; every man deſired that his own valour, in the preſent fight, might be ſome help to work out the full deliverance of *Greece*. In this alacrity of ſpirit, they divided themſelves into two battalions, whereof the *Athenians* led the one, by the way of the plain, directly towards the enemy's camp; the *Lacedemonians* conducted the other, by the mountains and ſtraight paſſages, to win the higher ground. The *Athenians* did firſt ſet upon the camp (ere the *Lacedemonians* could arrive on the other part) and being deſirous to get all the honour of the day to themſelves, did ſo forcibly aſſault it, that they brake way through the paliſſadoes and gabions, and made themſelves maſters of the place, ſlaying all that could not ſave themſelves by flight. In this fight the *Samians* did good ſervice, as is formerly mentioned.

But the *Mileſians*, who, upon the like jealouſy, were placed by the *Perſians* on the tops of *Mycale*, to defend the paſſages; did now (as if they had been ſet on purpoſe to keep them from running away) put as many to the ſword as fell into their hands, letting none eſcape, except a very few, that fled thro' by-paths. The *Lacedemonians* that day did little ſervice, for the buſineſs was diſpatched ere they came in: only they broke ſuch companies as retired in whole troops; making them fly diſperſed in very much diſorder, whereby the *Mileſians* were enabled to do the greater execution upon them. This was the laſt fight of that huge army levied againſt *Greece*, which was now utterly broken, and had no means left to make offenſive war.

SECT. XI.

Of the barbarous qualities of Xerxes: *with a tranſition from the* Perſian *affairs, to matters of* Greece, *which from this time grew more worthy of regard.*

XERXES lay at *Sardis*, not far from the place of this battel; but little mind had he to revenge either this or other his great loſſes, being wholly given over to the love of his brother's wife: with whom, when he could not prevail by intreaty, nor would obtain his deſire by force, becauſe he reſpected much his brother her huſband, he thought it beſt to make a match between his own ſon *Darius* and the daughter of this woman; hoping by that means to find occaſion of ſuch familiarity, as might work out his deſire. But whether it were ſo, that the chaſtity of the mother did ſtill reject him, or the beauty of her daughter allure him; he ſoon after fell in love with his own ſon's wife, being a vicious prince, and as ill able to govern himſelf in peace, as to guide his army in war. This young lady having once deſired the king to give her the garment which he then wore, being wrought by his own wife; it cauſed the queen thereby to perceive her huſband's converſation with her, which ſhe imputed not ſo much to the beauty of her daughter-in-law, as to the cunning of the mother, againſt whom thereupon ſhe conceiv'd extream hatred. Therefore at a royal feaſt, wherein the cuſtom was that the king ſhould grant every requeſt, ſhe crav'd that the wife of *Maſiſtes*, her huſband's brother, the young lady's mother, might be given into her diſpoſition. The barbarous king, who might either have reform'd the abuſe of ſuch a cuſtom, or have deluded the importunate cruelty of his wife, by threatning her ſelf with the like to whatſoever ſhe ſhould inflict upon the innocent lady, granted the requeſt, and ſending for his brother, perſuaded him to put away the wife which he had, and take one of his daughters in her ſtead. Hereby it ſeems, that he underſtood how villanouſly that poor lady ſhould be intreated, whom he knew to be virtuous,

[a] Iſa. 37. 7.

and

and whom himſelf had loved. *Maſiſtes* refuſed to put her away; alledging his own love, her deſerving, and their common children, one of which was married to the king's ſon, as reaſons important to move him to keep her. But in moſt wicked manner *Xerxes* reviled him, ſaying, *That he now ſhould neither keep the wife which he had, nor have his daughter whom he had promiſed unto him.* *Maſiſtes* was much griev'd with theſe words, but much more, when he returned home, he found his wife moſt butcherly mangled by the queen *Ameſtris*, who had cauſed her noſe, lips, ears, and tongue to be cut off, and her breaſts in like manner, which were caſt unto dogs. *Maſiſtes*, enraged with this villany, took his way with his children, and ſome friends, towards *Bactria*, of which province he was governor, intending to rebel and avenge himſelf. But *Xerxes* underſtanding his purpoſe, cauſed an army to be levied, which cut him off by the way, putting him and all his company to the ſword. Such was the tyrannical condition of the *Perſian* government; and ſuch are generally the effects of luxury, when it is joined with abſolute power.

Yet of *Xerxes* it is noted, that he was a prince of much virtue. And therefore *Alexander* the great, finding an image of his overthrown, and lying upon the ground, ſaid, that he doubted, whether, in regard of his virtue, he ſhould again erect it, or, for the miſchief done by him to *Greece*, ſhould let it lie. But ſurely whatſoever his other good qualities were, he was fooliſh, and was a coward, and conſequently mercileſs.

Therefore we may firmly believe, that the virtue of *Cyrus* was very great, upon which the foundation of the *Perſian* empire was ſo ſurely laid, that all the wickedneſs and vanities of *Xerxes*, and other worſe princes, could not overthrow it, until it was broken by a virtue almoſt equal to that which did eſtabliſh it. In wars againſt the *Egyptians*, the fortune of *Xerxes* did continue, as at the firſt it had been, very good; but againſt the general eſtate of *Greece*, neither he, nor any of his poſterity, did ever make offenſive war, but received many loſſes in *Aſia*, to which the laſt at *Mycale* ſerv'd but as an introduction; teaching the *Greeks*, and eſpecially the *Athenians*, that the *Perſian* was no better ſoldier at his own doors, than in a foreign country: whereof good trial was made forthwith, and much better proof as ſoon as the affairs of *Athens* were quietly ſettled and aſſured.

From this time forward I will therefore purſue the hiſtory of *Greece*, taking in the matters of *Perſia*, as alſo the eſtate of other countries, collaterally, when the order of time ſhall preſent them. True it is, that the *Perſian* eſtate continued in her greatneſs many ages following, in ſuch wiſe, that the known parts of the world had no other kingdom repreſenting the majeſty of a great empire.

But this greatneſs depended only upon the riches and power that had formerly been acquired, yielding few actions or none that were worthy of remembrance, excepting ſome tragedies of the court, and examples of that exceſſive luxury, wherewith both it, and all, or the moſt of empires that ever were, have been enervated, made unweildy, and (as it were) fatten'd for the hungry ſwords of poor and hardy enemies. Hereby it came to paſs, that *Xerxes* and his ſucceſſors were fain to defend their crowns with money and baſe policies; very ſeldom or never (unleſs it were with great advantage) daring to adventure the trial of plain battel with that little nation of *Greece*, which would ſoon have ruined the foundations laid by *Cyrus*, had not private malice and jealouſy urged every city to envy the height of her neighbours walls, and thereby diverted the ſwords of the *Greeks* into their own bowels, which after the departure of *Xerxes* began very well, and might better have continued to hew out the way of conqueſt on the ſide of *Aſia*.

CHAP. VII.

Of things that paſſed in Greece *from the end of the* Perſian *war to the beginning of the* Peloponneſian.

SECT. I.

How Athens *was rebuilt and fortified.*

AFTER that the *Medes* and *Perſians* had received their laſt blow, and were utterly beaten at *Mycale*: *Leotychides*, who then commanded the *Grecian* army, leaving the purſuit of the war to the *Athenians*, aſſiſted by the revolted *Iones*, returned with the *Lacedemonians* and other *Peloponneſians* to *Sparta*, and other places, out of which they had been levied. The *Athenians* in the mean while beſieged *Seſtos*, a city on the ſtraight of the *Helleſpont*, between which and *Abydus*, *Xerxes* had lately faſten'd his bridge of boats: where the inhabitants, deſperate of ſuccour, did not long diſpute the defence thereof, but quitted it to the *Greeks*, who entertained themſelves the winter following on that ſide the *Helleſpont*. In the ſpring they drew homeward, and having left their wives and children, ſince the invaſion of *Attica*, and the abandoning of *Athens*, in divers iſlands, and at *Troezen*, they now found them out, and returned with them to their own places.

And tho' the moſt part of all their houſes in *Athens* were burnt and broken down, and the walls of the city overturn'd, yet they reſolv'd firſt on their common defence, and to fortify their city, before they cared to cover themſelves, their wives and children, with any private buildings: whereof the *Lacedemonians* being advertiſed, and miſliking the fortifying of *Athens*, both in reſpect that their own city of *Sparta* was unwalled, as alſo becauſe the *Athenians* were grown more powerful by ſea, than either themſelves or any other ſtate of *Greece*, they diſpatched meſſengers to the *Athenians* to diſſuade them; not acknowledging any private miſlike or jealouſy, but pretending, that if the *Perſians* ſhould return to invade *Greece* a third time, the *Athenians* being in no better ſtate to defend themſelves than heretofore, the ſame would ſerve to receive their enemies, and to be made a ſeat of war, as *Thebes* had lately been. To this the *Athenians* promiſed

to give them ſatisfaction by their own ambaſſadors very ſpeedily. But being reſolved to go on with their works by the advice of *Themiſtocles*, they held the *Lacedemonians* in hope of the contrary, till they had raiſed their walls to that height, as they cared not for their miſlikes, nor doubted their diſturbance; and therefore (to gain time) they diſpatched *Themiſtocles* towards *Lacedemon*, giving him for excuſe, that he could not deliver the *Athenians* reſolutions, till the arrival of his fellow-commiſſioners, who were of purpoſe retarded. But after a while, the *Lacedemonians* expectation being converted into jealouſy (for by the arrival of divers perſons out of *Attica*, they were told for certain, that the walls of *Athens* were ſpeedily grown up beyond expectation) *Themiſtocles* prayed them not to believe reports and vain rumours, but that they would be pleaſed to ſend ſome of their own truſty citizens to *Athens*, from whoſe relation they might reſolve themſelves, and determine accordingly. Which requeſt being granted, and commiſſioners ſent, *Themiſtocles* diſpatched one of his own, by whom he adviſed the *Athenians*, firſt to entertain the *Lacedemonians* with ſome ſuch diſcourſe as might retain them a few days, and in concluſion to hold them among them till himſelf and the other *Athenian* embaſſadors, then at *Sparta*, had their liberty alſo to return. Which done, and being alſo aſſured by his aſſociates and *Ariſtides*, that *Athens* was already defenſible on all parts, *Themiſtocles* demanding audience, made the *Lacedemonians* know, that it was true, that the walls of *Athens* were now raiſed to that height, as the *Athenians* doubted not the defence of their city; praying the *Lacedemonians* to believe, that whenſoever it pleaſed them to treat with the *Athenians*, they would know them for ſuch, as right well underſtood what appertained to a common-wealth and their own ſafety, without direction and advice from any other: That they had in the war of *Xerxes* abandoned their city, and committed themſelves to the wooden walls of their ſhips, from the reſolution of their own counſels and courage, and not thereto taught or perſwaded by others: and finally, in all that perilous war againſt the *Perſians*, they found their own judgments, and the execution thereof in nothing inferior, or leſs fortunate, than that of any other nation, ſtate, or common-wealth among the *Greeks*; and therefore concluded, that they determined to be maſters and judges of their own affairs, and thought it good reaſon that either all the cities confederated within *Greece* ſhould be left open, or elſe that the walls of *Athens* ſhould be finiſhed and maintained.

The *Lacedemonians* finding the time unfit for quarrel, diſſembled their miſlike, both of the fortifying of *Athens*, and of the diviſion, and ſo ſuffered the *Athenians* to depart, and received back from them their own embaſſadors.

The walls of *Athens* finiſhed, they alſo fortified the port *Pyreus*, by which they might under covert imbark themſelves upon all occaſions.

SECT. II.

The beginning of the Athenian *greatneſs and proſperous wars made by that ſtate upon the* Perſian.

THE *Athenians* having ſettled things in good order at home, prepared thirty gallies for the purſuit of the war againſt the *Perſians*, to which the *Lacedemonians* added other twenty; and with this fleet, ſtrengthened by the reſt of the cities of *Greece* confederated, they ſet ſail for *Cyprus*, under the conduct of *Pauſanias* the *Lacedemonian*; where, after their landing, having poſſeſs'd themſelves of many principal places, they imbarked the army again, and took land in *Thrace*, recovering from the *Perſians* by force the city *Bizantium*, now *Conſtantinople*: from whence, *Pauſanias* behaving himſelf more like a tyrant than a captain, eſpecially towards the *Ionians* lately revolted from *Xerxes*, was called back by the council of *Lacedemon*, and not only accuſed of many inſolent behaviours, but of intelligence with the *Medes*, and treaſon againſt his country. In his ſtead they imployed *Docres*, who either gave the ſame cauſe of offence, or elſe the *Athenians*, who affected the firſt commandment in that war, practiſed the ſoldiers to complain; though indeed the wiſe and virtuous behaviour of *Ariſtides*, general of the *Athenian* forces, a man of rare and incomparable ſincerity, had been able to make a good commander ſeem ill in compariſon of himſelf; and therefore was much more available in rendering thoſe deteſted, whoſe vices afforded little matter of excuſe. Howſoever it were, the *Lacedemonians*, being no leſs wearied of the war than the *Athenians* were eager to purſue it, the one obtained their eaſe, and the other the execution and honour, which they deſired: for all the *Greeks* (thoſe of *Peloponneſus* excepted) willingly ſubjected themſelves to the commandment of the *Athenians*, which was both the beginning of their greatneſs in that preſent age, and of their ruin the next ſucceeding. For the charge of the war being now committed unto them, they began to rate the confederated cities, they appointed receivers and treaſurers, and began to levy money according to their diſcretion, for the maintenance of the general defence of *Greece*, and for the recovering of thoſe places on *Europe* ſide in *Aſia* the leſs, and the iſlands, from the *Perſians*. This tribute (the firſt that was ever paid by the *Greeks*) amounted to four hundred and threeſcore talents, which was raiſed eaſily by the honeſt care of that juſt man *Ariſtides*, to whoſe diſcretion all the confederates referred themſelves, and no man found occaſion to complain of him. But as the virtue of *Ariſtides*, and other worthy citizens, brought unto the *Athenians* great commodity; ſo the deſire which they conceived of encreaſing their commodity, corrupted their virtue, and robbing them of the general love which had made them powerful, abandoned their city to the defence of her treaſure, which with her in the next age periſhed. For it was not long ere theſe four hundred and threeſcore talents were raiſed to ſix hundred, nor long after that, ere their covetous tyranny had converted their followers into ſlaves, and extorted from them yearly thirteen hundred talents. The iſle of *Delos* was at the firſt appointed for the treaſure-houſe wherein theſe ſums were laid up; and where, at the general aſſembly, the captains of thoſe forces, ſent by the confederates, were for form ſake called to conſultation. But the *Athenians*, who were ſtronger by ſea than all *Greece* beſides, had lock'd up the common treaſure in an iſland under their own protection, from whence they might tranſport it at their pleaſure, as afterwards they did.

The general commander of this war, was *Cimon* the ſon of *Miltiades*, who firſt took *Eiona*, upon the river *Strimon*; then the iſle of *Sciros*, inhabited by the *Dolopes*: they maſtered the *Cariſtii*, and brought into ſervitude the *Naxii*, contrary to the form of the confederacy: ſo did they other the inhabitants of *Greece*, if at any time they failed of their contribution, or diſobeyed their commandments; taking upon them and uſurping a kind of ſoveraign authority over the reſt: which they exerciſed the more aſſuredly, becauſe they were now become lords of the ſea, and could not be reſiſted.

For

For many of the confederated cities and nations, weary of the war in their own perſons, and given up altogether to their eaſe, made choice rather to pay their parts in money, than either in men of war, or in ſhips; leaving the proviſion of both to the *Athenians*. Hereby the one grew weak in all their ſea-defences, and in the exerciſe of the wars; the other greatly ſtrengthened their navy and their experiences, being always armed and employed in honourable ſervices, at the coſt of thoſe who having lifted them into their ſaddles, were now enforced to become their footmen. Yet was the tribute-money, levied upon theſe their confederates, employed ſo well by the *Athenians* at the firſt (as ill proceedings are often founded upon good beginnings) that no great cauſe of repining was given. For they rigged out a great fleet of gallies, very well mann'd, wherewith *Cimon* the admiral ſcouring the *Aſiatick* ſeas, took in the city of *Phaſelis*; which having formerly pretended neutrality, and refuſed to relieve, or any way aſſiſt the *Greeks*, were enforced to pay ten talents for a fine, and ſo to become followers of the *Athenians*, paying yearly contribution.

From thence he ſet ſail for the river *Eurymedon* in *Pamphylia*, where the *Perſian* fleet rode, being of ſix hundred ſail, or (according to the moſt ſparing report) three hundred and fifty; and having a great land-army, encamped upon the ſhoar: All which forces having been provided for advancing the king's affairs in *Greece*, were utterly defeated in one day, and two hundred ſhips taken by the *Athenians*, the reſt being broken to pieces, or ſunk ere ever they had ſwam in the *Greecian* ſeas. *Cimon* having in one day obtained two great victories, the one by ſea, and the other by land, was very ſoon preſented with a third. For fourſcore ſail of *Phenicians* (who were the beſt of all ſea-men, under the *Perſian* command) thinking to have joined themſelves with the fleet before deſtroyed, arrived upon the ſame coaſt, ignorant of what had paſſed, and fearing nothing leſs than what enſued. Upon the firſt notice of their approach *Cimon* weighed anchor, and meeting them at an head-land called *Hydra*, did ſo amaze them, that they only ſought to run themſelves on ground; by which means preſerving few of their men, they loſt all their ſhips. Theſe loſſes did ſo break the courage of the *Perſian*, that, omitting all hope of prevailing upon *Greece*, he condeſcended to whatſoever articles it pleaſed the *Athenians* to propound, granting liberty unto all the *Greeks* inhabiting *Aſia*; and further covenanting, that none of his ſhips of war ſhould ſail to the weſtward of the iſles, called *Cyaneæ* and *Chelidoniæ*.

This was the moſt honourable peace that ever the *Greeks* made; neither did they in effect, after this time, make any war, that redounded to the profit or glory of the whole nation, till ſuch time as under *Alexander*, they overthrew the empire of *Perſia*; in which war few, or perhaps none of them, had any place of great command, but ſerved altogether under the *Macedonians*.

SECT. III.

The death of Xerxes *by the treaſon of* Artabanus.

BEſides theſe loſſes, which could not eaſily have been repaired, the troubles of the empire were at this time ſuch, as gave juſt cauſe to the *Perſian* of ſeeking peace upon any terms not altogether intolerable. For *Artabanus*, the uncle of *Xerxes*, perceiving that the king his maſter did eaſily take ſmall occaſions to ſhed the blood of ſuch, as in kindred or place were near unto him, began to repoſe leſs hope of ſafety in remaining faithful, than of obtaining the ſoveraignty, by deſtroying a prince that was ſo hated for his cruelty, and deſpiſed for his cowardiſe and misfortunes. Having conceived this treaſon, he found means to execute it by *Mithridates* an eunuch, in ſuch cloſe manner, that (as if he himſelf had been innocent) he accuſed *Darius* the ſon of *Xerxes*, and cauſed him to ſuffer death as a parricide. Whether it be true, that by this great wickedneſs he got the kingdom, and held it ſeven months; or whether intending the like evil to *Artaxerxes* the ſon of *Xerxes*, he was by him prevented and ſurprized, it were hard to affirm any certainty. But all writers agree upon this, that taken he was, and with his whole family put to death by extreme torments, according to the ſentence, whereof the truth is more ancient than the verſe.

Raro antecedentem ſceleſtum
Deſeruit pede pœna claudo.

Seldom the villain, though much haſte he make,
Lame-footed vengeance fails to overtake.

SECT. IV.

The baniſhment of Themiſtocles: *His flight to* Artaxerxes *newly reigning in* Perſia; *and his death.*

ARTAXERXES being eſtabliſhed in his kingdom, and having ſo compounded with the *Athenians*, as the preſent neceſſity of his affairs required, began to conceive new hopes of better fortune againſt the *Greeks*, than he or his predeceſſors had ever hitherto found. For the people of *Athens*, when the *Perſians* were chaſed out of *Greece*, did ſo highly value their own merits in that ſervice, that they not only thought it fit for themſelves to become the commanders over many towns, and iſlands of the *Greeks*, but even within their own walls they would admit none other form of government than merely democratical. Herein they were ſo inſolent, that no integrity nor good deſert was able to preſerve the eſtate of any ſuch as had borne great office, longer than, by flattering the raſcally multitude, he was contented to frame all his words and deeds to their good liking.

This their intolerable demeanor much offended *Themiſtocles*; who, though in former times he had laid the foundations of his greatneſs upon popularity, yet now preſuming upon his good ſervices done to the ſtate, he thought that with great reaſon they might grant him the liberty to check their inordinate proceedings. But contrariwiſe, they were ſo highly offended with his often rehearſing the benefits which they had received from him, that they laid upon him the puniſhment of *Oſtraciſm*, whereby he was baniſhed for ten years, as a man overburthenſome to the common-wealth.

Before the time of his return was half expired, a new accuſation was brought againſt him by the *Lacedemonians*, who charged him of conſulting with *Pauſanias*, about betraying the whole country of *Greece* unto *Xerxes*. Hereupon *Themiſtocles*, finding no place of ſecurity againſt the malice of two ſuch mighty cities, was driven, after many troubleſome flights, and dangerous removings, to adventure himſelf into *Perſia*; where he found *Artaxerxes* newly ſettled, and was by him very honourably entertained. But the great hope which *Artaxerxes* had conceived of advancing his affairs by the counſel and aſſiſtance of *Themiſtocles*, proved altogether fruitleſs. For when the *Athenians*, in favour of *Inarus* the *Libyan* (who infeſted *Egypt*, cauſing it to rebel againſt

againſt the *Perſian*) had ſent a fleet to ſea, landing an army in *Egypt*, and ſcowering thoſe eaſtern ſeas, to the great hindrance of *Artaxerxes*, and (for ought that I can underſtand) to the manifeſt breach of that peace, which to their great honour they had concluded with *Xerxes*; then did the king ſend his letters to *Themiſtocles*, requiring him to make good the hopes which he had given, of aſſuring the *Perſian* eſtate againſt the *Greeks*.

But whether *Themiſtocles* perceived much unlikelineſs of good ſucceſs, in leading a great army of daſtardly *Perſians* againſt the warlike people of *Greece*; or elſe (as in favour of his virtue it is more commonly reported) the love of his country would not permit him to ſeek honour by the ruin of it: ſure it is, that being appointed by *Artaxerxes* to undertake the conduct of great forces againſt the *Athenians*, he decided the great conflict between thankfulneſs to his well-deſerving prince, and natural affection to his own ill-deſerving people, by finiſhing his life with a cup of poiſon.

SECT. V.

How the Athenians, *breaking the peace, which to their great honour they had made with the* Perſian, *were ſhamefully beaten in* Egypt.

THEN was *Artaxerxes* driven to uſe the ſervice of his own captains in the *Egyptian* war, wherein it appeared well, That a juſt cauſe is a good defence againſt a ſtrong enemy. An *Athenian* fleet of two hundred ſail ſtrong was ſent forth under *Cimon*, to take in the iſle of *Cyprus:* which conqueſt ſeemed eaſy both to make, and to maintain, the *Perſian* being utterly broken at ſea, and thereby unable to relieve the iſland. Now although it were ſo, that a peace had been concluded, which was likely to have been kept ſincerely by the *Perſian*, who had made ſo good proof of the *Grecian* valour, that he was nothing deſirous to build any ſhips of war (without which the *Greeks* could receive no harm from him) whereof if any one ſhould be found ſailing towards *Greece*, the peace was immediately broken, and if not, his whole eſtate; yet all the ſea-coaſt (no ſmall part of his dominions) expoſed to the waſte of an enemy too far overmatching him. Yet whether the *Athenians* were in doubt, leſt the league, which in his own worſer fortunes he had made with them, he would break in theirs; and therefore ſought to get ſuch aſſurance into their hands, as might utterly diſable him from attempting ought againſt them; or whether the increaſe of their revenues and power, by adding that rich and great iſland to their empire, cauſed them to meaſure honour by profit; they thought it the wiſeſt way, to take whilſt they might, whatſoever they were able to get and hold, and he unable to defend.

The iſle of *Cyprus*, lying in the bottom of the ſtraits between *Cilicia*, *Syria* and *Egypt*, is very fitly ſeated for any prince of ſtate, that being mighty at ſea, doth either ſeek to enrich himſelf by trade with thoſe countries, or to infeſt one or more of them when they are his enemies. And this being the purpoſe of the *Athenians*, their ambition, which had already devoured, in conceit, this iſland, was on the ſudden well-nigh choaked with a greater morſel, to ſnatch at which, they let *Cyprus* alone, which they might eaſily have ſwallowed and digeſted. For *Inarus*, king of the *Libyans*, confining *Egypt*, having found how greatly the country was exhauſted by the late wars, and how weakly defended by very ſlender *Perſian* garriſons, conceived rightly, that if ſuch ſmall forces as the ſatrapa or viceroy could make on the ſudden of his own guards, or levy out of the ordinary garriſons, were by him defeated, the naturals of the country, not long ſince oppreſſed by *Cambyſes*, and after a revolt very lately ſubdued by *Xerxes*, would ſoon break faith with him who had no other title to that kingdom than a good ſword. Further, he perſwaded himſelf that the people, unable to defend themſelves againſt the *Perſian* without his aſſiſtance, would eaſily be drawn to accept him the author of their deliverance, for king. Neither did this hope deceive him: for having taken and cruelly ſlain *Achemenes* the viceroy, divers cities forthwith declared themſelves for him, and proclaiming him king, ſhewed the moſt of their endeavour for proſecution of the war. But he conſidering his own weakneſs, and that the means of the *Egyptians* his adherents were not anſwerable to their deſires, perceived well, that to reſiſt the power of *Artaxerxes*, far greater forces than his and theirs were to be procured, at what price ſoever he obtained them. Therefore hearing of the great *Athenian* fleet, and knowing well the virtue of the ſoldiers therein embark'd; he invited the commanders to ſhare with him the kingdom of *Egypt* as a far greater reward of their adventure, than ſuch an addition as that of *Cyprus* could be to their eſtate. Whether he or they (if things had wholly ſorted according to their expectation) would have been contented with an equal ſhare, and not have fallen out in the partition, were perhaps a divination unneceſſary. He was poſſeſſed of the people's love; they were of moſt power. But the iſſue of thoſe affairs was ſuch as left them nothing to communicate but misfortunes, which they ſhared ſomewhat equally. Yet had the beginnings of their enterpriſe very good and hopeful ſucceſs: for they enter'd the land as far as to *Memphis*, the principal city; and of the city it ſelf they took two parts: to the third part, which was called the *White Wall*, they laid ſuch hard ſiege, that neither thoſe forces of the *Perſians*, which then were in *Egypt*, were ſtrong enough to remove them; neither could *Artaxerxes* well deviſe what means to uſe for the recovery of that which was loſt, or for the preſervation of the remainder. The beſt of his hope was by ſetting the *Lacedemonians* upon *Athens*, to enforce the *Athenians* to look homewards to their own defence. This was the firſt time that the *Perſian* ſought to procure the aſſiſtance of the *Greeks* one againſt the other, by ſtirring them up with gold to the entertainment of private quarrels, for the good of their common enemy. To this purpoſe he ſent *Magabazus* to *Sparta* with much treaſure; who, after great expence, finding that the *Lacedemonians* were nothing forward in employing their whole force againſt the *Athenians*, whom in many conflicts of great importance they had found to be their matches, notwithſtanding the abſence of their army in *Egypt*; he thought it his wiſeſt way to employ the reſt of his money and means to their relief, who had now the ſpace of ſix years defended his maſter's right in *Egypt*. Therefore he haſtily diſpatched another of his name, the ſon of *Zopyrus*, who arriving in *Egypt*, was firſt encounter'd by the revolted people; over whom he obtained victory, which made him maſter of the country, whilſt the *Athenians* lay buſied about *Memphis* the great city. It cannot be doubted, but that long abode in a ſtrange air, and want of ſupply, had much enfeebled the *Athenians:* ſure it is, that when *Magabazus*, having reduced the country to obedience, attempted the city it ſelf, whether his former ſucceſs had amended the courage of the *Perſians*, or want of neceſſaries made the *Athenians* inferior to themſelves, he

he chaſed them out of *Memphis*, and purſued them ſo near, as they were forced to fortify themſelves in the iſle of [a]*Proſopites*, where *Magabazus*, after eighteen months ſiege turning away one part of the river by divers trenches, aſſaulted the *Athenians* without impediment of waters, took their gallies, and put all to the ſword, ſave a few that ſaved themſelves by flight into *Libya*; the ſame entertainment had fifty other gallies, which they ſent to the ſuccour of the firſt two hundred. For thoſe *Athenians* having heard nothing that their fleet and army was conſumed, enter'd by the branch of *Nilus*, called [b]*Mendeſium*, and fell unawares among the *Phenician* gallies and the *Perſian* army; ſo as the *Perſians* recovered all *Egypt*, but that part held by *Amyrteus*, and *Inarus* the king of *Libya*, being by them taken and hanged. This was the end of the *Athenians* ſix years war in *Egypt*, and the reward of their vanity and indiſcretion to undertake many enterpriſes at once.

SECT. VI.

Of other wars made by the Athenians *for the moſt part with good ſucceſs, about the ſame time.*

NOtwithſtanding theſe overthrows in *Egypt*, yet the *Athenians* in their home-wars waded through many difficulties, and held the reputation of their forces againſt the *Lacedemonians*, *Corinthians*, and others, rather to their advantage than otherwiſe. For as they were beaten near unto *Halia* by the *Corinthians* and *Epidaurians*, ſo they obtained two great victories ſoon after; the one over the *Peloponneſians*, near unto *Cecryphalia*; the other over the *Æginets*, near unto *Ægina*; where they ſunk and carried away threeſcore and ten gallies of their enemies. Furthermore, they landed their forces on the ſudden, and beſieged *Ægina*, from whence they could not be moved, notwithſtanding that the *Corinthians*, to divert them, invaded *Megara*; where, after a great fight, with equal loſs, the *Corinthians*, when they returned again to ſet up their trophy, as victors in the former battel, were utterly broken and ſlaughtered by the *Athenian* garriſons, and *Megarians*, to their great loſs and diſhonour.

Again, as the *Athenians* were diſcomfited near to *Tanagra* by the *Lacedemonians*, who returned from the ſuccour of the *Dorians* againſt the *Phocians* (at which time the *Theſſalian* horſemen turned from their allies, the *Athenians*, and fought againſt them) ſo about threeſcore days after, the *Athenians* enter'd *Bœotia* under the conduct of *Myronides*, where beating that nation, they won *Phocis* on the gulf *Oeteus*, and evened the walls of *Tanagra* to the ground. Finally, they enforced *Ægina* to render upon moſt baſe conditions; as to beat down the walls of their city, and to give them hoſtages for tribute; the ſiege whereof they had continued, notwithſtanding all their other brabbles and attempts elſewhere. Beſides theſe victories, they ſack'd and ſpoil'd many places upon the ſea-coaſt of *Peloponneſus*, belonging to the *Lacedemonians*; won upon the *Corinthians*, and overthrew the *Sicyonians* that came to their ſuccour. Theſe were the undertakings of the *Athenians*, and their allies, during the time of thoſe ſix years that a part of their forces made war in *Egypt*. In the end whereof they attempted *Theſſaly*, perſwaded thereunto by *Oreſtes*, but were reſiſted by the king *Pharſalus*, who had chaſed *Oreſtes* out of his dominions. They alſo landed in *Sicyonia*, and had victory over thoſe that reſiſted; after which, they made truce with the *Peloponneſians* for five years, and ſent *Cimon* into *Cyprus* with two hundred ſhips, but they were again allured by *Amyrteus*, one of the race of their former kings, who held the mariſh and woody parts of *Egypt* from the *Perſians*, to whom they ſent ſixty of their ſhips. The reſt of their army failing in their enterpriſe of *Cyprus*, and their fortunate and victorious leader *Cimon* dying there, as they coaſted the iſland, encounter'd a fleet of the *Phenicians* and *Cilicians*, over both which nations they returned victorious into *Greece*; as alſo thoſe rerurned ſafe which were ſent into *Egypt*.

SECT. VII.

Of Artaxerxes Longimanus, *that he was* Ahaſhuerus, *the husband of queen* Eſther.

THESE *Egyptian* troubles being ended, the reign of *Artaxerxes* continued peaceable; whereof the length is by ſome reſtrained into twenty years, but the more and better authors give him forty, ſome allow him four and forty. He was a prince of much humanity, and noted for many examples of gentleneſs. His favour was exceeding great to the *Jews*, as appeareth by the hiſtories of *Eſdras* and *Nehemias*, which fell in his time.

To prove that this was the king who gave countenance and aid to that great work of building the temple, it were a needleſs travail; conſidering that all the late divines have taken very much pains to ſhew, that thoſe two prophets were licenſed by him, and ſuccoured in that building, in ſuch ſort as appears in their writings.

This was likewiſe that king *Ahaſhuerus* who married *Eſther*. Whereof if it be needful to give proof, it may ſuffice; that *Ahaſhuerus* lived in *Suſa*, reigning from *India* to *Ethiopia*, and therefore muſt have been a *Perſian*; that he lived in peace, as appears by the circumſtances of the hiſtory, and uſed the counſel of the ſeven princes, the authority of which princes began under *Darius*, the ſon of *Hyſtaſpes*; wherefore he could be neither *Cyrus* nor *Cambyſes*.

The continual wars which exerciſed king *Darius*, the ſon of *Hyſtaſpes*, together with the certainty of his marriages with ſundry wives, from none of whom he was divorced, but left his firſt wife *Atoſſa*, the daughter of *Cyrus*, alive in great honour, ſhe being mother to *Xerxes* the ſucceeding king; do manifeſtly prove that *Eſther* was not his. Whereunto is added by *Philo* the *Jew*, that at the perſuaſion of *Mardocheus*, *Joiakim* the high prieſt, the ſon of *Jeſua*, cauſed the feaſt of *Purim* to be inſtituted in memory of that deliverance. Now the time of *Joiakim* was in the reign of *Artaxerxes*, at the coming of *Eſdras* and *Nehemias*; *Jeſua* his father dying about the end of *Darius*.

The ſame continuance of wars, with other his furious and tragical loves, wherewith *Xerxes* did conſume ſuch little time as he had free from war, are enough to prove that the ſtory of *Eſther* pertained not unto the time of *Xerxes*, who lived but one and twenty years, whereas the two and thirtieth of *Ahaſuerus* or *Artaſaſtha* is expreſſed by *Nehemias*. Again, it is well known, that *Xerxes* in the ſeventh year of his reign (wherein this marriage muſt have been celebrated) came not near to *Suſa*. Of the princes that ſucceeded *Artaxerxes Longima-*

[a] Proſopites *an iſland between the rivers of* Taly *and* Pharmutiacus, *two of the out-lets of* Nilus, *towards* Alexandria. [b] Mendeſius *is an iſland in the mouth of* Nilus, *between the out-let called* Buſiriticus *and* Diolcos. *But the branch of* Nilus, *called* Mendeſium *runneth into the ſea by the city* Panæphyſis.

nus, to prove that none of them could be *Ahaſhuerus*, it is enough to ſay, that *Mardocheus*, having been carried from *Jeruſalem* captive with *Jeconia*, by *Nebuchadnezzar*, was unlikely to have lived unto their times.

But of this *Artaxerxes* it is true, that he lived in *Suſa*, reigned from *India* to *Ethiopia*, lived in peace, was contemporary with *Joiachim* the high prieſt: and further, he had happily by his lieutenants reclaimed the rebellious *Egyptians* in that ſeventh year of his reign; which good fortune might well give occaſion to ſuch a royal feaſt as is deſcribed in the beginning of the book of *Eſther*. This is the ſum of the arguments, brought to prove the age of *Eſther*'s ſtory by the learned and diligent *Krentzhemius*, who adds the authorities of *Joſephus*, affirming the ſame, and of *Philo*, giving to *Mardocheus* eighteen years more than *Iſaac* the patriarch lived; namely, one hundred fourſcore and eighteen years in all, which expire in the five and thirtieth year of this *Artaxerxes*, if we ſuppoſe him to have been carried away captive, being a boy of ten years old.

SECT. VIII.

Of the troubles in Greece, *foregoing the* Peloponneſian *war.*

BUT it is fit that we now return to the affairs of the *Greeks*, who from this time forward, more vehemently proſecuting their civil wars, ſuffered the *Perſians* for many ages to reſt in peace, this *Egyptian* expedition being come to nought. Soon after this, the *Lacedemonians* undertook the war, called ſacred, recovered the temple and iſle of *Delphos*, and delivered both to the inhabitants; but the *Athenians* regained the ſame, and gave it in charge to the *Phocians*. In the mean while the baniſhed *Beotians* re-enter'd their own land, and maſtered two of their own towns, poſſeſs'd by the *Athenians*, which they ſoon recovered again from them; but in their return towards *Athens*, the *Beotians*, *Eubeans*, and *Locrians* (nations oppreſs'd by the *Athenians*) ſet upon them with ſuch reſolution, as the *Athenians* were in that fight all ſlain or taken, whereby the *Beotians* recovered their former liberty, reſtoring to the *Athenians* their priſoners. The iſlanders of *Eubœa* took ſuch courage upon this, that they revolted wholly from the *Athenians*, whom when *Pericles* intended to reconquer, he was advertiſed that the *Megarians* (who firſt left the *Lacedemonians*, and ſubmitted themſelves to *Athens*) being now weary of their yoke, had ſlain the *Athenian* garriſons, and joined themſelves with the *Corinthians*, *Sicyonians*, and *Epidaurians*. Theſe news haſtened *Pericles* homeward with all poſſible ſpeed; but ere he could recover *Attica*, the *Peloponneſians*, led by *Pliſtoanax*, the ſon of *Pauſanias*, had invaded it, pillaged, and burnt many parts thereof; after whoſe return, *Pericles* went on with his firſt intent, and recovered *Eubœa*. Finally, the *Athenians* began to treat of peace with the *Peloponneſians*, and yielded to deliver up all the places which they held in the country of *Peloponneſus*; and this truce was made for thirty years. After ſix of theſe years were expired, the *Athenians* (favouring the *Mileſians* againſt the *Samians*) invaded *Samos* by *Pericles*, and after many repulſes, and ſome great loſſes, both by ſea and land, the citizens were forc'd to yield themſelves upon moſt lamentable conditions; namely, to deliver up all their ſhips, to break down their own walls, to pay the charge of the war, and to reſtore whatſoever had been taken by themſelves, or by their practice from the *Athenians*. In the neck of which followed that long and cruel *Peloponneſian* war, whereof I have gathered this brief following; the ſame contention taking beginning fifty years after the flight of *Xerxes* out of *Greece*. But becauſe there was no city thereof, which either in the beginning of this war, or in the continuance of it, was not drawn into the quarrel, I hold it convenient now at the firſt to ſhew briefly the eſtate of the country at that time, and eſpecially the condition of thoſe two great cities, *Athens* and *Sparta*, upon which all the reſt had moſt dependance.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Peloponneſian *war.*

SECT. I.

Upon what terms the two principal cities of Greece, Athens *and* Sparta, *ſtood, at the beginning of the* Peloponneſian *war.*

GREECE was never united under the government of any one prince or eſtate, until *Philip* of *Macedon*, and after him *Alexander* brought them rather to a union and league againſt the *Perſian*, whereof they were captains, than into any abſolute ſubjection. For every eſtate held their own, and were governed by laws far different and by their own magiſtrates, notwithſtanding the power of the *Macedonians*, to whom they did yield obedience no otherwiſe than as to ſuch, who were (perforce) their leaders in the *Perſian* war (deemed the general quarrel of *Greece*) and took the profit and honour of the victory to their own uſe and increaſe of greatneſs. But the kings which afterwards reigned in *Macedonia*, did ſo far enlarge their authority, that all *Greece* was by them brought under ſuch obedience, as differed little from ſervitude; very few excepted, who could hardly, ſometimes with arms, and ſometimes with gifts, preſerve their liberty; of whom the *Lacedemonians* and *Athenians* were chief: which two people deſerved beſt the plague of tyranny, having firſt given occaſion thereunto by their great ambition, which wearied and weakened all the country by perpetual war. For, until theſe two cities of *Athens* and *Sparta* diſtracted all *Greece*, drawing every ſtate into the quarrel, on the one or other ſide, and ſo gave beginning to the *Peloponneſian* war (the effects whereof in true eſtimation ceaſed not, before the time that *Philip* had over-maſter'd all, foraſmuch as every concluſion of one war afforded henceforth matter to ſome new diſtraction of the whole country) the wars, commenced between one city of *Greece* and another, were neither great nor of long continuance. All controverſies were ſoon decided, either by the authority of the *Amphictiones*, who were the general council of *Greece*; or by the power of the *Lacedemonians*, whoſe aid was commonly held as good as the aſſurance of victory.

Theſe

These *Lacedemonians* had lived about 400 years under one form of government, when the *Peloponnesian* war began. Their education was only to practise feats of arms; wherein they so excelled, that a very few of them were thought equal to very great numbers of any other people. They were poor, and cared not much for wealth; every one had an equal portion of the common field, which sufficed to maintain him in such a manner of life as they used. For bravery they had none, and curious building or apparel they regarded not. Their diet was simple, their feasts and ordinary meals being in common halls, where all fared alike. They used money of iron, whereof they could not be covetous nor great hoarders. Briefly, they liv'd *Utopian*-like, save that they used no other occupation than war, placing all their felicity in the glory of their valour. Hereby it came to pass, that in all enterprises, whereof they were partakers, the leading and high command was granted to them, and all *Greece* followed their conduct. But the *Athenians* were in all points contrary to this: for they sought wealth, and measured the honours of their victories by the profit; they used mercenary soldiers in their wars, and exacted great tribute of their subjects, which were for the most part islanders, compelled to obey them, because the *Athenian* fleet was great.

As in form of policy, and in course of life, so in conditions natural, the difference between these two people was very much. The *Athenians* were eager and violent, sudden in their conclusions, and as hasty in the execution: the *Lacedemonians* very slow in their deliberations, full of gravity, but very resolute, and such as would in cold blood perform what the *Athenians* did usually in flagrant. Whereby it came to pass that the *Lacedemonians* had all the estates of *Greece* depending upon them, as on men firm and assured, that sought honour and not riches; whereas the *Athenians* were followed by such as obey'd them perforce, being held in straight subjection. But the seignory of the *Athenians* was nothing large, until such time as the *Persian Xerxes* had invaded *Greece*, pretending only a quarrel to *Athens*. For then the citizens perceiving well, that the town of *Athens* could not be defended against his great army of 1700000 men, bestowed all their wealth upon a navy, and (assisted by the other *Grecians*) overthrew the fleet of *Xerxes*, whose land-forces were soon after discomfited by them, and the *Greeks*, who all served under conduct of the *Spartans*. After these victories, the *Athenians* being now very mighty in fleet, reduced all the islands of the *Grecian* seas under their obedience; imposing upon them a hard tribute, for maintenance (as they pretended) of war against the *Persian*; tho' indeed they employ'd their forces chiefly to the conquest of such islands, and haven towns, of their own countrymen, as stood out against them. All which was easily suffered by the *Lacedemonians*, who were in-landers, and men that delighted not in expeditions to be made far from home. But afterwards perceiving the power of the *Athenians* to grow great, they held them in much jealousy, and were very apt to quarrel with them; but much more willing to breed contention between them and other estates. Wherefore at such time as the *Thebans* would have oppress'd the *Plateans*, when they of *Platæa* repaired to *Sparta* for succour, they found there no other aid, than this advice, that they should seek help at *Athens*. Hereby it was thought, that the *Athenians* should be entangled in a long and tedious war with their neighbours of *Thebes*. But it prov'd otherwise; for their force was now so great, that all such occasions did only serve to increase their honour and puissance.

SECT. II.

How Sparta *and* Athens *entered into a war.*

NEvertheless many estates of *Greece* were very ill affected to *Athens*, because that city grew very insolent upon sudden prosperity, and maintaining the weaker towns against the stronger, incroached apace upon their neighbours, taking their dependants from them. Especially the *Corinthians* were much inraged, because the people of the island *Corcyra*, their colony, which had rebelled against them, and given them a great overthrow by sea, was by the *Athenians* (who desired to increase their fleet by adjoining that of *Corcyra* unto it) taken into protection, and the *Corinthians* thereby impeached of that revenge which else they would have taken. Now, howsoever it were so, that these dealings of the *Athenians* were not directly against the conditions of peace agreed upon among the *Greeks*, yet were the complaints made at *Sparta* so vehement, that (tho' with much ado) they concluded to redress by war the injuries done to their allies.

First therefore seeking religious pretences, they required the *Athenians* to expiate certain offences committed against the gods; whereunto having for answer, that they themselves should expiate other the like offences, committed in *Sparta*; they began to deal plainly, and required that the people of some towns, oppress'd by the estate of *Athens*, should be set at liberty; and that a decree made against those of *Megara*, whereby they were forbidden to enter any port of the *Athenians*, should be reversed. This last point they so earnestly pressed, that if they might obtain it, they promised to absist from their purpose of making war.

This they desir'd, not as a matter of any great importance (for it was a trifle) but only that by seeming to have obtain'd somewhat, they might preserve their reputation without entring into a war, which threatned them with greater difficulties apparent, than they were very willing to undergo.

But the *Athenians* would yield to nothing; for it was their whole desire that all *Greece* should take notice, how far they were from fear of any other city. Hereupon they prepared on both sides very strongly, all that was needful to the war; wherein the *Lacedemonians* were superiour, both in number and quality, being assisted by most of the cities in *Greece*; and having the general favour, as men that pretended to set at liberty such as were oppressed: but the *Athenians* did as far exceed them in all provisions, of money, shipping, engines, and absolute power of command among their subjects; which they held, and afterwards found, of greater use in such need, than the willing readiness of friends, who soon grow weary, and are not easily assembled.

SECT. III.

The beginning of the Peloponnesian *war.*

THE first and second years expedition was very grievous to the city of *Athens*. For the fields were wasted; the trees cut down; the country people driven to flie, with their wives, children, and cattle into the town; whereby a most furious pestilence grew in the city, such as before they had never felt, nor heard of. Hereunto was added the revolt of the *Mytilenians*, in the isle of *Lesbos*, and the siege of *Platæa* their confederated city, which they durst not adventure to raise, besides

ſides ſome ſmall overthrows received. The *Lacedemonians* aſſembling as great forces as they could raiſe out of *Peloponneſus*, did in the beginning of ſummer enter the country of *Attica*, and therein abide, until victuals began to fail, waſting and deſtroying all things round about: the governours of the *Athenians* would not ſuffer the people to iſſue into the field againſt them; for they knew the valour of their enemies; but uſed to ſend a fleet into *Peloponneſus*, which waſted as faſt all the ſea-coaſt of their enemies, whilſt they were making war in *Attica*. So the *Peloponneſians* being the ſtronger by land, won the town of *Platææ*, which wanted reſcue; the *Athenians* likewiſe being more mighty by ſea, did ſubdue *Mytilene*, which had rebelled, but could not be ſuccoured from *Sparta*. By theſe proceedings in that war, the *Lacedemonians* began to perceive how unfit they were to deal with ſuch enemies. For, after that *Attica* was thoroughly waſted, it lay not greatly in their power to do any offence equal to ſuch harm as they themſelves might, and did receive. Their confederates began to ſet forward very ſlowly in their expeditions into *Attica*; perceiving well, that *Athens* was plentifully relieved with all neceſſaries, which came by ſea from the iſlands that were ſubject unto that eſtate; and therefore theſe invaders took but ſmall pleaſure in beholding the walls of that mighty city, or in waſting a forſaken field, which was to them a pattern of the calamities, with which their own territory was the while afflicted. Wherefore they began to ſet their care to build a ſtrong navy, wherein they had little good ſucceſs, being eaſily vanquiſhed by the *Athenians*, who both had more and better ſhips; and were ſo ſkilful in ſea-fights, that a few veſſels of theirs durſt undertake a great number of the *Peloponneſians*.

SECT. IV.

Of the great loſs which the Spartans *received at* Pylus.

AMong other loſſes which the *Spartans* had felt by ſea, they received at *Pylus* a very ſore blow, that compelled them to ſue for peace. A fleet of *Athenian* ſhips, bound for *Corcyra*, waſting in that paſſage, as their manner was, the coaſt of *Laconia*, and all the half-iſle of *Peloponneſus*, was by contrary winds detained at *Pylus*, which is a ragged promontory, joining to the main, by a ſtraight neck of land. Before it, there lies a ſmall barren iſland of leſs than two miles compaſs, and within that a creek, which is a good harbour for ſhips, the force of weather being borne off by the head-land and iſle. This promontory the *Athenians* fortified, as well as in haſte they might; and what was wanting in their artificial fortification, was ſupplied by the natural ſtrength and ſite of the place. By holding this piece of ground and haven, they reaſonably expected many advantages againſt their enemies. For the country adjoining was inhabited by the *Meſſenians*, who in ancient times had held very ſtrong and cruel war with *Sparta*; and, tho' quite ſubdu'd, they were held in ſtraight ſubjection; yet was not the old hatred ſo extinguiſhed, that by the near neighbourhood and aſſiſtance of the *Athenians*, it might not be revived. Furthermore, it was thought, that many ill-willers to the *Lacedemonians*, and as many of their bond-ſlaves as could eſcape from them, would repair to *Pylus*, and from thence make daily excurſions into *Laconia*, which was not far off: or, if other hopes failed, yet would the benefit of this haven, lying almoſt in the midway between them and *Corcyra*, make them able to ſurround all *Peloponneſus*, and waſte it at their pleaſure. The news of theſe doings at *Pylus*, drew the *Peloponneſians* thither in all haſte out of *Attica*, which they had entered a few days before with their whole army: but now they brought not only their land-forces, but all their navy, to recover this piece, which how bad a neighbour it might prove in time, they well foreſaw, little fearing the grievous loſs at hand, which they there in a few days received. For when they in vain made a general aſſault on all ſides, both by ſea and land, finding that ſmall garriſon which the *Athenians* had left, very reſolute in the defence; they occupied the haven, placing 420 choice men, all of them citizens of *Sparta*, in the iſland beforementioned; at each end whereof is a channel, that leads into the port, but ſo narrow, that only two ſhips in front could enter between the iſle and *Pylus*; likewiſe but 7 or 8 ſhips could enter at once by the further channel, between the iſland and the main. Having thus taken order to ſhut up this new town by ſea, they ſent part of their fleet to fetch wood, and other ſtuff, wherewith to fortify round about, and block up the piece on all ſides. But in the mean ſeaſon, the *Athenian* fleet, hearing of their danger that were left at *Pylus*, return'd thither, and with great courage entering the haven, did break and ſink many of their enemies veſſels; took five, and enforced the reſidue to run themſelves a-ground.

Now was the town ſecure, and the *Spartans* abiding in the iſland as good as loſt: wherefore the magiſtrates were ſent from *Sparta* to the camp (as was their cuſtom in great dangers) to adviſe what were beſt for the publick ſafety; who, when they did perceive that there was no other way to reſcue their citizens out of the iſle, than by compoſition with their enemies; they agreed to intreat with the *Athenians* about peace, taking truce in the mean while with the captains at *Pylus*. The conditions of the truce were, That the *Lacedemonians* ſhould deliver up all the ſhips which were in the coaſt, and that they ſhould attempt nothing againſt the town, nor the *Athenians* againſt the camp: That a certain quantity of bread, wine, and fleſh, ſhould be daily carried into the iſle, but that no ſhips ſhould paſs into the iſland ſecretly: That the *Athenians* ſhould carry the *Lacedemonian* embaſſadors to *Athens*, there to treat of peace; and ſhould bring them back, at whoſe return the the truce ſhould end; which, if in the mean time it were broken in any one point, ſhould be held utterly void in all: That when the truce was expired, the *Athenians* ſhould reſtore the *Peloponneſian* ſhips, in as good caſe as they receiv'd them. The embaſſadors coming to *Athens*, were of opinion, that as they themſelves had begun the war, ſo might they end it when they pleaſed: wherefore they told the *Athenians* how great an honour it was that the *Lacedemonians* did ſue to them for peace; adviſing them to make an end of the war, whilſt with ſuch reputation they might. But they found all contrary to their expectation: for inſtead of concluding upon even terms, or deſiring of meet recompence for loſs ſuſtained, the *Athenians* demanded certain cities to be reſtored to them, which had been taken from them by the *Lacedemonians* long before this war began; refuſing likewiſe to continue the treaty of peace, unleſs the *Spartans*, which were in the iſle, were firſt rendred unto them as priſoners. Thus were the embaſſadors return'd without effect, at which time the truce being ended, it was deſired of the *Athenian* captains, that they ſhould, according to their covenant, reſtore the ſhips, which had been put into their hands. Whereto anſwer was made, that the condition of the

the truce was, That if any one article were broken, all ſhould be held void; now (ſaid the *Athenians*) ye have aſſaulted our garriſons, and thereby are we acquitted of our promiſe to reſtore the ſhips. This and the like frivolous allegations which they made, were but meer ſhifts; yet profit ſo far over-weighed honour, that better anſwer none could be got. Then were the *Lacedemonians* driven to uſe many hard means, for conveyance of victuals into the iſle, which finally was taken by force, and the men that were in it carried priſoners to *Athens*; where it was decreed, that when the *Peloponneſians* next invaded *Attica*, theſe priſoners ſhould all be ſlain. Whether fearing the death of theſe men, or with-held by the troubles, which (according to the *Athenians* hope) fell upon them, the *Lacedemonians* were ſo far from waſting *Attica*, that they ſuffered their own country to be continually over-run, both by the *Athenians*, who landed on all parts of their coaſt, and by thoſe who iſſued out of *Pylus*; which became the rendezvous of all that were ill-affected unto them.

SECT. V.

How the Lacedemonians *hardly, and to their great diſadvantage, obtained a peace, that was not well kept.*

THerefore they endeavoured greatly to obtain peace; which the *Athenians* would not hearken unto. For they were ſo puffed up with the continuance of good ſucceſs, that having ſent a few bands of men into *Sicily*, to hold up a faction there, and make what profit they might of the *Sicilians* quarrels; when afterwards they heard that the differences in that iſle were taken away, and their bands return'd without either gain or loſs; they baniſhed the captains, as if it had been merely through their default that the iſle of *Sicily* was not conquered; which (beſides the longer diſtance) was in power to offend others, or defend it ſelf; no whit inferiour unto *Peloponneſus*. Yet was this their overweening much abated ſhortly after, by ſome diſaſters received, eſpecially in *Thrace*, where, in a battel which they loſt at *Amphipolis*, *Cleon*, and *Braſidas*, generals of the *Athenian* and *Lacedemonian* forces, were both ſlain; which two had moſt been adverſaries to the peace. As the *Athenians* by their loſſes were taught moderation; ſo the *Lacedemonians*, who not only felt the like wounds, but thro' the great navy which they had receiv'd at *Pylus*, were fain to proceed lamely in the war, againſt ſuch as, thro' commodity of their good fleet, had all advantages that could be found in expedition, were fervently deſirous to conclude the buſineſs, ere fortune by any new favour ſhould revive the inſolence, which was at this time well mortified in their enemies. Neither was it only a conſideration of their preſent eſtate, that urged them to bring the treaty of peace to a good and ſpeedy effect; but other dangers hanging over their heads, and ready to fall on them, which unleſs they compounded with the *Athenians*, they knew not how to avoid. The eſtate of *Argos*, which had ancient enmity with them, was now, after a truce of 30 years well nigh expired, ready to take the benefit of their preſent troubles, by joining with thoſe who alone found them work enough. *Argos* was a rich and ſtrong city, which, tho' inferiour to *Sparta* in valour, yet was not ſo unwarlike, nor held ſuch ill correſpondence with the neighbouring eſtates, that the *Lacedemonians* could ever far prevail upon it, when they had little elſe to do. This was a thing that in the beginning of this war had not been regarded: for it was then thought, that by waſting the territory of *Athens* with ſword and fire, the quarrel ſhould eaſily, and in ſhort time, have been ended; whereby not only the *Athenians* ſhould have been brought to good order, but the *Corinthians* and others, for whoſe ſake the war was undertaken, have been ſo firmly knit to the *Lacedemonians*, that they ſhould for love of them have abandoned the *Argives* to their own fortunes. But now the vanity of thoſe hopes appeared, in that the *Athenians*, abounding in ready money, and means to raiſe more, were able to ſecure themſelves by a ſtrong fleet, from any great harm: that the *Peloponneſians*, wanting wherewith to maintain a navy, could do unto them; yea, as maſters of the ſea, to weary them out, as in effect already they had done. As for the confederates of *Sparta*, they could now endure neither war nor peace; their daily travels, and many loſſes had ſo wearied and incenſed them. Wherefore the *Lacedemonians* were glad to uſe the occaſion, which the inclination of their enemies did then afford, of making a final peace; which with much ado they procured, as ſeemed equal and eaſy; but was indeed impoſſible to be performed, and therefore all their travel was little effectual.

The reſtitution of priſoners and places taken being agreed upon, it fell out by lot, that the *Lacedemonians* ſhould reſtore firſt. Theſe had won more towns upon the continent from the *Athenians*, than the *Athenians* had from them; but what they had won, they had not won abſolutely. For they had reſtored ſome towns to ſuch of their allies, from whom the ſtate of *Athens* had taken them; ſome, and thoſe the moſt, they had ſet at liberty (as reaſon required) which had opened their gates unto them, as to their friends and deliverers, and not compelled them to break in as enemies. Now, concerning the towns which were not in their own hands, but had been rendered unto their confederates, the *Spartans* found means to give ſome ſatisfaction, by permitting the *Athenians* to retain other, which they had gotten in the war; as for the reſt, they promiſed more than afterwards they could perform. The cities, which they had taken into protection, could not endure to hear of being abandon'd; neither would they by any means yield themſelves into the hands of their old lords, the *Athenians*, whom they had offended by revolting, notwithſtanding whatſoever articles were drawn and concluded, for their ſecurity, and betterance in time to come. This dull performance of conditions on the ſide of the *Spartans*, made the *Athenians* become as backward in doing thoſe things which on their part were required; ſo that reſtoring only the priſoners which they had, they deferred the reſt, until ſuch time as they might receive the full ſatisfaction according to the agreement. But before ſuch time, as theſe difficulties broke out into matter of open quarrel, the *Lacedemonians* entered into a more ſtraight alliance with the *Athenians*; making a league offenſive and defenſive with them. Hereunto they were moved by the backwardneſs of the *Argives*, who being (as they thought) likely to have ſued for peace at their hands, as ſoon as things were once compounded between *Athens* and *Sparta*, did ſhew themſelves plainly unwilling to give ear to any ſuch motion. Thinking therefore, that by cutting from *Argos* all hope of *Athenian* ſuccour, they ſhould make ſure work; the *Spartans* regarded not the affections of other ſtates, whom they had either bound unto them by well-deſerving in the late war, or found ſo troubleſome, that their enmity (if perhaps they durſt let it appear) were little worſe than friendſhip. It bred great jealouſy in all the cities of *Greece*, to perceive ſuch a conjunction between two

ſo powerful ſigniories; eſpecially one clauſe threatning every one, that was any thing apt to fear, with a ſecret intent, that might be harboured in their proud conceits, of ſubduing the whole country, and taking each what they could lay hold on. For, beſides the other articles, it was agreed, that they might by mutual conſent add new conditions, or alter the old at their own pleaſures. This impreſſion wrought ſo ſtrongly in the *Corinthians*, *Thebans*, and other ancient confederates of *Sparta*, that the hate which they had borne to the *Athenians* their profeſſed enemies, was violently thrown upon the *Lacedemonians* their unjuſt friends; whereby it came to paſs, that they, who had lately borne chief ſway in *Greece*, might have been abandon'd to the diſcretion of their enemies, as already in effect they were, had the enemies wiſely uſed the advantage.

SECT. VI.

Of the negotiations, and practices, held between many ſtates of Greece, *by occaſion of the peace that was concluded.*

THE admiration wherein all *Greece* held the valour of *Sparta* as irreſiſtible, and able to make way through all impediments, had been ſo exceſſive, that when by ſome ſiniſter accidents, that city was compelled to take and ſeek peace, upon terms not founding very honourable, this common opinion was not only abated, but (as happens uſually in things extreme) was changed into much contempt. For it was never thought that any *Lacedemonian* would have endured to lay down his weapons, and yield himſelf priſoner; nor that any misfortune could have been ſo great, as ſhould have drawn that city to relieve it ſelf otherwiſe than by force of arms. But when once it had appeared, that many of their citizens, among whom were ſome of eſpecial mark, being overlaid by enemies, in the iſland before *Pylus*, had rather choſen to live in captivity, than to die in fight; and that *Pylus* it ſelf, ſticking as a thorn in the foot of *Laconia*, had bred ſuch anguiſh in that eſtate, as utterly wearying the accuſtomed *Spartan* reſolution, had made it ſit down, and ſeek to refreſh it ſelf by diſhonourable eaſe: then did not only the *Corinthians* and *Thebans* begin to conceive baſely of thoſe men which were virtuous, tho' unfortunate; but other leſſer cities, joining with theſe in the ſame opinion, did caſt their eyes upon the rich and great city of *Argos*, of whoſe ability, to do much, they conceived a ſtrong belief, becauſe of long time it had done nothing. Such is the baſe condition, which thro' fooliſh envy is become almoſt natural in the greater part of mankind. We curiouſly ſearch into their vices, in whom had they kept ſome diſtance, we ſhould have diſcern'd only the virtues; and comparing injuriouſly our beſt part with their worſt, are juſtly plagued with a falſe opinion of that good in ſtrangers which we know to be wanting in our ſelves.

The firſt that publiſhed their diſlike of *Sparta*, were the *Corinthians*, at whoſe vehement entreaty (tho' moved rather by envy at the greatneſs of *Athens* daily increaſing) the *Lacedemonians* had entered into the preſent war. But theſe *Corinthians* did only murmur at the peace, alledging as grievances, that ſome towns of theirs were left in the *Athenians* hands. The *Mantineans*, who, during the time of war, had procured ſome part of the *Arcadians* to become their followers, and forſake their dependency upon the ſtate of *Sparta*, did more freely and readily diſcover themſelves; fear of revenge to come, working more effectually than indignation at things already paſt. The *Argives* feeling the gale of proſperous fortune that began to fill their ſails, prepared themſelves to take as much of it as they could ſtand under; giving for that purpoſe unto 12 of their citizens, a full and abſolute commiſſion to make alliance between them and any free cities of *Greece* (*Athens* and *Sparta* excepted) without any farther trouble of propounding every particular buſineſs to the multitude. When the gates of *Argos* were thus ſet open to all comers, the *Mantineans* began to lead the way, and many cities of *Peloponneſus* following them, entered into this new confederacy; ſome incited by private reſpects, others thinking it the wiſeſt way to do as the moſt did. What inconvenience might ariſe to them by theſe courſes, the *Lacedemonians* eaſily diſcerned; and therefore ſent embaſſadors to ſtop the matter at *Corinth*, where they well perceived that the miſchief had been hatched. Theſe embaſſadors found in the *Corinthians* a very rough diſpoſition, with a gravity expreſſing the opinion which they had conceived of their preſent advantage over *Sparta*. They had cauſed all cities which had not entered yet into the alliance with *Argos*, to ſend their agents to them, in whoſe preſence they gave audience to the *Lacedemonians*; the purport of whoſe embaſſy was this: that the *Corinthians*, without breach of their oath, could not forſake the alliance, which they had long ſince made with *Sparta*, and that reaſon did as well bind them to hold themſelves contented with the peace lately made, as religion enforced them to continue in their ancient confederacy; foraſmuch as it had been agreed between the *Spartans* and their aſſociates, that the conſent of the greater part (which had yielded unto peace with *Athens*) ſhould bind the leſſer number to perform what was concluded, if no divine impediment withſtood them. Hereunto the *Corinthians* made anſwer, that the *Spartans* had firſt begun to do them open wrong, in concluding the war wherein they had loſt many places, without proviſion of reſtitution; and that the very clauſe alledged by the embaſſadors, did acquit them from any neceſſity of ſubſcribing to the late peace; foraſmuch as they had ſworn unto thoſe people whom they perſwaded to rebel againſt *Athens*, that they would never abandon them, nor willingly ſuffer them to fall again into the tyrannous hands of the *Athenians*. Wherefore they held themſelves bound both in reaſon and religion, to uſe all means of upholding thoſe, whom by common conſent they had taken into protection; for that an oath was no leſs to be accounted a divine impediment, than were peſtilence, tempeſt, or any the like accident, hindering the performance of things undertaken. As for the alliance with *Argos*, they ſaid that they would do as they ſhould find cauſe. Having diſmiſs'd the embaſſadors with this anſwer, they made all haſte to join themſelves with *Argos*, and cauſed other ſtates to do the like; ſo that *Sparta* and *Athens* were in a manner left to themſelves, the *Thebans* and *Megarians* being alſo upon the point to have entered into this new confederacy. But as the affections were divers, which cauſed this haſty confluence of ſudden friends to *Argos*, it ſo likewiſe came to paſs, that the friendſhip it ſelf, ſuch as it was, had much diverſity both of ſincerity and of continuance. For ſome there were that hated or feared the *Lacedemonians*; as the *Mantineans* and *Eleans*: theſe did firmly betake themſelves to the *Argives*, in whom they knew the ſame affection to be inveterate; others did only hate the peace concluded; and theſe would rather have followed the *Spartans* than the *Argives* in war, yet rather the *Argives* in war than the *Lacedemonians* in peace:

peace; of this number were the *Corinthians*, who knowing that the *Thebans* were affected like unto themſelves, dealt with them to enter into the ſociety of the *Argives*, as they had done: but the different forms of government, uſed in *Thebes* and *Argos*, cauſed the *Thebans* to hold rather with *Sparta*, that was ruled by the principal men, than to incur the danger of innovation, by joining with ſuch as committed the whole rule to the multitude.

This buſineſs having ill ſucceeded, the *Corinthians* began to bethink themſelves of their own danger, who had not ſo much as any truce with *Athens*, and yet were unprepared for war. They ſought therefore to come to ſome temporary agreement with the *Athenians*, and hardly obtained it. For the *Athenians*, who had dealt with all *Greece* at one time, did not greatly care to come to any appointment with one city, that had ſhewed againſt them more ſtomach than force; but gave them to underſtand, that they might be ſafe enough from them, if they would claim the benefit of that alliance, which *Athens* had lately made with *Sparta* and her dependants; yet finally, they granted unto theſe *Corinthians* (which were loth to acknowledge themſelves dependants of *Sparta*) the truce that they deſired; but into private confederacy they would not admit them, it being an article of the league between them and the *Spartans*, that the one ſhould not make peace nor war without the other.

Herein, as in many other paſſages, may clearly be ſeen the great advantage which abſolute lords have as well in peace as in war, over ſuch as are ſerved by voluntaries. We ſhall hardly find any one ſigniory, that hath been ſo conſtantly followed as *Sparta* was, by ſo many ſtates, and ſome of them little inferior to it ſelf, being all as free: whereas contrariwiſe, the *Athenians* had lately, and by compulſive means, gotten their dominion, wherein they demeaned themſelves as tyrants. But in performance of conditions agreed upon, the *Athenians* were able to make their words good, by excluding any ſtate out of their confederacy, and giving up ſuch places as were agreed upon: of which the *Lacedemonians* could do neither the one nor the other. For ſuch towns as their old allies had gotten by their means in the late war, could not be reſtored without their conſent, which had them in preſent poſſeſſion; and particularly the town of *Panacte*, which the *Thebans* held, could by no means be obtained from them by the *Lacedemonians* (who earneſtly deſired it, that by reſtitution thereof unto the *Athenians*, as earneſty demanding it, themſelves might recover *Pylus*) unleſs they would agree to make a private alliance with *Thebes*; which thereupon they were conſtrain'd to do, tho' knowing it to be contrary to the laſt agreement between them and *Athens*.

The *Lacedemonians* having broken one article of the league made between them and the *Athenians*, that by ſo doing they might enable themſelves to the performance of another, were ſhamefully diſappointed of their hopes by the *Thebans*, who did not give up the town of *Panacte*, till firſt they had utterly demoliſhed it, and made it of no worth to the *Athenians*. This was ſought to have been excuſed by the *Lacedemonian* embaſſadors, who coming to *Athens* (whither they had ſent home all priſoners that had been detained at *Thebes*) hoping with gentle words to ſalve the matter; ſaying, that from henceforth no enemy to *Athens* ſhould neſtle in *Panacte*, for it was deſtroyed. But theſe embaſſadors had not to deal with tame fools: for the *Athenians* told them in plain terms, that of three principal conditions agreed upon in their late league, they had not performed any one, but uſed ſuch baſe colluſion as ſtood not with their honour: having made private alliance with the *Thebans*; having deſtroyed a town that they ſhould have reſtored; and not having forced their dependants by war, to make good the covenants of the late concluded peace. Hereupon they diſmiſſed the embaſſadors with rough words, meaning with as rough deeds to anger thoſe that ſent them.

There were at that time both in *Athens* and *Sparta*, many that were ill contented with the peace; among whom were the *Ephori*, choſen for that year, in *Sparta*; and *Alcibiades*, a powerful young gentleman in *Athens*. But the *Ephori*, though deſiring to renew the war, yet wiſhed that firſt they might get from the *Athenians* as much as was to be render'd to them by covenant, eſpecially *Pylus*, that had ſo ſorely troubled them. *Alcibiades*, whoſe nobility, riches and favour with the people, made him deſire war, as the means, whereby himſelf might procure ſome honourable employment, uſed all means to ſet the quarrel on foot, whilſt the *Athenians* had yet both advantage enough, as not having render'd ought ſave their priſoners, and pretence enough to uſe that advantage of breaking the peace, by reaſon that the *Lacedemonians* (though indeed againſt their wills) had broken all covenants with them. Now the ſtate of *Athens* had fully determined to retain *Pylus*, and to perform nothing that the *Lacedemonians* ſhould and might require, until they had firſt, without any longer halting, fulfilled all articles whereunto they were bound, even to the utmoſt point. This was enough to make them ſweat, who having already done the moſt that they could, had as yet got nothing in recompence, except the delivery of their citizens which were priſoners. But *Alcibiades* wiſhing a ſpeedy beginning of open war, ſent privily to the *Argives*, and gave them to underſtand how fitly the time ſerved for them to aſſociate themſelves with *Athens*, which was enough to give them ſecurity againſt all enemies.

The *Argives*, upon the firſt confluence of many eſtates unto their ſociety, had embraced great hopes of working wonders, as if they ſhould have had the conduct of all *Greece* againſt the *Athenians*, robbing *Sparta* of that honour, as having ill uſed it, and thereby leaving their old enemies in caſe of much contempt and diſability. But theſe ſudden apprehenſions of vain joy, were ſuddenly changed into as vain fear; which ill agreed with the great opinion that had lately been conceived of *Argos*. For when the *Thebans* had refuſed their alliance; when the *Corinthians* had ſought ſecurity from *Athens*; and when a falſe rumour was noiſed abroad, that *Athens*, *Thebes*, and *Sparta*, were come to a full agreement upon all points of difference; then began the *Argives* to let fall their creſts, and ſue for peace unto the *Lacedemonians*, who needing it as much as they, or more, yet held their gravity, and were not over-haſty to accept it. At this time, and in this perturbation, the meſſage of *Alcibiades* came very welcome to the *Argives*, which were not now conſulting how to become the chief of all others, but how to ſave themſelves. Wherefore they ſent away preſently to *Athens* their own embaſſadors, accompanied with the *Mantineans* and *Eleans*, to make a league offenſive and defenſive, between their eſtates and the *Athenians*.

Of this buſineſs the *Lacedemonians* knew not what to think: for well they ſaw, that ſuch a combination tended to their great hurt, and therefore were deſirous to prevent it; but to keep the love of the *Athenians*, the new *Ephori* thought that more was already

already done, than ſtood with their honour or profit; others held it the wiſeſt way, having done ſo much, not to ſtick at a little more; but rather by giving full ſatisfaction to retain the friendſhip of that ſtate, which was more to be valued than all the reſt of *Greece*. This reſolution prevailing, they ſent away ſuch of their citizens as were beſt affected to the peace; who coming to *Athens* with full commiſſion to make an end of all controverſies, did earneſtly labour in the council-houſe, to make the truth of things appear; ſaying, that their confederacy with the *Thebans* had tended to none other end than the recovery of *Panacte:* concerning which town, or any other buſineſs, that it much grieved the *Lacedemonians*, to ſee things fall out in ſuch wiſe as might give to the *Athenians* cauſe of diſpleaſure; but that all ſhould be done which in reaſon might be required for making matters even between them; to which purpoſe they ſhewed that themſelves had abſolute commiſſion. Wherefore they deſired that *Pylus* might be reſtored unto them, and eſpecially for the preſent, that the negotiations with the *Argives* might be called aſide. Favourable audience was given to this propoſition; the rather, becauſe they, which promiſed amends, had power to make their words good. But all this fair likelihood of good agreement was daſh'd on the ſudden, by the practice of *Alcibiades*, who ſecretly dealing with the *Lacedemonian* embaſſadors, perſwaded them well of his friendſhip towards their city, and adviſed them to take all care, that their abſolute power to conclude what they pleaſed in the name of *Sparta*, might not be known to the commonalty of *Athens*, leſt the inſolent multitude ſhould thereupon grow peremptory, and yield to nothing, unleſs they could draw them to unreaſonable conditions. The embaſſadors believed him, and faſhioned their tale in the aſſembly of the people as he had adviſed them. Hereupon the ſame *Alcibiades* taking preſently the advantage, which their double-dealing afforded, inveighed openly againſt them, as men of no ſincerity, that were come to *Athens* for none other purpoſe, than to hinder the people from ſtrengthening themſelves with friends, meaning to draw the *Argives* and their adherents to their own alliance, as (contrary to their oath) already they had the *Thebans*. The people of *Athens*, whom a pleaſing errand would hardly have ſatisfied, or brought into a good opinion of the *Lacedemonians* (whoſe honeſt meanings had ſo ill been ſeconded with good performance) were now ſo incenſed with the double-dealing of the embaſſadors, and the ſtrong perſwaſions of *Alcibiades*, that little wanted of concluding the league with *Argos*. Yet for the preſent, ſo far did *Nicias*, an honourable citizen, and great friend to the peace, prevail with them, that the buſineſs was put off, till he himſelf with other embaſſadors might fetch a better anſwer from *Sparta*.

It may ſeem a great wonder, how ſo poor a trick of *Alcibiades* was able to carry a matter of ſuch importance, when the *Spartan* embaſſadors might have caſt the load upon his own ſhoulders, by diſcovering the truth. But the gravity which was uſually found in the *Lacedemonians*, hinder'd them (perhaps) from playing their game handſomly againſt ſo nimble a wit; and they might well have been thought untruſty men, had they profeſſed themſelves ſuch as would ſay and unſay for their moſt advantage.

Nicias and his companions had a ſowr meſſage to deliver at *Sparta*, being peremptorily to require performance of all conditions, and among the reſt, that the *Lacedemonians* ſhould take the pains to rebuild *Panacte*, and ſhould immediately renounce their alliance made with the *Thebans*; letting them underſtand, that otherwiſe the *Athenians*, without further delay, would enter into confederacy with the *Argives* and their adherents. The *Ephori* at *Sparta* had no mind to forſake the *Thebans*, aſſured friends to their ſtate; but wrought ſo hard, that the anger of the *Athenians* was ſuffered to break out what way it could, which to mitigate they would do no more, than only (at the requeſt of *Nicias* their honourable friend, who would not ſeem to have effected nothing) ſwear anew to keep the articles of the league between them and *Athens*. Immediately therefore upon return of the embaſſadors, a new league was made between the *Athenians*, *Argives*, *Mantineans* and *Eleans*, with very ample proviſion for holding the ſame common friends and enemies; wherein, though the *Lacedemonians* were paſſed over with ſilence, yet was it manifeſt that the whole intent of this confederacy did bend it ſelf chiefly againſt them, as in ſhort while after was proved by effect.

At this time the *Lacedemonians* were in ill caſe, who having reſtored all that they could unto the *Athenians*, and procured others to do the like, had themſelves recovered nothing of their own (priſoners excepted) for default of reſtoring all that they ſhould. But that which did moſt of all diſable them was the loſs of reputation, which they had not more impaired in the late war by misfortunes, than in ſundry paſſages between them and the *Athenians:* to procure and keep whoſe amity, they had left ſundry of their old friends to ſhift for themſelves. Contrariwiſe, the *Athenians*, by the treaty of peace, had recovered the moſt part of that which they loſt in war; all their gettings they had retained, and were ſtrengthened by the acceſs of new confederates.

SECT. VII.

How the peace between Athens *and* Sparta *was ill kept, though not openly broken.*

IT was not long ere the *Argives* and their fellows had found buſineſs wherewith to ſet the *Athenians* on work, and make uſe of this conjunction. For, preſuming upon the ſtrength of their ſide, they began to meddle with the *Epidaureans*, whom it concerned the ſtate of *Sparta* to defend. So, many acts of hoſtility were committed, wherein *Athens* and *Sparta* did not (as principals) infeſt each the other, but came in collaterally, as to the aid of their ſeveral friends.

By theſe occaſions, the *Corinthians*, *Beotians*, *Phocians*, *Locrians*, and other people of *Greece*, began anew to range themſelves under the *Lacedemonians*, and follow their enſigns. One victory, which the *Lacedemonians* obtained by their mere valour in a ſet battle near to *Mantinea*, againſt the *Argive* ſide, helped well to repair their decayed reputation, tho' otherwiſe it yielded them no great profit. The civil diſſenſion, ariſing ſhortly after within *Argos* it ſelf, between the principal citizens and the commons, had almoſt thrown down the whole frame of the new combination. For the chief citizens getting the upper hand, made a league with *Sparta*, wherein they proceeded ſo far as to renounce the amity of the *Athenians* in expreſs words, and forced the *Mantineans* to the like. But in ſhort ſpace of time the multitude prevailing, reverſed all this, and having chaſed away their ambitious nobility, applied themſelves to the *Athenians* as cloſely as before.

Beſides theſe uproars in *Peloponneſus*, many eſſays were made to raiſe up troubles in all parts of *Greece*,

Greece, and likewiſe in *Macedon*, to the *Athenians*; whoſe forces and readineſs for execution prevented ſome things, revenged other, and requited all with ſome proſperous attempts. Finally, the *Athenians* wanting matter of quarrel, and the *Lacedemonians* growing weary, they began to be quiet, retaining ſtill that enmity in their hearts, which they had ſufficiently diſcovered in effects, tho' not yet breaking out into terms of open war.

SECT. VIII.

The Athenians *ſending two fleets to ſack* Syracuſe, *are put to flight and utterly diſcomfitted.*

DURING this intermiſſion of open war the *Athenians* re-entertained their hopes of ſubduing *Sicil*, whither they ſent a fleet ſo mighty as never was ſet forth by *Greece* in any age before or after.

This fleet was very well mann'd, and furniſhed with all neceſſaries to ſo great an expedition. All which came to nought; partly by the factions in *Athens*, whence *Alcibiades* author of that voyage, and one of the generals of their fleet, was driven to baniſh himſelf, for fear of ſuch judgment, as elſe he was like to have undergone among the incenſed people; partly by the invaſion which the *Lacedemonians* made upon *Attica*, whilſt the forces of that ſtate were ſo far from home. Hereunto was added the aid of the king of *Perſia*, who ſupplied the *Peloponneſians* with money.

Neither was the ſucceſs of things in *Sicil* ſuch, as without help from *Athens*, could give any likelihood of a good end in that war. For although in the beginning, the enterpriſe had ſo well ſucceeded, that they beſieged *Syracuſe*, the chief city of the iſland, and one of the faireſt towns which the *Greeks* inhabited, obtaining the better in ſundry battles by land and ſea; yet when the town was relieved with ſtrong aid from *Peloponneſus*, it came to paſs that the *Athenians* were put to the worſe on all ſides, in ſuch wiſe, that their fleet was ſhut up into the haven of *Syracuſe*, and could not iſſue out.

As the *Athenian* affairs went very ill in *Sicil*, ſo did they at home ſtand upon hard terms, for that the *Lacedemonians*, who had been formerly accuſtomed to make weariſome yearly yourneys into *Attica*, which having pilled and foraged, they returned home; did now by counſel of *Alcibiades* (who ſeeking revenge upon his own citizens, was fled unto them) fortify the town of *Decelea*, which was near to *Athens*, whence they ceaſed not with daily excurſions to harry all the country round about, and ſometimes give alarm unto the city it ſelf.

In theſe extremities, the perverſe obſtinacy of the *Athenians* was very ſtrange; who leaving at their backs, and at their own doors, an enemy little leſs mighty than themſelves, did yet ſend forth another fleet into *Sicil*, to invade a people no leſs puiſſant, which never had offended them.

It often happens, that proſperous events makes fooliſh counſel ſeem wiſer than it was, which came to paſs many times among the *Athenians*, whoſe vain conceits *Pallas* was ſaid to turn unto the beſt. But where unſound advice finding bad proof, is obſtinately purſued, neither *Pallas* nor fortune can be juſtly blamed for a miſerable iſſue. This ſecond fleet of the *Athenians*, which better might have ſerved to convey home the former, that was defeated; after ſome attempts made to ſmall purpoſe againſt the *Syracuſans*, was finally (together with the other part of the navy, which was there before) quite vanquiſhed, and barr'd up in the haven of *Syracuſe*, whereby the camp of the *Athenians*, utterly deprived of all benefit by ſea, either for ſuccour or departure, was driven to break up and fly away by land; in which flight they were overaken, routed, and quite overthrown in ſuch wiſe, that ſcarce any man eſcaped.

This miſchief well deſervedly fell upon the *Athenians*, who had wickedly condemned into exile, *Sophocles* and *Pthiodorus*, generals, formerly ſent into that iſle, pretending that they had taken money for making peace in *Sicil*; whereas indeed there was not any means or poſſibility to have made war. Hereby it came to paſs, that *Nicias*, who had the chief command in this unhappy enterpriſe, did rather chooſe to hazard the ruin of his country, by the loſs of that army, wherein conſiſted little leſs than all the power of *Athens*, than to adventure his own eſtate, his life, and his honour, upon the tongues of ſhameleſs accuſers, and the ſentence of judges before his tryal reſolved to condemn him, by retiring from *Syracuſe*, when wiſdom and neceſſity required it. *For* (ſaid he) *they ſhall give ſentence upon us, who know not the reaſon of our doings, nor will give ear to any that would ſpeak in our behalf; but altogether hearken to ſuſpicious and vain rumours that ſhall be brought againſt; yea, theſe our ſoldiers, who now are ſo deſirous to return in ſafety, will in our danger be well contented to frame their tales to the pleaſure of the lewd and inſolent multitude.*

This reſolution of *Nicias*, tho' it cannot be commended (for it is the part of an honeſt and valiant man, to do what reaſon willeth, not what opinion expecteth; and to meaſure honour or diſhonour by the aſſurance of his well informed conſcience, rather than by the malicious report and cenſure of others) yet it may be excuſed; ſince he had before his eyes the injuſtice of his people, and had well underſtood that a wicked ſentence is infinitely worſe than a wicked fact, as being held a precedent and pattern, whereby oppreſſion beginning upon one, is extended as warrantable upon all. Therefore his fear of wrongful condemnation was ſuch, as a conſtant man could not eaſily have over-maſter'd; but when afterwards the army, having no other expectation of ſafety than the faint hope of a ſecret flight, he was ſo terrified with an eclipſe of the moon, happening when they were about to diſlodge, that he would not conſent to have the camp break up till ſeven and twenty days were paſs'd. His timorouſneſs was even as fooliſh and ridiculous, as the iſſue of it was lamentable. For he ſhould not have thought that the power of the heavens, and the courſe of nature would be as unjuſt as his *Athenians*; or might pretend leſs evil to the ſlothful, than to ſuch as did their beſt. Neither do I think that any aſtrologer can alledge this eclipſe, as either a cauſe or prognoſtication of that army's deſtruction, otherwiſe than as the folly of men did, by application, turn it to their own confuſion. Had *C. Caſſius*, the *Roman*, he, who ſlew *Julius Ceſar*, imitated this ſuperſtition of *Nicias*, he had ſurely found the ſame fortune in a caſe very like. But when, he retiring, the broken remainder of *Craſſus*'s army defeated by the *Parthian* archers, was adviſed, upon ſuch an accident as this, to continue where he then was, till the ſun were paſt the ſign of *Scorpio*; he made anſwer, that he ſtood not in ſuch fear of *Scorpio*, as of *Sagittarius*. So adventuring rather to abide the frowning of the heavens, than the nearer danger of enemies upon earth, he made ſuch a ſafe and honourable retreat, as did both ſhew his noble reſolution, and give a fair example to that good rule,

—— *Sapiens dominabitur aſtris.*

Thus we ſee that God, who ordinarily works by concatenation of means, deprives the governours of underſtanding, when he intends evil to the multitude; and that the wickedneſs of unjuſt men is the ready means to weaken the virtue of thoſe who might have done them good.

SECT. IX.

Of the troubles wherein the ſtate of Athens *fell, after the great loſs of the fleet and army in* Sicilia.

THE loſs of this army was the ruin of the *Athenian* dominion, and may be well accounted a very little leſs calamity to that eſtate, than was the ſubverſion of the walls, when the city about ſeven years after was taken by *Lyſander*. For now began the ſubjects of the *Athenian* eſtate to rebel; of whom, ſome they reduced under their obedience, others held out; ſome for fear of greater inconvenience were ſet at liberty, promiſing only to be their good friends, as formerly they had been their ſubjects; others, having a kind of liberty offered by the *Athenians*, were not therewith contented, but obtained a true and perfect liberty by force. Among theſe troubles it fell out very unſeaſonably, that the principal men of *Athens* being wearied with the people's inſolency, took upon them to change the form of that eſtate, and bring the government into the hands of a few. To which purpoſe conſpiring with the captains which were abroad, they cauſed them to ſet up the form of an ariſtocracy in the towns of their confederates; and in the mean time, ſome that were moſt likely to withſtand this innovation, being ſlain at *Athens*, the commonalty were ſo diſmay'd, that none durſt ſpeak againſt the conſpirators, whoſe number they knew not; but every man was afraid of his neighbour, leſt he ſhould be a member of the league. In this general fear the majeſty of *Athens* was uſurped by four hundred men, who obſerving in ſhew the ancient form of proceeding, did cauſe all matters to be propounded unto the people, and concluded upon by the greater part of voices: but the things propounded were only ſuch as were firſt allowed in private among themſelves; neither had the commonalty any other liberty, than only to approve and give conſent, for whoſoever preſumed any further, was quickly diſpatched out of the way, and no enquiry made of the murder. By theſe means were many decrees made, all tending to the eſtabliſhment of this new authority, which nevertheleſs endured not long. For the fleet and army which then was in the iſle of *Samos*, did altogether deteſt theſe dealings of the four hundred uſurpers, and held them as enemies; whereupon they revoked *Alcibiades* out of baniſhment, and by his aſſiſtance procured that the ſupplies which the *Perſian* king had promiſed unto the *Lacedemonians*, were by *Tiſſaphernes* his lieutenant, made unprofitable through the ſlow and bad performance. *Alcibiades* had at the firſt been very well entertain'd in *Sparta*, whilſt his ſervices done to that ſtate was not grown to be the object of envy. But when it appeared that in counſel and good performance he ſo far excelled all the *Lacedemonians*, that all their good ſucceſs was aſcribed to his wit and valour, then were all the principal citizens weary of his virtue; eſpecially *Agis*, one of their kings, whoſe wife had ſo far yielded herſelf to the love of this *Athenian*, that among her inward friends ſhe could not forbear to call her young child by his name. Hereupon order was taken that *Alcibiades* ſhould be killed out of the way. But he diſcovering the *Spartan* treachery, conveyed himſelf unto *Tiſſaphernes*, whom he ſo bewitched with his great beauty, ſweet converſation, and ſound wit, that he ſoon became the maſter of that barbarous vice-roy's affections, who had free power to diſpoſe the great king's treaſures and forces in thoſe parts. Then began he to adviſe *Tiſſaphernes*, not ſo far forth to aſſiſt the *Lacedemonians*, that they ſhould quite overthrow the ſtate of *Athens*, but rather to help the weaker ſide, and let them one conſume another, whereby all ſhould fall at length into the hands of the *Perſian*. By this counſel he made way to other practices, wherein by ſtrength of his reputation (as the only favourite of ſo great a potentate) he play'd his own game, procuring his reſtitution. At length his baniſhment being repealed by the army, but not by the citizens (who then were oppreſſed by the four hundred) he laboured greatly to reconcile the ſoldiers to the governours; or at leaſt to divert their heat another way, and turn it upon the common enemy. Some of the four hundred approved his motion, as being weary of the tyranny whereof they were partakers; partly becauſe they ſaw it could not long endure, and partly for that themſelves, being leſs regarded by the reſt of their companions, than ſtood with their good liking, ſought to acquit themſelves of it as honeſtly as they might. But the moſt of that faction laboured to obtain peace of the *Lacedemonians*, deſiring chiefly to maintain both their own authority, and the greatneſs of their city, if they might; but if this could not be, they did rather wiſh to preſerve their own power, or ſafety at leaſt, than the good eſtate of the commonwealth. Therefore they made ſundry overtures of peace to the *Lacedemonians*, deſiring to compound in as good terms as they might, and affirming that they were fitter to be truſted than the wavering multitude; eſpecially conſidering that the city of *Sparta* was governed by an ariſtocracy, to which form they had now reduced *Athens*. All theſe paſſages between the four hundred (or the moſt and chief of them) and the *Lacedemonians*, were kept as ſecret as might be. For the city of *Athens* hoping, without any great cauſe, to repair their loſſes, was not inclined to make compoſition; from which upon juſter ground the enemy was much more averſe, truſting well that the diſcord of the *Athenians* (not unknown abroad) might yield ſome fair opportunity to the deſtruction of it ſelf, which in effect (though not then preſently) came to paſs. And upon this hope king *Agis* did ſometimes bring his forces from *Decelea* to *Athens*, where doing no good, he received ſome ſmall loſſes. Likewiſe the navy of *Peloponneſus* made ſhew of attempting the city, but ſeeing no likelihood of ſucceſs, they bent their courſe from thence to other places; where they obtained victories, which in the better fortune of the *Athenians* might more likely have been regarded, than in this their decayed eſtate. Yet it ſeems, without any diſparagement to their wiſdom, they ſhould rather have forborn to preſent unto the city, or to the countries near adjoining any terror of the war. For the diſſenſion within the walls might ſoon have done more hurt than could be received from the fleet or army without; which indeed gave occaſion to ſet the citizens at unity, though it laſted not very long. The four hundred, by means of theſe troubles, were fain to reſign their authority, which they could not now hold, when the people having taken arms to repel foreign enemies, would not lay them down, till they had freed themſelves from ſuch as oppreſſed the ſtate at home. Yet was not this alteration of government a full reſtitution of the ſoveraign command unto the people,

ple, or whole body of the city, but only to five thouſand; which company the four hundred (when their authority began) had pretended to take unto them as aſſiſtants: herein ſeeming to do little wrong or none to the commonalty, who ſeldom aſſembled in greater number. But now when the higheſt power was come indeed into the hands of ſo many, it was ſoon agreed that *Alcibiades* and his companions ſhould be recalled from exile, and that the army at *Samos* ſhould be requeſted to undertake the government; which was forthwith reformed according to the ſoldiers deſire.

SECT. X.

How Alcibiades *won many important victories for the* Athenians, *was recalled from exile, made their general, and again depoſed.*

THIS eſtabliſhment of things in the city, was accompanied with ſome good ſucceſs in the wars. For the *Lacedemonians* were about the ſame time overthrown at ſea, in a great battel, by the *Athenian* fleet, which had remained at *Samos*; to which *Alcibiades* afterwards joining ſuch forces as he could raiſe, obtain'd many victories. Before the town of *Abydus*, his arrival with 18 ſhips gave the honour of a great battel to the *Athenians*; he overthrew and utterly deſtroy'd the fleet of the *Lacedemonians*, commanded by *Mindarus*, took the towns of *Cyzicus* and *Perinthus*, made the *Selymbrians* ranſom their city, and fortify'd *Chryſopolis*. Hereupon letters were ſent to *Sparta*, which the *Athenians*, intercepting, found to contain the diſtreſs of the army in theſe few words: *All is loſt*, Mindarus *is ſlain, the ſoldiers want victuals, we know not what to do.*

Shortly after this, *Alcibiades* overthrew the *Lacedemonians* in fight by land at *Chalcedon*, took *Selymbria*, beſieged and won *Byzantium*, now called *Conſtantinople*, which even in thoſe days was a goodly, rich, and very ſtrong city. Hereupon he returned home with very great welcome, and was made high admiral of all the navy.

But this his honour continued not long; for it was taken from him, and he driven to baniſh himſelf again; only becauſe his lieutenant, contrary to the expreſs command of *Alcibiades*, fighting with the enemies in his abſence, had loſt a great part of the fleet.

The ſecond baniſhment of *Alcibiades* was to the *Athenians* more harmful than the firſt; and the loſs which they thereupon received was (tho' more heavy to them, yet) leſs to be pitied of others, than that which enſued upon his former exile. For whereas at the firſt, he had fought revenge upon his own city; now, as inured to adverſity, he rather pitied their fury, who in time of ſuch danger had caſt out him that ſhould have repaired their weak eſtate, than ſought by procuring or beholding the calamity of his people, to comfort himſelf after injury received. Before they, who were inſtituted in the place of *Alcibiades*, arrived at the fleet, he preſented battel to *Lyſander* the *Lacedemonian* admiral, who was not ſo confident upon his former victory, as to undertake *Alcibiades* himſelf, bringing more ſhips in number (notwithſtanding the former loſs of 15) than his enemies had, and better ordered than they had been under his lieutenant. But when the decree of the people was publiſhed in the navy, then did *Alcibiades* withdraw himſelf to a town upon *Helleſpont*, called *Bizanthe*, where he had built a caſtle.

SECT. XI.

The battel at Arginuſæ, *and condemnation of the victorious* Athenian *captains by the people.*

AFter this time the *Athenians*, receiving many loſſes and diſcomfitures, were driven to flie into the haven of *Mytelene*, where they were ſtraightly beſieged both by land and ſea. For the raiſing of this ſiege neceſſity enforced them to man all their veſſels, and to put the uttermoſt of their forces into the hazard of one battel. This battel was fought at *Arginuſæ*, where *Callicratidas*, admiral of the *Lacedemonians*, loſing the honour of the day, preſerved his own reputation by dying valiantly in the fight. It might well have been expected, that the ten captains, who jointly had command in chief over the *Athenian* fleet, ſhould for that good day's ſervice, and ſo happy a victory, have received great honour of their citizens. But contrariwiſe they were forthwith called home, and accuſed, as if wilfully they had ſuffered many of the citizens, whoſe ſhips were broken and ſunk, to be caſt away, when by appointing ſome veſſels to take them up, they might have ſaved them from being drowned. Hereto the captains readily made a very juſt anſwer; that they purſuing the victory, had left part of the fleet, under ſufficient men, to ſave thoſe that were wrack'd; which if it were not well accompliſhed, it was, becauſe a tempeſt ariſing about the end of the fight, had hindered the performance of that, and other their intendments. This excuſe availed not: for a lewd fellow was brought forth, who ſaid, that he himſelf eſcaping in a meal-tub, had been intreated by thoſe who were in peril of drowning, to deſire of the people revenge of their deaths upon the captains. It was very ſtrange, that upon ſuch an accuſation, maintained with ſo ſlender evidence, men, that had well deſerved of their country, ſhould be overthrown. But their enemies had ſo incenſed the raſcally multitude, that no man durſt abſolve them, ſave only *Socrates* the wiſe and virtuous philoſopher, whoſe voice in this judgment was not regarded. Six of them were put to death, of whom one had hardly eſcaped drowning, and was with much ado relieved by other veſſels in the ſtorm: but the captains which were abſent eſcaped; for when the fury of the people was over-paſs'd, this judgment was reverſed, and the accuſers called into queſtion for having deceived and perverted the citizens. Thus the *Athenians* went about to free themſelves from the infamy of injuſtice; but the divine juſtice was not aſleep, nor would be ſo deluded.

SECT. XII.

The battle at Ægos-Potamos, *wherein the whole ſtate of* Athens *was ruined; with the end of the* Peloponneſian *war.*

THE *Peloponneſian* fleet under *Lyſander*, the year next following, having ſcowred the *Ægean* ſeas, entered *Helleſpont*, where (landing ſoldiers) it beſieged and took the town of *Lampſacus*. Hereupon all the navy of *Athens*, being an hundred and fourſcore ſail, made thither in haſte; but finding *Lampſacus* taken before their coming, they put in at *Seſtos*, where having refreſhed themſelves, they ſailed to the river, called *Ægos-Potamos*, which is (as we might name it) *Goats-brook*, or the river of the *Goat*, being on the continent, oppoſite to *Lampſacus*; and there they caſt anchors, not one whole league off from *Lyſander*, who rode at *Lampſacus* in the harbour. The next day after their arrival, they preſented fight unto the *Peloponneſians*

neſians, who refuſs'd it; whereupon the *Athenians* returned again to *Ægos-Potamos*; and thus they continued five days, braving every day the enemy, and returning to their own harbour when it drew towards evening.

The caſtle of *Alcibiades* was not far from the navy, and his power in thoſe places was ſuch as might have greatly availed his countrymen, if they could have made uſe of it. For he had waged mercenaries, and making war in his own name upon ſome people of the *Thracians*, had gathered much wealth, and obtained much reputation among them. He perceiving the diſorderly courſe of the *Athenian* commanders, repaired unto them, and ſhewed what great inconvenience might grow, if they did not ſoon fore-ſee and prevent it. For they lay in a road ſubject to every weather, neither near enough to any town where they might furniſh themſelves with neceſſaries; nor ſo far off as had been more expedient. *Seſtos* was the next market-town; thither both ſoldiers and mariners reſorted, flocking away from the navy every day, as ſoon as they were returned from braving the enemy. Therefore *Alcibiades* willed them either to lie at *Seſtos*, which was not far off; or at the leaſt, to conſider how near their enemy was, whoſe fear proceeded rather from obedience to their general, than from any cowardiſe. This admonition was ſo far deſpiſed, that ſome of the commanders willed him to meddle with his own matters, and to remember that his authority was out of date. Had it not been for theſe opprobrious words, he could (as he told his familiars) have compelled the *Lacedemonians* either to fight upon unequal terms, or utterly to quit their fleet. And like enough it was that he might ſo have done, by tranſporting the light-armed *Thracians* his confederates, and others his followers, over the ſtraights, who aſſaulting the *Peloponneſians* by land, would either have compelled them to put to ſea, or elſe to leave their ſhips to the mercy of the *Athenians*. But finding their acceptance of his good counſel no better than hath been rehearſed, he left them to their fortune, which how evil it would be he did prognoſticate.

Lyſander all this while defending himſelf by the advantage of his haven, was not careleſs in looking into the demeanour of the *Athenians*. When they departed, his manner was to ſend forth ſome of his ſwifteſt veſſels after them, who obſerving their doings, related unto him what they had ſeen. Therefore underſtanding in what careleſs faſhion they romed up and down the country, he kept all his men aboard after their departure, and the 5th day gave eſpecial charge to his ſcouts, that when they perceived the *Athenians* diſembarking, as their cuſtom was, and walking towards *Seſtos*, they ſhould forthwith return, and hang up a brazen ſhield in the prow, as a token for him to weigh anchor.

The ſcouts performed their charge, and *Lyſander* being in a readineſs, made all ſpeed that ſtrength of oars could give, to *Ægos-Potamos*, where he found very few of his enemies aboard their ſhips, not many near them, and all in great confuſion, upon the news of his approach.

Inſomuch that the great induſtry which the *Athenians* then ſhewed, was in the eſcape of 8 or 9 ſhips, which knowing how much that loſs imported, gave over *Athens* as deſperate, and made a long flight unto the iſle of *Cyprus*; all the reſt were taken, and ſuch of the ſoldiers as came in to the reſcue cut in pieces. Thus was the war, which had laſted 27 years, with variable ſucceſs, concluded in one hour; and the glory of *Athens* in ſuch wiſe eclipſed, that ſhe never after ſhone in her perfect light.

Immediately upon this victory, *Lyſander*, having taken ſuch towns as readily did yield upon the firſt fame of his exploit, he ſet ſail for *Athens*, and joining his forces with thoſe of *Agis* and *Pauſanias*, kings of *Sparta*, ſummoned the city, which finding too ſtubborn to yield, and too ſtrong to be won on the ſudden, he put forth again to ſea; and rather by terror than violence, compelling all the iſlands, and ſuch towns of the *Ionians*, as had formerly held of the *Athenians*, to ſubmit themſelves to *Sparta*, he did thereby cut off all proviſion of victuals and other neceſſaries from the city, and enforced the people by mere famine to yield to theſe conditions: That the long walls leading from the town to the port, ſhould be thrown down; that all cities ſubject to their eſtate, ſhould be ſet at liberty; that the *Athenians* ſhould be maſters only of their own territories, and the fields adjoining to their town; and that they ſhould keep no more than twelve ſhips; that they ſhould hold as friends or enemies, the ſame whom the *Lacedemonians* did, and follow the *Lacedemonians* as leaders in the wars.

Theſe articles being agreed upon, the walls were thrown down with great rejoicing of thoſe who had borne diſpleaſure to *Athens*; and not without ſome conſultation of deſtroying the city, and laying waſte the land about it. Which advice, altho' it was not entertained, yet were thirty governours, or rather cruel tyrants, appointed over the people, who recompenſed their former inſolency and injuſtice over their captains, by oppreſſing them with all baſe and intolerable ſlavery.

The only ſmall hope then remaining to the *Athenians*, was, that *Alcibiades* might perhaps repair what their own folly had ruined. But the thirty tyrants perceiving this, advertiſed the *Lacedemonians* thereof, who contrived, and (as now domineering in every quarter) ſoon effected his ſudden death.

Such end had the *Peloponneſian* war. After which, the *Lacedemonians* abuſing the reputation and great power, which they had therein obtained, grew very odious to *Greece*; and by combination of many cities againſt them, were diſpoſſeſſed of their high authority, even in that very age, in which they had ſubdued *Athens*. The greateſt foil that they took was of the *Thebans*, led by *Epaminondas*, under whom *Philip* of *Macedon*, father to *Alexander* the Great, had the beſt of his education. By theſe *Thebans*, the city of *Sparta* (beſides other great loſſes received) was ſundry times in danger of being taken. But theſe haughty attempts of the *Thebans* came finally to nothing; for the ſeveral eſtates and ſigniories of *Greece* were grown ſo jealous of one another's greatneſs, that the *Lacedemonians*, *Athenians*, *Argives*, and *Thebans*, which were the mightieſt, aſſociating themſelves with the weaker party, did ſo counterpoiſe the ſtronger, that no one city could extend the limits of her juriſdiction ſo far as might make her terrible to her neighbours. And thus all parts of the country remained rather evenly balanced, than well agreeing, till ſuch time as *Philip*, and after him *Alexander*, kings of *Macedon* (whoſe forefathers had been dependants, and followers, yea, almoſt mere vaſſals to the eſtates of *Athens* and *Sparta*) found means, by making uſe of their factions, to bring them all into ſervitude, from which they never could be free, till the *Romans* preſenting them with a ſhew of liberty, did themſelves indeed become their maſters.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of matters concerning the Peloponneſian *war, or ſhortly following it.*

SECT. I.

How the affairs of Perſia *ſtood in theſe times.*

DURING the times of this *Peloponneſian* war, and thoſe other leſs expeditions foregoing it, *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, having peaceably enjoy'd a long reign over the *Perſians*, left it by his death either to *Darius*, who was called *Darius Nothus*, or the *Baſtard*, whom the *Greek* hiſtorians (lightly paſſing over *Xerxes* the ſecond, and *Sogdianus*, as uſurpers, and for their ſhort reign little to be regarded) place next unto him, or to *Xerxes* the ſecond, who, and his brother *Sogdianus* after him (ſeeming to have been the ſons of *Heſter*) held the kingdom but one year between them, the younger ſucceeding his elder brother. It is not my purpoſe (as I have ſaid before) to purſue the hiſtory of the *Perſians* from henceforth, by rehearſal of all the particulars, otherwiſe than as they ſhall be incident to the affairs of *Greece*. It may therefore ſuffice to ſay, that *Xerxes* the ſecond being a vicious prince, did periſh after a month or two, if not by ſurfeit, then by treachery of his, as riotous, brother *Sogdianus*. Likewiſe of *Sogdianus* it is found, that being as ill as his brother, and more cruel, he ſlew unjuſtly *Bagorazus* a principal eunuch, and would have done as much to his brother *Darius* the baſtard, had not he foreſeen it, and by raiſing a ſtronger army than this hated king *Sogdianus* could levy, ſeiz'd at once upon the king and kingdom. *Darius* having ſlain his brother, held the empire 19 years. *Amyrtæus* of *Sais* an *Egyptian* rebelled againſt him, and having partly ſlain, partly chaſed out of the land the *Perſian* garriſons, allied himſelf ſo firmly with the *Greeks*, that by their aid he maintained the kingdom, and delivered it over to his poſterity, who (notwithſtanding the fury of their civil wars) maintained it againſt the *Perſian*, all the days of this *Darius*, and of his ſon *Artaxerxes Mnemon*. Likewiſe *Amorges*, a ſubject of his own, and of the royal blood, being lieutenant of *Caria*, rebelled againſt him; confederating himſelf with the *Athenians*. But the great calamity, before ſpoken of, which fell upon the *Athenians* in *Sicil*, having put new life into the *Spartans*, and given courage to the iſlanders and others, ſubject to the ſtate of *Athens*, to ſhake off the yoke of their long continued bondage: it fell out well for *Darius*, that the *Lacedemonians* being deſtitute of money, wherewith to defray the charge of a great navy, without which it was impoſſible to advance the war againſt the ſtate of *Athens*, that remained powerful by ſea, were driven to crave his aſſiſtance, which he granted unto them, firſt upon what conditions beſt pleaſed himſelf, tho' afterwards the articles of the league between him and them were ſet down in more preciſe terms, wherein it was concluded, that he and they ſhould make war jointly upon the *Athenians*, and upon all that ſhould rebel from either of them, and (which was highly to the king's honour and profit) that all the cities of *Aſia*, which had formerly been his, or his predeceſſors, ſhould return to his obedience. By this treaty, and the war enſuing (of which I have already ſpoken) he recovered all that his grandfather and father had loſt in *Aſia*. Likewiſe by aſſiſtance of the *Lacedemonians*, he got *Amorges* alive into his hands, who was taken in the city of *Jaſus*; the *Athenians* wanting either force or courage to ſuccour him. Nevertheleſs *Egypt* ſtill held out againſt him; the cauſe whereof cannot be the employment of the *Perſian* forces on the parts of *Greece*, for he abounded in men, of whom he had enough for all occaſions, but they wanted manhood, which cauſed him to fight with gold, which effected for him by ſoldiers of other nations, and his natural enemies, what the valour of his own ſubjects was inſufficient to perform. *Darius* had in marriage *Paryſatis* his own ſiſter, who bare unto him (beſides other children) *Artaxerxes* called *Mnemon*, that is to ſay, the mindful, or the remembrer, who ſucceeded him in the kingdom; and *Cyrus* the younger, a prince of ſingular virtue, and accounted by all that knew him, the moſt excellent man that ever *Perſia* bred after *Cyrus* the great. But the old king *Darius* intending to leave unto his elder ſon *Artaxerxes* the inheritance of that great empire, did caſt a jealous eye upon the doings of young *Cyrus*, who being lieutenant of the lower *Aſia*, took more upon him than befitted a ſubject: for which cauſe his father ſent for him, with intent to have taken ſome very ſharp courſe with him, had not his own death prevented the coming of his younger ſon, and placed the elder in his throne. Of the war between theſe brethren, and ſummarily of *Artaxerxes*, we ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak ſomewhat in more convenient place.

SECT. II.

How the thirty tyrants got their dominion in Athens.

I Hold it in this place very convenient to ſhew the proceedings of the *Greeks*, after the ſubverſion of the walls of *Athens*, which gave end to that war called the *Peloponneſian* war, but could not free the unhappy country of *Greece* from civil broils. The 30 governours, commonly called the 30 tyrants of *Athens*, were choſen at firſt by the people to compile a body of their law, and make a collection of ſuch ancient ſtatutes as were meet to be put in practice: the condition of the city ſtanding as it did in that ſo ſudden alteration. To this charge was annexed the ſupreme authority, either as a recompence of their labours, or becauſe the neceſſity of the times did ſo require it, wherein the law being uncertain, it was fit that ſuch men ſhould give judgment in particular cauſes, to whoſe judgment the laws themſelves, by which the city was to be ordered, were become ſubject. But theſe 30 having ſo great power in their hands, were more careful to hold it, than to deſerve it by faithful execution of that which was committed to them in truſt.

Therefore apprehending ſuch troubleſome fellows, as were odious to the city, though not puniſhable therefore by law, they condemned them to death; which proceeding was by all men highly approved, who conſidered their lewd conditions, but did not withal bethink themſelves, how eaſy a thing it would be unto theſe 30 men, to take away the lives of innocents, by calling them perturbers of the peace, or what elſe they liſted, when condemnation without due trial and proof had been once well allowed. Having thus plauſibly entered into a wicked courſe of government, they thought it beſt to fortify themſelves with a ſure guard, ere they broke out into thoſe diſorders, which they muſt needs

needs commit for the eſtabliſhing of their authority. Wherefore diſpatching two of their own company to *Sparta*, they informed the *Lacedemonians*, that it was the full intent of the thirty, to keep the city free from all rebellious motions, to which purpoſe it behoved them to cut off ſuch as were ſeditious; and therefore deſired the *Lacedemonians* to ſend them a garriſon, which they promiſed at their own coſt to maintain. This motion was well approved, and a guard ſent, the captain of which was ſo well entertained by the thirty, that none of their miſdeeds could want his high commendations at *Sparta*. Hereupon the tyrants began to take heart, and looking no more after baſe and deteſted perſons, invaded the principal men of the city, ſending armed men from houſe to houſe, who drew out ſuch as were of great reputation, and likely, or able, to make any head againſt this wicked form of government: whereby there was ſuch effuſion of blood, as to *Theramenes* (one of the thirty) ſeemed very horrible, and unable to eſcape vengeance. His diſlike of their proceedings being openly diſcovered, cauſed his fellows to bethink themſelves, and provide for their own ſecurity, and his deſtruction, leſt he ſhould make himſelf a captain of the diſcontented (which were almoſt the whole city) and redeem his own peace with their ruin. Wherefore they ſelected three thouſand of the citizens, whom they thought meeteſt, and gave unto them ſome part of publick authority, the reſt they diſarmed; and having thus increaſed their own ſtrength, and weakened their oppoſites, they began afreſh to ſhed the blood not only of their private enemies, but of ſuch whoſe money or goods might enrich them, and enable them for the payment of their guard. And to this purpoſe they concluded, that every one of them ſhould name one man upon whoſe goods he ſhould ſeize, putting the owner to death. But when *Theramenes* uttered his deteſtation of ſo wicked an intent, then did *Critias*, who of all the thirty was moſt tyrannical, accuſe him to the council as a treacherous man, and (whereas one main privilege of the three thouſand was, that none of them ſhould ſuffer death at the appointment of the thirty, but have the acuſtomed tryal) he took upon him to ſtrike out of that number the name of *Theramenes*, and ſo reduced him under the tryal and ſentence of that order. It was well alledged by *Theramenes*, that his name was not more eaſy to be blotted out of the catalogue than any other man's, upon which conſideration, he adviſed them all to conceive no otherwiſe of his caſe, than as of their own, who were liable to the ſame form of proceeding; but (every man chooſing rather to preſerve his own life by ſilence, than preſently to draw upon himſelf the danger, which as yet concerned him little, and perhaps would never come near him) the tyrants interpreting ſilence as conſent, condemned him forthwith, and compelled him to drink poiſon.

SECT. III.

The conſpiracy againſt the thirty tyrants, and their depoſing.

AFTER the death of *Theramenes*, the thirty began to uſe ſuch outrage, as excelled their former villanies. For having three thouſand (as they thought) firm unto them, they robbed all others without fear or ſhame, deſpoiling them of lands and goods, and cauſing them to fly into baniſhment for ſafeguard of their lives. This flight of the citizens procured their liberty, and the general good of the city. For the baniſhed citizens, who were fled to *Thebes*, enter'd into conſultation, and reſolved to hazard their lives in ſetting free the city of *Athens*.

The very thought of ſuch a practice had been treaſon at home, which had no other danger abroad than might be found in the execution. Seventy men, or thereabouts, were the firſt undertakers, who with their captain *Thraſybulus* took *Phyla*, a place of ſtrength in the territory of *Athens*. No ſooner did the thirty hear of their exploit, than ſeek means to prevent further danger; aſſembling the three thouſand and their *Lacedemonian* guard, with which force they attempted *Phyla*, but were with ſome loſs of their men repelled. Finding the place too ſtrong to be taken by aſſault, they intended to beſiege it; which purpoſe came to nought by means of ſnow that fell, and other ſtormy weather, againſt which they had not made proviſion. Retiring therefore to the city, which above all they were to make good, they left the moſt of their guard, and two companies of horſe to weary out them which lay in *Phyla*, with a flying ſiege. But it was not long ere the followers of *Thraſybulus* were encreaſed from ſeventy to ſeven hundred, which adventured to give charge upon thoſe guards, of whom they cut off above an hundred and twenty. Theſe ſmall, but proſperous beginnings, added more to the number of thoſe in *Phyla*, who now with a thouſand men got entrance into *Pireus*, the ſuburb of *Athens*, lying on the port. Before their coming, the thirty had reſolved to fortify the town of *Eleuſine*, to their own uſe, whereinto they might make an eaſy retreat, and ſave themſelves from any ſudden peril. It may well ſeem ſtrange, that whereas their barbarous manner of government had brought them into ſuch danger, they were ſo far from ſeeking to obtain mens good will, that contrariwiſe, to aſſure themſelves of *Eleuſine*, they got all of the place who could bear arms into their hands by a train, and wickedly (tho' under form of juſtice) murdered them all. But *Sceleribus tutum per ſcelera eſt iter*, the miſchiefs which they had already done were ſuch as left them no hope of going backward, nor any other apparent likelihood of ſafety, than by extending their cruelty unto all, ſeeing few or none were left, whom they could truſt. When *Thraſybulus* and his fellows, who as yet were termed conſpirators, had taken the *Pyreus*, then were the three thouſand armed again by the tyrants, and brought to aſſault it; but in this enterpriſe *Thraſybulus* had the better, and repelled his enemies, of whom altho' there were ſlain to the number of ſeventy only, yet the victory ſeemed the greater, becauſe *Critias*, and one other of the thirty, periſhed in that fight. The death of *Critias*, and the ſtout defence of *Pireus*, together with ſome exhortations uſed by *Thraſybulus* to the citizens, wrought ſuch effect, that the thirty were depoſed. Nevertheleſs there were ſo many of the three thouſand who having communicated with the thirty in their miſdeeds, feared to be called to a ſharp account, that no peace, nor quiet form of government could be eſtabliſhed. For embaſſadors were ſent to *Sparta*, who craving aid againſt *Thraſybulus*, and his followers, had favourable audience, and a power ſent to their aſſiſtance, both by land and ſea, under the conduct of *Lyſander*, and his brother; whom *Pauſanias* the *Spartan* king did follow, raiſing an army of the cities confederate with the *Lacedemonians*. And here appeared firſt the jealouſy wherein ſome people held the ſtate of *Sparta*. The *Beotians* and *Corinthians*, who in the late wars had been the moſt bitter enemies to *Athens*, refuſed to follow *Pauſanias* in this expedition; alledging that it ſtood not with their oaths, to make war againſt that people, who had not hitherto broken any one article of the league: but fearing,

ing, indeed, leſt the *Lacedemonians* ſhould annex the territory of *Athens* to their own demains. It is not to be doubted that *Pauſanias* took this anſwer in good part. For it was not his purpoſe to deſtroy thoſe againſt whom he went, but only to croſs the proceedings of *Lyſander*, whom he envied. Therefore having in ſome ſmall ſkirmiſhes againſt them of *Thraſybulus*'s party, made a ſhew of war, he finally wrought ſuch means, that all things were compounded quietly: the thirty men, and ſuch others as were like to give cauſe of tumult, being ſent to *Sparta*. The remainder of that tyrannical faction, having withdrawn themſelves to *Eleuſine*, were ſhortly after found to attempt ſome innovation; whereupon the whole city riſing againſt them, took their captains as they were coming to parly, and ſlew them: which done, to avoid further inconvenience, a law was made, that all injuries paſt ſhould be forgotten, and no man called into queſtion for wrongs committed. By which order, wiſely made, and carefully obſerved, the city returned to their former quietneſs.

CHAP. X.

The expedition of Cyrus *the younger.*

SECT. I.

The grounds of Cyrus's *attempt againſt his brother.*

THE matters of *Greece* now ſtanding upon ſuch terms, that no one eſtate durſt oppoſe itſelf againſt that of *Lacedemon*; young *Cyrus*, brother to *Artaxerxes*, king of *Perſia*, having in his father's life time very carefully proſecuted the war againſt *Athens*, did ſend his meſſengers to *Sparta*, requeſting that their love might appear no leſs to him, than that which he had ſhewed towards them in their dangerous war againſt the *Athenians*. To this requeſt, being general, the *Lacedemonians* gave a ſuitable anſwer, commanding their admiral to perform unto *Cyrus* all ſervice that he ſhould require of him. If *Cyrus* had plainly diſcovered himſelf, and the *Lacedemonians* bent their whole power to his aſſiſtance, very likely it is, that either the kingdom of *Perſia* ſhould have been the recompence of his deſerts; or that he periſhing in battel, as after he did, the ſubverſion of that empire had forthwith enſued. But it pleaſed God, rather to ſhew unto the *Greeks* the ways, which under the *Macedonian* enſigns, the victorious footſteps of their poſterity ſhould meaſure; and opening unto them the riches, and withal the weakneſs of the *Perſian*, to kindle in them both deſire and hope of that conqueſt, which he reſerved to another generation; than to give into their hands that mighty kingdom, whoſe hour was not yet come. The love which *Paryſatis* the queen-mother of *Perſia* bare unto *Cyrus* her younger ſon, being ſeconded by the earneſt favour of the people, and ready deſires of many principal men, had moved this young prince, in his father's old age to aſpire after the ſucceſſion. But being ſent for by his father (as hath before been ſhewed) whoſe meaning was to curb this ambitious youth; he found his elder brother *Artaxerxes* eſtabliſhed ſo ſurely by the old king's favour, that it were not ſafe to attempt any means of diſplanting him, by whoſe diſfavour himſelf might eaſily loſe the place of a viceroy, which he held in *Aſia* the leſs, and hardly be able to maintain his own life. The neareſt neighbour to *Cyrus* of all the king's deputies in the lower *Aſia*, was *Tiſſaphernes*, a man compounded of cowardiſe, treachery, craft, and all vices which accuſtomably branch out of theſe. This man accompanied *Cyrus* to his father, uſing by the way all fair ſhews of friendſhip, as to a prince, for whom it might well be thought that queen *Paryſatis* had obtained the inheritance of that mighty empire. And it was very true that *Paryſatis* had uſed the beſt of her endeavour to that purpoſe, alledging that (which in former ages had been much available to *Xerxes*, in the like diſceptation with his elder brother) *Artaxerxes* was born whilſt his father was a private man, but *Cyrus*, when he was a crowned king. All which not ſufficing; when the moſt that could be obtained for *Cyrus*, was the pardon of ſome preſumptuous demeanour, and confirmation of his place in *Lydia*, and the parts adjoining; then did this *Tiſſaphernes* diſcover his nature, and accuſe his friend *Cyrus* to the new king *Artaxerxes*, of a dangerous treaſon intended againſt his perſon. Upon this accuſation, whether true or falſe, very eaſily believed, *Cyrus* was arreſted, and by the moſt vehement intreaty of his mother very hardly delivered, and ſent back into his own province.

SECT. II.

The preparations of Cyrus, *and his firſt entry into the war.*

THE form of government which the *Perſian* lieutenants uſed in their ſeveral provinces, was in many points almoſt regal. For they made war and peace, as they thought it meet, not only for the king's behoof, but for their own reputation; uſually indeed with the king's enemies, yet ſometimes one with another: which was the more eaſily tolerated, becauſe their own heads were held only at the king's pleaſure; which cauſed them to frame all their doings, to his will, whatſoever it were, or they could conjecture it to be. *Cyrus* therefore, being ſettled in *Lydia*, began to conſider with himſelf, the intereſt that he had in the kingdom; the ſmall aſſurance of his brother's love, held only by his mother's interceſſion; the diſgrace endured by his late impriſonment; and the means which he had by love of his own people, and that good neighbourhood of the *Lacedemonians*, whom he had bound unto him, to obtain the crown for himſelf. Neither was it expedient that he ſhould long ſit idle, as waiting till occaſion ſhould preſent it ſelf; but rather enterpriſe ſomewhat whilſt yet his mother lived, who could procure a good interpretation to all his actions, if they were no worſe than only queſtionable. Hereupon he firſt began to quarrel with *Tiſſaphernes*, and ſeized upon many towns of his juriſdiction, annexing them to his own province; which diſpleaſed not *Artaxarxes* at all, who (beſides that he was of condition ſomewhat ſimple) being truly paid by *Cyrus* the

the accuſtomable tributes out of thoſe places, was well contented to ſee his brother's hot ſpirit exerciſed in private quarrels. But *Tiſſaphernes*, whoſe baſe conditions were hated, and cowardiſe deſpiſed, although he durſt not adventure to take arms againſt *Cyrus*, yet perceiving that the *Mileſians* were about to give up themſelves into the hands of that young prince, as many other towns of the *Ionians* had done, thought by terror to preſerve his reputation, and keep the town in his own hands. Wherefore he ſlew many, and many he baniſhed, who flying to *Cyrus*, were gently entertained, as bringing fair occaſion to take arms, which was no ſmall part of his deſire. In levying ſoldiers he uſed great policy; for he took not only the men of his own province, or of the countries adjoining, whoſe lives were ready at his will; but ſecretly he furniſhed ſome *Grecian* captains with money, who being very good men of war, entertained ſoldiers therewith, ſome of them warring in *Thrace*, others in *Theſſaly*, others elſewhere in *Greece*; but all of them ready to croſs the ſeas, at the firſt call of *Cyrus*, till which time they had ſecret inſtructions to prolong their ſeveral wars, that the ſoldiers might be held in continual exerciſe, and ready in arms upon the ſudden. *Cyrus* having ſent a power of men to beſiege *Miletus*, forthwith ſummoned theſe bands of the *Greeks*, who very readily came over to his aſſiſtance, being 13000 very firm ſoldiers, and able to make head (which is almoſt incredible) againſt the whole power of *Artaxerxes*. With this army, and that which he had levy'd before, he could very eaſily have forced *Miletus*, and chaſed away *Tiſſaphernes* out of *Aſia* the leſs: but his purpoſe was not ſo to loſe time in ſmall matters, that was to be employ'd in the accompliſhment of higher deſigns. Pretending therefore that the *Piſidians*, a people of *Aſia* the leſs, not ſubject to the *Perſian*, had invaded his territory, he raiſed the ſiege of *Miletus*, and with all ſpeed marched eaſtward, leaving *Tiſſaphernes* much amazed, who had no leiſure to rejoice that *Cyrus* had left him to himſelf, when he conſidered that ſo great an army, and ſo ſtrong, was never levy'd againſt the rovers of *Piſidia*, but rather againſt the great king his maſter. For which cauſe taking a band of 500 horſe, he poſted away to carry tidings to the court, of this great preparation.

SECT. III.

How Cyrus *took his journey into the higher* Aſia, *and came up cloſe to his brother.*

THE tumult which his coming brought was very great, and great the exclamations of the queen *Statira*, againſt *Paryſatis*, the queen-mother, whom ſhe called the author and occaſioner of the war. But whilſt the king in great fear was arming the high countries in his defence, the danger haſted upon him very faſt. For *Cyrus* made great marches, having his numbers much increaſed, by the repair of his countrymen, tho' moſt ſtrengthened by the acceſs of 700 *Greeks*, and of other 400 of the ſame nation, who revolted unto him from the king. How terrible the *Greeks* were to the *Barbarians*, he found by trial in a muſter, which (to pleaſe the queen of *Cilicia*, who had brought him aid) he made in *Phrygia*: where the *Greeks* by his direction making offer of a charge upon the reſt of his army, which contained an hundred thouſand men; the whole camp (not perceiving that this was but a bravery) fled amain, the victuallers and baggagers forſaking their cabins, and running all away for very fear. This was to *Cyrus* a joyful ſpectacle, who knew very well, that his brother was followed by men of the ſame temper, and the more unlikely to make reſiſtance, becauſe they were preſs'd to the war againſt their will and diſpoſitions; whereas his army was drawn along by meer affection and good will. Nevertheleſs he found it a hard matter to perſwade the *Greeks* to paſs the river of *Euphrates*. For the very length of the way which they had trodden, wearied them with the conceit of the tedious return. Therefore he was driven, being in *Cilicia*, to ſeek excuſes, telling them, that *Abrocomas*, one of the king's principal captains, and his own great enemy, lay by the river, againſt whom he requeſted them to aſſiſt him. By ſuch devices, and exceſſive promiſe of reward, he brought them to *Euphrates*, where ſome of the *Greeks* conſidering, that who ſo paſſed the river firſt, ſhould have the moſt thanks, and might ſafely return if the reſt ſhould refuſe to follow them, they entered the fords, whereby were all finally perſwaded to do as ſome had begun; and being allured by great hopes, they reſolved to ſeek out *Artaxerxes*, whereſoever he was to be found. The king in the mean time having raiſed an army of nine hundred thouſand men, was not ſo confident upon this huge multitude, as to adventure them in tryal of a plain battle. *Abrocomas*, who with three hundred thouſand men had undertaken to make good the ſtraights of *Syria*, which were very narrow, and fortified with a ſtrong wall, and other defences of nature and art, which made the place ſeem impregnable, had quitted the paſſage, and retired himſelf towards the king's forces, not daring to look *Cyrus* in the face, who deſpairing to find any way by land, had procured the *Lacedemonian* fleet, by the benefit whereof to have tranſported his army. I do not find that this cowardiſe of *Abrocomas*, or of his ſoldiers, who arrived not at the camp till five days were paſs'd after the battel, received either puniſhment or diſgrace; for they, towards whom he withdrew himſelf, were all made of the ſame metal.

Therefore *Artaxerxes* was upon the point of retiring to the uttermoſt bounds of his kingdom, until by *Teribazus*, one of his captains, he was perſwaded not to abandon ſo many goodly provinces to the enemy, who would thereby have gathered addition of ſtrength, and (which in the ſharp diſputation of title to a kingdom is moſt available) would have grown ſuperiour in reputation. By ſuch advice the king reſolved upon meeting with his brother, who now began to be ſecure, being fully perſwaded that *Artaxerxes* would never dare to abide him in the field. For the king having caſt up a trench of almoſt forty miles in length, about thirty foot broad, and eighteen foot deep, intended there to have encamped: but his courage failing him, he abandoned that place, thinking nothing ſo ſafe as to be far diſtant from his enemies.

SECT. IV.

The battel between Cyrus *and* Artaxerxes.

THE army of *Cyrus* having overcome many difficulties of evil ways, and ſcarcity of victuals, was much encouraged by perceiving this great fear of *Artaxerxes*; and being paſs'd this trench, marched careleſly in great diſorder, having beſtowed their arms in carts, and upon beaſts of carriage; when on the ſudden one of their vant-currors brought news of the king's approach. Hereupon with great tumult they armed themſelves, and had ranged their battels in good order upon the ſide of the river *Euphrates*, where they waited for the coming of their enemies, whom they

ſaw

ſaw not till it was after noon. But when they ſaw the cloud of duſt raiſed by the feet of that huge multitude, which the king drew after him, and perceived by their near approach how well they were marſhalled, coming on very orderly, in ſilence; whereas it had been expected, that ruſhing violently with loud clamours, they ſhould have ſpent all their force upon the firſt brunt; and when it appeared that the fronts of the two armies were ſo unequal in diſtent, being all embattelled in one body and ſquare, that *Cyrus* taking his place (as was the *Perſian* manner) in the midſt of his own, did not with the corner and utmoſt point thereof, reach to the half breadth of *Artaxerxes*'s battel, who carried a front proportionable to his number, exceeding nine times that of *Cyrus:* then did the *Greeks* begin to diſtruſt their own manhood, which was not accuſtomed to make proof of it ſelf, upon ſuch exceſſive odds. It was almoſt incredible, that ſo great an army ſhould be ſo eaſily chaſed. Nevertheleſs, it quickly appeared, that theſe *Perſians*, having learned (contrary to their cuſtom) to give charge upon their enemies with ſilence, had not learned (for it was contrary to their nature) to receive a ſtrong charge with courage. Upon the very firſt offer of onſet made by the *Greeks*, all that beaſtly rabble of cowards fled amain, without abiding the ſtroak, or ſtaying till they were within reach of a dart. The chariots armed with hooks and ſcythes (whereof *Artaxerxes* had two hundred, and *Cyrus* not twenty) did ſmall hurt that day, becauſe the drivers of them leaping down, fled away on foot. This baſe demeanor of his enemies gave ſo much confidence to *Cyrus*, and his followers, that ſuch as were about him forthwith adored him as king. And certainly the title had been aſſured unto him that day, had not he ſought how to declare himſelf worthy of it, ere yet he had obtained it. For, perceiving that *Artaxerxes*, who found that part of the field which lay before him void, was about to encompaſs the *Greeks*, and to ſet upon them in the rear, he advanced with ſix hundred horſe, and gave ſo valiant a charge upon a ſquadron of ſix thouſand which lay before the king, that he broke it, ſlaying the captain thereof, *Artagerſes*, with his own hands, and putting all the reſt to flight. Hereupon his whole company of ſix hundred, very few excepted, began to follow the chaſe, leaving *Cyrus* too ill attended, who perceiving where the king ſtood in troup, uncertain whether to fight, or leave the field, could not contain himſelf, but ſaid, *I ſee the man*; and preſently with a ſmall handful of men about him ran upon his brother, whom he ſtruck thro' the cuiraſs, and wounded in the breaſt. Having given this ſtroke, which was his laſt, he received immediately the fatal blow, which gave period at once to his ambition and life, being wounded under the eye with a dart, thrown by a baſe fellow; wherewith aſtoniſhed, he fell dead from his horſe, or ſo hurt, that it was impoſſible to have recovered him, tho' all which were with him did their beſt for his ſafety; not caring afterwards for their own lives, when once they perceived that *Cyrus* their maſter was ſlain. *Artaxerxes* cauſed the head and right hand of his brother to be forthwith ſtruck off, and ſhewed to his people, who now purſuing them, fled apace, calling upon the name of *Cyrus*, and deſiring him to pardon them. But when this great accident had breathed new courage into the king's troops, and utterly diſmay'd ſuch *Perſian* captains, as were now, even in their own eyes, no better than rebels; it was not long ere the camp of *Cyrus* was taken, being quite abandoned; from whence *Artaxerxes*, making all ſpeed, arrived quickly at the quarters of the *Greeks*, which was about three miles from the place where *Cyrus* fell. There he met with *Tiſſaphernes*, who having made way thro' the battel of the *Greeks*, was ready now to join with his maſter in ſpoiling their tents. Had not the news, which *Artaxerxes* brought with him of his brother's death, been ſufficient to countervail all diſaſters received, the exploit of *Tiſſaphernes* in breaking thro' the *Greeks* would have yielded little comfort. For *Tiſſaphernes* had not ſlain any one man of the *Greeks*; but contrariwiſe, when he gave upon them, they opening their battel, drove him with great ſlaughter thro' them, in ſuch wiſe, that he rather eſcaped as out of an hard paſſage, than forced his way thro' the ſquadron of the *Greeks*. Hereof the king being informed by him, and that the *Greeks*, as maſters of the field, gave chaſe to all that came in their ſight; they ranged their companies into good order, and followed after theſe *Greeks*, intending to ſet upon them in the rear. But theſe good ſoldiers perceiving the king's approach, turned their faces, and made head againſt him; who not intending to ſeek honour with danger of his life, wheeled about and fled, being purſued unto a certain village, that lay under a hill, on the top whereof he made a ſtand, rather in a bravery, than with a purpoſe to attempt upon theſe bold fellows any further. For he knew well that his brother's death had ſecured his eſtate, whom he would ſeem to have ſlain with his own hand, thinking that fact alone ſufficient to give reputation to his valour; and this reputation he thought that he might now preſerve well enough, by ſhewing a manly look half a mile off. On the top of this hill therefore he advanced his ſtandard, a golden eagle diſplay'd on the top of a ſpear. This enſign might have encouraged his people, had not ſome of the *Greeks* eſpied it, who not meaning that he ſhould abide ſo near them, with all their power marched towards him. The king diſcovering their approach, fled upon the ſpur, ſo that none remained in the place of battle, ſave only the *Greeks*, who had loſt that day not one man, nor taken any other harm, than that one of them was hurt with an arrow. Much they wondered that they heard no news of *Cyrus*, but thinking that he was purſuing the army, they thought it was fitteſt for them, having that day done enough, to return to their quarters, and take their ſupper, to which they had good appetite, becauſe the expectation of the king's coming had given them no leiſure to dine.

SECT. V.

The hard eſtate of the Greeks *after the fight; and how* Artaxerxes *in vain ſought to have made them yield unto him.*

IT was now about the ſetting of the ſun, and they bringing home dark night with them, found their camp ſpoiled, little or nothing being left, that might ſerve for food: ſo that wanting victuals to ſatisfy their hunger, they refreſhed their weary bodies with ſleep. In the mean ſeaſon *Artaxerxes* returning to his camp, which he entred by torch-light, could not enjoy the pleaſure of his good fortune entire, becauſe he perceived that the baſeneſs of his people, and weakneſs of his empire, was now plainly diſcovered to the *Greeks:* which gave him aſſurance, that if any of theſe who had beheld the ſhameful deameanor of his army, ſhould live to carry tidings home, it would not be long ere with greater forces they diſputed with him for his whole ſignory. Wherefore he reſolved to try all means, whereby he might bring them to deſtruction, and not let one eſcape to carry tidings of that which he had

ſeen: to which purpoſe he ſent them a brave meſſage the next morning. Charging them to deliver up their arms, and come to his gates, to wait there upon his mercy. It ſeems that he was in good hope to have found their high courages broken, upon report of his brother's death; but he was greatly deceived in that thought: for the *Greeks* being adverti ſed that morning from *Ariæus*, a principal commander under *Cyrus*, that his maſter being ſlain, he had retired himſelf to the place of their laſt encamping, about eight miles from them, whence intending to return into *Ionia*, his meaning was to diſlodge the next day, awaiting for them ſo long if they would join with him, but reſolving to ſtay no longer: they ſent anſwer back to *Ariæus*, that having beaten the king out of the field, and finding none that durſt reſiſt them, they would place *Ariæus* himſelf on the king's throne, if he would join with them, and purſue the victory. Before they received any reply to this anſwer, the meſſengers of *Artaxerxes* arrived at the camp, whoſe errand ſeem'd to the captains very inſolent: one told them that it was not for the vanquiſhers to yield their weapons; another, that he would die ere he yielded to ſuch a motion; a third aſked, whether the king, as having the victory, required their weapons; if ſo, why did he not fetch them? or, whether he deſired them in way of friendſhip? for then would they firſt know, with what courteſy he meant to requite their kindneſs. To this queſtion *Phalinus*, a *Grecian*, waiting upon *Tiſſaphernes*, anſwered; that the king having ſlain *Cyrus*, knew no man that could pretend any title to his kingdom, in the midſt whereof he held them faſt incloſed with great rivers, being able to bring againſt them ſuch numbers of men, as they wanted ſtrength to kill if they would hold up their throats, for which cauſe he accounted them his priſoners. Theſe words, to them, who knew themſelves to be free, were nothing pleaſant. Therefore one told *Phalinus*, that having nothing left but their arms and valour, whilſt they kept their arms their valour would be ſerviceable; but ſhould they yield them, it was to be doubted, that their bodies would not long remain their own. Hereat *Phalinus* laughed, ſaying, this young man did ſeem a philoſopher, and made a pretty ſpeech; but that his deep ſpeculation ſhewed his wits to be very ſhallow, if he thought with his arms and his valour to prevail againſt the great king. It ſeems that *Phalinus* being a courtier, and imploy'd in a buſineſs of importance, thought himſelf too profound a ſtateſman, to be check'd in his embaſſage by a bookiſh diſcourſer. But his wiſdom herein failed him For whatſoever he himſelf was (of whom no more is known than that he brought an unhoneſt meſſage to his own countrymen, perſwading them baſely to ſurrender their weapons and lives to the mercileſs *Barbarians*) this young ſcholar by him deſpiſed, was that great *Xenophon*, who, when all the principal commanders were ſurpriſed by treachery of the *Perſians*, being a private gentleman, and having never ſeen the wars before, undertook the conduct of the army, which he brought ſafe into *Greece*, freeing it from all thoſe, and from greater dangers than *Phalinus* could propound. Some there were who promiſed to be faithful to the king, as they had been to *Cyrus*, offering their ſervice in *Egypt*, where they thought *Artaxerxes* might have uſe of them. But the final anſwer was, that without weapons they could neither do the king good as friends, nor defend themſelves from him as enemies. Hereupon *Phalinus* delivered the king's further pleaſure, which was to grant them truce, whilſt they abode where they then were, denouncing war if they ſtirred thence; whereunto he required their anſwer. *Clearchus* the general told him, they liked it. How (ſaith *Phalinus*) muſt I underſtand you? as chooſing peace if we ſtay, or otherwiſe war, ſaid *Clearchus*. But whether war or peace? quoth this politick embaſſador. To whom *Clearchus* (not willing to acquaint him with their purpoſe) Let our doings tell you; and ſo diſmiſſed him no wiſer than he came. All that day the *Greeks* were fain to feed upon their horſes, aſſes, and other beaſts, which they roaſted with arrows, darts, and wooden targets thrown away by the enemies.

SECT. VI.

How the Greeks *began to return homewards.*

AT night they took their way towards *Ariæus*, to whom they came at midnight, being forſaken by 400 foot, and 40 horſe, all *Thracians*, who fled over to the king, by whom how they were entertained, I do not find. Like enough it is, that they were cut in pieces; for had they been kindly uſed, it may well be thought that ſome of them ſhould have accompanied *Tiſſaphernes*, and ſerved as ſtales to draw in the reſt. *Ariæus* being of too baſe a temper and birth, to think upon ſeeking the kingdom for himſelf, with ſuch aſſiſtance as might have given it unto *Cyrus*, was very well pleaſed to make covenant with them for mutual aſſiſtance unto the laſt: whereunto both parts having ſworn, he adviſed them to take another way homeward, which ſhould be ſomewhat longer, yet ſafer and fitter to relieve them with victuals, than that by which they came. The next day, having made a weariſome march, and tired the ſoldiers, they found the king's army which had coaſted them, lodged in certain villages, where they purpoſed themſelves to have encamped: towards which *Clearchus* made directly, becauſe he would not ſeem by declining them to ſhew fear or weakneſs. That the king's men were contented to remove, and give place to their betters, it cannot be ſtrange to any that hath conſidered their former behaviour; nor ſtrange, that the *Grecians*, being weary and hungry, and lying among enemies in an unknown country, ſhould be very fearful; but it is almoſt paſt belief, that the noiſe which was heard of theſe poor men, calling one to another tumultuouſly, as the preſent condition inforced them to do, ſhould make the *Perſians* fly out of their camp, and ſo affright the great king, that inſtead of demanding their arms, he ſhould crave peace of them. The next day very early, came meſſengers from *Artaxerxes*, deſiring free acceſs for embaſſadors to intreat of peace. Were it not that ſuch particulars do beſt open the quality of the perſons, by whom things were managed, I ſhould hold it fitter to run over the general paſſages of thoſe times, than to dwell among circumſtances. But ſurely it is a point very remarkable, that when *Clearchus* had willed the meſſengers to bid the king prepare for battel, becauſe the *Greeks* (as he ſaid) wanting whereupon to dine, could not endure to hear of truce till their bellies were full; *Artaxerxes* diſſembling the indignity, was contented ſweetly to ſwallow down this pill, ſending them guides, who conducted them to a place where was plenty of victuals to relieve them.

SECT. VII.

How Tiſſaphernes, *under colour of peace, betray'd all the captains of the* Greeks.

HItherto the *Greeks* relying upon their own virtue, had rather advanced their affairs, than

than brought themſelves into any ſtraights or terms of diſadvantage. But now came unto them the ſubtil fox *Tiſſaphernes*, who circumventing the chief commanders by fine ſlights, did miſchievouſly entrap them, to the extream danger of the army. He told them, that his province lying near unto *Greece*, had cauſed him greatly to deſire that their deliverance might be wrought by his procurement; knowing well, that in time to come, both they and their countrymen at home, would not be unthankful for ſuch a benefit. Herewithal he forgot not to rehearſe the great ſervice that he had done to his maſter, being the firſt that advertiſed him of *Cyrus*'s intent, and having not only brought him a good ſtrength of men, but in the day of battel ſhewed his face to the *Greeks*, when all others turned their backs: that he, together with the king, did enter their camp, and gave chaſe to the *Barbarians* that ſtood on the part of *Cyrus*. All this (quoth he) did I alledge to the king, intreating that he would give me leave to conduct you ſafe into *Greece*; in which ſuit I have good hope to ſpeed, if you will ſend a mild anſwer to him, who hath willed me to ask you, for what cauſe you have borne arms againſt him. The captains hearing this, were contented to give gentle words, which *Tiſſaphernes* relating to the king, procured (though very hardly as he ſaid) that peace ſhould be granted: the conditions whereof were; that they ſhould paſs freely thro' all the king's dominions, paying for what they took, and committing no ſpoil: yet that it ſhould be lawful for them to take victuals by force, in any place that refuſed to afford them an open market. Hereupon both parties having ſworn, the league was concluded, and *Tiſſaphernes* returning to the king to take leave, and end all buſineſs, came unto them again after twenty days, and then they ſet forward. This interim of twenty days, which *Tiſſaphernes* did ſpend at the court, miniſtered great occaſion of miſtruſt to his new confederates. For beſides his long abſence, which alone ſufficed to breed doubt; the brethren and kindred of *Ariæus* repairing daily to him, and other *Perſians* to his ſoldiers, did work him and them ſo with aſſurance of pardon, and other allurements, that he daily grew more ſtrange to the *Greeks* than formerly he had been. This cauſed many to adviſe *Clearchus*, rather to paſs forward as well as he might, than to rely upon covenants, and ſit ſtill whilſt the king laid ſnares to entrap them. But he on the contrary perſwaded them to reſt contented whilſt they were well, and not to caſt themſelves again into thoſe difficulties, out of which they were newly freed by the late treaty; reciting withal their own wants, and the king's means, but eſpecially the oaths mutually given and taken, wherewith he ſaw no reaſon why the enemy ſhould have clogged himſelf if he meant miſchief, having power enough to do them harm by a fair and open war.

Tiſſaphernes was a very honourable man (if honour may be valued by greatneſs and place in court) which cauſed his oath to be the more eſteemed; foraſmuch as no inforcement, or baſe reſpect was like to have drawn it from him. But his falſehood was ſuch, both in ſubſtance and in ſucceſs, as may fitly expound that ſaying, which proceeded from a fountain of truth, *I hate a rich man a lyar.* A lye may find excuſe when it grows out of fear: for that paſſion hath his original from weakneſs. But when power, which is a character of the Almighty, ſhall be made the ſupporter of untruth, the falſhood is moſt abominable; for the offender, like proud lucifer, advancing his own ſtrength againſt the Divine Juſtice, doth commit that ſin with an high hand, which commonly produceth lamentable effects, and is followed with ſure vengeance. It was not long ere *Tiſſaphernes* found means to deſtroy all the captains, whom he ſubtilly got into his power by a train; making the general *Clearchus* himſelf the means to draw in all the reſt. The buſineſs was contrived thus: having travelled ſome days together in ſuch wiſe, that the *Perſians* did not encamp with the *Greeks*, who were very jealous of the great familiarity appearing between *Tiſſaphernes*, and *Ariæus*; *Clearchus* thought it convenient to root out of *Tiſſaphernes*'s brains all cauſes of diſtruſt, whereof many had grown in that ſhort time. To which purpoſe obtaining private conference with him, he rehearſed the oath of confederacy, which had paſſed between them, ſhewing how religiouſly he meant to keep it; and repeating the benefits, which the *Greeks* did receive by the help of *Tiſſaphernes*, he promiſed that their love ſhould appear to him not unfruitful, if he would make uſe of their ſervice againſt the *Myſians* or *Piſidians*, who were accuſtomed to infeſt his province; or againſt the *Egyptians*, who were then rebels to the great king. For which cauſe he deſired him, that whereas all divine and human reſpects had linked them together, he would not give place to any cloſe accuſation or ſuſpicion, whereby might grow ſudden inconvenience to either of them, upon no juſt ground. The faithleſs *Perſian* was very much delighted with this ſpeech, which miniſtered fair occaſion to the execution of his purpoſe. Therefore he told *Clearchus*, that all this was by him wiſely conſidered, wiſhing him further to call to mind how many ways he could have uſed to bring them to confuſion, without peril to himſelf, eſpecially by burning the country, thro' which they were to paſs, whereby they muſt needs have periſhed by mere famine. For which cauſe he ſaid that it had been great folly to ſeek by perjury, odious to God and man, the deſtruction of ſuch as were already in his hands: but the truth was, that his own love to them had moved him to work their ſafety; not only for thoſe ends which *Clearchus* had recounted, of pleaſures that might redound to himſelf, and the king, by their aſſiſtance; but for that he might, by their friendſhip, hope to obtain what *Cyrus* had miſs'd. Finally, he invited the credulous gentleman to ſupper, and ſent him away ſo well aſſured of his good will, that he promiſed to bring all the captains with him to the ſame place, where, in preſence of them all, *Tiſſaphernes* likewiſe promiſed to tell openly, which of them had by ſecret information ſought to raiſe diſſenſion between them. *Clearchus* himſelf being thus deceived, with great importunity drew all the chief commanders, and many of the inferior leaders, to repair with him to the camp of *Tiſſaphernes*, whither followed them about two hundred of the common ſoldiers, as it had been to ſome common fair. But being there arrived, *Clearchus* with other the five principal colonels were called into the tent, the reſt ſtaying without, where they had not waited long ere a ſign was given, upon which they within were apprehended, and the reſidue ſlain. Forthwith certain bands of *Perſian* horſe-men ſcoured the field, killing as many *Greeks* as they met; and riding up to the very camp of the *Grecians*, who wondered much at the tumult, whereof they knew not the cauſe, till one, eſcaping ſorely wounded, informed them of all that had been done. Hereupon the *Greeks* took arms in haſte, thinking that the enemy would forthwith have aſſailed their camp. Anon they might perceive the embaſſadors of *Tiſſaphernes*, among whom were his own brother, and *Ariæus*, followed with three hundred horſe, who called

called for the principal men in the army, ſaying, that they brought a meſſage from the king, which *Ariæus* delivered to this effect: That *Clearchus*, having broken his faith, and the league made, was juſtly rewarded with death; that *Menon* and *Proxenus*, two other of the five colonels, for detecting his treachery, were highly honoured; and finally, that the king required them to ſurrender their arms, which were due to him, as having belonged unto his ſervant *Cyrus*. When ſome alteration had followed upon this meſſage, *Xenophon* told the embaſſadors, that if *Clearchus* had in ſuch ſort offended, it was well that he was in ſuch ſort puniſhed: but he willed them to ſend back *Menon* and *Proxenus*, whom they had ſo greatly honoured, that by them, as by common friends to both nations, the *Greeks* might be adviſed how to anſwer the *Perſian*. Hereunto the embaſſadors knew not how to frame any reply, and therefore departed without ſpeaking one word more. *Clearchus*, and the other four were ſent to *Artaxerxes*, by whoſe commandment their heads were ſtruck off. I hold it not amiſs to prevent the order of time, annexing to this perfidiouſneſs of *Tiſſaphernes*, the reward which he afterward received. He ſaw his province waſted by the *Greeks*, againſt whom, receiving from his maſter convenient aid of men and money, he did ſo ill manage his affairs, that neither ſubtilty nor perjury (to which he failed not to have recourſe) availing him; finally, the king was jealous of his cunning head, and ſent a new lieutenant into thoſe parts, who took it from his ſhoulders. Such was the recompence of his treachery, which made him ſo miſtruſted at home, that the ſervice which he could not do, he was thought upon private ends to neglect; and ſo hated abroad, that he knew not which way to fly from the ſtroke, all the world being ſhut againſt him. But now let us return to the proſperity, wherein he triumphed without great cauſe, having betrayed braver men than himſelf, and intending to bring the like miſchief upon the whole army.

SECT. VIII.

How Xenophon *heartned the* Greeks, *and in deſpight of* Tiſſaphernes *went off ſafely.*

GREAT was the heavineſs of the ſoldiers, being now left deſtitute of leaders, and no leſs their fear of the evil hanging over their heads, which they knew not well how to avoid. Among the reſt, *Xenophon*, whoſe learning ſupplied his want of experience, finding the deep ſadneſs of the whole army to be ſuch, as hindered them from taking any courſe of preventing the danger at hand, began to adviſe the under-officers of *Proxenus*'s companies, whoſe familiar friend he had been, to bethink themſelves of ſome means, whereby their ſafety might be wrought, and the ſoldiers encouraged; ſetting before their eyes whatſoever might ſerve to give them hope, and above all, perſwading them in no wiſe to yield to the mercy of their barbarous enemies.

Hereupon they deſired him to take upon him the charge of that regiment; and ſo together with him, the ſame night calling up ſuch as were remaining of any account, they made choice of the fitteſt men to ſucceed in the places of thoſe who were ſlain, or taken. This being done, and order ſet down for diſburdening the army of all ſuperfluous impediments, they eaſily comforted themſelves for the loſs of *Tiſſaphernes*'s aſſiſtance, hoping to take victuals by force better cheap than he had been wont to ſell them: to which purpoſe they intended to take up their lodging two or three miles further, among ſome plentiful villages, and ſo to proceed, marching towards the heads of thoſe great rivers, which lay in their way, and to paſs them where they were fordable. Many attempts were made upon them by *Tiſſaphernes*, whom they, ſerving all on foot, were not able to requite for the harm which they received by the *Perſian* archers, who ſhot at a farther diſtance than the *Greeks* could reach. For this cauſe did *Xenophon* provide ſlings, wherewith he over-reached the enemy; and finding ſome horſes fit for ſervice, that were employed among the carriages, he ſet men upon them; training likewiſe his archers, to ſhoot compaſs, who had been accuſtomed to the point-blank. By theſe means did he bear off the *Perſians* who aſſailed him; and ſometimes gave them chaſe with that band of fifty horſe, which being well back'd, with a firm body of foot-men, and ſeconded with troops of the light-armed-ſhot and ſlingers, compelled the enemy to lie a-loof. *Tiſſaphernes*, not daring to come to handy-gripes with theſe reſolute men, did poſſeſs the tops of mountains, and places of advantage, by which they were to paſs. But finally, when their valour made way through all ſuch difficulties, he betook himſelf to that courſe, which was indeed the ſureſt, of burning the country. With great ſorrow did the *Greeks* behold the villages on fire, and thereby all hope of victuals cut off. Some adviſed to defend the country, as granted by the enemy himſelf to be theirs; others, to make more fires; *if ſo*, perhaps the *Perſians* might be aſhamed to do that which were the deſire of ſuch as made paſſage in hoſtile manner; but theſe were faint comforts. The beſt counſel was, that being near unto the *Carduchi*, a people enemy to the *Perſian*, they ſhould enter into their country, paſſing over ſome high mountains which lay between them. This courſe they followed, which could not have availed them, if *Tiſſaphernes* had begun ſooner to cut off their victuals, rather than to ſeek to force, or to circumvent them by his fine wit.

SECT. IX.

The difficulties which the Greek *army found in paſſing through the land of the* Carduchi.

ENtering upon the land of the *Carduchi*, they were encounter'd with many difficulties of ways, but much more afflicted by the fierce inhabitants, who, accuſtomed by force to defend themſelves againſt the huge armies of the *Perſian*, were no way inferior to the *Greeks* in daring, but only in the art of war. They were very light of foot, skilful archers, and uſed the ſling well; which weapons in that mountainous country, were of much uſe againſt theſe poor travellers, afflicting them in ſeven days, which they ſpent in that paſſage, far more than all the power of the great king had done. Between the territory of theſe *Carduchi*, and the parts of *Armenia* confining them, ran *Centrites*, a great river, upon which the *Greeks* refreſhed themſelves one day, rejoicing that they had ſo well eſcaped theſe dangers, and hoping that the remainder would prove eaſy. But the next morning they ſaw certain troops of horſe, that lay to forbid their paſſage. Theſe were levied by the kings deputies in thoſe parts; *Tiſſaphernes* and his companies having taken their way towards *Ionia*. The river was broad and deep, ſo that it was not poſſible for ſuch as would enter it, to make reſiſtance againſt thoſe which kept the oppoſite banks. To encreaſe theſe dangers, the *Carduchi* followed upon them, lay on the ſide of a mountain, within leſs than a mile of the water. But

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it was their good hap to discover a ford, by which the greater number of them passing over, did easily chase away the subjects of the *Persian*; and then sending back the most expedite men, gave succour to the rearward, against which the *Carduchi* being slightly armed, could not on plain ground make resistance hand to hand. These *Carduchi* seem to have inhabited the mountains of *Niphates*, which are not far from the spring of *Tigris*; tho' *Ptolemy* place them far more to the east upon the river of *Cyrus* in *Media*, wherein he differs much from *Xenophon*, whose relation being grounded upon his own knowledge, doth best in this case deserve credit. Of the river *Centrites* (as of many other rivers, towns, and places, mentioned by *Xenophon*) I will not labour to make a conjecture, which may endure the severity of a critick. For *Ptolemy*, and the whole nation of geographers, add small light to this expedition; only of this last, I think it the same which falleth into *Tigris*, not much above *Artasigarta*, springing out of *Niphates*, and running by the town of *Sardeva* in *Gordene*, a province of *Armenia* the great, wherein the *Greeks*, having passed *Centrites*, did arrive.

SECT. X.

How Teribazus, *governour of* Armenia, *seeking to entrap the* Greeks *with terms of feigned peace, was disappointed, and shamefully beaten.*

THE army finding in *Armenia* good provision, marched without any disturbance about fifty or threescore miles to the heads of the river *Tigris*, and passing over them, travelled as far further without resistance, till they were encountered by *Teribazus*, at the river *Teleboa*, which *Xenophon* commends as a goodly water, though small; but *Ptolemy* and others omit it. *Teribazus* governed that country for the *Persian*, and was in great favour with *Artaxerxes*, whose court may seem to have been a school where the art of falshood was taught as wisdom. He desired peace of the *Greeks*, which was made upon this condition, That they should take what they pleased, but not burn down the towns and villages in their way. As soon as he had made this league, he levied an army, and besetting the straits of certain mountains which they were to pass, hoped well to make such benefit of their security, as might give him the commendations of being no less craftily dishoneſt than *Tissaphernes*. Yet his cunning failed of success. For a great snow fell, which caused the *Greeks* to make many fires, and some of his men wandered about seeking relief. By the fires he was discovered, and by a soldier of his that was taken prisoner, the whole plot was revealed. Hereupon the *Greeks*, taking this captive with them for a guide, sought him out; and coming upon his camp, did so affright him, that before the whole army could arrive there, the shout which was raised by the vant-currors, chased him away. They took his pavilion, wherein (besides many slaves, that were artificers of voluptuousness) very rich furniture was left by the treacherous coward, who returned no more to challenge it. From hence the army went north-ward, and passing *Euphrates*, not far below the springs thereof, travelled with much difficulty through deep snow, being followed aloof by the enemy, who durst not approach them, but did cut off such as they found straggling behind. The inhabitants of the country, through which they marched, had their wintering-houses under ground, wherein was found great plenty of victuals, and of cattel, which likewise did winter in the same cellars with the owners. Having refreshed themselves in those parts, and taken sufficient ease after the miserable journey, which had consumed many of them with extream cold; they departed, leading with them many bond-slaves, and taking away (besides other horses and cattel) some colts that were bred up for the great king.

SECT. XI.

The passage of the army to Trabisond, *through the countries bordering upon the river of* Phasis, *and other obscure nations.*

SO without impediment they came to the river *Phasis*, near whereunto the people called *Phasiani Taochi*, and *Chalybes* were seated. These nations were joined together, and occupying the tops of a ledge of mountains, which the *Greeks* were to pass, made countenance of war: but some companies being sent by night to seize upon a place of equal height to that whereon the enemies lay, making good the piece of ground which they had taken, secured the ascent of the rest; which caused these people to fly, every one retiring to the defence of his own. The first upon whose country the *Greeks* did enter were the *Tacchi*, who conveying all their provision of victuals into strong holds, brought the army into much want, until with hard labour one place was forced, wherein great store of cattel were taken; the people, to avoid captivity, threw themselves headlong down the rocks, the very women throwing down first their own children, and then casting themselves upon them. Here was taken a great booty of cattel, which served to feed them, travelling through the land of the *Chalybes*, of whom they got nothing but strokes. The *Chalybes* were a very stout nation, well armed at all points, and exceeding fierce. They encounter'd the *Greeks* hand to hand, killing as many as they took prisoners, and cutting off their heads, which they carried away, singing and dancing, to the great grief of their companions living; who were glad, when after seven days journey they escaped from those continual skirmishes, wherewith they had been vexed by these *Barbarians*. Hence travelling through a good corn-country, inhabited by an obscure nation, called the *Scythini*, they came to a rich town, the lord whereof, and of the region adjoining, used them friendly, and promised to guide them to a mountain, whence they might discover the *Euxine* sea. From *Gymnias* (which was the name of his town) he led them through the territory of his enemies, desiring them to waste it with sword and fire. After five days march, they came to a mountain called *Teches*, being (as I think) a part of the mountains called *Moschici*, whence their guide shewed them the sea; towards which they bent their course, and passing friendly through the region of the *Macrones* (with whom by means of an interpreter, found among themselves, who born in that place had been sold into *Greece*, they made a good peace) they arrived in the land of *Colchos*, wherein stands the city of [a] *Trabisond*, called then *Trapezus*, a colony of the *Greeks*. The *Colchi* entertaining them with hostility, were requited with the like; for the army, having now good leisure to repose themselves among their friends the *Trapezuntians* did so spoil the country thirty days together, forbearing only the borderers upon *Trabisond*, at the citizens request.

[a] Trabisond, *a Colony of the* Greeks, *situate in the bottom of the* Euxine *sea.*

SECT. XII.

How the army began at Trabiſond *to provide a fleet, wherewith to return home by ſea: how it came into the territory of* Sinope, *and there proſecuted the ſame purpoſe.*

HAving now found a haven-town, the ſoldiers were deſirous to take ſhipping, and change their tedious land-journeys into an eaſy navigation. To which purpoſe *Cheriſophus*, a *Lacedemonian*, one of the principal commanders, promiſed by means of *Anaxibius* the *Lacedemonian* admiral, who was his friend, that he would provide veſſels to embark them. Having thus concluded, they likewiſe took order for the ſtaying of ſuch ſhips as ſhould paſs that way, meaning to uſe them for their navigation. Leſt all this proviſion ſhould be found inſufficient for the tranſportation of the whole army, *Xenophon* perſwaded the cities adjoining to clear the ways, and make an eaſy paſſage for them by land; whereunto the ſoldiers were utterly unwilling to give ear, being deſirous to return by ſea: but the country, fearing what inconvenience might grow by their long ſtay, did readily condeſcend to *Xenophon*'s requeſt. Two ſhips they borrowed of the *Trapezuntians*, which they manned and ſent to ſea; the one of them ſailed directly into *Greece*, forſaking their companions who had put them in truſt to bring ſhips into the port of *Trabiſond:* the other took merchants and paſſengers, whoſe goods were ſafely kept for the owners, but the veſſels were ſtay'd to increaſe the fleet. After long abode, when victuals began to fail, by reaſon that all the land of the *Colchi*, near unto the camp, was already quite waſted, they were fain to embark their ſick men, with the women, children, and ſuch of the baggage as might beſt be ſpared, in thoſe few ſhips which they had already provided. The reſt of the army took their way by land to *Ceraſus*, a *Greek* town, where the fleet likewiſe arrived. Here the army being muſtered, was found to conſiſt of eight thouſand and ſix hundred men. From hence they paſſed through the country of the [a] *Moſynaci*, who were divided into factions. The ſtronger party deſpiſing their friendſhip, cauſed them to join with the weaker, whom they left maſters of all.

The next place of their abode was [b] *Cotyora*, a *Greek* town likewiſe, and a colony of the *Sinopians*, as *Trapezus* and *Ceraſus* were; but the entertainment which they here found was very churliſh, having neither an open market afforded to them, nor the ſick men that were among them admitted into any houſe. Hereupon the ſoldiers enter'd the town by force, and (committing no outrage) beſtowed thoſe which were ſick in convenient lodgings, taking into their own hands the cuſtody of the gates. Proviſion for the army they made by ſtrong hand, partly out of the territory of the *Paphlagonians*, partly out of the lands belonging to the town. Theſe news were unwelcome to [c] *Sinope*, whence embaſſadors were ſent to the camp, who complaining of theſe dealings, and threatening to join with the *Paphlagonians*, if redreſs could not otherwiſe be had, were roundly anſwered by *Xenophon*, that mere neceſſity had enforced the army to teach thoſe of *Cotyora* good manners in ſo bad a method; letting them know, that he feared not to deal with them and the *Paphlagonian* at once, though perhaps the *Paphlagonian* would be glad to take *Sinope* it ſelf; to which, if cauſe were given, they would lend aſſiſtance. Upon this anſwer the embaſſadors grew better adviſed, promiſing all friendſhip that the ſtate of *Sinope* could ſhew; and commanding the town of *Cotyra* to relieve the ſoldiers as well as they might. Further, they promiſed to aſſiſt them with ſhipping, letting them underſtand how difficult the paſſage by land would prove, in regard of the many and great rivers, as *Thermodon*, *Iris*, *Halys*, and *Parthenius*, which croſſed their way. This good counſel, and the fair promiſes accompanying it, were kindly accepted by the army, which well perceived, that the city of *Sinope* would ſpare for no coſt, to be freed from ſuch a neighbourhood. It was therefore decreed, that they would paſs the reſt of the way by ſea; provided, that if there ſhould want ſuch number of veſſels as might ſerve to embark every one of them, then would they not put from the ſhore.

SECT. XIII.

Of diſſenſion which aroſe in the army; and how it was embarked.

HItherto the danger of enemies, and miſeries of weather and wants, had kept the company in firm unity; which now began to diſſolve and to thaw, by the neighbouring air of *Greece*, warming their heads with private reſpects to their ſeveral ends and purpoſes. Whilſt they, who were ſent as agents from the camp, remained at *Sinope*; *Xenophon* conſidering the ſtrength and valour of his men, and the opportunity of the coaſt whereon they lay, thought it would be an honourable work to build a city in thoſe parts, which were ſoon like to prove great and wealthy, in regard both of their own puiſſance, and of the great repair of the *Greeks* into that quarter. For this cauſe he made ſacrifice, according to the ſuperſtition of his time and country, divining of his ſucceſs by the entrails of beaſts. The ſooth-ſayer whom he employ'd, had received a great reward of *Cyrus*, for conjecturing aright, that *Artaxerxes* would not give battel in ten days: he therefore having preſerved his money carefully, was deſirous to be ſoon at home, that he might freely enjoy his gettings. By him the purpoſe of *Xenophon* was divulged, which was interpreted according to the diverſity of mens opinions; ſome approving the motion, but the greater part rejecting it. They of *Sinope* and *Heraclea*, being informed of this conſultation, were ſore afraid, leſt the poverty of the ſoldiers, who had not wherewith to maintain themſelves at home, ſhould give ſucceſs to the project. Which to prevent, they promiſed to ſupply the army with a ſufficient fleet, and likewiſe offered money to ſome of the captains, who thereupon undertook to give the ſoldiers pay, if they would preſently ſet ſail for *Greece*. One of theſe captains being a baniſhed man, deſired them to follow him into *Troas*; another offered to lead them into *Cherroneſus*. *Xenophon*, who only deſired the common good, was pleaſed greatly with theſe propoſitions, and profeſſed openly that he would have them to ſet forward, and hold together in any caſe, puniſhing him as a traitor that ſhould forſake the army, before ſuch time as they were arrived at their journey's end. *Silanus* the ſooth-ſayer, who had uttered *Xenophon*'s purpoſe, was hereby ſtay'd from outrunning his fellows, and driven to abide with his wealth among poor men, longer than ſtood with his good liking. Alſo the other captains were much trou-

[a] Moſynaci *a nation of* Pontus Cappadocius. [b] Cotyora, *a port-town in the ſame region.* [c] Sinope *a port-town in* Leucoſyria, *a colony of the* Mileſians.

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bled and afraid, when they perceived that ſhips were prepared ſufficient for their navigation, but that the money promiſed to them, and by them to the ſoldiers, came not. For the people of *Sinope* and *Heraclea*, knowing that the army was now reſolved for the voyage, and that *Xenophon*, whom they feared, had perſwaded them to this reſolution, thought it the wiſeſt way to furniſh them with a navy whilſt they were in good readineſs to depart, but to keep the money to themſelves. The captains therefore who being diſappointed by theſe towns, found themſelves in great danger of their men, whom they had deceived with fair hopes, repented much of their haſty offers, and ſignifying as much to *Xenophon*, pray'd him to make propoſition to the army, of taking the ſhips, and ſailing to *Phaſis*, where they might ſeize upon lands, and plant themſelves in ſuch wiſe as ſhould ſtand beſt with their good liking. But finding him cold in the buſineſs, they began to work the principal of their own followers, hoping by them to draw in all the reſt. This news becoming publick, bred a ſuſpicion of *Xenophon*, as if he had won the reſt of the captains to his purpoſe, and meant now to carry the army quite another way from their own home. Wherefore aſſembling the companies, he gave them ſatisfaction, and withal complained of ſome diſorders, which he cauſed them to redreſs. A general inquiſition was likewiſe made of offences committed ſince the death of *Cyrus*; which being puniſhed, all things were in quiet. Shortly after came embaſſadors from *Corylas*, lord of the *Paphlagonians*, who ſending preſents deſired peace of the *Greeks*: the embaſſadors were friendly entertained, and peace concluded, which needed not to have been ſought, for that the *Greeks* having now their fleet in a readineſs, did ſoon weigh anchors, and ſet ſail for *Harmene* the port of *Sinope*, whether *Cheriſophus* came, bringing with him a few gallies from the admiral *Anaxibius*, who promiſed to give the army pay as ſoon as they came into the parts of *Greece*.

SECT. XIV.

Another great diſſenſion and diſtraction of the army. How the mutineers were beaten by the Barbarians, *and reſcued by* Xenophon.

THE nearer they approached to *Greece*, the greater was their deſire to make proviſion for themſelves, that they might not return home empty-handed. Wherefore truſting well, that if the charge of the army were abſolutely committed to one ſufficient man, he might the more conveniently procure the good of them all, they determined to make *Xenophon* ſole commander of all; in whoſe favour, as well the captains as the common ſoldiers were very earneſt and violent. But he, either fearing to diſpleaſe the *Lacedemonians*, who were jealous of him already (being incenſed by that fugitive who forſook the army at *Trabizond*, flying with one of their two ſhips) or moved by ſome tokens appearing to him in the entrails, that threatened ill ſucceſs to his government, procured with vehement contention, that this honour was laid upon *Cheriſophus* a *Lacedemonian*. It ſeems that *Xenophon*, conſidering the vexations incident to the conduct of a voluntary army, wanting pay, did wiſely in yielding to ſuch tokens as forbad him to accept it: eſpecially, knowing ſo well their deſire, which was, by right or by wrong to get wealth whereſoever it might be found, without all regard of friend or of foe. *Cheriſophus* had been general but ſix or ſeven days when he was depoſed, for having been unwilling to rob the town of *Heraclea*, which had ſent preſents to the camp, and been very beneficial unto them in lending ſhips for their tranſportation. Two days they had ſailed by the coaſt of *Aſia*, when being paſs'd thoſe great rivers, which would have given impediment to their journey by land, they touched at *Heraclea*, where conſulting how to take their way onwards, whether by land or ſea, one ſeditious man began to put them in mind of ſeeking to get ſomewhat for themſelves; telling them that all their proviſion would be ſpent in three days, and that being now come out of the enemies country, victuals and other neceſſaries could not be had without money; for which cauſe he gave advice to ſend meſſengers into the town of *Heraclea*, giving the citizens to underſtand what their wants were, and demanding of them three thouſand pieces of money, called *Cyzicens*, which ſum amounteth to two thouſand and five hundred pounds ſterling, or thereabouts. This motion was greatly applauded, and the ſum raiſed to ten thouſand *Cyzicens* at leaſt: which to require, they thought *Cheriſophus*, as being general, the fitteſt man; others had more deſire to ſend *Xenophon*: but in vain, for they both refuſed it, and renounced the action as diſhoneſt. Leſt therefore either of theſe ſhould fail in managing the buſineſs which agreed not with his diſpoſition, others of more impudence and leſs diſcretion were ſent, who in ſuch wiſe delivered their inſolent meſſage; that the citizens taking time to deliberate upon their requeſt, brought what they could out of the fields into the town, and ſhutting the gates, did forthwith man the walls. When the ſoldiers perceived themſelves to be diſappointed of their ravenous purpoſe, they fell to mutiny, ſaying, that their leaders had betray'd them: and being for the more part of them *Arcadians*, and *Acheans*, they forſook immediately *Cheriſophus* and *Xenophon*, chooſing new leaders out of their own number. Above four thouſand five hundred they were, all heavily arm'd, who electing ten captains, ſailed unto the port of *Calpas*, which is the mid-way between *Heraclea* and *Bizantium*, with purpoſe to aſſail the *Bythinians* on the ſudden. With *Cheriſophus* there abode two thouſand and one hundred, of whom, one thouſand and four hundred were armed weightily: *Xenophon* had two thouſand foot, three hundred whereof were lightly armed, and forty horſe, which ſmall band had done good ſervice already, and could not have been ſpared now. *Cheriſophus* had agreed with *Cleander* governour of *Bizantium*, to meet him at the mouth of the river *Calpas*, whither *Cleander* promiſed to bring ſome gallies to convey him over into *Greece*; for which cauſe he took his way thither by land, leaving to *Xenophon* ſuch ſhipping as he had, who paſſing ſome part of the way by ſea, landed upon the confines of *Heraclea*, and *Thracia Aſiatica*, intending to make a cut thro' the mid-land country to the *Propont*. The mutineers, who had landed at *Calpas* by night, with purpoſe to take ſpoils in *Bithynia*, divided themſelves into ten companies, every captain leading his own regiment into ſome village, five or ſix miles from the ſea: in the greater towns were two regiments quartered, and ſo was that part of the country ſurpriſed on the ſudden, and ſacked all at one time. The place of rendezvous was an high piece of ground, where ſome of them arrived, finding no diſturbance; others, not without much trouble and danger; two companies were broken and defeated, only eight men eſcaping, the reſt were all put to the ſword. For the *Thracians*, which had ſlip'd at firſt out of the ſoldiers hands, did raiſe the country, and finding the *Greeks* loaden with booty, took the advantage of their diſorder, cutting in pieces thoſe two regiments: which done, they

they attempted the reſt, encompaſſing the hill whereon they encamped. One great advantage the *Thracians* had, that being all light-armed, they could at pleaſure make retreat from theſe *Arcadians* and *Acheans:* who wanting the aſſiſtance of horſe, and having neither archers nor ſlingers among them, were driven to ſtand merely upon their defence, bearing off with great danger, and many wounds received, the darts and arrows of the *Barbarians*, till finally they were driven from their watering place, and enforced to crave parley. Whatſoever the articles of compoſition were, the *Thracians* yielded to all; but pledges of aſſurance they would give none, without which the *Greeks* well knew, that all promiſes of ſuch people, eſpecially incenſed, were nothing worth. In the mean time *Xenophon*, holding his way quietly thro' the inland region, did enquire of ſome travellers, whether they knew ought of any *Grecian* army paſſing along thoſe parts: and receiving by them true information of the deſperate caſe into which theſe gallants had fooliſhly thrown themſelves, he marched directly towards the place where they lay, taking with him for guides, them who gave him the intelligence. His horſemen he ſent before to diſcover and to ſcour the ways; the light-armed footmen took the hill-tops on either hand; all of them ſetting fire on whatſoever they found combuſtible, whereby the whole country ſeemed to be on a light flame, to the great terror of the enemies, who thought that ſome huge army had approached. That night he encamped on a hill, within five miles of the *Arcadians*, encreaſing ſtill the number of his fires, which he cauſed haſtily to be quenched ſoon after ſupper. The enemies perceiving this, thought certainly that he would have fallen upon them in the dark, which cauſed them in all haſte to diſlodge. Early the next morning *Xenophon* coming thither in very good order, to have given battel, found that his advice to affright the *Thracians*, had taken full effect; but he marvelled that the *Greeks* were alſo departed, concerning whom he learned by enquiry, that they removed at break of day, and perceived by ſigns, that they had taken the way to the port of *Calpas*, in which journey he overtook them. They embraced him and his with great joy, confeſſing that they themſelves had thought the ſame which the enemies did, looking that he ſhould have come by night, wherein finding themſelves deceived, they were afraid leſt he had forſaken them, and therefore haſtened away to overtake him, and join with him. So they arrived at the haven of *Calpas*, where it was decreed, that whoſoever from thenceforth made any motion to disjoin the army, ſhould ſuffer death.

SECT. XV.

Of divers pieces of ſervice done by Xenophon; *and how the army returned into* Greece. *The occaſions of the war between the* Lacedemonians *and the* Perſian.

THE haven of *Calpas* lay under a goodly headland, that was very ſtrong, and abounding with all kind of grain and fruits, except olives. There was alſo timber for building and ſhipping, and a very convenient ſeat for a great city. All which commodities that might have allured the ſoldiers to ſtay there and to plant, cauſed them to haſte away, fearing leſt *Xenophon* ſhould find ſome device to have ſettled himſelf and them in that place. For the greater part of them had good means to live at home, neither did they ſo much for hope of gain follow *Cyrus* in that war, as in regard of his honour, and the love which they bare unto him: the poorer ſort were ſuch as left their parents, wives and children, to whom (tho' failing of the riches which they had hoped to purchaſe) they were now deſirous to return. But whether *Xenophon* found advantage by their own ſuperſtition, to make them ſtay, which they greatly ſuſpected; or whether the ſigns appearing in the entrails, did indeed forbid their departure: ſo long they were inforced to abide in the place till victuals failed, neither would the captains lead them forth to forage the country, until the ſacrifices ſhould promiſe good ſucceſs. *Cheriſophus* was dead of an ague, and his ſhips were gone, being returned to the *Heracleans*, of whom they were borrowed. His followers were joined to the reſt of the army, which the greater it was, the more proviſion it needed, and the ſooner felt want. For which cauſe, he that was choſen colonel into the place of *Cheriſophus*, would needs adventure to gratify the ſoldiers with the ſpoil of ſome villages that ſtood near at hand; in which enterpriſe he found ill ſucceſs, the whole country lying in wait to entrap him, and an army of horſe being ſent by *Pharnabazus*, the ſatrapa or viceroy of *Phrygia*, to the aſſiſtance of theſe *Bithynian Thracians*, which troops falling upon the *Greeks* that were ſcattered abroad in ſeeking booty, ſlew five hundred of them, and chaſed the reſt to a certain mountain there by. The news of this overthrow coming to *Xenophon*, he led forth a part of the army to the reſcue of thoſe that ſurvived, and brought them ſafe to the camp, upon which the *Bithynians* made an offer that night, and breaking a *Corps du garde*, ſlew ſome, purſuing the reſt to the very tents. This new courage of the enemy, together with the preſent condition of the army, ſo diſheartned and unfurniſhed of neceſſaries, cauſed the *Greeks* to remove their camp to a place of more ſtrength; which having intrench'd, and committed to the defence of ſuch as were leaſt able to endure travail, *Xenophon* with the firmeſt and beſt able men went forth, both to bury thoſe which were lately ſlain, and to abate the pride of the *Thracians*, and their aſſiſtants. In this journey his demeanour was very honourable. For having given burial to the dead, the enemy was diſcover'd, lying on the tops of the hills adjoining, to whom (notwithſtanding that the way was very rough and troubleſome, ſo that ſome thought it a matter of too great danger, to leave at their backs a wood ſcarce paſſable) he marched directly, telling his men plainly, that he had rather follow the enemy with half the number, than turn his back to them with twice as many, and letting them further know, that if they did not charge the *Barbarian*, he would not fail with the greater reſolution to purſue them; from whom, if they could ſafely retire to the camp, yet what ſhould they do there, wanting victuals to ſuſtain them in the place, and ſhips to carry them away? wherefore he willed them rather to fight well that day, having eaten their dinners, than another day faſting; and not to regard the uneaſy return, which might ſerve to ſtay cowards from running away, but to wiſh unto the enemy a fair and eaſy way, by which he might fly from them. Theſe perſwaſions were followed with ſo valiant execution, that both *Perſians* and *Bithynians* being chaſed out of the field, abandoned the country forthwith, removing their families, and leaving all that could not ſuddenly be convey'd away to the diſcretion of the *Greeks*, who at good leiſure gather'd the harveſt of theſe bad neighbours fields. This was the laſt fight which they had on the ſide of *Aſia*. For they were not only ſuffered quietly to enjoy the ſpoil of the country, but when the opinion grew common

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in thoſe parts, that it was the intent of *Xenophon* to plant a colony on the port of *Calpas*; embaſſadors were ſent from the neighbour-people, to deſire friendſhip, and make offer of their beſt aſſiſtance. But the ſoldiers had no mind to ſtay. Wherefore entering further into *Bithynia*, they took a great booty, which they carried away to *Chryſopolis*, a city near unto *Chalcedon*, where they ſold it. *Pharnabazus*, lieutenant in *Phrygia* to *Artaxerxes*, did greatly fear, leſt their long ſtay in that country might breed in them a deſire to viſit his province, where they might have found great wealth, and little power to guard it. Therefore he ſent to the *Lacedemonian* admiral, entreating him with much inſtance and large promiſes to waft them over into *Europe*; to whom *Anaxibius* the admiral condeſcending, promiſed to give the ſoldiers pay, as ſoon as they arrived at *Bizantium*. So were they carried out of *Aſia* at the entreaty of the *Perſian*, who in the height of his pride, had thought them ſo ſurely impriſoned with mighty rivers, that he not only denied to permit their quiet departure, but willed them to ſurrender their arms into his hands, and ſo to yield their lives to his diſcretion. How diſcourteouſly they were intreated by *Anaxibius*, and how to requite his injurious dealings, they ſeized upon *Bizantium*, which by *Xenophon*'s perſwaſion they forbare to ſack, I hold it ſuperfluous to relate. For the reſidue of their doings appertain little to the general courſe of things. But this expedition, as in all ages it was glorious, ſo did it both diſcover the ſecrets of *Aſia*, and ſtir up the *Greeks* to think upon greater enterpriſes than ever their forefathers had undertaken. Likewiſe it was the only remarkable action which the time afforded. For the *Roman* wars did hitherto extend no further than to the next neighbouring towns of *Italy*; and in *Greece* all things were quiet, the *Lacedemonians* ruling inſolently, but without diſturbance. True it is, that the ſeeds of the war ſhortly following, which the *Lacedemonians* made upon *Artaxerxes*, were already ſown, before theſe companies return'd out of the high countries of *Aſia*. For the towns of *Ionia*, which had ſided with young *Cyrus* againſt *Tiſſaphernes*, if not againſt the great king, prepared to rebel, which they thought ſafer than to fall into the hands of *Tiſſaphernes*, who was now appointed lieutenant, both of his old province, and of all that had belonged to *Cyrus*. Wherefore the *Ionians* beſought the *Lacedemonians* to ſend them aid, whereby to recover their liberty; and obtained their requeſt.

For a power was ſent over, under conduct of *Thimbro* a *Spartan*, who beſtowed his men in ſuch towns as had already revolted, to ſecure the cities and their fields, but not to make any offenſive war.

CHAP. XI.

Of the affairs of Greece, *whilſt they were managed by the* Lacedemonians.

SECT. I.

How the Lacedemonians *took courage by example of* Xenophon's *army, to make war upon* Artaxerxes.

IT ſeems that the *Lacedemonians* did well perceive in how ill part *Artaxerxes* took their favour ſhewed unto his brother, and yet were timorous in beginning an open war againſt him, thinking it ſufficient to take all care that no advantage might ſlip, which could ſerve to ſtrengthen their eſtate, by finding the *Perſian* work beyond the ſea. But when *Xenophon*'s army had revealed the baſeneſs of thoſe effeminate *Aſiaticks*, and rehearſed the many victories which they themſelves had gotten, upon terms of extreme diſadvantage; then was all *Greece* filled with deſire of undertaking upon this huge unweildy empire, thinking it no hard matter for the joint forces of that whole nation, to hew out the way to *Suſa*, whereof one handful had opened the paſſage to *Babylon*; and further, finding no power that was able to give them reſiſtance, in all that long journey of 34255 furlongs, ſpent in going and returning, which make of *Engliſh* miles about 4281, a very painful march of one year and three months. Nevertheleſs the civil diſtraction wherewith *Greece* was miſerably torn, and eſpecially that hot fire of the *Theban* war, which, kindled with *Perſian* gold, brake forth ſuddenly into a great flame, drew back out of *Aſia* the power of the *Lacedemonians*, to the defence of their own eſtate; leaving it queſtionable whether *Ageſilaus*, having both the fame, and far greater forces, could have wrought proportionable effects. Sure it is, that in the whole ſpace of two years, which he ſpent in *Aſia*, his deeds procured more commendation of magnanimity and fair behaviour, than of ſtout courage, and great, or profitable atchievements. For how highly ſoever it pleaſed *Xenophon*, who was his friend, and follower in this, and in other wars, to extol his virtue; his exploits being only a few incurſions into the countries lying near the ſea, carry no proportion to *Xenophon*'s own journey, which I know not whether any age hath parallelled: the famous retreat of *Conon* the *Briton* with 6000 men from *Aquileia*, to his own country, thro' all the breadth of *Italy*, and length of *France*, in deſpight of the emperor *Theodoſius*, being rather like it than equal. But of *Ageſilaus*, and his wars in *Aſia* and *Greece*, we ſhall ſpeak more in due place.

SECT. II.

The proſperous beginnings of the war in Aſia.

THimbro receiving *Xenophon*'s men, began to take in towns, and to entertain all ſuch as were willing to revolt from the *Perſian*, who were many, and ſome of them ſuch, as had been highly beholden to the king; who ſeem to have had no other cauſe of diſcontent, than that they were to live under the government of *Tiſſaphernes*, whom all others did as vehemently hate, as the king his maſter did love him. The managing of the war begun by *Thimbro*, was for his oppreſſions taken out of his hands, and committed to *Dercyllidas* a *Spartan*, who behaved himſelf as a good man of war, and a wiſe commander. For whereas the rule of the low countries of *Aſia* was divided between *Pharnabazus* and *Tiſſaphernes*, who did ill agree;

Pharnabazus being the worthier man, but the other by his prince's favour the greater, and having the chief command in thoſe wars againſt the *Greeks*; *Dercyllidas*, who did bear a private hatred to *Pharnabazus* (knowing well that *Tiſſaphernes* was of a miſchievous nature, and would not be ſorry to ſee his corrival throughly beaten, tho' to the king's loſs) made an appointment with *Tiſſaphernes*, and forthwith entered *Æolis*, which was under the juriſdiction of *Pharnabazus*, which province, in few days, he brought into his own power.

That country of *Æolis* had about the ſame time ſuffered a violent alteration, which gave eaſy ſucceſs to the attempts of *Dercyllidas*. *Zenis*, a *Dardanian*, had been deputy to *Pharnabazus* in thoſe parts; after whoſe death, his wife *Mania* procured his office, wherein ſhe behaved her ſelf ſo well, that ſhe not only was beloved of the people under her government, but enlarged her territory, by the conqueſt of certain towns adjoining; and ſundry times gave aſſiſtance to *Pharnabazus* in his wars againſt the *Myſians* and *Perſians*. For ſhe had in pay ſome companies of *Greeks*, whoſe valour by her good uſage did her great ſervice. But ſomewhat before the arrival of *Dercyllidas* in thoſe parts, a ſon-in-law of hers, called *Midias*, whom ſhe truſted and loved much, being blinded with ambition, found means to ſtifle her, and kill her ſon of 17 years old; which done, he ſeized upon two of her principal towns, wherein her treaſure lay, hoping to have been admitted into poſſeſſion of her whole eſtate. Being denied entrance by her ſoldiers that lay in garriſon, he ſent meſſengers with preſents to *Pharnabazus*, deſiring him to make him governour in the place of *Mania*. His preſents were not only rejected by *Pharnabazus*, but revenge of his foul treaſon threatened; whereby the wicked villain was driven into terms of almoſt utter deſperation. In the mean time came *Dercyllidas*, to whom the towns of *Mania*, that held againſt *Midias*, did quickly open their gates. One only town ſtood out four days (againſt the will of the citizens, who were covetous of liberty) the governour ſtriving in vain to have kept it to the uſe of *Pharnabazus*. Now remaining only two cities, *Gergethe* and *Scepſis*, which the traytor held, who fearing all men, as being loved of none, ſent embaſſadors to *Dercyllidas*, deſiring leave to ſpeak with him, and pledges for his ſecurity: upon the delivery of which he iſſued out of *Scepſis*, and coming into the camp, made offer to join with the *Greeks* upon ſuch conditions, as might ſeem reaſonable. But he was plainly told by *Dercyllidas*, that other conditions there were none, than to ſet the citizens freely at liberty. And preſently upon theſe words they marched toward *Scepſis*. When *Midias* perceived that it was in vain to ſtrive againſt the army, and the townſmen, who were all of one mind, he quietly went along with *Dercyllidas*; who remaining but a few hours in the city, did a ſacrifice to *Minerva*, and then leading away the garriſon of *Midias*, he left the city free, and departed towards *Gergethe*. *Midias* did not forſake his company, but followed him, earneſtly entreating that he might be ſuffered to retain *Gergethe*: but coming to the gates, he was bidden to command his ſoldiers that they ſhould be opened; for (quoth *Dercyllidas*) I muſt here likewiſe do a ſacrifice to *Minerva*. The traytor not daring to make denial, cauſed his mercenaries to open the gates, whereby *Dercyllidas*, taking poſſeſſion of the place, tendered pay to the garriſon, who did not refuſe to ſerve under his enſigns. This done, all the goods of *Mania* were ſeized upon, as belonging to one that had been ſubject to *Pharnabazus*, who was enemy to the *Greeks*: and ſo the murderous wretch was ſent away naked, not knowing in what part of the world he might find any place to hide his deteſted head. *Dercyllidas*, having in 8 days taken 9 cities, purpoſed for the eaſe of his confederates, to winter in *Bithynia*, to which end he took truce with *Pharnabazus*, who had not any deſire of war. That winter, and the ſummer enſuing, the truce being re-continued held; in which time, beſides the waſting of *Bithynia*, the neck of land joining *Cherronea* to the main was fortified, being 4 or 5 miles in breadth, by which means 11 towns, with much good land belonging to them, were freed from the incurſions of the wild *Thracians*, and made fit and able to victual the camp. Likewiſe the city of *Aterne* was taken, which was of great ſtrength, and very well ſtored with proviſion. After this, *Dercyllidas* had command from *Sparta*, to divert the war into *Caria*, where was the ſeat of *Tiſſaphernes*; for that hereby it was thought not uneaſy to recover all the towns of *Ionia*: *Pharax*, the admiral of the fleet (which was a yearly office) being appointed to join with him. Tho' it was manifeſt that *Tiſſaphernes* had neglected *Pharnabazus* in time of neceſſity, yet was he not in his own danger requited with the like. For *Pharnabazus* having reſpect to the king's ſervice, came to aſſiſt his private enemy *Tiſſaphernes*, and ſo paſſing into *Caria*, they thruſt garriſons into all places of ſtrength; which done, they march'd towards *Ionia*, hoping to find the towns ill manned for reſiſtance. As theſe *Perſians* were deſirous to keep the war from their own doors, ſo was *Dercyllidas* willing to free his confederates the *Ionians* from the ſpoil and danger of the war, by transferring it into *Caria*. For which cauſe he paſſed the river *Meander*, and not looking to have been ſo ſoon encountered, marched careleſly thro' the country; when on the very ſudden the whole army of *Tiſſaphernes* and *Pharnabazus* was diſcovered, conſiſting of *Perſians*, *Carians*, and ſome mercenary *Greeks*, who were all marſhalled in very good order to preſent battel. The odds was too apparent, both in numbers of men, and in readineſs, as alſo in advantage of ground: for the *Perſian* had a great multitude of horſe, the *Greek* very few and feeble, being to fight in an open plain. Therefore all the *Ionians*, together with the iſlanders and others, of ſuch places as bordered upon the king's dominions, did either betake themſelves to preſent flight; or, abiding a while for ſhame, did plainly diſcover by their looks, that they meant not to be more bold than wiſe. Only *Dercyllidas* with his *Peloponneſians*, regarding their honour, prepared to endure the fight; which muſt needs have brought them to deſtruction, if the counſel of *Pharnabazus* had been followed, who perceiving the opportunity of ſo great a victory, was not willing to let it ſlip. But *Tiſſaphernes*, who naturally was a coward, ſeeing that countenance of reſiſtance was made, began to conſider what ſtrange defence the ſoldiers of *Xenophon* had ſhewed, and thinking that all the *Greeks* were of the like reſolution, held it the wiſeſt way to crave parley; the concluſion of which was, that a truce ſhould be made, to laſt until *Tiſſaphernes* might receive anſwer from the king, and *Dercyllidas* from *Sparta*, concerning the demands propounded in the treaty; which were on the one part, that all the *Greeks* in *Aſia* might enjoy their own liberty and laws; but contrariwiſe on the other ſide, that the *Lacedemonians* ſhould depart *Aſia*, and leave the towns to the king's pleaſure. This treaty was of none effect; only it ſerved to free the *Greeks* from the preſent danger, and to gain time unto *Tiſſaphernes*, who

deſired

deſired to avoid the war by procraſtination, which he durſt not adventure to finiſh by tryal of a battel.

SECT. III.

How the Lacedemonians *took revenge upon the* Eleans *for old diſpleaſure. The diſcontents of the* Corinthians *and* Thebans, *conceived againſt the ſtate of* Sparta.

IN the mean ſeaſon the *Lacedemonians*, who found none able to withſtand them in *Greece*, began to call the *Eleans* to account for ſome diſgraces received by them during the late wars, when leiſure was wanting to the requital of ſuch petty injuries. Theſe *Eleans* being preſidents of the *Olympian* games, had ſet a fine upon the city of *Sparta*; for non-payment of which, they forbad them to come to the ſolemnity, and publickly whip'd one of them, that was a man of note, for preſuming to contend againſt their decree. Likewiſe they hindered *Agis*, king of *Sparta*, from doing ſacrifice to *Jupiter*; and in all points uſed great contempt toward the *Spartans*, who now had no buſineſs that could hinder them from taking revenge: and therefore ſent a peremptory meſſage to the *Eleans*, commanding them to ſet at liberty the cities which they held in ſubjection. This was the uſual pretence which they made the ground of all their wars; though little they cared for the liberty of ſuch towns, which they cauſed afterwards to become followers, and little better than mere vaſſals to themſelves. In their late wars with *Athens*, the ſtrong oppoſition which they found cauſed this goodly title of liberty to work very ſlowly: but having now to do with a ſtate of great ſpirit and ſmall force, it gave preſent ſucceſs to their deſires. Two years together they ſent an army into the country of the *Eleans*: the firſt year an earthquake (held in thoſe times a prodigious ſign, and which did always forbid the proſecution of any enterpriſe in hand) cauſed them to retire: the ſecond year, all the towns of the *Eleans* did haſtily revolt, and the city it ſelf was driven to ſubmiſſion; conſenting both to ſuffer their old ſubjects freely to enjoy their liberty, and to have her own walls thrown down. Only the preſidentſhip of the *Olympian* games was left unto them; which it was not to be doubted that they would, in time coming, uſe modeſtly, finding themſelves to ſtand at the mercy of *Sparta*. In this expedition all the *Greeks* were aſſiſtant to the *Lacedemonians*, excepting the *Corinthians* and *Beotians*, whoſe aid having been of as much importance in the late *Peloponneſian* war, as the force of *Sparta* it ſelf, they could not ſmother their diſlike of their unequal diviſion following the victory; which gave to *Sparta* the command of all *Greece*; to *Thebes* and *Corinth*, only ſecurity againſt *Athens*; but ſuch a ſecurity as was worſe than the danger. For when the equal greatneſs of two mighty eſtates did counterpoiſe each the other, it was in the power of theſe neutral common-wealths to adhere to either, as the condition of their affairs required: but when to revenge injuries, they had by mortal hatred proſecuted the war to extremity, leaving the one city naked of power and friends, the other mightily increaſed in both, it was then (if not neceſſary to obey the greatneſs which themſelves had made, yet) fooliſh and dangerous to provoke it. Nevertheleſs, it was not the purpoſe of the *Spartans* to take occaſion of any quarrel, which they could not finiſh at pleaſure, till ſuch time as they had by victory or compoſition made ſome good end with the *Perſian*, toward whom they bent all their care and forces.

SECT. IV.

The paſſage of Ageſilaus *into* Aſia. *His war with* Tiſſaphernes. *How* Tiſſaphernes *was put to death, and the war diverted into another province, thro' perſwaſion and gifts of* Tithrauſtes *his ſucceſſor. How careleſs the* Perſian *lieutenants were of the king's good.*

AGESILAUS, newly made king of *Sparta*, was deſirous to have the honour of the victory, which, not without cauſe, he expected upon thoſe of *Aſia*; and therefore procuring a great army to join with that of *Dercyllidas*, he took his way in great pomp to *Aulis* in *Beotia*, a haven lying oppoſite to the iſland of *Eubœa*, in which place *Agamemnon* (leading the power of all *Greece* to the war againſt *Troy*, many ages before) had embark'd his men. In imitation of *Agamemnon* he meant alſo to do ſacrifice in *Aulis*, which the *Thebans*, lords of that country, would not permit; but ſaying, that the performance of ſuch ceremonies in that place belonged unto their officers; they were ſo unable to conceal their malice, that ſending ſome companies of horſe, they threw down his ſacrifice from the altar. It was not then convenient time for *Ageſilaus* to entangle himſelf and his country in a new war; therefore, waiting better opportunity of revenge, he quietly ſwallowed the contumely, and followed his main intendment. Having landed his men at *Epheſus*, he was entertained by *Tiſſaphernes* with a treaty of peace, wherein *Ageſilaus* peremptorily requiring that the *Perſian* ſhould reſtore to liberty all the *Greek* towns in *Aſia*, was promiſed that the king, being firſt informed of his demand, ſhould ſend anſwer to his good liking, if he would in the mean while make truce. Truce was therefore made, which *Tiſſaphernes* had fought only to win time of making proviſion for the war, and getting ſupply of men and money from *Artaxerxes*; whilſt *Ageſilaus* was buſy in ſettling the eſtates of his confederate cities on that ſide of the ſea. The end of this long vacation from war, was at the coming down of the forces which *Artaxerxes* had ſent; at what time *Ageſilaus* received a plain meſſage from *Tiſſaphernes*, that either he muſt forthwith depart out of *Aſia*, or make good his abode by ſtrong hand. *Ageſilaus* returning word that he was glad to hear that his enemies had by perjury deſerved vengeance from heaven, prepared to invade them; and ſending word to all the towns which lay between him and *Caria*, that they ſhould provide victuals, and other neceſſaries for his army, did eaſily make *Tiſſaphernes* believe, that his intent was to invade that province wherein *Tiſſaphernes* dwelt, and which was unfit for horſe, in which part of his forces the *Perſian* had moſt confidence. Therefore *Tiſſaphernes* beſtowing all his companies of foot in *Caria*, enter'd with his horſe into the plains of *Meander*, hoping thereby to ſtop the paſſage of a heavy foot-army, not ſuffering them to paſs into that country which was fitteſt for their ſervice. But the *Greeks* left him waiting there in vain, and marched directly into *Phrygia*, where they took great ſpoil without reſiſtance, till ſuch time as the horſe-men of of *Pharnabazus* met him, who in a ſmall ſkirmiſh having the better of the *Greeks*, were the occaſion that *Ageſilaus* returned to *Epheſus*. Although in this laſt fight only twelve men were loſt, yet *Ageſilaus* perceiving by that tryal how hard it would be to prevail, and hold the maſtery of the field, without a greater ſtrength of horſe, took all poſſible care to encreaſe that part of his forces. By which means having enabled himſelf, whilſt winter

ter laſted, he enter'd upon the country of *Tiſſaphernes*, as ſoon as the ſeaſon of the year would permit, and not only took a great booty, but finding the horſe-men of *Tiſſaphernes* in the plain of *Meander*, without aſſiſtance of their infantry, he gave them battel, and had a great victory, taking their camp, in which he found great riches. The blame of this loſs fell heavy upon *Tiſſaphernes*, who either upon cowardiſe had abſented himſelf from the battel, or following ſome other buſineſs, was then at *Sardes*. For which cauſe his maſter having him in diſtruſt, and thinking that peace might be the ſooner had, which he much deſired, if the man, ſo odious to the whole nation of the *Greeks*, were taken out of the way, he ſent into thoſe parts *Tithrauſtes*, a *Perſian*, to cut off the head of *Tiſſaphernes*, and ſucceed him in the government. Such was the end of this baſe and cowardly politician, who little cared to offend heaven, when by perjury he could advance his purpoſes on earth, failed at the laſt thro' too much over-weening of his own wiſdom, even in that part of cunning wherein he thought himſelf moſt perfect. For ſuppoſing, that by his great ſkill in ſubtil negotiation he ſhould one way or other circumvent the *Greeks*, and make them weary of *Aſia*; he did not ſeek to finiſh the war, and, according to his maſter's wiſh, bring all things ſpeedily to quiet; but rather to temporiſe till he might find ſome opportunity of making ſuch end as beſt might ſtand with the king's honour and his own. Wherein it ſeems that he much miſtook his prince's diſpoſition, who, though he had highly rewarded him for the aid which he did bring in his time of danger, yet would he much more gladly have taken it, if he could have found ſuch means whereby the danger it ſelf might have been avoided: as not loving to have war, whilſt by any conditions (honourable or not) he might obtain peace. And this appeared well by the courſe which *Tithrauſtes* took at his firſt poſſeſſion of the low countries. For he ſent embaſſadors to *Ageſilaus* in very friendly ſort, letting him know, that the man who had been author of the war, was now taken out of the way; and that it was the king's pleaſure to let the *Greeks* enjoy their own laws and liberty, upon condition that they ſhould pay him the tribute accuſtomed, and the army be forthwith diſmiſſed. The anſwer to this propoſition, was by *Ageſilaus* referr'd to the counſel of *Sparta*; in the mean ſeaſon he was content to transfer the war into the province of *Pharnabazus*, at the requeſt of *Tithrauſtes*, who bought his departure with thirty talents.

This was a ſtrange manner of war, both on the offenſive and on the defenſive part. For *Ageſilaus*, having entertained great hopes of vanquiſhing the great king, was contented to forbear his ſeveral provinces, at the entreaty of the lieutenants: and thoſe lieutenants being employed by the king to maintain his eſtates againſt all enemies (wherein if they failed, they knew that their heads might eaſily be taken from their ſhoulders) were little offended at any loſs that fell on their next neighbour-princes, which were ſubject likewiſe to the ſame crown of *Perſia*, ſo long as their own government could be preſerved free from waſte and danger. The cauſe of this diſorder on the *Perſian* ſide, I can aſcribe to nothing ſo deſervedly, as to the corrupted eſtate of the court, wherein eunuchs, concubines, and miniſters of pleaſure, were able by partial conſtruction to countenance or diſgrace the actions of ſuch as had the managing of things abroad; and to that fooliſh manner of the king's (which was ſo uſual that it might be called a rule) to reward or puniſh the provincial governour, according to the benefit or loſs, which the country given in charge unto each of them received, during the time of his rule. Whereby it came to paſs, that as every one was deſirous to make his own territory yield a large increaſe of the king's treaſure; ſo no man was careful to aſſiſt his borderers, if loſs or danger might thereby grow to himſelf and his; but ſat ſtill as an idle beholder, when perhaps by joining their forces, it had not been uneaſy to recompenſe the ſpoil of one country, by conquering another, or defending a third from far greater miſeries.

SECT. V.

The war and treaty between Ageſilaus *and* Pharnabazus.

AGESILAUS, having thus compounded with *Tithrauſtes*, enter'd *Phrygia*, burning and waſting the country without reſiſtance. He took the palace of *Pharnabazus*, and by his lieutenant drove him out of his camp. Theſe actions, together with his honourable behaviour, which added much to their luſtre, were more glorious than profitable. For he did not win cities and places of ſtrength, which might have encreaſed his power, and given aſſurance to the reſt of his proceedings: but purchaſed fame and high reputation, by which he drew unto him ſome that were diſcontented and ſtood upon bad terms with the great king, whom he loſt again as eaſily, by means of ſome ſlight injury done to them by his under-captains. *Pharnabazus* did not encloſe himſelf in any town for fear of being beſieged, but kept the field, lying as near as he could ſafely to the enemies, with whom it was not his purpoſe to fight, but to make ſome good end by compoſition, which he found not uneaſy to do. For the pleaſures, by him formerly done to the ſtate of *Sparta*, in the times of their moſt neceſſity, had been ſo great, that when he (obtaining parly) did ſet before their eyes his bounty towards them, and his love (which had been ſuch, that beſides many other hazards of his perſon, he had for the reſcue of their fleet, when it was driven to run aſhoar at *Abidus*, adventured to ride into the ſea, as far as he could find any ground, and fight on horſeback againſt the *Athenians*) together with his faith, which had never been violated in word or deed: they knew not how to excuſe their ingratitude, otherwiſe than by telling him, that having war with his maſter, they were inforced againſt their will to offend him. *Ageſilaus* did make a fair offer to him, that if he would revolt from the king to them, they would maintain him againſt the *Perſian*, and eſtabliſh him free prince of the country wherein he was at that time only deputy to *Artaxerxes*. But *Pharnabazus* told him plainly, that if the king his maſter did put him in truſt to make war againſt them, he would not fail to do the beſt that he could as their enemy; if the charge were taken out of his hand, and he commanded to obey another, he would then ſhift ſide, and betake himſelf to their alliance. The iſſue of this parly was, that the army ſhould no longer abide in *Phrygia*, nor again return into it, whilſt employment could be found elſewhere. The excuſe made by *Ageſilaus*, and the withdrawing of his forces out of thoſe parts, were not ſufficient to appeaſe *Pharnabazus*, whom he had not invaded for want of more neceſſary buſineſs elſewhere; but becauſe his country would yield great booty; and for the hire of thirty talents. By this means the *Lacedemonians* changed an honourable friend into a hot enemy, who afterwards requited their unthankfulneſs with full revenge.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

The great commotions raiſed in Greece *by the* Thebans *and others, that were hired with gold from the* Perſian.

IN the mean while *Tithrauſtes*, perceiving that *Ageſilaus* meant nothing leſs than to return into *Greece*, and let *Artaxerxes* reſt quietly in *Aſia*, took a wiſe courſe, whereby the city of *Sparta* was not only driven to look to her own, and give over her great hopes of ſubverting the empire, but was beaten out of all that had been gotten by many late victories, and ſaw her dominion reſtrained unto the narrow bounds of her own territory. He ſent into *Greece* fifty talents of ſilver, to be employed in raiſing war againſt the *Lacedemonians*; which treaſure was, by the ſubtle practice of him that was put in truſt with it, in ſuch wiſe diſperſed, among the principal men of the *Thebans*, *Argives*, and *Corinthians*, that all thoſe eſtates having formerly borne ſecret hate to that of *Sparta*, were now deſirous of nothing ſo much as of open war. And leſt this great heat of the incenſed multitude ſhould, for want of preſent exerciſe, begin to faint, and vaniſh away in idle words, occaſion was found out to thruſt the *Lacedemonians* into arms, that they themſelves might ſeem authors of the quarrel. Some land there was in the tenure of the *Locrians*, to which the *Thebans* had in former time laid claim; but the *Phocians*, either having the better title, or finding the greater favour, had it adjudged unto them, and received yearly money for it. This money the *Locrians* were either hired or perſuaded to pay now to the *Thebans*, who readily accepted it. The *Phocians*, not meaning ſo to loſe their rent, made a diſtreſs by ſtrong hand, recovering a great deal more than their own; which the *Thebans* (as in protection of their new tenants) requited with an invaſion made upon *Phocis*, waſting that country in the manner of open war. Such were the beginnings of profeſſed hoſtility between *Thebes* and *Sparta*, and the firſt breaking out of their cloſe enmity, that had long time, tho' hardly been concealed. For when the *Phocian* embaſſadors came to *Sparta*, complaining of the violence done by the *Thebans*, and requeſting ſuccour, they had very favourable audience, and ready conſent to their ſuit; it being the manner of the *Lacedemonians*, to defer the acknowledgment of injuries received, until occaſion of revenge were offered, and then to diſcover their indignation in cold blood. At this time they had very good opportunity to work their own wills, having no other war to diſturb them in *Greece*, and hearing out of *Aſia* no news that could offend or trouble them. Wherefore they ſent *Lyſander* to raiſe all the countries about *Phocis*, and with ſuch forces as he could levy, to attend the coming of *Pauſanias*, king of *Sparta* (for *Sparta*, as hath been ſhewed before, had two kings) who ſhould follow him with the ſtrength of *Peloponneſus*. *Lyſander* did as he was appointed, and being of great reputation in thoſe parts, he drew the *Orchomenians* to revolt from *Thebes*. *Pauſanias* likewiſe raiſed all *Peloponneſus*, except the *Corinthians* (who refuſed to aſſiſt him in that enterpriſe) meaning to join with *Lyſander*, and make a ſpeedy end of the war. The conſideration of ſo great a danger approaching ſo ſwiftly, cauſed the *Thebans* to ſeek what help they could abroad, foraſmuch as their own ſtrength was far too little to make reſiſtance againſt ſuch mighty preparations. It was not unknown to them, that many followers of the *Lacedemonians* were otherwiſe affected in heart than they durſt utter in countenance; but the good wiſhes of ſuch people were little available, conſidering that the moſt which could be expected from them was, that they ſhould do as little hurt as they could: by which manner of tergiverſation, the *Corinthians* did at that preſent caſt themſelves into the diſpleaſure of the *Spartans*, to the no great benefit of *Thebes*. Wherefore it was thought the ſafeſt courſe to procure the aſſiſtance of ſome eſtate, that might preſently declare itſelf on their ſide, which would cauſe many others to follow the example, and make their party ſtrong. To this end they ſent embaſſadors to *Athens*, excuſing old offences, as either not committed by publick allowance, or done in time of the general war, and recompenſed with friendſhip lately ſhewn in their refuſal of aſſiſting *Pauſanias*, when he came in behalf of the thirty tyrants, againſt the good citizens of *Athens*. In regard of which, and for their own honour's ſake, they requeſted them of aid in the preſent war, offering to do the beſt that they could for the reſtoring of *Athens* to her former eſtate and dignity. *Thraſybulus* and his friends, who, perſecuted by the thirty, had been well entertained at *Thebes*, procured now the city to make a large requital of the courteſy which they had received. For it was decreed, that the ſtate of *Athens* ſhould not only refuſe to aid the *Lacedemonians* in this war, but that it ſhould aſſiſt the *Thebans*, and engage itſelf in their cauſe. Whilſt *Pauſanias* lay ſtill, waiting the arrival of his confederates, *Lyſander*, being deſirous to do ſomewhat that might advance the buſineſs in hand, came to *Haliartus*, where, tho' *Pauſanias* did not meet him, as had been appointed, yet he attempted the town, and was ſlain in fight by the *Thebans*, who came haſtily to the reſcue. As this victory did encourage the *Thebans*, ſo the coming of *Pauſanias* with his great army did again amaze them, with preſentation of extreme danger; but their ſpirits were ſoon revived by the ſtrong ſuccour which was brought from *Athens*; in conſideration of which, and of the late battle, *Pauſanias* durſt not hazard a new fight with them, but receiving the bodies of thoſe that were ſlain, by compoſition, departed out of their territory; for which, either cowardiſe or indiſcretion, he was, at his return to *Sparta*, condemn'd as a traytor, and driven to fly into *Tegea*, where he ended his days in baniſhment.

SECT. VII.

How Ageſilaus *was called out of* Aſia *to help his country. A victory of the* Spartans. Conon, *the* Athenian, *aſſiſted by* Pharnabazus, *overcomes the* Lacedemonian *fleet, recovers the maſtery of the ſeas, and rebuilds the walls of* Athens.

THIS good ſucceſs, and the confederacy made with *Athens*, gave ſuch reputation to the *Thebans*, that the *Argives*, *Corinthians*, *Eubeans*, *Locrians*, and *Acarnanes*, did forthwith ſide with them, and raiſing a ſtrong army, determined to give battle to the *Lacedemonians*, as near as they might to their own doors; conſidering that the force of *Sparta* itſelf was not great, but grew more and more by the adjunction of their confederates. The magiſtrates of *Sparta* perceiving the danger, ſent for *Ageſilaus*, who readily obeyed them, and promiſing his friends in *Aſia* to return ſpeedily to their aſſiſtance, paſſed the ſtreights of *Helleſpont* into *Europe*. In the mean time the cities of the new league had given battle to the *Lacedemonians*, and the remainder of their aſſociates, but with ill ſucceſs. For when the right wing of each part had gotten the better

better hand, the *Argives* and *Thebans* returning from the chaſe in ſome diſorder, were broken and defeated by the *Lacedemonians*, who meeting them in good order, won from them the honour which they had gotten by forcing the left wing of the *Lacedemonians*, and made the victory of that day entirely their own. The report of this battle meeting *Ageſilaus* at *Amphipolis*, were by him ſent over into *Aſia*, where it is not likely that they brought much comfort unto his friend, who had ſince his departure ſeen the *Spartan* fleet beaten, and *Lyſander* the admiral ſlain. The ſame man, whoſe endeavour had brought the *Athenians* into order, by advancing the ſea-forces of the *Lacedemonians* with money, and all manner of ſupplies, was now the occaſion that the power of *Athens* grew ſtrong at ſea, when the city was deſpoiled of her old reputation, and ſcarcely able to maintain an army by land for her own defence. *Pharnabazus* conſidering how much it imported the king his maſter, to have the *Greeks* divided into ſuch factions, as might utterly diſable them from undertaking abroad, thought it the ſafeſt way for himſelf, during theſe broils, to take ſuch order, that he ſhould not need any more to ſeek peace by entreaty, and commemoration of old benefits, at their hands, who unprovoked had ſold his love for thirty talents. To which purpoſe he furniſhed *Conon* the *Athenian* with eight ſhips, who had eſcaped, when the fleet of *Athens* was ſurpriſed by *Lyſander* at *Ægos-Potamos*; giving him the command of a great navy, wherewith he requited the loſs received at *Ægos-Potamos*, by repaying the *Lacedemonians* with the like deſtruction of their fleet at *Cnidus*. After this victory *Conon* ſailed to *Athens*, bringing with him, partly as the liberality of *Pharnabazus*, partly as the fruit of his victory, ſo ſtrong a navy, and ſo much gold, as encouraged the *Athenians* to rebuild their walls, and think more hopefully upon recovering the ſigniory which they had loſt.

SECT. VIII.

Of ſundry ſmall victories gotten on each part. The Lacedemonians *loſe all in* Aſia. *The* Athenians *recover ſome part of their old dominion.*

NEvertheleſs the *Lacedemonians*, by many victories at land, maintained for ſome years the honour of their eſtate, endangered very greatly by this loſs at ſea. For *Ageſilaus* obtained the better with his horſemen, from the *Theſſalians*, who were accounted the beſt riders in *Greece:* He waſted *Bœotia*, and fought a great battle at *Coronea* againſt the *Thebans*, and their allies, whom he overthrew; and by his marſhal *Gylis* foraged the country of *Locris:* which done, he return'd home.

The gain of theſe victories was not great, and the reputation of them was, by many loſſes, much defaced. For the *Thebans* did, in the battle of *Coronea*, vanquiſh the *Orchomenians*, who ſtood oppoſite unto them, and retired unbroken to mount *Helicon*, opening way perforce when *Ageſilaus* charged them in their return from the purſuit. Likewiſe *Gylis* was ſlain, with a great part of his army, by the *Locrians*; and ſome other exploits by the *Lacedemonians*, performed againſt the *Corinthians*, were repay'd with equal damage receiv'd in the parts adjoining; many towns being eaſily taken, and as eaſily recover'd. The variety of which inter-feats was ſuch, that the *Thebans* themſelves were drawn, by the loſs of the haven of *Corinth*, to ſue for peace, but could not get audience, till ſuch time as the news came of a great victory obtained by *Iphicrates*, general of the *Athenian* forces at *Lechæum*; whereupon the *Theban* embaſſadors being ſent for, and willed to do their meſſage, required only in ſcorn, to have a ſafe conduct given them, that they might enter into *Corinth*. From this time forward the war was made for a while only by incurſions, wherein the *Acheans*, confederates of *Sparta*, felt moſt loſs; their whole ſtate being endanger'd by the *Acarnanians*, who held with the contrary ſide, until *Ageſilaus* repayed theſe invaders with equal or greater calamities, brought upon their own lands, which did ſo afflict the *Acarnanians*, that they were driven to ſue for peace. But the affairs at ſea were of moſt conſequence, upon which the ſucceſs of all depended. For when the towns of *Aſia* perceiv'd, that the *Lacedemonians* were not only entangled in an hard war at home, but almoſt diſabled to paſs the ſeas, having loſt their fleet at *Cnidus*; they ſoon gave ear to *Pharnabazus*, who promiſed to allow that they ſhould uſe their own laws, if they would expel the *Spartan* governours. Only the city of *Abydos* did ſtand firm, wherein *Dercyllidas* lay, who did his beſt to contain all the towns about *Helleſpont*, in the alliance of the *Lacedemonians*; which he could not do, becauſe the *Athenian* fleet under *Thraſybulus* took in *Byzantium*, *Chalcedon*, and other places thereabout, reducing the iſle of *Lesbos* to their ancient acknowledgment of *Athens*.

SECT. IX.

The baſe conditions offered unto the Perſians *by the* Lacedemonians. *Of ſundry fights, and other paſſages in the war. The peace of* Antalcidas.

ABOUT this time the *Spartans* began to perceive, how uneaſy a thing it would be, to maintain the war againſt men as good as themſelves, aſſiſted with the treaſures of *Perſia*; wherefore they craved peace of *Artaxerxes*, moſt baſely offering, not only to renounce the *Greeks* inhabiting *Aſia*, and to leave them to the king's diſpoſition, but withal to ſet the iſlanders, and every town in *Greece*, as well the little as the great, at full and abſolute liberty, whereby they ſaid that all the principal eſtates of their country would ſo be weakened, that no one, nor all of them, ſhould be able to ſtir againſt the great king. And ſure it was, that the power of the country being ſo broken, and rent into many ſmall pieces, could neither have diſquieted the *Perſian*, by an offenſive war, nor have made any good defence againſt him, but would have left it eaſy for him, in continuance of time, to have taken the cities one after another, till he had made himſelf maſter of all. The *Spartans* were not ignorant of this, but were ſo carried with envy, that perceiving how the dominion of the ſeas was like to return to *Athens*, they choſe rather to give all from themſelves and others, and make all alike weak, than to permit that any of their own nation ſhould grow ſtronger than themſelves, who ſo lately had commanded all. Yet this great offer was not at the firſt accepted, both in regard that the other eſtates of *Greece*, who had in the king's behalf join'd together againſt the *Lacedemonians*, did by their ſeveral embaſſadors oppoſe themſelves unto it; and for that it was thought ſafeſt for *Artaxerxes*, rather to weaken the *Lacedemonians* yet more, than by interpoſing himſelf to bring friends and foes on the ſudden to an equality. Eſpecially *Struthas*, whom *Artaxerxes* had ſent as his lieutenant into the low countries, did ſeek to repay the harm done by *Ageſilaus* in thoſe parts: which his intent appearing plain, and all hope of the peace being thereby cut off, *Thimbro* was ſent into *Aſia*, to make

war

war upon *Struthas*; and others were appointed to other places, whereby the war, being ſcattered about all the iſles and towns on the firm land grew almoſt to the manner of piracy and robbery, affording many ſkirmiſhes, but few great actions worthy of remembrance. *Thimbro* was ſlain by *Struthas*, and in his place *Diphridas* was ſent, who demeaned himſelf more warily. *Dercyllidas* was removed from his charge at *Abydus*, becauſe he had not impeached *Thraſybulus* in his enterpriſes about *Helleſpont*; *Anaxibius*, who ſucceeded him, was ſurpriſed and ſlain in a ſkirmiſh by *Iphicrates* the *Athenian*. *Thraſybulus*, departing from *Lesbos* towards *Rhodes*, was ſlain by the way at *Aſpendus*; the city of *Rhodes* had long before joined with the *Lacedemonians*, who erected there (as was their manner) an *Ariſtocracy*, or the government of a few the principal citizens; whereas contrariwiſe, the *Athenians* were accuſtomed to put the ſoveraignty into the hands of the people, each of them ſeeking to aſſure themſelves, by erecting in the towns of their confederates a government like unto their own: which doing (where more eſpecial cauſe did not hinder) cauſed the nobility to favour *Sparta*, and the commons to incline to *Athens*. The people of *Ægina* roved upon the coaſt of *Attica*, which cauſed the *Athenians* to land an army in *Ægina*, and beſieged their town; but this ſiege being raiſed by the aſſiſtance of the *Lacedemonian* fleet, the iſlanders began anew to moleſt *Attica*, which cauſed the *Athenians* to man their ſhips again, that returned beaten, having loſt 4 of 13. The loſs of theſe ſhips was ſoon recompenſed by a victory which *Chabrias* the *Athenian* general had in *Ægina*; whereupon the iſlanders were fain to keep home, and leave to the *Athenians* the ſeas free. It may well ſeem ſtrange that the city of *Athens*, having but newly raiſed her walls, having not by any fortunate and important battle ſecured her eſtate from dangers by land; but only depending upon the aſſiſtance of ſuch confederates, as carried unto different ends, had often diſcovered themſelves irreſolute in the common cauſe, would ſend a fleet and an army to *Cyprus*, in defence of *Evagoras*, when the maſtery of the ſeas was ſo ill aſſured, that an iſland lying in the eye of *Piræus*, had ability to vex the coaſt of *Attica*. But as the over-weening of that city did cauſe it uſually to embrace more than it could compaſs; ſo the inſolency and ſhameleſs injuſtice of the people, had now bred in the chief commanders, a deſire to keep themſelves far out of ſight, and to ſeek employments at ſuch diſtance as might ſecure them from the eyes of the envious, and from publick judgments, out of which few or none eſcaped. For which cauſe *Timotheus* did paſs away much part of his time in the iſle of *Leſbos*; *Iphicrates* in *Thrace*, and *Chabrias* did now carry away into *Cyprus* a greater force than his country well could have ſpared; with which he returned not when the buſineſs in *Cyprus* came to an end, but ſought new adventures in *Egypt*, whereby aroſe neither thanks to himſelf, nor profit to his city, tho' honour both to him and it. The *Athenians* being thus careleſs of things at hand, had a notable blow given unto them, ſhortly after that *Chabrias* was gone to *Cyprus*, even within their own haven. For *Teleutias*, a *Lacedemonian*, being made governour of *Ægina*, conceived a ſtrong hope of ſurpriſing the navy of *Athens*, as it lay in *Piræus*; thinking aright, that it was an harder matter to encounter with ten ſhips prepared for the fight, than with twenty lying in harbour, whoſe mariners were aſleep in their cabins, or drinking in taverns. Wherefore he ſail'd by night unto the mouth of the port, which entering at the break of day, he found (according to his expectation) moſt of the men on ſhore, and few or none left aboard to make reſiſtance; by which means he took many ſhips laden with merchandiſes, many fiſher-men, paſſengers, and other veſſels; alſo three or four gallies, having ſunk or broken, and made unſerviceable, as many of the reſt as the time would ſuffer. About this time, *Pharnabazus*, the lieutenant of *Phrygia*, had one of the king's daughters given to him in marriage, with whom he lived about the court; and many officers that favoured the *Lacedemonians* were placed in the lower *Aſia*; by whoſe aſſiſtance, the fleet of *Sparta* grew victorious about *Helleſpont*; in ſuch wiſe, that perhaps they ſhould not have needed the peace, which they themſelves procured by *Antalcidas*, from the great king, the conditions whereof were ſuch as are mentioned before, giving freedom to all the cities of *Greece*, and dividing the country into as many ſeveral ſtates as there were petty boroughs in it. Thus *Artaxerxes*, having bought his own peace with money, did likewiſe by his money become arbitrator and decider of controverſies between the *Greeks*, diſpoſing of their buſineſs in ſuch wiſe as ſtood beſt with his own good. The tenor of *Artaxerxes*'s decree was, that all *Aſia* and *Cyprus* ſhould be his own; the iſles of *Lemnos*, *Imbrus*, and *Scirus* be ſubject to *Athens*; all other *Greek* towns, as well the little as the great, be ſet at liberty; and that whoſoever ſhould refuſe this peace, upon them the approvers of it ſhould make war, the king aſſiſting them by land and ſea, with men, and ſhips, and treaſure. The *Athenians* were ſo diſcouraged by their loſſes at ſea; the *Lacedemonians* by revolt of their confederates, and the neceſſity of maintaining many garriſons, for which they wanted money; and other ſtates by the miſeries of the war, whereof they ſaw no end; that all (excepting the *Theban*) did conſent unto theſe articles. This was called the peace of *Antalcidas*: whereof the *Lacedemonians* taking upon themſelves the execution, did not only compel the *Argives* to depart out of *Corinth* (which under pretence of defending they held by garriſons, lately thruſt into it, not as patrons, but as lords) and the *Thebans* to leave *Bœotia* free, of which province *Thebes* had always held the government: the *Thebans* themſelves being alſo comprehended under the name of *Beotians*, but cauſed the *Mantineans* to throw down their own city, and to dwell in villages; alledging, that they had formerly been accuſtomed ſo to do, tho' purpoſing indeed to chaſtiſe them, as having been ill affected to *Sparta* in the late war. By theſe courſes the *Lacedemonians* did hope that all the ſmall towns in *Greece* would, when occaſion ſhould require it, willingly follow them in the wars, as authors of their liberty; and that the great cities having loſt all their dependants, would be unable to make oppoſition.

SECT. X.

The war which the Lacedemonians *made upon* Olynthus. *They take* Thebes *by treaſon, and* Olynthus *by famine.*

WHILST theſe wars, which ended without either victory or profit, conſumed the riches and power of *Greece*, the city of *Olynthus* in *Thrace* was grown ſo mighty, that ſhe did not only command her neighbour-towns, but was alſo become terrible to places far removed, and to *Sparta* it ſelf. Great part of *Macedonia*, together with *Pella*, the principal city of that kingdom, was taken by the *Olynthians*, who following the uſual pretence of

of the *Lacedemonians*, to ſet at liberty the places over which king *Amyntas* did tyrannize, had almoſt now driven him out of his dominions, and taken all to themſelves. The citizens of *Acanthus* and of *Apollonia*, being neareſt unto the danger of thoſe incroaching neighbours, acquainted the *Lacedemonians* with their fear, affirming that this dominion of the *Olynthians* would be too ſtrong for all *Greece*, if continuance of time ſhould give it reputation, which only it wanted; wherefore they requeſted aſſiſtance, but in ſuch terms as did ſound of compulſion; proteſting that either they muſt war upon *Olynthus*, or become ſubject unto her, and fight in her defence. Hereupon was made a haſty levy of men, two thouſand being preſently ſent away with promiſe to be ſeconded by a greater army. Whilſt theſe two thouſand gave ſuch beginning to the war, as agreed with their ſmall number, the body of the army following them ſurprized the cittadel of *Thebes*, which was betrayed into the hand of *Phebidas* the *Lacedemonian*, by ſome of the magiſtrates, who ſought to ſtrengthen their faction by the ſlavery of their country. The *Thebans* were ill affected to *Sparta*, but had not in any one point violated the peace lately made between them; which cauſed the *Lacedemonians* to doubt whether this act of *Phebidas* were more worthy of reward or of puniſhment: in concluſion, profit ſo far over-weighed honeſty, that the deed was approved, many principal citizens of *Thebes* condemned to death, many driven into baniſhment, and the traytors rewarded with the government of the city; by whoſe authority, and the force of the garriſon, the *Thebans* were compelled to ſerve the *Lacedemonians*, in all, and more than all that they could require. This acceſs of power having ſtrengthened the *Lacedemonians*, cauſed them to entertain the greater forces about *Olynthus*, which (notwithſtanding the loſs of one great battel, and ſome other diſaſters) they compelled at length by famine to render it ſelf to their obedience.

SECT. XI.

How the Thebans *recovered their liberty, driving out the* Lacedemonian *garriſon.*

AFTER this *Olynthian* war, which endured almoſt three years, it ſeemed that no eſtate in *Greece* was able to make head againſt that of *Sparta*: but it was not long ere the *Thebans* found means to ſhake off their yoke, and gave both example and means to others to do the like. One of the baniſhed men found by conference with a ſcribe of the *Theban* magiſtrates coming to *Athens*, that the tyranny wherewith his country was oppreſſed, pleaſed him no better than it did thoſe who for fear of it were fled from home. Whereupon a plot was laid between theſe two, that ſoon found very good ſucceſs, being managed thus. Seven of the baniſhed men forſook *Athens* privily, and enter'd by night into the fields of *Thebes*; where ſpending the next day ſecretly, they came late in the evening to the gates like huſband-men returned from work, and ſo paſſed undiſcovered unto the houſe of *Charon*, whom *Phyllidas* the ſcribe had drawn into the conſpiracy. The day following, a ſolemn feaſt being then held in the city, *Phyllidas* promiſed the governours, who were inſolent and luſtful men, that he would convey unto them that night the moſt beautiful dames of the town, with whom they ſhould take their pleaſure. Having cheared them with ſuch hope, and plenty of good wine, he told them when the time of performance (which they urged) came, that he could not make good his promiſe, unleſs they would diſmiſs their followers; becauſe the gentlewomen, who attended without in a chamber, would not endure, that any of the ſervants ſhould ſee their faces. Upon this occaſion the attendants were diſmiſſed, and the conſpirators, attired like ladies and their maids, brought into the place; who taking advantage of the governours looſe behaviour, ſlew them all upon the ſudden with daggers, which they brought hidden under their garments. Then preſently caſting off their diſguiſe, they went to other places, where feigning themſelves to come to the governours upon buſineſs, they got admittance, and likewiſe ſlew thoſe that were of the *Lacedemonian* faction. By the like device they broke into the priſon, ſlew the goaler, and ſet at liberty ſuch as they thought meet; and being followed by theſe deſperate men, proclaimed liberty, making the death of the tyrants known. The captain of the caſtle hearing the ſudden proclamation, thought the rebels to be ſtronger than indeed they were: the citizens contrariwiſe miſtruſted, that it was a practice to diſcover ſuch, as would be forward upon occaſion of revolting. But as ſoon as day-light revealed the plain truth, all the people took arms, and beſieged the caſtle, ſending haſtily to *Athens* for ſuccour. The garriſon alſo ſent for aid unto the towns adjoining, whence a few broken troops coming to the reſcue, were defeated on the way, by the horſe-men of *Thebes*. On the other ſide, the baniſhed *Thebans* did not only make ſpeed to aſſiſt their country-men, but procured ſome *Athenians* to join with them, and thereby came ſo ſtrong into the city, that the caſtle was yielded more through fear than any neceſſity, upon condition that the ſoldiers might quietly depart with their arms; for which compoſition the captain at his return to *Sparta* was put to death. When the news of the doings at *Thebes*, and the ſucceſs arrived at *Sparta*, an army was raiſed forthwith, and all things prepared as earneſtly for the recovering of that city, as if ſome part of their ancient inheritance had been taken from the *Lacedemonians*, and not a town perfidiouſly uſurped by them, reſtored to her own liberty. *Cleombrotus*, one of the kings, was ſent on this expedition; who, having wearied his followers with a toilſome winter's journey, returned home without any good or harm done; leaving *Sphodrias*, with part of his army, at *Theſpies*, to infeſt the *Thebans*; who, doing them ſome diſpleaſures, made large amends by a fooliſh attempt upon the haven of *Athens*, which failing to take, he waſted the country adjoining, and drove away cattel, cauſing by this outrage the *Athenians* to enter with all their power into the war, out of which they were before very carefully ſeeking how to withdraw themſelves.

CHAP. XII.

Of the flouriſhing eſtate of Thebes, *from the battel of* Leuctra *to the battel of* Mantinea.

SECT. I.

How Thebes *and* Athens *joined together againſt* Sparta. *How the* Athenians *made peace for themſelves and others, out of which the* Thebans *were excluded. The battel of* Leuctra, *and beginning of the* Theban *greatneſs.*

THE *Lacedemonians* were men of great reſolution, and of much gravity in all their proceedings, but one diſhonourable rule they held, that all reſpects withſtanding the commodity of *Sparta* were to be neglected; the practice of which doctrine, even by the beſt and wiſeſt of them, did greatly blemiſh that eſtate; but when it was put in execution by inſufficient over-weening men, it ſeldom failed to bring upon them, inſtead of profit unjuſtly expected, both ſhame and loſs. And ſo it befel them in theſe enterpriſes of *Phebidas*, upon the caſtle of *Thebes*, and *Sphodrias* upon the *Pireus*. For howſoever *Ageſilaus* did ſpoil the country about *Thebes*, in which he ſpent two ſummers, yet the diligence of the *Thebans* repaired all, who by the good ſucceſs of ſome attempts grew ſtronger than they were at the firſt.

The *Athenians* likewiſe began to look abroad, ſailing to the iſle of *Corcyra*, where they ordered things at their pleaſure, and, having in ſome fights at ſea prevailed, began, as in the *Peloponneſian* war, to ſurround *Peloponneſus* with a navy; afflicting ſo the *Lacedemonians*, that had not the *Thebans* by their inſolency wearied their friends, and cauſed them to ſeek for peace, it had been very likely that the courſe of this war ſhould have ſoon come to a good end, which nevertheleſs being proſecuted by the *Thebans* (who oppoſed at once both theſe two great eſtates) left the city of *Sparta* as much dejected, as the beginning found it proud and tyrannous. But the *Athenians* perceiving how *Thebes* encroach'd every day upon her weak neighbours, not ſparing ſuch as had been dependants upon *Athens*, and finding themſelves, whilſt engaged in ſuch a war, unable to relieve their complaining friends, reſolved to ſettle the affairs of *Greece*, by renewing that form of peace which *Antalcidas* had brought from the *Perſian*. Wherefore they ſent meſſengers to *Thebes*, peremptorily ſignifying, that it was their intent to finiſh the war; to which purpoſe they willed the *Thebans* to ſend embaſſadors along with them to *Sparta*; who readily condeſcended, fearing otherwiſe that they ſhould be left out of the treaty of peace, which came to paſs, being ſo wrought by the couragious wiſdom of *Epaminondas*, who underſtood far better than his countrymen, what was to be feared or hoped. In this treaty the *Lacedemonians* and *Athenians* did ſoon agree; but when the *Thebans* offered to ſwear to the articles in the name of the *Beotians*, *Ageſilaus* required them to ſwear in their own name, and to leave the *Beotians* free, whom they had lately reduced under their obedience. Whereunto *Epaminondas* made anſwer, that the city of *Sparta* ſhould give example to *Thebes*, by ſetting the *Laconians* free; for that the ſigniory of *Beotia* did by as good right appertain to the *Thebans*, as that of *Laconia* to the *Spartans*. This was well and truly ſpoken; but was heard with no patience;

For *Ageſilaus* bearing a vehement hatred unto thoſe of *Thebes*, by whom he was drawn back out of *Aſia* into *Greece*, and diſappointed of all the glory which he had hoped to atchieve by the *Perſian* war, did now paſſionately urge that point of ſetting the *Beotians* at liberty, and finding it as obſtinately refuſed, he daſh'd the name of the *Thebans* out of the league. At the ſame time *Cleombrotus*, the other king of *Sparta*, lay in *Phocis*, who received command from the governours of *Sparta* forthwith to enter upon the land of the *Thebans* with all his power, which he did, and was there ſlain at *Leuctra*, and with him the flower of his army. This battel of *Leuctra* being one of the moſt famous that ever were fought between the *Greeks*, was not ſo notable for any circumſtance foregoing it, or for the managing of the fight it ſelf, as for the death of the king, and many citizens of *Sparta*; but eſpecially, for that after this battel (between which and the concluſion of the general peace, there paſſed but twenty days) the *Lacedemonians* were never able to recover the ſtrength and reputation which had formerly made them redoubted far and near; whereas contrariwiſe the *Thebans*, whoſe greateſt ambition had in former times confined it ſelf unto the little region of *Beotia*, did now begin to undertake the leading and command of many people and eſtates, in ſuch wiſe, that ſoon after they brought an army of threeſcore and ten thouſand ſtrong unto the gates of *Sparta*. So much do the afflictions of an hard war valiantly endured, advance the affairs of the diſtreſſed, and guide them into the way of conqueſt by ſtiffening that reſolution with a manly temper, which wealth and eaſe had through luxury, rechleſneſs, and many other vices or vanities, made ruſty and effeminate.

SECT. II.

How the Athenians *took upon them to maintain the peace of* Greece. *New troubles hence ariſing,* Epaminondas *invadeth and waſteth the territory of* Lacedemon.

THE *Athenians* refuſing to take advantage of this overthrow fallen upon their old enemies and new confederates the *Lacedemonians*; did nevertheleſs finally give them to underſtand, that their dominion was expired, and therefore their pride might well be laid away. For, taking upon themſelves the maintenance of the peace lately concluded, which *Ageſilaus* (perhaps of purpoſe to make benefit of quarrels that might ariſe) had left unperfect, they aſſembled the deputies of all the eſtates confederated at *Athens*; where the general liberty of all towns, as well ſmall as great, was ratified, under the ſtile of the *Athenians*, and their aſſociates. Hereupon began freſh garboils. The *Mantineans* claiming power by this decree to order their affairs at their own pleaſure did (as it were) in deſpight of the *Spartans*, who had enforced them to raiſe their town, re-edify it, and ally themſelves with ſuch of the *Arcadians* as ſtood worſt affected to *Sparta*. The *Arcadians*, a ſtrong nation, conſiſting of many cities, were diſtracted with factions; ſome deſiring to hold good correſpondence with the *Lacedemonians*,

ſome to weaken and keep them low; yet all pretending other ends. The *Lacedemonians* durſt not give impeachment to the *Mantineans*; nor take upon them to correct their ill-willers among the *Arcadians*, till ſuch time as the factions broke out into violence, and each part called in foreign help. Then was an army ſent from *Sparta*, as it were in defence of the people of *Tegea*, againſt the *Mantineans*, but indeed againſt them both. *Ageſilaus* had the leading of it, but effected nothing. The *Thebans* had by this time ſubdued the *Phocians*, and were become head of the *Locrians*, *Acarnians*, *Eubeans*, and many others; with the power of which countries, they enter'd *Peloponneſus* in favour of the *Arcadians*, who had, upon expectation of their coming, abſtained from giving battel to *Ageſilaus*. The army of the *Spartans* being diſmiſſed, and *Epaminondas* joined with the *Arcadians*, the region of *Laconia* was invaded and ſpoiled: a thing ſo ſtrange, that no oracle could have found belief if any had foretold it. Almoſt ſix hundred years were ſpent, ſince the *Dorians*, under the poſterity of *Hercules*, had ſeized upon *Laconia*, in all which time, the ſound of an enemy's trumpet was not heard in that country: ten years were not fully paſt ſince all *Greece* was at the devotion of the *Spartans*: but now the region which neither *Xerxes* with his huge army could once look upon, nor the mighty forces of *Athens*, and other enemy-ſtates had dared to ſet foot on, ſaving by ſtealth, was all on a light fire, the very ſmoak whereof the women of *Sparta* were aſhamed to behold. All which indignity notwithſtanding, the *Lacedemonians* did not iſſue out of *Sparta* to fight, but ſought how to preſerve the town, ſetting at liberty as many of their *Heilotes* or ſlaves, as were willing to bear arms in defence of the ſtate, and ſomewhat pitifully entreated the *Athenians* to give them ſuccour. From *Corinth* and ſome towns of *Peloponneſus* they received ſpeedy aſſiſtance; the *Athenians* came forward more ſlowly, ſo that *Epaminondas* returned without battel, having rebuilt the city of *Meſſene*, and peopled it anew by calling home the ancient inhabitants, whom the *Lacedemonians* many ages before had chaſed away into other countries, poſſeſſing their territories themſelves.

SECT. III.

The compoſition between Athens *and* Sparta *for command in war againſt the* Thebans; *who again invade and ſpoil* Peloponneſus. *The unfortunate preſumption of the* Arcadians.

THIS journey therefore utterly defaced the reputation of the *Spartans*, in ſuch wiſe that they did no longer demand the conduct of the army which was to be raiſed, nor any manner of precedence: but ſending embaſſadors from *Sparta*, and from all the cities which held league with it, unto *Athens*, they offered to yield the admiralty to the *Athenians*, requeſting that they themſelves might be generals by land. This had been a compoſition well agreeing with the ſituation and quality of theſe two cities; but it was rejected, becauſe the mariners and others that were to be employed at ſea, were men of no mark or eſtimation, in regard of thoſe companies of horſe and foot whereof the land army was compounded, who being all gentlemen or citizens of *Athens* were to have ſerved under the *Lacedemonians*. Wherefore it was agreed that the authority ſhould be divided by time, the *Athenians* ruling five days, the *Lacedemonians* other five, and ſo ſucceſſively that each of them ſhould have command of all, both by land and ſea. It is manifeſt, that in this concluſion vain ambition was more regarded than the common profit, which muſt of neceſſity be very ſlowly advanced, where conſultation, reſolution, and performance are ſo often to change hands. This appeared by a ſecond invaſion of *Peloponneſus*, wherein the *Thebans* found their enemies ſo unable to impeach them, that having fortified *Iſthmus* from ſea to ſea, as in former times they had done againſt *Xerxes*, they were driven out of their ſtrength by *Epaminondas*, who foraged the country without reſiſtance. But as the articles of this league between *Athens* and *Sparta* did, by dividing the conduct in ſuch manner, diſable the ſociety, and make it inſufficient to thoſe ends for which it was concluded; ſo the example of it wrought their good, by filling the enemies heads with the like vanity. For the *Arcadians* conſidering their own numbers which they brought into the field, and having found by many tryals that their people were not inferior to others in ſtrength of body, in courage, or in good ſoldierſhip, thought it good reaſon that they ſhould in like manner ſhare the government with their friends the *Thebans*; and not always continue followers of others, by encreaſing whoſe greatneſs, they ſhould ſtrengthen their own yoke. Hereupon they began to demean themſelves very inſolently, whereby they grew hateful to their neighbours, and ſuſpected of the *Thebans* in an ill time. For a motion of general peace having been made (which took not effect, becauſe the city of *Meſſene* was not abandoned to the *Lacedemonians*) the next enterpriſe of the *Spartans* and their friends was upon theſe *Arcadians*, who relying too much upon their own worth, were overthrown in a great battel, their calamity being as pleaſing to their confederates as to their enemies.

SECT. IV.

The great growth of the Theban *eſtate. Embaſſages of the* Greeks *to the* Perſian; *with the reaſons why he moſt favoured the* Thebans. *Troubles in the* Perſian *empire. The fruitleſs iſſue of the embaſſages.*

THE *Thebans* eſpecially rejoiced at the *Arcadians* misfortune, conſidering, that, without their aid, the ſucceſs of all enterpriſes proved ſo ill; whereas they themſelves had by their own power accompliſhed very well whatſoever they took in hand, and were become not only victorious over the *Lacedemonians*, but patrons over the *Theſſalians*, and moderators of the great quarrels that had riſen in *Macedonia*, where compounding the differences about that kingdom, as pleaſed them beſt, they carried *Philip* the ſon of *Amyntas*, and father of *Alexander* the Great, as an hoſtage unto *Thebes*. Having therefore obtained ſuch reputation that little ſeemed wanting to make them abſolute commanders of all *Greece*, they ſought means of alliance with the *Perſian* king, to whom they ſent embaſſador the great and famous captain *Pelopidas*, whoſe reputation drew *Artaxerxes* to grant unto the *Thebans* all that they deſired; whereof two eſpecial points were, that *Meſſene* ſhould remain free from the *Lacedemonians*, and that the *Athenians* ſhould forbear to ſend their ſhips of war to ſea; only the latter of theſe two was ſomewhat qualified with reference to farther advice. The other ſtates of *Greece* did alſo ſend their embaſſadors at the ſame time, of whom few or none received much contentment. For the king having found by long experience, how far it concerned him to maintain a ſure party in *Greece*, did upon many weighty conſiderations reſolve

ſolve to bind the *Thebans* firmly unto him; juſtly expecting, that their greatneſs ſhould be on that ſide his own ſecurity. The *Athenians* had been ancient enemies to his crown, and, having turn'd the profit of their victories upon the *Perſian*, to the purchaſe of a great eſtate in *Greece*, maintain'd their ſigniory in ſuch puiſſant manner, that (ſundry grievous misfortunes notwithſtanding) they had endur'd a terrible war, wherein the *Lacedemonians* being follow'd by moſt of the *Greeks*, and ſupply'd with treaſure, and all ſorts of aid, by *Darius Nothus*, were not able to vanquiſh them, till their own indiſcretion brought them on their knees. The *Lacedemonians* being victorious over *Athens*, had no ſooner eſtabliſhed their dominion at home, than they undertook the conqueſt of *Aſia*, from which, tho' by the commotion raiſed in *Greece* with *Perſian* gold, they were called back; yet having renew'd their power, and ſettled things in *Greece*, it was not unlikely that they ſhould upon the next advantage have purſued the ſame enterpriſe, had not they been impeached by this *Theban* war. But the *Thebans* contrariwiſe had always diſcovered a good affection to the crown of *Perſia*. They had ſided with *Xerxes*, in his invaſion of *Greece*; with *Darius* and the *Lacedemonians*, againſt *Athens*; and finally, having offer'd much contumely to *Ageſilaus*, when he put to ſea, they drew him home by making war on the confederates of *Sparta*. Beſides all theſe their good deſervings, they were no ſea-men, and therefore unlikely to look abroad, whereunto if perchance they ſhould have any deſire, yet were they diſabled by the want of good haven towns, which they could not ſeize upon without open breach of that peace, whereof they intended to become the executors, giving liberty to all cities that had at any time been free. Wherefore *Artaxerxes* did wholly condeſcend unto the requeſts of *Pelopidas*, as far forth as he might without giving open defiance to the reſt of *Greece*; and by that means he purchaſed his own quiet, being never afterwards moleſted by that nation in the lower *Aſia*. The ill means, which the *Greeks* had to diſturb *Artaxerxes*, was very beneficial to the eſtate of *Perſia* ſhortly after theſe times, in that great rebellion of all the maritime provinces. For had then the affairs of *Greece* been ſo compoſed, that any one city might, without impeachment of the reſt, have tranſported an army to aſſiſt the revolting *ſatrapæ*, or viceroys of *Caria*, *Phrygia*, *Lydia*, *Myſia*, *Lycia*, *Piſidia*, *Pamphilia*, *Cilicia*, *Syria*, and *Phenicia*, human reaſon can hardly find the means, by which the empire could have been preſerv'd from that ruin, which the divine council had defer'd unto the days of *Alexander*. But this great conſpiracy of ſo many large and wealthy provinces, wanting a firm body of good and hardy ſoldiers, was in ſhort ſpace diſcuſs'd and vaniſh'd like a miſt, without effect: theſe effeminate *Aſiatics*, wearied quickly with the travels and dangers incident to war, forſaking the common cauſe, and each man ſtriving to be the firſt that, by treaſon to his company, ſhould both redeem the former treaſon to his prince, and purchaſe withal his own promotion with increaſe of riches. Of this commotion, which in courſe of time follow'd ſome actions not as yet related, I have rather choſen to make ſhort mention in this place, than hereafter to interrupt the narration of things more important; but for that it was likely a ſudden ſtorm, raſhly commenced, idly follow'd, and fooliſhly laid down, having made a great noiſe without effect, and having ſmall reference to any other action regardable; as alſo, becauſe in the whole reign of *Artaxerxes*, from the war of *Cyrus* to the invaſion of *Egypt*, I find nothing (this inſurrection, and a fruitleſs journey againſt the *Caduſians* excepted) worthy of any mention, much leſs of digreſſion from the courſe of the buſineſs in *Greece*. All, or the moſt of his time, paſſed away ſo quietly, that he enjoy'd the pleaſures which an empire ſo great and wealthy could afford unto ſo abſolute a lord, with little diſturbance. The troubles which he found were only or chiefly domeſtical; growing out of the hatred which *Paryſatis*, the queen-mother, bare unto his wife *Statira*, and to ſuch as had been the greateſt enemies to her ſon *Cyrus*, or gloried in his death: upon whom, when by poiſon and miſchievous practices ſhe had ſatisfy'd her feminine appetite of revenge, thenceforth ſhe wholly apply'd herſelf to the king's diſpoſition, cheriſhing in him the leud deſire of marrying his own daughter, and filling him with the perſuaſion, which princes, not endued with an eſpecial grace, do readily entertain, That his own will was the ſupreme law of his ſubject, and the rule by which all things were to be meaſured, and adjudg'd to be good or evil. In this imaginary happineſs *Pelopidas*, and the other embaſſadors of *Greece*, both found and left him; but left him by ſo much more aſſured than they found him, by how much the concluſion of his treaty with them, being altogether to his own advantage, did ſeem to promiſe, if not the perpetuity, a long endurance of the ſame felicity to him and his; or (at the leaſt) a full ſecurity of danger from *Greece*, whence only could any danger be fear'd. But ſuch foundations of eternity laid by mortal men in this tranſitory world, like the tower of *Babel*, are either ſhaken from heaven, or made vain and unprofitable, ere the frame can be raiſed to full height, by confuſion of tongues among the builders. Hereof was found a good example in the *Thebans*, and other eſtates of *Greece*, that had ſent embaſſadors to the *Perſian*. For whereas it had been concluded, that all towns, as well the little as the great, ſhould be ſet at liberty, and the *Thebans* made protectors of this common peace, who thereby ſhould become the judges of all controverſies that might ariſe, and leaders in war of all that would enter into this confederacy; the king's letters being ſolemnly publiſh'd at *Thebes*, in the preſence of embaſſadors, drawn thither from all parts of *Greece*; when an oath was required for obſervation of the form of peace therein ſet down, a dilatory anſwer was made by the embaſſadors, who ſaid that they were ſent to hear the articles, not to ſwear unto them. Hereby the *Thebans* were driven to ſend unto each of the cities to require the oath, but in vain. For when the *Corinthians* had boldly refuſed it, ſaying, That they did not need it; others took courage by their example to do the like, diſappointing the *Thebans* of their glorious hopes, to whom this negotiation with *Artaxerxes* gave neither addition nor confirmation of greatneſs, but left them as it found them, to rely upon their own ſwords.

SECT. V.

How all Greece *was divided, between the* Athenians *and* Lacedemonians *on the one ſide, and* Thebans *on the other. Of the great tumults riſing in* Arcadia.

THE condition of things in *Greece* at that time did ſtand thus. *Athens* and *Sparta*, which in former times had commanded all that nation, and each upon envy of the other's greatneſs drawn all their followers into a cruel inteſtine war, by which the whole country, and eſpecially the eſtate of theſe

two

two cities, was brought very low, did now conjoin their forces againſt the *Thebans*, who ſought to make themſelves lords of all. The *Eleans*, *Corinthians*, and *Achaians*, followed the party of theſe ancient governing cities; either for the old reputation of them, and benefits received; or in diſlike of thoſe who by ſtrong hand were ready to become rulers, to which authority they could not ſuddenly aſpire without ſome injury and much envy. The city of *Thebes* abounding with men whom neceſſity had made warlike, and many victories in few years had filled with great ſpirits, and being ſo mighty in dependants, that ſhe had reduced all the continent of *Greece* without *Peloponneſus* (the region of *Attica*, and very little part beſide excepted) under ſuch acknowledgment, as wanted not much of mere vaſſalage, did hope to bring all *Peloponneſus* to the like obedience, wherein already ſhe had ſet good footing by her conjunction with the ſtates of *Argos*, and of *Arcadia*. The *Argives* had been always bad neighbours to the *Spartans*, to whom they thought themſelves in ancient nobility ſuperiors; but were far under them in valour, having been often beaten out of the field by them, and put in danger of loſing all; which cauſed them to ſuſpect and envy nothing more than the greatneſs and honour of *Sparta*; taking truce with her when ſhe was at reſt, and had leiſure to bend her whole force againſt them; but firmly joining with her enemies whenſoever they found her entangled in a difficult war. As the *Argives* were, in hatred of *Sparta*, ſure friends of *Thebes*, ſo the *Arcadians*, tranſported with a great opinion of their own worthineſs, had formerly renounced and provoked againſt them their old confederates and leaders, the *Lacedemonians*, and were now become very doubtful adherents to the *Thebans*. In which regard it was thought convenient by *Epaminondas*, and the ſtate of *Thebes*, to ſend an army into *Peloponneſus*, before ſuch time as theſe wavering friends ſhould fall further off, and become either neutral, or, which was to be feared, open enemies. And ſurely great cauſe there was to ſuſpect the worſt of them, conſidering that without conſent of the *Thebans*, they had made peace with *Athens*; which was very ſtrange, and ſeemed no leſs to the *Athenians* themſelves, who holding a firm league with *Sparta* at the ſame time when the *Arcadians* treated with them, did nevertheleſs accept this new confederacy, not relinquiſhing the old, becauſe they found that, howſoever theſe *Arcadians* were enemies to the *Lacedemonians*, they ſhould hereby be drawn ſomewhat further from their alliance with *Thebes*, which without them was unlikely to invade *Peloponneſus* with a ſtrong army. But this did rather haſten, than by any means ſtay, the coming of *Epaminondas*; who finding the way ſomewhat more clear for him (becauſe the city of *Corinth*, which lay upon the iſthmus, and had been adverſe to *Thebes*, was now, by miſeries of this grievous war, driven to become neutral) took occaſion hereby, and by ſome diſorders among the *Arcadians*, to viſit *Peloponneſus* with an army, conſiſting of all the power of *Thebes*. A great tumult had riſen in *Arcadia* about conſecrated money, which many principal men among them had laid hands on, under pretence of employing it to publick uſes. In compounding the differences grown upon this occaſion, ſuch as had leaſt will to render account of the money which had come into their hands, procured the captain of ſome *Theban* ſoldiers, lying in *Tegea*, to take priſoners many of their countrymen, as people deſirous of innovation. This was done: but the uproar thereby cauſed was ſo great, that the priſoners were forthwith enlarged, and the *Arcadians*, who had in great numbers taken arms, with much ado ſcarce pacified. When complaint of the captains proceedings came to *Thebes*, *Epaminondas* turned all the blame upon them who had made the peace with *Athens*, letting them know, that he would be ſhortly among them, to judge of their fidelity, by the aſſiſtance which they ſhould give him in that war which he intended to make in *Peloponneſus*. Theſe lordly words did greatly amaze the *Arcadians*; who needing not the aid of ſo mighty a power as he drew along with him, did vehemently ſuſpect that great preparation to be made againſt themſelves. Hereupon ſuch of them, as had before ſought means to ſettle the affairs of their country, by drawing things to ſome good concluſion of peace, did now forthwith ſend to *Athens* for help; and withal diſpatched ſome of the principal among them as embaſſadors to *Sparta*, by whom they offered themſelves to the common defence of *Peloponneſus*, now ready to be invaded. This embaſſage brought much comfort to the *Lacedemonians*, who feared nothing more than the coming of *Epaminondas*, againſt whom they well knew that all their forces, and beſt proviſions, would be no more than very hardly ſufficient. Forbearing therefore to diſpute about prerogatives, they (who had been accuſtomed unto ſuch a ſupremacy, as they would in no wiſe communicate with the powerful city of *Athens*, till other hope of ſecuring their own eſtate could not be thought upon) did now very gently yield to the *Arcadians*, that the command of the army in chief ſhould be given, for the time, to that city, in whoſe territory it lay.

SECT. VI.

A terrible invaſion of Peloponneſus *by* Epaminondas.

CErtain it is, that the condition of things did at that time require a very firm conſent, and uniform care of the common ſafety. For beſides the great forces raiſed out of the other parts of *Greece*, the *Argives* and *Meſſenians*, prepared with all their ſtrength to join with *Epaminondas*; who having lain a while at *Nemea*, to intercept the *Athenians*, received there intelligence, that the army coming from *Athens* would paſs by ſea; whereupon he diſlodged, and came to *Tegea*, which city, and the moſt of all *Arcadia* beſides, forthwith declared themſelves his. The common opinion was, that the firſt attempt of the *Thebans*, would be upon ſuch of the *Arcadians* as had revolted; which cauſed the *Lacedemonian* captains to fortify *Mantinea* with all diligence, and to ſend for *Ageſilaus* to *Sparta*, that he bringing with him all that ſmall force of able men, which remained in the town, they might be ſtrong enough to abide *Epaminondas* there. But *Epaminondas* held ſo good eſpial upon his enemies, that had not an unknown fellow brought haſty advertiſement of his purpoſe to *Ageſilaus*, who was then well onward in the way to *Mantinea*, the city of *Sparta* had ſuddenly been taken. For thither with all ſpeed and ſecrecy did the *Thebans* march, who had ſurely carried the city, notwithſtanding any defence that could have been made by that handful of men remaining within it; but that *Ageſilaus* in all-flying haſte got into it with his companies, whom the army of his confederates followed thither to the reſcue as faſt as it was able. The arrival of the *Lacedemonians* and their friends, as it cut off all hope from *Epaminondas* of taking *Sparta*, ſo it preſented him with a fair advantage upon *Mantinea*. It was the time of harveſt, which made

made it very likely that the *Mantineans*, finding the war to be carried from their walls into another quarter, would uſe the commodity of that vacation, by fetching in their corn, and turning out their cattel into their fields, whilſt no enemy was near that might impeach them. Wherefore he turned away from *Sparta* to *Mantinea*, ſending his horſemen before him, to ſeize upon all that might be found without the city. The *Mantineans* (according to the expectation of *Epaminondas*) were ſcattered abroad in the country; far more intent upon their harveſt-buſineſs, than upon the war, whereof they were ſecure, as thinking themſelves out of diſtance. By which preſumption it fell out, that great numbers of them, and all their cattel, being unable to recover the town, were in a deſperate caſe; and the town it ſelf in no great likelihood of holding out, when the enemy ſhould have taken all their proviſion of victuals with ſo many of the people, as had not over-dearly been redeemed, by that city's returning to ſociety with *Thebes*. But at the ſame time, the *Athenians* coming to the ſuccour of their confederates, whom they thought to have found at *Mantinea*, were very earneſtly entreated by the citizens to reſcue their goods, and people, from the danger whereinto they were fallen, if it were poſſible by any couragious adventure to deliver thoſe who otherwiſe were given as loſt. The *Thebans* were known at that time to be the beſt ſoldiers of all the *Greeks*; and the commendation of good horſeman-ſhip had always been given to the *Theſſalians*, as excelling in that quality all other nations; yet the regard of honour ſo wrought upon the *Athenians*, that for the reputation of their city, which had entered into this war, upon no neceſſity of her own, but only in deſire of relieving her diſtreſſed friends, they iſſued forth of *Mantinea*, not abiding ſo long as to refreſh themſelves, or their horſes with meat; and giving a luſty charge upon the enemy, who as bravely received them, after a long and hot fight, they remained maſters of the field, giving by this victory a ſafe and eaſy retreat to all that were without the walls. The whole power of the *Beotians* arrived in the place ſoon after this battel, whom the *Lacedemonians* and their aſſiſtants were not far behind.

SECT. VII.

The great battel of Mantinea. *The honourable death of* Epaminondas, *with his commendation.*

EPaminondas, conſidering that his commiſſion was almoſt now expired, and that his attempts of ſurpriſing *Sparta* and *Mantinea* having failed, the impreſſion of terror, which his name had wrought in the *Peloponneſians*, would ſoon vaniſh, unleſs by ſome notable act he ſhould abate their courage in their firſt growth, and leave ſome memorable character of his expedition; reſolved to give them battel, whereby he reaſonably hoped both to ſettle the doubtful affections of his own aſſociates, and to leave the *Spartans* as weak in ſpirit and ability as he found them, if not wholly to bring them into ſubjection. Having therefore warned his men to prepare for that battel, wherein victory ſhould be rewarded with lordſhip of all *Greece*; and finding the alacrity of his ſoldiers to be ſuch, as promiſed the accompliſhment of his own deſire; he made ſhew of declining the enemy, and intrenching himſelf in a place of more advantage, that ſo by taking from them all expectation of fighting that day, he might allay the heat of their valour, and afterwards ſtrike their ſenſes with amazement, when he ſhould come upon them unexpected. This opinion deceived him not: for with very much tumult, as in ſo great and ſudden a danger, the enemy ran to arms, neceſſity enforcing their reſolution, and the conſequence of that day's ſervice urging them to do as well as they might. The *Theban* army conſiſted of 30000 foot, and 3000 horſe; the *Lacedemonians* and their friends were ſhort of this number, both in horſe and foot, by a third part. The *Mantineans* (becauſe the war was in their country) ſtood in the right wing, and with them the *Lacedemonians*: the *Athenians* had the left wing, the *Acheans*, *Eleans*, and others of leſs account, filled the body of the army. The *Thebans* ſtood in the left wing of their own battel, oppoſite to the *Lacedemonians*, having by them the *Arcadians*; the *Eubeans*, *Locrians*, *Sicyonians*, *Meſſenians*, and *Theſſalians* with others, compounding the main battel; the *Argives* held the right wing, the horſemen on each part were placed in the flanks, only a troop of the *Eleans* were in rear. Before the footmen could join, the encounter of the horſe on both ſides was very rough, wherein finally the *Thebans* prevailed, notwithſtanding the valiant reſiſtance of the *Athenians*: who not yielding to the enemy either in courage or ſkill, were over-laid with numbers, and ſo beaten upon by *Theſſalian* ſlings, that they were driven to forſake the place, and leave their infantry naked. But this retreat was the leſs diſgraceful, becauſe they kept themſelves together, and did not fall back upon their own footmen; but finding the *Theban* horſe to have given them over, and withal diſcovering ſome companies of foot, which had been ſent about by *Epaminondas*, to charge their battel in the rear, they broke upon them, routed them, and hewed them all in pieces. In the mean ſeaſon the battel of the *Athenians* had not only to do with the *Argives*, but was hardly preſſed by the *Theban* horſemen, in ſuch wiſe that it began to open, and was ready to turn back, when the *Elean* ſquadron of horſe came up to the relief of it, and reſtored all on that part. With far greater violence did the *Lacedemonians* and *Thebans* meet, theſe contending for dominion, the other for the maintenance of their ancient honour; ſo that equal courage and equal loſs on both ſides made the hope and appearance of victory to either equally doubtful; unleſs perhaps the *Lacedemonians* being very firm abiders, might ſeem the more likely to prevail, as having borne the firſt brunt and fury of the onſet, which was not hitherto remitted; and being framed by diſcipline, as it were by nature, to excel in patience, whereof the *Thebans*, by practice of a few years, cannot be thought to have gotten a habit ſo ſure and general. But *Epaminondas* perceiving the obſtinate ſtiffneſs of the enemies to be ſuch, as neither the bad ſucceſs of their own horſe, nor all the force of the *Beotian* army, could abate ſo far, as to make them give one foot of ground; taking a choice company of the moſt able men, whom he caſt into the form of a wedge, or diamond, by the advantage of that figure againſt a ſquadron, and by his own exceeding virtue, accompanied with the great ſtrength and reſolution of them which followed him, did open their ranks, and cleave the whole battel in deſpight of all reſiſtance. Thus was the honour of that day won by the *Thebans*, who may juſtly be ſaid to have carried the victory, ſeeing that they remained maſters of the ground whereon the battel was fought, having driven the enemy to lodge farther off. For that which was alledged by the *Athenians*, as a token that the victory was partly theirs, the ſlaughter of thoſe mercenaries upon whom they lighted by chance in their own flight, finding them behind their army, and

and the retaining of their dead bodies; it was a ceremony regardable only among the *Greeks*, and ſerved merely for oſtentation, ſhewing that by the fight they had obtained ſomewhat, which the enemy could not get from them otherwiſe than by requeſt. But the *Thebans* arrived at the general immediate end of battel; none daring to abide them in the field: whereof a manifeſt confeſſion is expreſſed from them, who forſake the place which they had choſen or accepted, as indifferent for tryal of their ability and proweſs. This was the laſt work of the incomparable virtue of *Epaminondas*, who being in the head of that warlike troop of men, which broke the *Lacedemonian* ſquadron, and forced it to give back in diſarray, was furiouſly charged on the ſudden by a deſperate company of the *Spartans*, who all at once threw their darts at him alone; whereby receiving many wounds, he nevertheleſs with a ſingular courage maintained the fight, uſing againſt the enemies many of their darts, which he drew out of his own body; till at length by a *Spartan*, called *Anticrates*, he received ſo violent a ſtroke with a dart, that the wood of it broke, leaving the iron and a piece of the trunchion in his breaſt. Hereupon he ſunk down, and was ſoon conveyed out of the fight by his friends; having by his fall ſomewhat animated the *Spartans* (who fain would have got his body) but much more enflamed with revengeful indignation, the *Thebans*, who raging at this heavy miſchance, did with great ſlaughter compel their diſordered enemies to leave the field; though long they followed not the chaſe, being wearied more with the ſadneſs of this diſaſter, than with all the travel of the day. *Epaminondas* being brought into his tent, was told by the phyſicians, that when the head of the dart ſhould be drawn out of his body, he muſt needs die. Hearing this, he called for his ſhield, which to have loſt was held a great diſhonour: it was brought unto him. He bad them tell him which part had the victory, anſwer was made, that the *Beotians* had won the field. Then ſaid he, it is fair time for me to die; and withal ſent for *Iolidas* and *Diophantes*, two principal men of war that were both ſlain; which being told him, he adviſed the *Thebans* to make peace, whilſt with advantage they might, for that they had none leſt that was able to diſcharge the office of a general. Herewithal he willed that the head of the weapon ſhould be drawn out of his body; comforting his friends that lamented his death, and want of iſſue, by telling them that the victories of *Leuctra* and *Mantinea* were two fair daughters, in whom his memory ſhould live.

So died *Epaminondas*, the worthieſt man that ever was bred in that nation of *Greece*, and hardly to be matched in any age or country: for he equalled all others in the ſeveral virtues, which in each of them were ſingular. His juſtice, and ſincerity, his temperance, wiſdom, and high magnanimity, were no way inferior to his military virtue; in every part whereof he ſo excelled, that he could not properly be called a wary, a valiant, a politick, a bountiful or an induſtrious, and a provident captain; all theſe titles, and many other, being due unto him, which with his notable diſcipline, and good conduct, made a perfect compoſition of an heroick general. Neither was his private converſation unanſwerable to thoſe high parts, which gave him praiſe abroad. For he was grave, and yet very affable and courteous; reſolute in publick buſineſs, but in his own particular eaſy, and of much mildneſs; a lover of his people, bearing with mens infirmities, witty and pleaſant in ſpeech, far from inſolence, maſter of his own affections, and furniſhed with all qualities that might win and keep love. To theſe graces were added great ability of body, much eloquence and very deep knowledge in all parts of philoſophy and learning, wherewith his mind being enlightened, reſted not in the ſweetneſs of contemplation, but broke forth into ſuch effects as gave unto *Thebes* which had evermore been an underling, a dreadful reputation among all people adjoining, and the higheſt command in *Greece*.

SECT. VIII.

Of the peace concluded in Greece *after the battel of* Mantinea. *The voyage of* Ageſilaus *into* Egypt. *His death and qualities; with an examination of the compariſon made between him and* Pompey *the* Roman.

THIS battel of *Mantinea* was the greateſt that ever had been fought in that country, between the naturals, and the laſt. For at *Marathon* and *Platea*, the populous armies of the barbarous nations gave rather a great fame, than a hard tryal to the *Grecian* valour; neither were the practice of arms and art military ſo perfect in the beginnings of the *Peloponneſian* war, as long continuance and daily exerciſe had now made them. The times following produced no actions of worth or moment, thoſe excepted which were undertaken againſt foreign enemies, proving for the moſt part unfortunate. But in this laſt fight, all *Greece* was intereſſed, which never had more able ſoldiers, and brave commanders, nor ever contended for victory with greater care of the ſucceſs, or more obſtinate reſolution. All which notwithſtanding, the iſſue being ſuch as hath been related, it was found beſt for every particular eſtate, that a general peace ſhould be eſtabliſhed, every one retaining what he preſently had, and none being forced to depend upon another. The *Meſſenians* were by name compriſed in this new league, which cauſed the *Lacedemonians* not to enter into it. Their ſtanding out hindered not the reſt from proceeding to concluſion; conſidering that *Sparta* was now too weak to offend her neighbours, and therefore might well be allowed to ſhew that anger in ceremonies which had no power to declare it ſelf in execution. This peace, as it gave ſome breath and refreſhing to all the country, ſo to the cities of *Athens* and *Sparta* it afforded leiſure to ſeek after wealth by foreign employment in *Egypt*, whither *Ageſilaus* was ſent with ſome ſmall forces to aſſiſt, or indeed, as a mercenary, to ſerve under *Tachos* king of *Egypt*, in his war upon *Syria*. *Chabrias* the *Athenian*, who had before commanded under *Acoris* king of *Egypt*, went now as a voluntary, with ſuch forces as he could raiſe by entreaty, and offer of good pay, to the ſame ſervice. Theſe *Egyptian* kings deſcended from *Amyrtæus* of *Sais*, who rebelled againſt *Darius Nothus*, having retained the country notwithſtanding all inteſtine diſſenſions and foreign invaſions, during three generations of their own race, were ſo well acquainted with the valour of the *Greeks*, that by their help (eaſily procured with gold) they conceived great hope, not only to aſſure themſelves, but to become lords of the provinces adjoyning, which were held by the *Perſian*. What the iſſue of this great enterpriſe might have been, had it not fallen by domeſtick rebellion, it is uncertain. But very likely it is, that the rebellion it ſelf had ſoon come to nothing, if *Ageſilaus* had not proved a falſe traytor, joyning with *Nectanebus*, who roſe againſt his prince, and helping the rebel with that army which the money of *Tachos* had waged. This falſhood *Ageſilaus* excuſed,

ſed, as tending to the good of his own country; though it ſeems rather, that he grudged becauſe the king took upon himſelf the conduct of the army, uſing his ſervice only as lieutenant, who had made full account of being appointed the general. Howſoever it came to paſs, *Tachos* being ſhamefully betrayed by them, in whom he had repoſed his chief confidence, fled unto the *Perſian*, who upon his ſubmiſſion gave him gentle entertainment; and *Nectanebus* (who ſeems to have been the nephew of *Tachos*) reigned in his ſtead. At the ſame time the citizens of *Mendes* had ſet up another king, to whom all, or moſt of the *Egyptians* yielded their obedience. But *Ageſilaus* fighting with him in places of advantage, prevailed ſo far, that he left *Nectanebus* in quiet poſſeſſion of the kingdom; who in recompenſe of his treaſon to the former king *Tachos*, and good ſervice done to himſelf rewarded him with two hundred and thirty talents of ſilver, with which booty ſailing homewards, he died by the way. He was a prince very temperate and valiant, and a good leader in war; free from covetouſneſs, and not reproached with any blemiſh of luſt; which praiſes are the leſs admirable in him, for that the diſcipline of *Sparta* was ſuch as did endue every one of the citizens (not carried away by the violent ſtream of an ill nature) with all, or the chief, of theſe good qualities. He was nevertheleſs very arrogant, perverſe, unjuſt, and vain-glorious, meaſuring all things by his own will, and obſtinately proſecuting thoſe courſes whoſe ends were beyond hope. The expedition of *Xenophon* had filled him with an opinion, that by his hand the empire of *Perſia* ſhould be overthrown; with which conceit being tranſported, and finding his proceedings interrupted by the *Thebans*, and their allies, he did ever after bear ſuch hatred unto *Thebes*, as compelled that eſtate by mere neceſſity to grow warlike, and able, to the utter diſhonour of *Sparta*, and the irreparable loſs of all her former greatneſs. The commendations given to him by *Xenophon* his good friend, have cauſed *Plutarch* to lay his name in the balance againſt *Pompey* the Great; whoſe actions (the ſolemn gravity of carriage excepted) are very diſproportionable. Yet we may truly ſay, That as *Pompey* made great wars under ſundry climates, and in all the provinces of the *Roman* empire, exceeding in the multitude of employments all that were before him; ſo *Ageſilaus* had at one time or other ſome quarrel with every town in *Greece*; had made a war in *Aſia*, and medled in the buſineſs of the *Egyptians*, in which variety, he went beyond all his predeceſſors: yet not winning any countries, as *Pompey* did many, but obtaining large wages, which *Pompey* never took. Herein alſo they are very like, each of them was the laſt great captain which his nation brought forth in time of liberty, and each of them ruined the liberty of his country by his own lordly wilfulneſs. We may therefore well ſay, *Similia magis omnia quam paria*; The reſemblance was nearer than the equality. Indeed the freedom of *Rome* was loſt with *Pompey*, falling into the hands of *Cæſar*, whom he had enforced to take arms; yet the *Roman* empire ſtood, the form of government only being changed: but the liberty of *Greece*, or of *Sparta* it ſelf, was not forfeited unto the *Thebans*, whom *Ageſilaus* had compelled to enter into a victorious war; yet the ſigniory, and ancient renown of *Sparta* was preſently loſt: and the freedom of all *Greece* being wounded in this *Theban* war, and after much blood loſt, ill healed by the peace enſuing, did very ſoon upon the death of *Ageſilaus* give up the ghoſt, and the lordſhip of the whole country was ſeized by *Philip* king of *Macedon*, whoſe actions are now on foot, and more to be regarded than the contemporary paſſages of things, in any other nation.

The End of the Third Book.

THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD:

INTREATING of the

Times from the Reign of PHILIP *of* MACEDON, *to the eſtabliſhing of that Kingdom in the Race of* ANTIGONUS.

The FOURTH BOOK.

CHAP. I.

Of Philip, *the Father of* Alexander *the Great, King of* Macedon.

SECT. I.

What kings reigned in Macedon *before* Philip.

THE *Greeks*, of whom we have already made large diſcourſe, not as yet wearied with inteſtine war, nor made wiſe by their vain contention for ſuperiority, do ſtill, as in former times, continue the invaſion and vaſtation of each other.

Againſt *Xerxes*, the greateſt monarch of that part of the world, they defended their liberty with as happy ſucceſs as ever nation had, and with no leſs honour than hath ever been acquired by deeds of arms. And having had a tryal, and experience, more than fortunate, againſt thoſe nations, they ſo little regarded what might come from them, who had ſo often forfeited the reputation of their forces, as whatſoever could be ſpared from their own diſtraction at home, they tranſported over the *Helleſpont*, as ſufficient to entertain and buſy them withal.

But, as it commonly falleth out with every man of mark in the world, that they under-fall and periſh by the hands and harms which they leaſt fear; ſo fared it at this time with the *Greeks*. For of *Philip* of *Macedon* (of whom we are now to ſpeak) they had ſo little regard, as they grew even then more violent in devouring each other, when the faſt growing greatneſs of ſuch a neighbour-king ſhould, in regard of their own ſafeties, have ſerved them for a ſtrong argument of union and accord. But the glory of their *Perſian* victories, wherewith they

they were pamper'd and made proud, taught them to neglect all nations but themſelves, and the rather to value at little the power and purpoſes of the *Macedonians*, becauſe thoſe kings and ſtates, which ſat nearer them than they did, had in the time of *Amyntas*, the father of *Philip*, ſo much weakened them, and won upon them, that they were not (as the *Grecians* perſwaded themſelves) in any one age, likely to recover their own, much leſs to work any wonders againſt their borderers. And indeed it was not in their philoſophy to conſider, that all great alterations are ſtorm-like, ſudden and violent; and that it is then over-late to repair the decayed and broken banks, when great rivers are once ſwollen, faſt running, and inraged. No, the *Greeks* did rather imploy themſelves, in breaking down thoſe defences which ſtood between them and this inundation, than ſeek to rampare and re-enforce their own fields, which by the level of reaſon they might have found to have lain under it. It was therefore well concluded by *Oroſius*, [a]*Græciæ civitates dum imperare ſingulæ cupiunt, imperium omnes perdiderunt*; The cities of *Greece* loſt their command, by ſtriving each of them to command all.

The kingdom of *Macedon*, ſo called of *Macedon*, the ſon of *Oſiris*, or, as other authors affirm, of *Jupiter* and *Ethra*, is the next region towards the north which bordereth *Greece*; it hath to the eaſt, the *Egean* ſea; it is bounded on the north and north-weſt, by the *Thracians* and *Illyrians*; and on the ſouth and ſouth-weſt, by *Theſſaly* and *Epirus*.

Their kings were of the family of *Temenus*, of the race of *Hercules*, and by nation *Argives*; who are liſted as followeth. About ſome ſix years after the tranſlation of the *Aſſyrian* empire, *Arbaces* then governing *Media*, *Caranus* of *Argos*, commanded by an oracle to lead a colony into *Macedon*, departed thence with many people, and as he was marching through that country, the weather being rainy and tempeſtuous, he eſpied a great herd of goats, which fled the ſtorm as faſt as they could, haſting them to their known place of covert. Whereupon *Caranus* calling to mind, that he had alſo by [b] another oracle been directed to follow the firſt troop of beaſts, that ſhould either lead him or fly before him, he purſued theſe goats to the gates of *Edeſſa*, and being undiſcovered by the inhabitants, by reaſon of the darkneſs of the air, he enter'd their city without reſiſtance, and poſſeſs'd it. [c] Soon after this, by the overthrow of *Ciſſeus*, *Caranus* became lord of the reſt of *Macedon*, and held it eight and twenty years. *Cenus* ſucceeded *Caranus*, and reigned twelve years. *Tyrimas* followed *Cenus*, and ruled eight and twenty years.

Perdiccas the firſt, the ſon of *Tyrimas*, governed one and fifty years: a prince, for his great valour, and many other virtues, much renowned. [d]*Solinus*, *Pliny*, *Juſtin*, *Euſebius*, *Theophilus*, *Antiochenus*, and others affirm, that he appointed a place of burial for himſelf, and for all the kings of *Macedon* his ſucceſſors, at *Egæ*; aſſuring them that the kingdom ſhould ſo long continue in his line and race, as they continued to lay up their bodies in that ſepulchre; wherein it is ſaid, that becauſe *Alexander* the great failed, therefore the poſterity of the *Temenidæ* failed in him: a thing rather deviſed after the effect, as I conceive, than foretold by *Perdiccas*.

[e]*Argeus* ſucceeded unto *Perdiccas*, and ruled eight and twenty years.

Philip the firſt, his ſucceſſor, reigned twenty eight years.

Europus followed *Philip*, and governed ſix and twenty years: in whoſe infancy the *Illyrians* invaded *Macedon*, and having obtained a great victory, they purſued the ſame to the great danger of that ſtate. Whereupon the *Macedonians* gathering new forces, and reſolving either to recover their former loſs, or to loſe at once both their kingdom and their king, they carried him with them in his cradle into the field, and returned victorious; for they were either confident that their nation could not be beaten (their king being preſent) or rather they perſwaded themſelves that there was no man ſo void of honour and compaſſion, as to [f] abandon their natural lord, being an infant, and no way (but by the hands of his ſervants) able to defend himſelf from deſtruction. The like is reported by *Aimonius*, of *Clotarus* the ſon of *Fredegunda*.

Alcetas ſucceeded *Europus*, and ruled nine and twenty years.

Amyntas the firſt ſucceeded *Alcetas*, and reigned fifty years; he lived at ſuch time as *Darius Hyſtaſpes*, after his unproſperous return out of *Scythia*, ſent *Magabazus* with an army into *Europe*, who, in *Xerxes*'s name required *Amyntas* to acknowledge him for his ſupreme lord, by yielding unto him earth and water. But his embaſſadors, as you have heard before, were, for their inſolent behaviour towards the [g]*Macedonian* ladies, ſlain by the direction of *Alexander*, who was the ſon of *Amyntas* and his ſucceſſor.

Alexander ſurnamed the rich, the ſon of *Amyntas*, governed *Macedon* three and forty years. He did not only appeaſe the wrath of *Magabazus*, for the ſlaughter of the *Perſian* embaſſadors, by giving *Gygea* his ſiſter, to *Bubares* of the blood of *Perſia*, but by that match he grew ſo great in *Xerxes*'s grace, as he obtained all that region between the mountains of *Olympus* and *Hemus*, to be united to the kingdom of *Macedon*. Yet could not theſe benefits buy his affection from the *Greeks*. For *Xerxes* being returned into *Aſia*, and *Mardonius* made general of the *Perſian* army, [h]*Alexander* acquainted the *Greeks* with all his intents and purpoſes againſt them. He had three ſons, *Perdiccas*, *Alcetas*, and *Philip*.

Perdiccas the ſecond, the ſon of *Alexander*, lived in the time of the *Peloponneſian* war, and reigned in all eight and twenty years. The wars which he made were not much remarkable: the ſtory of them is found here and there by pieces, in *Thucydides*'s firſt ſix books. He left behind him two ſons; *Perdiccas*, who was very young, and *Archelaus*, who was baſe born.

Perdiccas the third, being delivered to the cuſtody and care of *Archelaus*, was at ſeven years of age caſt into a well and drowned by his falſe guardian: who excuſing this fact to *Cleopatra* the mother of the young king, ſaid, that the child in following a gooſe haſtily fell thereinto by miſadventure. But *Archelaus* ſtayed not here: for having thus diſpatched his brother, he ſlew both his uncle *Alcetas*, the ſon of *Alexander* the rich, and *Alexander* the ſon of this *Alcetas*, his couſin-german, and enjoyed the kingdom of *Macedon* himſelf four and twenty years.

This [i]*Archelaus*, of whom both *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* make mention, though he made himſelf king

[a] Oroſius, l. 3. c. 12. [b] Paul. Dion. Chuſ. Theop. Antioſ. 6. [c] Euſeb. in Chron. [d] Sol. c. 14. Plin. l. 4. c. 10. [e] Euſeb. in Chron. [f] Euſeb. Juſtin. Ammian. The. Ant. &c. Aimon. l. 3. c. 82. [g] Her. Euſeb. Juſtin. &c. [h] Her. l. 8. Plut. Euſeb. Juſt. &c. [i] Plat. in Gorg. Ariſt. in Pol. 5.

by wicked murder, yet he performed many things greatly to the profit of his nation. It is ſaid, That he ſought by all means to draw *Socrates* unto him, and that he greatly loved and honoured *Euripides* the *Tragedian*. He had two ſons, *Archelaus* and *Oreſtes*.

Archelaus the ſecond ſucceeded his father, and having reigned ſeven years, he was ſlain in hunting, either by chance or of purpoſe, by *Cratæus*.

Oreſtes his younger ſon was committed to the education of *Æropus*, of the royal blood of *Macedon*, and had the ſame meaſure which *Archelaus* had meaſured to his pupil; for *Æropus* murdered him and uſurped the kingdom, which he held ſome ſix years: the ſame who denied paſſage to *Ageſilaus* king of *Sparta*, who deſired after his return from the *Aſian* expedition, to paſs by the way of *Macedon* into *Greece*.

[a] This uſurper left three ſons, *Pauſanias*, *Argæus*, and *Alexander*. *Pauſanias* ſucceeded his father *Æropus*, and having reigned one year, he was driven out by *Amyntas* the ſon of *Philip*, the ſon of the firſt *Perdiccas*, the ſon of *Alexander* the rich; which *Philip* was then preſerved, when *Archelaus* the baſtard ſlew his brother *Perdiccas*, his uncle *Acetas*, and his ſon *Alexander*. This *Amyntas* reigned (tho' very unquietly) 24 years; for he was not only infeſted by *Pauſanias*, aſſiſted by the *Thracians*, and by his brother *Argæus*; incouraged by the *Illyrians*; and by the ſaid *Argæus*, for two years diſpoſſeſs'd of *Macedon*: but on the other ſide, the *Olynthians*, his neighbours near the *Ægean* Sea, made themſelves for a while maſters of *Pella*, the chief city of *Macedon*.

Amyntas the ſecond had by his wife *Eurydice* the *Illyrian*, three ſons; *Alexander* the ſecond, *Perdiccas* the third, and *Philip* the ſecond, father of *Alexander* the great; and one daughter called *Euryone* or *Exione*: he had alſo by his ſecond wife *Gygea*, three ſons; *Archelaus*, *Argæus*, and *Menelaus*, afterwards ſlain by their brother *Philip*. He had more by a concubine, *Ptolemy*, ſurnamed *Alorites*, of the city *Alorus*, wherein he was born.

Alexander the ſecond reigned not much above one year, in which time he was invaded by *Pauſanias*, the ſon of *Æropus*, but defended by *Iphicrates* the *Athenian*, while he was at that time about *Amphipolis*. He was alſo conſtrained (for the payment of a great ſum of money) to leave his youngeſt brother *Philip* in hoſtage with the *Illyrians*, who had ſubjected his father *Amyntas* to the payment of tribute. After this, *Alexander* being invited by the *Alevadæ* againſt *Alexander* the tyrant of *Pheres* in *Theſſaly*, having redeemed his brother *Philip*; to draw the *Thebans* to his aſſiſtance, entred into confederacy with *Pelopidas*, being at that time in the ſame country, with whom he alſo left *Philip*, with divers others principal perſons for the gage of his promiſes to *Pelopidas*. But *Eurydice* his mother falling in love with her ſon-in-law, who had married her daughter *Euryone* or *Exione*, practiſed the death of *Alexander* her ſon, with a purpoſe to confer the kingdom on her paramour, which *Ptolemy Alorites* did put in execution: by means whereof he held *Macedon* for three years, but was ſoon after ſlain by *Perdiccas* the brother of *Alexander*. [b] *Diodore* hath it otherwiſe of *Philip*'s being made pledge; and ſaith, That *Amyntas* his father delivered him for hoſtage to the *Illyrians*, by whom he was conveyed to *Thebes*, there to be kept: others report that *Philip* (while his father was yet living) was firſt engaged to the *Thebans*, and delivered for hoſtage a ſecond time by *Alexander* his brother.

Perdiccas the third, after he had ſlain *Alorites* his baſe brother, governed *Macedon* five years, and was then ſlain in battel againſt the *Illyrians*, according to *Diodorus*; but [c] *Juſtin* affirmeth, that he periſhed by the practice of *Eurydice* his mother, as *Alexander* did.

SECT. II.

The beginning of Philip's *reign, and how he delivered* Macedon *from the troubles wherein he found it entangled.*

Philip the ſecond, the youngeſt ſon of *Amyntas* by *Eurydice*, having been inſtructed in all knowledge requiſite unto the government of a kingdom, in that excellent education which he had under *Epaminondas*, [d] making an eſcape from *Thebes*, returned into *Macedon*, in the firſt year of the hundred and fifth *Olympiad*, which was after the building of *Rome* three hundred fourſcore and thirteen years: and finding the many enemies and dangers wherewith the kingom was invironed, he took on him, not as king (for *Perdiccas* left a ſon, tho' but an infant) but as the protector of his nephew, and commander of the men of war. Yet his fruitful ambition ſoon overgrew his modeſty, and he was eaſily perſuaded by the people to accept both the title of king, and withal the abſolute rule of the kingdom. And to ſay the truth, the neceſſity of the ſtate of *Macedon* at that time required a king both prudent and active. For, beſides the incurſions of the *Illyrians* and *Pannonians*, the king of *Thrace* did ſet up in oppoſition *Pauſanias*; the *Athenians*, *Argæus*; ſons of the late uſurper *Æropus*: each of theſe labouring to place in *Macedon* a king of their own election. Theſe heavy burthens when *Philip* could not well bear, he bought off the weightieſt by money, and by fair promiſes unloaded himſelf of ſo many of the reſt, as he ran under the remainder happily enough. For, notwithſtanding that his brother *Perdiccas* had his death accompanied with four thouſand *Macedonians*, beſides theſe that were wounded and taken priſoners; and that the *Pannonians* were deſtroying all before them in *Macedon*: and that the *Athenians* with a fleet by ſea, and three thouſand ſoldiers by land under *Mantias*, did beat upon him on all ſides and quarters of his country: yet after he had practiſed the men of war of *Pannonia*; and corrupted them with gifts; and had alſo bought the king of *Thrace* from *Pauſanias*, he forthwith made head againſt the *Athenians* his ſtiffeſt enemies; and, for the firſt, he prevented their recovery of *Amphipolis*, a city on the frontier of *Macedon*: and did then purſue *Argæus* the ſon of *Æropus*, ſet againſt him by the *Athenians*, and followed him ſo hard at the heels in his retreat from *Æges*, that he forced him to abide the battel: which *Argæus* loſt, having the greateſt part of his army ſlain in the place. Thoſe of the *Athenians*, and others which remained unbroken, took the advantage of a ſtrong piece of ground at hand, which tho' they could not long defend, yet avoiding thereby the preſent fury of the ſoldiers, they obtained of the vanquiſhers life and liberty to return into *Attica*. Whereupon a peace was concluded between him and the *Athenians* for that preſent, and for this clemency he was greatly renowned and honoured by all the *Greeks*.

[a] Diod. Polyæn. Plut. in Demet. [b] Diod. l. 15 & 16. [c] Juſt. l. 7. [d] Diod. l. 16.

SECT.

SECT. III.

The good ſucceſs which Philip *had in many enterpriſes.*

NOW had *Philip* leiſure to look northward, and to attend the *Illyrians* and *Peonians*, his irreconcilable enemies and borderers: both which he invaded with ſo proſperous ſucceſs, as he ſlew *Bardillas*, king of the *Illyrians*, with ſeven thouſand of his nation, and thereby recovered all thoſe places, which the *Illyrians* held in *Macedon*; and withal, upon the death of the king of *Pannonia*, he pierced that country, and, after a main victory obtained, he enforced them to pay him tribute. This was no ſooner done, than (without ſtaying to take longer breath) he haſted ſpeedily towards *Lariſſa*, upon the river *Peneus* in *Theſſaly*, of which town he ſoon made himſelf maſter; and thereby he got good footing in that country, whereof he made uſe in time following. Now altho' he reſolved either to ſubdue the *Theſſalians*, or to make them his own againſt all others, becauſe the horſemen of that country were the beſt, and moſt feared in that part of *Europe*; yet he thought it moſt for his ſafety to cloſe up the entrances out of *Thrace*, leſt while he invaded *Theſſaly* and *Greece* towards the ſouth, thoſe ample nations, lying towards the north, ſhould either withdraw him, or over-run *Macedon*, as in former times. He therefore attempted *Amphipolis*, ſeated on the famous river of *Strimon*, which parteth *Thrace* from *Macedon*, and won it. He alſo recovered *Pydna*; and (to the north of *Amphipolis*) the city of *Crenides* (ſometime *Datus*) and called it after his own name *Philippi:* to the people whereof St. *Paul* afterward directed one of his epiſtles. This place, wherein *Philippi* ſtood, is very rich in mines of gold, out of which, greatly to the advancement of *Philip*'s affairs, he drew yearly 1000 talents, which make 600000 *French* crowns.

And that he might with the more eaſe diſburden the *Thracian* ſhores of the *Athenian* garriſons, to which he had given a great blow by the taking in of *Amphipolis*, he entered into league with his father's malicious enemies, the *Olynthians*; whom the better to faſten unto him, he gave them the city of *Pydna*, with the territory, meaning nothing leſs than that they ſhould enjoy it, or their own eſtate many years.

Now that he might by degrees win ground upon the *Greeks*, he took the fair occaſion to deliver the city of *Pheres* in *Theſſaly*, from the tyranny of *Lycophron* and *Tiſiphonus*. Who, after they had conſpired with *Thebe* the wife of *Alexander*, who uſurped upon the liberty of that ſtate, they themſelves (*Alexander* being murthered) held it alſo by the ſame ſtrong hand and oppreſſion that *Alexander* did, till by the aſſiſtance of *Philip* they were beaten out, and *Pheres* reſtored to her former liberty. Which act of *Philip* did for ever after faſten the *Theſſalians* unto him, and, to his exceeding great advantage, bind them to his Service.

SECT. IV.

Of the Phocian *war, which firſt drew* Philip *into* Greece.

ABOUT this time, to wit, in the ſecond year of the hundred and ſixth *Olympiad*, eight years after the battel of *Mantinea*, and about the eight year of *Artaxerxes Ochus*, began that war, called *Sacred*. Now, as all occaſions concur towards the execution of eternal providence and of every great alteration in the world, there is ſome preceding preparation, tho' not at the firſt eaſily diſcerned; ſo did this revengeful hatred by the *Thebans*, *Theſſalians*, and *Locrians*, conceived againſt the *Phocians*, not only teach *Philip* how he might with half a hand wreſt the ſword out of their fingers; but the *Greeks* themſelves beating down their own defences, to give him an eaſy paſſage, and beating themſelves, to give him victory without peril, left nothing unperformed towards their own ſlavery, ſaving the title and impoſition. Of this war the *Thebans* (made over-proud by their victory at *Leuctres*) were the inflamers. For at the council of the *Amphyctiones*, or of the general eſtates of *Greece*, in which, at that time, they ſwayed moſt, they cauſed both the *Lacedemonians* and *Phocians* to be condemned in greater ſums of money than they could well bear; the one for ſurpriſing the caſtle of *Cadmea* in the time of peace; the other for ploughing up a piece of ground belonging to the temple of *Delphos*. The *Phocians* being reſolved not to obey this edict, were ſecretly ſet on and incouraged by the *Lacedemonians:* and for refuſal were expoſed as *Sacrilegers*, and accurſed to all their neighbour-nations, for whom it was then lawful to invade and deſtroy them at their pleaſures.

The *Phocians*, perſuaded thereunto by *Philomelus*, a captain of their own, caſt the ſame dice of hazard that *Cæſar* after many ages following did; but had not the ſame chance. Yet they dealt well enough with all the enemies of their own nation. And the better to bear out an ungracious quarrel, of which there was left no hope of compoſition, they reſolved to ſack the temple it ſelf. For ſeeing, that for the ploughing of a piece of *Apollo*'s ground, they had ſo much offended their neighbour-god, and their neighbour-nations, as worſe could not befall them than already was intended; they reſolved to take the gold with the ground, and either to periſh for all, or to prevail againſt all that had commiſſion to call them to account. The treaſure which they took out of the temple in the beginning of the war was 10000 talents, which in thoſe days ſerved them to wage a great many men, and ſuch was their ſucceſs in the beginning of the war, as they won three great battels againſt the *Thebans*, *Theſſalians*, and *Locrians*, but being beaten in the fourth, their leader *Philomelus* caſt himſelf headlong over the rocks.

In the mean while the cities of *Cherſoneſus*, both to defend themſelves againſt their bad neighbour *Philip*, who encroached upon them, and to draw others into their quarrel, rendred themſelves to the *Athenians*. *Philip* prepareth to get them into his hands, and at the ſiege of *Methone* loſt one of his eyes. It is ſaid, that he that ſhot him did purpoſely direct his arrow towards him, and that it was written on the ſhaft thereof: [a] *After Philippo, After to Philip*; for ſo he was called, that gave him the wound. This city he evened with the ſoil.

The tyrant *Lycophron* before-mentioned, while *Philip* was buſied on the border of *Thrace*, and the *Theſſalians* engaged in the holy war, entred *Theſſaly* with new forces, being aſſiſted by *Onomarchus*, commander of the *Phocian* army, in place of *Philomelus*. For hereby the *Phocians* hoped ſo to entertain the *Theſſalians* at home, as they ſhould not find leiſure to invade them. Hereupon was *Philip*

[a] Plut. Ulpian. Strab. l. 8.

the

the ſecond time called into *Theſſaly*; but both the *Theſſalians* and *Macedonians* (*Philip* being preſent) were utterly overthrown by *Onomarchus*; and great numbers of both nations loſt. From *Theſſaly*, *Onomarchus* drew ſpeedily towards *Bœotia*, and with the ſame victorious army brake the forces of the *Beotians*, and took from them their city of *Coronea*. But *Philip*, impatient of his late miſadventure, after he had reinforced his army, returned with all ſpeed into *Theſſaly*, there to find again the honour which he lately loſt: and was the ſecond time encounter'd by *Onomarchus*, who brought into the field twenty thouſand foot, and five hundred horſe. All this great preparation ſufficed not; for *Onomarchus* was by *Philip* ſurmounted, both in number and good fortune, his army overturned, ſix thouſand ſlain, and three thouſand taken; of which number, himſelf being one, was among others hanged by *Philip*. Thoſe that fled were in part received by the *Athenian* gallies, which ſailed along the coaſt, commanded by *Chares*; but the greateſt number of thoſe that took the ſea, were therein devoured ere they recovered them. *Lycophron* was now again driven out of *Theſſaly*, and *Pheres* made free as before.

SECT. V.

Of the Olynthian *war. The ambitious practices of* Philip.

FROM hence *Philip* reſolved to invade *Phocis* it ſelf, but the *Athenians* did not favour his entrance into thoſe parts; and therefore with the help of the *Lacedemonians* they retrench'd his paſſage at the ſtreights of *Thermopylis*. Whereupon he returned into *Macedon*, and after the taking of *Micyberne*, *Torone*, and other towns, he quarrelled with the *Olynthians*, whom not long before he had wooed to his alliance, and bought his peace of them. For the *Olynthians* were very ſtrong, and had evermore both braved and beaten the *Macedonians*. It is ſaid, that *Philip* having put to death *Archelaus* his half-brother (for *Amyntas* had three ſons by *Eurydice* the mother of *Philip*, and three other ſons by *Gygæa*: but *Philip*'s elder brothers by the ſame mother being dead, he determined to rid himſelf alſo of the reſt) the two younger held themſelves within *Olynthus*; and that the receiving of them by the *Olynthians* was the cauſe of the war, [a] *Juſtin* affirmeth. But juſt quarrels are ballanced by juſt princes; for to this king all things were lawful that might any way ſerve his turn; all his affections and paſſions, how diverſe ſoever in other men, were in his ambition ſwallowed up, and thereinto converted. For he neither forbare the murder of his own brothers, the breach of faith, the buying of other mens fidelity; he eſteem'd no place ſtrong where his aſs loaden with gold might enter; nor city or ſtate unconquerable, where a few of the greateſt, to be made greater, could loſe the ſenſe of other mens ſorrow and ſubjection. And becauſe he thought it vain to practiſe the winning of *Olynthus*, till he had incloſed all the power they had within their own walls, he enter'd their territory, and by the advantage of a well-compounded and trained army, he gave them two overthrows ere he ſat down before the city it ſelf: which done, he bought *Euthicrates* and *Laſthenes* from their people, and from the ſervice of their country and common-weal; by whoſe treaſon he enter'd the town, ſlew his brothers therein, ſack'd it, and ſold the inhabitants for ſlaves by the drum. By the ſpoil of this place he greatly enriched himſelf, and had treaſure ſufficient to buy in other cities withal, which he daily did. For ſo was he adviſed by the oracle in the beginning of his undertaking, *That he ſhould make his aſſaults with ſilver ſpears:* Whereupon [b] *Horace* well and truly ſaid,

——*Diffidit urbium*
Portas vir Macedo, & ſubruit æmulos
Reges muneribus. ——

By gifts the *Macedon* clave gates aſunder,
The kings envying his eſtate brought under.

And it is true that he won more by corruption and fraud, than he did by force. For, as he had in all the principal cities of *Greece* his ſecret workers (which way of conqueſt was well followed by *Philip* the ſecond of *Spain*:) ſo when in the contention between the competitors for the kingdom of *Thrace*, he was choſen the arbitrator, he came not to the council accompanied with piety and juſtice, but with a powerful army, and having beaten and ſlain both kings, gave ſentence for himſelf, and made the kingdom his own.

SECT. VI.

How Philip *ended the* Phocian *war.*

THE war ſtill continuing between the *Phocians* and the aſſociates of the holy war, the *Beotians*, finding themſelves unable to ſubſiſt without ſome preſent aid, ſent unto *Philip* for ſuccour, who willingly yielded to their neceſſities, and ſent them ſuch a proportion of men as were neither ſufficient to maſter their enemies, nor to aſſure themſelves; but yet to enable them to continue the war, and to waſte the ſtrength of *Greece*. They alſo ſent to *Artaxerxes Ochus* for ſupply of treaſure, who lent them thirty talents, which makes an hundred and fourſcore thouſand crowns; but when with theſe ſupplies they had ſtill the worſt in all their attempts againſt the *Phocians*, who held from them three of their ſtrongeſt cities within *Bœotia* it ſelf; they then beſought *Philip* of *Macedon* that he would aſſiſt them in perſon, to whom they would give an entrance into their territory, and in all things obey his commandments in that war.

Now had *Philip* what he longed for; for he knew himſelf in ſtate to give the law to both; and ſo quitting all his other purpoſes towards the north, he marched with a ſpeedy pace towards *Bœotia*; where being arrived, *Phallecus*, who commanded the *Phocian* army, fearing to ſhock with this victorious king, made his own peace, and withdrew himſelf with a regiment of eight thouſand ſoldiers into *Peloponneſus*, leaving the *Phocians* to the mercy of the conqueror; and for concluſion, he had the glory of that war, called *Sacred*, which the *Grecians* with ſo many mutual ſlaughters had continued for ten years; and, beſides the glory, he poſſeſs'd himſelf of *Orchomene*, *Coronea*, and *Corſia*, in the country of the *Beotians*, who invited him to be victorious over themſelves. He brought the *Phocians* into ſervitude, and waſted their cities, and gave them but their villages to inhabit, reſerving to himſelf the yearly tribute of threeſcore talents, which make thirty ſix thouſand *French* crowns He alſo hereby (beſides the fame of piety for ſervice of the gods) obtained the fame double voice in the council of the *Amphyctiones*, which the *Phocians* had, with the ſuperintendency of the *Pythian* games

[a] Juſt. l. 8. [b] Hor. Carm. Od. 16.

forfeited

forfeited by the *Corinthians*, by being partakers in the *Phocian* ſacrilege.

SECT. VII.

How Philip *with ill ſucceſs attempted upon* Perinthus, Byzantium, *and the* Scythians.

PHilip, after his triumphant return into *Macedon*, by the lieutenant of his army *Parmenio*, ſlaughtered many thouſands of the *Illyrians* and *Dardanians*, and brought the *Thracians* to pay him the tenth part of all their revenues. But his next enterpriſe againſt the *Perinthians* ſtaid his fury. *Perinthus* was a city of *Thrace* ſeated upon *Propontis*, in the mid-way between *Seſtos* and *Byzantium*; a place of great ſtrength, and a people reſolved to defend their liberty againſt *Philip*, where the *Athenians* encouraged and aſſiſted them. *Philip* ſat down before it with a puiſſant army, made many fair breaches, gave many furious aſſaults, built many over-topping and commanding towers about it. But he was repelled with equal violence. For whereas *Philip* thought by his continual aſſaults to weary them, and waſte both their men and munition, they were ſupplied not only from the *Perſian* with men and money, and ſuccoured from *Byzantium*, which ſtood upon the ſame ſea-coaſt, but they were relieved from *Athens*, *Chio*, and *Rhodes*, by the conduction of *Phocion*, with whatſoever was wanting to their neceſſity. But becauſe thoſe of *Byzantium*, by reaſon of their neighbourhood, and the eaſy paſſage by water, gave them often and ready help, *Philip* removed with the one half of his army and beſieged it, leaving fifteen thouſand foot before *Perinthus*, to force it if they could; but to be ſhort, he failed in both attempts (as all princes commonly do that undertake divers enterpriſes at one time) and returned into *Macedon* with no leſs diſhonour than loſs: whereupon he made an overture of peace with the *Athenians*, and greatly deſired it; to which tho' *Phocion* perſwaded them in all he could, and that by the occaſion offered they might greatly advantage their conditions, yet *Demoſthenes* with his eloquence prevailed in the refuſal. In the mean while, *Philip* having digeſted his late affront, and ſupplied his expence by the taking of an hundred and threeſcore and ten merchants ſhips, he gathered new forces, and being accompanied with his ſon *Alexander*, led them into *Scythia*; but he was alſo unproſperous in this enterpriſe: for the *Triballi*, a people of *Mœſia*, ſet on him in his return, wounded him, and took from him the greateſt part of the ſpoils which he had gathered.

SECT. VIII.

How Philip, *overthrowing the* Greeks *in the battel of* Chæronea, *was choſen captain-general of* Greece. *The death of* Philip.

AMONG theſe northern nations (part of which he ſuppreſs'd, and part quieted) he ſpent ſome eight years; and in the ninth year, after the end of the holy war, he was to his great advantage invited again by the *Grecians* to their aſſiſtance. For the citizens of *Amphiſſa* having diſobeyed the decree of the *Amphyctiones*, in which *Philip* had a double voice, and who, by reaſon that the *Thebans* and *Locrians* gave countenance and aid to the *Amphiſſenians*, the reſt were not of themſelves able to conſtrain them, they beſought *Philip* to come in perſon to their aſſiſtance. Now you muſt think that *Philip* was not long in reſolving upon this enterpriſe; he needed no drawing on, whom nothing could keep back; nor other diſſuaſion than a maſtering power could hold thence. He therefore commanded his army forthwith to march; the ſame being compounded of thirty thouſand foot, and two thouſand horſe; and with as much expedition as could be made, he enter'd *Phocis*, won *Platæa*, and brought into ſubjection all that region.

The reſt, and eſpecially the *Athenians*, although they had good cauſe to fear that a great part of this ſtorm would fall on themſelves, yet were they diſſuaded by *Demoſthenes* from accepting ſuch reaſonable conditions of peace as *Philip* offered, and rather made choice (having drawn the *Thebans* to join with them) to leave the enjoying of their eſtates and their freedom to the chance of one battel, than to hold it either by compoſition, or by the grace of *Philip*. But this their orator's eloquence coſt them dear. It is true, that he could far more eaſily mind them of the virtue of their anceſtors, than make them to be ſuch as they were. He might repeat unto them (with words moving paſſion) the wonders they wrought at *Marathon*, but he could not transform the *Macedonians* into *Perſians*, or draw from the dead, a *Miltiades*, an *Ariſtides*, a *Themiſtocles*, or a *Cimon*, or any of thoſe famous commanders, whoſe great virtues they had paid with the greateſt ingratitude that ever nation did. A *Phocion* they had, but by the ſtrength of a contrary faction he was at this time in diſgrace, and not employed: in ſo much as when the armies of *Philip* and the confederates encounter'd, although ſome thouſand of the *Athenians* did abide the killing, and the like number well near of the *Thebans* died with them; yet the want of worthy men on that ſide to hold up the reſt, and to draw them on, and the many choice captains of the *Macedonians*, encouraged by a king of a growing fortune, as it gave to *Philip* ſo ſhining a victory, that *Alexander* by the light thereof found his way (in deſpight of all the nations interjacent) into *Perſia*, *India*, and *Egypt*; ſo it cut to the ground, and gave end and date to all the *Grecian* glory: yea, their liberty (ſaith *Curtius*) with their large dominion won with ſo many difficulties, continued for ſo many ages, and ſo often defended againſt the greateſt kings, was now loſt in a moment, and for ever loſt.

Now this adviſed king (never paſſionate to his diſadvantage) to the end he might obtain the ſoveraignty over all *Greece*, and be acknowledged for their captain-general againſt the *Perſians*, without any further hazard or trouble, was content to let go thoſe *Athenians* that were taken at this battel of *Chæronea*, as he alſo forbore to attempt any thing againſt their city: but in *Thebes* (which lately by the virtue of *Epaminondas* triumphed over the reſt) he lodged a garriſon of *Macedonians*. And being ſoon after (according unto the long deſire which he had nouriſhed of this ſoveraignty) by the general ſtates of *Corinth*, ſtiled the firſt commander of all the *Grecians*, and contribution of men and money granted him, he compounded an army of great ſtrength, and under the commandment of *Attalus* and *Parmenio*, tranſported the ſame over the *Helleſpont* into *Aſia*, to begin the war. Of his enterpriſe againſt *Perſia*, he ſought the ſucceſs from the oracle at *Delphos*, from whence he received ſuch another convertible riddle, as *Creſus* did when he attempted *Cyrus*, and was in like ſort miſtaken in the expoſition.

But as it is hard to diſcern and withſtand the flatteries of our own appetites, ſo did *Philip*'s ambitious deſire to invade *Perſia* abuſe his judgment ſo far,

far, that the death, wherewith himſelf was threatened, he underſtood to be delivered of his enemy, whom he intended preſently to invade. Before his purpoſed departure into *Aſia*, he prepared for the marriage of his daughter *Cleopatra* with *Alexander*, king of *Epirus*; to which feaſt and paſtimes thereat appointed, he invited all his friends and allies, with the principal perſons of the *Grecian* cities, from whom he received much honour and many rich preſents; but this was indeed the feaſt of his funeral. For having refuſed to do juſtice to one *Pauſanias*, a gentleman of his guard, whom *Attalus* (greatly favoured by *Philip*) had firſt made drunk, and then left to be carnally abuſed by divers baſe perſons, this *Pauſanias* grew into ſo great deteſtation of the king's partiality in ſo foul a fact, as when *Philip* was paſſing towards the theatre, he drew a ſword from under his long garment and wounded him to death, when he had lived ſix and forty years, and reigned five and twenty. [a]*Juſtin* reports it, that *Olympias* encouraged *Pauſanias* to murder the king her huſband, which after his death ſhe boldly avowed, by the honour ſhe did unto *Pauſanias*, in crowning his dead body, in conſecrating his ſword unto *Apollo*, by building for him a monument, and other like graces.

SECT. IX.

What good foundations of Alexander's *greatneſs were laid by* Philip. *Of his laudable qualities, and iſſue.*

NOW although he were then taken from the world, when he had maſtered all oppoſition on that ſide of the ſea, and had ſeen the fruits of his hopes and labours changing colour towards ripeneſs and perfection, yet he was herein happy, that he lived to ſee his ſon *Alexander* at mans eſtate, and had himſelf been an eye-witneſs of his reſolution, and ſingular valour in this laſt battel.

The foundation of whoſe future greatneſs he had laid ſo ſoundly for him, with ſo plain a pattern of the buildings which himſelf meant to erect, as the performance and finiſhing was far more eaſy to *Alexander*, though more glorious, than the beginnings were unto *Philip*, though leſs famous. For beſides the recovery of *Macedon* it ſelf, in competition between him and the ſons of *Eropus*, the one aſſiſted by the *Thracians*, the other by the *Athenians*; and beſides the regaining of many places poſſeſs'd by the *Illyrians*, the cruſhing of all thoſe northern kings his neighbours, the overthrow of *Olynthus*, a ſtate that deſpiſed the power of his father, the many maritime cities taken, of great ſtrength and ancient freedom, and the ſubjection of that famous nation of *Greece*, which for ſo many ages had defended it ſelf againſt the greateſt kings of the world, and won upon them: he left unto his ſon, and had bred up for him, ſo many choice commanders, as the moſt of them both for their valour and judgment in the war, were no leſs worthy of crowns, than himſelf was that wore a crown: for it was ſaid of *Parmenio* (whom *Alexander*, ungrateful to ſo great virtue, impiouſly murdered) that *Parmenio* had performed many things challenging eternal fame, without the king; but the king, without *Parmenio*, never did any thing worthy of renown; as for the reſt of his captains, though content to obey the ſon of ſuch a father, yet did they not after *Alexander*'s death endure to acknowledge any man ſuperiour to themſelves.

Of this prince it is hard to judge, whether his ambition had taught him the exerciſe of more vices, than nature and his excellent education had enriched him with virtues. For beſides that he was valiant, wiſe, learned, and maſter of all his affections, he had this favour of piety, that he rather laboured to ſatisfy thoſe that were grieved, than to ſuppreſs them. Whereof (among many other) we find a good example in his dealing with *Arcadion* and *Nicanor*; whom when for their evil ſpeech of *Philip*, his familiars perſwaded him to put to death; he anſwered them, that firſt it ought to be conſidered, whether the fault were in them that gave him ill language, or in himſelf; ſecondly, that it was in every man's own power to be well ſpoken of; and this was ſhortly proved; for after *Philip* had relieved their neceſſities, there was none within his kingdom that did him more honour than they did. Whereupon he told thoſe that had perſwaded him to uſe violence, that he was a better phyſician for evil ſpeech than they were.

His epiſtles to *Alexander* his ſon are remembred by [b]*Cicero* and *Gellius*; and by *Dion* and *Chryſoſtom* exceedingly commended. His ſtratagems are gathered by *Polyenus* and *Frontinus*, his wiſe ſayings by *Plutarch*. And albeit he held *Macedon* as in his own right all the time of his reign, yet was he not the true and next heir thereof: for *Amyntas* the ſon of his brother *Perdiccas* (of whom he had the protection during his infancy) had the right. This *Amyntas* he married to his daughter *Cyna*, who had by him a daughter called *Eurydice*, who was married to *Philip*'s baſe ſon *Arideus*, her uncle by the mother's ſide: both which *Olympias*, *Philip*'s firſt wife, and mother to *Alexander* the great, put to death; *Arideus* by extream torments, *Eurydice* ſhe ſtrangled.

Philip had by this *Olympias*, the daughter of *Neoptolemus*, king of the *Moloſſians* (of the race of *Achilles*) *Alexander* the great, and *Cleopatra*. *Cleopatra* was married to her uncle *Alexander*, king of *Epirus*, and was after her brother *Alexander*'s death ſlain at *Sardis*, by the command of *Antigonus*.

By *Audata*, an *Illyrian*, his ſecond wife, he had *Cyna*, married as is ſhewed before.

By *Nicaſipolis*, the ſiſter of *Jaſon*, tyrant of *Pheres*, he had *Theſſalonica*, whom *Caſſander*, after he had taken *Pidna*, married; but ſhe was afterwards by her father-in-law, *Antipater*, put to death.

By *Cleopatra*, the niece of *Attalus*, he had [c]*Caranus*, whom others call *Philip*: him, *Olympias*, the mother of *Alexander* the great, cauſed to be roaſted to death in a copper pan. Others lay this murder to *Alexander* himſelf. By the ſame *Cleopatra* he had likewiſe a daughter, called *Europa*, whom *Olympias* alſo murdered at the mother's breaſt.

By *Phila* and *Meda* he had no iſſue.

He had alſo two concubines, *Arſinoe*, whom, after he had gotten with child, he married to an obſcure man, called *Lagus*, who bear *Ptolemy*, king of *Egypt*, called the ſon of *Lagus*, but eſteemed the ſon of *Philip*: by *Philinna*, his ſecond concubine, a publick dancer, he had *Arideus*, of whom we ſhall have much occaſion to ſpeak hereafter.

[a] Juſt. l. 9. [b] Cic. Off. 2. Gell. l. 9. c. 3. Dion. 2. de Rege. [c] Athen. l. 13. c. 2. Juſt. l. 3.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of ALEXANDER *the Great.*

SECT. I.

A brief rehearſal of Alexander*'s doings, before he invaded* Aſia.

ALEXANDER, afterwards called the great, ſucceeded unto *Philip* his father; being a prince no leſs valiant by nature, than by education; well inſtructed, and enriched in all ſorts of learning and good arts. He began his reign over the *Macedonians* four hundred and ſeventeen years after *Rome* built, and after his own birth twenty years. The ſtrange dreams of *Philip* his father, and that one of the gods, in the ſhape of a ſnake, begat him on *Olympias* his mother, I omit as fooliſh tales; but that the temple of *Diana* (a work the moſt magnificent of the world) was burnt upon the day of his birth, and that ſo ſtrange an accident was accompanied with the news of three ſeveral victories, obtained by the *Macedonians*, it was very remarkable, and might with the reaſon of thoſe times be interpreted for ominous, and foreſhewing the great things by *Alexander* afterwards performed. Upon the change of the king, the neighbour-nations, whom *Philip* had oppreſs'd, began to conſult about the recovery of their former liberty, and to adventure it by force of arms. *Alexander*'s young years gave them hope of prevailing, and his ſuſpected ſeverity increaſed courage in thoſe who could better reſolve to die, than to live ſlaviſhly. But *Alexander* gave no time to thoſe ſwelling humours, which might ſpeedily have endangered the health of his eſtate. For after revenge taken upon the conſpirators againſt his father, whom he ſlew upon his tomb; and the celebration of his funerals, he firſt faſtened unto his own nation, by freeing them from all exactions and bodily ſlavery, other than their ſervice in his wars; and uſed ſuch kingly auſterity towards thoſe that contemned his young years, and ſuch clemency to the reſt that perſwaded themſelves of the cruelty of his diſpoſition, as all affections being paſſed at home, he made a preſent journey into *Peloponneſus*, and ſo well exerciſed his ſpirits among them, as by the council of the ſtates of *Greece*, he was, according to the great deſire of his heart, elected captain-general againſt the *Perſians*, upon which war *Philip* his father had not only reſolved (who had obtained the ſame title of general commander) but had tranſported under the leading of *Parmenio* and *Attalus*, a part of his army, to recover ſome places on *Aſia* ſide, for the ſafe deſcent of the reſt.

This enterpriſe againſt the *Perſian* occupied all *Alexander*'s affections; thoſe fair marks of riches, honour, and large dominion, he now ſhot at both ſleeping and waking: all other thoughts and imaginations were either grievous or hateful. But a contrary wind ariſeth; for he receiveth advertiſement that the *Athenians*, *Thebans*, and *Lacedemonians*, had united themſelves againſt him, and, by aſſiſtance from the *Perſian*, hoped for the recovery of their former freedom. Hereto they were perſwaded by *Demoſthenes*, himſelf being thereto perſwaded by the gold of *Perſia*; the device he uſed was more ſubtle than profitable, for he cauſed it to be bruited that *Alexander* was ſlain in a battel againſt the *Triballes*, and brought into the aſſembly a companion whom he had corrupted to affirm, that himſelf was preſent and wounded in the battel. There is indeed a certain doctrine of policy (as policy is now adays defined by falſhood and knavery) that deviſed rumours and lies, if they ſerve the turn, but for a day or two, are greatly available. It is true, that common people are ſometimes mock'd by them, as ſoldiers are by falſe alarms in the wars; but in all that I have obſerved, I have found the ſucceſs as ridiculous as the invention. For as thoſe that find themſelves at one time abuſed by ſuch like bruits, do at other times neglect their duties, when they are upon true reports, and in occaſions perillous, ſummoned to aſſemble; ſo do all men in general condemn the venters of ſuch trumpery, and for them fear upon neceſſary occaſions to entertain the truth it ſelf. This labour unlooked for, and loſs of time, was not only very grievous to *Alexander*, but by turning his ſword from the ignoble and effeminate *Perſians*, againſt which he had directed it, towards the manly and famous *Grecians*, of whoſe aſſiſtance he thought himſelf aſſured, his preſent undertaking was greatly diſordered. But he that cannot endure to ſtrive againſt the wind, ſhall hardly attain the port which he purpoſeth to recover: and it no leſs becometh the worthieſt men to oppoſe misfortunes, than it doth the weakeſt children to bewail them.

He therefore made ſuch expedition towards theſe revolters, as that himſelf, with the army that followed him, brought them the firſt news of his preparation. Hereupon all ſtagger, and the *Athenians*, as they were the firſt that moved, ſo were they the firſt that fainted, ſeeking by their embaſſadors to pacify the king, and to be received again into his grace. *Alexander* was not long in reſolving; for the *Perſians* perſwaded him to pardon the *Grecians*. Wiſe men are not eaſily drawn from great purpoſes by ſuch occaſions as may eaſily be taken off; neither hath any king ever brought to effect any great affair, who hath entangled himſelf in many enterpriſes at once, not tending to one and the ſame certain end.

And having now quieted his borderers towards the ſouth, he reſolved to aſſure thoſe nations which lay on the north-ſide of *Macedon*, to wit, the *Thracians*, *Triballes*, *Peones*, *Getes*, *Agrians*, and other ſavage people, which had greatly vexed with incurſions, not only others of his predeceſſors, but even *Philip* his father: with all which, after divers overthrows given them, he made peace, or elſe brought them into ſubjection. Notwithſtanding this good ſucceſs, he could not yet find the way out of *Europe*. There is nothing more natural to man than liberty; the *Greeks* had enjoy'd it overlong, and loſt it too late to forget it; they therefore ſhake off the yoke once again. The *Thebans*, who had in their citadel a garriſon of a thouſand *Macedons*, attempt to force it; *Alexander* haſteth to their ſuccour, and preſents himſelf with thirty thouſand foot, all old ſoldiers, and three thouſand horſe, before the city, and gave the inhabitants ſome days to reſolve, being even heart-ſick with the deſire of paſſing into *Aſia*. So unwilling indeed he was to draw blood of the *Grecians*, by whom he hoped to ſerve himſelf elſewhere, that he offered the *Thebans* remiſſion, if they would only deliver into his hands *Phœnix* and *Prothytes*,

Prothytes, the ſtirrers up of the rebellion. But they, oppoſing the mounting fortune of *Alexander*, (which bare all reſiſtance before it, like the breaking-in of the ocean-ſea) inſtead of ſuch an anſwer, as men beſieged and abandoned ſhould have made, demanded *Philotas* and *Antipater* to be delivered unto them; as if *Thebes* alone, then laid in the ballance of fortune with the kingdom of *Macedon*, and many other provinces, could either have evened the ſcale, or ſwayed it. Therefore in the end they periſhed in their obſtinacy. For while the *Thebans* oppoſe the army aſſailant, they are charged at the back by the *Macedonian* garriſon, their city taken and razed to the ground, ſix thouſand ſlain, and thirty thouſand ſold for ſlaves, at the price of 440 talents. This the king did, to the terror of the other *Grecian* cities.

Many arguments were uſed by *Cleadas*, one of the priſoners, to perſuade *Alexander* to forbear the deſtruction of *Thebes*. He prayed the king to believe, that they were rather miſled by giving haſty credit to falſe reports, than any way malicious; for being perſuaded of *Alexander*'s death, they rebelled but againſt his ſucceſſor. He alſo beſought the king to remember, that his father *Philip* had his education in that city; yea, that his anceſtor *Hercules* was born therein: but all perſuaſions were fruitleſs; the times wherein offences are committed, do greatly aggravate them. Yet for the honour he bare to learning, he pardoned all of the race of *Pindarus* the poet, and ſpared, and ſet at liberty *Timoclea*, the ſiſter of *Theagenes*, who died in defence of the liberty of *Greece* againſt his father *Philip*. This noble woman being taken by a *Thracian*, and by him raviſhed, he threatned to take her life, unleſs ſhe would confeſs her treaſure; ſhe led the *Thracian* to a well, and told him that ſhe had therein caſt it; and when the *Thracian* ſtooped to look into the well, ſhe ſuddenly thruſt him into the mouth thereof, and ſtoned him to death.

Now, becauſe the *Athenians* had received into their city ſo many of the *Thebans*, as had eſcaped and fled unto them for ſuccour, *Alexander* would not grant them peace, but upon condition to deliver into his hands both their orators, which perſuaded this ſecond revolt, and their captains; yet in the end, it being a torment unto him to retard the enterpriſe of *Perſia*, he was content that the orators ſhould remain, and accepted of the baniſhment of the captains, wherein he was exceeding ill adviſed, had not his fortune, or rather the providence of God, made all the reſiſtance againſt him unprofitable: for theſe good leaders of the *Grecians* betook themſelves to the ſervice of the *Perſian*, whom after a few days he invadeth.

SECT. II.

How Alexander *paſſing into* Aſia, *fought with the* Perſians *upon the river of* Granicus.

WHEN all was now quieted at home, *Alexander*, committing to the truſt of *Antipater*, both *Greece* and *Macedon*, in the firſt of the ſpring did paſs the *Helleſpont*, and being ready to diſ-embark, he threw a dart towards the *Aſian* ſhore, as a token of defiance, commanding his ſoldiers not to make any waſte in their own territory, or to burn or deface thoſe buildings, which themſelves were preſently, and in the future, to poſſeſs. He landed his army, conſiſting of two and thirty thouſand foot, and five thouſand horſe, all old ſoldiers, near unto *Troy*, where he offer'd a ſolemn ſacrifice upon *Achilles*'s tomb, his maternal anceſtor.

But before he left his own coaſt, he put to death, without any offence given him, all his mother-in-law's kinſmen, whom *Philip* his father had greatly advanced, not ſparing ſuch of his own as he ſuſpected. He alſo took with him many of his tributary princes, of whoſe fidelity he doubted; thinking by unjuſt cruelty to aſſure all things, both in the preſent and future. Yet the end of all fell out contrary to the policy which his ambition had commended unto him, tho' agreeing very well with the juſtice of God; for all that he had planted, was ſoon after withered, and rooted up; thoſe whom he moſt truſted, were the moſt traiterous; his mother, friends, and children, fell by ſuch another mercileſs ſword as his own, and all manner of confuſion followed his dead body to the grave, and left him there.

When the knowledge of *Alexander*'s landing on *Aſia* ſide was brought to *Darius*, he ſo much ſcorned the army of *Macedon*, and had ſo contemptible an opinion of *Alexander* himſelf, as having ſtiled him his ſervant in a letter which he wrote unto him, reprehending his diſloyalty and audacity (for *Darius* entituled himſelf king of kings, and the kinſman of the gods) he gave order withal to his lieutenants of the leſſer *Aſia*, that they ſhould take *Alexander* alive, whip him with rods, and then convey him to his preſence: that they ſhould ſink his ſhips, and ſend the *Macedons* taken priſoners beyond the *Red* ſea, belike into *Ethiopia*, or ſome other unhealthful part of *Africa*.

In this ſort did this glorious king, confident in the glittering but heartleſs multitude which he commanded, diſpoſe of the already-vanquiſhed *Macedonians:* but the ill deſtinies of men bear them to the ground, by what ſtrong confidence ſoever armed. The great numbers which he gathered together, and brought in one heap into the field, gave rather an exceeding advantage to his enemies, than any diſcouragement at all. For, beſides that they were men utterly unacquainted with dangers; men, who by the name and countenance of their king, were wont to prevail againſt thoſe of leſs courage than themſelves; men, that took more care to embroider with gold and ſilver their upper garments, as if they intended the invaſion but of the ſun-beams, than they did to arm themſelves with iron and ſteel againſt the ſharp pikes, ſwords, and darts of the hardy *Macedonians:* I ſay, beſides all theſe, even the opinion they had of their own numbers, of which every one in particular hoped that it would not fall to his turn to fight, filled every one of them with the care of their own ſafety, without any intent at all to hazard any thing but their own breath, and that of their horſes, in running away. The *Macedonians* as they came to fight, and thereby to enrich themſelves with the gold and jewels of *Perſia*, both which they needed, ſo the *Perſians*, who expected nothing in that war but blows and wounds, which they needed not, obeyed the king, who had power to conſtrain them in aſſembling themſelves for his ſervice; but their own fears and cowardice, which in time of danger had moſt power over them, they only then obeyed, when their rebellion againſt ſo ſervile a paſſion did juſtly and violently require it. For ſaith *Vegetius: Quemadmodum bene exercitatus miles prælium cupit, ita formidat indoctus; nam ſciendum eſt in pugnâ uſum amplius prodeſſe quàm vires*; As the well-practiſed ſoldier deſires to come to battel, ſo the raw one fears it: for we muſt underſtand, that in fight it more

more avails to have been accuſtomed unto the like, than only to have rude ſtrength. What manner of men the *Perſians* were, *Alexander* diſcovered in the firſt encounter, before which time it is ſaid, by thoſe that writ his ſtory, that it was hard to judge, whether his daring to undertake the conqueſt of an empire ſo well peopled, with a handful of men, or the ſucceſs he had, were more to be wonder'd at. For at the river of *Granick*, which ſevereth the territory of *Troy* from *Propontis*, the *Perſians* ſought to ſtop his paſſage, taking the higher ground and bank of the river to defend, which *Alexander* was forced (as it were) to climb up unto, and ſcale from the level of the water; great reſiſtance (ſaith *Curtius*) was made by the *Perſians*, yet in the end *Alexander* prevailed. But it ſeems to me, that the victory then gotten was exceeding eaſy, and that the twenty thouſand *Perſian* foot-men ſaid to be ſlain, were rather kill'd in the back in running away, than hurt in the boſoms by reſiſting. For had thoſe twenty thouſand foot, and two hundred and fifty horſe-men, or, after *Plutarch*, two thouſand and five hundred horſe-men, died with their faces towards the *Macedonians*, *Alexander* could not have bought their lives at ſo ſmall a rate as with the loſs of four and thirty of all ſorts of his own. And if it were alſo true, that *Plutarch* doth report, how *Alexander* encounter'd two of the *Perſian* commanders *Spithridates* and *Rhœſaces*, and that the *Perſian* horſe-men fought with great fury, tho' in the end ſcattered; and laſtly, how thoſe *Grecians* in *Darius*'s pay, holding themſelves in one body upon a piece of ground of advantage did (after mercy was refuſed them) fight it ought to the laſt; how doth it then reſemble truth, that ſuch reſiſtance having been made, yet of *Alexander*'s army there fell but twelve foot-men, and two and twenty horſe-men.

SECT. III.

A digreſſion concerning the defence of hard paſſages. Of things following the battel of Granick.

THE winning of this paſſage did greatly encourage the *Macedonians*, and brought ſuch terror upon all thoſe of the leſſer *Aſia*, as he obtained all the kingdoms thereof without a blow, ſome one or two towns excepted. For in all invaſions, where the nations invaded have once been beaten upon a great advantage of the place, as in defence of rivers, ſtreights and mountains, they will ſoon have perſuaded themſelves, that ſuch an enemy, upon equal terms and even ground, can hardly be reſiſted. It was therefore *Machiavel*'s counſel, that he, which reſolveth to defend a paſſage, ſhould with his ableſt force oppoſe the aſſailant. And to ſay truth, few regions of any great circuit are ſo well fenced, that armies of ſuch force as may be thought ſufficient to conquer them can be debarred all entrance by the natural difficulty of the ways. One paſſage or other is commonly left unguarded: if all be defended, then muſt the forces of the country be diſtracted, and yet likely ſome one place will be found that is defended very weakly. How often have the *Alps* given way to armies breaking into *Italy*? Yea, where ſhall we find that ever they kept out an invader? Yet are they ſuch, as (to ſpeak briefly) afflict with all difficulties thoſe that travel over them; but they give no ſecurity to thoſe that lye behind them: for they are of too large extent. The towns of *Lombardy* perſuaded themſelves that they might enjoy their quiet, when the warlike nation of the *Switzers* had undertaken to hinder *Francis* the *French* king from deſcending into the duchy of *Milan*: but whilſt theſe patrons of *Milan*, whom their own dwelling in thoſe mountains had made fitteſt of all other for ſuch a ſervice, were buſied in cuſtody of the *Alps*, *Francis* appeared in *Lombardy*, to ſo much the greater terror of the inhabitants, by how much the leſs they had expected his arrival. What ſhall we ſay of thoſe mountains, which lock up whole regions in ſuch ſort, as they leave but one gate open? The ſtreights, or (as they were called) the gates of *Taurus* in *Cilicia*, and thoſe of *Thermopylæ*, have ſeldom been attempted, perhaps becauſe they were thought impregnable: but how ſeldom (if ever) have they been attempted in vain? *Xerxes*, and, long after him the *Romans*, forced the entrance of *Thermopylæ*, *Cyrus* the younger, and after him *Alexander*, found the gates of *Cilicia* wide open; how ſtrongly ſoever they had been locked and barred, yet were thoſe countries open enough to a fleet that ſhould enter on the backſide. The defence of rivers, how hard a thing it is, we find examples in all hiſtories that bear good witneſs. The deepeſt have many fords; the ſwifteſt and broadeſt may be paſſed by boats, in caſe it be found a matter of difficulty to make a bridge. He that hath men enough to defend all the length of his own bank, hath alſo enough to beat his enemy; and may therefore do better to let him come over, to his loſs, than by ſtriving in vain to hinder the paſſage, as a matter tending to his own diſadvantage, fill the heads of his ſoldiers with an opinion that they are in an ill caſe, having their means of ſafeguard taken from them, by the ſkill or valour of ſuch as are too good for them. Certainly if a river were ſufficient defence againſt an army, the iſle of *Mona*, now called *Angleſey*, which is divided from north-*Wales* by an arm of the ſea, had been ſafe enough againſt the *Romans* invading it under conduct of *Julius Agricola*. But he wanting, and not meaning to ſpend the time in making veſſels to tranſport his forces, did aſſay the fords; whereby he ſo amazed the enemies attending for ſhips and ſuch like proviſion by ſea, that ſurely believing nothing could be hard or invincible to men, which came ſo minded to war, they humbly intreated for peace, and yielded the iſland. Yet the *Britons* were men ſtout enough; the *Perſians* very daſtards.

It was therefore wiſely done of *Alexander*, to paſs the river of *Granick* in face of the enemy; not marching higher to ſeek an eaſier way, nor labouring to convey his men over it by ſome ſafer means. For having beaten them upon their own ground, he did thereby cut off no leſs of their reputation than of their ſtrength, leaving no hope of ſuccour to the partakers and followers of ſuch unable protectors.

Soon after this victory he recovered *Sardis*, *Epheſus*, the cities of the *Trallians* and *Magneſia*, which were render'd unto him. The inhabitants of which, with the people of the country, he received with great grace, ſuffering them to be governed by their own laws. For he obſerved it well; *Novum imperium inchoantibus utilis clementiæ fama*; It is commodious unto ſuch as lay the foundation of a new ſoveraignty to have the fame of being merciful. He then by *Parmenio* won *Miletus*, and by force maſter'd *Halicarnaſſus*, which, becauſe it reſiſted obſtinately, he razed to the ground. From whence he enter'd into *Caria*, where *Ada* the queen, who had been caſt out of all that ſhe held (except the city of *Alinda*) by *Darius*'s lieutenants, preſented her ſelf unto him, and adopted him her ſon and ſucceſſor; which *Alexander* ac-

cepted in ſo gracious part, as he left the whole kingdom to her diſpoſing. He then entered into *Lycia* and *Pamphylia*, and obtained all the ſea-coaſts, and ſubjecting unto him *Piſidia*, he directed himſelf towards *Darius* (who was ſaid to be advanced towards him with a marvellous army) by the way of *Phrygia:* for all the province of *Aſia* the leſs, bordering upon the ſea, his firſt victory laid under his feet.

While he gave order for the government and ſetling of *Lycia*, and *Pamphylia*, they ſent *Cleander* to raiſe ſome new companies in *Peloponneſus*, and marching towards the north, he enter'd *Celenas*, ſeated on the river *Meander*, which was abandoned unto him, the caſtle only holding out, which alſo after forty days was given up: for ſo long time he gave them to attend ſuccour from *Darius*. From *Celenas* he paſs'd on through *Phrygia* towards the *Euxine* ſea, till he came to a city called *Gordium*, the regal ſeat, in former times, of king *Midas*. In this city it was that he found the *Gordian* knot, which when he knew not how to undo, he cut it aſunder with his ſword: for there was an ancient prophecy did promiſe to him that could untie it, the lordſhip of all *Aſia*; whereupon *Alexander*, not reſpecting the manner how, ſo it were done, aſſumed to himſelf the fulfilling of the prophecy, by hewing it in pieces.

But before he turned from this part of *Aſia* the leſs towards the eaſt, he took care to clear the ſea-coaſt on his back, and to thruſt the *Perſians* out of the iſlands of *Lesbos*, *Scio*, and *Coos*, the charge whereof he committed unto two of his captains, giving them ſuch order as he thought to be moſt convenient for that ſervice; and delivering unto them fifty talents to defray the charge; and withal, out of his firſt ſpoil gotten, he ſent threeſcore talents more to *Antipater* his lieutenant in *Greece*, and *Macedon*. From *Celenas* he removed to *Ancyra*, now called *Anguri*, ſtanding on the ſame river of *Sangarius*, which runneth through *Gordium:* there he muſter'd his army, and then enter'd *Paphlagonia*, whoſe people ſubmitted themſelves unto him, and obtained freedom of tribute: where he left *Catus* governour, with one regiment of *Macedonians* lately arrived.

Here he underſtood of the death of *Memnon*, *Darius*'s lieutenant, which heartned him greatly to paſs on towards him, for of this only captain he had more reſpect than of all the multitude by *Darius* aſſembled, and of all the commanders he had beſides. For ſo much hath the ſpirit of ſome one man excelled, as it hath undertaken and effected the alteration of the greateſt ſtates and commonwealths, the erection of monarchies, the conqueſt of kingdoms and empires, guided handfuls of men againſt multitudes of equal bodily ſtrength, contriv'd victories beyond all hope and diſcourſe of reaſon, converted the fearful paſſions of his own followers into magnanimity, and the valour of his enemies into cowardiſe; ſuch ſpirits have been ſtirred up in ſundry ages of the world, and in divers parts thereof, to erect and caſt down again, to eſtabliſh and to deſtroy, and to bring all things, perſons and ſtates to the ſame certain ends, which the infinite ſpirit of the univerſal, piercing, moving, and governing all things hath ordained. Certainly the things that this king did were marvellous, and would hardly have been undertaken by any man elſe: and though his father had determined to have invaded the leſſer *Aſia*, it is like enough that he would have contented himſelf with ſome part thereof, and not have diſcovered the river of *Indus*, as this man did. The ſwift courſe of victory, wherewith he ran over ſo large a portion of the world, in ſo ſhort a ſpace, may juſtly be imputed unto this, that he was never encounter'd by an equal ſpirit, concurring with equal power againſt him. Hereby it came to paſs, that his actions, being limited by no greater oppoſition than deſart places, and the mere length of tedious journeys could make, were like the *Coloſſus* of *Rhodes*, not ſo much to be admired for the workmanſhip, though therein alſo praiſe-worthy, as for the huge bulk. For certainly the things performed by *Xenophon*, diſcover as brave a ſpirit as *Alexander*'s, and working no leſs exquiſitely, though the effects were leſs material, as were alſo the forces and power of command, by which it wrought. But he that would find the exact pattern of a noble commander, muſt look upon ſuch as *Epaminondas*, that encountering worthy captains, and thoſe better followed than themſelves, have by their ſingular virtue overtopped their valiant enemies, and ſtill prevailed over thoſe that would not have yielded one foot to any other. Such as theſe are do ſeldom live to obtain great empires; for it is a work of more labour and longer time, to maſter the equal forces of one hardy and well-ordered ſtate, than to tread down and utterly ſubdue a multitude of ſervile nations, compounding the body of a groſs unweildy empire. Wherefore theſe *parvo potentes* men, that with little have done much upon enemies of like ability, are to be regarded as choice examples of worth; but great conquerors, to be rather admired for the ſubſtance of their actions, than the exquiſite managing: exactneſs and greatneſs concurring ſo ſeldom, that I can find no inſtance of both in one, ſave only that brave *Roman Ceſar*.

Having thus far digreſſed, it is now time that we return unto our eaſtern conqueror, who is traveling haſtily towards *Cilicia*, with a deſire to recover the ſtreights thereof before *Darius* ſhould arrive there. But firſt making a diſpatch into *Greece*, he ſent to thoſe cities, in which he repoſed moſt truſt, ſome of the *Perſian* targets which he had recovered in his firſt battel; upon which, by certain inſcriptions, he made them partakers of his victory. Herein he well adviſed himſelf; for he that doth not as well impart of the honour which he gaineth in the wars, as he doth of the ſpoils, ſhall never be long followed by thoſe of the better ſort. For men, which are either well born or well bred, and have more of wealth than of reputation, do as often ſatisfy themſelves with the purchaſe of glory, as the weak in fortune, and ſtrong in courage, do with the gain of gold and ſilver.

The governour of *Cilicia* hearing of *Alexander*'s coming on, left ſome companies to keep the ſtreights, which were indeed very defenſible; and withal, as *Curtius* noteth, he began over-late to prize and put in execution the counſel of *Memnon:* who in the beginning of the wars adviſed him to waſte all the proviſions for men and horſe, that could not be lodged in ſtrong places, and always to give ground to the invader, till he found ſome ſuch notable advantage as might aſſuredly promiſe him the obtaining of victory. For the fury of an invading army is beſt broken by delays, change of diet and want, eating ſometimes too little and ſometimes too much, ſometimes repoſing themſelves in beds and oftener upon the cold ground. Theſe and the like ſudden alterations bring many diſeaſes upon all nations out of their own countries. Therefore, if *Darius* had kept the *Macedonians* but a while from meat and ſleep, and refuſing to give or take battel had wearied them with his light horſe, as the *Parthians* afterwards did the *Romans*, he might perchance have ſaved his own life and eſtate:

for

for it was one of the greateſt encouragements given by *Alexander* to the *Macedonians*, in the third and laſt fatal battel, that they were to fight with all the ſtrength of *Perſia* at once.

Xerxes, when he invaded *Greece* and fought abroad, in being beaten, loſt only his men; but *Darius* being invaded by the *Greeks*, and fighting at home, by being beaten, loſt his kingdom; *Pericles*, though the *Lacedemonians* burnt all in *Attica* to the gates of *Athens*, yet could not be drawn to hazard a battel: for the invaded ought evermore to fight upon the advantage of time and place. Becauſe we read hiſtories to inform our underſtanding by the examples therein found, we will give ſome inſtances of thoſe that have periſhed by adventuring in their own countries to charge an invading army. The *Romans*, by fighting with *Hannibal*, were brought to the brink of their deſtruction.

Pompey was well adviſed for a while, when he gave *Ceſar* ground, but when by the importunity of his captains he adventured to fight at *Pharſalia*, he loſt the battel, loſt the freedom of *Rome*, and his own life.

Ferdinand, in the conqueſt of *Naples*, would needs fight a battel with the *French* to his confuſion, tho' it was told him by a man of ſound judgment, that thoſe counſels which promiſe ſurety in all things are honourable enough.

The conſtable of *France* made fruſtrate the mighty preparation of *Charles* V, when he invaded *Provence*, by waſting the country, and forbearing the fight; ſo did the duke of *Alva* weary the *French* in *Naples*, and diſſolve the boiſterous army of the prince of *Orange* in the low countries.

The *Leigers*, contrary to the advice of their general, would needs fight a battel with the *Bourgonians*, invading their country, and could not be perſwaded to linger the time, and ſtay their advantage; but they loſt eight and twenty thouſand upon the place. *Philip* of *Valois* ſet upon king *Edward* at *Creſſy*, and king *John* (when the *Engliſh* were well near tired out, and would in ſhort time by an orderly purſuit have been waſted to nothing) conſtrained the black prince with great fury, near *Poictiers* to join battel with him: But all men know what lamentable ſucceſs theſe two *French* kings found. *Charles* V. of *France* made another kind of *Fabian* warfare; and though the *Engliſh* burnt and waſted many places, yet this king held his reſolution to forbear blows, and followed his advice which told him, That the *Engliſh* could never get his inheritance by ſmoke; and it is reported by *Bellay* and *Herrault*, that king *Edward* was wont to ſay of *Charles*, that he won from him the duchy of *Guienne* without ever putting on his armour.

But where God hath a purpoſe to deſtroy, wiſe men grow ſhort-lived, and the charge of things is committed unto ſuch as either cannot ſee what is for their good, or know not how to put in execution any ſound advice. The courſe which *Memnon* had propounded muſt, in all appearance of reaſon, have brought the *Macedonian* to a great perplexity, and made him ſtand ſtill a while at the ſtreights of *Cilicia*, doubting whether it were more ſhameful to return, or dangerous to proceed. For had *Cappadocia* and *Paphlagonia* been waſted whilſt *Alexander* was far off, and the ſtreights of *Cilicia* been defended by *Arſenes*, governour of that province, with the beſt of his forces; hunger would not have ſuffered the enemy to ſtay the tryal of all means that might be thought upon of forcing that paſſage; or if the place could not have been maintained, yet might *Cilicia* at better leiſure have been ſo throughly ſpoiled, that the heart of his army ſhould have been broken, by ſeeking out miſeries by painful travel.

But *Arſenes* leaving a ſmall number to defend the ſtreights, took the beſt of his army with him, to waſte and ſpoil the country, or rather, as may ſeem, to find himſelf ſome work, by pretence of which he might honeſtly run further away from *Alexander*. He ſhould rather have adventured his perſon in cuſtody of the ſtreights, whereby he might perhaps have ſaved the province; and in the mean time, all that was in the fields would have been conveyed into ſtrong towns. So ſhould his army, if it were driven from the place of advantage, have found good entertainment within walled cities, and himſelf with his horſemen have had the leſs work in deſtroying that little which was left abroad. Handling the matter as he did, he gave the *Cilicians* cauſe to wiſh for *Alexander's* coming, and as great cauſe to the keepers of the paſſage not to hinder it. For cowards are wiſe in apprehending all forms of danger. Theſe guardians of the ſtreights, hearing that *Arſenes* made all haſte to join himſelf with *Darius*, burning down all as he went, like one deſpairing of the defence, began to grow circumſpect, and to think that ſurely their general, who gave as loſt the country behind their backs, had expoſed themſelves unto certain death, as men that were good for nothing elſe but to dull the *Macedonian* ſwords. Wherefore not affecting to die for their prince and country (which honour they ſaw that *Arſenes* himſelf could well forbear) they ſpeedily followed the footſteps of their general, gleaning after his harveſt. Thus *Alexander* without labour got both the entrance of *Cilicia*, abandoned by the cowardiſe of his enemies, and the whole province that had been alienated from the *Perſian* ſide by their indiſcretion.

SECT. IV.

Of the unwarlike army levied by Darius *againſt* Alexander. *The unadviſed courſes which* Darius *took in this expedition. He is vanquiſhed at* Iſſus; *where his mother, wife, and children are made priſoners. Of ſome things following the battel of* Iſſus.

IN the mean ſeaſon *Darius* approached, who (as *Curtius* reports) had compounded an army of more than two hundred and ninety thouſand ſoldiers, out of divers nations: *Juſtin* muſters them at three hundred thouſand foot, and an hundred thouſand horſe; *Plutarch* at ſix hundred thouſand.

The manner of his coming on, as *Curtius* deſcribes it, was rather like a maſker than a man of war; and like one that took more care to ſet out his glory and riches, than to provide for his own ſafety, perſwading himſelf, as it ſeemed, to beat *Alexander* with pomp and ſumptuous pageants. For before the army there was carried the holy fire which the *Perſians* worſhipped, attended by their prieſts, and after them three hundred and threeſcore and five young men, anſwering the number of the days of the year, covered with ſcarlet; then the chariot of *Jupiter*, drawn with white horſes, with their riders cloathed in the ſame colour, with rods of gold in their hands; and after it, the horſe of the ſun. Next after theſe followed ten ſumptuous chariots, inlaid and garniſh'd with ſilver and gold; and then the vant-guard of their horſe, compounded of twelve ſeveral nations, which the better to avoid confuſion, did hardly underſtand each other's language, and theſe, marſhalled in the head of the reſt, being beaten, might ſerve very fitly to diſorder all

that

that followed them; in the tail of theſe horſes the regiment of foot marched, with the *Perſians* called immortal, becauſe if any died, the number was preſently ſupplied: and theſe were armed with chains of gold, and their coats with the ſame metal embroidered, whereof the ſleeves were garniſhed with pearls, baits either to catch the hungry *Macedonians* withal, or to perſwade them that it were great incivility to cut and to deface ſuch glorious garments. But it was well ſaid, *Sumptuoſe inductus miles, ſe virtute ſuperiorem aliis non exiſtimet, cum in præliis oporteat fortitudine animi, & non veſtimentis muniri, quoniam hoſtes veſtibus non debellantur*; Let no man think that he exceedeth thoſe in valour, whom he exceedeth in gay garments; for it is by men armed with fortitude of mind, and not by the apparel they put on, that enemies are beaten. And it was perchance from the *Roman Papyrius* that this advice was borrowed, who, when he fought againſt the *Samnites* in that fatal battel, wherein they all ſwore either to prevail or die, thirty thouſand of them having apparelled themſelves in white garments, with high creſts and great plumes of feathers, bad the *Roman* ſoldiers to lay aſide all fear: [a] *Non enim criſtas vulnera facere, & per picta atque aurata ſcuta tranſire Romanum pilum*; For theſe plumed creſts would wound nobody, and the *Roman* pile would bore holes in painted and gilded ſhields.

To ſecond this court-like company, fifteen thouſand were appointed more rich and glittering than the former, but apparelled like women (belike to breed the more terror) and theſe were honoured with the title of the king's kinſmen. Then came *Darius* himſelf, the gentlemen of his guard-robe riding before his chariot, which was ſupported with the gods of his nation, caſt and cut in pure gold; theſe the *Macedonians* did not ſerve, but they ſerved their turns of theſe, by changing their maſſy bodies into thin portable and current coin. The head of his chariot was ſet with precious ſtones, with two little golden idols, covered with an open-winged eagle of the ſame metal: the hinder part being raiſed high whereon *Darius* ſat, had a covering of ineſtimable value. This chariot of the king was followed with ten thouſand horſemen, their lances plated with ſilver, and their heads gilt; which they meant not to embrue in the *Macedonian* blood, for fear of marring their beauty. He had for the proper guard of his own perſon two hundred of the blood royal, blood too royal and precious to be ſpilt by any valorous adventure (I am of opinion that two hundred ſturdy fellows, like the *Switzers*, would have done him more ſervice) and theſe were back'd with thirty thouſand footmen, after whom again were led four hundred ſpare horſes for the king, which if he had meant to have uſed, he would have marſhalled ſomewhat nearer him.

Now followed the rearward, the ſame being led by *Siſygambis* the king's mother, and by his wife, drawn in glorious chariots, followed by a great train of ladies their attendants on horſeback, with fifteen waggons of the king's children, and the wives of the nobility, waited on by two hundred and fifty concubines, and a world of nurſes and eunuchs, moſt ſumptuouſly apparelled: by which it ſhould ſeem that *Darius* thought that the *Macedonians* had been comedians or tumblers; for this troop was far fitter to behold thoſe ſports than to be preſent at battels. Between theſe and a company of ſlight-armed ſlaves, with a world of valets, was the king's treaſure, charged on ſix hundred mules, and three hundred camels, brought, as it proved, to pay the *Macedonians*. In this ſort came the may-game-king into the field, incumbered with a moſt unneceſſary train of ſtrumpets, attended with troops of divers nations, ſpeaking divers languages, and for their numbers impoſſible to be marſhalled; and for the moſt part ſo effeminate, and ſo rich in gold and in garments, as the ſame could not but have encouraged the nakedeſt nation of the world againſt them. We find it in daily experience, that all diſcourſe of magnanimity, of national virtue, of religion, of liberty, and whatſoever elſe hath been wont to move and encourage virtuous men, hath no force at all with the common ſoldier, in compariſon of ſpoil and riches. The rich ſhips are boarded upon all diſadvantages, the rich towns are furiouſly aſſaulted, and the plentiful countries willingly invaded. Our *Engliſh* nation have attempted many places in the *Indies*, and run upon the *Spaniards* headlong, in hope of their royals of plate, and piſtolets, which had they been put to it upon the like diſadvantages in *Ireland*, or in any poor country, they would have turned their pieces and pikes againſt their commanders, conteſting that they had been brought without reaſon to the butchery and ſlaughter. It is true, that the war is made willingly, and for the moſt part with good ſucceſs, that is ordained againſt the richeſt nations; for as the needy are always adventurous, ſo plenty is wont to ſhun peril; and men that have well to live, do rather ſtudy how to live well, I mean wealthily, than care to die (as they call it) honourably. *Car où il n'y a rien à gagner que des coups volontiers, il n'y va pas*; No man makes haſte to the market, where there is nothing to be bought but blows.

Now, if *Alexander* had beheld this preparation before his conſultation with his ſoothſayers, he would have ſatisfy'd himſelf by the outſides of the *Perſians*, and never have looked into the entrails of beaſts for ſucceſs. For leaving the deſcription of this ſecond battel (which is indeed no-where well deſcribed, neither for the confuſion and haſty running away of the *Aſians* could be) we have enough by the ſlaughter that was made of them, and by the few that fell of the *Macedonians*, to inform us what manner of reſiſtance was made. For if it be true that threeſcore thouſand *Perſian* footmen were ſlain in this battel, with ten thouſand of their horſemen: or (as *Curtius* ſaith) an hundred thouſand footmen, with the ſame number of horſemen, and beſides this ſlaughter, forty thouſand taken priſoners, while of *Alexander*'s army there miſcarried but two hundred and fourſcore of all ſorts, of which numbers *Arianus* and other hiſtorians cut off almoſt the one half: I do verily believe that this ſmall number rather died with the over-travel and painstaking in killing their enemies, than by any ſtrokes received from them. And ſurely, if the *Perſian* nation (at this time degenerate, and the baſeſt of the world) had had any ſavour remaining of the ancient valour of their forefathers, they would never have ſold ſo good cheap, and at ſo vile a price, the mother, the wife, the daughters, and other the king's children, had their own honour been valued by them at nothing, and the king's ſafety and his eſtate at leſs. *Darius* by this time found it true what *Charidemus*, a baniſhed *Grecian* of *Athens*, had told him, when he made a view of his army about *Babylon*, to wit, that the multitude which he had aſſembled of divers nations, richly attired, but poorly armed, would be found more terrible to the inhabitants of the country, whom in paſſing by

[a] Liv. l. 10.

they

they would devour, than to the *Macedonians*, whom they meant to aſſail; who being all old and obedient ſoldiers, embattled in groſs ſquadrons, which they call their *Phalanx*, well covered with armour for defence, and furniſhed with weapons for offence of great advantage, would make ſo little account of his delicate *Perſians*, loving their eaſe and their palate, being withal ill armed and worſe diſciplined, as except it would pleaſe him to entertain (having ſo great abundance of treaſure to do it withal) a ſufficient number of the ſame *Grecians*, and ſo to encounter the *Macedonians* with men of equal courage, he would repent him over-late, as taught by the miſerable ſucceſs like to follow.

But this diſcourſe was ſo unpleaſing to *Darius* (who had been accuſtomed to nothing ſo much as to his own praiſes, and to nothing ſo little as to hear truth;) as he commanded that this poor *Grecian* ſhould be preſently ſlain: who, while he was aſundring in the tormentors hands, uſed this ſpeech to the king, that *Alexander*, againſt whom he had given this good counſel, ſhould aſſuredly revenge his death, and lay deſerved puniſhment upon *Darius* for deſpiſing his advice.

It was the ſaying of a wiſe man: *Deſperata ejus principis ſalus eſt, cujus aures ita formatæ ſunt, ut aſpera quæ utilia, nec quicquam niſi jucundum accipiat*; That prince's ſafety is in a deſperate caſe, whoſe ears judge all that is profitable to be too ſharp, and will entertain nothing that is unpleaſant.

For liberty in counſel is the life and eſſence of counſel; *Libertas conſilii eſt ejus vita, & eſſentia, qua erepta conſilium evaneſcit.*

Darius did likewiſe value at nothing the advice given him by the *Grecian* ſoldiers that ſerved him, who intreated him not to fight in the ſtraights: but had they been counſellors and directors in that war, as they were underlings and commanded by others, they had with the help of a good troop of horſemen been able to have oppoſed the fury of *Alexander*, without any aſſiſtance of the *Perſian* footmen. For when *Darius* was overthrown with all his cowardly and confuſed rabble, thoſe *Grecians*, under their captain *Amyntas*, held firm, and marched away in order, in deſpight of the vanquiſhers. Old ſoldiers are not eaſily diſmay'd: we read in hiſtories ancient and modern, what brave retreats have been made by them, tho' the reſt of the army in which they have ſerved, hath been broken.

At the battel of *Ravenna*, where the *Imperialiſts* were beaten by the *French*, a ſquadron of *Spaniards*, old ſoldiers, came off unbroken and undiſmay'd; whom when *Gaſton de Foix*, duke of *Nemures*, and nephew to *Lewis* the twelfth, charged, as holding the victory not entire by their eſcape, he was overturn'd and ſlain in the place. For it is truly ſaid of thoſe men, who, by being acquainted with dangers, fear them not: that, *Neglecto periculo imminentis mali opus ipſum quantumvis difficile aggrediuntur*; They go about the buſineſs it ſelf, how hard ſoever it be, not ſtanding to conſider of the danger, which the miſchief hanging over their heads may bring: and as truly of thoſe that know the wars but by hearſay: *Quod valentes ſunt & prævalentes ante pericula, in ipſis tamen periculis diſcedunt*; They have ability enough, and to ſpare, till dangers appear; but when peril indeed comes, they get them gone.

Theſe *Grecians* alſo, that made the retreat, adviſed *Darius* to retire his army into the plain of *Moſopotamia*, to the end that *Alexander* being entered into thoſe large fields, and great champions, he might have environed the *Macedonians* on all ſides with his multitude; and withal they counſelled him to divide that his huge army into parts, not committing the whole to one ſtroke of fortune, whereby he might have fought many battels, and have brought no greater numbers at once than might have been well marſhalled and conducted. But this counſel was ſo contrary to the cowardly affections of the *Perſians*, as they perſwaded *Darius* to environ the *Grecians* which gave the advice, and to cut them in pieces as traytors. The infinite wiſdom of God doth not work always by one and the ſame way, but very often in the alteration of kingdoms and eſtates, by taking underſtanding from the governours, ſo as they can neither give nor diſcern of counſels. For *Darius*, that would needs fight with *Alexander* upon a ſtraightened piece of ground, near unto the city of *Iſſus*, where he could bring no more hands to fight than *Alexander* could (who by the advice of *Parmenio* ſtaid there, as in a place of beſt advantage) was utterly overthrown, his treaſure loſt, his wife, mother, and children (whom the *Grecians* his followers had perſwaded him to leave in *Babylon*, or elſewhere) taken priſoners, and all their train of ladies ſpoiled of their rich garments, jewels, and honour. It is true, that both the queen, with her daughters, who had the good hap to be brought to *Alexander*'s preſence, were entertained with all reſpect due unto their birth, their honours preſerved, and their jewels and rich garments reſtored unto them; and tho' *Darius*'s wife was a moſt beautiful lady, and his daughters of excellent form, yet *Alexander* maſtered his affections towards them all: only it is reported out of *Ariſtobulus* the hiſtorian, that he embraced the wife of the valiant *Memnon*, her huſband lately dead, who was taken flying from *Damaſcus* by *Parmenio*, at which time the daughters of *Ochus*, who reigned before *Darius*, and the wives and children of all the nobility of *Perſia* in effect, fell into captivity; at which time alſo *Darius*'s treaſure (not loſt at *Iſſus*) was ſeized, amounting to ſix thouſand and two hundred talents of coin, and of bullion five hundred talents, with a world of riches beſides.

Darius himſelf leaving his brother dead, with divers others of his chief captains (caſting the crown from his head) hardly eſcaped.

After this overthrow given unto *Darius*, all *Phenicia* (the city of *Tyre* excepted) was yielded to *Alexander*, of which *Parmenio* was made governour.

Aradus, *Zidon*, and *Biblos*, maritimate cities of great importance, of which one *Strato* was king (but hated of the people) acknowledged *Alexander*. Good fortune followed him ſo faſt that it trod on his heels; for *Antigonus*, *Alexander*'s lieutenant in *Aſia* the leſs, overthrew the *Cappadocians*, *Paphlagonians*, and others lately revolted; *Ariſtodemus*, *Darius*'s admiral, had his fleet partly taken, and in part drowned by the *Macedonians* newly levied; the *Lacedemonians* that warred againſt *Antipater* were beaten; four thouſand of thoſe *Greeks* which made the retreat at the laſt battel, forſaking both the party of *Darius* and of *Alexander*, and led by *Amyntas* into *Egypt*, to hold it for themſelves, were buried there; for the time was not yet come to divide kingdoms.

Alexander, to honour *Ephiſtion*, whom he loved moſt, gave him power to diſpoſe of the kingdom of *Zidon*. A man of a moſt poor eſtate, that laboured to ſuſtain his life, being of the royal blood, was commended by the people unto him, who changed his ſpade into a ſcepter, ſo as he was beheld both a begger and a king in one and the ſame hour.

It was a good desire of this new king, when speaking to *Alexander*, he wish'd that he could bear his prosperity with the same moderation, and quietness of heart, that he had done his adversity; but ill done of *Alexander*, in that he would not perform in himself that which he commended in another man's desire; for it was a sign that he did but accompany, and could not govern, his felicity.

While he made some stay in those parts, he received a letter from *Darius*, importing the ransom of his wife, his mother, and his children, with some other conditions of peace; but such as rather became a conqueror, than one that had now been twice shamefully beaten, not vouchsafing, in his direction, to stile *Alexander* King. It is true, that the *Romans*, after that they had received an overthrow by *Pyrrhus*, returned him a more scornful answer upon the offer of peace, than they did before the trial of his force. But as their fortunes were then in the spring, so that of *Darius* had already cast leaf; the one resolved, well armed, and disciplined nation; the other cowardly and effeminate. *Alexander* disdained the offers of *Darius*, and sent him word, that he not only directed his letter to a king, but to the king of *Darius* himself.

SECT. V.

How Alexander *besieged and won the city of* Tyre.

ALEXANDER, coming near to the city of *Tyre*, received from them the present of a golden crown, with great store of victuals, and other presents, which he took very thankfully, returning them answer, that he desired to offer a sacrifice to *Hercules*, the protector of their city, from whom he was descended. But the *Tyrians* like not his company within their walls, but tell him, that the temple of *Hercules* was seated in the old city adjoining, now abandoned and desolate. To be short, *Alexander* resolved to enter it by force, and though it were a place in all mens opinion impregnable, because the island, whereon it was built, was eight hundred furlongs from the main; yet with the labour of many hands, having great store of stone from the old *Tyre*, and timber sufficient from *Libanus*, he filled the passage of the sea between the island and the main; which being more than once carried away by the strength of the sea upon a storm of wind, some time by the *Tyrians* fired, and some time torn asunder; yet with the help of his navy, which arrived (during the siege) from *Cyprus*, he overcame all difficulties, and prevailed, after he had spent seven months in that attempt. The *Tyrians*, in the beginning of the siege, had barbarously drowned the messengers sent by *Alexander*, persuading them to render the city, in respect whereof, and of the great loss of time and men, he put eight thousand to the sword, and caused two thousand of those that escaped the first fury, to be hanged on crosses on the sea-shore, and reserved for slaves (saith *Diodore*) thirteen thousand; [a] *Arianus* reckons them at thirty thousand. Many more had died, had not the *Zidonians*, that served [b] *Alexander*, conveyed great numbers away by shipping unto their own city.

Happy it was for *Apollo* that the town was taken; for one of the *Tyrians* having dreamt, that this god meant to forsake the city, they bound him fast with a golden chain to the idol of *Hercules*; but *Alexander*, like a gracious prince, loosened him again.

It is true, that it was a notable enterprise and difficult; but great things are made greater. For *Nabuchodonosor* had taken it before, and filled up the channel that lay between the island and the main.

The government of this territory he gave to *Philotas*, the son of *Parmenio*; *Cilicia* he committed to *Socrates* and *Andromachus*, lieutenant under *Parmenio*; *Ephestion* had the charge of the fleet, and was directed to find *Alexander* at *Gaza* towards *Egypt*.

SECT. VI.

How Darius *offered conditions of peace to* Alexander. Alexander *wins* Gaza; *and deals graciously with the* Jews.

IN the mean while *Darius* sends again to *Alexander*, sets before him all the difficulties of passing on towards the east, and layeth the loss of the last battel to the straitness of the place: he hoped to terrify him, by threatning to encompass him in the plain countries; he bids him to consider, how impossible it was to pass the rivers of *Euphrates*, *Tigris*, *Araxes*, and the rest, with all such other fearful things: for he, that was now filled with nothing but fear, had arguments enough of that nature to present unto another. All the kingdoms between the river of *Alys* and the *Hellespont*, he offered him in dower with his beloved daughter. But *Alexander* answered, that he offered him nothing but his own, and that which victory and his own virtue had possess'd him of: that he was to give conditions, and not to receive any; and that he having passed the sea it self, disdained to think of resistance in transporting himself over rivers. It is said, that *Parmenio*, who was now old and full of honour and riches, told the king, that were he *Alexander*, he would accept of *Darius*'s offers; to which *Alexander* answered, that so would he if he were *Parmenio*.

But he goes on towards *Egypt*, and coming before *Gaza*, *Betis*, a faithful servant to *Darius*, shuts the gate against him, and defends the town with an obstinate resolution, at the siege whereof *Alexander* received a wound in his shoulder, which was dangerous, and a blow on his leg with a stone: He found better men in this place than he did at the former battels; for he left so many of his *Macedonians* buried in the sands of *Gaza*, that he was forc'd to send for a new supply into *Greece*. Here it was that *Alexander* first began to change condition, and to exercise cruelty. For after that he had enter'd *Gaza* by assault, and taken *Betis* (whom [c] *Josephus* calls *Babemesis*) that was weakened with many wounds, and who never gave ground to the assailants, he bored holes through his feet, and caused him to be drawn about the streets, whilst he was yet alive; who being as valiant a man as himself, disdained to ask him either life, or remission of his torments. And what had he to countenance this his tyranny, but the imitation of his ancestor *Achilles*, who did the like to *Hector*? It is true, that cruelty hath always somewhat to cover her deformity.

From *Gaza* (saith [d] *Josephus*) he led his army towards *Jerusalem*, a city, for the antiquity and great fame thereof, well known unto him while he lay before *Tyre*: He had sent for some supply thither, which *Jaddus* the high priest, being subject and sworn to *Darius*, had refused him. The *Jews* therefore fearing his revenge, and unable to resist,

[a] Arian. [b] Just. l. 18. [c] Joseph. Ant. l. 11. c. 8. [d] L. 11. c. ult.

committed

committed the care of their eſtates and ſafety to *Jaddus*, who, being taught by God, iſſued out of the city covered with his pontifical robes, to wit, an upper garment of purple, embroidered with gold, with his miter, and the plate of gold wherein the name of God was written, the prieſts and levites in their rich ornaments, and the people in white garments, in a manner ſo unuſual, ſtately, and grave, as *Alexander* greatly admired it. *Joſephus* reports it, that he fell to the ground before the high prieſt, as reverencing the name of God, and that *Parmenio* reprehended him for it: howſoever it was, I am of opinion, that he became ſo confident in his enterprife, and ſo aſſured of the ſucceſs after the prophecy of *Daniel* had been read unto him, wherein he ſaw himſelf, and the conqueſt of *Perſia*, ſo directly pointed at, as nothing thenceforth could diſcourage him or daunt him. He confeſſed to *Parmenio* (ſaith *Joſephus*) that in *Dio*, a city of *Macedon*, when his mind laboured the conqueſt of *Aſia*, he ſaw in his ſleep ſuch a perſon as *Jaddus*, and ſo apparelled, profeſſing one and the ſame God, by whom he was encouraged to purſue the purpoſe he had in hand, with aſſurance of victory. This apparition, formerly apprehended only by the light of his phantaſy, he now beheld with his bodily eyes; wherewith he was ſo exceedingly pleaſed and emboldened, as contrary to the practice of the *Phenicians* (who hoped to have ſack'd and deſtroyed *Jeruſalem*) he gave the *Jews* all, and more than they deſired, both of liberty and immunity, with permiſſion to live under their own laws, and to exerciſe and enjoy their own religion.

SECT. VII.

Alexander *wins* Egypt, *and makes a journey to the temple of* Hammon.

FROM *Jeruſalem Alexander* turned again towards *Egypt*, and entered it, where *Darius*'s lieutenant, *Aſtaces*, received him, and delivered into his hand the city of *Memphis*, with eight hundred talents of treaſure, and all other the king's riches. By this we ſee that the king of *Perſia*, who had more of affection than of judgment, gave to the valianteſt man he had but the command of one city, and to the verieſt coward the government of all *Egypt*. When he had ſet things in order in *Egypt*, he began to travel after *Godhead*, towards *Jupiter Hammon*; ſo fooliſh had proſperity made him. He was to paſs over the dangerous and dry ſands, where, when the water which he brought on his camel's back was ſpent, he could not but have periſhed, had not a marvellous ſhower of rain fallen upon him, when his army was in extreme deſpair. All men that know *Egypt*, and have written thereof, affirm, that it never rains there; but the purpoſes of the mighty God are ſecret, and he bringeth to paſs what it pleaſeth him; for it is alſo ſaid, that when he had loſt his way in thoſe vaſt deſarts, that a flight of crows flew before the army; who making faſter wing when they were followed, and fluttering ſlowly when the army was caſt back, guided them over thoſe pathleſs ſands to *Jupiter*'s temple.

[a] *Arianus*, from the report of *Ptolemy*, the ſon of *Lagus*, ſays, that he was led by two dragons, both which reports may be alike true; but many of thoſe wonders and things prodigious, are feigned by thoſe that have written the ſtory of *Alexander*; as, that an eagle lay hovering directly over his head at the battel of *Iſſus*; that a ſwallow flew about his head when he ſlept, and could not be affrighted from him, till it had wakened him, at *Halicarnaſſeus*, fore-ſhewing the treaſon of *Eropus*, practiſed by *Darius* to have ſlain him; that from the iron bars, of which the *Tyrians* made their defenſive engines when *Alexander* beſieged them, there fell drops of blood; and that the like drops were found in a loaf of bread, broken by a *Macedonian* ſoldier, at the ſame time; that a turf of earth fell on his ſhoulder, when he lay before *Gaza*, out of which there flew a bird into the air. The *Spaniards*, in the conqueſt of the *Weſt-Indies*, have many ſuch pretty tales; telling how they have been aſſiſted in battel, by the preſence of our lady, and by angels riding on white horſes, with the like *Romiſh* miracles, which I think themſelves do hardly believe. The ſtrangeſt things that I have read of in this kind, being certainly true, was, that the night before the battel of *Novara*, all the dogs which followed the *French* army, ran from them to the *Switzers*, leaping and fawning upon them, as if they had been bred and fed by them all their lives; and in the morning following, *Trivulzi* and *Tremoville*, generals for *Lewis* the twelfth, were by theſe *Imperial Switzers* utterly broken and put to ruin.

The place of this idol of *Jupiter Hammon* is ill deſcribed by *Curtius*; for he bounds it by the *Arabian* troglodites on the ſouth, between whom and the territory of *Hammon*, the region *Thebais*, or the ſuperior *Egypt*, with the mountains of *Libya*, and the river of *Nilus*, are interjacent, and on the north he joins it to a nation, called *Naſſamones*, who bordering the ſea-ſhore, live (ſaith he) upon the ſpoils of ſhipwrack; whereas the temple or grove of this idol hath no ſea near it by two hundred miles and more, being found on the ſouth part of [b] *Libya*; theſe *Naſſamones* being due weſt from it, in the ſouth part of *Marmarica*.

When *Alexander* came near the place, he ſent ſome of his paraſites before him to practiſe the prieſts attending the oracle, that their anſwer might be given in all things agreeable to his mad ambition, who affected the title of *Jupiter*'s ſon. And ſo he was ſaluted *ſon of Jupiter*, by the devil's prophet, whether prepared before to flatter him, or rather (as ſome think) defective in the *Greek* tongue; for whereas he meant to ſay *O-pai-dion*, he ſaid *O-pai-dios*; that is, *O ſon of Jupiter*, inſtead of, *O dear ſon:* For which grammatical error he was richly rewarded, and a rumour preſently ſpread, that the great *Jupiter* had acknowledged *Alexander* for his own.

He had heard that *Perſeus* and *Hercules* had formerly conſulted with this oracle; the one, when he was employed againſt *Gorgon*; the other, againſt *Anteus* and *Buſiris*; and ſeeing theſe men had derived themſelves from the gods, why might not he? By this it ſeems, that he hoped to make his followers and the world fools, though indeed he made himſelf one, by thinking to cover from the world's knowledge his vanities and vices; and the better to confirm his followers in the belief of his deity, he had practiſed the prieſts to give anſwer to ſuch as conſulted with the oracle, that it ſhould be pleaſing to [c] *Jupiter* to honour *Alexander* as his ſon.

Who this *Ammon* was, and how repreſented, either by a boſs carried in a boat, or by a ram, or a ram's head, I ſee that many wiſe men have troubled themſelves to find out; but, as *Arianus* ſpeaks of *Dionyſius*, or *Liber Pater* (who lived, ſaith St. *Auguſtine*, in *Moſes*'s time) *Ea quæ de diis veteres fabulis ſuis conſcripſêre, non ſunt nimium curiosè per-*

[a] Arian. l. 3. [b] Ptol. Aſiæ Tab. 3. [c] Curt. l. 4.

veſtiganda;

veſtiganda; We muſt not over-curiouſly ſearch into the fables which the ancients have written of their gods.

But this is certain and notable, that after the goſpel began to be preached in the world, the devil in this and in all other idols became ſpeechleſs. For that this *Hammon* was neglected in the time of *Tiberius Ceſar*, and in the time of *Trajan* altogether forgotten, *Strabo* and *Plutarch* witneſs.

There is found near this temple a fountain, called *Fons ſolis* (though *Ptolemy* in his third *African* table ſets it farther off) that at midnight it is as hot as boiling water, and at noon as cold as any ice, to which I cannot but give credit, becauſe I have heard of ſome other wells of like nature, and becauſe it is reported by St. *Auguſtine*, by *Diodore*, *Herodotus*, *Pliny*, *Mela*, *Solinus*, *Arianus*, *Curtius*, and others; and indeed our baths in *England* are much warmer in the night than in the day.

SECT. VIII.

How Alexander *marching againſt* Darius, *was oppoſed very unskilfully by the enemy.*

FROM the temple of *Hammon* he returned to *Memphis*, where among many other learned men he heard the philoſopher *Pſammones*, who, belike underſtanding that he affected the title of *Jupiter's* ſon, told him, that God was the father-king of all men in general; and, refining the pride of this haughty king, brought him to ſay, that God was the Father of all mortal men, but that he acknowledged none for his children ſave good men.

He gave the charge of the ſeveral provinces of *Egypt* to ſeveral governours, following the rule of his maſter [a]*Ariſtotle*, That *a great dominion ſhould not be continued in the hands of any one:* whom therein the *Roman* emperors alſo followed, not daring to commit the government of *Egypt* to any of their ſenators, but to men of meaner rank and degree. He then gave order for the founding of *Alexandria* upon the weſtermoſt branch of *Nilus*. And having now ſettled (as he could) the eſtate of *Egypt*, with the kingdoms of the leſſer *Aſia*, *Phenicia*, and *Syria* (which being but the pawns of *Darius*'s ill fortune, one happy victory would readily have redeemed) he led his army towards *Euphrates*, which paſſage, though the ſame was committed to *Mazeus* to defend, yet was it abandoned, and *Alexander* without reſiſtance paſſed it. From thence he marched towards *Tigris*, a river for the ſwiftneſs thereof called by the *Perſians*, the arrow. Here, as [b]*Curtius* and reaſon it ſelf tells us, might *Darius* eaſily have repelled the invading *Macedonian:* for the violent courſe of the ſtream was ſuch, as it drove before it many weighty ſtones, and thoſe that moved not, but lay in the bottom, were ſo round and well poliſhed by continual rolling, that no man was able to fight on ſo ſlippery a footing; nor the *Macedonian* footmen to wade the river, otherwiſe than by joining their hands and interlacing their arms together, making one weighty and entire body to reſiſt the ſwift paſſage and furious race of the ſtream. Beſides this notable help, the channel was ſo deep towards the eaſtern ſhore, where *Darius* ſhould have made head, as the foot-men were enforced to lift their bows and arrows and darts over their heads, to keep them from being moiſtened and made unſerviceable by the waters. But it was truly and underſtandingly ſaid of *Homer*,

Talis eſt hominum terreſtrium mens,
Qualem quotidie ducit pater virorumq; Deorumq;
The minds of men are ever ſo affected,
As by God's will they daily are directed.

And it cannot be denied, that as all eſtates of the world by the forfeit of miſgovernment have been ſubject to many grievous, and ſometimes mortal diſeaſes. So had the empire of *Perſia* at this time brought it ſelf into a burning aad conſuming fever, and thereby become frantick and without underſtanding, foreſhewing manifeſtly the diſſolution and death thereof.

But *Alexander* hath now recovered the eaſtern ſhores of *Tigris*, without any other difficulty than that of the nature of the place; where *Mazæus* (who had charge to defend the paſſage both of *Euphrates* and it) preſented himſelf to the *Macedonians*, followed with certain companies of horſemen, as if with uneven forces he durſt have charged them on even ground, when as with a multitude far exceeding them he forſook the advantage, which no valour of his enemies could eaſily have overcome. But it is commonly ſeen, that fearful and cowardly men do ever follow thoſe ways and counſels, whereof the opportunity is already loſt.

It is true, that he ſet all proviſions a fire wherewith the *Macedonians* might ſerve themſelves over *Tigris*, thinking thereby greatly to have diſtreſſed them; but the execution of good counſel is fruitleſs when unſeaſonable. For now was *Alexander* ſo well furniſhed with carriages, as nothing was wanting to the competency of the army which he conducted. Thoſe things alſo which he ſought to waſte, *Alexander* being now in ſight, were by his horſe-men ſaved and recovered. This *Mazeus* might have done ſome days before at good leiſure; or at this time with ſo great a ſtrength of horſemen, as the *Macedonians* durſt not have purſued them, leaving the ſtrength of their foot out of ſight, and far behind.

SECT. IX.

The new proviſions of Darius. *Accidents foregoing the battel of* Arbela.

DARIUS, upon *Alexander*'s firſt return out of *Egypt*, had aſſembled all the forces, which thoſe regions next him could furniſh, and now alſo were the *Arians*, *Scythians*, *Indians*, and other nations arrived; nations (ſaith *Curtius*) that rather ſerved to make up the names of men, than to make reſiſtance. *Arianus* hath numbered them with their leaders, and finds of foot-men of all ſorts ten hundred thouſand, and of horſe four hundred thouſand, beſides armed chariots, and ſome few elephants. *Curtius*, who muſters the army of *Darius* at two hundred thouſand foot, and near fifty thouſand horſe, comes (I think) nearer to the true number; and yet ſeeing that he had more confidence in the multitude than in the valour of his vaſſals, it is like enough that he had gathered together of all ſorts ſome three or four hundred thouſand, with which he hoped in thoſe fair plains of *Aſſyria* to have overborne the few numbers of the invading army. But it is a rule in the philoſophy of the war.

[c] *In omni prælio non tam multitudo, & virtus indocta, quam ars & exercitum ſolent præſtare victoriam*; In every battel ſkill and practice do more towards the victory, than multitude and rude audacity.

While *Alexander* gave reſt to his army after their paſſage over *Tigris*, there happened an eclipſe of the moon, of which the *Macedonians*, not knowing the cauſe and reaſon, were greatly affrighted. All

[a] Ariſt. Pol. l. 5. [b] Curt. l. 4. [c] Veget.

that

that were ignorant (as the multitude always are) took it for a certain preſage of their overthrow and deſtruction, inſomuch as they began not only to murmur, but to ſpeak it boldly, that for the ambition of one man, a man that diſdained *Philip* for his father, and would needs be called the ſon of *Jupiter*, they ſhould all periſh; for he not only enforced them to make war againſt worlds of enemies, but againſt rivers, mountains, and the heavens themſelves.

Hereupon *Alexander* being ready to march forward, made a halt; and, to quiet the minds of the multitude, he called before him the *Egyptian* aſtrologers, which followed him thence, that by them the ſoldiers might be aſſured that this defection of the moon was a certain preſage of good ſucceſs; for that it was natural they never imparted to the common people, but reſerved the knowledge to themſelves, ſo as a ſorry almanack-maker had been no ſmall fool in thoſe days.

Of this kind of ſuperſtitious obſervation *Ceſar* made good uſe, when he fought againſt *Arioviſtus* and the *Germans:* for they being perſwaded by the caſting of lots, that if they fought before the change of the moon, they ſhould certainly loſe the battel, *Ceſar* forced them to abide it, though they durſt not give it; wherein having their minds already beaten by their own ſuperſtition, and being reſolutely charged by the *Romans*, the whole army in effect periſhed.

Theſe *Egyptians* gave no other reaſon than this, that the *Grecians* were under the aſpect of the ſun, the *Perſians* of the moon; and therefore the moon failing and being darkened, the ſtate of *Perſia* was now in danger of falling, and their glory of being obſcured. This judgment of the *Egyptian* prieſts being noiſed through all the army, all were ſatisfied, and their courage redoubled. It is a principle in the war, which, though deviſed ſince, was well obſerved then: *Exercitum terrore plenum dux ad pugnam non ducat*; Let not a captain lead his army to the fight, when it is poſſeſſed with matter of terror. It is truly obſerved by *Curtius*, that the people are led by nothing ſo much as by ſuperſtition; yea, we find it in all ſtories, and often in our own, that by ſuch inventions, deviſed tales, dreams and prophecies, the people of this land have been carried head-long into many dangerous tumults and inſurrections, and ſtill to their own loſs and ruin.

As *Alexander* drew near the *Perſian* army, certain letters were ſurpriſed written by *Darius* to the *Grecians*, perſwading them for great ſums of money, either to kill or betray *Alexander*. But theſe, by the advice of *Parmenio*, he ſuppreſſed.

At this time alſo *Darius*'s fair wife, oppreſſed with ſorrow, and wearied with travel, died. Which accident *Alexander* ſeemed no leſs to bewail than *Darius*, who upon the firſt bruit ſuſpected that ſome diſhonourable violence had been offered her; but being ſatisfied, by an eunuch of his own that attended her, of *Alexander*'s kingly reſpect towards her, from the day of her being taken, he deſired the immortal Gods, that if they had decreed to make a new maſter of the *Perſian* empire, then it would pleaſe them to confer it on ſo juſt and continent an enemy as *Alexander*, to whom he once again, before the laſt tryal of battel, offered theſe conditions of peace.

That with his daughter in marriage he would deliver up and reſign all *Aſia* the leſs, and with *Egypt*, all thoſe kingdoms between the *Phenician* ſea, and the river of *Euphrates*; that he would pay him for the ranſom of his mother, and his other daughters, thirty thouſand talents, and that for the performance thereof, he would leave his ſon *Occhus* in hoſtage: to this they ſought to perſwade *Alexander* by ſuch arguments as they had. *Alexander* cauſing the embaſſadors to be removed, adviſed with his council, but heard no man ſpeak but *Parmenio*, the very right hand of his good fortune; who perſwaded him to accept of theſe fair conditions. He told him, that the empire between *Euphrates* and *Helleſpont* was a fair addition to *Macedon*; that the retaining of the *Perſian* priſoners was a great cumber, and the treaſure offered for them of far better uſe than their perſons, with divers other arguments; all which *Alexander* rejected. And yet it is probable, that if he had followed his advice, and bounded his ambition within thoſe limits, he might have lived as famous for virtue as for fortune, and left himſelf a ſucceſſor of able age to have enjoyed his eſtate, which afterward, indeed, he much enlarged, rather to the greatning of others than himſelf: who, to aſſure themſelves of what they had uſurped upon his iſſues, left not one of them to draw breath in the world within a few years after. The truth is, that *Alexander*, in going ſo far into the eaſt, left behind him the reputation which he brought out of *Macedon*; the reputation of a juſt and prudent prince, a prince temperate, adviſed, and grateful: and, being taught new leſſons by abundance of proſperity, became a lover of wine, of his own flattery, and of extreme cruelty. Yea, as *Seneca* hath obſerved, the taint of one unjuſt ſlaughter, amongſt many, defaced and withered the flouriſhing beauty of all his great acts and glorious victories obtained. But the *Perſian* embaſſadors ſtay his anſwer, which was to this effect: that whatſoever he had beſtowed on the wife and children of *Darius*, proceeded from his own natural clemency and magnanimity, without all reſpect to their maſter; thanks to an enemy was improper; that he made no wars againſt adverſity, but againſt thoſe that reſiſted him; not againſt women and children, but againſt armed enemies: and although by the reiterated practice of *Darius* to corrupt his ſoldiers, and by great ſums of money to perſwade his friends to attempt upon his perſon, he had reaſon to doubt that the peace offered was rather pretended than meant; yet he could not (were it otherwiſe and faithful) reſolve in haſte to accept the ſame, ſeeing *Darius* had made the war againſt him, not as a king with royal and overtforce, but as a traytor by ſecret and baſe practice: that for the territory offered him, it was already his own, and if *Darius* could beat him back again over *Euphrates*, which he had already paſs'd he would then believe that he offered him ſomewhat in his own power: otherwiſe he propounded to himſelf for the reward of the war which he had made, all thoſe kingdoms as yet in *Darius*'s poſſeſſion, wherein, whether he were abuſed by his own hopes or no, the battel which he meant to fight in the day following ſhould determine. For in concluſion, he told them, that he came into *Aſia* to give, and not to receive; that the heavens could not hold two ſuns: and therefore if *Darius* could be content to acknowledge *Alexander* for his ſuperior, he might perchance be perſwaded to give him conditions fit for a ſecond perſon and his inferior.

SECT. X.

The battel of Arbela, *and that it could not be ſo ſtrongly fought as report hath made it.*

WITH this anſwer the embaſſadors return; *Darius* prepares to fight, and ſends *Mazæus* to defend a paſſage, which he never yet dared ſo much

much as to hazard. *Alexander* conſults with his captains; *Parmenio* perſwades him to force *Darius*'s campt by night, ſo that the multitude of enemies might not move terror in the *Macedonians*, being but few. *Alexander* diſdains to ſteal the victory, and reſolves to bring with him the day-light, to witneſs his valour. But it was the ſucceſs that made good *Alexander*'s reſolution, tho' the counſel given by *Parmenio* was more ſound: for it is a ground in war, *Si pauci neceſſario cum multitudine pugnare cogantur, conſilium eſt noctis tempore belli fortunam tentare.* Notwithſtanding, upon the view of the multitude at hand, he ſtaggers and entrenches himſelf upon a ground of advantage, which the *Perſian* had abandoned: and whereas *Darius*, for fear of ſurpriſe, had ſtood with his army in armour all the day, and forborn ſleep all the night; *Alexander* gave his men reſt and ſtore of food, for reaſon had taught him this rule in the war: *In pugna milites validius reſiſtunt, ſi cibo potuque refecti fuerint, nam fames intrinſecus magis pugnat, quam ferrum exterius*; Soldiers do the better ſtand to in fight, if they have their bellies full of meat and drink; for hunger within fights more eagerly than ſteel without.

The numbers which *Alexander* had, ſaith *Arianus*, were forty thouſand foot, and ſeven thouſand horſe; theſe belike were of the *European* army; for he had beſides both *Syrians*, *Indians*, *Egyptians*, and *Arabians*, that followed him out of thoſe regions. He uſed but a ſhort ſpeech to his ſoldiers to encourage them, and I think that he needed little rhetorick; for by the two former battels upon the river of *Granick* and in *Cilicia*, the *Macedonians* were beſt taught with what men they were to encounter. And it is a true ſaying; *Victoria victoriam parat, animumque victoribus auget, & adverſariis aufert*; One victory begets another, and puts courage into thoſe that have already had the better, taking ſpirit away from ſuch as have been beaten.

Arianus and *Curtius* make large deſcriptions of this battel, fought at *Gaugamela*; they tell us of many changes and re-changes; that the victory inclined ſometimes to the *Perſians*, ſometimes to the *Macedonians*; that *Parmenio* was in danger of being overthrown, who led the left wing; that *Alexander*'s rear-gard was broken, and his carriages loſt; that for the firſt and valorous encounters on both ſides, *Fortune* herſelf was long unreſolved on whom to beſtow the garland: and laſtly, that *Alexander* in perſon wrought wonders, being charged in his retreat. But, in concluſion, *Curtius* delivers us in account but three hundred dead *Macedonians*, in all this terrible days work; ſaying, that *Epheſtion*, *Perdiccas*, and others of name, were wounded. *Arianus* finds not a third part of this number ſlain; of the *Perſians* there fell forty thouſand (ſaith *Curtius*) thirty thouſand, according to *Arianus*: ninety thouſand, if we believe *Diodore*. But what can we judge of this great encounter, other than that, as in the two former battels, the *Perſians* upon the firſt charge ran away, and that the *Macedonians* purſued? for if of theſe four or five hundred thouſand *Aſians* brought into the field by *Darius*, every man had caſt but a dart, or a ſtone, the *Macedonians* could not have bought the empire of the eaſt at ſo eaſy a rate, as ſix or ſeven hundred men in three notorious battels. Certainly, if *Darius* had fought with *Alexander* upon the banks of *Euphrates*, and had armed but fifty or threeſcore thouſand of this great multitude, only with ſpades (for the moſt of all he had were fit for no other weapon) it had been impoſſible for *Alexander* to have paſs'd the river ſo eaſily, much leſs the river of *Tigris*. But, as a man whoſe empire God in his providence had determined, he abandoned all places of advantage, and ſuffered *Alexander* to enter ſo far into the bowels of his kingdom, as all hope and poſſibility of eſcape by retreat being taken from the *Macedonians*, they had preſented unto them the choice, either of death or victory; to which election *Darius* could no way conſtrain his own, ſeeing they had many large regions to run into from thoſe that invaded them.

SECT. XI.

Of things following the battel of Arbela. *The yielding of* Babylon *and* Suſa.

Darius, after the rout of his army, recovered *Arbela* the ſame night, better followed in his flight, than in the fight. He propounded unto them that ran after him his purpoſe of making a retreat into *Media*, perſwading them that the *Macedonians*, greedy of ſpoil and riches, would rather attempt *Babylon*, *Suſa*, and other cities, filled with treaſure, than purſue the vanquiſhed. This miſerable reſolution his nobility rather obeyed than approved.

Alexander, ſoon after *Darius*'s departure, arrives at *Arbela*, which, with a great maſs of treaſure and princely ornaments, was rendered unto him: for the fear which conducted *Darius* took nothing with it but ſhame and diſhonour. He, that had been twice beaten, ſhould rather have ſent his treaſure into *Media*, than brought it to *Arbela*, ſo near the place where he did abide the coming of his enemies; if he had been victorious, he might have brought it after him at leiſure; but being overcome, he knew it impoſſible to drive mules and camels laden with gold from the purſuing enemy, ſeeing himſelf, at the overthrow he had in *Cilicia*, caſt the crown from his head to run away with the more ſpeed. But errors are then beſt diſcerned, when moſt incurable; *Et præterita magis reprehendi poſſunt, quam corrigi*; It is eaſier to reprehend, than amend what is paſs'd.

From *Arbela* *Alexander* took his way towards *Babylon*, where *Mazeus*, in whom *Darius* had moſt confidence, rendered himſelf, his children, and the city. Alſo the captain of the caſtle, who was keeper of the treaſure, ſtrewed the ſtreets with flowers, burnt frankincenſe upon altars of ſilver as *Alexander* paſſed by, and delivered unto him whatſoever was committed to his truſt. The *Magi* (the *Chaldean* aſtrologers) followed this captain in great ſolemnity to entertain their new king: after theſe came the *Babylonian* horſemen, infinite rich in attire, but exceeding poor in warlike furniture. Between theſe (though not greatly to be feared) and himſelf, *Alexander* cauſed his *Macedonian* footmen to march. When he entered the caſtle, he admired the glory thereof, and the abundance of treaſure therein found, amounting to fifty thouſand talents of ſilver uncoined. The city it ſelf I have elſewhere deſcribed, with the walls, the towers, the gates, and the circuit, with the wonderful place of pleaſure about two miles in circuit, ſurrounded with a wall of fourſcore foot high, and on the top thereof (being under-borne with pillars) a grove of beautiful and fruitful trees, which it is ſaid that one of the kings of *Babylon* cauſed to be built, that the queen and other princeſſes might walk privately therein. [a] In this city, rich in all things, but moſt of all in vo-

a An. b. Alex.

luptuous

luptuous pleaſures, the king reſted himſelf and the whole army four and thirty days, conſuming that time in banqueting, and in all ſorts of effeminate exerciſe, which ſo much ſoftened the minds of the *Macedonians*, not acquainted till now with the like delicacies, as the ſevere diſcipline of war, which taught them the ſufferances of hunger and thirſt, of painful travel, and hard lodging, began rather to be forgotten, than neglected.

Here it was that thoſe bands of a thouſand ſoldiers were erected, and commanders appointed over them, who thereupon were ſtiled *Chiliarchi*. This new order *Alexander* brought in, was to honour thoſe captains which were found by certain ſelected judges to have deſerved beſt in the late war. For before this time the *Macedonian* companies conſiſted but of five hundred. Certainly the drawing down of the footbands in this latter age hath been the cauſe (ſaith the marſhal *Monluct*) that the title and charge of a captain hath been beſtowed on every *Picque Bœuf* or ſpurn-cow; for when the captains of foot had a thouſand ſoldiers under one enſign, and after that five hundred, as in the time of *Francis* the firſt, the title was honourable, and the kings were leſs charged, and far better ſerved. King *Henry* the eighth of *England* never gave the commandment of any of his good ſhips, but to men of known valour, and of great eſtate; nay, ſometimes he made two gentlemen of quality commanders in one ſhip: but all orders and degrees are fallen from the reputation they had.

While *Alexander* was yet in *Babylon*, there came to him a great ſupply out of *Europe*, for *Antipater* ſent him ſix thouſand foot, and five hundred horſe; out of *Macedon*, of *Thracians* three thouſand foot, and the like number of horſe; and out of *Greece*, four thouſand foot, and four hundred horſe; by which his army was greatly ſtrengthened: for thoſe that were infected with the pleaſures of *Babylon*, could hardly be brought again, *De quitter la plume pour dormir ſur la dure*; To change from ſoft beds to hard boards.

He left the caſtle and city of *Babylon* with the territories about it in charge with three of his own captains, to wit, *Agathon*, *Minetus*, and *Appolidorus*; to ſupply all wants a thouſand talents: but to grace *Mazeus*, who rendered the city unto him, he gave him the title of his lieutenant over all, and took with him *Bagiſtines* that gave up the caſtle, and having diſtributed to every ſoldier a part of the treaſure, he left *Babylon*, and entered into the province *Satrapene*: from thence he went on towards *Suſa* in *Perſia*, the ſame which *Ptolemy*, *Herodotus*, and *Elianus* call *Memnonia*, ſituate on the river *Euleus*, a city ſometime governed by *Daniel* the prophet. *Abulites* alſo, governour of this famous city, gave it up to the conqueror with fifty thouſand talents of ſilver in bullion, and twelve elephants for the war, with all other the treaſures of *Darius*. [a] In this ſort did thoſe vaſſals of fortune, lovers of the king's proſperity, not of his perſon (for ſo all ambitious men are) purchaſe their own peace and ſafety with the king's treaſures. And herein was *Alexander* well adviſed, that whatſoever titles he gave to the *Perſians*, yet he left all places of importance in truſt with his own captains; to wit, *Babylon*, *Suſa*, and *Perſepolis*, with other cities and provinces by him conquered; for if *Darius* (as yet living) had beaten the *Macedonians* but in one battel, all the nobility of *Perſia* would have returned to their natural lord. Thoſe that are traitors to their own kings, are never to be uſed alone in great enterpriſes by thoſe princes that entertain them, nor ever to be truſted with the defences of any frontier town, or fortreſs of weight, by the rendering whereof they may redeem their liberty and eſtates loſt. Hereof the *French* had experience, when *Don Pedro de Navarra*, being baniſhed out of *Spain*, was truſted with *Fonterabie*, in the year 1523.

While *Alexander* ſpoiled *Arbela*, *Mazeus* might have furniſhed the king from *Babylon*, and while he ſtaid four and thirty days at *Babylon*, *Abulites* might have holpen him from *Suſa*: and while he feaſted there, *Tiridates* from *Perſepolis* might have reliev'd him, for the great maſs of treaſure was laid up in that city. But who hath fought out and friended fearful adverſity? it is certain, that benefits bind not the ambitious, but the honeſt: for thoſe that are but greedy of themſelves, do in all changes of fortune only conſult the conſervation of their own greatneſs.

The government of *Suſa*, with the caſtle and treaſure, he committed to his own *Macedonians*, making *Abulites*, who rendered it unto him, his lieutenant, as he had done *Mazeus* and others, in giving them titles, but neither truſt nor power; for he left three thouſand old ſoldiers in garriſon to aſſure the place, and *Darius*'s mother and her children to repoſe themſelves.

It is ſaid, that *Charles* the fifth, having promiſed *Charles* of *Bourbon* the government of *Marſeilles*, if he could have forc'd it, and whereof he made ſure account, told ſome of his neareſt counſellers, that he meant nothing leſs than the performance of that promiſe, becauſe he ſhould thereby have left the duke (revolted from his maſter) very well wherewithal to have recovered his favour.

SECT. XII.

How Alexander *came to* Perſepolis, *and burnt it.*

FROM *Suſa Alexander* leadeth his army toward *Perſepolis*, and when he ſought to paſs thoſe mountains which ſunder *Suſiana* and *Perſia*, he was ſoundly beaten by *Ariobarzanes*, who defended againſt him thoſe ſtreights, called *Pylæ Perſidis*, or *Suſœidæ*; and after the loſs of many companies of his *Macedonians*, he was forced to ſave himſelf by retreat, cauſing his foot to march cloſe together, and to cover themſelves with their targets from the ſtones tumbled on them from the mountain-top. Yet in the end he found out another path, which a *Lycian*, living in that country, diſcovered unto him, and came thereby ſuddenly in view of *Ariobarzanes*, who being inforc'd to fight upon even ground, was by *Alexander* broken, whereupon he fled to *Perſepolis*, but (after that they of *Perſepolis* had refuſed to receive him) he returned and gave a ſecond charge upon the *Macedonians*, wherein he was ſlain. In like manner did king *Francis* the firſt, in the year 1515, find a way over the *Alps*, the *Switzers* undertaking to defend all the paſſages, who, if their footmanſhip had not ſaved them upon the king's deſcent on the other ſide, they had been ill paid for their hard lodging on thoſe hills.

Four thouſand *Greeks*, ſaith *Curtius* (*Juſtin* numbers them but at eight hundred) having been taken priſoners by the *Perſians*, preſented themſelves to *Alexander* now in ſight of *Perſepolis*. Theſe had the barbarous *Perſians* ſo maimed and defaced, by cutting off their hands, noſes, ears, and other members, as they could no way have been known to their countrymen, but by their voices;

[a] Diodore *ſpeaketh of more than* 40 *thouſand talents in bullion, and of* 9 *millions of gold.* Sub dorica forma exercitu.

to

to each of theſe *Alexander* gave three hundred crowns, with new garments, and ſuch lands as they liked to live upon.

Tiridates, one of *Darius*'s falſe-hearted grandees, hearing of *Alexander*'s approach, made him know that *Perſepolis* was ready to receive him, and prayed him to double his pace, becauſe there was a determination in the people to ſpoil the king's treaſure. This city was abandoned by many of her inhabitants upon *Alexander*'s arrival, and they that ſtaid, followed the worſt counſel; for all was left to the liberty of the ſoldiers, to ſpoil and kill at their pleaſure. There was no place in the world at that time, which, if it had been laid in the balance with *Perſepolis*, would have weighed it down. *Babylon*, indeed, and *Suſa*, were very rich; but in *Perſepolis* lay the bulk and main ſtore of the *Perſians*. For after the ſpoil that had been made of money, curious plate, bullion, images of gold and ſilver, and other jewels, there remained to *Alexander* himſelf one hundred and twenty thouſand talents. He left the ſame number of three thouſand *Macedonians* in *Perſepolis*, which he had done in *Suſa*, and gave the ſame formal honour to the traytor *Tiridates*, that he had done to *Abulites*; but he that had the truſt of the place was *Nicarides*, a creature of his own. The body of his army he left here for thirty days, of which the commanders were *Parmenio* and *Craterus*, and, with a thouſand horſe, and certain troops of choſen foot, he would needs view in the winter-time thoſe parts of *Perſia* which the ſnow had cover'd, a fruitleſs and fooliſh enterpriſe; but, as *Seneca* ſays, *Non ille ire vult, ſed non poteſt ſtare*; He hath not a will to go, but he is unable to ſtand ſtill. It is ſaid and ſpoken in his praiſe, that when his ſoldiers cried out againſt him, becauſe they could not endure the extreme froſt, and make way, but with extreme difficulty, through the ſnow, that *Alexander* forſook his horſe, and led them the way. But what can be more ridiculous than to bring other men into extremity, thereby to ſhew how well himſelf can endure it? His walking on foot did no otherwiſe take off their wearineſs that followed him, than his ſometimes forbearing to drink did quench their thirſt that could leſs endure it. For mine own little judgment, I ſhall rather commend that captain that makes careful proviſion for thoſe that follow him, and that ſeeks wiſely to prevent extreme neceſſity, than thoſe witleſs arrogant fools, that make the vaunt of having endured equally with the common ſoldier, as if that were a matter of great glory and importance.

We find in all the wars that *Ceſar* made, or the beſt of the *Roman* commanders, that the proviſion of victuals was their firſt care. For it was a true ſaying of *Coligni*, admiral of *France*, *That who ſo will ſhape that beaſt* (meaning war) *muſt begin with his belly*.

But *Alexander* is now returned to *Perſepolis*, where thoſe hiſtorians that were moſt amorous of his virtues, complain, that the opinion of his valour, of his liberality, of his clemency towards the vanquiſhed, and all other his kingly conditions, were drowned in drink; [a] that he ſmothered in carouſing cups all the reputation of his actions paſt; and that, by deſcending, as it were, from the reverend throne of the greateſt king, into the company and familiarity of baſe harlots, he began to be deſpiſed both of his own and all other nations. For being perſuaded, when he was inflamed with wine, by the infamous ſtrumpet *Thais*, he cauſed the moſt ſumptuous and goodly caſtle and city of *Perſepolis* to be conſumed with fire, notwithſtanding all the arguments of *Parmenio* to the contrary, who told him, that it was a diſhonour to deſtroy thoſe things by the perſuaſions of others, which by his proper virtue and force he had obtained; and that it would be a moſt ſtrong perſuaſion to the *Aſians*, to think hardly of him, and thereby alienate their hearts: For they might well believe that he, which demoliſhed the goodlieſt ornaments they had, meant nothing leſs than (after ſuch vaſtation) to hold their poſſeſſion: [b] *Fere vinolentiam crudelitas ſequitur*; Cruelty doth commonly follow drunkenneſs: For ſo it fell it out ſoon after, and often, in *Alexander*.

SECT. XIII.

The treaſon of Beſſus *againſt* Darius. Darius's *Death.*

ABOUT this time he received a new ſupply of ſoldiers out of *Cilicia*, and goes on to find *Darius* in *Media*. *Darius* had there compounded his fourth and laſt army, which he meant to have increaſed in *Bactria*, had he not heard of *Alexander*'s coming on, with whom (truſting to ſuch companies as he had, which was numbred at thirty or forty thouſand) he determined once again to try his fortune. He therefore calls together his captains and commanders, and propounds unto them his reſolution, who being deſperate of good ſucceſs, uſed ſilence for a while. *Artabazus*, one of his eldeſt men of war, who had ſometime lived with *Philip* of *Macedon*, brake the ice, and proteſting that he could never be beaten by any adverſity of the king's, from the faith which he had ever ow'd him, with firm confidence, that all the reſt were of the ſame diſpoſition (whereof they likewiſe aſſured *Darius* by the like proteſtation) he approved the king's reſolution. Two only, and thoſe the greateſt, to wit, *Naburzanes* and *Beſſus*, whereof the latter was governor of *Bactria*, had conſpired againſt their maſter, and therefore adviſed the king to lay a new foundation for the war, and to purſue it by ſome ſuch perſon for the preſent, againſt whom neither the gods nor fortune had in all things declar'd themſelves to be an enemy: This preamble *Naburzanes* uſed, and in concluſion, adviſed the election of his fellow-traytor *Beſſus*, with promiſe that, the wars ended, the empire ſhould again be reſtored to *Darius*. The king, ſwollen with diſdain, preſs'd towards *Naburzanes* to have ſlain him; but *Beſſus*, and the *Bactrians*, whom he commanded, being more in number than the reſt, with-held him. In the mean while, *Naburzanes* withdrew himſelf, and *Beſſus* followed him, making their quarter apart from the reſt of the army. *Artabazus*, the king's faithful ſervant, perſuaded him to be adviſed, and ſerve the time, ſeeing *Alexander* was at hand; and that he would at leaſt make ſhew of forgetting the offence made; which the king, being of a gentle diſpoſition, willingly yielded unto. *Beſſus* makes his ſubmiſſion, and attends the king, who removes his army. *Patron*, who commanded a regiment of four thouſand *Greeks*, which had in all the former battels ſerved *Darius* with great fidelity, and always made the retreat in ſpight of the *Macedonians*, offered himſelf to guard his perſon, proteſting againſt the treaſon of *Beſſus*; but it was not his deſtiny to follow their advice, who from the beginning of the war gave him faithful counſel; but he inclined ſtill to *Beſſus*, who told him, that the *Greeks*, with *Patron* their captain, were corrupted by *Alexander*, and practiſed the diviſion of his faith-

[a] Curt. l. 5. [b] Sen. Epiſt. 84.

ful

ful servants. *Bessus* had drawn unto him thirty thousand of the army, promising them all those things, by which the lovers of the world and themselves are wont to be allured, to wit, riches, safety, and honour.

Now the day following *Darius* plainly discover'd the purposes of *Bessus*, and being overcome with passion, as thinking himself unable to make head against these ungrateful and unnatural traitors, he pray'd *Artabazus*, his faithful servant, to depart from him, and to provide for himself. In like sort, he discharged the rest of his attendants; all, save a few of his eunuchs; for his guards had voluntarily abandoned him. His *Persians* being most base cowards, durst not undertake his defence against the *Bactrians*, notwithstanding that they had four thousand *Greeks* to join with them, who had been able to have beaten both nations. But it is true, that him which forsakes himself, no man follows. It had been far more man-like and king-like, to have died at the head of those four thousand *Greeks*, which offered him the disposition of their lives, (to which *Artabazus* perswaded him) than to have lain bewailing himself on the ground, and suffering himself to be bound like a slave by those ambitious monsters that laid hands on him, whom neither the consideration of his former great estate, nor the honours he had given them, nor the trust reposed in them, nor the world of benefits bestowed on them, could move to pity: no, nor his present adversity, which above all things should have moved them, could pierce their viperous and ungrateful hearts. Vain it was indeed to hope it, for infidelity hath no compassion.

Now *Darius*, thus forsaken, was bound and laid in a cart, covered with hides of beasts, to the end that by any other ornament he might not be discovered; and to add despight and derision to his adversity, they fastened him with chains of gold, and so drew him on among their ordinary carriages and carts. For *Bessus* and *Nabarzanes* perswaded themselves to redeem their lives and the provinces they held, either by delivering him a prisoner to *Alexander*, or if that hope failed, to make themselves kings by his slaughter, and then to defend themselves by force of arms. But they failed in both. For it was against the nature of God, who is most just, to pardon so strange villany, yea, though against a prince purely heathenish, and an idolater.

Alexander, having knowledge that *Darius* was retired towards *Bactria*, and durst not abide his coming, hasted after him with a violent speed; and because he would not force his foot-men beyond their powers, he mounted on horseback certain selected companies of them, and best armed, and with six thousand other horse, rather ran than marched after *Darius*. Such as hated the treason of *Bessus*, and secretly forsook him, gave knowledge to *Alexander* of all that had happened, informing him of the way that *Bessus* took, and how near he was at hand; for many men of worth daily ran from him. Hereupon *Alexander* again doubled his pace, and his vanguard being discovered by *Bessus*'s rear, *Bessus* brought a horse to the cart where *Darius* lay bound, perswading him to mount thereon, and to save himself. But the unfortunate king refusing to follow those that had betray'd him, they cast darts at him, wounded him to death, and wounded the beasts that drew him, and slew two poor servants that attended his person. This done, they all fled that could, leaving the rest to the mercy of the *Macedonian* swords.

Polystratus, a *Macedonian*, being by pursuit of the vanquished press'd with thirst, as he was refreshing himself with some water that he had discover'd, espying a cart with a team of wounded beasts breathing for life, and not able to move, searched the same, and therein found *Darius* bathing in his own blood. And by a *Persian* captive which followed this *Polystratus*, he understood that it was *Darius*, and was informed of this barbarous tragedy; *Darius* also seemed greatly comforted (if dying men, ignorant of the living God, can be comforted) that he cast not out his last sorrows unheard; but that by this *Macedonian*, *Alexander* might know, and take vengeance on those traitors, which had dealt no less unworthily than cruelly with him, recommending their revenge to *Alexander* by this messenger, which he besought him to pursue, not because *Darius* had desir'd it, but for his own honour, and the safety of all that did, or should after wear crowns. He also, having nothing else to present, rendered thanks to *Alexander* for the kingly grace used towards his wife, mother, and children, desiring the immortal gods to submit unto him the empire of the whole world. As he was thus speaking, impatient death pressing out his few remaining spirits, he desired water, which *Polystratus* presented him; after which he lived but to tell him, that of all the best things which the world had, which were lately in his power, he had nothing remaining but his last breath, wherewith to desire the gods to reward his compassion.

SECT. XIV.

How Alexander *pursued* Bessus, *and took into his grace* Darius*'s captains.*

IT was now hoped by the *Macedonians*, that their travels were near an end, every man preparing for his return. When *Alexander* had knowledge thereof, he was greatly grieved; for the bounded earth sufficed not his boundless ambition. Many arguments he therefore used to draw on his army farther into the east; but that which had most strength was, that *Bessus*, a most cruel traitor to his master *Darius*, having at his devotion the *Hyrcanians* and *Bactrians*, would, in short time (if the *Macedonians* should return) make himself master of the *Persian* empire, and enjoy the fruits of all their former travels. In conclusion, he won their consent to go on; which done, leaving *Craterus* with certain regiments of foot, and *Amyntas* with six thousand horse, in *Parthenia*, he enters, not without some opposition, into *Hyrcania*; for the *Mardons*, and other barbarous nations, defended certain passages for a while. He passed the river of *Zioberis*, which taking beginning in *Parthia*, dissolves it self in the *Caspian* sea: it runneth under the ledge of mountains which bound *Parthia* and *Hyrcania*, where, hiding it self under-ground for three hundred furlongs, it then riseth again, and followeth its former course. In *Zadracarta*, or *Zeudracarta*, the same city which *Ptolemy* writes *Hyrcania*, the metropolis of that region, he rested fifteen days, banqueting and feasting therein.

Phataphernes, one of *Darius*'s greatest commanders, with other of his best followers, submit themselves to *Alexander*, and were restored to their places and governments. But of all others, he graced *Artabazus* most highly, for his approved and constant faith to his master *Darius*. *Artabazus* brought with him ten thousand and five hundred *Greeks*, the remainder of all those that had served *Darius*: he treats with *Alexander* for their pardon,

before they were yet arrived; but in the end they ſurrender themſelves ſimply without promiſe or compoſition. He pardons all but the *Lacedemonians*, whom he impriſoned, their leader having ſlain himſelf: he was alſo wrought (though to his great diſhonour) to receive *Nabarzanes*, that had joined with *Beſſus* to murder *Darius*.

SECT. XV.

Of Thaleſtris, *Queen of the* Amazons; *where, by way of digreſſion, it is ſhewed, that ſuch* Amazons *have been, and are.*

HERE it is ſaid, that *Thaleſtris*, or *Minothea*, a queen of the *Amazons*, came to viſit him, and her ſuit was (which ſhe eaſily obtained) that ſhe might accompany him till ſhe were made with child by him; which done (refuſing to follow him into *India*) ſhe returned into her own country.

Plutarch citeth many hiſtorians, reporting this meeting of *Thaleſtris* with *Alexander*, and ſome contradicting it. But, indeed, the letters of *Alexander* himſelf to *Antipater*, recounting all that befell him in thoſe parts, and yet omitting to make mention of this *Amazonian* buſineſs, may juſtly breed ſuſpicion of the whole matter as forged. Much more juſtly may we ſuſpect it as a vain tale, becauſe an hiſtorian of the ſame time reading one of his books to *Lyſimachus* (then king of *Thrace*) who had followed *Alexander* in all his voyage, was laugh'd at by the king for inſerting ſuch news of the *Amazons*, as *Lyſimachus* himſelf had never heard of. One that accompanied *Alexander*, took upon him to write his acts; which to amplify, he told how the king had fought ſingle with an elephant, and ſlain it. The king hearing ſuch ſtuff, caught the book, and threw it into the river of *Indus*, ſaying, that it were well done to throw the writer after it, who, by inſerting ſuch fables, diſparaged the the truth of his great exploits. Yet, as we believe and know that there are elephants, though it were falſe that *Alexander* fought with one; ſo may we give credit unto writers, making mention of ſuch *Amazons*, whether it were true or falſe that they met with *Alexander*; as *Plutarch* leaves the matter undetermined. Therefore I will here take leave to make a digreſſion, as well to ſhew the opinions of the ancient hiſtorians, coſmographers, and others, as alſo of ſome modern diſcoverers, touching theſe warlike women; becauſe, not only *Strabo*, but many others of theſe our times, make doubt, whether or no there were any ſuch kind of people. [a] *Julius Solinus* ſeats them in the north parts of *Aſia* the leſs. *Pomp. Mela* finds two regions filled with them; the one on the river *Thermodoon*, the other near the *Caſpian* ſea; [b] *Quas* (ſaith he) *Sauromatidas appellant*; which the people call *Sauromatidas*. The former of theſe two had the *Cimerians* for their neighbours; *Certum eſt* (ſaith *Vadianus*, who hath commented upon *Mela*) *illos proximos Amazonibus fuiſſe*; it is certain that the *Cimerians* were the next nations to the *Amazons*. [c] *Ptolemy* ſets them farther into the land northwards, near the mountains *Hippaci*, not far from the pillars of *Alexander*. And that they had dominion in *Aſia* it ſelf toward *India*, *Solinus* and *Pliny* tell us; where they governed a people called the *Pandeans*, or *Padeans*, ſo called after *Pandea* the daughter of *Hercules*, from whom all the reſt derive themſelves. [d] *Claudian* affirms, that they commanded many nations: for he ſpeaks (largely perhaps as a poet) thus:

Medis levibuſque Sabæis
Imperat hic ſextus: Reginarumque ſub armis,
Barbariæ pars magna jacet.

Over the *Medes*, and light *Sabeans*, reigns
This female ſex: and under arms of queen,
Great part of the *Barbarian* land remains.

[e] *Diodorus Siculus* hath heard of them in *Libya*, who were more ancient (ſaith he) than thoſe which kept the banks of *Thermodoon*, a river falling into the *Euxine* ſea near *Heraclium*.

Herodotus doth alſo make report of theſe *Amazons*, whom he tells us that the *Scythians* call *Æorpatas*, which is as much as *Viricidas*, or men-killers. And that they made incurſion into *Aſia* the leſs, ſack'd *Epheſus*, and burnt the temple of *Diana*, *Manethon* and *Aventinus* report, which they performed forty years after *Troy* was taken. At the ſiege of *Troy* it ſelf we read of [f] *Pentheſilea*, that ſhe came to the ſuccour of *Priamus*.

[g] *Am. Marcellinus* gives the cauſe of their inhabiting upon the river of *Thermodoon*, ſpeaking confidently of the wars they made with divers nations, and of their overthrow.

Plutarch, in the life of *Theſeus*, out of *Philochorus*, *Hellanicus*, and other ancient hiſtorians, reports the taking of *Antiopa*, queen of the *Amazons*, by *Hercules*, and by him given to *Theſeus*, though ſome affirm, that *Theſeus* himſelf got her by ſtealth when ſhe came to viſit him aboard his ſhip. But in ſubſtance there is little difference; all confeſſing, that ſuch *Amazons* there were. The ſame author, in the life of *Pompey*, ſpeaks of certain companies of the *Amazons*, that came to aid the *Albanians* againſt the *Romans*, by whom, after the battel, many targets and buskins of theirs were taken up: and he ſaith farther, that theſe women entertain the *Gelæ* and *Lelages* once a year, nations inhabiting between them and the *Albanians*.

But, to omit the many authors, making mention of *Amazons* that were in the old times, [h] *Fran. Lopez*, who hath written the navigation of *Orellana*, which he made down the river of *Amazons* from *Peru*, in the year 1542. (upon which river, for the divers turnings, he is ſaid to have ſailed ſix thouſand miles) reports from the relation of the ſaid *Orellana*, to the council of the *Indies*, that he both ſaw thoſe women, and fought with them, where they ſought to impeach his paſſage towards the eaſt ſea.

It is alſo reported by *Ulricus Schmidel*, that in the year 1542, when he ſailed up the rivers of *Paragna* and *Parabol*, that he came to a king of that country, called *Scherues*, inhabiting under the tropic of *Capricorn*, who gave his captain *Ernando Rieffere* a crown of ſilver, which he had gotten in fight from a queen of the *Amazons* in thoſe parts.

Ed. Lopez, in his deſcription of the kingdom of *Congo*, makes relation of ſuch *Amazons*, telling us, that (agreeable to the reports of elder times) they burn off their right breaſt, and live apart from men, ſave at one time of the year, when they feaſt and accompany them for one month. Theſe (ſaith he) poſſeſs a part of the kingdom of *Monomotapa* in *Africa*, nineteen degrees to the ſouthward of the line: and that theſe women are the

[a] Solin. c. 27, & 65. [b] Ther. l. 1. [c] Ptol. l. 6. Aſiæ Tab. 2. Plin. l. 6. c. 20. [d] Claud. de cap. Proſerpinæ. [e] Diod. l. 2. [f] Æneiad. 1. l. 3. [g] Mar. l. 22. c. 7. [h] Hiſtor. Ind. part 1. c. 28.

ſtrongeſt

ſtrongeſt guards of this emperor, all the *Eaſt-Indian Portugals* know.

I have produced theſe authorities, in part, to juſtify mine own relation of theſe *Amazons*, becauſe that which was delivered me for truth by an ancient *Caſicque* of *Guiana*, how upon the river of *Papamena* (ſince the *Spaniſh* diſcoveries called *Amazons*) that theſe women ſtill live and govern, was held for a vain and unprofitable report.

SECT. XVI.

How Alexander *fell into the* Perſian *luxury: and how he further purſued* Beſſus.

NOW, as *Alexander* had begun to change his conditions after the taking of *Perſepolis:* ſo at this time his proſperity had ſo much over-wrought his virtue, as he accounted clemency to be but baſeneſs, and the temperance which he had uſed all his life-time, but a poor and dejected humour, rather becoming the inſtructors of his youth, than the condition and ſtate of ſo mighty a king, as the world could not equal. For he perſwaded himſelf, that he now repreſented the greatneſs of the Gods; he was pleaſed that thoſe that came before him, ſhould fall to the ground and adore him; he wore the robes and garments of the *Perſians*, and commanded that his nobility ſhould do the like; he entertained in his court, and camp, the ſame ſhameleſs rabble of curtiſans, and ſodomitical eunuchs, that *Darius* had done, and imitated in all things the proud, voluptuous, and deteſted manners of the *Perſians*, whom he had vanquiſhed. So licentious is felicity, as notwithſtanding that he was fully perſwaded that the Gods, whom he ſerved (deteſting the vices of the invaded) aſſiſted him in all attempts againſt them, he himſelf, contrary to the religion he profeſſed (which how idolatrous ſoever it were, could not be but fearful unto him by neglecting it) became by imitation, and not by ignorance or education, a more foul and fearful monſter than *Darius*, from whoſe tyranny he vaunted to have delivered ſo many nations. Yea thoſe, that were deareſt and neareſt unto him, began to be aſhamed of him, entertaining each other with this, and the like ſcornful diſcourſe, that *Alexander* of *Macedon* was become one of *Darius*'s licentious courtiers; that by his example the *Macedonians* were in the end of ſo many travels more impoveriſhed in their virtues, than enriched by their victories; and that it was hard to judge whether the conquerors, or the conquered were the baſer ſlaves. Neither were theſe opinions ſo reſerved, but that the noiſe of them came to his ears. He therefore with great gifts ſought to pacify the better ſort, and thoſe of whoſe judgments he was moſt jealous; and making it known to the army that *Beſſus* had aſſumed the title of a king, and called himſelf *Artaxerxes*; and that he had compounded a great army of the *Bactrians*, and other nations, he had arguments enough to perſwade them to go on, to the end that all already gotten might not with themſelves (ſo far engaged) be caſt away. And becauſe they were peſtered with the ſpoils of ſo many cities, as the whole army ſeemed but the guard of their carriages (not much unlike the warfare of the *French*) having commanded every man's fardels to be brought into the market-place, he, together with his own, cauſed all to be conſumed with fire. Certainly, this could not but have proved moſt dangerous to him, ſeeing the common ſoldiers had more intereſt in theſe things, which they had bought with their painful travels, and with their blood, than in the king's ambition; had not (as *Seneca* often obſerved) his happy temerity overcome all things. As he was in his way news came to him that *Satribarzanes*, whom he had eſtabliſhed in his former government over the *Arians*, was revolted; whereupon leaving the way of *Bactria*, he ſought him out; but the rebel hearing of his coming, fled to *Beſſus* with two thouſand horſe. He then went on towards *Beſſus*, and by ſetting a great pile of wood on fire with the advantage of a ſtrong wind, won the paſſage over a high and inacceſſable rock, which was defended againſt him with thirteen thouſand foot. For the extremity of the flame and ſmoke forced them from the place, otherwiſe invincible. I ſaw in the third civil war of *France* certain caves in *Languedoc*, which had but one entrance, and that very narrow, cut out in the mid-way of high rocks, which we knew not how to enter by any ladder or engine, till at laſt by certain bundles of ſtraw let down by an iron chain, and a weighty ſtone in the midſt, thoſe that defended it were ſo ſmothered, as they render'd themſelves with their plate, money, and other goods therein hidden. There were alſo, ſome three years before my arrival in *Guiana*, three hundred *Spaniards* well mounted, ſmothered to death, together with their horſes, by the country people, who did ſet the long dry graſs on fire to the eaſtward of them (the wind in thoſe parts being always eaſt) ſo as, notwithſtanding their flying from the ſmoke, there was not any one that eſcaped. Sir *John Borrowes* alſo, with an hundred *Engliſh*, was in great danger of being loſt at *Margarita*, in the *Weſt-Indies*, by having the graſs fired behind him, but the ſmoke being timely diſcovered, he recovered the ſea-ſhore with the loſs of ſixteen of his men. I remember theſe things, but to give caution to thoſe that ſhall in times to come invade any part of thoſe countries, that they always, before they paſs into the land, burn down the graſs and ſedge to the eaſt of them; they may otherwiſe, without any other enemy than a handful of ſtraw ſet on fire, die the death of honey-bees, burnt out of the hive.

SECT. XVII.

A conſpiracy againſt Alexander. *The death of* Philotas *and* Parmenio.

ALEXANDER was, after he parted hence, no-where reſiſted, till he came into *Aria*, to the eaſt of *Bactria*, where the chief city of that province, called *Artacoana*, was a while defended againſt him, by the revolt of *Satribarzanes*, but in the end he received the inhabitants to mercy. At this place his army was re-enforced with a new ſupply of five thouſand and five hundred foot, and near five hundred horſe, out of *Greece*, *Theſſaly*, and other places. His journey out of *Perſia* into theſe parts, is very confuſedly deſcribed. For having (as all his hiſtorians tell us) a determination to find *Beſſus* in *Bactria*, he leaves it at the very entrance, and takes the way of *Hyrcania*; from thence he wanders northward towards the obſcure *Mardi*, upon the *Caſpian* ſea, and thence over the mountains *Coronus* into *Aria* and *Drangiana*.

At this time it was that the treaſon of *Dimnus* broke out, of which *Philotas* the ſon of *Parmenio* was accuſed, as acceſſary, if not principal. This *Dimnus*, having (I know not upon what ground) conſpired with ſome others againſt the life of *Alexander*, went about to draw *Nicomachus*, a young man whom he loved, into the ſame treaſon. The youth, altho' he was firſt bound by oath to ſecrecy, when he heard ſo foul a matter uttered, began to proteſt againſt it ſo vehemently, that his friend was like

like to have ſlain him for ſecurity of his own life. So conſtrained by fear, he made ſhew as if he had been won by perſwaſion, and by ſeeming at length to like well of the buſineſs, he was told more at large what they were, that had undertaken it. There were nine or ten of them, all men of rank; whoſe names *Dimnus* (to countenance the enterpriſe) reckoned up to *Nicomachus*. *Nicomachus* had no ſooner freed himſelf from the company of this traitor *Dimnus*, than he acquainted his own brother *Ceballinus* with the whole hiſtory: whereupon it was agreed between them, that *Ceballinus* (who might with leaſt ſuſpicion) ſhould go to the court and utter all. *Ceballinus*, meeting with *Philotas*, told him the whole buſineſs, deſiring him to acquaint the king therewith; which he promiſed to do, but did not. Two days paſſed, and *Philotas* never brake with the king about the matter; but ſtill excuſed himſelf to *Ceballinus* by the king's want of leiſure. This his coldneſs bred ſuſpicion, and cauſed *Ceballinus* to addreſs himſelf to another, one *Metron*, keeper of the king's armory, who forthwith brought him to *Alexander*'s preſence. *Alexander*, finding by examination what had paſſed between *Ceballinus* and *Philotas*, did fully perſwade himſelf that his concealment of the treaſon, argued his hand to have been in the buſineſs. Therefore, when *Dimnus* was brought before him, he asked the traitor no other queſtion than this: *Wherein have I ſo offended thee, that thou ſhouldeſt think* Philotas *more worthy to be king than I? Dimnus* perceiving, when he was apprehended, how the matter went, had ſo wounded himſelf, that he lived no longer than to give his laſt groan in the king's preſence. Then was *Philotas* called, and charged with the ſuſpicion which his ſilence might juſtly breed. His anſwer was, that when the practice was revealed unto him by *Nicomachus*, he judging it to be but frivolous, did forbear to acquaint *Alexander* therewithal, until he might have better information. This error of his (if it were only an error) altho' *Alexander*, for the notorious ſervices of his father *Parmenio*, of his brother *Nicanor* lately dead, and of *Philotas* himſelf, had freely pardoned and given him his hand for aſſurance; yet by the inſtigation of *Craterus*, he again ſwallowed his princely promiſe, and made his enemies his judges: *Curtius* gives a note of *Craterus* in this buſineſs; how he perſwaded himſelf, that he could never find a better occaſion to oppreſs his private enemy, than by pretending piety and duty towards the king. Hereof a poet of our own hath given a note as much better, as it is more general in his *Philotas*.

> See how theſe great men cloath their private hate,
> In theſe fair colours of the publick good;
> And to effect their ends, pretend the ſtate,
> As if the ſtate by their affection ſtood;
> And arm'd with power and princes jealouſies,
> Will put the leaſt conceit of diſcontent
> Into the greateſt rank of treacheries,
> That no one action ſhall ſeem innocent:
> Yea, valour, honour, bounty, ſhall be made
> As acceſſaries unto ends unjuſt;
> And even the ſervice of the ſtate muſt lade
> The needfull'ſt undertaking with diſtruſt:
> So that baſe vileneſs, idle luxury,
> Seem ſafer far, than to do worthily, *&c.*

Now, although it were ſo that the king, following the advice of *Craterus*, had reſolved the next day to put *Philotas* to torment, yet in the very evening of the ſame night in which he was apprehended, he called him to a banquet, and diſcourſed as familiarly with him as at any other time. But, when in the dead of the night *Philotas* was taken in his lodging, and that they which hated him began to bind him, he cried out upon the king in theſe words: *O* Alexander, *the malice of mine enemies hath ſurmounted thy mercy, and their hatred is far more conſtant than the word of a king.* Many circumſtances were urged againſt him by *Alexander* himſelf (for the kings of *Macedon* did in perſon examine the accuſations of treaſon) and this was not the leaſt (not the leaſt offence, indeed, againſt the king's humour, who deſired to be glorified as a god.) That when *Alexander* wrote unto him concerning the title given him by *Jupiter Hammon*; he anſwer'd, that he could not but rejoice that he was admitted into that ſacred fellowſhip of the gods; and yet he could not but withal grieve for thoſe that ſhould live under ſuch a one as would exceed the nature of man. This was (ſaith *Alexander*) a firm perſwaſion unto me, that his heart was changed, and that he held my glory in deſpight. See what a ſtrange monſter flattery is, that can perſwade kings to kill thoſe that do not praiſe, and allow thoſe things in them, which are, of all others, moſt to be abhorred. *Philotas* was brought before the multitude to hear the king's oration againſt him: he was brought forth in vile garments, and bound like a thief; where he heard himſelf, and his abſent father, the greateſt captain of the world, accuſed, his two other brothers, *Hector* and *Nicanor*, having been loſt in the preſent war. He was ſo greatly oppreſs'd with grief, that, for a while, he could utter nothing but tears; and ſorrow had ſo waſted his ſpirits, that he ſunk under thoſe that led him. In the end, the king aſked him in what language he would make his defence: he anſwered, in the ſame wherein it had pleaſed the king to accuſe him, which he did, to the end that the *Perſians*, as well as the *Macedonians*, might underſtand him. But hereof the king made his advantage, perſwading the aſſembly, that he diſdained the language of his own country; and ſo withdrawing himſelf, left him to his mercileſs enemies.

This proceeding of the king's, *Philotas* greatly lamented, ſeeing the king, who had ſo ſharply inveighed againſt him, would not vouchſafe to hear his excuſe. For, not his enemies only were emboldened thereby againſt him; but all the reſt having diſcovered the king's diſpoſition and reſolution, contended among themſelves which of them ſhould exceed in hatred towards him. Among many other arguments which he uſed in his own defence, this was not the weakeſt, that when *Nicomachus* deſired to know of *Dimnus* what men of mark and power were his partners in the conſpiracy (as ſeeming unwilling to adventure himſelf with mean and baſe companions) *Dimnus* named unto him *Demetrius* of the king's chamber, *Nicanor*, *Amyntas*, and ſome others; but ſpake not a word of *Philotas*, who, by being commander of the horſe, would greatly have valued the party, and have encouraged *Nicomachus*. Indeed, as *Philotas* ſaid well for himſelf, it is likely that *Dimnus*, thereby the better to have heartned *Nicomachus*, would have named him, though he had never dealt with him in any ſuch practice. And for more certain proof that he knew nothing of their intents that practiſed againſt the king, there was not any one of the conſpirators, being many, enforc'd by torments, or otherwiſe, that could accuſe him; and it is true, that adverſity being ſeldom able to bear her own burden, is, for the moſt part, found ſo malicious, that ſhe rather deſires to draw others (not always deſerving it) into the ſame danger, than to ſpare any that it can accuſe. Yet

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at the laſt, howſoever it were, to avoid the extremity of reſiſtleſs and unnatural torments, deviſed by his profeſs'd enemies, *Craterus*, *Cœnus*, *Epheſtion*, and others, *Philotas* accuſed his own ſelf; being perſwaded that they would have ſlain him forthwith. But he failed even in that miſerable hope, and ſuffering all that could be laid upon fleſh and blood, he was forced to deliver, not what he knew, but whatſoever beſt pleaſed their ears, that were far more mercileſs than death it ſelf.

Of this kind of judicial proceeding St. *Auguſtin* greatly complaineth, as a matter to be bewailed, ſaith he, with fountains of tears. [a] *Quid cum in ſua cauſa quiſque torquetur: & cum quæritur utrum ſit nocens cruciatur: & innocens luit pro incerto ſcelere certiſſimas pœnas: non quia illud commiſiſſe detegitur, ſed quia non commiſiſſe neſcitur*; What ſhall we ſay to it, when one is put to torture in his own caſe; and tormented, whilſt yet it is in queſtion whether he be guilty; and being innocent, ſuffers aſſured puniſhment for a fault, of which there is no certainty; not becauſe he is known to have committed the offence, but becauſe others do not know that he hath not committed it.

It had been enough for *Alexander*'s ſafety, if *Philotas* had been put to death without torment, the reſt would not much have grieved thereat, becauſe he was greatly ſuſpected. But *Hemolaus*, who afterwards conſpired againſt him, made the king's cruelty and delight in blood the greateſt motive of his own ill intent. Therefore [b] *Seneca*, ſpeaking of *Alexander*, ſaith thus, *Crudelitas minime humanum malum eſt, indignum tam miti animo; ferina iſta rabies eſt ſanguine gaudere & vulneribus, & abjecto homine, in ſilveſtre animal tranſire*; Cruelty is not a human vice; it is unworthy of ſo mild a ſpirit. It is even a beaſtly rage to delight in blood and wounds, and caſting away the nature of man, to become a ſavage monſter.

For the concluſion of this tragedy, *Curtius* makes a doubt, whether the confeſſion that *Philotas* made, were to give end to the torments which he could no longer endure, or that the ſame was true indeed: For (ſaith he) in this caſe, they that ſpeak truly, or they that deny falſly, come to one and the ſame end. Now while the king's hands were yet in blood, he commanded that *Lynceſtes*, ſon-in-law to *Antipater*, who had been three years in priſon, ſhould be ſlain: The ſame diſpatch had all thoſe that *Nicomachus* had accuſed. Others there were that were ſuſpected, becauſe they had followed *Philotas*; but when they had anſwer'd for themſelves, that they knew no way ſo direct to win the king's favour, as by loving thoſe whom the king favoured, they were diſmiſs'd. But *Parmenio* was yet living; *Parmenio*, who had ſerved with great fidelity, as well *Philip* of *Macedon*, the king's father, as himſelf; *Parmenio*, that firſt opened the way into *Aſia*; that had depreſs'd *Attalus*, the king's enemy; that had always, and in all hazards, the leading of the king's vanguard, that was no leſs prudent in counſel, than fortunate in all attempts; a man beloved of the men of war, and, to ſay the truth, he that had made the purchaſe for the king of the empire of the eaſt, and of all the glory and fame he had: That he might not therefore revenge the death of his ſon, though not upon the king (for it was unlikely that he would have diſhonoured his fidelity in his eldeſt age, having now lived threeſcore and ten years;) yet upon thoſe, that, by the witchcraft of flattery, had poſſeſs'd themſelves of his affection, it was reſolved that he ſhould be diſpatch'd. *Polydamas* was employ'd in this buſineſs; a man, whom, of all others, *Parmenio* truſted moſt, and loved beſt; who (to be ſhort) finding him in *Media*, and having *Cleander* and other murtherers with him, ſlew him walking in his garden, whilſt he was reading the king's letters. [c] *Hic exitus* Parmenionis *fuit; militiæ domique clari viri; multa ſine rege proſperè, rex ſine illo nihil magnæ rei geſſerat*; This was the end of *Parmenio* (ſaith *Curtius*) who had performed many notable things without the king; but the king, without him, did never effect any thing worthy of praiſe.

SECT. XVIII.

How Alexander *ſubdued the* Bactrians, Sogdians, *and other people. How* Beſſus *was deliver'd into his hands. How he fought with the* Scythians.

WHEN theſe things had an end, *Alexander* went on with his army, and brought under his obedience the *Araſpians*, or *Evergitans*; he made *Emenides* (ſometime *Darius*'s ſecretary) their governor; then he ſubdued the *Arachoſians*, and left *Menon* to command over them. Here the army, ſometimes led by *Parmenio*, finds him, conſiſting of twelve thouſand *Macedons* and *Greeks*, with whom he paſſed through ſome cold regions with difficulty enough. At length he came to the foot of the mountain *Taurus*, towards the eaſt, where he built a city, which he honoured with his own name, and peopled it with ſeven thouſand of his old *Macedons*, worn with age and with travels of the war. The *Arians*, who, ſince he left them, were revolted, he ſubdued again, by the induſtry and valour of *Caranus* and *Erigius*; and now he reſolves to find out the new king *Beſſus* in *Bactria*. *Beſſus*, hearing of his coming, prepares to paſs over the great river of *Oxus*, which divides *Bactria* from *Sogdiana*; *Artabazus* is made governor of *Bactria*, abandon'd by *Beſſus*; the *Macedonian* army ſuffereth for want of water, inſomuch as when they came to the river of *Oxus*, there died more of them by drinking inordinately, than *Alexander* had loſt in any one battel againſt the *Perſians*. And it may well be; for (as *Clytus* did afterwards object unto him) he fought againſt women, not againſt men, and not againſt their perſons, but their ſhadows. He found on the banks of this great river no manner of timber, or other materials, to make either boats, bridges, or raff; but was forced to ſow together the hides that covered his carriages, and ſtuff them with ſtraw, and on them in ſix days to paſs over his army; which *Beſſus* might eaſily have diſtreſs'd, if he had dared but to behold the *Macedonian* army afar off. He had formerly complained againſt *Darius*, for neglecting to defend the banks of *Tigris*, and other paſſages; and yet now, when this traiterous ſlave had ſtiled himſelf king, he durſt not perform any thing worthy of a ſlave. And therefore thoſe, who were neareſt unto him, and whom he moſt truſted, to wit, *Spitamines*, *Dataphernes*, *Catanes*, and others, the commanders of his army, moved both by the care of their own ſafety, and by the memory of *Beſſus*'s treaſon and cruelty againſt *Darius*, bound him in the like manner that he had done his maſter; but with this difference, that he had the chain cloſed about his neck like a maſtiff dog, and ſo was dragged along to be preſented to his enemy.

In the mean while, *Alexander* was arrived at a certain town inhabited with *Greeks* of *Miletum*, brought thither by *Xerxes*, when long before he re-

[a] Aug. de Civit. Dei, l. 19. c. 6. [b] Sen. de Clem. l. 1. [c] Lib. 7.

turned out of *Greece*, whoſe iſſues had well-near forgotten their country language. Theſe moſt cruelly (after they had received him with great joy) he put to the ſword, and deſtroyed their city. At this place he received *Beſſus*, and, having rewarded *Spitamenes*, with the reſt that delivered him, he gave the traitor into the hands of *Oxatres*, *Darius*'s brother, to be tormented.

But while he now thought himſelf ſecure, ſome twenty thouſand mountainers aſſaulted his camp; in repelling whom, he received a ſhot in the leg, the arrow-head ſticking in the fleſh; ſo that he was carried in a horſe-litter, ſometimes by the horſemen, ſometimes by the foot.

Soon after he came unto *Maracanda*, which *Petrus Perondinus* takes to be *Samarchand*, the regal city of the great *Tamerlain*. It had in compaſs threeſcore and ten furlongs (*Curtius* ſaith.) Here he received the embaſſadors of the *Scythians* (called *Avians*) who offered to ſerve him.

The *Bactrians* are ſhortly again, with the *Sogdians*, ſtirred to rebellion by the ſame *Spitamenes* and *Catanes*, who had lately delivered into his hands the traitor *Beſſus*. Many cities were reſolvedly defended againſt him; all which, after victory, he defaced and raſed, killing all therein. At one of theſe he received a blow on the neck, which ſtruck him to the ground, and much diſabled him for many days after. In the mean while, *Spitamenes* had recovered *Maracanda*, againſt whom he employed *Menedemus*, with three thouſand foot and eight hundred horſe.

In the heat of theſe tumults, *Alexander* marched on (if we may believe *Curtius* and others) till he came to the river of *Tanais*; upon whoſe bank he built another *Alexandria*, threeſcore furlongs in compaſs, which he beautified with houſes within ſeventeen days after the walls were built. The building of this city is ſaid to have been the occaſion of a war between him and the *Scythians*; the *Scythian* king perſwading himſelf, that this new town was fortified on purpoſe to keep him under. I do not well underſtand why the *Scythians*, offering war in ſuch terrible manner, that *Alexander* was judged by his own ſoldiers to counterfeit ſickneſs for very fear, ſhould nevertheleſs make ſuit for peace: neither find I the reaſon why *Alexander* (not intending the conqueſt of thoſe northern deſarts, but only the defence of his own bank) ſhould refuſe to let them alone, with whom he could not meddle further than they ſhould agree to ſuffer him. Yet hereof is made a great matter, and a victory deſcribed; in purſuit of which, the *Macedons* ran beyond the bounds and monuments of *Bacchus*'s expedition.

The truth is, that *Curtius* and *Trogus* have greatly miſtaken this river, which they call *Tanais*; for it was the river of *Iaxartes*, that runs between *Sogdiana* and *Scythia*, which *Alexander* paſs'd over, while *Menedemus* was employed in the recovery of *Samarchand*: But *Tanais*, which divides *Aſia* from *Europe*, is near two thouſand miles diſtant from any part of *Bactria* or *Sogdiana*, and the way deſart and unknown. So that *Alexander* had (beſides *Iaxartes*) the great river of *Volga*, and many others, to ſwim over, ere he could recover *Tanais*, which (from the place where he was) he could hardly have diſcover'd with the army that followed him, if he had employed all the time that he lived in *Aſia* in that travel.

Wherefore it is enough to believe, that the *Aſiatic Scythians*, making ſome offer to diſturb the erection of this new city, which was like to give ſome hindrance to their excurſions, were driven away by the *Macedonians*; and being naked of defenſive arms, eaſily chaſed ſome ten or twelve miles, which is the ſubſtance of *Curtius*'s report. As for the limits of *Bacchus*'s journey; like enough it is, that *Bacchus* (if in his life-time he were as ſober a man, as after his death he was held a drunken god) went not very far into that waſte country, where he could find nothing but trees and ſtones, nor other buſineſs than to ſet up a monument.

Threeſcore of the *Macedons* are ſaid to have been ſlain, and one thouſand one hundred hurt in this fight, which might eaſily be, in paſſing a great river, defended againſt them by good archers. Of *Scythian* horſes one thouſand eight hundred were brought into the camp, and many priſoners. It is forbidden by ſome hiſtorians, and indeed it is hardly poſſible to ſet down the numbers of ſuch as periſh in battel; yet *Ceſar* commonly did it. And where the diligence of the victors hath been ſo inquiſitive into the greatneſs of their own ſucceſs, that writers have been able to deliver ſuch particulars by credible report; I hold it not unlawful to ſet down what we find; eſpecially when it ſerves to give light to the buſineſs in hand. The ſmall number which the *Macedonians* loſt; the omiſſion of the number which they ſlew (a thing not uſual in *Curtius*, who forbears nothing that may ſet out the greatneſs of *Alexander*) and the little booty that was gotten, do make it probable, that this war was no better than the repulſion of a few roving *Tartars* (the like being yearly performed by the *Muſcovite*, without any boaſt) and therefore better omitted by ſome hiſtorians, than ſo highly extolled as a great exploit by others.

While *Alexander* was aſſuring himſelf of thoſe *Scythians* bordering upon *Iaxartes*, he received the ill news that *Menedemus* was ſlain by *Spitamenes*, the army (by him led) broken, and the greateſt numbers ſlain, to wit, two thouſand foot, and three hundred horſe. He therefore, to appeaſe the rebellion, and to take revenge of *Spitamenes*, makes all the haſte he can; but *Spitamenes* flies into *Bactria*. *Alexander* kills, burns, and lays waſte all before him; not ſparing the innocent children, and ſo departs, leaving a new governour in that province.

To repair this loſs, he received a great ſupply of nineteen thouſand ſoldiers out of *Greece*, *Lycia*, and *Syria*; with all which and the old army, he returns towards the ſouth, and paſſeth the river of *Oxus*; on the ſouth ſide whereof he built ſix towns near each other for mutual ſuccour. But he finds a new ſtart-up-rebel, called *Arimazes* (a *Sogdian*) followed with thirty thouſand ſoldiers that defended againſt him a ſtrong piece of ground on the top of a high hill; whom, when *Alexander* had fought in vain to win by fair words, he made choice of three hundred young men, and promiſed ten talents to the firſt, nine to the ſecond, and ſo in proportion to the reſt, that could find a way to creep up to the top thereof. This they performed with the loſs of ſome two and thirty of their men, and then made a ſign to *Alexander*, that they had performed his commandment. Hereupon he ſent one *Cophes* to perſwade *Arimazes* to yield the place; who, being ſhewed by *Cophes* that the army of *Macedon* was already mounted up, yielded ſimply to *Alexander*'s mercy, and was (with all his kindred) ſcourged and crucified to death; which puniſhment they well deſerved for neglecting to keep good watch in ſo dangerous a time. For the place, as ſeems by the deſcription, might eaſily have been defended againſt all the armies of the world. But what ſtrength cannot do, man's wit, being the moſt forcible engine, hath often effected;

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of which I will give you an example in a place of our own.

The iſland of *Sarke*, joining to *Guernſey*, and of that government, was in queen *Mary*'s time ſurprized by the *French*, and could never have been recovered again by force, having cattel and corn enough upon the place to feed ſo many men as will ſerve to defend it; and being every way ſo inacceſſible, that it might be held againſt the great *Turk*. Yet by a ſtratagem of a gentleman of the *Netherlands*, it was in this ſort regained. He anchored in the road with one ſhip of ſmall burden, and pretending the death of his merchant, beſought the *French*, being ſome thirty in number, that they might bury their merchant in hallowed ground, and in the chapel of that iſle, offering a preſent to the *French* of ſuch commodities as they had on board; whereto (on condition that they ſhould not come aſhore with any weapon, no, not ſo much as with a knife) the *Frenchmen* yielded. Then did the *Flemmings* put a coffin into their boat, not filled with a dead carcaſs, but with ſwords, targets, and harquebuſſes. The *French* received them at their landing, and ſearching all of them ſo narrowly, that they could not hide a penknife, gave them leave to draw their coffin up the rocks with great difficulty; ſome part of the *French* took the *Flemmiſh* boat and rowed aboard their ſhip, to fetch the commodities promiſed, and what elſe they pleaſed; but being entered, they were taken and bound. The *Flemmings* on the land, when they had carried their coffin into the chapel, ſhut the door to them; and taking their weapons out of the coffin, ſet upon the *French*: they run to the cliff, and cry to their company aboard the *Flemmings* to come to their ſuccour; but finding the boat charged with *Flemings*, yielded themſelves and the place. Thus a fox-tail doth ſometimes help well to piece out the lion's ſkin, that elſe would be too ſhort.

SECT. XIX.

How Alexander *ſlew his own friends.*

AFTER theſe *Sogdian* and *Scythian* wars, we read of *Alexander*'s killing of a lion, and other frivolous matters, and that he committed the government of *Maracanda*, and the country about it, to *Clytus*; and how he ſlew him ſoon after, for valuing the virtue of *Philip* the father, before that of *Alexander* the ſon; or rather, becauſe he objected to the king the death of *Parmenio*, and derided the oracle of *Hammon*; for therein he touch'd him to the quick, the ſame being delivered in publick, and at a drunken banquet. *Clytus*, indeed, had deſerved as much at the king's hands as any man living had done, and had, in particular, ſaved his life, which the king well remember'd, when he came to himſelf, and when it was too late. Yet, to ſay the truth, *Clytus*'s inſolency was intolerable. As he, in his cups, forgat whom he offended; ſo the king in his (for neither of them were themſelves) forgat whom he went about to ſlay; for the grief whereof, he tore his own face, and lamented ſo inordinately, that, but for the perſwaſions of *Caliſthenes*, it is thought he would have ſlain himſelf.

Wine begat fury, fury matter of repentance; but preceding miſchiefs are not amended by ſucceeding bewailings. *Omne vitium ebrietas & incendit, & detegit; obſtantem malis conatibus verecundiam removet; ubi poſſedit animum nimia vis vini, quicquid mali latebat, emergit: non facit ebrietas vitia, ſed protrahit.* Drunkenneſs both kindles and lays open every vice; it removes out of the way that ſhame which gives impediment unto bad attempts; where wine gets the maſtery, all the ill that before lay hidden breaks out: drunkenneſs, indeed, rather diſcovers vices, than makes them.

Soon after this, *Spitamenes*, who ſlew *Beſſus*, and had lately revolted from *Alexander*, was murdered by his wife, and his head preſented to *Alexander*. *Spitamenes* being taken away, the *Dahans* alſo ſeized upon his fellow-conſpirator *Dataphernes*, and delivered him up. So *Alexander*, being now freed from all theſe petty rebels, diſpoſed of the provinces which he paſſed over, and went on with his army into *Gabaza*, where it ſuffered ſo much hunger, cold, lightning, thunder, and ſtorm, that he loſt, in one tempeſt, a thouſand of his train. From hence he invaded the *Sacans*, and deſtroyed their country. Then came he into the territory of *Cohortanes*, who ſubmitted himſelf unto him, feaſted him greatly, and preſented him with thirty beautiful virgins, among whom *Roxane*, afterwards his wife, was one; which, although all the *Macedonians* diſdained, yet none of them durſt uſe any freedom of ſpeech after *Clytus*'s death. From hence he directed his courſe towards *India*, having ſo increaſed his numbers, that they amounted to an hundred and twenty thouſand armed men.

In the mean while he would needs be honoured as a god; whereto, that he might allure the *Macedonians*, he employed two pernicious paraſites, *Hagis* and *Cleo*, whom *Caliſthenes* oppoſed: For, among many other honeſt arguments uſed to the aſſembly, he told *Cleo*, that he thought that *Alexander* would diſdain the gift of godhead from his vaſſals; that the opinion of ſanctity, though it did ſometimes follow the death of thoſe, who, in their life-time, had done the greateſt things; yet it never accompanied any one, as yet, living in the world. He further told him, that neither *Hercules* nor *Bacchus* were deified at a banquet, and upon drink (for this matter was propounded by *Cleo* at a carouſing feaſt;) but that, for the more than manly acts by them performed while they lived, they were in future and ſucceeding ages numbered among the gods. *Alexander* ſtood behind a partition, and heard all that was ſpoken, waiting but an opportunity to be revenged on *Caliſthenes*, who, being a man of free ſpeech, honeſt, learned, and a lover of the king's honour, was yet ſoon after tormented to death; not for that he had betrayed the king to others, but becauſe he never would condeſcend to betray the king to himſelf, as all his deteſtable flatterers did. For in a conſpiracy againſt the king, made by one *Hermolaus*, and others (which they confeſſed) he cauſed *Caliſthenes*, without confeſſion, accuſation, or trial, to be torn aſunder upon the rack: This deed, unworthy of a king, *Seneca* thus cenſureth. *Hoc eſt Alexandri crimen æternum, quod nulla virtus, nulla bellorum felicitas redimet. Nam quoties quis dixerit, occidit Perſarum multa millia; opponitur, & Caliſthenem: quoties dictum erit, occidit Darium; opponitur, & Caliſthenem. Quoties dictum erit, omnia oceano tenus vicit, ipſum quoque tentavit novis claſſibus, & imperium ex angulo Thraciæ uſque ad orientis terminos protulit, dicetur, ſed Caliſthenem occidit. Omnia licet antiqua ducum regumque exempla tranſierit, ex his quæ fecit nihil tam magnum erit quàm ſcelus Caliſthenes:* This is the eternal crime of *Alexander*, which no virtue nor felicity of his in war ſhall ever be able to redeem. For as often as any man ſhall ſay, he ſlew many thouſand *Perſians*; it ſhall be replied, he did ſo, and he ſlew *Caliſthenes*. When it ſhall be ſaid, he ſlew *Darius*; it ſhall be replied, and *Caliſthenes*. When it ſhall be ſaid, he won as far as to the very ocean, thereon alſo he adventured with unuſual navies, and extended his empire

pire from a corner of *Thrace* to the utmoſt bounds of the orient; it ſhall be ſaid withal, but he killed *Caliſthenes*. Let him have outgone all the ancient examples of captains and kings, none of all his acts makes ſo much to his glory, as *Caliſthenes* to his reproach.

SECT. XX.

Of Alexander's *journey into* India. *The battel between him and* Porus.

WITH the army before remember'd, of one hundred and twenty thouſand foot and horſe, *Alexander* did enter the borders of *India*, where ſuch of the princes, as ſubmitted themſelves unto him he entertained lovingly, the reſt he conſtrained; killing man, woman, and child, where they reſiſted. He then came before *Niſa*, built by *Bacchus*, which after a few days was render'd unto him. From thence he removed to a hill at hand, which on the top had goodly gardens filled with delicate fruits and vines, dedicated to *Bacchus*, to whom he made feaſts for ten days together. Now, when he had drunk his fill, he went on towards *Dedala*, and from thence to *Acadera*, countries ſpoiled and abandoned by the inhabitants, by reaſon whereof, victuals failing, he divides his army: *Ptolemy* led one part, *Cenon* another, and himſelf the reſt. They take many towns, whereof that of greateſt fame was *Mazage*, which had in it three hundred thouſand men; but after ſome reſiſtance, it was yielded unto him by *Cleophe* the queen, to whom again he reſtored it; at the ſiege of this city he received a wound in the leg. After this *Nora* was taken by *Polyſperchon*, and a rock of great ſtrength by himſelf: he won alſo a paſſage upon one *Eryx*, who was ſlain by his company, and his head preſented to *Alexander*. This is the ſum of *Alexander*'s doings in thoſe parts, before ſuch time as he arrived at the river *Indus*. Coming to *Indus*, he found there *Epheſtion*, who (being ſent before) had prepared boats for the tranſportation of his army, and ere *Alexander*'s arrival had perſwaded *Omphis*, king of that part of the country, to ſubmit himſelf to this great conqueror. Therefore, ſoon upon *Alexander*'s coming, *Omphis* preſented himſelf with all the ſtrength of his country, and ſix and fifty elephants unto him, offering him his ſervice and aſſiſtance. He made *Alexander* know that he was an enemy to the next two great kings of that part of *India*, named *Abiaſares* and *Porus*, wherewith *Alexander* was not a little pleaſed, hoping by this diſunion to make his own victory by far the more eaſy. He preſented *Alexander* with a crown of gold, ſo did he the reſt of his commanders, and withal fourſcore talents of ſilver coin, which *Alexander* not only refuſed, but, to ſhew that he was covetous of glory, not of gold, he gave *Omphis* a thouſand talents of his own treaſure, beſides other *Perſian* rarities. *Abiaſares* having heard that *Alexander* had received his enemy *Omphis* into his protection, reſolved to make his own peace alſo: for knowing that his own ſtrength did but equal that of *Omphis*, and that there was no other difference between them, than that which the change of war gave, he thought it an ill match when *Alexander*, who had already beaten under foot all the greateſt princes of *Aſia*, ſhould make himſelf a party and head of the quarrel. So had *Alexander* none now to ſtand in his way but *Porus*, to whom he ſent a commandment, that he ſhould attend him at the border of his kingdom, there to do him homage. But from *Porus* he received this manly anſwer, that he would ſatisfy him in his firſt demand, which was to attend him on his borders, and that well accompanied; but for any other acknowledgment he was reſolved to take counſel of his ſword. To be ſhort, *Alexander* reſolves to paſs over the river *Hydaſpes*, and to find *Porus* at his own home. *Porus* attends him on the farther bank with thirty thouſand foot, fourſcore and ten elephants, three hundred armed chariots, and a great troop of horſe. If *Darius* had done the like on *Tigris*, *Alexander* had ſurely ſtaid ſomewhat longer ere he had ſeen *India*. The river was four furlongs broad, which makes half a mile, and withal deep and ſwift. It had in it many iſlands, among which there was one well ſhadowed with wood, and of good capacity. *Alexander* ſent *Ptolemy* up the river with a great part of the army, ſhrowding the reſt from the view of *Porus*, who by this device being drawn from his firſt incamping, ſets himſelf down oppoſite to *Ptolemy*, ſuppoſing that the whole army of *Macedon* meant to force their paſſage there. In the mean while *Alexander* recovers the farther ſhore without reſiſtance. He orders his troops, and advanceth towards *Porus*, who at firſt rather believes that *Abiaſares* his confederate (but now the confederate of fortune) had been come over *Hydaſpes* to his aid than that *Alexander* had paſs'd it. But he finds it otherwiſe, and ſends his brother *Hagis* with four thouſand horſe, and a hundred armed waggons to entertain him. Each waggon had in it four to fight, and two to guide it; but they were at this time of little uſe: for there had fallen ſo much rain, and thereby the fields were ſo moiſten'd, as the horſes could hardly trot. The *Scythians* and *Dahans* had the vant-guard, who ſo galled theſe *Indians*, as they broke their reins, and other furniture, overturning the waggons and thoſe in them. *Perdiccas* alſo gave up the *Indian* horſe-men, and the one and the other were forced to recoil. *Porus* moves forward with the groſs of his army, that thoſe of his vant-guard ſcattered might recover his rear: *Alexander*, being followed with *Epheſtion*, *Ptolemy*, and *Perdiccas*, took on him to charge the *Indian* horſe-men on the left wing, commanding *Cenus* or *Cenon* to invade the right; *Antigonus* and *Leonatus*, he directed to break upon *Porus*'s battel of foot, ſtrengthened with elephants, *Porus* himſelf being carried upon one of them of the greateſt ſtature. By theſe beaſts the *Macedonian* foot were moſt offended; but the archers and darters, being well guarded with the long and ſtrong pikes of the *Macedonians*, ſo galled them, as being enraged, they turned head, and ran over the foot that followed them. In the end, and after a long and doubtful fight, by the advantage of weapon, and by the courage, and ſkilfulneſs of the *Macedonian* captains, the victory fell to *Alexander*, who alſo far exceeded *Porus* in number: for, beſide the *Macedonians*, and other eaſtern and northern nations, *Porus* was aſſailed by his own confederate and country people. Yet for his own perſon he never gave ground otherwiſe than with his ſword towards his enemies, till being weakened with many wounds, and abandoned by his army, he became a priſoner to the conqueror, from whom again he received his eſtate with a great enlargement.

SECT. XXI.

How Alexander *finiſhed his expedition, and returned out of* India.

I Forbear to trouble my ſelf and others with a frivolous diſcourſe of ſerpents, apes, and peacocks, which the *Macedonians* found in theſe their travels: or of thoſe petty wars which *Alexander* made

made between the overthrow of *Porus*, and his sailing down the river of *Indus*. The descriptions of places about the head and branches thereof are better known unto us in this age, by means of our late navigations into those parts, than they were in any former times. The magnificence and riches of those kings we could in no sort be perswaded to believe, till our own experience had taught us, that there were many stranger things in the world, than are to be seen between *London* and *Staines*.

Our great traveller *Mandevile*, who died in the year 1372, and had seen so much of the world, and of the *East-Indies*, we account the greatest fabler of the world; yet had he another reputation among other nations, as well able to judge as we; witness the monument made of him in the convent of the friers [a] *Guillimins* in *Liege*, where the religious of that place keep some things of his, *Comme pour honorable memoire de son excellence*; *for an honourable memory of his excellency*, saith *Guichardine*.

The countries towards the springs of *Indus*, and where those many rivers of *Hydaspes*, *Zaradris*, *Acesines*, and the rest, fall into the main stream, are now possess'd by the great *Mogor*, the ninth from *Tamberlain*, who commands all that tract between *Persia* and *Indus* towards the west, as also a great extent of country towards *Ganges*. In the mouth of *Indus*, the *Ascension*, a ship of *London*, suffered shipwrack in the year 1609, and some of the company travelled over land till they came to *Agra*, the same great city (as I take it) which our later cosmographers call *Nagra*, being named of old *Dionysopolis*.

Philostratus, in the life of *Apollonius Tyanæus*, speaking of the expedition of *Bacchus* and *Hercules* into the *East-Indies*, tells us, that those two great captains (whom *Alexander* sought by all means to out-fame) when they endeavoured to subject unto them the *Oxydracæ*, a people inhabiting between the rivers of *Hyphasis* and *Ganges*, they were beaten from the assault of their cities with thunder and lightnings. This may well be understood by the great ordnance that those people had then in use. For it is now certainly known, that the great kings of the uttermost east, have had the use of the cannon, many hundreds of years since, and even since their first civility and greatness, which was long before *Alexander*'s time. But *Alexander* pierc'd not so far into the east. It sufficed, that having already over-wearied his army, he discovered the rest of *India* by fame. The *Indian* kings whom he had subdued, informed him, that a prince called *Aggramenes*, who commanded many nations beyond the river of *Ganges*, was the powerfullest king of all those regions, and that he was able to bring into the field two hundred thousand foot, three thousand elephants, twenty thousand horse, and two thousand armed chariots. With this report, though *Alexander* were more inflamed than ever to proceed in this discovery and conquest, yet all the art he had could not perswade the soldiers to wander over those great deserts beyond *Indus* and *Ganges*, more terrible unto them than the greatest army that the east could gather. Yet at the last contented they were, after many persuasive orations, to follow him towards the south, to discover such part of the ocean sea, as was nearer at hand, whereunto the river of *Indus* was their infallible guide. *Alexander*, seeing that it would be no otherwise, devised a pretty trick, wherewith he hoped to beguile posterity, and make himself seem greater than he was. He enlarged his camp, made greater trenches, greater cabins for the soldiers, greater horse-stalls, and higher mangers than his horses could feed in. He caused all furniture of men and horses to be made larger than would serve for use; and scattered these armours and bridles about his camp to be kept as reliques, and wonder'd at by the savages. Proportionable to these, he raised up twelve great altars to be the monument of his journey's end. This was a ready way to increase the fame of his bigness; to his greatness it could add nothing, save a suspicion that it was less than is thought, seeing he strove so earnestly to make it thought more than it was.

This done, he returned again to the bank of *Acesines*, and there determined to set up his fleet where *Acesines* and *Hydaspis* encounter, where, to testify by a surer monument how far he had past towards the east, he built by those rivers two cities; the one he called *Nicæa*, and the other *Bucephalon*, after the name of his beloved horse *Bucephalus*. Here again he received a fourth Supply of six thousand *Thracian* horsemen, seven thousand foot; and from his lieutenant at *Babylon* five and twenty thousand armors, garnished with silver and gold, which he distributed amongst his soldiers. About these rivers he won many towns, and committed great slaughter on those that resisted: It is then written of him, that assaulting a city of the *Oxidracans*, he leapt from the top of the wall into it, and fought, I know not how long, against all the inhabitants; tales like those of *Bevis* of *Southampton*, frivolous and incredible. Finally, he past down the river with his fleet, at which time also the news came unto him of a rebellion in *Bactria*, and then of the arrival of an hundred embassadors from a king of *India*, who submitted himself unto him. He feasted these embassadors upon a hundred beds of gold, with all the sumptuosity that could be devised, who soon after their dispatch returned again with a present of three hundred horse, one hundred and thirty waggons, and to each four horses, a thousand targets, with many other things rare and rich.

Their entertainments ended, he sailed towards the south, passed through many obscure nations, which did all yield unto him either quietly, or compelled by force: among these he built another *Alexandria*. Of many places which he took in this passage, *Samus* was one, the inhabitants whereof fought against him with poisoned swords, with one of which *Ptolemy* (afterwards King of *Egypt*) was wounded, and cured by an herb which *Alexander* dreamt that he had seen in the mouth of a serpent.

When he came near the out-let of *Indus* (being ignorant of the tides of the sea) his gallies, as they were on a sudden shuffled one upon another by the flood, so on the ebb they were left on the dry ground and on the sandy banks of the river, wherewith the *Macedonians* were much amazed; but after he had a few days observed well the course of the sea, he pass'd out of the river's mouth some few miles, and, after sacrifices offered to *Neptune*, returned: and, the better to inform himself, he sent *Nearchus* and *Onesicritus*, to discover the coast towards the mouth of *Euphrates*. *Arianus*, in the beginning of his sixth book, hath written this passage down the river *Indus* at length, with the manner of the vessels, in which he transported his army, the commanders that were used therein, and other the marvellous provisions made.

[a] Guic. in Dis. *of the* Low Countries.

Near the out-lets of this river he ſpent ſome part of the winter, and in eighteen days march from thence recovered *Gedroſia*, in which paſſage his army ſuffered ſuch miſery for want of food, that of a hundred and twenty thouſand foot, and twelve thouſand horſe, which he carried into *India*, not the fourth part returned alive.

SECT. XXII.

Of Alexander's *riot, cruelty, and death.*

FROM *Gedroſia Alexander* led his army into *Carmania*, and ſo drawing near to *Perſia*, he gave himſelf wholly to feaſting and drinking, imitating the triumphs of *Bacchus*. And though this ſwiniſh vice being hateful enough in itſelf, yet it always inflamed this king to cruelty. *For* (ſaith *Curtius*) *the hangman followed the feaſt, for* Aſpaſtes, *one of his provincial governors, he commanded to be ſlain; ſo as neither did the exceſs of voluptuouſneſs qualify his cruelty, nor his cruelty hinder in ought his voluptuouſneſs.*

While he refreſhed his army in theſe parts, a new ſupply of five thouſand foot, and a thouſand horſe was brought him by *Cleander* and his fellows, that had been employed in the killing of *Parmenio*. Againſt theſe murderers great complaint was made by the deputies of the provinces in which they had commanded; and their offences were ſo outragious, as *Alexander* was perſwaded, that, had they not altogether deſpaired of his return out of *India*, they durſt not have committed them. All men were glad of the occaſion, remembring the virtue of him whom they had ſlaughtered. The end was, that *Cleander* and the other chief, with ſix hundred ſoldiers by them employed, were delivered over to the hangman: every one rejoicing that the ire of the king was at laſt executed on the miniſters of his ire.

Nearchus and *Oneſicritus* were now returned from the coaſt, and made report of an iſland rich in gold, and of other ſtrange things; whereupon they were commanded to make ſome farther diſcovery: which done, that they ſhould enter the mouth of *Euphrates*, and find the king at *Babylon*.

As he drew near to *Babylon*, he viſited the ſepulchre [a] of *Cyrus* in *Paſargada*, now called *Chelquera:* where he was preſented with many rich gifts by *Orſines*, one of the princes of *Perſia*, of the race of *Cyrus*. But becauſe *Bagoas*, an *Eunuch*, in eſpecial favour with the king, was neglected, he not only practiſed certain looſe fellows to witneſs againſt *Orſines*, that he had robbed *Cyrus*'s tomb, for which he was condemned to die; but he aſſiſted the hangman with his own hands in tormenting him. At which time alſo *Alexander* cauſed *Phradites* to be ſlain, ſuſpecting his greatneſs. *Cœperat* (ſaith *Curtius*) *eſſe præceps ad repræſentanda ſupplicia, item ad deteriora credenda; he began headlongly to ſhed blood, and to believe falſe reports.* It is true, that he took a way to make all men weary of his government, ſeeing cruelty is more fearful than all the adventures that can be made againſt it.

At this time it is ſaid that *Calanus* the philoſopher burnt himſelf, when he had lived threeſcore and thirteen years. Whether herein he followed the cuſtom of his country, being an *Indian*, or ſought to prevent the grief and incommodity of elder age, it is uncertain: but in this the hiſtorians agree, that foreſeeing and foreſhewing *Alexander*'s death, he promiſed to meet him ſhortly after at *Babylon*.

From *Paſargada* he came to *Suſa*, where he married *Statira*, *Darius*'s eldeſt daughter, giving her youngeſt ſiſter to his beloved *Epheſtion*, and fourſcore other *Perſian* ladies to his captains. There were ſix thouſand gueſts invited to the feaſt, to each of which he gave a cup of gold. Here there came unto him three thouſand young ſoldiers out of his conquered provinces, whereat the *Macedonians* greatly murmured. *Harpalus*, his treaſurer in *Babylon*, having laviſhly conſumed the monies in his keeping, got him going with five thouſand talents, and ſix thouſand hired ſoldiers, but he was rejected in *Greece*, and there ſlain. *Alexander* greatly rejoiced at the fidelity of the *Greeks*, whom *Harpalus* with theſe forces and treaſures could not ſtir: yet he ſent commandment that they ſhould again receive their baniſhed men, whereunto (fearful of his indignation) all ſubmitted themſelves (except the *Athenians)* though they reſolved that it was a manifeſt preparation towards their bondage. After this, there followed a marvellous diſcontentment in his army, becauſe he had reſolved to ſend into *Macedon* all thoſe old ſoldiers which could no longer endure the travel of war, and to keep the reſt in *Aſia*. He uſed many orations to ſatisfy them, but it was in vain during the tempeſt of their fury. But afterwards, as whales are drawn to the land with a twine thread, when they have tumbled a while, ſo are the inconſiderate multitude eaſily conducted when their firſt paſſions are evaporate. With ſuch as were licenſed to depart, he ſent *Craterus*, to whom he gave the lieutenantſhip of *Macedon*, *Theſſaly*, and *Thrace*, which *Antipater* had held from his firſt departure out of *Europe*, who had beaten the rebellious *Greeks* in his abſence, diſcharged the truſt committed unto him with great fidelity, and ſent him ſo many ſtrong ſupplies into *Aſia* from time to time. Certainly, if *Alexander* had not taken counſel of his cups, he would have caſt ſome better colour on this alteration, and given *Antipater* a ſtronger reaſon for his remove, than to have employed him in the conduction of a new ſupply to be brought him to *Babylon*, the war being now at an end. For *Antipater* ſaw nothing in this remove, but the king's diſpoſition to ſend him after *Parmenio* and the reſt. With this *Antipater*, the king, notwithſtanding his great courage, had no great appetite to grapple: princes, tho' jealous, do not ſtand in doubt of every man ill-affected, tho' valiant; but there is a kind of kingly courage, compounded of hardineſs and underſtanding, which is many times ſo fearful unto them, as they take leave both of law and religion, to free themſelves thereof.

After he had ſent for *Antipater*, he made a journey into *Media* to ſettle things there; where *Epheſtion*, whom he favoured moſt of all men, dies. The king, according to the greatneſs of his love, laments his loſs, hangs his phyſician, and beſtows upon his monument twelve thouſand talents: after which he returns to *Babylon*. Thither *Antipater* came not, but ſent; and not to excuſe himſelf, but to free himſelf. For if we believe *Curtius* (whom *Plutarch* and others gainſay) *Antipater*, by his ſons, *Caſſander*, *Philip*, and *Iolla*, who waited on *Alexander*'s cup, gave him poiſon, *Theſſalus* (who was of the conſpiracy) having invited him to a drinking feaſt of purpoſe. For after he had taken a carouſe in *Hercules*'s cup, a draught of drink ſtronger than *Hercules* himſelf, he quitted the world within a few days.

[a] *Arianus* hath a far different deſcription of *Cyrus*'s tomb.

Certainly

Certainly the princes of the world have ſeldom found good by making their miniſters over-great, and thereby ſuſpicious to themſelves. For he that doth not acknowledge fidelity to be a debt, but is perſwaded that kings ought to purchaſe it from their vaſſals, will never pleaſe himſelf with the price given. The only reſtorative, indeed, that ſtrengthens it, is the goodneſs and virtue of the prince, and his liberality makes it more diligent; ſo as proportion and diſtance be obſerved. It may be, that *Antipater*, having commanded two or three kingdoms ten or twelve years, knew not how to play any other part; no more than *Ceſar* did, after he had ſo long a time governed the *Gauls*, where he utterly forgot the art of obedience. A moſt cruel and ungrateful traitor *Antipater* was, if *Curtius* do not belie him: for though he feared ſome ill meaſure upon his remove (the tragedies of *Parmenio*, *Clytus*, and *Caliſthenes*, having been ſo lately acted;) yet he knew nothing to the contrary, but that the king had reſolved to have given him ſome other great government in *Aſia*: the old ſoldiers thence returned, having perchance deſired to be governed by *Craterus*, whom they had followed in all the former war.

SECT. XXIII.

Of Alexander's *perſon and qualities.*

HOwſoever it were, *Alexander*'s former cruelties cannot be excuſed, no more than his vanity to be eſteemed the ſon of *Jupiter*, with his exceſſive delight in drink and drunkenneſs, which others make the cauſe of his fever and death. In that he lamented his want of enterprizing, and grieved to conſider what he ſhould do when he had conquered the world, *Auguſtus Ceſar* found juſt cauſe to deride him, as if the well-governing of ſo many nations and kingdoms, as he had already conquered, could not have offer'd him matter more than abundant, to buſy his brains withal. That he was both learned, and a lover of learning, it cannot be doubted. Sir *Francis Bacon*, in his firſt book of the advancement of learning, hath proved it ſufficiently. His liberality I know not how to praiſe, becauſe it exceeded proportion. It is ſaid, that when he gave a whole city to one of his ſervants, he, to whom it was given, did, out of modeſty, refuſe it, as diſproportionable to his fortune: to whom *Alexander* replied, that he did not enquire what became him to accept, but the king to give: of which *Seneca*; [a] *Animoſa vox videtur & regia, cum ſit ſtultiſſima: nihil enim per ſe quenquam decet. Refert quid, cui, quando, quare, ubi, &c. ſine quibus facti ratio non conſtabit; habeatur perſonarum & dignitatum proportio, & cum ſit ubique virtutis modus, æque peccat quod excedit, quàm quod deficit*; It ſeems a brave and royal ſpeech, whereas indeed it is very fooliſh; for nothing, ſimply conſider'd by it ſelf, becomes a man. We muſt regard what, to whom, when, why, where, and the like; without which conſiderations, no act can be approved. Let honours be proportion'd unto the perſons; for whereas virtue is ever limited by meaſure, the exceſs is as faulty as the defect.

For his perſon, it is very apparent, that he was as valiant as any man; a diſpoſition, taken by it ſelf, not much to be admired; for I am confident, that he had ten thouſand in his army as daring as himſelf. Surely, if adventurous natures were to be commended ſimply, we ſhould confound that virtue with the hardineſs of thieves, ruffians, and maſtiff dogs. For certainly, it is no ways praiſe-worthy but in doing good things, and in the performance of thoſe lawful enterprizes, in which we are employed for the ſervice of our kings and commonweals.

If we compare this great conqueror with other troubles of the world, who have bought their glory with ſo great deſtruction, and effuſion of blood, I think him far inferior to *Ceſar*, and many others that lived after him, ſeeing he never undertook any warlike nation, the naked *Scythians* excepted, nor was ever encountered with any army, of which he had not a moſt maſtering advantage, both of weapons and of commanders, every one of his father's old captains, by far, exceeding the beſt of his enemies. But it ſeemeth, fortune and deſtinies (if we may uſe thoſe terms) had found out and prepared for him, without any care of his own, both heaps of men, that willingly offered their necks to the yoke, and kingdoms that invited and called in their own conquerors. For concluſion, we will agree with *Seneca*; who, ſpeaking of *Philip* the father, and *Alexander* the ſon, gives this judgment of them. [b] *Quod non minores fuêre peſtes mortalium quàm inundatio, qua planum omne perfuſum eſt, quàm conflagratio qua magna pars animantium exaruit*; That they were no leſs plagues to mankind, than an overflow of waters drowning all the level; or ſome burning drought, whereby a great part of living creatures is ſcorched up.

[a] L. 2. de Ben. c. 1. [b] Natural. Quæſt. l. 3. q. 1.

CHAP. III.

The Reign of ARIDÆUS.

SECT. I.

Of the queſtion about ſucceſſion to Alexander.

THE death of *Alexander* left his army (as *Demades*, the *Athenian*, then compared it) in ſuch caſe, as was that monſtrous giant *Polyphemus*, having loſt his only eye. For, that which is reported in fables of that great *Cyclops*, might well be verified of the *Macedonians*: their force was intolerable, but for want of good guidance, ineffectual, and harmful chiefly to themſelves. The cauſes whereof (under the divine ordinance) were, partly the uncertainty of title to ſucceſſion in the kingdom of *Macedon*, partly the ſtubborn pride of *Alexander* himſelf, who, thinking none worthy to be his heir, did refuſe to eſtabliſh the right in any one, leaving every one to his own fortune; but eſpecially the great ambition of his followers, who all had learned of their maſter to ſuffer no equals; a leſſon ſoon taught unto ſpirits reflecting upon their own worth, when the reverence of a greater object faileth.

It

It hath formerly been ſhewed, that *Philip* (the father of *Alexander*) governing in *Macedon* as protector, aſſumed unto himſelf the kingdom, not rendring it unto *Amyntas* (the ſon of his elder brother *Perdiccas*) when he grew to man's eſtate; but only beſtowing upon him in marriage a daughter of his own: by which bond, and much more by his own proper ſtrength, he aſſured the crown unto himſelf: *Amyntas* never attempting ought againſt *Philip*, tho' (with price of his life) he did againſt *Alexander* in the beginning of his reign. Wherefore *Eurydice*, the ſole iſſue of his marriage, ought in reaſon to have been acknowledged queen after *Alexander*; as having better title thereto, than either he or *Philip* had, when they lived, unleſs, peradventure, ſome law of that nation forbad the reign of women. But the excellent virtue of theſe two princes had utterly defaced the right of all pretenders, not claiming from their own bodies: and ſo great were their conqueſts, that *Macedon* it ſelf was (in regard of them) a very ſmall appendix, and no way deſerving to be laid in balance againſt the demand of their poſterity, had they left any able to make challenge of the royal ſeat.

Alexander, having taken many wives, had iſſue by none of the principal of them. *Barſine*, the daughter of *Artabazus* a *Perſian*, had born unto him a young ſon: and *Roxane*, the daughter of *Oxyartes* (whom he had more ſolemnly married) was left by him great with child. But the baſeneſs of the mothers, and contempt of the conquered nations, was generally alledged in bar of the plea made for them, by ſome that would (perhaps) have wrought out their own ends, under the name of *Alexander*'s children.

Cleopatra, a ſiſter of *Alexander*, widow to the king of *Epirus*, and *Aridæus* his baſe brother (ſon to *Philip* by a concubine of no account) who had married the lady *Eurydice* before mentioned, were next in courſe. Of *Cleopatra* there was no ſpeech, which may give ſuſpicion, that either law or cuſtom had made that ſex uncapable of the ſoveraignty; *Aridæus* (beſides his baſtardy) was neither for perſon nor quality fit to rule as king; yet upon him the election fell, but ſlowly, and (as happeneth often) for lack of a better: when the counſellors having over-laboured their diſagreeing wits in deviſing what was beſt, were content for very wearineſs to take what came next to hand.

Ptolemy (ſoon after king of *Egypt*) concurring with them who rejected all mention of the half-*Perſian* brood, king *Alexander*'s children, was of opinion, that the rule of all ſhould be given to the captains, that going for law which by the greater part of them ſhould be decreed: ſo far was he from acknowledging any one as true heir to the crown.

This *Ptolemy* was called the ſon of *Lagus*, but reputed of *Philip*: who having uſed the company of *Arſinoe*, *Ptolemy*'s mother, delivered her in marriage to *Lagus*, being great with child. Therefore, whether it were ſo, that he hoped well to work his own fortune out of thoſe diſſenſions, which are incident unto the conſultations of many ambitious men, equal in place, forcing them at length to redeem their quiet with ſubjection to one, deſerving regard by his blood, and truſt for his even carriage; or whether he deſired only to get a ſhare to himſelf, which could not have come to paſs had all been given to one: plain enough it is, that he thought not on preferring *Aridæus* before himſelf; and therefore gave ſuch counſel as fitted his own and other men's purpoſes. Yea, this device of his took place indeed, tho' not in form as he had propounded it: For, it was in effect all one, to have aſſembled at *Alexander*'s empty chair, as *Ptolemy* had conceived the form of their conſultations, or to ſet in the chair ſuch a king as *Aridæus*, no wiſer than the chair it ſelf. Alſo the controverſies ariſing were determined by the greater part of the captains; by the greater part, if not in number, yet in puiſſance.

But as theſe counterfeit ſhews of diſſembling aſpirers, do often take check by the plain dealing of them, who dare to go more directly to work: ſo was it like to have fared with *Ptolemy* and the reſt, when *Ariſtonus*, another of the captains, interpreted the very words of *Alexander*; ſaying, that he left his kingdom to the worthieſt, as deſigning *Perdiccas*, to whom (lying at the point of death) he delivered his ring. It ſeemeth good in reaſon, that *Alexander* ſhould be diſpoſer of his own purchaſes; and thoſe tokens of *Alexander*'s purpoſe appeared plain enough, ſo long as no man would interpoſe another's conſtruction: every one being uncertain how the ſecret affections of the reſt might be inclined. Many therefore, either out of their love, or becauſe they would not be of the lateſt, urged *Perdiccas* to take upon him the eſtate royal. He was no ſtranger to the royal blood; yet his birth gave him not ſuch reputation, as the great favour of his dead king, with whom he had been very inward, and that eſpecially ſince the death of *Epheſtion* (a powerful minion) into whoſe place he was choſen. For his own worth he might well be commended, as a good man of war, and one that had given much proof of his private valour. But very ſurly he was: which quality (joined with good fortune) carried a ſhew of majeſty: being check'd with miſadventure, it was called by a true name *Pride*; and rewarded with death.

In the preſent buſineſs a fooliſh over-weening did him as great harm, as it had been great happineſs to have ſucceeded *Alexander*. For not content to have the acclamation of the ſoldiers approving the ſentence of *Ariſtonus*, he would needs counterfeit modeſty; thinking that every one of the princes would have entreated him to take the weighty burden of an empire, which would be the leſs envious, the more ſolemnity he uſed in the acceptance. It is truly ſaid, he that feigneth himſelf a ſheep, may chance to be eaten by a wolf. *Meleager* (a man by nature envious, and bearing a particular hatred to *Perdiccas*) took advantage of his irreſolute behaviour, and very bitterly inveighed againſt him. In concluſion he pronounced, that whoſoever was heir to the crown, the ſoldiers ought to be heirs to the treaſure; and therefore he invited them, who were nothing ſlow, to ſhare it. This diſturbed all the conſultation. The captains were left alone, far enough from agreeing, and not able to have brought any concluſion to good effect without conſent of the ſoldiers, who greedy of ſpoil thronged about *Meleager*.

SECT. II.

The election of Aridæus, *with the troubles thereabout ariſing; the firſt diviſion of the empire.*

DUring this uproar, mention was made of *Aridæus* by ſome one, and entertained with good liking of many, until at laſt it grew to the voice of the army. *Meleager*, having withdrawn himſelf tumultuouſly from the company of the lords, was glad of ſo fair an occaſion to make himſelf great: therefore he produced *Aridæus*, commended him to the ſoldiers, who called him by his father's name *Philip*, and brought him into the palace, inveſted him

him in *Alexander*'s robes, and proclaiming him king. Many of the nobles withſtood this election, but in vain; for they could not reſolve what courſe to follow, rejecting this. Only *Python*, a hot-headed man, took upon him to proclaim the ſon of *Alexander* by *Roxana*, according to the counſel which *Perdiccas* at firſt had given, appointing *Perdiccas* and *Leonatus* his protectors: but this child was not yet born, which made that attempt of *Python* vain. Finally, *Perdiccas*, with ſix hundred men, and *Ptolemy*, with the king's pages, took upon them to defend the place where *Alexander*'s body lay: but the army, conducted by *Meleager*, who carried the new king about whither he liſted, eaſily brake in upon them, and inforced them to accept *Arideus* for their ſoveraign lord. Then, by the interceſſion of the ancient captains, a reconciliation was propounded and admitted, but on neither ſide faithfully meant.

Leonatus, who was of royal blood, a goodly gentleman, and valiant, iſſued out of *Babylon*, being followed by all the horſe, which conſiſted (for the moſt part) of the nobility. *Perdiccas* abode in the city (but ſtanding upon his guard) that he might be ready to take the opportunity of any commotion that ſhould happen among the infantry. The king (who was governed by *Meleager*) commanded, or gave leave to have *Perdiccas* made away; which attempt ſucceeded ill, being neither ſecretly carried, nor committed to ſure executioners. Their coming was not unexpected, and they were by *Perdiccas* rebuked with ſuch gravity, that they departed honeſter than they came; being ſorry for their bad enterprize. Upon the news of this attempt, the camp was in an uproar, which the king ſeeking to pacify, wanted authority, as having newly gotten the crown by them, and holding it by their courteſy. The matter it ſelf afforded no good excuſes, and his indiſcretion made them worſe. He ſaid, that no harm was done, for *Perdiccas* was alive: but their exclamations were againſt the tyrannous enterprize, which he imputed to *Meleager*; abandoning the ſureſt of his friends to the rage of the multitude, who were not appeaſed, until the king, by offering to reſign his eſtate unto them, renewed, out of their pity, that favourable affection, which had moved them to ſet him up at the firſt.

Perdiccas, having now joined himſelf with *Leonatus*, kept the fields, intending to cut off all proviſion of victuals from the city. But, after ſundry embaſſies paſſing between the king and the nobles (they requiring to have the authors of ſedition given up into their hands; the king, that *Meleager* might be joined with *Leonatus* and *Perdiccas*, as a third in government of the army) things were compounded according to the king's deſire. *Meleager* ſhould have done well to conſider, that ſuch men as had one day demanded his head, were not like, the day following, to give him a principal place among them, without any new occaſion offered, had not ſome purpoſe of treachery lurked under their great facility. General peace was renewed, and much love proteſted, where little was intended. The face of the court was the ſame which it had been in *Alexander*'s time: but no longer now did the ſame heart give it life; and windy ſpirits they were which moved in the arteries. Falſe reports were given out by appointment of *Perdiccas*, tending to his own diſgrace; but in ſuch terms, as might ſeem to have proceeded from *Meleager*, who, finding part of the drift, but not all, took it as an injury done to himſelf; and (as deſirous of a true friendſhip) deſired of *Perdiccas*, that ſuch authors of diſcord might be puniſhed. *Perdiccas* (as a lover of peace) did well approve the motion; and therefore agreed, that a general muſter ſhould be made, at which time the diſturbers of the common quiet ſhould receive their puniſhment (as was the manner for ſoldiers offending) in preſence of the army. The plot was miſchievouſly laid: Had *Meleager* given way to ſeditious rumours, he muſt needs have incurred the general hatred of all, as a ſower of diſſenſion; and thereby, with publick approbation, might have been cut off, as having often offended in that kind; his prince being too weak a patron. Now, ſeeking redreſs of theſe diſorders, he haſtened his own ruin, by a leſs formal, but more ſpeedy way. This kind of muſter was very ſolemn, and practiſed with many ceremonies, as for cleanſing of the army. The horſemen, the elephants, the *Macedonian* foot, the mercenaries, were each, according to their quality, ſet in array, apart from others, as if they had been of ſundry ſorts, met at adventure; which done, the manner was to ſkirmiſh (as by way of exerciſe) according to direction of their ſeveral captains. But at that time the great battel of *Macedonian* pikes, which they called the *Phalanx*, led by *Meleager*, was on purpoſe beſtowed in a ground of diſadvantage; and the countenance of the horſe and elephants beginning to give charge upon them, was ſuch, as diſcovered no jeſting paſtime nor good intent. Kings were always wont to fight among the horſemen; of which cuſtom *Perdiccas* made great uſe that day, to the utter confuſion of his enemies: for *Arideus* was always governed by him, which, for the preſent, had him in poſſeſſion. Two or three days before, he had ſought the death of *Perdiccas*, at the inſtigation of *Meleager*; now he rides with *Perdiccas* up and down about the footmen, commanding them to deliver unto the death all ſuch as *Perdiccas* required. Three hundred they were who were caſt unto the elephants, and by them ſlain, in the preſence of the king, who ſhould have defended them, and their affrighted companions. But theſe three hundred were not the men whoſe puniſhment *Meleager* had expected; they were ſuch as had followed him, when he diſturbed the firſt conſultation that was held about the election of a new king, and ſome of them his eſpecial friends. Having therefore kept himſelf quiet a-while, as unwilling to give offence to them who had the advantage; when he ſaw their proceedings tend very manifeſtly to his deſtruction, he fled away into a temple, which he found no ſanctuary; for thither they ſent, and ſlew him.

The army being thus corrected, was led into the city, where a new council of the princes was held, who, finding what manner of man their king was, divided all the provinces of the empire among themſelves; leaving to *Arideus* the office of a viſitor, and yet making *Perdiccas* his protector, and commander of the forces remaining with him. Then were the funerals of *Alexander* thought upon, whoſe body, having been ſeven days neglected, was opened and embalmed by the *Egyptians*; no ſign of poiſon appearing, how great ſoever the ſuſpicion might be. The charge of his burial was committed to *Arideus*; one of the captains, who was two years preparing of a great and coſtly ſhew, making a ſtately chariot, in which the corps was laid; many coarſes of his friends being laid in the ground, before that of *Alexander* was beſtowed in *Alexandria*, a city of his own building in *Egypt*.

SECT. III.

The beginning of the Lamian *war.*

WHILST theſe things were in doing, or preſently after, *Antipater* and *Craterus*, two principal noblemen, and inferior to none of *Alexander*'s followers, if not greater than any of the reſt, were buſied in *Greece* with a war, which the *Athenians* more bravely than wiſely had begun in *Alexander*'s life, but now did proſecute more boldly than before, upon the courage which they had taken by his death. *Alexander*, not long before he died, had commanded, that all the baniſhed *Greeks* (few excepted) ſhould be reſtored unto their former places. He knew the factious quality of the *Grecian* eſtates, and therefore thought ſo to provide, that in every city he would have a ſure party. But it fell out otherwiſe; for he loſt the hearts of many more than he won, by this proud injunction: his pleaſure, indeed, was fulfilled; yet not without great murmuring of the whole nation, as being againſt all order of law, and a beginning of open tyranny. The *Athenians*, greatly decayed in eſtate, but retaining more than was needful, of their ancient ſpirits, forbad the execution of this decree in their dominions; ſo did alſo the *Etolians*, who were valiant men, and inhabited a region well fortified by nature; yet neither of them took arms, but ſeemed to bear themſelves, as men that had done no more than they might well juſtify by reaſon: nevertheleſs, to prevent the worſt, the *Athenians* gave ſecret inſtructions to *Leoſthenes*, a captain of theirs, willing him to levy an army, but in his own name, and to keep it in a readineſs for their uſe. This was no hard thing for *Leoſthenes* to do, great numbers of *Greek* ſoldiers being lately returned from the *Aſian* war in poor eſtate, as defrauded of their pay by the captains. Of theſe he gathered up eight thouſand, when the certain news were brought of *Alexander*'s death; at which the city of *Athens* declared it ſelf, and more honourably than wiſely, proclaimed open war againſt the *Macedonians*, for the liberty of *Greece*. Hereupon *Leoſthenes* drew in the *Etolians*, and ſome other eſtates; gave battel to the *Beotians*, who ſided with *Antipater*, and overthrew them; growing ſo faſt in reputation, and ſo ſtrong in adherents, that *Antipater* (arming in all haſte, yet ſuſpecting his own ſtrength) was forced to ſend into *Aſia* to *Craterus* for ſuccour.

Nothing is more vain than the fears and hopes of men, ſhunning or purſuing their deſtinies afar off, which deceive all mortal wiſdom, even when they ſeem near at hand. One month was ſcarcely paſſed, ſince nothing ſo heavily burthened the thoughts of *Antipater*, as the return of *Craterus* into *Macedon*; which he then feared as death, but now deſired, as the moſt likely aſſurance of his life. *Craterus*, whom *Alexander* held, as of all men, the moſt aſſured unto him, was ſent into *Macedon*, to convey home the old ſoldiers (that was the pretence) and to ſucceed *Antipater* in the government of *Macedon* and *Greece*. The ſuſpicions were ſtrong, that he had a privy charge to put *Antipater* to death; neither did that which was commonly publiſhed, found much better; which was, that *Antipater* ſhould be ſent unto the king, as captain of the young ſoldiers, newly to be levied in *Europe*. For *Alexander* was much incenſed againſt him by his mother *Olympias*; and would ſometimes give out ſpeeches, teſtifying his own jealouſy and hatred of him; but yet he ſtrove to ſmother it, which in a cruel prince betokeneth little good. Few of *Alexander*'s lieutenants had eſcaped with life; moſt of them, indeed, were mean perſons in regard of thoſe who followed him in his *Indian* expedition, and were therefore (perhaps) removed, to make place for their betters. But if the king's rigor was ſuch, as could find rebellious purpoſes (for ſo he interpreted even lewd government) in baſe perſons; little might *Antipater* hope for, who, having ſat viceroy ten years in the ſtrongeſt part of the empire, was called away to the preſence of ſo fell a maſter, and the envy of a court, wherein they had been his inferiors, which would now repine to ſee him their equal. Therefore, whether his fear drew him to prevention, working firſt the king's death by poiſon, given by his ſon *Iolaus*, *Alexander*'s cup-bearer; or whether it brake not forth until opportunity had changed it into the paſſion of revenge, which was cruelly performed by his ſon *Caſſander*; great cauſe of much fear he had, which I note in this place, as the ground of effects to be produced in very few years.

At the preſent *Craterus* was ſent for, and all the captains of companies lying near ſollicited to make haſte. Not without cauſe; for in *Macedon*, there could not, at that time, be raiſed more than thirteen thouſand foot, and ſix hundred horſe; which muſter was of raw ſoldiers, all the force of the country being emptied into *Aſia*. The *Theſſalians*, indeed, who had long ſtood firm for *Philip* and *Alexander*, who alſo were the beſt horſemen of *Greece*, furniſhed him with very brave troops, that might have done great ſervice, had their faith held out, which they changed for the liberty of *Greece*. With theſe forces did *Antipater*, in *Theſſaly*, try the fortune of a battel with *Leoſthenes*; rather (as may ſeem) fearing the increaſe of his enemies power, and rebellion of the *Greeks* (were they not check'd at the firſt) than preſuming on his own ſtrength. For *Leoſthenes* had of *Athenians*, *Etolians*, and mercenaries, two and twenty thouſand foot, beſides the aſſiſtance of many petty ſignories, and of ſome *Illyrians*, and *Thracians*: of horſe he brought into the field about two thouſand and five hundred; but over-ſtrong he was that way alſo, when once the *Theſſalians* had revolted unto him. So *Antipater* loſt the day; and his loſs was ſuch, that he neither was able to keep the field, nor to make a ſafe retreat into his own country: therefore he fled into the town of *Lamia*, which was well fortified, and well provided of all things neceſſary to bear out a ſiege. Thither did *Leoſthenes* follow him, preſent him battel again, and upon refuſal cloſe up the town with earth-works, and a wall. There will we leave him for a while, travelling in the laſt honourable enterprize that ever was undertaken by that great city of *Athens*.

SECT. IV.

How Perdiccas *employed his Army,*

KING *Arideus* living under the rule of *Perdiccas*, when all the princes were gone each to his own province, kept a naked court; all his greatneſs conſiſting in a bare title, ſupported by the ſtrength of his protector, who cared not for him, otherwiſe than to make uſe of him. *Perdiccas* had no province of his own peculiar, neither was he like to be welcome to any whom he ſhould viſit in his government. A ſtronger army than any of the reſt he had, which he might eaſily hope, in that unſettled condition of things, to make better worth to him than many provinces could have been. The better to accompliſh his deſires, he cloſely ſought the marriage of *Cleopatra*, the ſiſter of *Alexander*; yet about the ſame time, he either married *Nicea*, the daughter of *Antipater*, or made ſuch love to her as blinded their eyes, who did not ſomewhat narrowly ſearch into his doings.

Ariarathes,

Ariarathes the *Cappadocian*, the ſecond of that name, and tenth king of that country, had continued faithful to the *Perſian* empire as long as it ſtood, following the example of his forefathers, even from *Pharnaces* I. that reigned in *Cappadocia*, who married *Atoſſa*, ſiſter to the great *Cyrus*. Some of his anceſtors had (indeed) been oppreſſed by the *Perſians*, but what fortune took from them at one time, virtue reſtored at another, and their faithful princes had much increaſed all. But now in the fatal period of ſo great an empire, with much wiſdom, and (*Darius* being ſlain) with ſufficient honour, he might have acknowledged the *Macedonian* in the *Perſian*'s room. This he did not, neither did *Alexander* call him to account, being occupied with greater cares. But *Perdiccas*, who had no greater buſineſs wherein to entertain his army, found it expedient both for the honour of the empire, to take in that inland kingdom, ſurrounded with provinces of the *Macedonian* conqueſt, and for his own particular to have one opportune place of ſure retreat, under the government of a ſtedfaſt friend. Therefore he enter'd *Cappadocia*, fought with *Ariarathes*, who drew into the field thirty thouſand foot, and fifteen thouſand horſe (a ſtrong army, had it not encounter'd a ſtronger, and better trained) won the victory, and thereby the whole kingdom. But with much cruelty did he uſe the victory: for having taken *Ariarathes* priſoner with many others, he crucified him, and as many of his kindred as he could light upon: and ſo delivered that province to *Eumenes*, whom of all men living he truſted moſt.

Another part of his forces he had committed to *Python*, rather as to the moſt honourable of ſuch as remained about him, than as to the moſt aſſured. *Python* was to ſubdue the *Greeks*, rebelling in the high countries of *Aſia*. About twenty thouſand foot, and three thouſand horſe they were (all old ſoldiers) who, planted in colonies by *Alexander*, to bridle the barbarous nations, were ſoon weary of their unpleaſant habitations, and the rude people among whom they lived: and therefore took advantage of the preſent troubles to ſeek unto themſelves a better fortune. Againſt theſe *Python* went, more deſirous to make them his own, than to deſtroy them: which intent of his *Perdiccas* diſcovering, did both give him in charge to put all thoſe rebels to the ſword, giving the ſpoils of them to his ſoldiers, and further enjoined it unto *Python*'s captains (his own creatures) that they ſhould ſee this command executed. Theſe directions for uſe of the victory might have proved needleſs; ſo uncertain was the victory itſelf. A captain of the rebels commanding over three thouſand, corrupted by *Python*, did in the heat of the fight (which was very doubtful) retire without neceſſity to a hill not far off. This diſmayed the reſt, and gave the day to *Python*, who being far enough from *Perdiccas*, offered compoſition to the vanquiſhed, granting unto them their lives and liberty, under condition of laying down their arms; and hereupon he gave them his faith. Being maſter of theſe companies, he might well have a good opinion of his own power: all power being then valued by ſtrength in followers, when as none could vaunt himſelf as free lord of any territory. He had thirteen thouſand foot, and eight thouſand eight hundred horſe, beſides theſe new companions, whom needleſs fear without great loſs had cauſed to leave the field: but in true eſtimation, all the greatneſs whereof *Python* might think himſelf aſſured, was (and ſoon appeared to be) inherent in *Perdiccas*. For by his command were ten thouſand foot, and eight thouſand horſe, of thoſe which followed *Python*, levied; the rulers of the provinces carefully obeying the letters of *Perdiccas*, by which they were enjoined to give aſſiſtance to that buſineſs: and by virtue of the precept given unto them by *Perdiccas*, did the *Macedonians* cut in pieces all thoſe poor men who had yielded themſelves, leaving *Python* as naked as he came forth to return unto his great maſter.

Now was *Perdiccas* mighty above the mighty, and had fair leiſure to purſue his hopes of marriage with *Cleopatra*, and thereby to make himſelf lord of all: but this muſt be ſecretly carried for fear of oppoſition. How it ſucceeded will appear when the *Lamian* war taketh ending.

SECT. V.

The proceſs of the Lamian *war.*

WE left *Antipater* hardly beſieged, wanting means to free himſelf without ſuccours from his friends in *Aſia*. Thoſe helps not appearing ſo ſoon as he expected, he came to parley with *Leoſthenes*, and would have yielded unto any terms of reaſon, wherewith men poſſeſſed with hope of victory do ſeldom limit their deſires. *Leoſthenes* willed him without further circumſtance to ſubmit himſelf to diſcretion. This was too much for him that had once commanded over them, who now required of him ſuch a diſhonourable compoſition. Wherefore, knowing that the extremities, from which as yet he was far enough, could bring no worſe with it, *Antipater* prepared for the defence, and the other for winning the town, which felt great want of victuals. In this lingring war, the *Etolians* (whether weary of ſitting ſtill at a ſiege, or having buſineſs which they pretended at home) took their leave, and returned into their own country. Their departure left the trenches ſo thinly manned, that *Antipater* found means to ſally out upon his enemies to their great loſs: for many were ſlain, and *Leoſthenes* himſelf among them, ere he could be repulſed into the town. Yet hereby the *Macedonians* were nothing relieved; their victuals waſted, and they were not ſtrong enough to deal with the *Greeks* in open fight. *Craterus* was long in coming. *Lyſimachus*, who was neareſt at hand in *Thrace*, had too much work of his own, leading no more than four thouſand foot, and two thouſand horſe, againſt *Seuthas* their king, who brought into the field above four times that number; and though *Lyſimachus*, not without loſs, had gotten one victory, yet the enemy, abounding in multitude, felt not the blow ſo much as might abate his courage. Therefore *Leonatus* was earneſtly ſollicited by *Antipater*'s friends, to make all haſte to the reſcue. He had the government of *Phrygia* the leſs, and was able to raiſe an army of more than twenty thouſand foot, and two thouſand five hundred horſe, whether levied out of his province, or appointed unto him out of the main army, it is uncertain. Certain it is, that he was more willing to take in hand the journey into *Greece*, than *Antipater* was to have him come. For *Cleopatra* had written unto him, deſiring his preſence at *Pella*, the chief city of *Macedon*, and very kindly offering herſelf to be his wife; which letters he kept not ſo cloſe as had been requiſite, and therefore brought himſelf into great ſuſpicion, that ſoon ended with his life. *Antiphilus*, choſen general by the *Athenians*, in place of *Leoſthenes*, hearing of this, forſook the ſiege of *Lamia*, and took the ready way to theſe great conquerors of *Aſia*, with purpoſe to give them an evil welcome home, before

before *Antipater* and they ſhould join in one. He had (notwithſtanding the departure of the *Etolians*) the advantage of *Leonatus* in horſe, by the odds of two thouſand *Theſſalians*; in other things he was equal to him; in cauſe he thought himſelf ſuperior; in the fortune of that day he proved ſo: for he won a great victory (chiefly by virtue of the *Theſſalians*) which appeared the greater by the end of *Leonatus* himſelf; who fighting valiantly, was driven into a piece of mariſh ground, where he found his death, which he deſperately had fought among the *Indians*, but it waited for him at home, not far from the place of his nativity. He was the firſt of *Alexander*'s captains which died in battel, but all, or moſt of the reſt ſhall follow him the ſame way. After this day the *Athenians* did never any thing ſuitable to their ancient glory. The vanquiſhed *Macedonians* were too weak to renew the fight, and too proud to fly. They betook themſelves to high grounds, unfit for ſervice on horſeback, and ſo abode in the ſight of the enemy that day; the day following, *Antipater* with his men came into their camp, and took the charge of all. The *Athenians* perceiving their ſtrength to be at the greateſt, and fearing leſt that of the enemies ſhould increaſe, did earneſtly ſeek to determine the matter quickly by another battel. But ſtill *Antipater* kept himſelf on ground of advantage: which gave more than reaſonable confidence to the *Greeks*, many of whom departed to their homes, accounting the enemy to be vanquiſhed. This wretchleſneſs (incorrigible in an army of voluntiers) was very inexcuſable; ſeeing that the victories by land were very much defaced by loſſes at ſea, where the *Athenians*, labouring to have made themſelves once again maſters, were put to the worſt.

But now the fatal captivity of *Greece* came on, of which ſhe never could be delivered unto this day. *Craterus*, with a ſtrong army, having made great marches from *Cilicia*, paſſed over into *Europe*, and coming into *Theſſaly*, joined himſelf with *Antipater*. The forces of *Leonatus*, *Antipater*, and *Craterus*, being joined in one, contained forty thouſand weightily armed, three thouſand light-armed men, and five thouſand horſe, of which numbers the *Greeks* wanted a thouſand and five hundred in horſe, in foot eighteen thouſand. Carefully therefore did *Antiphilus* labour to avoid the neceſſity of a battel, until ſuch time as the towns confederate ſhould return unto the camp thoſe bands which had ſtraggled from it. But thoſe companies were ſo ſlow in coming, and *Antipater* ſo urgent upon the *Greeks*, that compelled they were to put the matter in hazard without further attendance. Like enough it is, that with a little more help they had carried away the victory; for the *Theſſalians* had the upper hand, and held it, until ſuch time as they perceived their battels (overlaid with multitude) retire unto the higher ground, which cauſed them alſo to fall back. So the *Macedonians* became lords of the field, having little elſe to boaſt of, conſidering, that with the loſs of an hundred and thirty men, they had purchaſed only the death of ſome five hundred enemies. Yet hereof was great uſe made. For the *Greeks*, as not ſubject unto the full command of one general, and being every one deſirous to preſerve his own eſtate and city, concluded to make a treaty of peace with *Antipater*; who being a ſubtle artificer, and well underſtanding their aptneſs to diviſion, refuſed to hearken to any general compoſition, but willed every city to deal apart for itſelf. The intent of his device was ſo apparent, that it was rejected; the *Greeks* chuſing rather to abide the coming of their aſſiſtants, whoſe unreaſonable careleſneſs betrayed the cauſe *Antipater* and *Craterus* beſieging and winning ſome towns in *Theſſaly*, which the army of the confederates wanted means and courage to relieve, wearied that nation from attending any longer upon other mens unlikely hopes, with their own aſſured and preſent calamity.

SECT. VI.

Of the peace granted to Athens *by* Antipater. *Of* Demoſthenes's *death.*

THE *Theſſalians* falling off, all the reſt ſoon followed ſeverally, and ſued for peace; the gentle conditions given to the moſt forward, inviting ſuch as were ſlack. Only the *Athenians* and *Etolians* held out. Little favour could they hope for, having been authors of this tumult; and their fear was not great; the ſeat of the war being far from them. But the celerity of *Antipater* confounded all their imaginations, who ſat ſtill at *Athens*, deviſing upon courſes of proſecuting the war to come, which came to their doors before their conſultation could find iſſue. He was ready to enter upon their frontiers; they had no ability to reſiſt, and were as heartleſs as friendleſs. All that remained was to ſend embaſſadors deſiring peace upon ſome good terms: neceſſity enforcing them to have accepted even the very worſt. *Phocion*, with *Demades* the Orator, and *Xenocrates* the philoſopher, were chief of this embaſſage; *Phocion* as the moſt honourable, *Demades* as a ſtrong perſwader (both of them well reſpected by *Antipater*) and *Xenocrates* as one admired for wiſdom, gravity of manners, and virtue; but all theſe ornaments conſiſting in ſpeculation, and therefore of leſs regard, when their admiration was to coſt much in real effects.

Antipater calling to mind the pride of *Leoſthenes*, required of the *Athenians* that they ſhould wholly ſubmit themſelves to his pleaſure; which being (perforce) granted, he commanded them to defray the charges of the war paſt, to pay a fine, and entertain a garriſon. Further, he abrogated the popular eſtate, committing the government of the city to thoſe of moſt wealth, depriving of the right of ſuffrage all ſuch as wanted a convenient proportion of riches.

About nine thouſand they were, all men of good ſubſtance, to whom the adminiſtration of the common-wealth was given, a number ſufficient to retain the name and form of a *Democracy*. But the raſcal multitude of beggarly perſons, accuſtomed to get their livings out of the common troubles, being now debarred from bearing offices and giving their voices, cry'd out that this was a meer *Oligarchy*, the violent uſurpation of a few incroaching upon the publick right. Theſe turbulent fellows (of whom king *Philip* had been wont to ſay, that war to them was peace, and peace war) *Antipater* planted in *Thrace*, and gave them lands to manure, leaving as few of them as he could to moleſt the quiet of *Athens*.

To the ſame end (yet withal for ſatisfying his own ſuſpicions and hatred) he cauſed *Demoſthenes* and *Hyperides*, famous orators, with ſome others to be ſlain. Had the death of theſe two, eſpecially of *Demoſthenes*, been forborn, the reſt of his proceedings in this action might well have paſſed for very mild: whereas now all ſuch, as either delighted with the orations of *Demoſthenes*, or have ſurrender'd their judgments to authors juſtly admiring him, as the moſt eloquent of all that ever did ſpeak and write, condemn him utterly, calling

ling him a bloody tyrant. Such grace and reputation do the learned arts find in all civil nations, that the evil done to a man, famous in one of them, is able to blemiſh any action, how good ſoever otherwiſe it be, or honourably carried.

Demoſthenes had taken ſanctuary in the temple of *Neptune*, in the iſle of *Calauria*; there did *Archias* (ſent with ſoldiers by *Antipater* for the purpoſe) find him, and gently perſwade him to leave the place, but not ſo prevailing, he threatned violence. Then *Demoſthenes*, entreating a little reſpite, as it had been to write ſomething, ſecretly took poiſon, which he had kept for ſuch a neceſſity, and ſo died, rather chuſing to do the laſt execution upon himſelf, than to fall into the hands of ſuch as hated him. Only this act of his (commendable, perhaps, in a heathen man) argued ſome valour in him, who was otherwiſe too much a coward in battel, howſoever valiant in perſwading to enterprizes, wherein the way to very honourable ends was to be made through paſſages exceedingly dangerous. He loved money well, and had great ſums given him by the *Perſian*, to incourage him in finding work for the *Macedonians* at home. Neither did he ill (methinks) in taking from the *Perſians* which loved not his country, great rewards, for ſpeaking ſuch things as tended to his country's good; which he did not ceaſe to procure, when the *Perſians* were no longer able to give him recompence. Such as in tender contemplation of his death can endure no honourable, though true mention of *Antipater*, may (if they can) believe *Lucian*, who tells us, that it was *Antipater*'s purpoſe to have done him great honour. Sure it is, that he was a ſtedfaſt enemy to the *Macedonians*; therefore diſcretion required that he ſhould be cut off.

The matters of *Athens* being thus ordered, the chief command was left in the hand of *Phocion*, a virtuous man, and lover of his country, yet applying himſelf to the neceſſity of the times, by which commendations he had both at other times done the city much good, and now procured this peace, which (though grievous to freemen, yet favourable to the vanquiſhed) he endeavoured carefully to preſerve.

SECT. VII.

How Craterus *and* Antipater *were drawn from their* Etolian *wars into* Aſia. *The grounds of the firſt civil war between the* Macedonian *lords.*

SO *Antipater* with *Craterus* returned into *Macedonia*, where they ſtrengthened their friendſhip with a new alliance, *Craterus* taking *Phila*, the daughter of *Antipater*, to wife.

Shortly after they went againſt the *Etolians*, whoſe poverty was not ſo eaſily daunted, as the luxurious wealth of the more powerful ſtate of *Athens* had been. Their country was rough and mountainous, having many places of great faſtneſs, into which they conveyed ſuch of their goods as they moſt eſteemed, and of their people as were leaſt fit for war, with the reſt they fortified the ſtrongeſt of their cities, and ſo abode the coming of the *Macedonians*, whom they manfully reſiſted. With great obſtinacy did the *Macedonians* contend againſt the difficulties of the places, which the *Etolians* made good as long as their victuals held out. But when *Craterus* had ſhut up all paſſages, and utterly debarred them of relief, then were they put to a miſerable choice, either to deſcend from their ſtrong holds and fight upon equal ground with unequal numbers, or to endure the miſeries of hunger and cold, againſt which they could make no long reſiſtance, or to yield themſelves to the *Macedonians*; who, incenſed by the loſs of many good ſoldiers, were not like to leave ſo ſtubborn enemies in places which might give confidence to rebellion. In caſes of extremity, much fineneſs of wit apprehending all circumſtances of danger commonly doth more hurt, than a blunt conſideration of that only, which at the preſent is in hand. Theſe *Etolians* did not as yet want meat, but their enemies daily moleſted them, wherefore as yet they thought upon nothing but fighting. Fortune was gracious to their courage. For ſuch news came out of *Aſia* into the *Macedonian* camp, as made *Antipater* and *Craterus* think every hour a month till they had rid their hands of theſe *Etolians*, giving them whatſoever conditions they would aſk, yet with purpoſe to call them to ſevere account; yea, to root them out of *Greece* by death, or by captivity, when once they ſhould have ſettled the affairs of *Aſia*, as they hoped and deſired. But of mens purpoſes God is the diſpoſer: in whoſe high counſel it was ordained, that this poor nation ſhould continue a troubleſome bar to the proceedings of *Macedon* and *Greece*, and (when time had ripened the next monarchy) an open gate to let the *Roman* conquerors into thoſe and other provinces. Likewiſe concerning the matters of *Aſia*, the reformation intended by *Antipater* and *Craterus* was ſo far from taking effect, that it ſerved merely as an introduction to all the civil wars enſuing.

The grounds of the *Aſiatic* expedition, which did ſet the world in an uproar, were theſe. *Antipater* and *Craterus* were of *Alexander*'s captains the mightieſt in reputation: the one, in regard of his ancient precedency, and the preſent rule which he bare in the parts of *Europe*; the other, as of all men the beſt beloved, and moſt reſpected, both of *Alexander* and of the whole army. Next unto theſe had *Perdiccas* been, whom the advantage of his preſence at the king's death did make equal, or ſuperior to either of theſe, if not to both together. The firſt intents of *Perdiccas* were to have conſorted with theſe two, and to have been with them a third partner in the government of all: to which purpoſe he entertained the diſcourſe of marriage with one of *Antipater*'s daughters. But feeling in ſhort ſpace the ſtrength of that gale of wind which bore him up, he began to take wind, and ſoar quite another way. *Arideus* was a very ſimple man, yet ſerved well enough to wear the title of that majeſty, whereof *Perdiccas* being adminiſtrator, and hoping to become proprietary, the practice was more ſevere than had been in the days of *Alexander:* the deſire to ſeem terrible being very familiar with weak princes and their ambitious officers, who know no other means of preſerving themſelves from contempt, and of giving ſuch a fiery luſtre to their actions, as may dazzle the eyes of the beholders. How cruelly the poor *Greeks* in the higher *Aſia* were all put to the ſword, and how tyrannouſly the king and princes of *Cappadocia* were crucified, hath already been ſhewed. The *Piſidians* were the next who felt the wrath of theſe counterfeit *Alexanders*. One city of theirs was utterly razed, the children ſold for ſlaves, and all the reſt maſſacred. The *Iſaurians*, by this example grown deſperate, when after two or three days trial they found themſelves unable to continue the defence, lock'd themſelves into their houſes, and ſet the town on fire, into the flame whereof the young men did throw themſelves, after that they had a while repelled the *Macedonians* from the walls.

These exploits being performed, the army had no other work than to ſift the aſhes of the burnt city for gold and ſilver; but *Perdiccas* had buſineſs of greater importance troubling his brains. Nothing was more contrary to his ends, than to ſit ſtill without employment, letting his ſoldiers grow idle about him, whilſt others grew great, and took deep root in their ſeveral provinces. He purpoſed therefore to tranſport his forces into *Europe*, under pretence of bringing the king into *Macedonia*, the ſeat of his anceſtors, and head of the empire. The king's preſence would make the offices of his vice-roys (during the time) actually void; *Antipater* with *Craterus* being once in caſe of private men, and only *Perdiccas* holding authority, the match with *Cleopatra* might eaſily be made. So ſhould greatneſs meet with a good title, and what more could be wiſhed? Some impediment the power of *Ptolemy* might give, who held *Egypt* well fortified with men, but much better with love of the people; yet, if the buſineſs proſpered in *Macedonia*, like enough it was that either *Ptolemy* would follow of himſelf, or be driven to come to reaſon. *Antigonus* likewiſe then governing in *Phrygia*, a buſy-headed man, and ill affected to the ſide, was to be looked into and made away, for fear of further trouble. So thought *Perdiccas*, and was deceived in ſo thinking. *Antigonus* was as good a man of war, of as deep a judgment, as high a ſpirit, and as great undertaking, as any of *Alexander*'s captains. His employments had been leſs than ſome of theirs, which made him alſo the leſs reſpected; but his thoughts were as proud as theirs; for he valued himſelf by his own worth, not by the opinions of other men; with careful attention had he watched *Perdiccas*, and ſounded the depth of his purpoſes, which it was now high time to diſcover. For *Perdiccas*, having with a jealous eye pryed into the demeanour of *Antigonus*, and finding him no way fit for his turn, cauſed him to be charged with ſuch accuſations as might ſuffice to take away his life, eſpecially by a judge that ſought his death. This device *Antigonus* would not ſeem to perceive, but prepared himſelf in ſhew to make anſwer, indeed to make eſcape, which eaſily he did, putting himſelf and his ſon *Demetrius* aboard of ſome *Athenian* gallies that carried him to *Antipater*, laden with ſuch tidings as finiſhed the *Etolian* war before mentioned.

As the coming of *Antigonus* made *Craterus* and *Antipater* manifeſtly perceive their own danger: ſo his flight gave *Perdiccas* to underſtand that his intentions were laid open, and muſt now be juſtified by the ſword. Therefore he prepared as faſt as he could, not only for defence, but (as having on his ſide the king's name) to meet with them at home, who were nothing ſlack in providing to encounter him. *Ptolemy* being advertiſed of theſe procedings, and conſidering how nearly they concerned him, ſided with *Antipater*. To his government of *Egypt* he had annexed the dominion of *Cyrene*, not without conſent of the chief citizens; and now in the midſt of theſe garboils he celebrated the funeral of *Alexander* with great ſolemnity, purchaſing thereby to himſelf much good will and many partakers, notwithſtanding the terrible report of the king's army coming againſt him.

SECT. VIII.

Perdiccas's *voyage into* Egypt, *and his death.*

PERDICCAS, uncertain which way to bend his main power, at length reſolved to ſet upon *Ptolemy*; leaving *Eumenes* to keep to his uſe, againſt *Craterus* and *Antipater*, the parts of *Aſia* bordering upon *Europe*.

It may ſeem ſtrange, that he did not rather make head againſt thoſe who were to come out of *Greece* with a great number, and of more able men than *Ptolemy* could bring. Perhaps he thought to make a quick end with *Ptolemy*; or believed that *Craterus* would not be ready for him ſoon enough. Sure it is that he took a bad courſe, and made it worſe with ill handling.

Ptolemy by his ſweet behaviour allured many to his party, without help of any bad arts. *Perdiccas* contrariwiſe was full of inſolency, which never failed to be rewarded with hatred; that is truly defined, An affectation founded upon opinion of an unjuſt contempt. The whole ſtory of his proceedings in *Egypt* is not worth relating: for he did nothing of importance; but (as a wilful man) tired his followers, and waſted them in hard enterpriſes without ſucceſs. His moſt forcible attempt was upon a little town called the *Camels Wall*: thither he marched by night, with more haſte than good ſpeed; for *Ptolemy* preventing him, did put himſelf into the place, where behaving himſelf not only as a good commander, but as a ſtout ſoldier, he gave the foil to *Perdiccas*, cauſing him to retire with loſs, after a vehement, but vain aſſault continued one whole day. The night following, *Perdiccas* made another journey (which was his laſt) and came to the diviſions of *Nilus*, over againſt *Memphis*. There with much difficulty he began to paſs over his army into an iſland where he meant to encamp. The current was ſtrong, the water deep, and hardly fordable. Wherefore he placed his elephants above the paſſage, to break the violence of the ſtream, and his horſemen beneath it, to take up ſuch as were carried away by ſwiftneſs of the water. A great part of his army being arrived on the further bank, the channel began to wax deep; ſo that whereas the former companies had waded up to the chin, they who ſhould have followed could find no footing. Whether this came by riſing of the water, or flitting away of the ground (the earth being broken with the feet of ſo many men, horſe, and elephants) no remedy there was, but ſuch as had paſs'd muſt re-paſs again, as well as they might: for they were too weak for the enemy, and could not be relieved by their fellows. With great confuſion therefore they committed themſelves to the river, wherein above two thouſand of them periſhed, a thouſand were devoured by crocodiles; a miſerable ſpectacle even to ſuch as were out of danger; ſuch as were ſtrong and could ſwim recovered the camp, many were carried down the ſtream, and driven to the contrary bank, where they fell into the hands of their enemies.

This misfortune exaſperated the ſoldiers againſt their general, giving liberty to their tongues, which long time had concealed the evil thoughts of their hearts. While they were thus murmuring, news came from *Ptolemy*, which did ſet them in an uproar. *Ptolemy* had not only ſhewed much compaſſion on thoſe who fell into his hands alive, but performed all rights of funeral to the dead carcaſes, which the river had caſt upon his ſide; and finally, ſent their bones and aſhes to be interred by their kinſmen or friends. This did not only move the common ſoldiers, but made the captains fall to mutiny, thinking it unreaſonable to make war upon ſo virtuous and honourable a perſon, to fulfil the pleaſure of a lordly ambitious man, uſing them like ſlaves. The ſedition growing ſtrong, wanted only a head, which

which is quickly found. *Python* was there, who inwardly hated *Perdiccas*, for the disgrace which he had suffered by his procurement after the victory upon the rebellious *Greeks*. *Python* had lived in honourable place about *Alexander*; he was in the division of the provinces made governour of *Media*; he had followed *Perdiccas*, and being in all things (the protectorship excepted) equal to him, had nevertheless been scornfully used by him, which now he requited. Drawing together a hundred of the captains, and a good part of the horse, which consisted of the gentry (the footmen having declared themselves before) he entered the tent of *Perdiccas*, where, without further circumstance, they all ran upon him, and slew him. Such end had the proud misgoverning authority of *Perdiccas*. He might have lived as great as any, could he have suffered any as great as himself; yea, peradventure, master of all, had he not been too masterly over those which were already his.

The next day *Ptolemy* came into the camp, where he was joyfully received; he excused himself of things past, as not having been author, or given cause of the war, and was easily believed: the favour of the army being such towards him, that needs they would have made him protector in the room of *Perdiccas*. But this he refused. It was an office fit for one, that would seek to increase his greatness with his trouble. *Ptolemy* was well enough already; wherefore for his own quiet he forbare to accept it, and for their well-deserving of him, he procured that honourable charge to *Python*, and to *Arideus* the captain, who having had some companies of soldiers to furnish with their attendance the solemnities of *Alexander*'s funerals, did with them adhere to him against *Perdiccas*.

In the midst of these businesses came news of two great victories obtained by *Eumenes*; which news, had they arrived two or three days sooner, had been entertained with joyful acclamations; and would have given such reputation to *Perdiccas*, as had caused both his private maligners to continue his open flatterers, and his open enemies to have accepted any tolerable composition. But these good tidings coming in ill time, when death had stopped the ears which would have given them welcome, found bad acceptance, as shall be shewed hereafter.

SECT. IX.

Victories of Eumenes *in the lower* Asia.

BEfore we proceed in the relation of things, happening about the person of the king, it is meet that we speak of those businesses in the lower *Asia*, which were handled by *Eumenes* with notable dexterity, whilst *Perdiccas* was occupied in the *Egyptian* wars. *Alcetas*, the brother of *Perdiccas*, and *Neoptolemus*, had received command from *Perdiccas* to be assistant to *Eumenes*, and to follow his directions. But *Alcetas* made flat answer, that he would not; alledging the backwardness of his men to bear arms against so great a person as *Antipater*, and a man so much honoured as *Craterus*. *Neoptolemus* was content to make fair shew, but inwardly he repined at the precedency given to *Eumenes*, as thinking himself the better man. *Eumenes* discovering, through the counterfeited looks of *Neoptolemus*, the mischief lurking in his heart, wisely dissembled with him, in hope to win him by gentle behaviour and sweet language, that commonly are lost, when bestowed upon arrogant creatures. Yet, the better to fortify himself, that he might stand upon his own strength, he raised out of the countries under his jurisdiction, about six thousand horse, giving many privileges to such as were serviceable, and training them well up. Not without great need: for when upon advertisement of the great preparations made by *Craterus* and *Antipater* (who had newly passed the *Hellespont*) for the invasion of his provinces, he willed *Neoptolemus* to come to him with all his power; *Neoptolemus* did indeed advance, but in hostile manner, tho' unprovoked, presented him battel. *Neoptolemus* had secretly covenanted with *Antipater* to lay open the way for him to the conquest of *Asia*, which now intending to perform, he was shamefully disappointed. For tho' his footmen, being all *Macedonians*, had much the better, and prevailed far upon *Eumenes*'s battels; yet were his horse driven out of the field, and himself compelled, with a few of them, to run away, leaving naked the backs of his *Macedonian* footmen, to be charged by *Eumenes*, who forced them in such wise, that casting down their pikes, they cry'd for mercy, and gladly took their oath to do him faithful service. *Antipater* and *Craterus* endeavoured with many goodly promises to draw *Eumenes* into their society, who contrariwise offered himself, as a means of reconciliation, between *Perdiccas* and *Craterus*, whom he dearly loved; professing withal his hatred to *Antipater*, and constant faith to the cause which he had undertaken to maintain.

Whilst these negotiations were on foot, *Neoptolemus* came with his broken crew to *Antipater* and his associates, vilifying *Eumenes*, and calling him a *Scribe* (at which foolish railing they laugh'd) but extolling the virtue of *Craterus*, as well he might, with high commendations; assuring them, that if *Craterus* did but once appear, or that his voice were but heard by any *Macedonian* in *Eumenes*'s camp, the victory was won, for they would all forthwith revolt unto him. Earnestly therefore he desired them to give him aid against *Eumenes*, and especially requested that *Craterus* might have the leading of the army to be sent. Their own affections did easily lead them to condescend to his motion; and good hope there was, that the reputation of *Craterus* might prevail as much, as the force which he drew along. For he had in the midst of *Alexander*'s vanities, when others (imitating their king) betook themselves to the *Persian* fashions of garments and customs, retained the ancient *Macedonian* form of behaviour and apparel; whereby he became very gracious with the common soldiers, who beheld these new tricks of *Asia* with discontented eyes, as reproachful and derogatory to the manners of their native country. So *Antipater* took the way towards *Cilicia*, to hold *Perdiccas* at bay, and to join with *Ptolemy*. *Craterus* used great celerity, to have taken *Eumenes* revelling (as he hoped) according to the common fashion of captains after a great victory. But he had a wary and well-advised enemy to encounter, who kept good espial upon him, and with much wisdom foresaw all that was to be feared, and the means of prevention, which his courage did not fail to execute.

Eumenes was not ignorant, that *Craterus* was able to defeat him without battel, yea, without stroke; him therefore he feared more than the army following him (yet the army following him was such as much exceeded his own in footmen, but was inferiour in horsemen) and thought it more uneasy to keep the *Macedonians* from revolting to him, than from knowing him. Hereupon he took in hand a strange piece of work, which desperation (of all courses else) taught him, and wise managing, prosperously accomplished. He gave out reports, that *Neoptolemus*

lemus was returned with ſuch company as he could gather together, and had gotten *Pigres* (a captain of no great eſtimation, who lay not far off) to join with him. Having animated his men againſt *Neoptolemus*, whom he knew to be deſpiſed and hated among them (as having been vanquiſhed by ſome of them, and forſaken by others in plain field, whilſt they valiantly fought in his quarrel) he took great care to keep them from receiving any intelligence of the enemies matters. Peremptorily he commanded, that no meſſenger nor trumpeter ſhould be admitted; and not herewith ſatisfied, he placed againſt *Craterus* no one *Macedonian*, nor any other that much would have regarded him had he been known: but *Thracians*, *Cappadocians*, and *Perſians*, under the leading of ſuch, as thought more highly of none, than of *Perdiccas* and himſelf. To theſe alſo he gave in charge, that without ſpeaking or hearkening to any word, they ſhould run upon the enemy, and give him no leiſure to ſay or do any thing, but fight. The directions which he gave to others, he did not fail to execute in his own perſon: but placing himſelf in the right wing of his battel, oppoſite to *Neoptolemus*, who (as he underſtood conducted the left wing on the contrary ſide, he held the *Macedonians* arranged in good order, and ready to charge the enemy as ſoon as the diſtance would give leave. A riſing piece of ground lay between them, which having aſcended, the armies diſcovered each other: but that of *Eumenes* every way prepared for the fight, the other wearied with long journies, which over-haſtily they had made, ſeeking the deceitful iſſue of frivolous hopes. Then was it high time for *Craterus* (having failed in ſurpriſing them as enemies) to diſcover himſelf to his old friends and fellow-ſoldiers, of whom he could ſee none. *Phœnix*, a *Tenidian*, and *Artabazus*, a *Perſian*, had the leading of that ſide, who mindful of their inſtructions, began to give upon him with ſuch countenance, as told him his error; which to redeem, he bad his men fight and win the day, and take the ſpoil to themſelves. But the bear whoſe ſkin he ſells, is not yet caught. The ground whereon the battel was fought gave moſt advantage to the horſe, who encountered very roughly on all parts; eſpecially about *Eumenes* and *Neoptolemus*, who as ſoon as they had diſcovered one another, could not contain themſelves, but with great rage met body to body, and letting looſe their bridles, grappled ſo violently together, that their horſes ran from under them, leaving both of them tumbling on the ground. *Neoptolemus* roſe firſt up, but *Eumenes* had his ſword firſt drawn, wherewith he houghed the other, cauſing him to fall down and fight upon one knee. In this conflict they received many wounds, but *Neoptolemus* giving ſlight ones, took ſuch as were deadly, by which he died in the place, and was there (being half-dead, half-alive) ſtripped by his mortal enemy, whoſe revilings he requited, lying even at the laſt gaſp, with one wound in the groin, dangerous, had it not wanted force. The death of *Neoptolemus* cauſed his followers to run away upon the ſpur, and ſeek ſhelter behind the battels of their foot. They were nothing hotly purſued: for *Eumenes* pained himſelf to carry ſuccour to his left wing, which he ſuſpected much to be diſtreſſed, but found accompanied with the ſame fortune, that had aſſiſted him when he fought in perſon. *Craterus* had gallantly borne himſelf a while, and ſuſtained the impreſſion of *Artabazus* and *Phœnix*, with more courage than force; holding it nothing agreeable with his honour to retire and protract the fight, when he was charged by men of little eſtimation or note. Otherwiſe it is not unlikely, that he might have either carried the day, or preſerved himſelf to a better adventure by giving ground, as the reſt (when he and *Neoptolemus* were ſlain) did. But whilſt he ſought to preſerve his reputation, he loſt his life by the fall of his horſe, or his falling from his horſe, through force of a wound received; upon which accident he was trampled under foot by many that knew him not, and ſo periſhed unknown, till it was too late to know it. *Eumenes*, coming to the place where he lay, made great lamentation, as having always loved and honoured *Craterus*, of whoſe death he was now become the inſtrument. The vanquiſhed army entertained a treaty of peace with *Eumenes*, making ſhew of willingneſs to become his followers; but their intent was only to refreſh themſelves, which (by his permiſſion) having done, they ſtole away by night, and fled towards *Antipater*.

This battel fought within ten days of the former, won to *Eumenes* more reputation than good will: for his own ſoldiers took the death of *Craterus* heavily; and the armies lying further off were enraged with the news. But other matters there were which incenſed men againſt him, beſides the death of *Craterus*, whereof it manifeſtly appeared, that he was as ſorry as any that pretended greater heavineſs. His army wanted pay. This was a great fault; which he wiſely amended, by giving to them the ſpoil of ſuch towns as were ill affected to him. So he redeemed the love of his own men, who of their mere motion appointed unto him a guard for defence of his perſon. Others were not ſo eaſy to be reconciled. They, who had been traytors to *Perdiccas*, hated him for his faithfulneſs, as greatly as they thought that he would hate them for their falſhood; neither found they any fairer way of excuſing their late revolt, than by accuſing and condemning the ſide which they had forſaken. Wherefore they proclaimed *Eumenes* a traytor, and condemned him to die: but it was an eaſier matter to give that ſentence, than to put it in execution.

SECT. X.

Quarrels between Eurydice *the queen, and* Python *the protector.* Python *reſigns his office, into which* Antipater *is choſen.*

PYTHON and *Arideus* being choſen protectors of king *Arideus*, and the children of *Alexander*, took the way to *Aſia* the leſs, conducting the army through *Syria*. Of theſe two *Python* was the greater in reputation, yet far too weak to ſuſtain ſo important a charge. For *Eurydice*, wife to king *Arideus*, was come to her huſband, a lady of a maſculine ſpirit, well underſtanding what ſhe was or ſhould be, and thinking her ſelf able to ſupport the weight which fortune had laid upon her fooliſh huſband, being due to her own title. Her mother *Cyna*, ſiſter to *Alexander* by her father, king *Philip*, was married (as hath been ſhewed) to *Amyntas*, who was right heir to the kingdom of *Macedon*, being the only ſon of king *Perdiccas*, *Philip*'s elder brother.

This *Cyna* was a warlike woman; ſhe had led armies, and (as a true ſiſter of *Alexander*) fighting hand to hand with *Ceria* queen of the *Phrygians*, a virago like unto her ſelf, had ſlain her. She brought up this *Eurydice* in the ſame unwomanly art of war, who now among the ſoldiers began to put in practice the rudiments of her education, to the ſmall contentment of *Python*, that could not brook her too curious intermedling in his charge.

charge. Whether it were ſo that *Python* had ſome purpoſe to advance the ſon of *Alexander* by *Roxana*, to the kingdom (as once he had ſought to do;) or whether the queen did ſuſpect him of ſome ſuch intent; or whether only deſire of rule cauſed her to quarrel with him, quarrel ſhe did, which diſturbed the proceeding againſt *Eumenes*. The army having ſhaken off ſuch a rank-rider as *Perdiccas*, would not afterwards be reined with a twined thread. *Python*, bearing himſelf upon his office, took upon him to give directions in the king's name, which the queen did oftentimes controul, uſing the ſame name, with more authority, and better liking of the ſoldiers. *Python*, ſeeing this, would needs reſign his office, whether upon wearineſs of the contentions daily growing, or on purpoſe to bring the queen into envy, it is uncertain. Perhaps he thought, that now being the far worthieſt man in the camp, he ſhould be intreated to retain the place, and have his authority confirmed, or (as might be) increaſed, were it but for want of a fit ſucceſſor. *Eurydice* was nothing ſorry at this courſe; for now ſhe thought to manage the affairs of the empire at her own will, being freed from the troubleſome aſſiſtance of a protector. But the ſoldiers diſappointed both her and *Python* of their contrary expectations; chooſing *Antipater*, the only powerful man of *Alexander*'s captains then living, into the room of *Python*. Hereat the queen fretted exceedingly, and began to deal earneſtly with the *Macedonians*, that they ſhould acknowledge no lord ſave only the king their ſoveraign. Yet ſhe failed of her purpoſe, being hinder'd (as may ſeem) by three things: the apparent weakneſs of her husband, the growth of *Alexander*'s children, who (though born of outlandiſh women) were bred in the *Macedonian* camp; and the mightineſs of *Antipater*, who commanding a great army near at hand arrived in few days at the camp, and enforced *Eurydice* to hold her ſelf content. *Antipater* was of ſuch power, that he needed not to work by any cloſe devices, as *Perdiccas* had done; he had no concurrents, all the governours of provinces that remained alive acknowledged him their better; yea, many of them he diſplaced out of hand, putting others in their room. This done, he took the king, queen, and princes along with him into *Macedonia*, leaving *Antigonus* general of the royal army: to whom for his good ſervices done, and to be done againſt *Eumenes*, he gave the rule of *Suſiana*, beſides his former provinces, and committed into his hands the government of *Aſia* during that war.

SECT. XI.

Antigonus *lieutenant of* Aſia, *wins a battel of* Eumenes, *and beſiegeth him in* Nora: *he vanquiſheth other followers of* Perdiccas.

HERE begins the greatneſs of *Antigonus*, whoſe power in few years over-growing the reſt, wanted little of ſpreading it ſelf over the whole monarchy. He was to make war upon *Eumenes*, *Alcetus* the brother, and *Attalus* the brother-in-law, to *Perdiccas*: work enough to keep his army employed in the publick ſervice, till ſuch time as he might find occaſion to make uſe of it in his own buſineſs. The firſt of theſe which he undertook was *Eumenes*, with whom *Alcetus* and *Attalus* refuſed to join, having unſeaſonably contended with him in time of common danger about the chief place. *Eumenes* had an army ſtrong in number, courage, and all needful proviſions; but obedient only at diſcretion. Therefore *Antigonus* tryed all ways of corrupting his ſoldiers, tempting firſt the whole army with letters; which practice failing by the cunning of *Eumenes* (who made ſhew as if he himſelf had ſcattered abroad thoſe letters to try the faith of his men) he dealt apart with ſuch captains, as he thought moſt eaſie to be won. Of theſe captains one rebelled, breaking out too haſtily before any help was near him, yet looking ſo careleſly to himſelf, that he and his were ſurpriſed, when he thought his enemies far off. Another follower of *Eumenes* (or rather of good fortune, which he thought now to be in company with *Antigonus*) kept his treachery ſecret, reſerving it for the time of execution. Upon confidence of the treaſon, which this falſe man *Apollonides* had undertaken, *Antigonus* preſented battel to *Eumenes*; in the heat whereof, *Apollonides*, general of the horſe to *Eumenes*, fled over to the contrary ſide with ſuch as he could get to follow him: but was cloſely followed by ſome, whoſe company he deſired not. *Eumenes*, perceiving the irrecoverable miſchief which this traiterous practice brought upon him, purſued the villain, and cut him off before he could thruſt himſelf into the troops of *Antigonus*, and boaſt of his treachery. This was ſome comfort to *Eumenes* in the loſs of that battel, which diſabled him utterly to keep the field, and left it very hard for him to make a ſafe retreat. Yet one thing he did, which much amazed his enemies, and (though a matter of ſmall importance) cauſed *Antigonus* himſelf to admire his high reſolution. It was held no ſmall part of the victory to get poſſeſſion of the dead bodies. *Eumenes*, whilſt *Antigonus* held him in chace, turned out of the way, and fetching a compaſs returned to the place where the battel had been fought; there he burned (according to the manner of the time) the bodies of his own men, and interred the bones and aſhes of the captains and common ſoldiers apart, raiſing up heaps of earth as mountains over them, and ſo went his way. As this bold adventure bred in the *Macedonians* (returned to their camp) great admiration of his brave ſpirit; ſo the news which *Menander* (who was ſet to look unto their carriages) brought and publiſhed among them, enticed them to love him as their honourable friend. He had found *Menander* in an open plain, careleſs, as after an aſſured victory, and loaded with the ſpoils of many nations, the rewards of their long ſervice, all which he might have taken: but fearing leſt ſuch a purchaſe ſhould prove a heavy burthen to him, whoſe chief hope conſiſted in ſwift expedition, he gave ſecret warning to *Menander* to flie to the mountains, whilſt he detained his men (whom authority could not have reſtrained) by this ſleight, ſetting them to bait their horſes. The *Macedonians* extolled him for this courteſie, as a noble gentleman, that had forborn when it lay in his power to ſtrip them out of all their wealth, and make their children ſlaves, and to raviſh their wives: but *Antigonus* told them, that he had not forborn to do this out of any good will to them; but out of mere ſubtilty had avoided thoſe precious fetters, which would have hinder'd his ſpeedy flight. He told them true: for *Eumenes* did not only think all carriages to be over-burdenſome, but the number of his men to be more troubleſome than available, in his intended courſe. Wherefore he ſent them from him as faſt as he could, wiſhing them to ſhift for themſelves; and retaining only five hundred horſe, and two hundred foot. When he had wearied *Antigonus* a while in following him up and down, he came to *Nora*; where again, keeping no more about him, than neceſſity required to make good the place, he rovingly diſmiſſed all the reſt. *Nora* was a little fortreſs in the borders of *Lycaonia* and

Cappadocia, ſo ſtrongly ſituated, that it ſeemed impregnable, and ſo well victualled and ſtored with all neceſſaries, that it might hold out for many years. Thither did *Antigonus* follow him, with more deſire to make him his friend, than to vanquiſh him in war. To this purpoſe he entertained parley with him, but in vain. For whereas *Antigonus* offered him pardon, and his love; *Eumenes* required reſtitution of his provinces, which could not be granted without *Antipater*'s conſent. Then was *Nora* cloſed up; where *Antigonus* leaving ſufficient ſtrength for continuance of the ſiege, took his journey into *Piſidia*, againſt *Alcetus* and *Attalus*, with whom he made ſhort work. He came upon them unexpected, and ſeized on paſſages, which wanted not men, but ſuch a captain as *Eumenes*, to have defended them. *Alcetus* and *Attalus*, as they had been too ſecure before his coming, ſo were they too adventurous in fighting at the firſt ſight, upon all diſadvantages; and their folly was attended with ſuitable event. *Attalus*, with many principal captains, was taken; *Alcetus* fled to the city of *Termeſus*, where the love of the younger ſort toward him was ſo vehement, that, ſtopping their ears againſt all perſwaſions of the ancient men, they needs would hazard their lives and their country in his defence. Yet this availed him nothing; for the governors of the town, having ſecretly compounded with *Antigonus*, cauſed the young men to ſally out; and uſing the time of advantage, they with their ſervants did ſet upon *Alcetus*, who unable to reſiſt, ſlew himſelf. His dead body was conveyed to *Antigonus*, and by him barbarouſly torn, was caſt forth without burial. When *Antigonus* was gone, the young men interred the carcaſe with ſolemn funerals, having once been minded to ſet on fire their own town, in revenge of his death. Such favour had he purchaſed with courteous liberality; but to make an able general, one virtue, how great ſoever, is inſufficient.

SECT. XII.

Ptolemy *wins* Syria *and* Phenicia. *The death of* Antipater.

WHILST theſe things were in doing, the reſt of the princes lay idle, rather ſeeking to enjoy their governments for the preſent, than to confirm or enlarge them. Only *Ptolemy* looking abroad, won all *Syria* and *Phenicia:* an action of great importance, but not remarkable for any circumſtance in the managing. He ſent a lieutenant thither with an army, who quickly took *Laomedon* priſoner, that ruled there by appointment of *Antipater*, and formerly of *Perdiccas*, but (as may ſeem) without any great ſtrength of ſoldiers, far from aſſiſtants, and vainly relying upon the authority which had given him that province, and was now occupied with greater cares, than with ſeeking to maintain him in his office.

Antipater was old and ſickly, deſirous of reſt, and therefore contented to let *Antigonus* purſue the diſpatch of thoſe buſineſſes in *Aſia*. He had with him *Polyſperchon*, one of the moſt ancient of *Alexander*'s captains, that had lately ſuppreſſed a dangerous inſurrection of the *Etolians*, which nation had ſtirred in the quarrel of *Perdiccas*, prevailing far at the firſt, but ſoon loſing all that they had gained, whilſt *Antipater* was abroad in his *Cilician* expedition. In this *Polyſperchon Antipater* did repoſe great confidence; ſo far forth, that (ſuſpecting the youth of his own ſon *Caſſander* of inſufficiency in ſo great a charge) he bequeathed unto him on his death-bed the government of *Macedon* and *Greece*, together with his office of protectorſhip. So *Antipater* died, being fourſcore years old, having always travelled in the great affairs of mighty princes, with ſuch reputation, that *Alexander* in all his greatneſs was jealous of him, and the ſucceſſors of *Alexander* did either quietly give place unto him, or were unfortunate in making oppoſitions. In his private qualities he was a ſubtle man, temperate, frugal, and of a philoſophical behaviour; not unlearned, as having been ſcholar to *Ariſtotle*, and written ſome hiſtories. He had been much moleſted by *Olympias*, *Alexander*'s mother, whom after the death of her ſon he compelled to abſtain from coming into *Macedonia*, or intermedling in matters of eſtate; yea, at his own death he gave eſpecial direction, that no woman ſhould be permitted to deal in the adminiſtration of the empire. But this precept was ſoon forgotten; and yet, ere long, by ſorrowful experience approved to have been found and good.

SECT. XIII.

Of Polyſperchon, *who ſucceeded unto* Antipater *in the protectorſhip. The inſurrection of* Caſſander *againſt him.*

Polyſperchon was very ſkilful in the art of war, having long time been apprentice in that occupation; other qualities, requiſite in ſo high an office as he underwent, either nature had not given to him, or time had robbed him of them. He managed his buſineſs more formally than wiſely, as a man of a ſecond wit, fitter to aſſiſt than to command in chief. At the firſt entrance upon the ſtage, he called to council all his friends, wherein, for weighty conſiderations (as they who weighed not the contrary reaſons held them) the queen *Olympias* was revoked out of *Epirus* into *Macedon*, that the preſence of *Alexander*'s mother might countenance and ſtrengthen their proceedings. For the condition of the times requiring, that the governors of provinces abroad ſhould keep greater armies than were needful or eaſy to be retained about the perſon of the king in *Macedonia*, it ſeemed expedient, that the face of the court ſhould be filled with all majeſty, that might give authority to the injunctions from thence proceeding, and by an awful regard contain within the bounds of duty ſuch as could not by force have been kept in order, being ſtrong, and lying too far off.

Such care was taken for prevention of imaginary dangers and out of ſight, whilſt preſent miſchief lay unregarded in their boſoms. *Caſſander*, the ſon of *Antipater*, was not able to diſcover that ſufficiency in *Polyſperchon*, for which his father had repoſed in him ſo much confidence: neither could he diſcern ſuch odds in the quality of himſelf and *Polyſperchon*, as was in their fortune. He was left captain of one thouſand, which office, by practice of thoſe times, was of more importance than the title now ſeems to imply. He ſhould thereby have been as camp-maſter, or lieutenant-general to the other, a place no way ſatisfying his ambition, that thought himſelf the better man. Therefore he began to examine his own power, and compare with the forces likely to oppoſe. All that had relied on his father were his own aſſured, eſpecially ſuch as commanded the garriſons beſtowed in the principal cities of *Greece*. The like hope was of the magiſtrates, and others of principal authority in thoſe Common-weals, whoſe forms had been corrected by *Antipater*, that they would follow the ſide, and draw in many partakers: it concerned theſe men in their own particular, to adhere unto the captains

tains by whom their faction was upheld, and by whom the rascal multitude, covetous of regaining the tyrannous power which they had formerly exercised over the principal citizens, were kept in order, obeying their betters perforce. Besides these helps, *Cassander* had the secret love of queen *Eurydice*, who had in private render'd him such courtesy, as was due only to her husband. But neither the queen's favour, nor all his other possibilities, gave him confidence to break out into open rebellion, because he saw *Polysperchon* much reverenced among the *Macedonians*, and strong enough to suppress him before he could have made head. Therefore he made shew of following his pleasures in the country, and calling many of his friends about him, under pretence of hunting, advised with them upon the safest course, and most free from all suspicion. The necessity was apparent of raising an army, before the business was set on foot; and to do this, opportunity presented him with fair means. *Ptolemy* had by fine force, without any commission, annexed *Syria* to his government of *Egypt* and *Cyrene:* this was too much either for the king to trust him with, or for him to part with. *Antigonus*, upon the first news of *Antipater*'s death, began to lay hold upon all he could get, in such sort, that he manifestly discovered his intent of making himself lord of all *Asia*. These two therefore stood in no need of a civil war; which *Cassander* well noted, and presumed withal, that the friendship which had passed between his father and them, would avail him somewhat. Whereupon he secretly dispatched messengers to them both, and within a little while conveyed himself on a sudden over the *Hellespont*, that he might in person advance the business with greater speed. Much perswasion is needless in winning a man to what he desireth. *Antigonus* coveted nothing more than to find *Polysperchon* work by raising some commotions in *Greece*. Yet (as formalities must not be neglected) *Cassander* did very earnestly press him, by the memory of his father, and all requisite conjurations, to assist him in this enterprize; telling him, that *Ptolemy* was ready to declare for them, and urging him to a speedy dispatch. *Antigonus*, on the other side, repayed him with the same coin; saying, that for his own sake, and his dead father's, whom he had very dearly loved, he would not fail to give him all manner of succour. Having thus feasted one another with words, they were nothing slack in preparing the common means leading to their several ends.

SECT. XIV.

The unworthy courses held by Polysperchon *for the keeping down of* Cassander.

GREAT necessity there was of timely provision. For *Polysperchon* needed no other instructions to inform him of *Cassander*'s drift, than the news of his departure. He was not ignorant of the ready disposition which might be found in *Antigonus* and *Ptolemy* to the strengthning of rebellion; and well he knew that one principal hope of *Cassander* was reposed in the confidence of such as ruled in the *Grecian* estate. Therefore (loving to work circumspectly) he called another council, wherein it was concluded, that the popular form of government should be erected in all the cities of *Greece*, the garrisons withdrawn, and that all magistrates and principal men, into whose hands *Antipater* had committed the supreme authority, should forthwith be either slain or banished. This was a sure way to diminish the number of *Cassander*'s friends, and to raise up many enemies to him in all quarters. Yet hereby was disclosed both an unthankful nature in *Polysperchon*, and a factious malice in his adherents. For how could he be excused of extreme ingratitude, that for hatred of the son went about to dishonour the father's actions, whose only bounty had enabled him to do it? or what could be said in their defence, who sought to destroy many worthy men, friends to the state, by whom the *Greeks* were held restrained from stirring against the *Macedonians*; and in opposition to their private enemy, gave the rule of things to base companions, and such as naturally maligned the empire? But as in man's body, through sinews newly issuing from one branch, a finger is more vexed by inflammation of his next neighbour, than by any distemper in the contrary hand: so in bodies politick, the humours of men, subdivided in faction, are more enraged by the disagreeable qualities of such as curb them in their neerest purposes, than they are exasperated by the general opposition of such as are divided from them in the main trunk. Hereby it comes to pass, that contrary religions are invited to help against neighbour princes; bordering enemies drawn in to take part in civil wars, and ancient hatred called to counsel against injurious friends. Of this fault nature is not guilty; she hath taught the arm to offer itself unto manifest loss in defence of the head: they are depraved affections, which render men sensible of their own particular, and forgetful of the more general good, for which they were created.

The decree, whereby the *Greeks* were presented with a vain shew of liberty, ran under the king's name; but so, as one might easily discern, that *Polysperchon* had guided his pen. For the main point was, that they should follow such directions as *Polysperchon* gave, and treat with him about all difficulties. In the rest it contained such a deal of kindness, as proceeding on a sudden from those who had kept them in hard subjection, might well appear to have some other root than the pretended good will, and was of itself too base and unfit for a king to use toward his conquered subjects, and often subdued rebels.

SECT. XV.

Of the great commotions raised in Athens *by* Polysperchon's *decree. The death of* Phocion.

NEvertheless the *Athenians*, with immoderate joy, entertained this happy seeming proclamation, and sought how to put it in execution without further delay. But *Nicanor*, captain of the garrison, which kept one of their havens, called *Munychia*, in the lower part of the town, would needs take longer time of deliberation, than was pleasing to their hasty desires.

Nicanor, as a trusty follower of *Cassander*, was by him shifted into the place, and *Menillus* (that was captain there before) discharged, when *Antipater* was newly dead. His coming to *Athens* was no way grateful to the citizens, who soon after hearing the news of *Antipater*'s death, cry'd out upon *Phocion*, saying, that he had sufficient intelligence of that accident, and might by advertising them in due time, have put into their hands a fair opportunity of thrusting out the *Macedonians*. But these exclamations argued no more than a desire to shake off the *Macedonian* yoke. Far more grievously would they have been offended, had they known the instructions which *Cassander* had given

given to *Nicanor*, and his reſolution to follow them. It was concluded, that he ſhould not only retain *Munychia*, any injunction to the contrary notwithſtanding; but that he ſhould find means to thruſt ſome companies into *Pireus*, and fortify that alſo, which was the principal haven, againſt the high-town. How to accompliſh this, he rather wanted ſome reaſonable pretence, than good ability. But the *Athenians* were not long in giving him ſufficient cauſe to do that, which he would have done without any cauſe given. They deſired him to come unto their council, aſſembled in the *Pireus*, there to conſider of the king's proclamation; whither upon *Phocion*'s word and ſafe conduct he came, and earneſtly preſſed them to hold with *Caſſander* in the war which was ready to break forth. Contrariwiſe they urged him firſt of all, to make them maſters of their own, which how to uſe they might conſult afterwards. Each of them refuſing to condeſcend unto the other's demand; the *Athenians* (who did always meaſure juſtice by profit, yet ſeldom thrived by that courſe) practiſed with *Dercyllus*, a captain following *Polyſperchon*, and then lying near at hand, that he ſhould enter into the town, and take *Nicanor* priſoner. But *Phocion*, who then governed in *Athens*, a man very unlike to the reſt of the citizens, being nothing pleaſed with ſuch a trick of politic diſhoneſty, did quietly ſuffer him to depart and ſave himſelf.

Nicanor hereupon began to deviſe upon taking *Pireus*; not as following now the project of *Caſſander*, but proſecuting his own juſt revenge. He levied as many ſoldiers as he could, and drew them cloſely into *Munychia*; which done, he iſſued into *Pireus*, took it, and intrenched himſelf therein: to the exceeding diſcomfort of the *Athenians*, who, lately impatient of his keeping the one haven, ſaw him now maſter of both. *Alexander*, the ſon of *Polyſpherchon*, came thither ſhortly after, with an army. Then were the citizens in great hope of recovering all, and addreſſed themſelves unto him; who made fair ſhews, intending mere miſchief, which they perceived not, being blinded with the vain epiſtles of his father, and of *Olympias* the old queen. *Olympias*, taking upon her to command, before ſhe durſt well adventure to return into *Macedon*, had peremptorily charged *Nicanor* to reſtore to the *Athenians* the places which he held: but he would firſt conſider more of the matter. *Polyſperchon* had further ordained, that the iſle of *Samos* ſhould be rendered unto them: a goodly offer, had it accorded with his power and meaning. He was (indeed) ſo far from purpoſing to let them have *Samos*, that as yet he did not throughly intend to let them have themſelves. The commodity of their havens was ſuch, as he would rather get into his own hands, than leave in theirs; yet rather wiſhed in theirs, than in *Caſſander*'s. His ſon *Alexander*, not ignorant of this, made fair ſhew to the *Athenians*, and ſpent much labour in communing with *Nicanor*, but ſuffered not them, for whom he ſeemed to labour, to intermeddle with the buſineſs. Hereupon the citizens grew jealous, and the diſpleaſure they conceived againſt him they poured out upon *Phocion*, depriving him of his office. This was done with much tumult: baniſhed men and ſtrangers, thruſting themſelves into the aſſembly of the citizens, who diſtracted with ſundry paſſions, growing out of their preſent misfortunes, thought every one that beſt could inveigh againſt things paſt, a moſt likely man to find ſome remedy for the evil threatning them. In this hurliburly was *Alexander* deviſing how he might come to ſome good point of compoſition with *Nicanor*, and held much privy conference with him; which he could not ſo ſecretly carry, but that his negotiation was diſcovered, whereby the uproar in the town was ſo far increaſed, that *Phocion* with many of his friends were accuſed, and driven to ſeek ſafeguard of their lives by flight. So they came to *Alexander*, who entertained them gently, and gave them his letters of commendation to his father, deſiring him to take them into his protection.

Polyſperchon was in the country of *Phocis*, ready to enter with an army into *Attica*. Thither came *Phocion* with his companions, hoping well that the letters which they brought, and their own deſerts (having always been friends to the *Macedonians*, as far as the good of their country gave leave) ſhould be enough to get patronage to their innocency. Beſides all this, *Dinarchus* a *Corinthian*, *Polyſperchon*'s familiar friend, went along with them (in an evil hour) who promiſed to himſelf and them great favour by means of his acquaintance. But *Polyſperchon* was an unſtable man, very earneſt in what he took in hand; yet, either for want of judgment in following them, or of honeſty in holding the beſt of them, eaſily changing his intended courſes, and doing things by the halfs, which made him commonly fail of good ſucceſs. For fear of *Caſſander*, he had offered wonderful kindneſs to the *Athenians*; this had cauſed them to love him: out of their love he gathered hope of deceiving them, which made him to change his mind, and ſeek how to get into his own hands thoſe keys, with which *Caſſander* held them faſt locked up: finding himſelf diſappointed of this purpoſe, and ſuſpected as a falſe diſhonourable man, he ſtood wavering between the contrary allurements of profit and reputation. To keep the *Athenians* perforce at his devotion, would indeed have done well: but the effecting of this began to grow deſperate; and many towns of importance in *Greece* began to caſt their eyes upon his proceeding in that action. Wherefore he thought it the wiſeſt way to redeem their good opinion, by giving all contentment unto the popular faction, which was then grown to be maſter of that city. And in good time for this purpoſe were the *Athenian* ambaſſadors come, treading (as one may ſay) upon *Phocion*'s heels, whom they were ſent to accuſe. Theſe had ſolemn audience given to them in the king's preſence, who was attended by many great lords, and for oſtentation's ſake was glorified with all exterior ſhews of majeſty; yet all too little to change *Arideus* into *Alexander*: for he did nothing there, but either laugh or chafe, as he ſaw others do. For beginning of the buſineſs, *Polyſperchon* commanded that *Dinarchus* ſhould be tortured and ſlain: this was enough to teſtify his hearty affection to the commonalty of *Athens*, in that he ſpared not his old acquaintance for their ſake; whoſe ambaſſadors he then bad to ſpeak. When their errand was done, and anſwer to it made by the accuſed, who had no indifferent hearing, *Phocion* and the reſt were pronounced guilty of treaſon; but to give ſentence, and do the execution upon them, was (for honour's ſake) referred unto the city of *Athens*, becauſe they were burgeſſes. Then were they ſent away to *Athens*, where the raſcal multitude, not ſuffering them to ſpeak for themſelves, condemned them to die. So they periſhed being innocent. But the death of *Phocion*, a man very conſpicuous, made the fortune of the reſt to be of the leſs regard. Five and forty times had he been choſen governour of the city, never ſuing for the place, but ſent for when he was abſent: ſo well was his integrity known, and ſo highly valued, even of ſuch as were no pretenders to the ſame virtue. He was

a good commander in war, wherein tho' his actions were not very great, yet were they of good importance, and never unfortunate. Never did the city repent of having followed his counsel: nor any private man of having trusted his word. *Philip* of *Macedon* highly esteemed him so; and much more did *Alexander*, who (besides other signs of his love) sent him two hundred talents of silver, and offered to bestow upon him of four cities in *Asia* any one which he would choose. But *Phocion* refused these and other gifts, howsoever importunately thrust upon him; resting well contented with his honest poverty: wherein he lived above fourscore years, and then was compelled by the unjust judgment of wicked men to drink that poyson, which by just judgment of the righteous God so infected the city of *Athens*, as from that day forwards it never brought forth any worthy man resembling the virtue of their ancestors.

SECT. XVI.

Of Polysperchon's *vain expedition against* Cassander.

NOT long after these things were done, *Cassander* with such forces as *Antigonus* lent him, entered into *Pireus*; which news drew *Polysperchon* head-long into *Attica*, with a great army, but so ill victualled, that he was fain to depart without any thing done. Only he had given some impediment to the enemy; who not contented with defending what he held, began to look out, and make new purchases abroad. Finding therefore himself unable to drive *Cassander* out of *Athens*, he left his son *Alexander*, with such number of men, as exceeded not the proportion of victuals, to withstand his further incroaching. The greatest part of his army he carried into *Peloponnesus*, to make the country sure to himself, wherein *Cassander* had many friends.

His doings in *Peloponnesus* were such, as they had been in other parts of *Greece*. First, he began to fight with edicts, restoring the *Democracy*, or popular form of government. He commanded that the principal citizens, that had by *Antipater* been made rulers, should be either slain or driven into exile. This decree took immediate effect in most places: the vulgar sort being very ready to seal the charter of their freedom and authority with the blood of those who had kept them in subjection. Yet many cities there were which delighted in the rule of the chief citizens, and many which wished well to *Cassander*; especially they of *Megalopolis*, on whom *Polysperchon* meant to inflict an exemplary punishment of disobedience to him, which he termed rebellion. *Megalopolis* had in it fifteen thousand serviceable men, well furnished with necessaries, and resolved to endure the worst. And need there was of such resolution. For *Polysperchon* coming thither with all his power did so much, that he overthrew, by a mine, three of their bulwarks, and all the space of wall between them. But the defendants manfully repelled the *Macedonians* which came up to the breach; and at the same time, with great labour, they raised up an inner wall, to bear out the next assault. The assailants having failed to carry the town at the first attempt, took much pains to clear the ground, and make fair way for their elephants, whose violence was likely to overthrow all that came in their way. But the townsmen perceiving their drift, prepared boards driven through with long nails, which they used as gall-throps, bestowing them slightly, covered with the points upwards, in the way by which the beasts were to pass. Neither did they set any to encounter them in front, but appointed certain light-armed men to beat upon their sides with arrows and darts, as they were instructed by some that had learned the manner of that fight in the *Asian* wars. Of these provisions they made happy use in the next assault. For by them were the elephants (wherein the enemy chiefly trusted) either sorely hurt, or driven back upon the *Macedonians*, whom they trampled under feet. *Polysperchon* came as ill furnish'd for long abode to *Megalopolis*, as before to *Athens*. Therefore being neither able to dispatch the business quickly, nor to take such leisure as was requisite, he forsook the siege, with some loss, and much dishonour, leaving some part of his army to lie before the town for his credit.

After this, he sent *Clitus* his admiral to sea, to join with *Arideus* that was come out of *Phrygia*, and to cut off all succour which might come to the enemy out of *Asia*. *Cassander* also sent his whole fleet under *Nicanor*, who taking along with him some ships of *Antigonus*, came to the *Propontis*, where he fought with *Clitus* and was beaten. But *Antigonus* hearing of the overthrow, gathered together the ships that were escaped, and manning them very well, sent out *Nicanor* again, assuring him of the victory, as well he might. For he sent out sufficient numbers of light-armed men, whom he caused to be wafted over the straights in small vessels by night; these before day-light setting upon *Clitus*, drove his men, that lay securely on the land, headlong into their ships; in which tumult, *Nicanor* arriving, did assail them so lustily, that few or none escaped him.

This loss at sea, together with his bad success by land, brought *Polysperchon* into great contempt. He had a good facility in penning bloody decrees; but when the execution was referred to his own sword, he could find the matter more difficult. Wherefore the *Athenians* perceiving that he had left them to shift for themselves, and was not able to give them protection against the enemy which lay in their bosoms, came to agreement with *Cassander*, accepting a governour of his appointment; and restoring all things to the same state wherein *Antipater* had left them. The like inclination to the party of *Cassander*, was found in very many cities of *Greece*, which daily and willingly revolted unto him; as to an industrious man, and likely to prevail in the end. Thus was the whole country set in a combustion, uneasy to be quenched; which presented unto *Antigonus* an opportunity that he neglected not, of making himself lord of *Asia*.

SECT. XVII.

Antigonus *seeks to make himself an absolute lord: and thereupon treats with* Eumenes, *who disappointeth him.* Phrygia *and* Lydia *won by* Antigonus.

ANTIGONUS had in *Antipater*'s life time a firm resolution, to make unto himself the utmost benefit that he might of the army committed to his charge. And in fair season for advancement of his purposes came the news of *Antipater*'s death; even then, when all the business in *Pisidia* was dispatched, and no more imployment for the army remaining, save only the continuance of the siege of *Nora*; a small thing of it self, but as hard as a greater matter; and requiring few men, but much time; when time of all things was most precious. *Eumenes* lay in that fort of *Nora*,

able to make the place good, and hoping that the mutability, to which the preſent ſtate was manifeſtly ſubject, would in continuance of ſome years (which he might abide) work more for him, than his enemies in that ſpace could work againſt him. His moſt fear was, that for want of exerciſe in that narrow caſtle, his men and horſes might grow ſickly and unſerviceable: which made him to practiſe many devices of keeping them in health and luſty. But when he had continued ſhut up in this manner about a year, his hopes came to good paſs, and he was eaſed of his cares by *Antigonus* himſelf, whoſe forces held him beſieged.

Antigonus knowing the great ſufficiency of *Eumenes*, and conſidering his fidelity ſhewed unto *Perdiccas*, thought that he could not find in all the world a fitter man than him, to employ in managing thoſe high deſigns, wherein he doubted not that he ſhould be withſtood by the mightieſt princes of the empire. He ſent therefore to *Eumenes* by one that was friend to them both, acquainting him with ſome part of his intent, and promiſing to make him a greater lord than ever he had been, and the next man to himſelf, if things fell out as he deſired, in regard whereof he required only his friendſhip, and thereupon ſent him an oath to take; which done, he might at his good pleaſure iſſue ſafely out of *Nora*, and enjoy his perfect liberty. *Eumenes* peruſing the form of the oath, perceived the meaning of *Antigonus*, which was rather to make him his follower than his fellow. For whereas, in a few words, it mentioned the king and princes of the blood, rather to keep the *Decorum*, than upon any loyal intent; the binding words and ſum of all the reſt were ſuch as tied him faſt only to *Antigonus*, omitting all reſervation of duty to the king or any other. This he liked not, holding it unſeemly to become a ſworn man to him, with whom he had fought for the maſtery; and being aſſured that his voluntary aſſiſtance, which way ſoever he gave, would be more acceptable, and far more honourable than the courſe propounded. Yet would he not therefore break off the negotiation, and wait for ſome better occaſion of enlargement, which might perhaps be long in coming; but ſeeming to be well agreed with *Antigonus*, he prepared to give up his hold and depart. As for the oath itſelf, when he came to take it, he made ſhew of diſlike, in that it was not ſolemn enough for ſuch perſonages as they were, who could not be too ceremonious in teſtifying their allegiance. The *Macedonians* which lay encamped before *Nora*, liked his words, and gave him leave to put in *Olympias*, and the children of *Alexander*, binding himſelf to them and their adherents, as well as to *Antigonus*, and ſo he departed.

Antigonus had taken upon him, as ſoon as he came down to the ſea-ſide, to remove ſome of the governors of the provinces, behaving himſelf according to the authority which he had received of *Antipater*, to exerciſe in the time of war. Neither did he want ſufficient pretence whereby to juſtify his proceedings. For, if *Polyſperchon* might lawfully hold the protectorſhip, which the old man doting on his death-bed bequeathed unto him as a legacy, without conſent of the princes or ſoldiers, why might not he himſelf as well retain the lieutenantſhip of *Aſia*, that was granted unto him for the general good of the ſtate, in preſence of the whole army, by the king, and by *Antipater*, who had power to ordain what ſhould ſeem convenient whilſt he lived, not to diſpoſe of things that ſhould happen after his death? To give a fair colour to his ambition, this was enough: if any were not herewith ſatisfied, he had three-ſcore thouſand footmen, ten thouſand horſe, and thirty elephants in a readineſs to anſwer them.

The firſt that perceived his drift, and provided to reſiſt him, was *Arideus*, governor of *Phrygia*, who fortified the towns of his own province, and ſought to have won *Cyzicus*, a fair haven town, and ſeated very conveniently for him, but was fain to go away without it. Hereupon *Antigonus* took occaſion to command him out of the country. *Arideus* was ſo far from obeying him, that he ſent forces to relieve *Eumenes*. Nevertheleſs, finding that he was unable of himſelf to make long reſiſtance, he took ſuch companies as he could draw along with him, and ſo paſſed over into *Europe*, to complain at the court. The like fortune had *Clitus*, who ruled in *Lydia*, and ſought the like remedy of his fortune, with ſome hope at the firſt (for both of them were entertained with very good words) which quickly vaniſhed, and grew deſperate, when they were beaten at ſea, as hath already been declared.

SECT. XVIII.

Antigonus *purſues* Eumenes. Eumenes *having authority from the court, raiſeth great war againſt* Antigonus, *in defence of the royal houſe.*

ANtigonus having thus gotten into his hands all, or moſt of *Aſia* the leſs, was able to have enter'd *Macedon*, and ſeized upon the court; which that he forbore to do, it proceeded (as may ſeem) for ſome of theſe reaſons. It would have bred as much jealouſy in *Caſſander*, as fear in *Polyſperchon*, which might have brought them to terms of reconciliation; it would aſk more time than he could ſpare; and the envy which followed the protectorſhip was ſuch, as he that had power enough without the office, ought rather to ſhun than to purſue. Beſides all this, it was manifeſt that *Eumenes* would not only refuſe to take his part, but would make war upon him in defence of the royal houſe, to which it was found that *Antigonus* did not ſtand well affected. Againſt him therefore he bent his courſe, and with an army of twenty thouſand foot, and four thouſand horſe, made great haſte toward *Cilicia*, hoping to ſuppreſs him before he ſhould be able to make head.

Eumenes was one of thoſe few that continued faithful to their dead maſter, which being well known in the court, he had commiſſion ſent unto him from thence to raiſe an army, and make war upon *Antigonus*, taking of the king's treaſure as much as he ſhould need. Other letters alſo there were directed to all the governours of provinces, requiring them to give aſſiſtance to *Eumenes*, and be ordered by his direction: eſpecially to the captains of the old ſoldiers, called the *Argyraſpides*, or ſilver-ſhielded bands, commandment was given to be at his appointment. He had of his own followers gathered together two thouſand foot, and five hundred horſe, before his authority was given him; but now he purpoſed with all the ſtrength that he could make, to fight with *Antigonus* in defence of the royal blood. *Olympias* had written to him, deſiring him to bring help to her and to her nephew the ſon of *Alexander*, and in the mean time to give her his advice in that which *Polyſperchon* required of her, for ſhe was deſirous to return into *Macedon*, but ſuſpected his ambition, as not contained within lawful bounds. *Eumenes* therefore counſelled her to remain in *Epirus*, till ſuch time as he could bring the war to a good iſſue; which done, he promiſed that his faith and care ſhould not be wanting to the ſeed of *Alexander*.

Strange

Strange it is to conſider, that in all the empire, ſcarce any one could be found among the noblemen, in whom *Alexander*'s mother, wives and children, might repoſe firm confidence, ſaving only this *Eumenes*, a ſtranger to the *Macedonian* blood, born at *Cardia*, a city of *Thrace*. His reputation was no more than his own virtue had made it; his followers obeyed at their own diſcretion, and compelled he was to travel as far as *Perſia*, to gather together an army ſufficient to reſiſt the enemies that purſued his heels.

SECT. XIX.

How the princes of Macedon *ſtood affected mutually.* Olympias *takes* Arideus *and* Eurydice, *whom ſhe cruelly puts to death.*

NOW, foraſmuch as in this preſent war, all the rulers of the provinces did intermeddle; and great alterations happened, not only in the parts of *Aſia*, but *Macedon* itſelf, which brought a new face unto the ſtate, by the extirpation of the royal houſe of *Philip* and *Alexander*: I hold it convenient in this place, before we enter into the particulars of the war itſelf, to ſhew briefly how the great ones did mutually ſtand affected, and by what paſſions they were drawn into thoſe courſes which overthrew moſt of them, and out of their ruins built the greatneſs of a few: as likewiſe to what extremity the faction brake out in *Macedon* itſelf, about the main controverſy of the title to the crown, whereupon all other quarrels were or ſhould have been depending.

Arideus the king, being ſimple and fearful, did only what he was bidden.

Polyſperchon, deſirous to continue long in office, had a purpoſe to advance the ſon of *Alexander* by *Roxana* to the kingdom, and become governor to a king of his own making.

Eurydice the queen diſcovering plainly this intent, and meaning nothing leſs than to let her huſband ſerve as a ſtale, keeping the throne warm, till another were grown old enough to ſit in it, grew acquainted with *Caſſander*, who hated the memory of *Alexander*, and was therefore the fitter for her turn.

Caſſander held freſh in mind the danger wherein his family had been through *Alexander*'s malice, together with the indignity offered to himſelf by *Alexander*, who knocked his head againſt a wall, for deriding one that adored him after the *Perſian* manner. The diſpleaſure hereof, and the pleaſure which he took in the amorous queen, made him reſolve both to ſuppreſs the lineage which he hated, and to maintain his beloved miſtreſs, either by ſupporting her weak husband, or by taking her to be his own wife.

The reſt of the lords held it a thing indifferent who reigned over all, ſo as they might reign in their ſeveral countries, and eſtabliſh their authority in ſuch wiſe, that it might not be taken from them.

Among theſe, *Ptolemy* and *Antigonus* were well enough already, if their ambition would have ſuffered them to ſee it.

Pytho and *Seleucus* lying far off, and being ſtrong, had ſome good hope to encroach upon their neighbours. Againſt theſe, *Peuceſtes* and ſome others with much ado hardly made reſiſtance, until ſuch time as *Eumenes* came to them, who propounded to himſelf great matters, which he lived not to accompliſh.

Olympias, the old queen (as it is common with ſtep-dames) hated the children of her husband by his other wives. It was thought that ſhe had given poiſon to *Arideus*; which, failing to take away his life, had much impaired both his body and wits. Now ſhe, conſidering that *Eumenes* was too full of buſineſs, to come home ſo ſoon as ſhe wiſhed that he ſhould, and that *Caſſander* daily prevailed in *Greece*; thought it the beſt way to join with *Polyſperchon*, and ſet up, as king, her nephew *Alexander*, the ſon of *Roxana*, removing *Arideus*, before *Caſſander* were able to defend him. To this intent, ſhe procured men among her kindred in *Epirus*, and ſo took her way towards *Polyſperchon*; who, joining with her, enter'd into *Macedon*.

Eurydice, hearing this news, wrote very earneſtly to *Caſſander*, praying him to ſet aſide all other buſineſs, and come to ſuccour her. She her ſelf, by entreaty, gifts and promiſes, drew to her party as many of the *Macedonians* as ſhe could, until ſhe thought her own ſide ſtrong enough; and then, taking her huſband with her, went boldly forth againſt *Olympias*, and the traitor *Polyſperchon*.

Theſe two queens met armed, as if the matter ſhould have been determined by their own hands, which ended without any ſtroke ſtricken, by the revolt of thoſe who followed *Eurydice*. For as ſoon as the *Macedonians* beheld *Olympias*; calling to mind her former eſtate, and the victorious reigns of her huſband and ſon, they refuſed to lift any weapon againſt her. *Eurydice*, finding her ſelf thus forſaken, fled towards *Amphipolis*; but was intercepted, and made priſoner with her huſband.

Olympias, having obtained this victory without blood, thought that all things would ſucceed as eaſily, and that upon the ſame conſiderations for which they had refuſed to bear arms againſt her, the *Macedonians* would not ſtick to maintain her, whatſoever her proceedings were. Having therefore ſhut up *Arideus* and his wife in a cloſe room, where they could ſcarce turn round, ſhe fed them through a little hole; till, after a while, it came in her head (for fear leſt the people ſhould have commiſeration of him, that had reigned almoſt ſix years and a half) to put them to death. So ſhe delivered *Arideus* to ſome barbarous *Thracians*, who took away his life by cruel torments: to *Eurydice* ſhe ſent a ſword, a halter, and a cup of poiſon, willing her to chuſe the inſtrument of her own death, who, praying that the like preſents might one day be ſent to *Olympias*, yielded her neck to the halter, having ſpent her laſt curſes not in vain. *Nicanor*, the brother of *Caſſander*, and a hundred the chief of his friends, did *Olympias* then chuſe out, all whom ſhe commanded to be ſlain. His brother *Iolaus*, that was already dead and buried, ſhe accuſed of poiſon given to *Alexander*; and thereupon cauſed his tomb to be thrown down, and his bones to be ſcattered abroad. The *Macedonians*, wondering at this fury, began to condemn themſelves, and the folly of *Polyſperchon*, who had, quite contrary to *Antipater*'s charge given on his death-bed, called this outragious woman to the government of the empire.

SECT. XX.

How Caſſander *was revenged upon* Olympias.

†. I.

The great expedition of Caſſander. Olympias *ſhuts her ſelf into* Pydna, *where* Caſſander *beſieged her.* Eacides, *king of* Epirus, *coming to ſuccour* Olympias, *is forſaken, and baniſhed by his own ſubjects.*

CASSANDER, at that time, lay before *Tegea*, in *Peloponneſus*; whither, when all theſe ill tidings were brought to him, he never ſtaid to take

take the city, nor to give order for the ſtate of things in that country, though *Alexander*, the ſon of *Polyſpercon*, were there with an army; but compounding with them of *Tegea*, he willed his aſſociates to look to themſelves as well as they could, till his return; and ſo in all haſte he took his journey towards *Macedon*, carried headlong with the greedy deſire of juſt revenge. The *Etolians* had taken the ſtreights of *Thermopyle*, in favour of the queen and *Polyſperchon*, to hinder his paſſage; but he, not willing to miſpend any time in dealing with them, got together as many ſhips as he could, great and ſmall, with which he tranſported his army into *Theſſaly*. There he divided his companies, appointing ſome under *Callas*, a ſubtil captain, to hold *Polyſperchon* buſied, who then lay encamped near to *Perbebia*; with the reſt he marched directly againſt *Olympias*. She, having once prevailed by the reſpect given to her dignity, took more care now to appear majeſtical, to make her ſelf ſtrong. To this end, ſhe made a ſolemn progreſs to *Pydna*, a ſea-town, and well fenced, having in her company all the flower of the court, eſpecially the great ladies, among whom was *Roxana*, and her young ſon *Alexander*, heir to the great *Alexander* by his grandmother's deſignment; who, during his minority, kept the ſoveraign power in her own hands. But all this pomp ſerved to little uſe, againſt the violence of the enemy, that ſoon preſented himſelf before the walls; only it fed the beſieged with a vain hope of ſuccour, that would, from all parts, arrive, to reſcue perſons of their quality. And hereof there ſoon appeared fair likelihood, which as ſoon vaniſhed, and went away in ſmoak.

For *Eacides*, king of *Epirus*, made great haſte to bring ſuccour to *Olympias*, his couſin, with whom *Deodamia*, his daughter was alſo ſhut up. Nevertheleſs, his ſubjects were nothing forward in this expedition; but finding certain paſſages taken in the way by *Caſſander*'s men, they called upon him to retire, and quit the enterprize. The king's importunity, urging them to proceed, and the obſtinate refuſal of the army, brake out at length into ſuch terms, that when he had raged in vain againſt the multitude, his authority, with which he thought to have prevailed upon them, was, by them, taken from him, and he compelled to forſake his kingdom, and to wander up and down in foreign countries, a baniſhed man; his people joining with the enemy, againſt whom he had led them forth to war.

Pydna, in the mean time, was cloſed up ſtreightly both by ſea and land; ſo that neither any could iſſue out of the city, nor any relief be conveyed into it; but it held out as long as any food was left, no memorable ſervice being done there, whilſt great actions were managed abroad.

†. II.

A continuation of Olympias's *ſtory.* Polyſperchon *defeated. Extreme famine in* Pydna. Olympias *yields to* Caſſander.

NOW, though order of time require it, that we ſhould rehearſe the doings of *Eumenes* and *Antigonus* in this place, leaving *Olympias* yet a while to the hour of her deſtiny, which grows the faſter upon her, becauſe ſhe may diſcern it coming; yet that we may not be compelled to interrupt the courſe of our narration, by inſerting her tragedy in the midſt of things, not manifeſtly coherent with it, we will here (as elſewhere we have done, and elſewhere muſt) continue to end one hiſtory, that we may not be therewith diſtracted, when we ſhall come to the relation of another. All the hope of the beſieged, remaining in *Polyſperchon*, was in like manner diſappointed, as their former truſt had been, which was repoſed in the ſuccours of the *Epirot*. For *Callas*, who was ſent againſt him, found the means to corrupt the greateſt part of his army with money, leaving him within a little while ſo ſlenderly accompanied, that he was fit for no other buſineſs of war, than a ſwift retreat. When famine had ſo far prevailed in the city, that the horſes were killed as a precious food, many men feeding on the dead carcaſes of their fellows, and ſaw-duſt being given to the elephants for provender; ſome of the ſoldiers obtaining the queen's leave (who could not deny it;) others, without aſking leave, yielded themſelves to the enemy, and were by him gently relieved, and ſent abroad into the country. The news of the queen's affairs, diſperſed by theſe men, did ſo affright her well-willers, that ſuch as had reſerved themſelves to the event, came in apace, and ſubmitted them to *Caſſander*. At length, when the mortality was ſo great in the town, that the living were even poiſoned with the noiſome ſcent of the dead, *Olympias* bethought her ſelf of ſtealing away by ſea in a galley that ſhe had; wherein her ſucceſs was as bad as in the reſt. For God had appointed this town, by her choſen as a place of refuge, to be unto her as a houſe of torment, and a goal, out of which ſhe ſhould not be delivered, but unto an evil death. Being therefore utterly broken with miſeries, which daily afflicted her, and the other ladies, unaccuſtomed to ſo wretched a kind of life, ſhe offered compoſition; and, with much labour, hardly obtained of *Caſſander* (who, having fetch'd her galley out of the haven, accounted himſelf as good as maſter of her body) a grant of her own life. Immediately, upon her apprehenſion, *Pella*, the chief city of the kingdom, was yielded to *Caſſander*. *Amphipolis* did ſtand out; for *Ariſtonus*, to whom *Olympias* had given charge of ſuch forces as were left abroad in the country, taking courage from the ſucceſs of ſome petty ſervices wherein he had prevailed, began to promiſe himſelf great unlikelihoods. But *Olympias*, to win *Caſſander*'s favour, very earneſtly required him, upon his faith to her, that he ſhould give it up. He did ſo, and preſently after was killed by his private enemies, that were ſet on by *Caſſander*, who partly hated him upon old reſpects, partly doubted him as a man likely to ſeek innovation.

†. III.

The death of Olympias, *and her conditions.*

WHEN *Olympias* had now heard ſorrowful tidings of all her friends, ſhe her ſelf was called into queſtion, and accuſed in an aſſembly of the *Macedonians*, for the murthers (they were ſo ſtiled in her affliction, which in time of proſperity ſhe called juſtice) by her committed. There was ſhe (being not heard, nor called to ſpeak) condemned to die. The ſuit was commenced and proſecuted againſt her, by the kindred of thoſe whom ſhe had ſlain; but it was at *Caſſander*'s inſtigation, who (to haſten the execution) ſent her word, that he would furniſh her with a ſhip, and other neceſſaries, to ſave her ſelf by flight; which when ſhe refuſed, ſaying, that ſhe would plead for her ſelf, and tell her own tale, he diſſembled no longer, but ſent unto her ſuch men as hated her moſt, who took away her miſerable life. She was daughter and ſiſter unto two kings of *Epirus*, wife and mother unto two the mightieſt kings of that or many other ages, a ſtout lady, and of unreproveable chaſtity; but

her

her ambition was boundleſs, her hatred unappeaſable, and her fury, in revenge, moſt unwomanly. Her perverſe conditions, made her huſband ſeek other wives and concubines, which cauſed her to hate both him and them. She was thought privy to her huſband's death; after which, very cruelly, ſhe ſlew his late wife *Cleopatra*, having firſt murdered one of her two children in her arms, and, with a beaſtly fury, broiled the other alive in fire, in a copper baſon. For theſe things, her ſon *Alexander* (otherwiſe loving her well) forbad her to meddle in the government of *Macedon*. But God, more ſevere unto cruel tyrants, than only to hinder them of their wills, permitted her to live and fulfill the reſt of her wickedneſs (which was his juſtice upon the adulteries of *Philip*, and the oppreſſion done by him and others;) after all which, he rewarded her malice, by returning it upon her own head.

†. IV.

Caſſander *celebrates the funeral of* Arideus *and* Eurydice; *and ſeeks to make himſelf king of* Macedon.

AFTER her death, *Caſſander* gave honourable burial to *Arideus* and *Eurydice*, among their progenitors, kings of *Macedon*. And looking further into his own poſſibilities of greatneſs, he married the lady *Theſſalonica*, whom he had taken at *Pydna*, being the daughter of king *Philip*, by another of his wives, that by her he might have ſome title to the crown. For the ſame end, he committed *Roxana* and her young ſon to cloſe priſon, removing thereby ſome part of his impediment. And, the better to increaſe his fame, and purchaſe love, he built a city, called by his own name, *Caſſandria*, that ſoon grew to be very great and powerful. He re-edified likewiſe *Thebes* in *Greece*, and reſtored it unto the old inhabitants, after it had lain twenty years waſte, being utterly raſed by *Alexander*. By theſe means, eſpecially by the reſtoration of *Thebes*, whereunto all *Greece* voluntarily contributed, he grew ſo ſtrong, that few remained enemies unto him; and they, with much labour, hardly could reſiſt him. Leaving him therefore daily prevailing in *Greece*, we will return to them who contended in *Aſia* for leſs titles, but larger provinces, with greater forces.

CHAP. IV.

Of the great lordſhip which ANTIGONUS *got in* Aſia.

SECT. I.

The Journey of Eumenes *into* Perſia. *His wiſe dealing with thoſe that joined with him.*

EUMENES, having joined unto his company the *Argyraſpides*, made haſte into the eaſtern parts, to take poſſeſſion of thoſe countries, according to his commiſſion, and ſtrengthen himſelf againſt *Antigonus*. He took his journey through *Celoſyria* and *Phenicia*, hoping to reclaim thoſe provinces, uſurped with the reſt of *Syria* (as hath been ſhewed) by *Ptolemy*, to the king's obedience. But to effect this, his haſte of paſſing forward was too great, his army too little, and the readineſs of the people to return to their due obedience, none at all. Beſides all which impediments, one inconvenience troubled him in all his proceedings, making them the leſs effectual. The captains of the *Argyraſpides* were ſo froward, that they ſcorned to repair to him, and take his directions; and their fidelity was ſo unſteady, that he might have more eaſily dealt with open traitors. It was not expedient, that he, being general, ſhould weaken his authority, by courting them; neither lay it in his power to keep them in order by compulſion. Therefore he feigned, that *Alexander* had appointed unto him, in a dream, a place for their meeting; namely, in a rich pavilion, wherein an empty throne was placed, as if *Alexander* himſelf had been preſent at their conſultations. Thus he freed himſelf from their vain pride; but of their faith he could have no aſſurance. Yet when *Ptolemy* requeſted them, and *Antigonus* bribed them to forſake him, they continued (though not without conſidering of the matter) to take his part. So he marched on, ſending before him the king's warrant, which *Pytho* and *Seleucus* refuſed to obey; not as rejecting the king's authority, but excepting againſt the perſon of *Eumenes*, as a man condemned to die by the *Macedonian* army, for the death of *Craterus*. *Eumenes*, knowing well that he was not to rely upon their aſſiſtance, who ſtood otherwiſe affected than his affairs required, and were not to be dealt with by perſwaſion, fought paſſage by ſtrong hand through the country of *Babylon*, in ſuch wiſe, that *Seleucus*, having in vain aſſayed to hinder him, by opening the ſluices of *Euphrates*, was glad at length to grant him friendly way, as deſirous to be rid of him. Thus he came to *Peuceſtes*, and the reſt of the eaſtern lords, who were glad of his company, becauſe of the differences between *Pytho*, *Seleucus*, and themſelves. Yet the contention about ſuperiority grew very hot among them; every one finding matter enough to feed his own humour of ſelf-worthineſs. But the former device of aſſembling in one pavilion, made all quiet; the concluſion ever being ſure to follow that which *Eumenes* propounded, who was both wiſeſt in giving advice, and beſt able to reward, by means of the authority given him, to take what he pleaſed of the king's treaſures. By theſe means he won to himſelf many of thoſe who had moſt power to do good or hurt.

SECT. II.

How Antigonus, *coming to ſet upon* Eumenes, *was driven off with loſs.*

ANtigonus, hearing that *Eumenes* lay in the province of *Suſa*, had an earneſt deſire to follow him, and drive him further from the king's treaſures, which were kept there. To which end, as ſoon as he had made himſelf ſtrong enough, he removed out of *Meſopotamia*, where he had wintered; and taking to him *Pytho* and *Seleucus*, with their men, he marched directly againſt the enemies, with intent to give them battel. *Eumenes* had fortified the caſtle of *Suſa*, and was retired back toward *Perſia*, keeping the river of *Tigris* be-

tween him and his purſuers. The paſſages of the river were well guarded, and good eſpial kept upon *Antigonus*, to obſerve which way he took. Before he came to *Tigris* itſelf, he was to paſs over *Coprates*, a great river, and not fordable, which he ſought to do by ſmall veſſels, whereof he had no great ſtore. A great part of his army had gotten over, when *Eumenes*, who kept a bridge upon *Tigris*, came with a thouſand horſe, and four thouſand foot, to ſee their demeanor; and finding them out of order, charged them, broke them, and drove them headlong back into *Coprates*, wherein moſt of them were drowned; very few eſcaping with life, except four thouſand that yielded themſelves priſoners, in ſight of *Antigonus*, that was not able to relieve them. This loſs made *Antigonus* glad to fall off; and the heat of that country in the dog-days breeding diſeaſes in the army, by which many periſhed, cauſed him to remove as far as into *Media*. So he took *Python* with him (leaving *Seleucus* to beſiege the caſtle of *Suſa*) and ſeeking to go the neareſt way, paſſed through ſavage nations, that continually vexing him with ſkirmiſhes, ſlew great numbers of his men before he could arrive in *Media*, with his troops that were quite heart-broken.

SECT. III.

Of Eumenes's *cunning. A battel between him and* Antigonus.

AFTER his departure, *Eumenes* with his aſſociates fell into conſultation about the remainder of their buſineſs. Fain he would have had them to enter upon thoſe provinces, which *Antigonus* had left behind him; to which alſo the captains of the *Argyraſpides* or *Silver-ſhields* were very inclinable, as deſiring to draw nearer to *Greece*. But *Peuceſtes* and the reſt, whoſe dominions lay in the high-countries, had more care of their own particular eſtates, and would needs march eaſtward. Theſe carried it, for the army was not ſtrong enough to divide itſelf into parts.

When they came into *Perſia*, *Peuceſtes* ruling there, feaſted them royally, and ſought by all means to win the ſoldiers love to himſelf. *Eumenes*, perceiving whereunto thoſe doings tended, ſuffered him a while to keep good cheer, till the time of war drew near. Then did he feign an epiſtle, directed as from *Orontes*, governor of *Armenia*, to *Peuceſtes* himſelf: the purport whereof was, that *Olympias* had vanquiſhed *Caſſander*, and ſent over a great army under *Polyſperchon*, to join with *Eumenes*. Theſe news, as they filled the camp with vain joy, ſo they wrought in all mens minds a great willingneſs to obey *Eumenes*, by whom was the likelieſt appearance of their preferment, wherein they dealt wiſely, he being far the moſt ſufficient commander, as they found ſoon after. For when *Antigonus*, coming out of *Media*, drew near unto them, *Eumenes* by ſome miſchance was fallen ſick, and fain to be carried in a litter; the army marched in very bad array, and was likely to have been forced to take battel in that diſorder. But *Eumenes*, when the reſt of the captains were amazed, was carried about the army in his litter, and upon the ſudden did caſt his men into ſo good form, that *Antigonus*, perceiving him afar off, could not refrain from giving him deſerved commendations. Yet he did not ceaſe to promiſe great rewards to the captains, and all ſorts of men, if they would forſake *Eumenes*: which hopes deceiving him, he came to the trial of a battel. *Eumenes* had more elephants than *Antigonus*, otherwiſe he was inferior in number both of horſe and foot by a third part. The battel was fought with variable ſucceſs, and great loſs on both ſides, continuing a great part of the day, and of the night following, yet the victory was uncertain. For *Eumenes* could not force his men to lie far from their carriages, by which means *Antigonus* (who had a more abſolute command over his) incamping on the ground whereon they fought, had in his power the dead bodies, which was accounted the ſign of victory; for he buried his own, and gave leave to his enemies, craving it, to do the like; but a greater ſign of victory had *Eumenes*, for he abode ſtill in the ſame place, and not only buried his men very honourably at great leiſure, but held the country round about, whereas *Antigonus* was glad (having tarried but one day) to ſteal away by night, and return into *Media*, from whence he came.

SECT. IV.

Of divers ſtratagems practiſed by Antigonus *and* Eumenes, *one againſt the other.*

THUS did the war continue doubtful, and was protracted to a greater length, each part having ſtout ſoldiers, and ſkilful generals; but the ſide which had hitherto prevailed, being hindered by the equal authority of many, from purſuing all advantages to the beſt. *Antigonus* grew daily weaker in men and reputation; ſo that to repair himſelf, he could find no way ſafer, than to put all to adventure. He knew that his enemies lay in their wintering places, quartered far aſunder; ſo that if he could ſuddenly come among them, he was likely to put them in great diſtreſs. Between him and them the way was not long, being only nine days journey; but very bad, through a rough dry wilderneſs, hardly paſſable. Another way fairer, and leading through a country well peopled, but requiring twenty-five days journey, he forſook, partly for the length, partly and chiefly, becauſe he would come undiſcovered. So therefore taking his journey in the dead of winter, he forbad unto his men the uſe of fire by night, becauſe he would not have them deſcried afar off. This commandment had been well obſerved four or five days, when continuance of time (as commonly) breeding negligence, and the cold weather pinching them, they were bold to cheriſh themſelves, being near to their way's end. The light of theſe fires gave notice of their coming, which being reported to *Peuceſtes*, and other captains, they were ſo aſtoniſhed with the ſudden danger, that in all haſte they betook themſelves to flight. But *Eumenes*, meeting with the news, began to hearten his affrighted companions, promiſing to make *Antigonus* march leiſurely, and willing them to abide and draw up their men together. They could ſcarce believe him, yet they were content to be ruled, and did as he appointed, who failed not in making his word good. He took with him ſome companies of the readieſt men, wherewith he occupied certain tops of mountains, looking toward the camp of *Antigonus*: there he choſe a convenient ground to incamp upon, and made great ſtore of fires in ſundry places, as if the whole army had been preſent. This was a ſorrowful ſpectacle to *Antigonus*, who thought himſelf prevented of his purpoſe, and began to fear leſt he ſhould be compelled to fight, whilſt his men were tired with a long and painful journey. Therefore he reſolv'd to turn aſide, and take the way to ſuch places as might better ſerve to refreſh his army. This he did with great care and circumſpection at the firſt, as knowing how ready *Eumenes* would

would be upon all advantages. But after a while, conſidering that no enemy ſtirred about him, he began to pauſe and think in himſelf, that ſomewhat or other was not fallen out according to his opinion. To be the better informed in the matter, he cauſed ſome inhabitants of that deſart to be taken, and brought before him; of whom he learned, that they had ſeen no other army than his thereabouts, but only a few men that kept fires on the hill-tops. It vexed him exceedingly to find that he had been ſo deluded, therefore he went againſt theſe troops with great fury, meaning to take ſharp vengeance on them for having ſo deceived him. But by this time ſufficient ſtrength was arrived there, which could not be forced without much buſineſs and long time. All the army was come, ſave only *Eudamus*, captain of the elephants, who, beſides thoſe beaſts, had no more than four hundred horſemen in his company. *Antigonus* hearing of this ſupply coming to his enemies, ſent above two thouſand horſe, and all his light-armed footmen to cut it off by the way. *Eudamus* being fallen into this danger, was fain to place his elephants round about his carriages, and ſo to defend himſelf as well as he could; for his horſemen, overlaid with multitudes, were quickly broken, and driven to run away upon the ſpur. Neither knew they, who ſat upon the elephants, which way to turn them; for on all ſides they received wounds, and were not able to requite them with the like. In this extremity there appeared brave troops of horſe and foot, that came unexpected to the reſcue, and charging the aſſailants upon the back, drave them to ſeek their own ſafety by ſpeedy flight. Theſe were ſent by *Eumenes*, who, though he knew not what his adverſary meant to do, yet he knew very well what was fitteſt for him to do; and therefore playing both games himſelf, provided the remedy.

SECT. V.

The conſpiracy of Peuceſtes *and others againſt* Eumenes's *life.*

BY theſe means *Eumenes* won great honour, and was by the whole army acknowledged a moſt expert general, and well worthy of the chief command. But *Peuceſtes* and the other captains, conſcious of their own inſufficiency, were ſo tranſported with envy, that they could no longer contain their vile thoughts, but held communication, as upon a neceſſary point, how they might find means to murder him.

Surely it is great injuſtice to impute the miſchief contrived againſt worthy men to their own proud carriage, or ſome other ill deſerving: for, though it often happen, that ſmall vices do ſerve to counterpoiſe great virtues (the ſenſe of evil being more quick and laſting than of good) yet he ſhall bewray a very fooliſh malice, that, wanting other teſtimony, will think it a part of wiſdom to find good reaſon of the evils done to virtuous men, which oftentimes have no other cauſe than virtue itſelf. *Eumenes*, among many excellent qualities, was noted to be of ſingular courteſy, of a very ſweet converſation among his friends, and careful by all gentle means to win their love that ſeemed to bear him any ſecret ill affection. It was his mere virtue that overthrew him, which even they that fought his life acknowledged. For they concluded that he ſhould not be ſlain before the battel were fought with *Antigonus*, wherein they confeſſed that it ſtood beſt with their ſafety to be governed by his direction. Of this treaſon he was quickly advertiſed by *Eudamus*, to whom he had done many pleaſures, and by ſome others of whom he uſed to borrow money when he needed not, to the end that they ſhould be careful of his good for fear of loſing their own. Conſidering therefore, and diſcourſing with himſelf of the villainy intended againſt him, he made his laſt will, and burnt all his writings that contained any matter of ſecret; which done, he revolved many things in his mind, being doubtful what courſe were beſt to follow. All the nobles of the empire ſtood ill-affected to the royal blood, excepting thoſe which were with him, that were more in number than in worth. How things at that time ſtood in *Macedon* and *Greece*, either he knew not, or knowing the truth, knew nothing that might encourage him to ſeek their help that needed his. To make his own peace with *Antigonus*, had been againſt his faith to *Olympias* and the princes that had committed this great power into his hands. For which cauſe alſo it may be thought, that he forbare either to loſe the battel willingly, or to fly into *Cappadocia*, and make ſhift for himſelf among his old friends. At length he reſolved to do his beſt againſt the common enemy, and afterwards to look to himſelf as well as he might.

SECT. VI.

The laſt battel between Antigonus *and* Eumenes.

THE ſoldiers, eſpecially thoſe old bands of the *ſilver-ſhields*, finding *Eumenes* perplexed, and not knowing the cauſe, entreated him not to doubt of the victory, but only to bring them into the field, and ſet them in array; for the reſt, they alone would take ſufficient order. The like alacrity was generally found in the common ſoldiers faces; but the chief commanders were ſo miſchievouſly bent againſt him, that they could not endure to think upon being beholden to him for the victory; yet he ordered the battel ſo well, that, without their own great fault, they could hardly fail of getting the upper hand.

Before the armies came to joining, a horſe-man from the ſide of *Eumenes*, proclaimed with a loud voice to the followers of *Antigonus*, that their wickedneſs in fighting againſt their own fathers, would now be puniſhed as it well deſerved. This was not ſpoken in vain, for the *ſilver-ſhields* were men of threeſcore or ſeventy years old, and ſtrengthned more by continual exerciſe than decayed by age, and excelling in courage, as having paſſed through greater dangers than any like to be preſented in that fight. Therefore *Antigonus*'s men (who had often been beaten by them, and were now to try their laſt hope with theſe reſolute warriors, the moſt ancient and beſt regarded of all *Alexander*'s ſoldiers) grew very penſive, and advanced heavily, ſuſpecting their own cauſe, and fearing that the threatnings uttered would prove true.

Antigonus was now again far the ſtronger in horſe, which gave him cauſe of great hope; the ground on which they were to fight, being a plain levelled field. Placing therefore himſelf and his ſon *Demetrius* in the right wing, and committing the left wing to *Python*, he did ſet forward courageouſly againſt the enemies, that were ready to give him a ſharp entertainment.

Eumenes took unto him *Peuceſtes*, with the reſt of the lords, and ſtood in the left wing of his battel, in the face of *Antigonus*, meaning both to prevent the traitors, his companions, of all means to make head againſt him on the ſudden, and (withal) to give proof of his own valour, which perhaps

haps he ſhould no more do, in the face of all his enemies. In the right wing, oppoſite unto *Python*, he beſtowed the weakeſt of his horſe and elephants, under one *Philip*, an honeſt man; and (which was enough at ſuch a time) obedient; commanding him to protract the fight, and make a leiſurable retreat, expecting the event of the other ſide.

So they joined very fiercely; *Antigonus* labouring to make himſelf maſter of all; *Eumenes*, to die an honourable death, or to win ſuch a victory upon his open enemies, as might give him leiſure and opportunity to deal with his falſe friends.

The foot-men of *Antigonus* being, even in their own opinions, far inferior to thoſe whom they muſt encounter, were, at the firſt brunt, preſently defeated by the *ſilver-ſhields*, who ſlew above five thouſand of them, loſing, of their own, not one man. But in horſe, *Eumenes* was ſo over-matched, that he could not repel *Antigonus*, who preſſed him very hard; but was fain to ſtand wholly upon defence. Yet his courage wrought ſo well by example among his followers, that the enemy could not win one foot of ground upon him, until ſuch time as *Peuceſtes*, with one thouſand five hundred horſe withdrew himſelf out of the battel, leaving his companions fighting to defend his back.

Then did *Eumenes* deſperately ruſh amongſt his enemies, labouring to break open the way unto *Antigonus* himſelf. And though he failed of his purpoſe; yet, with great ſlaughter, he did ſo beat upon them which came in his way, that the victory hung a long time in ſuſpence, uncertain which way to incline.

The ground, whereon they fought, being of a ſlight ſandy mould, through the trampling of horſes, men, and elephants, did caſt up ſuch a cloud of duſt, as hindered the proſpect; ſo that no man could ſee what was done a little from him. *Antigonus*, finding this advantage, diſpatched away ſome companies of horſe, that paſſed, undiſcovered, beyond *Eumenes*'s battels, and came to his carriages, which lay about half a mile from the place of fight, ſlenderly guarded (for that the whole body of the army lay between them and danger) and therefore eaſily taken. Had *Peuceſtes* retired himſelf no further than unto the carriages, he might not only have defended them; but, peradventure, have ſurprized thoſe which came to ſurprize them; and ſo have done as good a piece of ſervice as a better man. But he was gotten ſomewhat further, to a place, where, out of danger, he might expect the event; and *Eumenes* was ſo over-laboured both in body and mind, that he could not poſſibly give an eye to every place, being not well able to continue where he was.

It happened ſo, that the elephants meeting together, thoſe of *Antigonus* had the better hand; whereupon *Eumenes*, finding himſelf every way over-charged, began to give back, and withdrew himſelf and his companies, in good order, to the other ſide of the battel, where *Philip* (as he was directed) had, by fighting and retiring together, kept that wing from loſs. The *Antigonians* had felt ſo much of *Eumenes* that day, that they were well contented to let him depart quietly, and wiſhed not to ſee him come again; as fain he would have done.

The loſs of the carriages was reported unto him, as ſoon as he had any leiſure to hear how things went; whereupon he preſently ordered his men for a freſh charge, and ſent for *Peuceſtes*, that was not far off, requeſting him to bring in his men, and renew the fight; whereby he truſted, not only to recover their own goods, but to enrich themſelves with the ſpoils of the enemies. *Peuceſtes* not only refuſed to join with him, but immediately withdrew himſelf into a ſafer place, where he might be further from ſuch dangerous temptations.

By this, the night grew on; and both armies, wearied with fighting, were deſirous to return into their camps. Yet *Antigonus* conceived hope of doing ſomewhat more; and therefore, taking half his horſe-men, he waited upon *Eumenes* a part of his way homewards, but found no opportunity to offend him: the other half he committed to *Python*, willing him to ſet upon the *ſilver-ſhields* in their retreat; which yet he forbare to do, becauſe it appeared too full of danger. So the battel ended, wherein *Antigonus* had not ſo much the better in horſe, as the worſe in foot; but the ſpoil which he got, by ſurprizing his enemies carriages, made amends for all his other loſſes.

SECT. VII.

How Eumenes *was betrayed to* Antigonus, *and ſlain.*

EUMENES, coming into his camp, and finding the *ſilver-ſhields* extremely diſcontented with their misfortune, began to chear them up, and put them in hope of recovering all with advantage; for their brave demeanor that day had ſo cruſhed the enemy, that he had no power left wherewith to abide them in open field, and was much leſs able to draw their carts after him, through that great wilderneſs, over the high mountains.

But theſe perſwaſions availed nothing. *Peuceſtes* was gone; the other captains would needs return into the high countries; and the ſoldiers had no deſire either to fly or to fight, but only to recover their goods. Wherefore *Teutamus*, one of the two captains of the *ſilver-ſhields* (who had in former times readily conſented unto traiterous motions, in hope of gain; but was letted by his partner, *Antigenes*) finding, as he thought, a fit occaſion of making himſelf great, and winning the love of thoſe bands, dealt ſecretly with *Antigonus*, requeſting him to reſtore unto thoſe old ſoldiers their goods, which he had taken, being the only reward of their ſervices in the wars of *Philip* and *Alexander*.

Antigonus, as a ſubtil man, knew very well, that they which requeſted more than they had reaſon to expect, would alſo, with a little entreaty, perform a great deal more than they promiſed; and therefore he lovingly entertained the meſſengers, filling them with hopes of greater matters than they deſired, if they would put *Eumenes* into his hands, by whom they were ſeduced to make war againſt him. This anſwer pleaſed them ſo well, that they forthwith deviſed how to deliver him alive. Wherefore coming about him, as at other times, to do their duty; and, pretending more joy of their victory, than ſorrow of their loſs, which they ſaid they would redeem by another fight; in the midſt of this goodly talk, they leaped upon him, caught hold of his ſword, and bound him faſt. So they hauled him away, and, ſtopping their ears againſt all perſwaſions, would not yield ſo far as to looſen one of his hands, and let him kill himſelf; but brought him alive (that was their own general, under whom they had obtained many victories) as it had been in triumph, into the camp of their enemies.

The preſs of men, running out of the camp to ſee him, was ſo great, that *Antigonus* was forced to ſend a guard of horſe-men and elephants, to keep him from being ſmothered, whom he could not ſuddenly reſolve either to kill or ſave. Very few they were that ſued for his life; but of theſe, *Demetrius*, the ſon of *Antigonus*, was one; the reſt were

were deſirous to be rid of him quickly; thinking, belike, that if he were ſaved, he would ſoon be the chief in reputation, for his great ability. So, after long deliberation, *Antigonus* concluded, that it was the ſafeſt way to put him to death; which intending to have done by famine (perhaps, becauſe he would keep it a-while in his own power to reverſe this ſentence, as deſiring (if it might be) to have him live his friend) haſte of other buſineſs made him do it by the ſword.

To this end came all the travels of that worthy general, *Eumenes*, who had, with great wiſdom, fidelity, and patience, laboured in vain, to uphold the family, which God had purpoſed to caſt down. He is reckoned among the notable examples of fortune's mutability; but more notable was his government of himſelf in all her changes. Adverſity never leſſened his courage, nor proſperity his circumſpection. But all his virtue, induſtry, and wit, were caſt away, in leading an army, without full power to keep it in due obedience. Therefore it was not ill anſwer'd by *Gaſpar de Colligny*, admiral of *France*, in our days, to one that foretold his death, which enſued ſoon after, in the maſſacre of *Paris*; *That rather than to lead an army of voluntiers, he would die a thouſand times.*

Antigonus himſelf gave to the body of *Eumenes* honourable funeral; and rewarded the treaſon wrought againſt him with deſerved vengeance. One chief captain of the *ſilver-ſhields* he burnt alive; many of the other captains he ſlew; and to the whole multitude of the *ſilver-ſhields*, that had betrayed ſo worthy a commander, he appointed a leader, that ſhould carry them into far countries, under pretence of wars; but with a privy charge, to conſume them all, as perjured wretches, letting none of them return alive unto his friends and kindred, or ſo much as once behold the ſeas that beat upon the ſhoars of *Greece* and *Macedon*.

SECT. VIII.

How Antigonus *ſlew* Python, *and occupied* Media. *How he removed governors of provinces, and made himſelf lord of* Perſia, *carrying away* Peuceſtes.

THE two armies being joined thus in one, were carried into *Media*, where they ſpent the reſt of the winter; the common ſoldier idly; the principal men intentively bent unto the buſineſs enſuing. *Python* began to conſider his own deſervings; for that the whole war had been chiefly maintained by the ſtrength and riches of his province. Beſides, he thought himſelf as good a man as *Antigonus*, unleſs it were in the ſoldiers opinion, which he judged eaſy to be purchaſed with gifts; and therefore ſpared not to aſſay them with great liberality. But, in following this courſe, he was driven by neceſſity to truſt many, of whom he ſtumbled upon ſome, that were unſecret; and others, bearing him no ſincere affection. Thus was his purpoſe diſcovered to *Antigonus*, who (nothing like to *Python*) diſſembled his indignation, and rebuked the informers, as breeders of diſſenſion between him and his honourable friend, unto whom he meant to commit the government of all thoſe countries; his own buſineſs calling him into the lower *Aſia*. Theſe reports, coming daily to his ears, did finely delude *Python*. By his greatneſs with *Alexander*; his authority in that province where they lay, whereof he was governor; and the love of the ſoldiers, which he had bought with money, he was ſtrong enough to maintain, even an offenſive war. But, what need had he to uſe the ſword, when he was likely, without contention, to obtain more than his own aſking? therefore he came, as ſoon as he was ſent for, to take his farewel of *Antigonus*, and to divide the provinces with him, that meant nothing leſs than to yield to any ſuch diviſion. As ſoon as he came, he was taken, and accuſed, condemned to die, and ſlain out of hand. For *Antigonus*, having begun with *Eumenes*, his ancient friend, was not afterwards reſtrained by any conſideration of old acquaintance, from cutting down indifferently all that ſtood in his way; but ſwam careleſly through the blood, wherein at the firſt he doubtfully waded.

When this buſineſs was ended, he appointed a new governor in *Media*, to order the province; and a captain, to ſuppreſs all commotions; thinking, belike, that the power and authority, ſo divided, would hardly agree in one againſt him, from whom both were derived.

After this, he marched into *Perſia*, where he was entertained, as abſolute lord of *Aſia*: there began he to ſhew how well he underſtood his own mightineſs. For he placed and diſplaced, at his pleaſure, governors in all provinces; leaving none in office, that were not his own creatures, except ſuch as lay too far off to be diſlodged eaſily.

Peuceſtes, who ruled in *Perſia*, thought with good cheer to redeem old offences; but was deceived, having to do with one that could not be taken with ſuch baits: he was carried away, and feaſted with goodly words of promiſe, that never took effect. Thus he, that envied the virtue of his friend, was driven to flatter (in vain) the fortune of his enemy; after which, he lived a moſt contemptible life, till he died obſcurely, a man forgotten.

SECT. IX.

How Seleucus *was chaſed out of* Babylon, *by* Antigonus. *The great riches of* Antigonus.

SELEUCUS was the next in this viſitation; one that had, from time to time, continued in the ſame tenor of good-will to *Antigonus*, and now gave proof of his hearty affection towards him, by making the captain of the caſtle of *Suſa* to meet him on the way, rendering unto him that ſtrong piece, and all the treaſures therein beſtowed. This offer was ſo great, that *Antigonus* (though having in his hands the keeper of the place) could hardly believe it; but uſed him with exceſſive kindneſs, for fear ſo good a mood ſhould change. In that caſtle he found all the treaſures of *Alexander*, with the jewels of the *Perſian* kings; which, added to his former ſtore of money, made up twenty-five thouſand talents. Having all this, he might well account himſelf a happy man, if riches were ſufficient to happineſs. But large dominion was the mark at which he aimed; therefore he proceeded, with intent to leave no country behind his back, that ſhould not acknowledge him for ſoveraign lord. Coming to *Babylon*, he was entertained by *Seleucus* with all poſſible demonſtration of love, and honour'd with preſents, beſeeming the majeſty of a king. All this he accepted with great gravity, as being due to him, and began to require an account of the revenues of that province. This demand *Seleucus* held unreaſonable, ſaying, that it was not needful for him to render unto any man an account of that province, which was given unto him, in reſpect of his many good ſervices to the ſtate. But whether he ſpake reaſon or no, it ſufficed, that *Antigonus* was powerful; who urged him daily to come to a reckoning. Manifeſt it was, that neither want of money, nor any other neceſſity, moved *Antigonus* to preſs him thus; but only the deſire to pick matter of quarrel againſt him, whereof it was likely that he

ſhould find ſuch iſſue as *Python* and *Peuceſtes* had done. Therefore, taking with him only fifty horſe, he conveyed himſelf away, and fled into *Ptolemy*'s dominions, deſiring him to protect him from the violence of ſuch a man, as went about to oppreſs all that in former times had been his betters, or at leaſt his equals. *Antigonus* was glad of his flight; for now all thoſe countries were yielded unto him without battel, whereas to fight with *Seleucus* for them he wanted all pretence, and to kill him it was not his deſire, having received many benefits of him, and thoſe not intermixed, as commonly it happens, with any injuries. Yet it is reported, that the *Chaldeans* brought a ſtrange prophecy to *Antigonus*, bidding him to look well to himſelf, and know, that if *Seleucus* did eſcape his hands, he ſhould recover *Babylon*, yea, win all *Aſia*, and kill *Antigonus* in battel. Eaſy believers may give credit to this tale. Had it been true, methinks, *Antigonus* rather ſhould have hanged thoſe *Chaldeans*, for giving him no warning till it was too late, than ſent purſuers (as they ſay that he did) after him, whom the deſtinies preſerved for ſo great purpoſes. When he had ſettled things at *Babylon*, he took his journey into *Cilicia*, where he winter'd. There he took up ten thouſand talents more of the king's treaſures, and caſting his accounts, found his yearly income to amount unto eleven thouſand talents.

CHAP. V.

Of the great civil war between Alexander's *captains: and how they aſſumed the name and ſtate of kings.*

SECT. I.

The combination of Ptolemy, Caſſander, *and others, againſt* Antigonus. *Their demands, and his anſwer.*

THESE great riches, and the reſt of his power, made *Antigonus* dreaded, envied, and ſuſpected, whereby he quickly was embarked in a new war. *Ptolemy*, *Caſſander*, and *Lyſimachus* had privily combined themſelves together, intending to hinder his further growth, and bring him to more reaſon, than of his own accord he ſeemed like to yield unto. Of their practices he had ſome notice; the good entertainment given unto *Seleucus*, giving him ſufficient cauſe of miſtruſt. Therefore he ſent embaſſadors to them ſeverally, entreating them to continue firm in their love towards him, that would be ready to requite them with the like. The cold anſwers which they made occaſioned his haſty preparation againſt the moſt forward of them, which was *Ptolemy*, it being likely that a good army ſhould prevail more than a fair meſſage. Therefore, as ſoon as the ſeaſon of the year would permit, he took the way towards *Syria*, and was encountered by embaſſage from them all. Theſe told him, that their lords did much rejoice at his victory obtained againſt *Eumenes* their common enemy, and the honour that he had thereby gotten. In which war, foraſmuch as they being his confederates, muſt have endured great loſs, with hazard of their whole eſtates, if the contrary faction had prevailed, they held it very juſt, that all ſhould be partakers in the fruits of that voyage, wherein they had been all adventurers. Wherefore they deſired him, that making between them all an equal diviſion of the treaſures that were in his hands (a thing eaſy to be done) he would alſo take ſome convenient order for enlarging their dominions, according to the rate of his new purchaſes. This might beſt be to every one's liking, if he would make over *Cappadocia*, with *Lycia*, to *Caſſander*; and *Phrygia*, bordering upon the *Helleſpont*, to *Lyſimachus*; for whereas his own dominions were ſo much extended eaſtward by his late victory, he might well ſpare ſome of thoſe weſtern provinces, to thoſe that were ſeated in the weſt. As for *Ptolemy*, he would not crave any new additi-

on, but reſt contented within his own territories. Provided always, that *Seleucus* their common friend, and partner in the late war, might be reſtored to his own, out of which he had been driven ſo injuriouſly, that all of them were forced to take it deeply to heart; requiring amends, with his friendly conſent unto their demands, which otherwiſe they muſt labour to obtain with armed hands.

Antigonus knew, that after many loſſes received, he ſhould yet be able to redeem peace whenſoever he lifted, with theſe, or perhaps with eaſier conditions. Neither was he ſo weak, to give away quietly any part of his ſtrength into the hands of ſuch bad friends, for fear only leſt it ſhould be taken from him perforce. Rather he hoped that he ſhould be able to find them work, more than enough to defend their own. Therefore, he roundly anſwered the embaſſadors, that it was no part of his meaning to communicate with other men the profit of that victory, which he alone, without other mens help, had obtained. Tho' indeed they had already ſufficiently gained by him, if they could ſee it, having by his means kept their governments, whereof they were like to be diſpoſſeſſed by *Polyſperchon*, and the council of eſtate in *Macedon*. But what marvel was it, if they conſidered not how he had ſaved them, ſeeing one of them had forgotten the time, when coming to him as a fugitive and begging ſuccour, he was by his mere bounty relieved, and enabled to get all that he now held? *Caſſander* did not (ſaid he) in thoſe days command me to ſurrender provinces, and give him his equal ſhare of my treaſures; but (for his father's ſake) deſired me to pity him, and help him againſt his enemies; which I did, by lending him an army and fleet, on confidence whereof he now preſumes to threaten me. As for *Seleucus*, how can he complain of wrong, that durſt not ſtay to plead his right? I did uſe him well; but his conſcience told him that he had deſerved ill: elſe he would not have fled. Let them that ſo curiouſly ſearch into my doings, conſider well their own, which ſome of them can hardly juſtify. I am now in the way to *Syria*, meaning to examine *Ptolemy*'s proceedings; and, after him, to deal with others, if they continue to provoke me.

SECT.

SECT. II.

The preparation and beginnings of the wars.

WHEN the embaſſadors were diſmiſſed with this anſwer, nothing was thought upon but war. *Antigonus*, perceiving that he ſhould be invaded from *Europe*, as ſoon as he were entered into *Syria*, left his nephew *Ptolemy* to guard the ſea-coaſts, and hinder *Caſſander* from landing in *Aſia*: giving him alſo in charge, to drive out of *Cappadocia* ſome that were already ſent over to moleſt him. Likewiſe he diſpatched meſſengers into *Greece* and *Cyprus*, not unfurniſhed of money, to draw friends to his ſide, and raiſe up troubles to his enemies. Eſpecially he laboured to make himſelf the ſtrongeſt by ſea; to which purpoſe, he rather haſtened than foreſlowed his journey into *Syria*, that he might get poſſeſſion of mount *Libanus*, which afforded many excellent commodities for building of a navy. Therefore, having erected beacons, and laid poſt-horſes throughout all *Aſia* to give ſwiſt advertiſement of all occurrences, he invaded *Syria*, that was not held againſt him by any power ſufficient to maintain the field.

Ptolemy lay in *Egypt*, the ſtrength and heart of his dominion, where he was beloved and honoured of all the people as their natural lord; his other provinces he kept with a few garriſons, better ſerving to contain the people within obedience than to confront a foreign enemy. So *Antigonus* took many cities and places of that country, and began to ſet great numbers of artificers on work in making ſhips, which was one of his moſt earneſt cares. In theſe buſineſſes he conſumed a year and three months, not idly; for he took *Joppe* and *Gaza*, which were yielded unto his diſcretion, and well uſed. The ſtrong city of *Tyrus* held out long, but was compelled in the end, by famine, to render itſelf upon compoſition that *Ptolemy*'s ſoldiers might depart with their arms, which was permitted.

Ptolemy was not aſleep while theſe things were in doing, though he kept himſelf within the bounds of *Egypt*, as indeed it behoved him to do. His forces were not able to ſtand againſt *Antigonus* in plain field, but likely they were to increaſe, which made him willing to protract the time. Nevertheleſs by ſea (where his enemy was as yet unready) he ſent his fleet into all quarters, whereof *Seleucus* had the chief command.

Seleucus paſſed with an hundred ſail along the coaſt of *Syria*, in the full view of *Antigonus* and his army, to their no little diſcomfort. He landed in *Cyprus*, which was then governed by many petty lords, of whom the greateſt adhered to *Ptolemy*; the reſt were, by the factors of *Antigonus*, bought for him with gold, but now redeemed by the *Egyptian* with ſharp ſteel.

The ſame commodity of aid by ſea encouraged the preſident of *Caria* (called alſo *Caſſander*, but not the ſon of *Antipater*, howſoever by the painful and learned writer *Reinerus Reineccius*, he is by ſome over-ſight counted for the ſame) to declare for *Ptolemy* and his confederates, and buſily employ in their quarrel all his forces, which he had hitherto kept in good neutrality, and thereby enjoyed reſt; but now he threw himſelf into dangerous war, chuſing rather to undergo trouble at hand, than to fall under certain ruin, though ſomewhat further diſtant, which would have overwhelmed him, if *Antigonus* had beaten all the reſt.

SECT. III.

How each party ſought to win the aſſiſtance of Greece. Antigonus*'s declaration againſt* Caſſander. Alexander, *the ſon of* Polyſperchon, *revolteth from* Antigonus, *who had ſet him up.*

IN the mean ſeaſon all poſſible care was taken on both ſides, to aſſure unto them the people of *Greece*, whoſe aid, which way ſoever it inclined, was of great importance. Herein, at the firſt, *Antigonus* ſped ſo well by large effuſion of his treaſure, that he drew to him the *Lacedemonians*, and, other *Peloponneſians*, of whom he waged eight thouſand, and cauſed *Polyſperchon* (who had a good while made hard ſhifts) to rouſe himſelf again, and taking upon him the title of captain of *Peloponneſus*, to make head againſt *Caſſander*.

Theſe hopeful beginnings encouraged him to proceed further in the ſame kind. Wherefore, to make *Caſſander* the more odious, he called together both his own ſoldiers, and all the *Greeks* and *Macedonians* that were to be found thereabouts. To theſe he declared, that *Caſſander* had very cruelly ſlain *Olympias*, mother to the great *Alexander*; and not herewith contented, had ſhut up in cloſe priſon the poor lady *Roxana*, *Alexander*'s wife, and his ſon begotten on her body. That all this proceeded from a deſire to make himſelf king over the *Macedonians*; which well appeared, by his enforcing the lady *Theſſalonica*, daughter to king *Philip*, a match unfit for a man of no greater parentage than he, to join with him in marriage. That in mere deſpite of thoſe dead princes, *Philip* and *Alexander*, he had planted the *Olynthians*, rooted out by *Philip*, in a new city by him built, and called by his own name *Caſſandria*; and had re-edified the city of *Thebes*, which for the great treaſon of the inhabitants, was levelled with the ground by the victorious hand of *Alexander*. For theſe reaſons he required them to make a decree, that *Caſſander* ſhould reſtore to abſolute liberty the lady *Roxana* and her ſon, and ſhould yield obedience to the lord lieutenant-general of the empire (by which name *Antigonus* himſelf was underſtood) or elſe ſhould be reputed a traitor and open enemy to the ſtate. Furthermore, he propounded, that all the cities of *Greece* ſhould be reſtored into freedom; this he did, not becauſe he was careful of their good, but for the need which he had of their aſſiſtance.

Theſe things being decreed, *Antigonus* was perſwaded, that not only the *Greeks* would adhere unto him, as to their loving patron, and fall off from *Caſſander*; but that the rulers of provinces, who had hitherto ſuſpected him as a man regardful of nothing but his own benefit, would correct their opinion, and think him the moſt faithful of all others to the royal blood. But concerning his loyalty to the young prince, the world was too wiſe to be deceived with vain ſhews. His undertaking for the liberty of the *Greeks* was more effectual, and got eaſy belief, in regard of his preſent hatred to *Caſſander*. Yet herein alſo *Ptolemy* ſtrove to be as earneſt as he, making the like decree, in hope to win to himſelf that valiant nation, which afforded men far more ſerviceable in war than were to be found in any province of the empire.

And this indeed was the point at which both ſides aimed. Wherein *Antigonus*, thinking to make all ſure, deceived himſelf, not without great coſt. For he gave to *Alexander*, the ſon of *Polyſperchon*, five hundred talents, willing him to ſet the war on foot in *Peloponneſus*, whereby it might appear, that

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on his ſide was meant nothing elſe than what was openly pretended.

In *Peloponneſus*, *Caſſander*'s men had, with much bloodſhed, grievouſly afflicted the contrary faction; and he himſelf perceiving, that they were more eaſily ſpoiled as enemies, than retained as friends, thought it the beſt way to make what uſe he could of them, that were not long like to continue his. Finally, perceiving that *Alexander* came furniſhed with plenty of gold, wherewith he was able, not only to win the doubtful, but to corrupt ſuch as might ſeem beſt aſſured: he thought it a good part of wiſdom to ſurrender upon fair conditions that which he could not aſſure himſelf to hold any long time by force. Therefore he ſent one to deal with *Alexander*, about the matters in controverſy; letting him know, that *Antigonus* was very ſkilful in ſetting men together by the ears, not caring who prevailed, but only deſiring to have them weary themſelves whilſt he was buſy elſewhere, that ſo at length he might find opportunity to ſet upon the ſtronger. If therefore *Alexander* were ſo wiſe, as to keep in his purſe the five hundred talents which he had, and without ſtroke ſtricken, to receive the whole lordſhip of *Peloponneſus*, it ſhould be freely put into his hands by *Caſſander*: provided, that he ſhould from thenceforth renounce all confederacy made with *Antigonus*, and enter into a ſure and faithful league with *Ptolemy*, *Caſſander*, and the reſt of the confederates; otherwiſe, he might well perſwade himſelf, that the country which his father could not keep, when he was indeed the lieutenant of the empire, ſhould not in haſte be won by him, that was only the factor of a proud injurious man, ſo ſtiling himſelf, but not acknowledged by others.

Alexander had lived a while with *Antigonus* ſince the beginning of theſe wars, among whoſe followers it was not hard to diſcover the intent (which he did not carry very ſecret) of making himſelf abſolute lord of all: Therefore he was ſoon entreated to accept ſo good an offer, and did not ſtick to enter into that league, whereby he was to become a free lord, and ſubject unto no man's controul.

Howbeit, this his honour continued not long ere he loſt both it and his life together, by treaſon of the *Sicyonians*; who thinking thereby to have made themſelves free, were ſoon after vanquiſhed in battel by *Crateſipolis*, *Alexander*'s wife, a diſcreet and valiant lady. She, in revenge of her husband's death, crucified thirty of the citizens taken in flight; and having by ſeverity taught them obedience, did afterwards continue her army in good order, and governed thoſe places that ſhe held with the love and commendation of her ſubjects and neighbours.

SECT. IV.

The Etolians *riſe againſt* Caſſander *in favour of* Antigonus, *and are beaten. A fleet and land-army of* Antigonus *utterly defeated by* Ptolemy's *lieutenant. In what term the war ſtood at this time.* Antigonus *draws near to* Greece.

Antigonus, when he found that with ſo much money he had only bought an enemy, began to raiſe troubles to *Caſſander* and his other adverſaries in *Greece*, by ſtirring up the *Etolians* againſt them; likewiſe he laboured to win to his party the iſlands in the *Greek* ſeas, by whoſe aſſiſtance he might be the better able to deal with *Ptolemy*, that greatly prevailed by reaſon of his ſtrong fleet. But neither of theſe attempts had the ſucceſs which he expected. The *Etolians*, a factious nation, and always envying the greatneſs of their neighbours, were often in commotion, but ſo, that commonly their gains equalled not their loſſes. *Caſſander* won ſome of their own countries, fortified the *Acarnanians* againſt them, and compelled *Glaucias*, king of the *Illyrians*, whom he vanquiſhed in battel, to forſake their ſide, and bind himſelf to bear no arms againſt *Caſſander*'s friends.

On the other ſide, as many petty iſlands were drawn to join with *Antigonus*; ſo the fleet of the *Rhodians* under *Theodatus*, who was admiral to *Antigonus*, paſſing along the coaſt of *Aſia* toward *Cyprus*, with an army under conduct of *Perilaus*, marching on the ſhore for mutual aſſiſtance, was quite overthrown by *Ptolemy*'s navy. *Polyclytus*, who in *Ptolemy*'s behalf had been ſent into *Peloponneſus* againſt *Alexander*, finding no need of his ſervice in that country, becauſe *Alexander* was come over to their ſide, returned homewards, and by the way heard of the courſe which theſe *Antigonians* held, whom he very cunningly ſurprized. He rode with his fleet behind a cape, which the enemies were to double; his land-forces he placed in ambuſh, whereinto *Perilaus* falling, was taken priſoner with many of his men, and many were ſlain, making little reſiſtance. *Theodatus*, the admiral, perceiving this, made all haſte to help his fellows that were on land; but whilſt he, with all his fleet, were intentive only to that buſineſs, *Polyclytus* appeared at their backs, who, as ſoon as he perceived their diſorder, haſtened about the cape, and charging them behind, ſuffered not one of them to eſcape him. Theſe ill tidings cauſed *Antigonus* to deal with *Ptolemy* about ſome compoſition. Firſt, he ſent embaſſadors; afterwards they met in perſon. But *Antigonus* would not yield unto the demands of *Ptolemy*, ſo the parly was vain.

Hitherto each party ſeemed to have indifferently ſped in the war, and thereby to have equal cauſe of hope and fear. This late victory, with the good ſucceſs of his affairs in *Cyprus*, did ſeem to make amends to *Ptolemy* for his loſſes in *Syria*. Likewiſe the revolt of *Alexander* from *Antigonus* did equal the confederacy made between the *Etolians* and him; as alſo thoſe petty ſkirmiſhes that had been in *Aſia* the leſs, to *Antigonus*'s advantage, were ſufficiently recompenſed by others of like regard, but adverſe to him, and by the troubles brought upon his eſtates in thoſe parts by the two *Caſſanders*.

Contrariwiſe, *Antigonus* valued the loſs of his men, money, and ſhips, no otherwiſe than as the paring of his nails that were left long enough, and would eaſily grow again; but the enlargement of his territory, by addition of *Syria*, he prized at a higher rate, as if thereby he had fed upon a limb of *Ptolemy*'s enemy, and ſtrengthened the body of his own empire. Concerning other accidents, whereof the good were hitherto ſufficient to counterpoiſe the bad, he meant to proceed as occaſion ſhould direct, which commonly is not long wanting to them that want no money.

That which moſt moleſted him, was the attempts of his enemies upon *Aſia* the leſs; wherein, though as yet they had gotten little, yet had he cauſe to fear, leſt the people, being tied unto him by no bond of allegiance, might upon ſmall occaſion revolt from him, to men of as honourable reputation as he himſelf. To prevent this, and to be nearer to *Greece*, he held it expedient for him to be there in perſon, where his affairs did ſeem to proſper the worſe, by reaſon of his abſence. Therefore,

fore he left part of his army in *Syria*, under his ſon *Demetrius*, to whom, being then but two and twenty years old, he appointed many ancient captains as aſſiſtants, or rather as directors; the reſt he carried with him into *Phrygia*, where he meant to winter.

SECT. V.

How Lyſimachus *and* Caſſander *vanquiſhed ſome enemies, raiſed againſt them by* Antigonus. *The good ſucceſs of* Antigonus *in* Aſia *and* Greece: *with the rebellion of many cities againſt* Caſſander.

THE coming of *Antigonus* into thoſe parts wrought a great alteration in the proceſs of his buſineſs thereabouts. For his enemies had ſhort leiſure to think upon moleſting him in *Aſia*: they themſelves were held over-hardly to their own work on *Europe* ſide. *Seuthes*, a king of the *Thracians*, joining with ſome towns that rebelled againſt *Lyſimachus*, brought alſo the bordering *Scythians* into the quarrel. All theſe relied upon *Antigonus*, who was to help them with money and other aid. The *Etolians* likewiſe took courage, and roſe againſt *Caſſander*, having *Eacides*, lately reſtored to the kingdom of *Epirus*, their aſſiſtant. But *Lyſimachus* gave unto his rebels no time to confirm themſelves. He ſuddenly preſented himſelf before two of the cities that had rebelled, and compelled them, by fear, to return to their former duty. He fought a battel with the *Scythians* and wild *Thracians*, and drove them out of the country. Finally, he overcame *Seuthes*; and, following the heat of his victory, ſlew *Pauſanias* in battel, whom *Antigonus* had ſent over with an army; and all his men he did either put to ranſom, or fill up with them his own bands. The like ſucceſs had *Philip*, *Caſſander*'s lieutenant, againſt the *Etolians*. For he waſted their country; fought with the *Epirotes* that came to help them; and, after the victory, fought again with their forces joined in one, overthrowing them, and killing *Eacides*, that unfortunate king. Finally, he drove the *Etolians* out of moſt of their country, and forced them to ſeek their ſafety among the wild mountains. Of the *Epirotes*, he ſent as priſoners to *Caſſander*, the principal authors of the king's reſtitution, and of the preſent war.

Yet theſe actions required ſome time, and wearied *Antigonus*'s adverſaries with painful travel; after which, they remained only ſavers. *Antigonus* himſelf, at fair leiſure, won all *Caria* the whilſt, and ſent armies into *Peloponneſus*, and other parts of *Greece*, beſtowing liberty upon all the cities he took out of *Caſſander*'s hands. The whole country of *Peloponneſus* (excepting *Sicyon* and *Corinth*) with the iſle of *Eubea*, and many places of the firm land, were by thoſe means won to be his in true and vehement affection, ready to do or ſuffer any thing for him that had made ſo evident a demonſtration of his readineſs to give them the liberty in deed, which others had promiſed in idle words. Many ſtates, deſirous of the ſame benefit, would fain have ſhewed their goodwill; but they were kept in by *Caſſander*'s garriſons, who was too wiſe to truſt them looſe. Therefore *Antigonus* made ſhew as if he would paſs over into *Macedon*; by which terror, he forced *Caſſander* to repair thither in all haſte, with the beſt of his ſtrength, leaving many good towns of *Greece* ſo weakly guarded, that well they might take courage to help themſelves, if any foreign ſuccour appeared. The aid which they deſired, was not long wanting. The lieutenants of *Antigonus*, taking the advantage of *Caſſander*'s departure, entered the country; drove his garriſons out of divers cities; forced the governor of *Athens* to enter into league with their lord; won the citadel of *Thebes*, and ſet the people at liberty. This laſt action was ſomewhat remarkable; for *Thebes* had not long before been raiſed out of her old ruins, by the mere power of *Caſſander*; of which act he was accuſed by *Antigonus*, as if it had been ſome heinous crime. Yet now the ſame *Antigonus* winneth the city, and the love of the inhabitants, only by expelling him that was their founder. So much are men readier to thank the increaſer, than the author of their good; and rather to look forward upon thoſe hopes, which vainly they extend beyond all meaſure, than backward upon their miſerable nullity, that held them incapable of being any thing.

SECT. VI.

Victories of Ptolemy *by ſea. A great battel at* Gaza, *which* Ptolemy *and* Seleucus *won, againſt* Demetrius, *the ſon of* Antigonus.

AS the preſence or nearneſs of *Antigonus* gave life to his affairs in the lower *Aſia*, and *Greece*; ſo the deſigns of his enemies, taking the advantage of his abſence, ruined the very foundations of thoſe great works in the eaſtern parts, wherewith in the year preceding he had overtopped them. The iſle of *Cyprus*, whoſe princes wavered between contrary affections, inclining one while to *Antigonus*, another while faintly regarding their covenant with *Ptolemy*, was viſited by an *Egyptian* fleet, wherewith *Ptolemy*, in his own perſon, eaſily reduced them to a more ſettled order, putting ſome to death, carrying others away priſoners, and leaving a lieutenant, of his own appointment, governor of the whole country. With the ſame fleet he ran along the ſea-coaſts, waſting a great part of *Caria* and *Cilicia*, with the ſpoils of which he enriched his followers, and returned loaden to *Cyprus*. *Demetrius*, the ſon of *Antigonus*, hearing frequent reports of the miſeries wherewith his father's ſubjects were oppreſſed, made all haſte out of *Syria* to the reſcue, taking only his horſe and light-armed foot with him, becauſe the buſineſs required expedition. But in vain did he tire himſelf, and his followers, in haſty ſeeking of one, that, by launching out into the deep, could, in a few minutes, delude the labour of ſo many days, if need had ſo required. Anſwerable to the vanity of this expedition, was the ſucceſs. For *Ptolemy* was gone, before *Demetrius* came into *Cilicia*. Neither was it certain, whether having lightened his ſhips of their burthen in *Cyprus*, he would return upon thoſe maritime countries; or make towards *Syria*, where his coming was expected. He was indeed gone into *Egypt*, and there, with *Seleucus*, was deſcribing a royal army, which he levied with all convenient ſpeed, for the recovery of *Syria*. This was more than *Demetrius* knew. Therefore he was fain to chuſe, out of uncertainties, the moſt likelihood, and return the way that he came, with all his companies, which were fitter for ſervice in the open field, than to be beſtowed in garriſons among the *Cicilians*. He had ſcarce refreſhed his men and horſes in *Syria*, when the news arrived of *Ptolemy*'s coming with a puiſſant army to give him battel. Hereupon, he called to counſel his principal friends, who adviſed him to give way to the time, and expect ſome better opportunity in the future; being a young man, and weakly furniſhed with means to reſiſt ſuch ancient and famous generals, as *Ptolemy* and *Seleucus*. This counſel ſeemed rather to proceed from the cold temper of thoſe aged men that

gave it, than from any neceſſity growing out of the preſent buſineſs. For *Demetrius*, conſidering himſelf to be the ſon of *Antigonus*, and now general of his father's army, thought his own title weighty enough to be laid in ballance againſt the bare names of thoſe two great commanders. Neither found he much reaſon that ſhould move him to diſtruſt his forces, as inſufficient. His men were better exerciſed than the enemies, and promiſed as much as could be required. Therefore, perſwading himſelf, that ſuch odds of number, and of great fame, would rather ſerve to adorn his victory, than hinder him in obtaining it, he reſolved to put the matter to trial, without expecting the advantage of more help. So, animating his ſoldiers with hope of ſpoil and rewards, he abode the coming of the enemies at *Gaza*, with purpoſe to encounter them, as ſoon as they had finiſhed their weariſom journey over the deſarts of *Arabia*.

Ptolemy and *Seleucus*, iſſuing out of ſo rich a province as *Egypt*, came ſo well provided of all neceſſaries, that their army felt not any great grievance of the evil way, when battel was preſented them, which confidently they undertook. In all things elſe they had the odds of *Demetrius*; of elephants they were utterly unprovided: but how to deal with thoſe beaſts they were not ignorant. They had prepared a kind of palliſado, faſtened ſtrongly together with chains, and ſharpened in ſuch a manner, that the elephants could not ſeek to break upon it, without receiving much hurt. The reſt of their forces, which (beſides that they had advantage in multitude) were heartened with many fortunate ſervices, by them performed that year, whilſt the enemies had wearied themſelves, either with vain journeys, or long and dulling expectation, they diſpoſed in ſuch order, as beſt anſwered to the form, wherein *Demetrius* was embattelled. The fight began, and was maintained with equal courage for a long time, each party ſtriving more to win honour, than to ſatisfy any other paſſion, as having little cauſe of hatred or revenge. But after ſome continuance, the greater number holding better out, the error of *Demetrius*, who, upon no neceſſity, would needs fight a battel at diſadvantage, began to appear by his loſſes. He had committed himſelf to fortune, having more to loſe by her than he could get: but in this fight ſhe was idle, and left all to be decided by ſtrong hands; unleſs it may be ſaid, that the terror brought upon his men, by the loſs of his elephants, was bad luck. Thoſe beaſts were in that kind of war hardly to be reſiſted on plain ground; and therefore, at the firſt, they made great ſpoil amongſt *Ptolemy*'s men. Afterwards, ſeeking to break through the palliſado, they were ſorely hurt, and every one of them taken. This diſaſter cauſed the horſemen of *Demetrius* to faint: they had laboured hard, and prevailed little; till now, perceiving that all muſt lye upon their hands, who were ill able to make their own places good, they began to ſhrink, and many of them to provide for their ſafety by timely flight; which example the reſt quickly follow'd. When *Demetrius* had ſtroven ſo long in vain to make his men abide, that he himſelf was likely to be loſt, he was fain to give place to the ſtronger, making a violent retreat as far as to *Azotus*, which was about thirty miles from the place of battel. A great part of his carriages was in *Gaza*, whither ſome of his company turned aſide, hoping to ſave ſuch goods, as, in haſte, they could pack up. This fooliſh covetouſneſs was their deſtruction, and the loſs of the town: for whilſt they, forgetful of the danger, had filled the ſtreets with ſumpter horſes, and ſtopped up the gates, thronging, ſome to get in and fetch, others to carry out, what they had already loaden, *Ptolemy*'s army brake in without reſiſtance, taking them with their goods and the city altogether.

This victory reſtored unto *Ptolemy* the beſt part of *Syria*; a province, more eaſy in thoſe times to get, than to keep; and opened the way to all the greatneſs of *Seleucus*: for between *Gaza* and *Phenicia*, no place offered reſiſtance. In *Celoſyria* and *Phenicia*, ſome towns held out a while; but were ſoon taken in by *Ptolemy*. Among theſe, were the great cities of *Tyrus* and *Sidon*; of which *Sidon* was given up by the inhabitants; *Tyrus* by the garriſon, falling to mutiny againſt their captain; who, truſting to the ſtrength of it, had made great vaunts; but was pardoned by *Ptolemy*, and honourably entertained, in reſpect of his fidelity.

SECT. VII.

How Seleucus *recovered* Babylon, *and made himſelf lord of many countries in the higher* Aſia. *The* Æra *of the kingdom of the* Greeks, *which began with the dominion of* Seleucus.

WHILE *Ptolemy* followed his buſineſs with ſuch proſperity, *Seleucus* took leave of him, and went up to *Babylon*, to try his own fortune; which he found ſo favourable, that, recovering firſt his own province, he became at length maſter of the better part of *Alexander*'s purchaſes.

This expedition of *Seleucus* was very ſtrange, and full of unlikelihoods. His train conſiſted of no more than eight hundred foot, and two hundred horſe; a number too ſmall to have been placed as garriſon in ſome one of thoſe main great cities, againſt which he carried it into the higher *Aſia*. But little force is needful, to make way into ſtrong places, for him that already ſtands poſſeſſed of their hearts which dwell within the walls. The name of *Seleucus* was enough, whom the *Babylonians* had found ſo good a governor, that none of them would find courage to reſiſt him; but left that work to *Antigonus*'s own men, wiſhing them ill to ſpeed. Some of the *Macedonians*, that were in thoſe countries, had the like affection; others made a countenance of war, which, by eaſy compulſion, they left off, and followed new enſigns. This added courage to the people, who came in apace, and ſubmitted themſelves joyfully to *Seleucus*. In a defection ſo general, it was not a ſafe courſe for the *Antigonians*, to thruſt themſelves into the towns of moſt importance; for every man of them ſhould have been troubled with daily enemies in his own lodging. It remained, that they ſhould iſſue forth into the field, and try the matter by fight; but the treaſon of one principal man, who revolted to the enemy with more than a thouſand ſoldiers following him, ſo diſmayed the reſt, that they did no more than ſeek to make good one ſtrong place, wherein were kept the hoſtages and priſoners that *Antigonus* held for his ſecurity in thoſe quarters. This caſtle, belike, they had not fortified in times of leiſure, againſt dangers, that were not then apparent. *Seleucus* quickly took it, and ſo got the entire poſſeſſion of *Meſopotamia* and *Babylon*.

Antigonus had beſtowed in *Media* and *Perſia*, forces convenient for the defence of thoſe provinces, that were the utmoſt of his dominion. In the countries about *Euphrates*, he had not done the like; for his own great army lay between them and all enemies. Therefore, when the victory at *Gaza* had opened unto *Seleucus* the way into thoſe parts, he found little impediment in the reſt of his buſineſs. Having now gotten what he fought, it behoved him to ſeek how he might keep his gettings; for his own

forces

forces were too ſmall, and his friends were ill able to lend him any more. That which his friends could not do for him, his enemies did. *Nicanor*, to whom *Antigonus* had committed his army in *Media*, joining unto himſelf, out of *Perſia*, and other countries, all needful help, came with ten thouſand foot, and ſeven thouſand horſe, either to ſave all from being loſt, or to drive *Seleucus* out of that which he had won.

Againſt this power, *Seleucus* had only four hundred horſe, and ſomewhat above three thouſand foot, wherewith to oppoſe himſelf; his large conqueſt of unwarlike nations having yielded him many loving ſubjects, but few ſoldiers. Therefore, when his enemies were near to the river of *Tigris*, he withdrew himſelf from the place, where his reſiſtance was expected, into certain marſhes not far off, where he lay ſecretly, waiting for ſome advantage. *Nicanor* thought that he had been fled, and was the leſs careful in fortifying his camp. In recompence of this vain ſecurity, his camp was taken by ſurprize, the firſt night of his arrival; the *ſatrapa*, or lieutenant of *Perſia*, together with ſundry of the captains, were ſlain; he himſelf was driven to flee for his life into the deſarts, and the whole army yielded unto *Seleucus*; whoſe gentle demeanor, after the victory, drew all *Media*, *Suſiana*, and the neighbouring provinces, to acknowledge him their lord, without any further ſtroke ſtricken.

This victory of *Seleucus* gave beginning unto the new ſtile of *The kingdom of the Greeks*, an account much uſed by the *Jews*, *Chaldeans*, *Syrians*, and other nations in thoſe parts. I will not make any long diſputation about the firſt year of this *Æra*. The authority of that great aſtrologer [a] *Ptolemy*, from which there is no appeal, makes it plain, that *the five hundred and nineteenth year of* Nabonaſſar, *was the eighty-ſecond year of this account*. Other inference hereupon is needleſs, than that note of the learned [b] *Gauricus*, *that the firſt of theſe years was reckoned compleat at* Babylon, *together with the end of four hundred and thirty-eight years after* Nabonaſſar. With the obſervation of the *Saturn*, recorded by *Ptolemy*, agrees (as it ought) the calculation of *Bunting*; finding the ſame planet to have been ſo placed in the ſign of *Virgo*, as the *Chaldeans* had obſerved it, in the ſame year; which was, from *Nabonaſſar*, the five hundred and nineteenth; from *Seleucus* the eighty-ſecond year; and the laſt of the hundred and thirty and ſeventh *Olympiad*. Theſe obſervations of the celeſtial bodies, are the ſureſt marks of time; from which he, that wilfully varies, is inexcuſable. As for ſuch occurrences in hiſtory, and the years of ſucceeding princes (that are not ſeldom ambiguous, by reaſon of unremembered fractions) if they ſeem to be here-againſt, it is not greatly material; yet thus much is worthy of note, that theſe years of the *Greeks* were not reckoned in all countries from one beginning; as plainly appears in the difference of one year, that is found between actions, related by the ſeveral authors of the two books of the *Maccabees*, who follow divers accounts. He that ſhall adhere to the time defined by *Ptolemy*, may apply the other ſupputations thereunto, as being no farther from it, than a year's diſtance.

SECT. VIII.

How Ptolemy *loſt all that he had won in* Syria. *What the cauſes were of the quiet obedience, performed unto the* Macedonians, *by thoſe that had been ſubject unto the* Perſian *empire. Of divers petty enterprizes, taken in hand by* Antigonus *and* Demetrius, *with ill ſucceſs.*

IN a happy hour did *Seleucus* adventure, to go up to *Babylon*, with ſo few men as his friend could then well ſpare; for had he ſtayed longer, upon hope of getting more ſoldiers, *Ptolemy* could have ſpared him none at all, *Demetrius*, the ſon of *Antigonus*, having loſt the battel at *Gaza*, received from *Ptolemy* all his own goods, his pages, and ſervants, in free gift; and therewithal a courteous meſſage, to this effect: that no perſonal hatred was the ground of this war, which he and his confederates held with *Antigonus*; but only terms of honour, wherein they would ſeek to right themſelves after ſuch manner, that other friendly offices, without reference to the quarrel, ſhould not be forgotten.

This noble dealing of *Ptolemy*, did kindle in *Demetrius*, an earneſt deſire of requiting him with ſome as brave liberality. Which to effect, he gathered together the remainder of his broken troops, drew as many as could be ſpared out of the garriſons in *Cilicia*, or other provinces thereabouts; and, advertiſing his father of his misfortune, beſought him to ſend a new ſupply, wherewith he might redeem his honour loſt. *Antigonus*, upon the firſt news of this overthrow, had ſaid, that the victory, which *Ptolemy* won upon a beardleſs boy, ſhould be taken from him by bearded men: yet upon deſire that his ſon, whom he tenderly loved, ſhould amend his own reputation, he was content to make a ſtand in *Phrygia*. *Ptolemy*, hearing of *Demetrius*'s preparations, did nevertheleſs follow his own buſineſs in *Celoſyria*; thinking it enough to ſend part of his army under *Cilles*, his lieutenant, againſt the remnant of thoſe, that had been already vanquiſhed, when their forces were entire. This, peradventure, would have been ſufficient, had not *Cilles* too much undervalued the power of ſuch an enemy. He thought this young gallant, having lately ſaved his life by flight, would now be more careful of having a fair way at his back, than adventurous in ſetting further forward, than urgent reaſon ſhould provoke him. In this confidence, he paſſed on without all fear; as one that were already maſter of the field, and ſhould meet with none that would iſſue out of their places of ſtrength, to make reſiſtance. When *Demetrius* was informed of this careleſs march, he took the lighteſt of his army, and made his journey with ſuch diligence, one whole night, that, early in the morning, he came upon *Cilles* unexpected; and was, on a ſudden, without any battel, maſter of his camp; taking him alive, with his ſoldiers, and their carriages, all at once.

This exploit ſerved not only to repair the credit of *Demetrius*, which his loſs at *Gaza* had almoſt ruined; but, further, it enabled him to recompenſe the bounty of *Ptolemy*, with equal favour, in reſtoring to him *Cilles*, with many other of his friends, accompanied with rich preſents. But neither was *Ptolemy* ſo weakened by this loſs, nor *Demetrius* ſo emboldened by his victory, that any matter of conſequence thereupon enſued. For *Demetrius* feared the coming of *Ptolemy*, and therefore he fortified himſelf in places of advantage: *Ptolemy*, on the other ſide, was loth to engage himſelf in an enterprize, wherein he might perceive, that if the coming of *Antigonus* found him entangled, he ſhould either be driven to make a ſhameful retreat, or a dangerous adventure of his whole eſtate, in hope of not much more than already he poſſeſſed.

[a] Ptol. Almag. l. 11. c. 7, 8. [b] L. Gauric. in annotat. ad locum citatum.

Antigonus

Antigonus, indeed, was nothing ſlow in his way towards *Syria*; whither he made all haſte, not ſo much to relieve his ſon, as to embrace him: for he rejoiced exceedingly, that the young man had ſo well acquitted himſelf, and being left to his own advice, performed the office of a good commander. Wherefore, to increaſe the reputation of this late victory, he brought ſuch forces, as might ſerve to recover all *Syria*; meaning, that the honour of all, ſhould be referred unto the good foundation laid by his ſon, whom, from this time forwards, he employed in matters of greateſt importance.

Ptolemy had now leſs reaſon to encounter with *Antigonus*, than before his coming to have aſſailed the camp of *Demetrius*; yet he made it a matter of conſultation, as if he had dared more than he meant. But all his captains adviſed him to retire into *Egypt*, alledging many good arguments to that purpoſe; which they might well perceive to be agreeable to his own intent, by his propounding that courſe; not without remembrance of the good ſucceſs againſt *Perdiccas*, in the like defenſive war. So he departed out of *Syria*, preſerving his honour; as being rather led by mature deliberation, than any ſudden paſſion of fear: and he departed at fair leiſure, not only carrying his treaſures along with him, but ſtaying to diſmantle ſome principal cities, that he thought moſt likely to trouble him for the future. All the country, that he left at his back, fell preſently to *Antigonus*, without putting him to the trouble of winning it by pieces; ſo eaſy was it in thoſe times, for the captain of a ſtrong army, to make himſelf lord of a great province.

We may juſtly wonder, that theſe kingdoms of *Syria*, *Media*, *Babylon*, and many other nations (which the victory of *Alexander* had over-run, with ſo haſty a courſe, as gave him not leiſure to take any good view of them) were ſo eaſily held, not only by himſelf, but by the captains of his army after him. The hot contentions for ſuperiority between the king of *Iſrael*, and thoſe of *Damaſcus*; between *Egypt* and *Babylon*; *Babylon* and *Nineveh*; the *Perſians*, and many countries; argue a more manly temper, to have once been in thoſe people; which are now ſo patient of a foreign yoke, that, like ſheep or oxen, they ſuffer themſelves to be diſtributed, fought for, won, loſt, and again recovered, by contentious maſters; as if they had no title to their own heads, but were born to follow the fortune of the *Macedonians*. This will appear the more ſtrange, if we ſhall conſider, how the ſeveral ſtates of *Greece* (many of which had never poſſeſſed ſo large dominion, as might cauſe their ſpirits to ſwell beyond their ability) did greedily embrace all occaſions of liberty: and how theſe proud conquerors were glad to offer it, deſiring to have them rather friends, than ſervants, for fear of further inconvenience.

It muſt therefore be noted, that moſt of theſe countries, had always been ſubject unto the rule of kings, or petty lords, whom the *Babylonians* and *Perſians* long ſince had rooted out; and held them in ſuch bondage, that few of them knew any other law, than the command of foreign maſters. This had utterly taken from them all remembrance of home-born princes, and incorporated them into the great body of the *Perſian* empire; ſo that wanting within themſelves all ſoveraign power, or high authority (the life and ſpirit of every eſtate) they lay as dead, and were bereaved of motion, when that kingdom fell, whereof they lately had been members.

Why the *Perſian ſatrapæ*, or princes of that empire, did not, when *Darius* was taken from them, as the *Macedonian* captains after the death of *Alexander*, ſtrive to lay hold upon thoſe provinces, which had been many ages ſubject unto them, and ſcarce four years in quiet poſſeſſion of their enemies; or why, at leaſt, they contended not (when the terrible name of that great conqueror did ceaſe to affright them) to get their ſhares among his followers, if not wholly to diſpoſſeſs them of their new purchaſes; it is a queſtion, wherein who is not ſatisfied may find no leſs reaſon to ſuſpect the hiſtory, than authority to confirm it. For we ſeldom read, that any ſmall kingdom, prevailing againſt a far greater, hath made ſo entire a conqueſt, in the compaſs of ten years, as left unto the vanquiſhed no hope of recovery, nor means to rebel; eſpecially when ſuch diſorders, or rather utter confuſion, hath enſued, by the fury of civil war among the victors.

The cauſe why the *Macedonians* held ſo quietly the *Perſian* empire, is well ſet down by *Machiavel*; and concerns all other kingdoms, that are ſubject unto the like form of government: the ſum whereof is this. Whereſoever the prince doth hold all his ſubjects under the condition of ſlaves, there is the conqueſt eaſy, and ſoon aſſured. Where ancient nobility is had in due regard, there is it hard to win all, and harder to keep that which is won. Examples of this, are the *Turkiſh* empire, and the kingdom of *France*. If any invader ſhould prevail ſo far upon *Turky*, that the great ſultan and his children (for brethren he uſeth not to ſuffer alive) were taken or ſlain; the whole empire would quickly be won, and eaſily kept, without any danger of rebellion. For the baſſa's, how great ſoever they may ſeem, are mere ſlaves; neither is there in all that large dominion, any one man, whoſe perſonal regard could get the people to follow him in ſuch an attempt, where, in hope of private gain, ſhould not countervail all apparent matter of fear. Contrariwiſe, in *France*, it were not enough for him that would make a conqueſt, to get into his hands the king and his children; though he further got the better part of the country, and were, by far, the ſtrongeſt in the field. For, beſides the princes of the royal blood, there are in that kingdom ſtore of great men, who are mighty in their ſeveral countries; and having certain royalties and principalities of their own, are able to raiſe war in all quarters of the realm; whereunto the remembrance of their own ancient families, and long continued nobility, will always ſtir up and inflame them; ſo that until every one piece were won, and every one (an endleſs work) of the chief nobility brought under or deſtroyed, the victory were not compleat, nor well aſſured. It is true, that ſuch power of the nobility doth oftentimes make way for an invader, to whom the diſcontentments of a few can eaſily make a fair entrance. But ſuch aſſiſtants are not ſo eaſily kept, as they are gotten; for they look to be ſatisfied at full, in all their demands; and, having what they would, they ſoon return to their old allegiance, upon condition to keep what they have, unleſs they be daily hired with new rewards; wherein it is hard to pleaſe one man, without offending another as good as himſelf. The *Turk*, on the other ſide, needs not to fear any peril, that might ariſe from the diſcontented ſpirits of his principal men. The greateſt miſchief that any of them could work againſt him, were the betraying of ſome frontier town, or the wilful loſs of a battel; which done, the traitor hath ſpent his ſting, and muſt either fly to the enemy, whereby he loſeth all that he formerly did hold; or elſe, in hopes of doing ſome further harm, he muſt adventure to excuſe himſelf unto his maſter, who ſeldom forgives the captain, that hath not

ſtriven,

ſtriven, by deſperate valour, againſt misfortune. As for making head, or arming their followers againſt the great ſultan, and ſo joining themſelves unto any invader, it is a matter not to be doubted; for none of them have any followers or dependants at all, other than ſuch as are ſubject unto them, by virtue of their offices and commiſſions. Now, as this baſe condition of the principal men, doth leave unto them no means, whereby to oppoſe themſelves againſt the flouriſhing eſtate of their prince; ſo would it weaken both their power and their courage in giving him aſſiſtance, if adverſity ſhould make him ſtand in need of them. For there is ſcarce any one among the *Turkiſh* baſſa's, or provincial governors, that knows either from whence he was brought, or from whom deſcended; nor any one among them, that by the loſs and utter ruin of the *Turkiſh* empire, can loſe any foot of his proper inheritance; and it is the proper inheritance of the ſubject, which is alſo a kingdom unto him, which makes him fight with an armed heart againſt the conqueror, who hath no other device painted on his enſign, than the picture of ſlavery.

As is the *Turkiſh* empire, ſo was the *Perſian*, void of liberty in the ſubjects, and utterly deſtitute of other nobility, than ſuch as depended upon the mere favour of the prince. Some, indeed, there were of the royal blood, and others, deſcended from the princes that joined with *Darius*, the ſon of *Hyſtaſpes*, in oppreſſing the *Magi*: theſe were men of reputation in *Perſia*; but their reputation conſiſted only in their pedigree, and their ſafety in not medling with affairs of ſtate, which made them little eſteemed. In what ſmall account theſe *Perſian* princes were held, it may appear by this, that the king's uncles, couſin-germans, and brethren, were called by the kings, *their ſlaves*; and ſo did ſtile themſelves, in ſpeaking unto theſe great monarchs. That upon every light occaſion of diſpleaſure, they were handled as ſlaves, it is eaſy to be diſcerned, in that example of cruelty practiſed by *Xerxes* upon his own brother *Maſiſtes*, which hath been formerly noted in a place more convenient. As for the *ſatrapæ*, or governors of the provinces, it is needleſs to cite examples, proving them to have been mere ſlaves: it may ſuffice, that their heads are taken from them at the king's will; that is, at the will of thoſe women and eunuchs by whom the king was governed.

To this want of nobility in *Perſia*, may be added the general want of liberty convenient among the people; a matter no leſs available, in making eaſy and ſure the conqueſt of a nation, than is the cauſe aſſigned by *Machiavel*. For, as *Æſop*'s aſs did not care to run from the enemies, becauſe it was not poſſible that they ſhould load him with heavier burthens, than his maſter cauſed him daily to bear; ſo the nations that endure the worſt under their own princes, are not greatly fearful of a foreign yoke; nor will be haſty to ſhake it off, if by experience they find it more light, than was that whereunto they had been long accuſtomed. This was it that made the *Gaſcoigns* bear ſuch faithful affection to the kings of *England*; for that they governed more mildly than the *French*: this enlarged the *Venetian* juriſdiction in *Lombardy*; for the towns that they won, they won out of the hands of tyrannous oppreſſors: and this did cauſe the *Macedonians*, with other nations, that had been ſubject unto the poſterity of *Alexander*'s followers, to ſerve the *Romans* patiently, if not willingly; for that by them they were eaſed of many burthens, which had been impoſed upon them by their own kings.

So that of this tameneſs, which we find in thoſe that had been ſubjects of the *Perſian* kings, the reaſons are apparent. Yet ſome of theſe there were, that could not ſo eaſily be contained in good order by the *Macedonians*; for they had not indeed been abſolutely conquered by the *Perſians*. Such were the *Sogdians*, *Bactrians*, and other nations about the *Caſpian* ſea. Such alſo were the *Arabians* bordering upon *Syria*, againſt whom *Antigonus* ſent part of his army, thinking therewith to bring them under; or rather, to get a rich booty. The captains that he ſent, fell upon the *Nabatheans* at ſuch time as they were buſied in a great mart, wherein they traded with the more remote *Arabians*, for myrrh, frankincenſe, and other ſuch commodities. All, or moſt of theſe rich wares, together with five hundred talents of ſilver, and many priſoners, the *Macedonians* laid hold upon; for their coming was ſudden, and unexpected. But ere they could recover *Syria*, the *Nabatheans* overtook them, and finding them weary with long marches, made ſuch a ſlaughter, that of four thouſand foot and ſix hundred horſe, only fifty horſe eſcaped. To revenge this loſs, *Demetrius* was ſet out with a greater power, yet all in vain; for he was not reſiſted by any army, but by the natural defence of a vaſt wilderneſs, lack of water, and of all things neceſſary. Therefore he was glad to make peace with them, wherein he loſt not much honour; for they craved it, and gave him preſents. Returning from the *Nabatheans*, he viewed the lake *Aſphaltites*, whence he conceived hope of great profit that might be raiſed, by gathering the ſulphur. With this good huſbandry of his ſon, *Antigonus* was well pleaſed, and appointed men to the work; but they were ſlain by the *Arabians*, and ſo that hope vaniſhed.

Theſe petty enterpriſes, with the ill ſucceſs accompanying them, had much impaired the good advantage againſt *Ptolemy*; when the news of *Seleucus*'s victories in the high countries, marred all together. For neither was the loſs of thoſe great and wealthy provinces, a matter to be neglected; neither was it ſafe to tranſport the war into the parts beyond *Euphrates*, whereby *Syria* and the lower *Aſia* ſhould have been expoſed to the danger of ill affected neighbours. A middle courſe was thought the beſt, and *Demetrius*, with fifteen thouſand foot and three thouſand horſe, was ſent againſt *Seleucus*. Theſe forces being ſent away, *Antigonus* did nothing, and his ſon did leſs. For *Seleucus* was then in *Media*; his lieutenants about *Babylon* withdrew themſelves from neceſſity of fight; ſome places they fortified and kept; *Demetrius* could hold nothing that he got, without ſetting in garriſon more men than he could ſpare; neither did he get much, and therefore was fain to ſet out the bravery of his expedition, by burning and ſpoiling the country; which he did thereby the more alienate, and, as it were, acknowledge to belong unto his enemy, who thenceforth held it as his own aſſured.

Antigonus had laid upon his ſon a peremptory commandment, to return unto him at a time prefixed; reaſonably thinking (as may ſeem) that in ſuch an unſettled ſtate of things, either the war might be ended, by the fury of the firſt brunt; or elſe it would be vain to ſtrive againſt all difficulties likely to ariſe, where want of neceſſaries ſhould fruſtrate the valour, that by length of time was like to become leſs terrible to the enemy. *Demetrius* therefore leaving behind him five thouſand foot and a thouſand horſe, rather to make ſhew of continuing the war, than to effect much, where himſelf, with greater forces, could do little more than nothing, forſook the enterpriſe, and went back to his father.

SECT. IX.

A general peace made and broken. How all the houſe of Alexander *was deſtroyed.*

THESE ambitious heads, having thus wearied themſelves with ineffectual travel, in ſeeking to get more than any one of them could hold, were contented at length to come to an agreement; wherein it was concluded, that each of them ſhould hold quietly, that which at the preſent he had in poſſeſſion. As no private hatred, but mere deſire of empire had moved them to enter into the war, ſo was it no friendly reconciliation, but only a dulneſs growing upon the ſlow advancement of their ſeveral hopes, that made them willing to breathe a while, till occaſion might better ſerve to fight again.

Beſides that main point, *Of retaining the provinces which every man held*, there were two articles of the peace, that gave a fair, but a falſe colour to the buſineſs: *That the ſon of* Alexander *by* Roxana, *ſhould be made king, when he came to full age*; and, *That all the eſtates of* Greece *ſhould be ſet at liberty.* The advancement of young *Alexander* to his father's kingdom, ſeems to have been a matter forcibly extorted from *Antigonus*; in whom was diſcovered a purpoſe to make himſelf lord of all. But this, indeed, more nearly touched *Caſſander*. For in his cuſtody was the young prince and his mother; neither did he keep them in ſort anſwerable to their degree, but as cloſe priſoners, taken in that war, wherein they had ſeen the old queen *Olympias* taken and murdered, that ſought to have put them in poſſeſſion of the empire. The mutual hatred and fear between them, rooted in theſe grounds, of injuries done, and revenge expected, upon this concluſion of peace, grew up faſter than any time before, in the heart of *Caſſander*, who ſaw the *Macedonians* turn their favourable expectation towards the ſon of their late renowned king.

All this, either little concerned *Antigonus*, or tended greatly to his good. The young prince muſt firſt have poſſeſſion of *Macedon*; whereby *Caſſander* ſhould be reduced to his poor office, *of captain over a thouſand men*, if not left in worſe caſe. As for them that held provinces abroad, they might either do as they had done under *Arideus*; or better, as being better acquainted with their own ſtrength. He in the mean time, by his readineſs to acknowledge the true heir, had freed himſelf from that ill-favoured imputation, of ſeeking to make himſelf lord of all that *Alexander* had gotten.

The like advantage had he in that article, of *reſtoring the* Greeks *to their liberty*. This liberty had hitherto been the ſubject of much idle diſcourſe; but it never took effect. *Antigonus* held ſcarce any town of theirs; *Caſſander* occupied moſt of the country: which if he ſhould ſet free, he muſt be a poor prince; if not, there was matter enough of quarrel againſt him, as againſt a diſturber of the common peace.

In the mean ſeaſon, the countries lying between *Euphrates* and the *Greek* ſeas, together with a great army, and money enough to entertain a greater, might ſerve to hold up the credit of *Antigonus*, and to raiſe his hopes as high as ever they had been.

With much diſadvantage do many men contend againſt one that is equal to them all in puiſſance, *Caſſander*'s friends had left him in an ill caſe; but he could not do with all: for where every one mans help is neceſſary to the war, there may any one make his own peace; but no one can ſtand out alone, when all the reſt are weary. The beſt was that he knew all their affections, which tended to no ſuch end as the becoming ſubjects unto any man; much leſs to the ſon of an *Aſiatick* woman, of whom they had long ſince refuſed to hear mention. Therefore he took a ſhort courſe, and cauſed both the child and his mother to be ſlain: freeing thereby himſelf in a trice, from the dangerous neceſſity of yielding up his government, which he muſt have done when the child had come to age. *Roxana* was a lady of ſingular beauty, which was perhaps the cauſe, why *Perdiccas* deſired to have her ſon, being as yet unborn, proclaimed heir to the great *Alexander*. Immediately upon the death of *Alexander*, ſhe had uſed the favour (if it were not love) of *Perdiccas*, to the ſatisfying of her own bloody malice, upon *Statira*, the daughter of king *Darius*, whom *Alexander* had likewiſe married, according to the cuſtom of thoſe countries, wherein plurality of wives is held no crime. For having by a counterfeit letter, in *Alexander*'s name, gotten this poor lady into her hands, ſhe did, by aſſiſtance of *Perdiccas*, murder her and her ſiſter, and threw their bodies into a well, cauſing it to be filled up with earth. But now, by God's juſt vengeance, were ſhe and her ſon made away, in the like ſecret faſhion; even at ſuch time, as the near approaching hope of a great empire had made her life, after a weariſome impriſonment, grow dearer unto her than it was before.

The fact of *Caſſander*, was not ſo much deteſted in outward ſhew, as inwardly it was pleaſing unto all the reſt of the princes. For now they held themſelves free lords of all that they had under them; fearing none other change of their eſtates, than ſuch as might ariſe by chance of war; wherein every one perſwaded himſelf of ſucceſs, rather better than worſe. Hereupon all of them (except *Lyſimachus* and *Seleucus*, that had work enough at home) began to rouſe themſelves; as if now the time were come, for each man to improve his own ſtock. *Antigonus*'s lieutenants were buſy in *Peloponneſus*, and about *Helleſpont*, while their maſter was careful in following other, and ſome greater matters that were more ſecretly to be handled. He pretended the liberty of *Greece*; yet did the ſame argument miniſter unto *Ptolemy* matter of quarrel, againſt both him and *Caſſander*. *Ptolemy* complaining (as if he had taken the matter deeply to heart) that *Antigonus* had put garriſons into ſome towns, which ought, in fair dealing, to be ſet at liberty. Under colour of redreſſing this enormity, he ſent an army into *Cilicia*, where he won four towns, and ſoon after loſt them, without much labour of his own or his enemies.

After this, putting to ſea with a ſtrong fleet, he ran along the coaſt of *Aſia*, winning many places: and in that voyage allured unto him a nephew of *Antigonus* (a good commander, but diſcontented with the ill requital of his ſervices) whom finding ſhortly as falſe to himſelf, as he had been to his own uncle, he was fain to put to death. But in doing theſe things, his deſire to ſet the *Greeks* at liberty, appeared not ſo plain, as he wiſhed that it ſhould: for their caſe was no way bettered, by his moleſting *Antigonus* in *Aſia*. Therefore to get the love of that valiant nation, he made at the laſt an expedition into *Greece* it ſelf; where having ſet free ſome little iſlands, and landed in *Peloponneſus*, he raiſed ſo great an expectation of finiſhing the long deſired work, that *Crateſipolis*, the widow of *Alexander*, *Polyſperchon*'s ſon, gave up into his hands the towns of *Sicyon* and *Corinth*.

Ptolemy had conceived a vain belief, that the *Greeks*, emboldened by his countenance and aſſiſtance,

ance, would all of them take heart, and riſe up in arms, whereby, with little labour, their liberty might be gotten, and he be acknowledged as author of this immortal benefit. But long ſervitude had well-near extinguiſhed the ancient valour of that nation: and their ill fortune, in many likely attempts to recover freedom, had ſo tired their ſpirits, that they would no more ſtir in purſuit thereof; but ſat idly ſtill, as wiſhing it to fall into their mouths.

The *Lacedemonians*, about theſe times, began to fortify their town with walls; truſting no longer in their virtue (for both it, and the diſcipline that upheld it, were too much impaired) that had been a wall to their town and territory.

The *Athenians* were become as humble ſervants, as they had been, in times paſt, inſolent maſters; erecting as many ſtatues in honour of *Demetrius Phalereus*, as there were days in the year. This *Demetrius* was now their governour, and he governed them with much moderation; but in ſpight of their hearts, as being ſet over them by *Caſſander*. By this baſe temper of the principal cities, it is eaſy to gather, how the reſt of the country ſtood affected. *Ptolemy* could not get them to ſet their helping hands to their own good; and to furniſh him with the promiſed ſupplies, of money and victuals. Credible it is, that he had a true meaning to deliver them from thraldom; as judging the commodity that would ariſe by annexing them to his party, a matter of more weight, than the loſs that *Caſſander* ſhould receive thereby, who could hardly retain them, if once *Antigonus* took the work in hand. But when he found ſuch difficulty in the buſineſs, he changed his purpoſe; and renewing his former friendſhip with *Caſſander*, he retained *Sicyon* and *Corinth* in his own poſſeſſion.

Before the coming of *Ptolemy* into *Greece*, *Caſſander* had been held occupied with very much work. For (beſides his pains taken in wars among barbarous princes) he found means to allure unto himſelf the lieutenants of *Antigonus*, that were in *Peloponneſus*, and about *Helleſpont*; making his own advantage of their diſcontentments. By the like ſkilful practice, he freed himſelf from a greater danger; and made thoſe murders which he had committed ſeem the leſs odious, by teaching his enemies to do the like. Old *Polyſperchon*, that had made ſo great a ſtir in the reign of *Arideus*, did after the death of *Roxana* and her child, enter again upon the ſtage, leading in his hand another ſon of the great *Alexander*, and meaning to place him in his father's throne.

The name of this young prince was *Hercules*: he was begotten on *Barſine*, the daughter of *Artabazus*, a *Perſian*; but had been leſs eſteemed than the ſon of *Roxana*, either for that his mother was held no better than a concubine, or elſe perhaps, in regard of the favour which *Perdiccas*, and after him *Olympias*, did bear unto *Roxana*. At this time, the death of his brother, had moved ſuch compaſſion, and regard of his being *Alexander*'s only living child, had procured unto him ſuch good will, that the demand which *Polyſperchon* made in his behalf, was deemed very juſt and honourable. There were indeed more hearts than hands, that joined with this young prince; yet wanted he not ſufficient ſtrength of hands, if the heart of him, that leaſt ought, had not been moſt falſe. *Caſſander* had raiſed an army to withſtand his entry into *Macedon*: but little truſt could he repoſe in that army, whoſe wiſhes he perceived to be with *Hercules*. Therefore he aſſail'd *Polyſperchon* himſelf with gifts and promiſes; wherewith at length he prevailed ſo far, that the old villain was contented to murder his pupil, chooſing rather, with many curſes and foul diſhonour, to take the offered lordſhip of *Peloponneſus*, and commander of an army, than to purchaſe a noble fame with dangerous travel, in maintaining his faith unto both his dead and living ſoveraigns.

Antigonus had not all this while been aſleep, tho' his loſſes were hitherto the chief witneſſes of his having been a ſtirrer in theſe commotions. He thought it enough for him at the preſent, to retain his own; and therefore took order for the recovery of thoſe places, which *Ptolemy* had taken pains to win. As for the reſt, it no way grieved him, to ſee *Caſſander* incur the general hatred of men, by committing thoſe murders, of which the profit was like to redound unto him, that was the moſt powerful: or to ſee *Polyſperchon* and *Ptolemy* ſweat in a buſy war againſt *Caſſander*. If they would have continued their quarrels, he could well have afforded them leiſure, and have thought the time well ſpent in beholding their contentions. For he was throughly perſwaded, that when the reſt had wearied themſelves in vain with long ſtrife, his armies and treaſures, wherein he exceeded them all, would bring all under. According to theſe haughty conceits, he demeaned himſelf among his followers; looking big upon them, and like a king before his time. This was it that cauſed ſo many of them to revolt from him: but it was no great loſs to be forſaken by thoſe that looked with envious eyes upon that fortune, whereon their own ſhould have depended. Againſt this envy of his own men, and the malice of others, *Antigonus* buſily ſought a remedy, ſuch as was like to give him a goodly title to the whole empire.

Cleopatra, ſiſter unto the great *Alexander*, lay for the moſt part in *Sardes*, whom he had a great deſire to take to wife. This his deſire was not without good hope: for howſoever ſhe diſcovered much unwillingneſs thereunto, yet was ſhe in his power, and might therefore be entreated, were it only for fear of being enforced. But it was not his purpoſe to get her by compulſive means; either becauſe his fancy, being an old man, was not over-violent; or rather becauſe his ambition, whereunto all his affections had reference, could have made ſmall uſe of her, by doing ſuch apparent wrong. She had been married unto *Alexander*, king of *Epirus*, after whoſe death, ſhe came to her brother in *Aſia*; hoping, belike, to find a new huſband in his camp. But neither any of thoſe brave captains, that were, in times following, ſo hot in love with her, durſt then aſpire unto her marriage: nor did her brother, full of other cares, trouble himſelf with providing her of an huſband. She therefore, being a luſty widow, ſuffered her blood ſo far to prevail againſt her honour, that ſhe ſupplied the want of an huſband by entertainment of paramours. *Alexander* hearing of this, turned it to a jeſt; ſaying, that ſhe was his ſiſter, and muſt be allowed this liberty, as her portion of the empire. When by his death, the empire lay, in a manner, void, and the portion due to her therein, grew, in mens opinion, greater than it had been; then did many ſeek to obtain her, while ſhe herſelf deſired only a proper man, with whom ſhe might lead a merry life. To this purpoſe ſhe did invite *Leonatus* unto her; who made great haſte, but was cut off by death, ere he came to her preſence. Now at the laſt, after long tarrying, ſhe had her choice of all the great commanders: *Antigonus*, *Ptolemy*, *Lyſimachus*, and *Caſſander*, being all her earneſt woers. All theſe (*Antigonus* excepted) had wives already; *Ptolemy* had many wives, and many concubines,

cubines, whom he reſpected as much as his wives, being noted of too much dotage in that kind. This hindred not his ſuit, peradventure it advanced it, by giving to *Cleopatra* ſome hope of mutual toleration. To him therefore ſhe bequeathed herſelf, and was taking her journey from *Sardes* towards him, when *Antigonus*'s deputy in that city made her to ſtay, until his maſter's further pleaſure ſhould be known. *Antigonus* had now a wolf by the ears; he neither could well hold her, nor durſt let her go. She would not be his wife; he had none honeſt pretence to force her; and to keep her priſoner, had been the way, by which he might have incurred a general hatred, laſting perhaps beyond her life, as the courſe taken by *Caſſander* againſt *Roxana* (a lady leſs reſpected than *Alexander*'s own ſiſter) did well teſtify; therefore he thought it the wiſeſt way to procure her death; for to let any other enjoy the commodity of ſo fair a title to the kingdom, it was no part of his meaning. To this purpoſe he ſent inſtructions to the governor of *Sardes*, willing him in any caſe to do it ſecretly. So the fact was committed, and certain women about her put in truſt with the murder; which women afterwards were put to death, as miſchievous conſpirers againſt the life of that good lady. So was *Antigonus* freed from blame, at the leaſt, in his own opinion; but the world was leſs fooliſh than to be ſo deluded. How the murther was detected we need not ask; for ſeldom is that bloody crime unrevealed, and never ſo ill ſmothered, as when great perſons are the authors.

Thus was the whole race of *Philip* and *Alexander* the great extinguiſhed, and it was extinguiſhed by the hands of ſuch as thought upon nothing leſs than the execution of God's juſtice, due unto the cruelty of theſe powerful, but mercileſs princes. Wherefore the ambitious frames, erected by theſe tyrants, upon ſo wicked foundations of innocent blood, were ſoon after caſt down, over-whelming themſelves or their children with the ruins, as the ſequel will declare.

SECT. X.

How Demetrius, *the ſon of* Antigonus, *gave liberty to* Athens, *expelling the garriſons of* Caſſander *out of thoſe parts. The immoderate honours decreed by the* Athenians *to* Antigonus *and* Demetrius.

NONE being left alive that had any title to the kingdom, it ſtood with good reaſon, that they which were lords of the provinces, acknowledging no ſuperior, ſhould freely profeſs themſelves kings in name, as they were already in ſubſtance. Yet had this name ill beſeemed the weaker, while the ſtrongeſt of all did forbear it; neither ſeemed it convenient, in the judgment of *Antigonus*, to crown his laſt action with ſuch a title, as if he had attained unto greatneſs by that foul murder, the infamy whereof he was careful how to diſcharge from his own head. He purpoſed therefore to undertake a plauſible enterprize, even the liberty of *Greece*; whereby it was apparent, that he might get ſuch honour as would not only drown all bad reports, but make him be thought equal to any name of royalty, whereof in ſeeming modeſty he was not covetous. To this purpoſe he delivered a ſtrong army, with a navy of two hundred and fifty ſail, and five thouſand talents of ſilver, unto *Demetrius* his ſon, willing him to begin at *Athens*, and thence to proceed, in ſetting all the country free.

Demetrius came to *Athens* before he was expected, ſo that without reſiſtance he entred the haven, it being thought that a fleet of *Ptolemy*, *Caſſander*'s good friend, had been arrived. But when it was known, both who he was, and what was the cauſe of his coming, the joy of the citizens brake out into loud acclamations. *Demetrius Phalereus* forſook the town, and withdrew himſelf to *Thebes*, under ſafe-conduct; only the garriſon in *Munychia* ſtrove to make good that piece, which after a while was won upon them by force. During the ſiege of *Munychia*, *Demetrius* went to *Megara*, whence he expelled the garriſon of *Caſſander*, and ſo reſtored the city to liberty.

I think it not impertinent ſometimes to relate ſuch accidents as may ſeem no better than mere trifles; for even by trifles are the qualities of great perſons as well diſcloſed, as by their great actions; becauſe in matters of importance, they commonly ſtrain themſelves to the obſervance of general commended rules; in leſſer things they follow the current of their own natures. The lady *Crateſipolis* lay in *Patras*, and had a great deſire to ſee *Demetrius*, hoping, belike, that ſhe might by his means better her eſtate, and recover her towns in *Sycion* and *Corinth*, detained by *Ptolemy* (to whoſe lieutenant, in thoſe places, *Demetrius*, before his departure out of *Greece*, offered money for the ſurrender of them) yet the only buſineſs pretended was love. He being advertiſed hereof, left his forces in the country of *Megara*, and taking a company of his lighteſt armed for guard of his perſon, made a long journey to meet with her. This troop alſo he cauſed to lodge a great way from his tent, that none might ſee her when ſhe came. As cloſely as the buſineſs was carried, ſome of his enemies had gotten knowledge of it, whereby they conceived good hope, that the diligence of a very few men might overthrow all the great preparations of *Antigonus*, and bring him to any terms of reaſon, by taking his dear ſon priſoner. Their project fell but a little ſhort of the effect, for they came ſo ſuddenly upon him, that he had no better ſhift than to muffle himſelf in an old cloak, and creep away diſguiſed, leaving them to ranſack his tent. There was in this prince a ſtrange medly of conditions; eſpecially an extream diſſoluteneſs in wanton pleaſures, and a painful induſtry in matter of war. He was of a moſt amiable countenance, a gentle nature, and a good wit; excellent in deviſing engines of war, and curious in working them with his own hands. He knew better how to reform his bad fortune, than how to rule his good. For adverſity made his valour more active, proſperity puffed him with an over-weening, wherein he thought that he might do what he lifted. His fortune was as changeable, as were his qualities: turning often round, like the picture of her wheel, till ſhe had wound up the thread of his life, in ſuch manner as followeth to be ſhewed.

Returning to his camp, and finiſhing his buſineſs at *Megara*; he reſolved no longer to attend the iſſue of a ſiege, but to aſſail *Munychia* by force, that ſo he might accompliſh the liberty of *Athens*; which, until it was fully wrought out, he refuſed to enter into the city. *Munychia* was ſtrongly fortified: yet by the continuance of the aſſault, the multitude without, through help of their engines that ſcoured the walls, prevailed upon the reſolution of thoſe that lay within it, and won the place in two days. The walls and all the defences of that piece againſt the city, were levelled with the ground, and ſo was it freely put into the citizens hands, to whom withal was given their liberty, with promiſe to aid them in maintaining it.

The

The fame of this action was louder than of any other victory gotten by *Demetrius* with greater ſkill and induſtry. For the *Athenians* having forgotten how to employ their hands, laboured to make up that defect with their tongues; converting to baſe flattery that eloquence of theirs, which the virtues of their anceſtors had ſuited unto more manly arguments.

They decreed unto *Antigonus* and *Demetrius* the name of kings; they conſecrated the place in which *Demetrius* leaped from his chariot, when he entred their city, and built there an altar, calling it by the name of *Demetrius the Alighter*; they called them by the names of the *Gods their Saviours*, ordaining that every year there ſhould be choſen a prieſt of theſe gods; and further, that ſuch as were employed by their ſtate, in dealing with either of theſe two princes, ſhould not be called embaſſadors, but *Theori*, or *Conſulters with the Gods*, like as were they whom they ſent unto the oracle of *Jupiter* or *Apollo*.

It were a frivolous diligence to rehearſe all their flatteries, theſe being ſo groſs. Hereby they not only corrupted the young prince, but made that acclamation, which beſt would have pleaſed the old man, to be of no uſe. For he could not handſomely take upon him the name of king as impoſed by the *Athenians*, unleſs he would ſeem to approve their vanity, in loading him with more than human honours. Yet was he ſo tickled with this their fine handling him, that when their *Theori*, or *Conſulters* came ſhortly after, deſiring him to relieve them with corn, and timber to build ſhips, he gave them almoſt a hundred thouſand quarters of wheat, and matter ſufficient to make a hundred gallies. So gracious was his firſt oracle, or rather, ſo weak is great power in reſiſting the aſſaults of flattery.

SECT. XI.

The great victory of Demetrius *againſt* Ptolemy *in* Cyprus. *How* Antigonus *and* Demetrius *took upon them the ſtile of kings, wherein others followed their example.*

FROM this glorious work, *Antigonus* called away *Demetrius* unto a buſineſs of greater difficulty; meaning to employ his ſervice againſt *Ptolemy* in *Cyprus*. Before his departure out of *Greece*, he was willed to eſtabliſh a general council that ſhould treat of matters concerning the common good of the country. About the ſame time *Antigonus* withdrew his own garriſon out of *Imbros*, committing their liberty entire into the people's hands; whereby it might appear, that as he would not permit any other to oppreſs the *Greeks*, ſo would he be far from doing it himſelf. This was enough to hold his reputation high among theſe new purchaſed friends: it followed, that he ſhould convert his forces to the winning of ground upon his enemies.

A pitiful tragedy had lately happened in *Cyprus*, through the indiſcretion of *Menelaus*, *Ptolemy*'s brother, and his lieutenant in that iſle. *Nicocles*, king of *Paphos*, was entred into ſome practice with *Antigonus*; yet, not ſo far, that he thought himſelf paſt excuſe; by which confidence, he was, perhaps, the more eaſily detected. To cut off this negotiation, and the falſe-hearted king of *Paphos* at one blow, *Menelaus* was ſent thither, who ſurrounding *Nicocles*'s houſe with ſoldiers, required in *Ptolemy*'s name, to have him yielded to the death. *Nicocles* offered to clear himſelf; but *Menelaus* told him, that die he muſt, and bade him come forth quietly. This deſperate neceſſity cauſed the unhappy king to rid himſelf of life, and his death ſtruck ſuch an impreſſion into his wife, that ſhe not only ſlew herſelf, but perſwaded the wives of her husband's brethren to do the like; alſo thoſe brethren of *Nicocles*, unto whom *Ptolemy* had intended no ill, being amazed with the ſuddenneſs of this calamity, did ſhut up the palace; and, ſetting it on fire, conſumed it, with all that was in it, and themſelves together.

Whatſoever the crime objected was, *Nicocles* periſhed as a man innocent, becauſe he was not ſuffered to make his anſwer. Of this ſad accident, though *Menelaus* deſerved the blame for his rigorous proceeding, yet is it to be thought that much diſlike fell alſo upon *Ptolemy*; as men that are grieved, caſt an ill affection, even upon thoſe that gave the fartheſt removed occaſion.

Not long after this, *Demetrius* came into *Cyprus*, with a power ſufficient againſt any oppoſition that *Ptolemy* was like to make. The *Cypriots* did little or nothing againſt him, either becauſe they had ſmall ſtrength, or for that they held it a matter indifferent, whom they acknowledged as their lord, being ſure that they ſhould not themſelves have the rule of their own country. *Menelaus* therefore, out of his garriſons, drew forth an army, and fought with *Demetrius*. But he was beaten, and driven to ſave himſelf within the walls of *Salamis*; where he was ſo hardly beſieged, that, without ſtrong ſuccour, he had no likelihood to make good the place, much leſs to retain poſſeſſion of the whole iſland. His greateſt help, at the preſent, was the fidelity of his ſoldiers, whom no rewards could win from him, nor good uſage (when any of them were taken priſoners, and enrolled in the enemies bands) keep from returning to him, with the firſt opportunity. Moſt of them were mercenaries; but all their goods were in *Egypt*, which was enough to keep them faithful. Yet could not this their reſolution have ſtood long againſt the odds of number, which *Demetrius* had of men as reſolute, and againſt his terrible engines of battery, if *Ptolemy* had not haſted to the reſcue.

Ptolemy brought with him a hundred and forty gallies, beſides two hundred ſhips of burden, for tranſporting his army and carriages. This fleet made a terrible ſhew, when it was deſcried afar, though more than half of it was unfit for ſervice in fight at ſea. Wherefore, to make the opinion of his forces the more dreadful, *Ptolemy* ſent unto *Demetrius* a threatning meſſage, willing him to be gone, unleſs he would be overwhelmed with multitudes, and trampled to death in a throng. But this young gallant repayed him with words of as much bravery, promiſing to let him eſcape, upon condition that he ſhould withdraw his garriſons out of *Sicyon* and *Corinth*.

Demetrius had no more than one hundred and eighteen gallies; but they were, for the moſt part, greater than thoſe of *Ptolemy*; better ſtored with weapons fit for that ſervice, and very well furniſhed with engines in the prows to beat upon the enemy. Nevertheleſs, he ſtood in great doubt of threeſcore gallies that lay in the haven of *Salamis*, leſt *Menelaus*, with them, ſhould ſet upon his back; in which caſe, it was very likely that all ſhould go very ill with him. Againſt this miſchief, he beſtowed ten of his own gallies in the mouth of that haven, to keep *Menelaus* from iſſuing forth, and ſetting his horſe-men on the ſhore, to give what aſſiſtance they could, he, with the reſt of his fleet, puts to ſea againſt *Ptolemy*.

The fight began early in the morning, and continued long with doubtful ſucceſs. The generals were not ranged oppoſite one to the other; but held each of them the left wing of his own fleet. Each of them prevailed againſt the ſquadron wherewith he encountered; but the ſucceſs of *Demetrius* was to better purpoſe: for his victory in one part was ſuch, as cauſed others to fall out of order; and, finally, drove all to betake themſelves unto ſpeedy flight. As for *Ptolemy*, he was fain to leave his advantage upon the enemy in one part of the fight, that he might relieve and animate thoſe of his own, which needed him in another; wherein he found his loſs over-great, to be repaired, by contending any longer againſt the fortune of that day; and therefore he laboured only to ſave himſelf, in hopes of better event that might follow ſome other time.

There fell out in this battel no unuſual accident; yet was the victory greater than could have been expected. The occaſions whereof were, partly the great ſkill in ſea ſervices, which the *Greeks* and *Phenicians*, that were with *Demetrius*, had, above thoſe which followed *Ptolemy*; partly the good furniture of the ſhips, wherein conſiſted no leſs, than in the quality of thoſe with whom they were manned. Further, we may reaſonably judge, that the two hundred ſhips of burthen, carrying the ſtrength of *Ptolemy*'s army, did not more encourage his own men, and terrify his enemies the day before the fight, than breed in each part the contrary affections; when, in the beginning of the fight, they fell off, and ſtood aloof. For though it were fitting that they ſhould do ſo, yet a multitude, prepoſſeſſed with vain conceits, will commonly apprehend very ſlight occaſions, to think themſelves abandoned. Beſides all this, the expectation, that *Menelaus* iſſuing with his fleet out of *Salamis*, ſhould charge the enemies in ſtern, was utterly fruſtrate. He was kept in perforce, by the ten ſhips appointed to bar up the mouth of the haven; which they manfully performed, as great neceſſity required.

Such diſappointment of expectation, doth much abate the courage of men in fight, eſpecially of the aſſailants; whereas, on the contrary, they that find ſome part of their fears vain, do eaſily gather hopeful ſpirits, and conceive an opinion of their own ability, to do more than they had thought upon, out of their not ſuffering the harm that they had imagined.

Whatſoever the cauſes of this victory were, the fruit was very great. For *Ptolemy* had no more than eight gallies that accompanied him in his flight; all the reſt of his fleet was either taken or ſunk. Neither did *Menelaus* any longer ſtrive againſt the violence of fortune; but yielded up all that he held in *Cyprus*, together with his army, conſiſting of twelve thouſand foot, and a thouſand and two hundred horſe, and thoſe gallies in the haven of *Salamis*. The ſame dejection of ſpirit was found in the common ſoldier, as well that was taken at ſea, as that had ſerved the *Egyptian* by land; none of them repoſing any more confidence in *Ptolemy*, but willingly becoming followers of a new lord, whoſe army they now increaſed.

It was generally believed, that much more depended on the event of this fight, than the iſle of *Cyprus*, for which they contended. Wherefore the common expectation was great; eſpecially *Antigonus*, whom it moſt concerned, was deeply perplexed with cares, thinking every day a year, till he were advertiſed of the iſſue. In this mood *Ariſtodemus* found him, a notable flatterer, whom *Demetrius* had honoured with the meſſage of theſe good news. *Ariſtodemus* had bethought himſelf of a trick, whereby to double the welcome of his joyful errand: he cauſed his ſhips to ride at anchor a good diſtance from the ſhore; he himſelf landed in a cock-boat, which he ſent immediately back to the ſhip; and ſo all alone, he went forward, looking very ſadly, that no part of his tidings might appear in his countenance. Report of his arrival (for it was not known where he had been) came preſently to *Antigonus*, who ſent meſſenger after meſſenger to meet him on the way, and bring ſpeedy word how all went: but neither any anſwer, nor ſo much of a look as might intimate the purport of his errand, could be won from this demure gentleman. Thus marched he fair and ſoftly forward, with a great throng at his heels (that ſerved well to ſet out his pageant) until he came in ſight of *Antigonus*, who could not contain himſelf, but went down to meet him at the gate, and hear the news. Then did *Ariſtodemus*, upon the ſudden, with a high voice, ſalute *Antigonus*, by the name of king; uttering the greatneſs of the victory (with as much pomp, as before he had covered it with ſilence) in the hearing of all the people; who, with loud acclamations, gave that name of king both to *Antigonus*, and to his ſon *Demetrius*. *Antigonus*, in requital of the long ſuſpence, wherein *Ariſtodemus* had held him, ſaid, that it ſhould alſo be long ere he received his reward. But the title of king, together with the diadem, which his friends did ſet on his head, he could not wiſh a fairer occaſion to aſſume; wherefore he readily accepted them, and ſent the like to his ſon.

When it was once noiſed abroad that *Antigonus* and *Demetrius* called themſelves kings, it was not long ere their fellows were ready to follow the good example. *Ptolemy*'s friends would by no means endure that their lord ſhould be thought a man dejected for the loſs of a fleet; therefore they ſaluted him alſo king. *Lyſimachus*, in *Thrace*, had boldneſs enough to put the diadem about his own head. *Seleucus* had, before this time, among the barbarous people, taken upon him as king; but now he uſed the ſtile indifferently, as well among the *Greeks* and *Macedonians*, as in dealing with others. Only *Caſſander* held himſelf contented with his own name; whereby, howſoever he might ſhadow his pride, he no way leſſened the fame of his cruelty againſt his maſter's houſe. But the name which he forbore, his ſons after him were bold to uſurp, though with ill ſucceſs, as will appear, when they ſhall enter upon the ſtage; whereon theſe old tragedians, under new habits, as no longer now the ſame perſons, begin to play their parts, with bigger looks, and more boiſterous actions, not with greater grace and judgment, than in the ſcenes already paſt.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of the wars between the kings of Egypt, Aſia, Macedon, Thrace, *and others, until all* Alexander's *princes were conſumed.*

SECT. I.

The expedition of Antigonus *againſt* Egypt, *with ill ſucceſs.*

ALL the reſt of theſe kings had taken that name upon them, in imitation of *Antigonus* himſelf, as beſeeming his greatneſs; which was ſuch, as gave him hope to ſwallow them up, together with their new titles. Being not ignorant of his own ſtrength, he reſolved to ſingle out *Ptolemy*, and make him an example to others; who ſhould hardly be able to ſtand, when the greateſt of them was fallen. To this purpoſe, he prepared an army of eighteen thouſand foot and eight thouſand horſe, with fourſcore and three elephants; as likewiſe a fleet of a hundred and fifty gallies, and a hundred ſhips of burthen: the land-forces he commanded in perſon; of the navy *Detrius* was Admiral.

When all was ready for the journey, the ſea-men adviſed him to ſtay yet eight days longer, and expect the ſetting of the *Pleiades*. But his haſty deſire to prevent all preparations for reſiſtance that *Ptolemy* ſhould make, rejected this counſel, imputing it rather to their fear than ſkill. Wherefore he departed from *Antigonia* (a town which he had built in *Syria*, and called after his own name, that was ſoon changed into *Seleucia*, by his mortal enemy) and came to *Gaza*, where he met with his fleet. The nearer that he drew to *Egypt*, the more haſte he made; thinking by celerity to prevail more than by his great power. He cauſed his ſoldiers to carry ten days proviſion of victuals, and had many camels loaden with all neceſſaries for paſſing the deſarts, over which he marched with no ſmall toil, though he met with no reſiſtance. At *Mount Caſſius*, which is near adjoining to *Nilus*, he ſaw his fleet riding at anchor, not far from the ſhore, in ill caſe, and many ſhips wanting. It had been ſorely beaten with foul weather, wherein ſome were loſt, others driven back to *Gaza*, or ſcattered elſewhere into ſuch creeks as they could recover: *Demetrius* himſelf, with the beſt and ſtrongeſt veſſels, did ſo long beat it up againſt the wind, that all his freſh water was ſpent; in which extremity he and all his muſt have periſhed, had not the tempeſt ceaſed when it did, and *Antigonus* appeared in ſight, from whom theſe over-wearied, thirſty, and ſea-beaten ſoldiers received relief. After theſe painful travels, there followed a war, no leſs painful than to little purpoſe; for *Ptolemy* had ſo fortified all the paſſages upon the river of *Nilus*, as he aſſured himſelf either to end the war there, or, if his guards ſhould happen to be forced, yet could it not be done; but ſo much to the weakening of the aſſailants, as he ſhould afterwards, with a ſecond army (which he held entire) entertain the invader upon advantage enough. All that *Antigonus* fought, was to come to blows ſpeedily; *Ptolemy*, on the contrary, to beat *Antigonus* by the belly. It is true, that *Nilus* gave him water enough, but wood he had none to warm it; and while *Antigonus* aſſaulted the ramparts, raiſed upon the river in vain, *Ptolemy* aſſayed the faith of his ſoldiers with good ſucceſs; for with great gifts, and greater promiſes, he ferried them over ſo faſt, as had not *Antigonus* thruſt ſome aſſured regiments upon the paſſages next the enemy, and in the mean while taken a reſolution to return, *Ptolemy* had turned him out of *Egypt* ill attended.

Some of them, indeed, he laid hands on, in the way of their eſcape, and thoſe he put to death with extreme torments; but, in all likelihood, with the ſame ill ſucceſs that *Perdiccas* had formerly done, when he invaded *Egypt*, had he not readily removed his army further off from the noiſe of their entertainment, that had already been won from him.

To prevent, therefore, as well the preſent danger of his ſtay, as the ſhame following a forced retreat, he ſecretly practiſed the advice of his council, upon whom the burden muſt be laid of his entrance, and leaving *Egypt*.

It is, indeed, leſs prejudicial in ſuch like caſes, that errors, diſhonours, and loſſes, be laid on counſellors and captains, than on kings; on the directed, than on the director; for the honour and reputation of a prince is far more precious than that of a vaſſal. *Charles* V, as many other princes have done, laid the loſs and diſhonour he received in the invaſion of *France*, by the way of *Provence*, to *Antony de Leua*; whether juſtly or no, I know not: but howſoever, all the hiſtorians of that time agree, that the ſorrow thereof coſt that brave captain his life. Certainly, to give any violent advice in doubtful enterprizes, is rather a teſtimony of love, than of wiſdom, in the giver; for the ill ſucceſs is always caſt upon the counſel; the good never wants a father, though a falſe one, to acknowledge it. Yet I have ſometimes known it, that great commanders, who are for the preſent in place of kings, have not only been diſſwaded, but held in a kind by ſtrong hand, from hazarding their own perſons; and yet have thoſe kind of mutineers never been called to a marſhal's court.

SECT. II.

How the city of Rhodes *was beſieged by* Demetrius.

THIS departure of *Antigonus* left behind it many dead carcaſes, and a great deal of joy in *Egypt*. *Ptolemy* held a ſolemn feaſt, and ſent meſſengers abroad, loaden with glad news, to *Seleucus*, *Lyſimachus*, and *Caſſander*, his confederates; ſtrongly encouraging all that ſide with the report of this his late felicity, though it appeared but in a defenſive war. *Antigonus*, on the contrary, flattered himſelf with another interpretation, calling the joys of his enemies for witneſſes of his own greatneſs, ſeeing they aroſe but from ſo little things; his enemies being but bare ſavers by the laſt bargain; and himſelf, as he ſuppoſed, having loſt but a little time, and no part of his honour in the late retreat. Howſoever it were, yet he meant to follow his affairs henceforth in another faſhion, for that which he could not cleave aſunder by great blows, he purpoſed by little and little to pare off, by cutting off the branches firſt, to fell the tree it ſelf with the more facility. To effect which he reſolved (leaving the great ones to grow a while) to root up the dependants of his enemies: dependants, whom the forenamed confederates ſhould be forced, either to relieve, or to loſe;

loſe; and hereby he doubted not to draw them into the field, where the advantage of power, and of all other warlike proviſions, promiſed him victory.

At this time the city of *Rhodes* was very mighty, being well governed, and having long held it ſelf in good neutrality, it drew the better part of all the trade of thoſe parts, and thereby a great deal of riches to it ſelf, to maintain which, and to increaſe it, it furniſhed and kept on the ſeas a fleet of well armed ſhips, by which it not only beat off all pirates and petty thieves, but the reputation of their ſtrength was thereby ſo much increaſed, as all the neighbour princes ſought their alliance and confederacy.

In this ſo dangerous a time (in which they muſt either refuſe all that ſought them, and ſo ſtand friendleſs and apart, or join themſelves to ſome one; and thereby forego the peace, by which their greatneſs had grown) their affections carried them to the *Egyptian*, both becauſe the greateſt part of their trade lay that way, as alſo for that *Antigonus*'s diſpoſition, greatneſs, and neighbourhood was fearful unto them. This affection of theirs, with ſome other paſſages more apparent, gave argument of quarrel to *Antigonus*, who began to declare himſelf againſt them by petty injuries, of taking ſome of their ſhips, with ſuch other grievances, while he made a more weighty preparation to purſue the war againſt them openly and ſtrongly. All things ſoon after ordered according to the greatneſs of the enterpriſe, he imploy'd his ſon *Demetrius* againſt them in their own iſland, who brought ſuch terror upon the citizens, that laying aſide all reſpect of friendſhip and honour, they offered him their aſſiſtance and ſervice againſt whomſoever. *Demetrius*, who knew from whence this change came, and that the alteration was perſwaded by fear, and not by love, raiſed his demands to an intolerable height, requiring an hundred hoſtages to be delivered him, and liberty to lodge in their port as many ſhips of war as himſelf pleaſed: theſe conditions, more properly to be impoſed upon a ſtate already conquered, than on thoſe who as yet had heard of nothing but a conſtrained aſſiſtance, reſtored unto the *Rhodians* their loſt courage, and made them reſolve to defend their liberty to the laſt man: this taught them to infranchiſe all their able bond-men, and wiſely rather to make them their fellow citizens, than to make themſelves fellow ſlaves with them.

Demetrius, having refuſed the fair conditions offered, as the *Rhodians* the fearful ones propounded to them, makes preparation for a long ſiege, and finding no appearance to carry the place in fury, he ſet in hand with his engines of battery; in the invention and uſe of which, he never ſhewed himſelf a greater *Artiſan*, than in this war. But in concluſion, after the citizens had ſuſtained all the aſſaults given them for a whole year, after many brave ſallies out of the town, and the famine which they indured within the town, which had proved far more extreme, if *Ptolemy* had not with many hazards relieved them, *Demetrius* by mediation of the *Grecian* embaſſadors, gave over the ſiege, a hundred hoſtages they gave him for performance of the peace made, but with exception of all the magiſtrates and officers of the city.

Hereunto *Demetrius* was brought by the uſual policy of war and ſtate: for while, with the flower of all his father's forces, he lay before *Rhodes*, *Caſſander* recovered many of thoſe places in *Greece*, which *Demetrius* had formerly taken from him; neither did *Caſſander* make the war as in former times, by practice and ſurpriſe, but by a ſtrong and well compounded army, which he himſelf led as far as into *Attica*, and therewith greatly diſtreſſed and indangered *Athens* it ſelf. On the other ſide (tho' with leſs ſucceſs) did *Polyſperchon* invade *Peloponneſus*. Theſe dangerous undertakings upon *Greece*, adviſed the *Athenians* and *Etolians* to diſpatch their embaſſadors towards *Demetrius*, and adviſed *Demetrius* rather to abandon the enterpriſe of *Rhodes*, than to abandon the great honour which he had formerly gotten, by ſetting all *Greece* at liberty.

Demetrius was no ſooner out of the iſland, than that the *Rhodians* erected ſtatues in honour of *Lyſimachus* and *Caſſander*, but for *Ptolemy*, whom they moſt affected, and from whom they received their moſt relief, they conſulted the oracle of *Jupiter*, whether it were not lawful to call him a *God*. The prieſts which attended in the temple of *Hammon*, gave the ſame fair anſwer for *Ptolemy*, which they had formerly done for *Alexander*'s maſter; for as *Alexander* conſulted the oracle with an army at his heels, ſo was *Ptolemy* at this time lord of the ſoil: and yet was this a far more cleanly creation than that done by the *Athenians*, who deified *Antigonus* and *Demetrius* by decree of the people. A mad age it was, when ſo many of *Alexander*'s captains could not content themſelves with the ſtile of kings, but that they would needs be called gods.

SECT. III.

How Demetrius *prevailed in* Greece, Caſſander *deſires peace of* Antigonus, *and cannot obtain it. Great preparations of war againſt* Antigonus.

Demetrius coming with a ſtrong fleet and army into *Greece*, quickly drove *Caſſander* out of *Attica*; and purſuing his fortune, chaſed him beyond the ſtraits of *Thermopyle*. Herein his reputation did much avail him, which was ſo great, that ſix thouſand of his enemies ſoldiers revolted unto him. So partly by the greatneſs of his name, partly by force, he recover'd in ſhort ſpace all that *Caſſander* held in thoſe ſtraights, and giving liberty unto the people, he beſtowed upon the *Athenians* thoſe pieces which had been fortified againſt them, to block them up. Then went he into *Peloponneſus*, where he found the like, or more eaſy ſucceſs: for he ſuddenly took *Argos*, *Corinth*, *Sicyon*, and the moſt of the country, beſtowing liberty upon ſuch as needed it. The town of *Sicyon* he tranſlated by conſent of the citizens, from the old ſeat into another place: and called it after his own name *Demetrius*. This done, he betook himſelf to his pleaſure: at the *Iſthmian* games he cauſed himſelf to be proclaimed captain general of *Greece*, as *Philip* and *Alexander* had been in former times: whereupon (as if he were now become as great as *Alexander*) he deſpiſed all others, making it a matter of jeſt, that any, ſave himſelf or his father, ſhould uſurp the name of king. But in his behaviour, he was ſo far unlike to a king, that in all the time of his leiſure, he deſerved none other name than of a drunken *palliard*. Yet were the *Athenians* as ready as ever to deviſe new honours for him; among which they made one decree, that whatſoever king *Demetrius* ſhould command, ought to be held ſacred with the gods, and juſt with men.

All *Greece* being now at the diſpoſition of *Antigonus*, *Caſſander* ſtood in great fear, leſt the wars ſhould fall heavily upon him in *Macedon*; which, to avoid, he knew no better way than to make peace with his enemies betimes. And to that purpoſe he ſent Embaſſadors, but had no better anſwer from *Antigonus*, than that he ſhould ſubmit his whole eſtate

eſtate to his diſcretion. This proud demand made him look about him, and labour hard in ſolliciting his friends both to aſſiſt him, and take heed to themſelves; neither found he them ſlow in apprehending the common danger, for *Lyſimachus* knew, that if once *Caſſander* had loſt *Macedon*, *Demetrius* would ſoon be maſter of *Thrace*. Neither were *Ptolemy* and *Seleucus* ignorant of that which was like to befal them, if *Antigonus* were ſuffered to put himſelf in quiet poſſeſſion of thoſe provinces in *Europe*. Wherefore it was agreed, that with joint forces they ſhould all together ſet upon the common enemy.

Hereof *Antigonus* had notice, but ſcorned all their preparations, ſaying, that he would as eaſily ſcatter them, as a flock of birds are driven away with a ſtone. With theſe conceits he pleaſed himſelf, and no way hindered the proceedings of his enemies. He lay at that time in his town of *Antigonia* (a name that it muſt ſhortly loſe) where he was carefully providing to ſet out ſome ſtately game and pageants, in oſtentation of his glory. But thither was brought unto him the tumultuous news of *Lyſimachus*'s victories about *Helleſpont*. For *Caſſander* had committed unto *Lyſimachus* part of his forces, wherewith to paſs over into *Aſia*, while he himſelf with the reſt ſhould oppoſe *Demetrius* on *Europe* ſide. So *Lyſimachus* paſſing the *Helleſpont*, began to make hot war upon the ſubjects of *Antigonus*; getting ſome of the cities in thoſe parts to join with him by fair means, winning others by force, and waſting the country round about.

To repreſs this unexpected boldneſs, *Antigonus* made haſty journeys, and came ſoon enough to recover his loſſes, but not ſtrong enough to drive *Lyſimachus* home, or compel him to come to battel. *Lyſimachus* waited for the coming of *Seleucus*, keeping himſelf the whilſt from neceſſity of fighting. But *Babylon* was far off, and *Seleucus*'s preparations were too great to be ſoon in readineſs. The winter alſo did hinder his journey, which enforced them on both ſides to reſt in ſome quiet, without performing any matter of importance. This delay of debating the quarrel in open field, held all thoſe nations in a great ſuſpence, and bred much expectation. Yet might all have come to nothing, had not *Antigonus* been ſo froward, that he refuſed to yield unto any peaceable conditions. At length *Seleucus* drew near with a mighty army of his own (for he had gathered ſtrength in that long time of leiſure which *Antigonus* had given him) and with great aid from *Ptolemy*, that was joined with his forces.

To help in this needful caſe, *Demetrius* was called over into *Aſia* by his father's letters, which he readily obeyed. Before his departure out of *Greece*, he made peace with *Caſſander* upon reaſonable terms, to the end he might not be driven to leave any part of his army for defence of the country; and that his journey might be without any ſuch blemiſh of reputation, as if he had abandoned his dependants: for one article of the peace was, that all the cities of *Greece* ſhould be at liberty. *Caſſander* was glad to be ſo rid of an enemy, that was too ſtrong for him. Yet would this league have done him little good, if things had fallen out contrariwiſe than they did in *Aſia*; ſeeing the ratification thereof was referred unto *Antigonus*. It ſufficed, that for the preſent every one found means to clear himſelf of all incumbrances elſewhere, to the end that each of them might freely apply himſelf to the trial of the main controverſy in *Aſia*.

SECT. IV.

How Antigonus *was ſlain in a great battel at* Ipſus, *near unto* Epheſus, *wherein his whole eſtate was loſt.*

SELEUCUS, with his ſon *Antiochus*, joining with *Lyſimachus*, compounded a great army, which was (all conſidered) not inferior to that of the enemy. In greatneſs of name (that helpeth much in all wars, but eſpecially in the civil) they were rather unanſwerable, than unequal to their adverſaries; for *Antigonus* had of long time kept them under with a maſtering ſpirit, and had been reputed a king indeed, when the reſt were held but uſurpers of the title. Likewiſe *Demetrius* was generally acknowledged a brave commander, having given proof of his worth in many great ſervices of all kinds, and enriched the art of war with many inventions, which even his enemies, and particularly *Lyſimachus*, did much admire. *Seleucus*, who had ſometimes flattered *Antigonus*, and fearfully ſtolen away from him to ſave his life, with young *Antiochus*, a prince not heard of before this journey, and *Lyſimachus*, that had lived long in a corner, hardly keeping his own from the wild *Thracians*, wanted much in reputation, of that which was yielded to their oppoſites; yet ſo, that as ancient captains under *Philip* and *Alexander*, two of them were held worthy enough to receive any benefit that fortune might give; and the third a prince of great hope, whereof he now came to make experience.

The ſoldiers, on both ſides, were for the moſt part hardy and well exerciſed; many of them having ſerved under *Alexander*, though of thoſe old companies the long ſpace of two and twenty years had conſumed the greateſt number. But concerning their affections; the followers of *Seleucus* were eaſily perſwaded, that in this battel they muſt either get the upper hand, or put in extreme danger all that belonged unto the confederate princes; whereas *Antigonus*'s men could diſcern no other neceſſity of fighting, than the obſtinate quality of their lord, that needs would be maſter of all. *Antigonus* had about threeſcore and ten thouſand foot, ten thouſand horſe, and ſeventy-five elephants. His enemies were ſix thouſand ſhort of him in number of their foot; in horſe they had the odds of five hundred; of elephants they had four hundred, and a hundred and twenty armed chariots of war; which helps, though they little had availed the *Perſians*, yet were they not to be deſpiſed, in the hands of a good captain.

Antigonus himſelf, either troubled with the unexpected greatneſs of his enemies forces, or preſaging little good like to enſue, grew very penſive, communing much in private with his ſon, whom he commended to the army as his ſucceſſor; whereas in former times he had never been ſo jocund, as towards the hour of battel, nor had been accuſtomed to make his ſon, or any other, privy to his counſel, before it required execution. Other tokens of bad luck, either foregoing the fight, or afterwards deviſed, I hold it needleſs to recount. *Diana* of *Epheſus* dwelt near to the place of battel, a buſy goddeſs in many great fights, and therefore likely to have been thruſt into the fable, if any matter, nearly reſembling a miracle, had chanced.

It is eaſy to believe that theſe two ſo gallant armies, containing well near all the ſtrength of *Alexander*'s whole empire, performed a notable fight, being led by ſuch worthy commanders, and whom the iſſue thereof did highly concern. Yet are few of the particulars recorded; an eaſy loſs

in regard of the much variety wherewith every ſtory aboundeth in this kind. The moſt memorable things in the battel, were theſe. *Demetrius*, with his beſt force of horſe, charged valiantly upon young *Antiochus*; whom when he had broken, and put to flight, he was ſo tranſported with the heat of his good ſucceſs, that he never gave over his purſuit, but left his father naked, and loſt thereby both him and the victory. For when *Seleucus* perceived this advantage, he interpoſed his elephants between *Demetrius* and the *phalanx* of *Antigonus*; and with many troops of horſe offering to break upon the enemies battel, whereſoever it lay moſt open, he did ſo terrify the *Antigonians*, that a great part of them rather choſe to revolt from their lord, whilſt they were fairly invited, than to ſuſtain the fury of ſo dangerous an impreſſion. This cowardice, or rather treaſon of ſome, diſcouraged others; and, finally, caſt them all into flight, expoſing their general to the laſt end of his deſtinies. *Antigonus* was then fourſcore years old, very fat and unweildy, ſo that he was unapt for fight, if his high ſpirit could have entertained any thought thereof. He had about him ſome of his moſt truſty followers, and as many others as he could hold together. When one, that perceived a great troop making towards him, told him, *Sir king, yonder company means to charge you*; he anſwered, *Well may they, for who defends me? but anon* Demetrius *will relieve us.* Thus expecting, to the very laſt, that his ſon ſhould come to the reſcue, he received ſo many darts into his body, as took away his lately ambitious, but then fearful hopes, together with his troubleſome life.

His great ability in matter of arms, together with his inſatiable deſire of empire, have ſufficiently appeared in the whole volume of his actions. He was more feared by his enemies, than loved by his friends; as one that could not moderate his fortune, but uſed inſolence towards all alike, as if it had been ſome virtue neareſt repreſenting a kingly majeſty. This was the cauſe that ſo many of his followers revolted to his enemies; and finally, that a great part of his army forſook him in his laſt neceſſity. For thoſe kings and princes that call all the careful endeavours of their vaſſals, only duty and debt; and are more apt to puniſh the leaſt offences, than to reward the greateſt ſervices, ſhall find themſelves, upon the firſt change of fortune (ſeeing it is love only that ſtays by adverſity) not only the moſt friendleſs, but even the moſt contemptible and deſpiſed of all others. This *Antigonus* found true in part, while he lived; in part he left it to be verified upon his ſon.

SECT. V.

How Demetrius *forſaken by the* Athenians, *after his overthrow, was reconciled to* Seleucus *and* Ptolemy, *beginning a new fortune, and ſhortly entering into quarrels.*

FOR *Demetrius*, at his return, from the idle purſuit of young *Antiochus*, finding all quite loſt, was glad to ſave himſelf, with four thouſand horſe and five thouſand foot, by a ſpeedy retreat unto *Epheſus*; whence he made great haſte unto *Athens*, as to the place that for his ſake would ſuffer any extremity. But whilſt he was in the midſt of his courſe thither, the *Athenian* ambaſſadors met him with a decree of the people; which was, that none of the kings ſhould be admitted into their city. Theſe were ambaſſadors, not *theori*, or conſulters with the oracle. It was a ſhameleſs ingratitude in the *Athenians*, to reward their benefactor, in his miſery, with ſuch a decree; neither did any part of his calamity more afflict the unfortunate prince, than to ſee his adverſity deſpiſed by thoſe whom he had thought his ſureſt friends. Yet he was fain to give good words; for he had left many of his ſhips in their haven, of which he now ſtood in great need, and therefore was fain to ſpeak them fair, that ſometimes had groſly flattered him: but he ſhall live to teach them their old language, and ſpeak unto them in another tune. When he had gotten his ſhips, he ſailed to the *Iſthmus*, where he found nothing but matter of diſcomfort. His garriſons were every where broken up, the ſoldiers having betaken themſelves to his enemies pay; ſo that he was king only of a ſmall army and fleet, without money or means wherewith to ſuſtain him and his followers any long time. All the reſt, or the greateſt part of his father's large dominion, was now dividing among the conquerors; and thoſe few places, which as yet held for him (having not, perchance, heard the worſt of what had happened) he no way knew how to relieve. For, to put himſelf into the field, on the ſide of *Aſia*, he had no power; and to incloſe himſelf in any town, how ſtrong ſoever, were but to impriſon his fortune, and his hopes, or therein, indeed, to bury himſelf and his eſtate. He therefore creeping thorough thoſe buſhes, that had feweſt briars, fell upon a corner of *Lyſimachus*'s kingdom, whereof he gave all the ſpoil that was gotten to his ſoldiers; his own loſſes having been too great, to be repayed again by ſmall prizes.

In the mean while, the confederate princes had wherewithal to buſy themſelves in the partition of thoſe provinces, of which their late victory had made them lords; wherein *Seleucus* had a notable advantage, by being preſent, and maſter of the field. For neither *Ptolemy* nor *Caſſander* were at the overthrow given, having only ſent certain troops to reinforce the army which *Seleucus* led, who took hold of a part of *Aſia* the leſs, and all *Syria*, being no otherwiſe divided from his own territory than by the river of *Euphrates*. For there had not any order been taken by the confederates for the diviſion of all thoſe lands, becauſe they did not expect ſo proſperous an iſſue of that war, which they made only in their common defence. It was therefore lawful for *Seleucus* to make the beſt benefit that he could of the victory; at which, nevertheleſs, others did repine; and though they neither could, nor durſt, accuſe him of ill dealing for the preſent; yet, ſeeing the over-greatneſs of *Seleucus* brought no leſs danger to the reſt of the new kings, than that of *Antigonus* had done, they conſulted upon the ſame reaſon of ſtate as before, how to oppoſe it in time. Neither was *Seleucus* ignorant of what they had determined; for he read it in the law univerſal of kingdoms and ſtates, needing no other intelligence. Hereupon they forget friendſhip on all ſides, and cure themſelves of all unprofitable paſſion; the hatred of each to other, and their loves, being laid on the one ſide, againſt their profits on the other, were found ſo far too light, as *Seleucus*, who had to day ſlain *Antigonus*, the father, and driven *Demetrius* the ſon, out of *Aſia*, fought to-morrow, how to match himſelf with *Stratonica*, *Demetrius*'s daughter; and ſo by *Demetrius*, to ſerve his turn againſt *Lyſimachus*.

The ſtory of this *Stratonica*, with whom young *Antiochus*, the ſon of *Seleucus*, fell ſo paſſionately in love, and ſo diſtempered, as *Seleucus*'s father, to ſave his ſon's life, gave her (though ſhe were his wife) unto him; and how his paſſion was diſcovered by his pulſe, is generally noted by all writers. But neither did this alliance between *Seleucus* and *Demetrius*, between *Ptolemy* and *Lyſimachus*,

chus, between *Demetrius* and *Caſſander*, between *Demetrius* and *Ptolemy*, though for the preſent it brought them again into the rank of kings, otherwiſe tie any of them to each other, than the marriages between chriſtian kings have done in latter times: namely between the *Auſtrians*, the *Arragonians*, the *French*, and other princes; neither have the leagues of thoſe elder times been found more faithful, than thoſe of the ſame later times have been; as in the ſtories of *Charles* VIII. of *France*, and of *Charles* the emperor, of *Francis* I. and of the kings of *Naples*, dukes of *Milan*, and others, the reader may obſerve: between whom, from the year of our lord one thouſand four hundred ninety and five, when *Charles* VIII. undertook the conqueſt of *Naples*, to the year one thouſand five hundred fifty and eight, when *Henry* II. died, the hiſtories of thoſe times tell us, that all the bonds, either by the bed or by the book, either by weddings or ſacramental oaths, had neither faithful purpoſe nor performance. Yet did *Demetrius* reap this profit, by giving his daughter to his enemy *Seleucus*, that he recovered *Cilicia* from *Pliſtarchus*, the brother of *Caſſander*, who had gotten it as his ſhare in the diviſion of *Antigonus*'s poſſeſſions: for the intruder was not ſtrong enough to hold it by his proper forces from him, that entred upon it as a lawful heir: neither would *Seleucus* lend him any help, as by the rule of confederacy he ſhould have done againſt the common enemy. So *Pliſtarchus*, with very angry complaint, as well againſt *Seleucus* as *Demetrius*, went unto *Caſſander*, whither *Phila*, their ſiſter, followed him ſhortly, to pacify them both, and keep all quiet, being ſent for that purpoſe by *Demetrius* her huſband, that was not ſtrong enough to deal with *Caſſander*, and therefore glad to make uſe of that bond of alliance betwixt them, whereof in his own proſperity he never took notice to the others good. About the ſame time he took to wife a daughter of *Ptolemy*'s (plurality of wives being familiar with theſe *Macedonians*, that had learned it in their eaſtern conqueſts) and ſo was he by two marriages rather freed from two enemies than ſtrengthned with two friends; for neither of them wiſhed him any good, otherwiſe than might ſeem to advance their own ambitious deſires.

Seleucus and *Ptolemy* could both of them have been contented better, that *Demetrius*, with help of their countenance, ſhould ſeek his fortune ſomewhat farther off, than ſettle his eſtate under their noſes: Particularly *Seleucus* thought that *Cilicia* lay very fitly for himſelf, and *Ptolemy* had a great appetite (which yet he concealed a while) to the iſle of *Cyprus*. Now whether it were ſo that *Seleucus* would fain have ſet his new father-in-law upon the neck of *Lyſimachus*, or whether he were indeed greedy of the bargain, he offered to buy of *Demetrius* for ready money, his late purchaſe of *Cilicia*. Hereunto *Demetrius* would not hearken, but meant to keep as much land as he could, having already found in *Cilicia* twelve thouſand talents of his father's treaſure, that would ſerve him to make ſport a while. This refuſal ſo diſpleaſed *Seleucus*, that in angry terms he demanded the cities of *Tyre* and *Sidon* to be ſurrendred unto him, which were the only places in *Syria* that had not followed the fortune of the late great battel. Inſtead of giving them up, *Demetrius* took preſent order to have them better manned, and ſpake it ſtoutly, that were he overcome a thouſand times, yet would he not hire *Seleucus* to become his ſon-in-law. In this quarrel *Seleucus* was generally reprehended as one of a malignant diſpoſition, that would break friendſhip with his father-in-law for two towns, from whom he had already taken more than well he knew how to govern. But the fire conſumed itſelf in words, which had it faſtened upon arms, like it is that the weaker ſhould have found friends, out of envy to the ſtronger.

SECT. VI.

How Demetrius *won the city of* Athens, *and prevailed in* Greece, *but loſt in* Aſia. *Of troubles in* Macedon *following the death of* Caſſander.

IN the mean while, the *Athenians* not knowing how to uſe the liberty which *Demetrius* had beſtowed on them, were fallen by ſedition under the tyranny of *Lachares*. Through which alteration their diſtempered city was ſo weakned, that it ſeemed ill able to keep off the puniſhment due to their late ingratitude. This advantage haſtned him, whom they had once called their *God and Saviour*, to preſent himſelf unto them in the habit of a revenging fury. He brought againſt them all the force that he could well ſpare from other employments, which were at that time perhaps the more, becauſe his doubtful eaſtern friends were unwilling to give impediment to any buſineſs that might entangle him in *Greece*. His firſt enterprize in *Athens* had ill ſucceſs, a great part of his fleet periſhing in a tempeſt, but he ſoon repaired the loſs; and (after ſome victories in *Peloponneſus*, where he won divers towns that had fallen from him) returning to the enterprize, waſted the country of *Attica*, and cut off all relief from the city both by land and ſea.

Athens was not able to feed the great multitude within it any long time; for it ſtood in a barren ſoil, and wanted now the command of thoſe iſlands and places abroad from whence it was wont to be ſtored with victuals; being alſo deſtitute of means to keep ſuch a navy as might bring in ſupply, or dare to do any thing at ſea againſt that of *Demetrius*. Yet was there ſome hope of ſuccour from *Ptolemy*, who (truſting thereby to win the love of *Greece*) had laden a hundred and fifty ſhips with corn, and ſent them to relieve the hungry city. But theſe hundred and fifty were unable to deal with three hundred good fighting ſhips which *Demetrius* had; rather they feared to become a prey to him, and therefore haſted away betimes, as having done enough in adventuring to come ſo near, that they might be deſcry'd. This broke the heart of the people, among whom the famine was ſo extreme, that a father and his ſon did fight for a dead mouſe, which dropped down between them from the houſe top: Wherefore they ſent ambaſſadors to yield up the town and crave pardon, having ſo far offended, that out of deſperation they made it a capital offence to propoſe any motion of peace: yet were they fain to aboliſh this decree, rather becauſe they knew not what elſe to do than becauſe they hoped to be forgiven.

Demetrius, contented with the honour of the victory, did not only forbear to take away the lives of theſe unthankful men, which they had ſubmitted unto his mercy, but out of his liberality gave them food, and placed in office amongſt them ſuch as were moſt acceptable to the people. Nevertheleſs, he was grown wiſer than to truſt them ſo far as he had done in times paſt. And therefore, when (among other flattering acclamations) they bade him take their havens, and diſpoſe of them at his pleaſure; he was ready to lay hold upon the word, and leave a ſure garriſon within their walls to keep them honeſt perforce. After this he went into *Peloponneſus*, vanquiſhed the *Lacedemonians* in two battels,

battels, and was in very fair poſſibility to take their city; when the dangerous news called him in all haſte, of *Lyſimachus* and *Ptolemy*, that prevailed faſter upon him elſewhere than himſelf did upon his enemies in *Greece*. *Lyſimachus* had won many towns in *Aſia*; *Ptolemy* had gotten all the iſle of *Cyprus* except the city of *Salamis*, wherein *Demetrius* had left his children and mother, that were ſtraitly beſieged. Whilſt he was bethinking himſelf which way to turn his face, a notable piece of buſineſs offered itſelf, which thruſt all other cares out of his head.

Caſſander was lately dead in *Macedon*, and ſoon after him *Philip* his eldeſt ſon, whoſe two younger brethren, *Antipater* and *Alexander*, ſought for the kingdom. In this quarrel, *Theſſalonica*, the daughter of king *Philip*, whom *Caſſander* had married, ſeemed better affected to *Alexander* than to her elder ſon; who thereupon grew ſo enraged, that moſt barbarouſly he ſlew his own mother. The odiouſneſs of this fact gave a fair luſtre to *Alexander*'s cauſe, drawing the generality of the *Macedons* to take his part, as in revenge of the queen's death, upon that wicked parricide *Antipater*. But *Antipater* was ſo ſtrongly backed by *Lyſimachus*, whoſe daughter he had married, that *Alexander* could not hope to make his party good without ſome foreign aid. For which cauſe he called in both *Pyrrhus* and *Demetrius*, who how they dealt with him it will ſoon appear in the following tragedy of him and his brother. Their father *Caſſander* had been one that ſhifted well for himſelf, at ſuch time as every man ſought how to get ſomewhat, in the ill ordered diviſion of the empire. He was cunning in practice, and a good ſoldier; one of more open dealing than were his companions, but withal more impudent, rudely killing thoſe whom others would more wiſely have made away. He deeply hated the memory of *Alexander*, that had knocked his head againſt a wall, upon ſome opinion of contempt. With *Olympias* he had an hereditary quarrel, derived from his father, whom ſhe could not abide. Her feminine malice did ſo exaſperate him by cruelty, that ſhe uſed againſt his friends both alive and dead, as it made him adventure upon ſhedding the royal blood; wherewith when once he had ſtained his hands, he did not care how far he proceeded in that courſe of murder. His carefulneſs to deſtroy thoſe women and children, whoſe lives hindred his purpoſe, argues him to have been rather ſkilful in matters of arms than a valiant man: ſuch cruelty being a true mark of cowardice, which fears afar off the dangers that may quietly paſs away, and ſeeks to avoid them by baſe and wicked means, as never thinking itſelf ſafe enough until there be nothing left that carries likelihood of danger. Of *Olympias* and *Roxana* it may be ſaid, that they had well deſerved the bloody end which overtook them, yet ill beſeemed it *Caſſander* to do the office of a hangman. But *Alexander*'s children had by no law of men deſerved to die for the tyranny of their father. Wherefore, though *Caſſander* died in his bed, yet the divine juſtice brought ſwords upon his wife and children, that well revenged the cruelty of this bloody man, by deſtroying his whole houſe, as he had done his maſter's.

SECT. VII.

Of Pyrrhus *and his doings in* Macedon. *The death of* Caſſander's *children.* Demetrius *gets the kingdom of* Macedon; *prevails in war againſt the* Greeks; *loſeth reputation in his war againſt* Pyrrhus, *and in his civil government, and prepares to win* Aſia. *How all conſpire againſt* Demetrius. Pyrrhus *and* Lyſimachus *invade him; his army yields to* Pyrrhus, *who ſhares the kingdom of* Macedon *with* Lyſimachus.

PYRRHUS, the ſon of that unfortunate prince *Æacides*, which periſhed in war againſt *Caſſander*, was hardly preſerved, being a ſuckling infant, from the fury of his father's enemies. When his foſterers had conveyed him to *Glaucias*, king of *Illyria*, the deadly hatred of *Caſſander* would have bought his life with the price of two hundred talents; but no man can kill him that ſhall be his heir. *Glaucias* was ſo far from betraying *Pyrrhus*, that he reſtored him by force to his father's kingdom, when he was but twelve years of age. Within the compaſs of ſix years, either the indiſcretions of his youth, or the rebellious temper of his ſubjects, drave him out of his kingdom, and left him to try the world anew. Then went he to *Demetrius*, (who married his ſiſter) became his page, followed him awhile in his wars, was with him in the great battel of *Ipſus*, whence he fled with him to *Epheſus*, and was content to be hoſtage for him, in his reconciliation with *Ptolemy*. In *Egypt* he ſo behaved himſelf, that he got the favour of *Berenice*, *Ptolemy*'s principal wife, ſo that he married her daughter, and was thereupon ſent home with men and money into *Epirus*, more beholden now to *Ptolemy* than to *Demetrius*. When he had fully recovered the kingdom of *Epirus*, and was ſettled in it, then fell out that buſineſs between the children of *Caſſander*, which drew both him and *Demetrius* into *Macedon*.

Antipater, the elder of *Caſſander*'s ſons, was ſo far too weak for *Pyrrhus*, that he had no deſire to attend the coming of *Demetrius*, but made an haſty agreement, and divided the kingdom with his younger brother *Alexander*; who likewiſe felt the aid of *Pyrrhus* ſo troubleſome, that he was more willing to ſend him away, than to call in ſuch another helper. For *Pyrrhus* had the audacity to requeſt, or take as granted, by ſtrong hand, *Ambracia*, *Acarnania*, and much more of the country, as the reward of his pains; leaving the two brethren to agree as well as they could about the reſt. Neceſſity inforced the brethren to compoſition; but their compoſition would not ſatisfy *Demetrius*, who took the matter heinouſly, that he was ſent for, and made a fool, to come ſo far with an army, and find no work for it. This was a frivolous complaint; whereby it appeared, that *Demetrius* had a purpoſe to do as *Pyrrhus* had done, and ſo much more, by how much he was ſtronger. Hereupon it ſeemed to *Alexander* a wiſe courſe, to remove this overdiligent friend, by murdering him upon ſome advantage. Thus *Demetrius* reported the ſtory, and it might be true; tho' the greateſt part, and perhaps the wiſeſt, believed it not. But the iſſue was, that *Alexander* himſelf was feaſted and ſlain by *Demetrius*, who took his part of the kingdom as a reward of the murder; excuſing the fact ſo well, by telling his own danger, and what a naughty man *Caſſander* had been, that all the *Macedonians* grew glad enough to acknowledge him their king. It fell out happily, that about the ſame time *Lyſimachus* was buſied in war with a king of the wild *Thracians*; for thereby he was compelled to ſeek peace of *Demetrius*, which to obtain, he cauſed the remainder of *Macedon* to be given up; that is, the part belonging to *Antipater* his ſon-in-law. At this ill bargain *Antipater* grievouſly ſtormed, though he knew not how to amend it; yet ſtill he ſtormed, until his father-in-law, to ſave the labour of making

king many'excuſes, took away his troubleſome life. Thus in haſte, with a kind of neglect, and as it were to avoid moleſtation, were ſlain the children of *Caſſander*; of *Caſſander* that had ſlain his own maſter's children in a wiſe courſe of policy, with careful meditation (ſo much the more wicked as the more long) ſtudying how to erect his own houſe, that fell down upon his grave, ere the earth on it was throughly ſettled.

It might be thought, that ſuch an acceſs of dominion added much to the greatneſs of *Demetrius*; but indeed it ſhewed his infirmity, and thereby made him neglected by many, and at length hated by all. For he had no art of civil government, but thought (or ſhewed by his actions that he thought) the uſe and fruit of a kingdom to be none other than to do what a king liſted. He gave himſelf over to women and wine, laughing openly at thoſe that offered to trouble him with ſupplications, and the tedious diſcourſe of doing juſtice. He had more ſkill in getting a kingdom than in ruling it; war being his recreation, and luxury his nature. By long reſt (as ſix years reign is long to him, that knows not how to reign one year) he diſcovered ſo much of his worſt conditions, as made both the people weary of his idleneſs, and the ſoldiers of his vanity. He was freed from care of matters in *Aſia*, by hearing that all was loſt, though more eſpecially, by hearing that *Ptolemy* had with great honour entertained and diſmiſſed his mother and children. This afforded him the better leiſure of making war in *Greece*, where he vanquiſhed the *Thebans*, and won their city twice in ſhort ſpace, but uſed his victory with mercy. Againſt *Lyſimachus* he would fain have done ſomewhat (the peace between them notwithſtanding) at ſuch time as he was taken by the *Thracians*; but *Lyſimachus* was freely diſmiſſed, and in good caſe to make reſiſtance ere *Demetrius* came, ſo as this journey purchaſed nothing but enmity. Another expedition he took in hand againſt *Pyrrhus*, with no better, or rather with worſe event. *Pyrrhus* held ſomewhat belonging to *Macedon*, which he had indeed as honeſtly gotten as *Demetrius* the whole kingdom; he had alſo made excurſions into *Theſſaly*. But there needed not any handſome pretence of quarrel, ſeeing *Demetrius* thought himſelf ſtrong enough to over-run his enemies country with two great armies. It is a common fault in men, to deſpiſe the virtue of thoſe whom they have known raw novices in that faculty, wherein themſelves are noted as extraordinary. *Pyrrhus* was a captain, whom later ages, and particularly the great *Hannibal*, placed higher in the rank of generals, than either *Demetrius*, or any of *Alexander*'s followers. At this time he miſſed that part of the army which *Demetrius* led, and fell upon the other half, which he overthrew, not with more commendations of his good conduct, than of his private valour, ſhewed in ſingle combat againſt *Pantauchus*, *Demetrius*'s lieutenant; who being a ſtrong man of body, challenged this young prince to fight hand to hand, and was utterly beaten. The loſs of this battel did not ſo much offend the *Macedonians*, as the gallant behaviour of *Pyrrhus* delighted them. For in him they ſeemed to behold the lively figure of *Alexander* in his beſt quality. Other kings did imitate, in a counterfeit manner, ſome of *Alexander*'s graces, and had good ſkill in wearing princely veſtures; but (ſaid they) none, ſave *Pyrrhus*, is like him in deed, in performing the office of a captain.

Theſe rumours were not more nouriſhed by the virtue of the *Epirot*, than by diſlike of their own king, whom they began to diſeſteem, not ſo much in regard of his unprofitable journey into *Epirus* (for he had waſted much of the country, and brought home his army in good caſe) as of his inſolence, that grew daily more and more intolerable. His apparel ſeemed, in the eyes of the *Macedons*, not only too ſumptuous and new-fangled, but very unmanly, and ſerving chiefly to be a daily witneſs how much he contemned them and their good opinion. Of his ſoldiers lives he was retchleſs, and ſuffered unwiſely this unprincely ſentence to eſcape out of his mouth; that *the more of them died, the fewer he was to pay*. He made a mockery of juſtice; and (as it were to publiſh unto all his ſubjects, how little he eſteemed it or them) having by a ſhew of popularity invited petitioners, and with a gracious countenance entertained their ſupplications, he led the poor ſuitors after him in great hope, till coming to a bridge, he threw all their writings into the river, pleaſing himſelf in that he could ſo eaſily and ſo boldly delude the cares of other men. By theſe courſes he grew ſo odious, that *Pyrrhus* gathered audacity, and invading *Macedon*, had almoſt won it all with little reſiſtance. *Demetrius* lay then ſick in his bed, who recovering health, and taking the field, had ſuch great odds of ſtrength, as made *Pyrrhus* glad to forſake his winnings and be gone.

At length he began to have ſome feeling of the general hate, which to redreſs he did not (for he could not) alter his own conditions; but purpoſed to alter their idle diſcourſes of him, by ſetting them on work in ſuch an action, wherein his beſt qualities might appear, that is, in a great war. His intent was to invade *Aſia* with a royal army, wherein the fortune of one battel might give him as much, as the fortune of another had taken from him. To this end, he firſt made peace with *Pyrrhus*, that ſo he might leave all ſafe and quiet at home. Then did he compoſe a mighty army, of almoſt a hundred thouſand foot, and twelve thouſand horſe, with a navy of five hundred ſail, wherein were many ſhips, far exceeding the greatneſs of any that had been ſeen before, yet ſo ſwift and uſeful withal, that the greatneſs was leaſt part of their commendation.

The terrible fame of theſe preparations made *Seleucus* and *Ptolemy* ſuſpect their own forces, and labour hard with *Lyſimachus* and *Pyrrhus*, to join againſt this ambitious ſon of *Antigonus*, that was like to prove more dangerous to them all than ever was his father. It was eaſily diſcerned, that if *Demetrius* once prevailed in *Aſia*, there could be no ſecurity for his friends in *Europe*, what league ſoever were of old concluded. Therefore they reſolved to begin with him betimes, and each to invade that quarter of *Macedon* that lay next his own kingdom. *Lyſimachus* came firſt, and againſt him went *Demetrius* with a great part of his army; but whilſt he was yet on the way, news were brought into his camp that *Pyrrhus* had won *Berrhæa*. The matter was not over-great, were it not, that minds prepared with long diſcontent, are ready to lay hold upon ſmall occaſions of diſlike. All the camp was in uproar; ſome wept, others raged, few or none did forbear to utter ſeditious words, and many deſired leave of *Demetrius* to go to their own houſes, meaning indeed to have gone to *Lyſimachus*.

When *Demetrius* perceived the bad affection of his army, he thought it the wiſeſt way to lead the *Macedonians* further off from *Lyſimachus*, their own countryman, againſt *Pyrrhus*, that was a ſtranger, hoping by victory againſt the *Epirot*, to recover the love of his followers, in ſuch ſort, that he might afterwards at leiſure deal with the other.

But herein his wiſdom beguiled him, for the ſoldiers were as haſty as he to meet with *Pyrrhus*; not intending to hurt him, but longing to ſee that noble prince, of whom they daily heard the honourable fame. Some ſpake of his valour, ſome enquired, others anſwered, of his perſon, his armour, and other tokens whereby he might be known; as particularly, by a pair of goat's horns that he wore on his creſt. It was not likely that theſe men ſhould hurt him. Divers of them ſtole away and ran over into *Pyrrhus*'s camp; where the news that they brought were better welcome than their perſons. For they ſaid, and it was true, that if the *Macedonians* might once get ſight of *Pyrrhus*, they would all ſalute him king. To try this, *Pyrrhus* rode forth, and preſented himſelf bareheaded in view of the camp, whither ſome were ſent before to prepare his welcome. The news of his arrival found a general applauſe, and every one began to look out, with deſire to ſet eye on him. His face was not ſo well known as his helmet, therefore he was admoniſhed to put it on, which done, all came about him and proffered their ſervice; neither were there any that ſpake for *Demetrius*, only ſome (and they the moſt moderate of tongue) bade him begone betimes and ſhift for himſelf. So *Demetrius* threw aſide his maskers habit, and attiring himſelf poorly, did fearfully ſteal away out of his own camp, deſerving well this calamity, whether it were ſo that he would not hearken to the good counſel of his friends, or whether his behaviour deprived him of ſuch friends as would dare to let him hear the unpleaſant ſound of neceſſary truth.

Whilſt *Pyrrhus* was making this triumphant entry into the kingdom of *Macedon*, *Lyſimachus* came upon him very unſeaſonably, and would needs have half, ſaying, that he had done as much as *Pyrrhus* in the war, and therefore had reaſon to challenge his part of the gains. The bargain was quickly made, and the diviſion agreed upon, each of them being rather deſirous to take his part quietly than to fight for the whole, as hoping each of them to work his fellow quite out of all upon better opportunity.

SECT. VIII.

How Demetrius *gathering forces, enterprized many things with ill ſucceſs in* Greece *and* Aſia. *How he was driven upon* Seleucus, *and compelled to yield himſelf. His impriſonment and death.*

THE *Athenians* were as unthankful to *Demetrius* in this his adverſity, as they had been in former times; for they preſently forſook his friendſhip, and called *Pyrrhus* out of *Macedon* to be their patron. *Demetrius*, when he went againſt *Lyſimachus*, had left a great part of his forces in *Greece*, under his ſon *Antigonus*: Therefore it is like that he had ſoon gotten an army, though *Phila* his wife (who is highly commended for a wiſe and virtuous lady) did poiſon herſelf, upon deſperate grief for his misfortune. The firſt upon whom he attempted to ſhew his anger were the *Athenians*, that had well deſerved it. He began to lay ſiege to their town, but was pacified by *Crates* the philoſopher, whom they had made their ſpokeſman, and taking fair words inſtead of ſatisfaction, paſſed over into *Aſia* with eleven thouſand ſoldiers, meaning to try his fortune againſt *Lyſimachus*, for the provinces of *Lydia* and *Caria*.

At his firſt coming into thoſe parts, fortune ſeemed to ſmile upon him. For many good towns, willingly, or by compulſion, yielded to his obedience. There were alſo ſome captains that fell from *Lyſimachus* to him with their companies and treaſures. But it was not long, ere *Agathocles*, the ſon of *Lyſimachus*, came upon him with an army ſo ſtrong, that it was not for *Demetrius*'s good, to hazard his laſt ſtock againſt it. Wherefore, he reſolved to paſs through *Phrygia* and *Armenia*, into *Media*, and the provinces of the higher *Aſia*, truſting to find a kingdom ſomewhere in thoſe remote quarters. The execution of this counſel was grievouſly impeached by *Agathocles*, who purſued him cloſe, and cut off all his proviſions, driving him to take which ways he could, without following his intended courſe. In many ſkirmiſhes, *Demetrius* vanquiſhed this troubleſome enemy: nevertheleſs, he could not be ſhaken off, but continued afflicting the poor titulary king with extreme famine. At length, in paſſing the river *Lycus*, ſo many of *Demetrius*'s men were loſt, that the reſt could no longer make reſiſtance; but were driven to travel with ſuch ſpeed, as might well be called a plain flight: ſo that with famine, peſtilent diſeaſes following famine, and other accidents of war, eight thouſand of them were conſumed; the reſt, with their captain, eſcaped into *Cilicia*. *Seleucus* had gotten poſſeſſion of *Cilicia*, whilſt *Demetrius* was occupied in *Greece*; yet was it no part of *Demetrius*'s errand, to lay claim to the country; but with vehement and humble letters he beſought his ſon-in-law to call to mind their alliance, and to pity him in his great miſery. Theſe letters, at the firſt, wrought well with *Seleucus*, and he condeſcended to the requeſt; yet conſidering further how *Demetrius* had carried himſelf, when he recovered ſtrength after the battel at *Ipſus*, he changed his purpoſe, and went againſt him with an army.

Many treaties were held between them, of which none took effect, through the jealouſy of *Seleucus*. Therefore, mere deſperation enforced *Demetrius* to fight like a mad man; and his fury got him ſome victories, though of ſmall importance. At length, ſickneſs took and held him forty days, in which time a great number of his few men ran to the enemy. This notwithſtanding, he ſtill held out, and once had like to have taken *Seleucus* in his bed, had not his coming been diſcover'd by fugitives that gave the alarm. Finally, when all his army had forſaken him, and left him, with a few of his friends, to ſhift for himſelf; he was compelled, by the laſt of thoſe adherents (for even ſome of thoſe few forſook him) to yield unto *Seleucus*.

Seleucus, hearing this, was exceeding glad, and ſent him very comfortable meſſages; but the approbation of his own humanity, by his followers, was ſuch, as renew his jealous thoughts, and hindered him from admitting *Demetrius* to his preſence; though otherwiſe he uſed him with as much favour, as any priſoner could wiſh. He was kept under ſure guard in a demi-iſland, wherein were goodly walks, orchards, and parks, for hunting. He had all that he aſked royally, and friends allowed to viſit him at his, and their pleaſure; only his liberty was reſerved unto the coming of young *Antiochus* and *Stratonica*, out of the high countries. In this ſort he ſpent three years, living merrily all the while (as one that now enjoyed the happineſs, which, with ſo much travel and blood-ſhed, he had ſought in vain) and then died, leaving to his ſon *Antigonus*, the ſame which his father had left unto himſelf; that is, friends and hope. His aſhes were honourably buried in *Corinth*; his qualities have appeared in his actions; and the fortune of his houſe will ſhew it ſelf hereafter, in times and places convenient.

SECT.

SECT. IX.

The death of Ptolemy, *of* Lyſimachus, *and of* Seleucus, *that was laſt of* Alexander's *captains: with other occurrences.*

ABOUT the ſame time that *Demetrius* died, did alſo *Ptolemy* king of *Egypt*; a virtuous prince, warlike, gentle, bountiful, and (which in thoſe times was a rare commendation) regardful of his word. He had, by many wives and concubines, many children; out of whom he ſelected *Ptolemy Philadelphus*, and cauſed him to reign, together with himſelf, two or three years before he died, that ſo he might confirm him in the inheritance of the kingdom. At this, *Ptolemy Ceraunus* (for all of that houſe aſſumed the name of *Ptolemy*) was grievouſly incenſed; but no man cared for his anger. Therefore he went to *Seleucus*, who gave him loving entertainment. There were now only two of *Alexander*'s captains left, *Seleucus* and *Lyſimachus*. Theſe two needs would fight for it, who ſhould be the longeſt liver of that brave company. The true ground of their quarrel was, their near equality of ſtrength, and want of one to part them. The pretence was, the murders which *Lyſimachus* had committed upon many of his nobles, together with his poiſoning *Agathocles*, his eldeſt ſon, whoſe wife and children fled unto *Seleucus* for aid.

The *Macedons*, after ſeven months pauſe, having ſpent their firſt heat of admiration, began to hearken ſo well to *Lyſimachus*, their natural countryman, that they forſook *Pyrrhus* upon none other ground, than becauſe he was an alien. This they had known well enough before; but they did him no great wrong in taking lightly from him, what they lightly gave him. *Lyſimachus* had reigned about five years alone, when the city of *Lyſimachia* (built by him, and called after his name) falling by an earthquake, appeared, by events, to have fore-ſhewed the fall of his houſe. His own jealouſy, and the inſtigation of a mother-in-law, cauſed him to poiſon his ſon *Agathocles*, which drew upon him that war, wherein (after the loſs of all his fifteen children, that were taken away by divers accidents) he periſhed himſelf.

Seleucus was encountered by *Lyſimachus* on *Aſia* ſide, where one battel concluded the war with *Lyſimachus*'s death. It pleaſed *Seleucus* more than the victory, that he was the laſt of all the great heroes which had followed *Alexander*; for now he ſeemed to himſelf, as lord and heir of all the conquered world. So he paſſed over into *Macedon*, to take poſſeſſion of *Europe*, where there was none to withſtand him. But there he ended his days, and within ſeven months followed *Lyſimachus*, and others of his fellows, by a bloody death; being treacherouſly ſlain by *Ptolemy Ceraunus*, whoſe friend and patron he had been. Seventy-ſeven years old he was, when he fought with *Lyſimachus*, and *Lyſimachus* was ſeventy-four. With them ended the generation of old captains, that had ſeen the days, as it were, of another world under the *Perſian*; yet was there left one equal to any of them in the art of war, even *Pyrrhus*, the *Epirot*, of whom we ſpake before, that is now ready to enter into a war with the *Romans*, a more warlike people than *Alexander* himſelf did ever encounter. Of which war, and of which people, it is needful that we here make mention, as of a ſtory more important, than any likely to enſue in *Greece*, or in the great kingdoms that were held by *Alexander*'s ſucceſſors, with leſs (and ſtill decreaſing) virtue, than was that by which they were firſt purchaſed.

CHAP. VII.

The growth of Rome, *and ſettling of the eaſtern kingdoms.*

SECT. I.

How the Romans *enlarged their dominion in* Italy, *from the death of* Tullus Hoſtilius, *unto ſuch time as they were aſſailed by* Pyrrhus.

HOW *Rome* was founded by *Romulus*, ſettled in good order by *Numa Pompilius*; and by many, though ſmall victories, it gathered ſtrength, until ſuch time as it became the head of *Latium*, by the conqueſt of *Alba*, in the reign of *Tullus Hoſtilius*, it hath been already noted in due order of time. But whereas now the *Roman* greatneſs beginneth to encounter the power of *Greece*, and, extending it ſelf out of *Italy*, to overwhelm the dominions of other ſtates and princes; I hold it convenient (as in like caſes I have done) briefly to ſet down the growth of this mighty city, in a compendious relation of thoſe many actions, which could not have been delivered in the ages wherein they were ſeverally performed, without much interruption of the hiſtory, that was then occupied in matter more important.

After the death of *Tullus Hoſtilius* (who, when he had reigned two and thirty years, was burnt together with his houſe by lightning) *Ancus Martius*, grand-child to *Numa Pompilius*, by his daughter, and not much unlike him in diſpoſition, ſucceeded in the kingdom of *Rome*. He walled the city about, enlarged it with the hill *Aventine*, which he incloſed; built a bridge over *Tybris*, and the city of *Oſtia*, upon the ſea, ſixteen miles diſtant from *Rome*. Finally, having reigned twenty-four years, he died; and by his laſt will, he left his children in charge with one *Lucumon*, the ſon of *Damaratus* a *Corinthian*, who, avoiding *Cypſelus* king of *Corinth*'s tyranny, had fled into *Hetruria*, and dwelt in *Tarquinii*, by the name of which town he was afterwards called *Tarquinius*. From that city in *Hetruria* coming to *Rome*, and encouraged by ſome ominous occurrents, together with his wife *Tanaquil*'s prophecy, he grew a favourite of *Ancus Martius*, by his *Grecian* wit, humouring the factions of the *Roman* court; inſomuch, that after his deceaſe he became not only protector to the children, but governor to the city. He doubled the number of ſenators, and enlarged the centurions of horſe-men: neither was he leſs eminent in war than in peace; for he prevailed often againſt the *Tuſcans*, and from his victories, the chiefeſt ornaments of triumph took their original. When this *Lucius Tarquinius* had reigned eight and thirty years, he was ſlain by the ſons of *Ancus Martius*, to whom he had been left guardian.

But

But *Tanaquil* his wife, perceiving what was done, informed the people from out of an high turret, that her husband was wounded, and sick, but not dangerously: and withal signified unto them, that in the *interim* of his sickness, one *Servius Tullius*, whom from his birth she always propheſied to be born to great hopes (the son of *P. Corniculanus* and *Ocrisia*, a well descended, but captive woman) brought up in her house, and husband unto her daughter, should supply her husband's place, in governing the state until his recovery: which government, being thus at first obtained by cunning, he afterwards usurped as his right. He first ordained ratements, subsidies, and valuations of the people's wealth; among whom, at that time, fourscore thousand were mustered, of which number consisted their whole corporation; and by distinction of dignities, ages, trades, and offices, he managed the kingdom in as good sort, as if it had been a private household. At length, having two daughters of different natures, the one mild and gentle, the other fierce and outragious: and finding also, that the two sons of *Tarquinius Priscus*, *Sextus* and *Aruns*, which had been committed to his tuition, were of different dispositions, proportionably answering to his daughters; he (willing to add water, not oyl, to fire) gave the mild daughter to *Sextus*, the hot-headed son; and the violent, to *Aruns*, the gentle, in marriage. But whether by intended courses, or by accident, it happened; the two mild ones being made away, the furious natures were readily joined in marriage: who soon after concurring, and calling the senate together, began to lay claim to the kingdom. Upon this tumult, *Servius Tullius* hastening to the senate (where he thought by authority to have bridled insolency) was thrown down the stairs, and going home sore bruised, was slain by the way, when he had reigned forty and four years. Then *Tullia* his daughter, first proclaiming her husband *Tarquinius Superbus* king, returning home, enforced her coach-man to drive his chariot over her father's corps; whereupon the street had the denomination of *wicked-street*. This *Tarquin*, exercising cruelty without justice, and tyranny without mercy, upon the people and senators; having tired himself and them at home, used the same rage and treachery upon his borders. He took *Ocriculum*, *Suessa*, *Pometia*, and the *Gabii*. The issue of besieging *Ardea*, a town eighteen miles distant from *Rome*, was of bad success. In the heat of which war, his son *Sextus Tarquinius* violently ravished that chaste lady *Lucretia*, his kinsman *Collatine*'s wife: who, in way of expiation for so unchaste a deed, thought good to wash out those spots of infamy with her own blood; so (having first bequeathed the revenge unto her father *Sp. Lucretius Tricipitinus*, her husband *Collatine*, and *Junius Brutus*) she killed herself: whereupon (chiefly by *Junius Brutus*'s resolution) *Tarquinius Superbus*, with his wife and children, was deposed and banished; and fled to *Porsenna* king of *Hetruria* for succour, in the five and twentieth year of his reign, and the two hundred forty and fourth from the building of their city; in which space *Rome* had scarce gotten full possession of fifteen miles round about her.

Junius Brutus, by the help of *Collatine*, having expelled *Tarquin*, and freed his country from that heavy yoak of bondage, enforced the people, by solemn oath, never to admit any government by kings amongst them: whereupon they ransacked their kings goods, consecrated their fields to *Mars*, and conferred the government of the state upon *Brutus* and *Collatine*. But because the name of king was odious in their ears, they changed the manner of their government, from perpetual to annual, and from a single governour to a double; lest perpetual or sole dominion might be some motive to usurpation: and instead of kings they called them *Consuls*, signifying, as it may be interpreted, *Providers*; that their titles might remember them of their place, which was to be always mindful of their citizens welfare. And yet was it so hard setling of troubled waters, that the people, after this innovation of state, scarce daring to assure themselves of their own security, enforced *Tarquinius Collatine* to resign up his authority, fearing that tyranny would be hereditary, and supposing that the very name and affinity with the house of *Tarquin*, savoured already of their condition. In his room was substituted *Valerius Publicola*, who, that he might (as his name importeth) be gracious in the people's eyes, gave liberty, in matters of controversy, to appeal from the consuls to the people: and that he might, as well in goods as in person, avoid occasion of suspicion, caused his own house to be pulled down, because it was built in a place defensible, as if it had been a citadel. Neither was *Brutus* any ways deficient in matter of greater moment, which concerned as well the people's safety, as their favour: for having got intelligence, that some greener wits, and in the first rank his own sons, were itching after innovations, hoping to restore the banished kings; he caused them, publickly in the market-place to be whipt, and then to be brought all impartially to the block.

Hitherto the *Romans*, having by the unblemished integrity of *Brutus*, well appeased all inbred quarrels at home, now hereafter employ their military designments against foreigners; first, for their liberty; secondly, for enlarging their possessions; and lastly, for defending their confederate provinces, and extending their empire. For *Rome*, situated as it were in the mid-way between *Latium* and the *Tuscans*, having as yet but narrow bounds, being in her minority, could not but give occasion of offence to her neighbours; until by main opposition, having prevailed against her borderers, she used them as instruments, whereby to obtain the rest.

Their first war, in the first year of *Consuls*, was against *Porsenna* king of *Hetruria*; who being overperswaded by *Tarquin*'s lamentation, came to *Rome*, together with the banished king, and with great forces, to seat him again in his kingdom.

In the first conflict, *Horatius Cocles*, having long time borne the main brunt of his enemies, on the bridge over *Tybris*; at length, feeling himself too faint to stand against so many, caused the bridge behind him to be broken down, and, with his armour, leaping into the river like a hunted stag, refreshed his hot spirits, and returned safe to his fellows, with the like resolution to sustain a new charge. *Porsenna*, although by this he had wellnigh won the hill *Janiculus*, which is the very entrance into the city, and found the victory, in a manner, assuredly his own; yet admiring their valour, and terrified by the constant resolution of *Mutius Scævola* (who having by error slain *Porsenna* his secretary, instead of the king himself, did, in scorn of torments threatened, burn off his own hand) he thought it not a whit prejudicial, either to his safety, or credit, to enter league with them at the worst hand. And yet the edge of *Tarquinius*'s spleen was not quite abated, though *Aruns* his son, and *Brutus* his enemy, in single combat, had slain each other. And here the *Romans*, although they lost *Brutus*, got the field; and their ladies, whose champion

champion he was, for their chaſtity, not for beauty, mourned the loſs of him one whole year. Into his place, for the reſidue of his year, was ſubrogated *Sp. Lucretius Tricipitinus*, father to *Lucretia*: and in his room (deceaſing naturally before the year expired) *Horatius Pulvillus*.

Tarquine, upon his overthrow, feeling the fates diſaſtrous, thought it no boot to ſtrive againſt the ſtream; and ſpent the reſidue of his time, which was about fourteen years, privately at *Tuſculum*. Yet his ſon-in-law, *Mamilius Tuſculanus*, ſtomaching afreſh at thoſe old repulſes, becauſe *Porſenna* had made peace with the *Romans*, and denied further ſuccour unto the *Tarquines*, muſtered up his *Latins*, and gave battle to the *Romans* at the lake *Regillum*; where the conflict was fierce, and the iſſue uncertain, until *Aulus Poſthumus*, the *Roman Dictator* (for they had created this magiſtracy greater than *Conſuls*, purpoſely for this war, when firſt it was expected) to exaſperate his ſoldiers courage, threw their own enſigns amidſt the enemies; and *Coſſus*, or *Spurius Caſſius* (maſter of the horſemen, an aſſiſtant officer to the *Dictator*) commanded to take off their bridles, that they might run with free violence, to recover again their enſigns. This fight was ſo well performed, that a report went current, of *Caſtor* and *Pollux*, two *Gods*, who came on milk-white ſteeds, to be eye-witneſſes of their valour, and fellow-helpers of their victory; for the general conſecrated a temple to them, as a ſtipend for their pains. After this, the *Romans* fierce ſpirits, having no object of valour abroad, reflected upon themſelves at home; and the ſixteenth year after the kings expulſion, upon inſtigation of ſome deſperate bankrouts, thinking themſelves wrongfully oppreſſed by the ſenate and conſuls, they made an uproar in the holy mount; until by *Menenius Agrippa*, his diſcreet alluſion, of the inconvenience in the head and bellies diſcord, to that preſent occaſion, they were reconciled to the ſenate: with condition, that they might have ſome new magiſtrates created, to whom they might appeal in caſes of variance, and make them ſollicitors in all their controverſies, the conſuls authority notwithſtanding. This was enacted; and they were called the tribunes of the people. After this attonement amongſt themſelves, they had continual war with the *Latines*, concerning their bounds and limits, and with other neighbouring ſtates. Amongſt theſe the *Volſci* and *Æqui* held them longeſt; who made war, of themſelves, upon the *Romans*; whereby they loſt the beſt city in their whole juriſdiction, *Corioli*.

In this conqueſt, *T. Martius* got the ſirname of *Coriolanus*: a name honourable then, as derived from a great victory; although by reaſon of the poverty of the town, a *Roman* general, in after times, would have been aſhamed of that title. But yet theſe graces had been no occaſion of diſparagement, had he not afterwards, in a time of dearth, adviſed to ſell corn, which they procured from *Sicil*, at too high a rate, to the people: whereupon, *Decius Mus*, their tribune, in their behalf, accuſed him, and after judgment, baniſhed him. *Coriolanus* flying to the *Volſci*, whom lately before he had vanquiſhed, incenſed them to renew their forces again, which being committed unto him, and to *Attius Tullus*, he prevailed in field ſo far forth, that he was come within four or five miles of the city. Encamping there, he made ſo ſharp war, and was at ſuch defiance with his country, that he would not relent, by any ſupplication of embaſſadors, until his mother *Veturia*, and *Volumnia* his wife, with a pitiful tune of deprecation, ſhewing themſelves better ſubjects to their country, than friends to their ſon and huſband, were more available to *Rome*, than was any force of Arms. Hereupon *Coriolanus* diſmiſſing his army, was after put to death among the *Volſci*, as a Traytor, for neglecting ſuch opportunity: or (as others ſurmiſe) living with them until old age, he died naturally.

Not long after this, the *Veii* in *Hetruria* provoked the *Romans*; againſt whom the *Fabii*, three hundred and ſix in number, all of one family, entreated and obtained, that they only might be employed, as it had been in a private quarrel. Theſe *Fabii*, after ſome good ſervices, lying encamped at *Cremera*, were circumvented, and all ſlain; one only of that whole houſe, had been left, by reaſon of infancy, at home; from whom afterward ſprang *Fabius Maximus*, who vanquiſhed *Hannibal*.

In proceſs of time, the *Romans* were alſo troubled with the *Volſci*, at the hill of *Algidum*, two miles from *Rome*; where *Lucius Minucius* their conſul, with his whole army, had been diſcomfited, had not *L. Quintius Cincinatus*, choſen *Dictator*, and taken from the plough to the higheſt honour in *Rome*, which ſucceſs anſwerable to his expedition, diſperſed his enemies, and freed his country in the ſpace of ſixteen days. In the continuance of this *Volcian* war it was, that *Appius Claudius*, one of the ten men, whom they had two years before choſen governours of the ſtate, and enactors of *Solon*'s Laws amongſt them, procured from *Athens* (abrogating in the mean while the conſuls, and all other magiſtrates) would have raviſhed *Virginia*, the daughter of *T. Virginius*, captain of a company, and lying then in camp at *Algidum*. Hereupon the people, in an uproar, took the hill *Aventine*, and after much variance, enforced the ten men to reſign up their authority again to new conſuls.

After this, either new quarrels, or deſire to revenge old loſſes, drew the *Romans* into a new war againſt the *Veientes*, and their adherents, upon whom having tried their forces, with diverſity of captains, and variety of event, they vanquiſhed the *Faliſci*, and the *Fidenates*, and utterly ſubdued the *Veientes*. In conquering the *Faliſci*, *Furius Camillus* ſhewed no leſs integrity than fortitude. For when a ſchool-maſter, by training forth into the *Roman* camp, many children of the principal citizens, thought to betray the town, yielding them all up as hoſtages: *Camillus* delivered this traytor bound unto his ſcholars, willing them to whip him back into the city; which forth-with yielded unto him in reverence of his juſtice. The ſiege of *Veii* was ten years, and ſo troubleſome, that the *Romans* were there firſt enforced to winter abroad under beaſts ſkins (to which they were the more eaſily induced, becauſe then firſt they received pay) and to make vows never to return without victory.

At length, winning the city by a mine, they got ſo large ſpoils, that they conſecrated their tenths to *Apollo Pythius*; and the whole people in general, were called to the ranſacking of the city. But they were no leſs unthankful to *Camillus* for his ſervice, than before they had been to *Coriolanus*; for they baniſh'd him the city, upon ſome occaſion of inequality in dividing the ſpoils: yet he requited their unkindneſs with a new piece of ſervice, againſt the fury of the *Gauls*; who being a populous country, and very healthful, the fathers (as ſometimes now) lived ſo long, that the ſons, deſtitute of means, were enforced to rove abroad, ſeeking ſome place, where to ſet up their reſt: and withal being a nation vaſt in body, rude by nature, and barbarous in conditions, wandred as rovers over many countries. Some of them lighting on *Italy*,

ſet upon *Cluſium*, a town in *Hetruria*; whereof *Rome* having information (and being careful of her confederate towns) ſent embaſſadors, warning them to deſiſt from ſuch injurious enterpriſes. But the barbarous people, not regarding the meſſage, upon ſome injury offered by the *Roman* embaſſadors, converted their forces from *Cluſium* towards *Rome*; and giving a great overthrow unto the *Romans*, by the river *Allia*, upon the ſixteenth day before the *Calends* of *Auguſt* (which day was after branded for unlucky, and called *Allienſis* in the *Roman Calendar*) they haſtened towards the city. Then was *Rome* the true map of miſery and deſolation. For ſome leaving the city, ſome creeping into holes, prieſts hiding their reliques, and every one ſhifting for himſelf; ere the enemy came, *Rome* was abandoned, as indefenſible. The veſtal virgins, in this tumult, were ſafely conveyed away; the ancients of the city, gathering boldneſs out of deſperate fear, did put on their robes, and taking their leave of the world, did ſeat themſelves in thrones, in their ſeveral houſes, hourly expecting the meſſengers of death, and meaning to die, as they had lived, in ſtate. The younger ſort, with *M. Manlius* their captain, took upon them to make good the capitol.

By this, the *Gauls* were entred the city, who ſeeing all quiet, at firſt ſuſpected ſome ambuſh; after finding all ſecure, they fell to the ſpoil, committing all to the fire and ſword. As for the old ſenators, they ſate in their majeſty, with a grave reſolution: having firſt reverenced them as *Gods*, anon they tried whether they would die like Men. When the city was thoroughly rifled, they attempted the capitol; which held them work for the ſpace of ſeven months. Once they were like to have ſurprized it by night, but being deſcried by the gagling of *geeſe*, *M. Manlius* did awaken, and kept them from entrance. At length a compoſition was agreed upon: the *Gauls* being weary, and the *Romans* hungry. The bargain was, that the *Gauls* ſhould take a thouſand pound weight in gold, to deſiſt from their ſiege. Whilſt the gold was in weighing, the *Gauls*, with open inſolency, made their weights too heavy: *Brennus*, their captain, caſting his ſword into the balance, and, with a proud exprobration, ſaying, that the vanquiſhed muſt be patient *per* force. But in the midſt of this cavilling, came *Furius Camillus* with an army from *Ardea*, (where he had lived in his baniſhment) and fell upon the *Gauls* with ſuch violence, that he diſperſed their troops, quenched the fire of the city with their blood, forcing them to reſtore the ſpoils with advantage, and forbear the gold, in accepting which, they had lately been ſo nice. Further, having rid the city of them, he ſo hotly purſued them through a great part of *Italy*, that the remainder of their army which eſcaped from him, was very ſmall. Other armies of the *Gauls*, which followed this firſt, had the like ill ſucceſs. They were often beaten by the *Romans*; eſpecially the victories of *M. Torquatus*, and of *M. Valerius Corvinus* (each of which in ſingle fight ſlew a champion of the *Gauls*) abated their preſumption, and reſtored courage to the *Romans*. *Camillus*, for his notable ſervice, was afterwards accounted a ſecond *Romulus*.

The people, after this deſtruction of their city, were earneſtly bent to go to the *Veii* to inhabit; but *Camillus* diſſwaded them.

About the ſame time, ſomewhat before the ſiege of *Veii*, they changed their government from conſuls to military tribunes. The government of theſe alſo, after ſome years, was by civil diſſention interrupted: ſo that one while conſuls ruled; another while there was an anarchy: then the tribunes were reſtored and ruled again, till after many years expired, the conſular authority was eſtabliſhed; it being enacted, that one of the conſuls ſhould always be a *Plebeian*. This was after the building of the city, three hundred ſixty five years. And now *Rome*, by ſuppreſſion of her neighbour countries, creeping well forward out of her minority, dares ſet forth againſt the warlike *Samnites*, who dwelt almoſt one hundred and thirty miles off; ſituated between *Campania* and *Apulia*. Theſe did ſo ſtrongly invade the *Campanians* their neighbours, that they forced them to yield themſelves ſubjects to *Rome*, and undergo any conditions of tribute, or whatſoever elſe, to obtain protection: which the *Romans*, although both countries had been their confederates, yet not willing that the greater, like fiſh, ſhould devour the leſs, eaſily allowed of; aiming themſelves at the good ſituation of *Campania*, the abundance of corn and wine, pleaſant cities and towns, but eſpecially *Capua* it ſelf, the faireſt city then in all *Italy*.

The Families of the *Papyrii* and *Fabii* were moſt employed in the managing of this war, which endured the ſpace of fifty years. And in this ſeaſon were the *Romans* often-times dangerouſly encountred by the *Samnites*; as when *T. Veturius*, and *Sp. Poſthumius* were conſuls; and diſcomfited by *Pontius* at *Caudium*, with no ſmall ignominy; and when *Q. Fabius Gurges* loſt the field with three thouſand men. But for theſe loſſes, many great victories made large amends: the greateſt whereof were gotten by *L. Papyrius*, and by *Quintus Fabius Maximus*.

The *Samnites* drew the *Hetrurians* into their quarrel. But the force of the *Samnites* was well broken, ere the *Hetrurians* (the greater and richer, but leſs warlike nation) began to ſtir. So the one and the other of theſe two countries, became at length, tributary to *Rome*.

In the continuance of this long war it was, (though in time of truce between the *Romans* and the *Samnites*) that the *Latins* began to challenge equal freedom in the corporation of *Rome*, and right in bearing office, ſo that they required to have one of the conſuls yearly choſen out of them.

This demand of the *Latins* was not unreaſonable. For the *Romans* themſelves were a *Latin* colony; beſides all which, they made offer, to change their name, and to be all called *Romans*. But the *Romans* were too proud, to admit any ſuch capitulation. So a great battel was fought between them; wherein the fortune of *Rome* prevailed, by the vertue of the conſuls.

Manlius Torquatus, and the elder *Decius*, were then conſuls, whom the ſooth-ſayers advertiſed, that the ſide ſhould be victorious which loſt the general in fight. Hereupon, *Decius* the conſul, expoſed his life to the enemy, and purchaſed victory (as was believed) by his death. In which kind of devoting himſelf for his army, the ſon of this *Decius*, being after conſul, did imitate his father, in the *Hetrurian* war. But (as *Tully* well notes) it was rather the deſperate reſolution of theſe *Decii*, that purchaſed victory, by ruſhing into the midſt of the enemies, wherein their ſoldiers followed them, than any great commendation of ſuch a religion as required the lives of ſo worthy citizens to be ſacrificed for their country. The diſcipline of *Manlius* was no leſs reſolute than the valour of *Decius*. He forbad any one to forſake his place, and fight ſingle with an enemy. For breach of which order, he cauſed his ſon to be put to death, who had

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ſlain a captain of the *Latins*, being challenged in ſingle fight.

When the *Latins*, the *Æqui*, *Voſci*, *Hernici*, *Campani*, *Samnites*, and *Hetrurians*, with ſome other people, were brought under obedience; it was a vain labour for any people of *Italy*, to contend againſt the *Romans*.

Yet the *Sabines* adventured to try their fortune; and found it bad; for *Curius Dentatus*, the *Roman* conſul, waſting all their country with fire and ſword, from the river *Nar* and *Velia*, to the *Adriatick* ſea, brought them into quiet ſubjection.

The laſt of the *Italians* that made trial of the *Roman* arms, were the *Tarentines*, and their adherents. Theſe had interpoſed themſelves as Mediators between the *Romans* and *Samnites*; with a peremptory denunciation of war unto that party which ſhould dare to refuſe the peace by them tendered. Theſe threats, which diſcovered their bad affection unto *Rome*, ended in words; but when the *Samnites* were utterly ſubdued, matter enough of quarrel was found to examine their ability of performance.

The *Romans* complained that certain ſhips of theirs were robbed, and ſent ambaſſadors unto *Tarentum*, to require amends. Upon ſome wrong done to theſe ambaſſadors, was laid the foundation of that war, wherein the *Lucans*, *Meſſapians*, *Brutians*, and *Appulians*, joining with the *Tarentines*, procured the *Samnites*, and other ſubjects of *Rome*, to rebel and take their part. But ſome experience of the *Roman* ſtrength, taught all theſe people to know their own weakneſs. Wherefore, they agreed to ſend for *Pyrrhus*, by whoſe aid being a *Grecian*, as the *Tarentines* alſo were) great hope was conceived, that the dominion of *Rome* ſhould be confined unto more narrow bounds than all *Italy*, which already, in a manner, it did overſpread.

SECT. II.

How Pyrrhus *warred* upon the *Romans*, *and vanquiſhed them in two battels.*

PYRRHUS, forſaken by the *Macedonians*, and unable to deal with *Lyſimachus*, was compelled a while to live in reſt; which he abhorred no leſs, than a wiſer prince would have deſired. He had a ſtrong army, and a good fleet, which in that unſettled eſtate of things, was enough to purchaſe a kingdom; but the fall of *Demetrius* had ſo increaſed the power of *Lyſimachus*, that it was no point of wiſdom to make an offenſive war upon him, without far greater forces. *Antigonus*, the ſon of *Demetrius*, held *Corinth* at the ſame time, and ſome other towns, with the remainder of his father's army and treaſures, left in his hand. Upon him it is like that *Pyrrhus* might have won; but it was better to let him alone, that he might ſerve to give ſome hindrance to *Lyſimachus*.

In this want of employment, and covetous deſire of finding it, the *Tarentine* ambaſſadors came very fitly to *Pyrrhus*; and they came with brave offers, as needing none other aid than his good conduct, which to obtain, they would caſt themſelves under his protection. They had in their company ſome of the *Samnites*, *Lucanians*, *Meſſapians*, and others; which promiſed, in behalf of their ſeveral nations, as much as could be deſired. This encouraged *Pyrrhus*, and filled him with hopes of goodly conqueſts, that he might enlarge his empire to the weſt, as far as *Alexander* had gotten eaſtward; and ſtill, by one victory, open the gate unto another. To which effect, it is ſaid, that once he anſwered *Cyneas*, his chief counſellor, aſking what he meant to do after every of the victories which he hoped to get; that, having won *Rome*, he would ſoon be maſter of all *Italy*; that, after *Italy*, he would quickly get the iſle of *Sicil*; that out of *Sicil* he would paſs over into *Africk*, and win *Carthage*, with all the reſt of the country; and being ſtrengthened with the force of all theſe provinces, he would be too hard for any of thoſe that were now ſo proud and troubleſome. But *Cyneas* enquired yet further what they ſhould do, when they were lords of all; whereunto *Pyrrhus* (finding his drift) anſwered pleaſantly, that they would live merrily; a thing (as *Cyneas* then told him) that they preſently might do without any trouble, if he could be contented with his own.

Nevertheleſs, this *Italian* expedition ſeemed unto *Pyrrhus* a matter of ſuch conſequence, as was not to be omitted, in regard of any ſcholaſtical diſputation. Wherefore he prepared his army, of almoſt thirty thouſand men, well ſorted, and well trained ſoldiers; part of which he ſent over before him unto *Cyneas*, with the reſt he followed in perſon. At his coming, he found the *Tarentines* very prompt of tongue; but in matter of execution, utterly careleſs to provide for the war. Wherefore he was fain to ſhut up their theater, and other places of pleaſure and reſort; enforcing them to take arms, and making ſuch a ſtrict muſter, as was to them very unpleaſing, though greatly behoving to their eſtate.

Whilſt he was occupied with theſe cares, *Levinus* the *Roman* conſul drew near, and began to waſte *Lucania*, a province confederate with the *Tarentines* in this war.

The *Lucanians* were not ready to defend their own country; the *Samnites* were careleſs of the harm, that fell not (as yet) upon themſelves; the *Tarentines* were better prepared than they would have been, but their valour was little; all of theſe had been accuſtomed to ſhrink, for fear of the *Roman* fortitude; and therefore it fell out happily, that *Pyrrhus* relied more upon his own forces, than the iſſue of their vaunting promiſes. He was now driven either to ſet forward with thoſe that himſelf had brought into *Italy*, and the aſſiſtance of the *Tarentines*, wherein little was to be repoſed; or elſe to weaken the reputation of his own ſufficiency, which by all means he was careful to uphold. In good time, a great part of his forces that had been ſcattered by foul weather at ſea, were ſafely come to him; with which he reſolved to aſſay the valour of the *Romans*, againſt whom he proudly marched.

Levinus, the conſul, was not affrighted with the terrible name of a great king; but came on confidently to meet him, and give him battel ere all his adherents ſhould be ready to join with him. This boldneſs of the *Roman*, and the ſlackneſs of the *Meſſapians*, *Lucanians*, *Samnites*, and others, whom the danger moſt concerned, cauſed *Pyrrhus* to offer a treaty of peace; requiring to have the quarrel between the *Romans* and his *Italian* friends, referred to his arbitrement. Whether he did this to win time, that the *Samnites* and their fellows might arrive at his camp; or whether, conſidering better at near diſtance, the weight of the buſineſs which he had taken in hand, he were deſirous to quit it with his honour; the ſhort anſwer that was returned to his propoſition, gave him no means of either the one or the other; for the *Romans* ſent him this word, that *they had neither choſen him their judge, nor feared him their enemy*.

Hereupon both armies haſtened their march unto the river of *Siris*: *Levinus* intending to fight before the arrival of the *Samnites*; *Pyrrhus*, to hinder him from paſſing that river, until his own army

my were full. Upon the firſt view of the *Roman* camp, it was readily conceived by *Pyrrhus*, that he had not now to do with barbarous people, but with men well trained in a brave diſcipline of war: which cauſed him to ſet a ſtrong *Corps de garde* upon the paſſage of the river, that he might not be compelled to fight, until he ſaw his beſt advantage. But he quickly found that this new enemy was not only ſkilful in the art of war, but couragious in execution; for the *Roman* army entered the ford in face of his *corps de garde*; and their horſe at the ſame time began to paſs the river in ſundry places, which cauſed the *Greeks* to forſake the defence of their bank, and ſpeedily retired unto their camp.

This audacity forced *Pyrrhus* to battel, wherewith he thought it beſt to preſent them ere their whole army had recovered firm footing, and were in order. So, directing his captains how to marſhal his battels, himſelf with the horſe charged upon the *Romans*, who ſtoutly received him, as men well exerciſed in ſuſtaining furious impreſſions. In this fight, neither did his courage tranſport him beyond the duty of a careful general, nor his providence, in directing others, hinder the manifeſtation of his perſonal valour. It behoved him, indeed, to do his beſt; for he never met with better oppoſers. Once, and ſhortly after the fight began, his horſe was ſlain under him; afterwards he changed armour with a friend, but that friend paid his life for the uſe of his king's armour, which was torn from his back. This accident had almoſt loſt him the battel; but he perceiving it, diſcovered his face, and thereby reſtored courage to his men, and took from the *Romans* their vain joy. The fight was obſtinate, and with the greater loſs (at leaſt of more eminent men) on *Pyrrhus*'s ſide, as long as only ſpear and ſword were uſed. But when the elephants were brought into the wings, whoſe unuſual form and terrible aſpect the horſes of the *Romans* (unaccuſtomed to the like) were not able to ſuſtain, then was the victory quickly gotten; for the *Roman* battles perceiving their horſe put to rout, and driven out of the field, finding alſo themſelves both charged in flank, and overborn by the force and huge bulk of thoſe ſtrange beaſts, gave way to neceſſity, and ſaved themſelves as well as they could by haſty flight: in which conſternation, they were ſo forgetful of their diſcipline, that they tarried not to defend their camp, but ran quite beyond it, leaving both it, and the honour of the day, entirely to *Pyrrhus*.

The fame of this victory was ſoon ſpread over *Italy*; and the reputation was no leſs than the fame; for it was a matter very rare to be heard, that a *Roman* conſul, with a ſelect army, ſhould loſe in plain battel not only the field, but the camp it ſelf, being ſo notably fortified as they always were. And this honour was the more bravely won by *Pyrrhus*, for that he had with him none of his *Italian* friends, ſave the unwarlike *Tarentines*. Neither could he well diſſemble his content that he took, in having the glory of this action peculiarly his own, at ſuch time as he blamed the *Lucans* and *Samnites* for coming (as we ſay) a day after the fair. Nevertheleſs, he wiſely conſidered the ſtrength of the *Romans*, which was ſuch as would better endure many ſuch loſſes, than he could endure many ſuch victories. Therefore he thought it good to compound with them, whilſt with his honour he might; and to that purpoſe, he ſent unto them *Cyneas*, his ambaſſador, demanding only to have the *Tarentines* permitted to live at reſt, and himſelf accepted as their eſpecial friend. This did *Cyneas*, with all his cunning, and with liberal gifts, labour to effect: but neither man nor woman could be found in *Rome*, that would take any bribe of him; neither did their deſire of recovering their captives, or their danger, by the riſing of many ſtates in *Italy* againſt them, ſo incline them to peace, as the vehement exhortation of *Appius Claudius*, an old and blind ſenator, did ſtir them up to make good their honour by war. So they returned anſwer, that whilſt *Pyrrhus* abode in *Italy*, they would come to no agreement with him.

Such was the report that *Cyneas* made at his return, of the *Roman* puiſſance and virtue, as kindled in *Pyrrhus* a great deſire of confederacy with that gallant city. Hereupon many kind offices paſſed between them: but ſtill when he urged his motion of peace, the anſwer was, *He muſt firſt depart out of* Italy, *and then treat of peace.*

In the mean ſeaſon each part made proviſion for war; the *Romans* levying a more mighty army than the former; and *Pyrrhus* being ſtrengthened with acceſs unto his forces, of all the eaſt parts of *Italy*. So they came to trial of a ſecond battel, wherein (tho' after long and cruel fight) the boiſtrous violence of the elephants gave to *Pyrrhus* a ſecond victory. But this was not altogether ſo joyful as the former had been: rather it gave him cauſe to ſay, that ſuch another victory would be his utter undoing. For he had loſt the flower of his army in this battel, and tho' he drove the *Romans* into their camp, yet he could not force them out of it, nor ſaw any likelihood of prevailing againſt them that were like to be relieved with daily ſupplies, whilſt he ſhould be driven to ſpend upon his old ſtock. Neither could he expect that his elephants ſhould always ſtand him in ſtead. A little knowledge of their manner in fight, would ſoon teach the *Romans*, that were apt ſcholars in ſuch learning, how to make them unſerviceable. Wherefore he deſired nothing more, than how to carry his honour ſafe out of *Italy*: which to do (ſeeing the *Romans* would not help him, by offering or accepting any fair conditions of peace or of truce) he took a ſlight occaſion, preſented by fortune, that followeth to be related.

SECT. III.

The great troubles in Macedon *and* Sicil. *How* Pyrrhus *being invited into* Sicil, *forſook* Italy; *won the moſt of the iſle, and loſt it in ſhort ſpace.* Pyrrhus *returns into* Italy; *where he is beaten by the* Romans, *and ſo goes back to his own kingdom.*

WHEN *Ptolemy Ceraunus* had traiterouſly murdered his benefactor and patron *Seleucus*, he preſently ſeized upon all the dominions of *Lyſimachus* in *Europe*, as if they had been the due reward unto him, that had ſlain the conqueror. The houſes of *Caſſander* and *Lyſimachus* were then fallen to the ground: neither was there in *Macedon* any man of ſtrength and reputation enough to advance himſelf againſt *Ceraunus*. The friends of *Lyſimachus* were rather pleaſed to have him their king, that had (as he profeſſed) revenged their lord's death, than any way offended with the odiouſneſs of his fact, by which they were freed from ſubjection, to one, againſt whom they had ſtood in oppoſition. Many there were, that upon remembrance of his father's great virtue, gathered hope of finding the like in *Ceraunus*: perſwading themſelves that his reign might prove good, tho' his entrance had been wicked. Theſe affections of the *Macedonians* did ſerve to defeat *Antigonus* the ſon of *Demetrius*, that made an attempt upon the kingdom.

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As for *Antigonus*, the ſon of *Seleucus*, he was far off, and might be queſtioned about ſome part of *Aſia*, ere he ſhould be able to bring an army near unto *Europe*. Yet he made great ſhew of meaning to revenge his father's death: but being ſtronger in money than in arms, he was content, after a while, to take fair words, and make peace with the murtherer. While theſe three ſtrove about the kingdom, *Pyrrhus*, who thought his claim as good as any of theirs, made uſe of their diſſenſion: threatning war, or promiſing his aſſiſtance to every one of them. By theſe means he ſtrengthened himſelf, and greatly advanced his *Italian* voyage, which he had then in hand: requeſting money of *Antiochus*, ſhips of *Antigonus*, and ſoldiers of *Ptolemy*, who gave him his daughter in marriage, and lent him a ſtrong power of *Macedonian* ſoldiers, and of elephants (covenanting to have them reſtored at two years end) more for fear than for love: that ſo he might free himſelf from trouble, and quietly enjoy his kingdom. Thus *Ptolemy* grew mighty on the ſudden; and the power that by wicked means he had gotten, by means as wicked he increaſed.

All *Macedon* and *Thrace* being his, the ſtrong city of *Caſſandria* was held by *Arſinoe* his ſiſter, the widow of *Lyſimachus*, who lay therein with her young children. Her he circumvented by making love to her, and (according to the faſhion of thoſe times, wherein princes regarded no degree of conſanguinity) taking her to wife, with promiſe to adopt her children: a promiſe that he meant not to perform; for it was not long ere he ſlew them and drove her into exile.

In the pride of this good ſucceſs which his villany found, vengeance came upon him from afar, by the fury of a nation that he had never heard of. *Belgius* a captain of the *Gauls*, having forced his paſſage thro' many countries, unto the confines of *Macedon*, ſent a proud meſſage to *Ceraunus*, commanding him to buy peace with money, or otherwiſe to look for all the miſeries of war. Theſe *Gauls* were the race of thoſe that iſſued out of their country, to ſeek new ſeats in that expedition, wherein *Brennus* took and burnt the city of *Rome*. They had divided themſelves at their ſetting forth, into two companies; of which the one fell upon *Italy*, the other paſſing through the countries that lie on the northern ſide of the *Adriatic* ſea, made long abode in *Pannonia*, and the regions adjoining, where they forced all the neighbour princes to redeem peace with tribute, as now they would have compelled *Ceraunus* to do, upon whoſe borders they came, about an hundred and eight years after ſuch time as their fellows had taken *Rome*.

When their embaſſadors came to *Ptolemy*, aſking what he would give: his anſwer was, that he would be contented to give them peace, but it muſt be with condition, that they ſhould put into his hands their princes as hoſtages, and yield up their arms, for otherwiſe he would neither pardon their boldneſs, nor give any credit to their words. At this anſwer, when it was returned, the *Gauls* did laugh; ſaying, that they would ſoon confute with deeds the vanity of ſuch proud words. It may ſeem ſtrange, that he, who had given away part of his army unto *Pyrrhus* for very fear, ſhould be ſo confident in undertaking more mighty enemies. The king of the *Dardanians* offered to lend him twenty thouſand men againſt the *Gauls*, but he ſcorned the offer; ſaying, that he had the children of thoſe, who, under the conduct of *Alexander*, had ſubdued all the eaſt. This he iſſued forth againſt the barbarous people, with his famous *Macedonians*, as if the victory muſt needs have followed the reputation of a great name. But he ſoon found his great error, when it was too late. For the enemies were not only equal in ſtrength of body and fierceneſs of courage, but ſo far ſuperior to the *Macedonians* in numbers, that few or none eſcaped their fury: *Ptolemy* himſelf grievouſly wounded, fell into their hands whilſt the battel continued, and they preſently ſtruck off his head, which they ſhewed to his men on the top of a lance, to their utter aſtoniſhment.

The report of this great overthrow filled all *Macedon* with ſuch deſperation, that the people fled into walled towns, and abandoned the whole country as loſt. Only *Soſthenes*, a valiant captain, animating as many as he could, gathered a ſmall army, with which he many times got the upper hand, and hindered *Belgius* from uſing the victory at his whole pleaſure. In regard of this his virtue, the ſoldiers would have made him king, which title he refuſed, and was content with the name of a general. But (as miſchiefs do ſeldom come alone) the good ſucceſs of *Belgius*, drew into *Macedon Brennus*, another captain of the *Gauls*, with an hundred and fifty thouſand foot, and fifteen thouſand horſe; againſt which mighty army, when *Soſthenes* with his weak troops made oppoſition, he was eaſily beaten, and the *Macedonians* again compelled to hide themſelves within their walls, leaving all their country to the ſpoil of the *Barbarians*.

Thus were the *Macedonians* deſtitute of a king, and trodden down by a nation that they had not heard of in leſs than fifty years after the death of *Alexander*, who fought to diſcover and ſubdue unknown countries, as if all *Greece*, and the empire of *Perſia* had been too little for a king of *Macedon*.

Very ſeaſonably had theſe news been carried to *Pyrrhus* in *Italy*, who ſought a fair pretext of relinquiſhing his war with the *Romans*, had not other tiding out of *Sicily* diſtracted him, and carried him away in purſuit of nearer hopes. For, after the death of *Agathocles*, who reigned over the whole iſland, the *Carthaginians* ſent an army to conquer *Sicily*, out of which, by him, they had been expelled. This army did ſo faſt prevail, that the *Sicilians* had no other hope to avoid ſlavery, than in ſubmitting themſelves to the rule of *Pyrrhus*; whom, being a *Grecian*, and a noble prince, they thought it more for their good to obey, than to live under the well known heavy yoke of *Carthage*. To him therefore the *Syracuſans*, *Leontines*, and *Agragentines*, principal eſtates of the iſle, ſent embaſſadors, earneſtly deſiring him to take them into his protection.

It grieved *Pyrrhus* exceedingly, that two ſuch notable occaſions, of enlarging his dominions, ſhould fall out ſo unluckily, both at one time. Yet, whether he thought the buſineſs of *Sicily* more important, or more full of likelihood; or whether perhaps he believed (as came after to paſs) that his advantage, upon *Macedon*, would not ſo haſtily paſs away, but that he might find ſome occaſion to lay hold on it, at better leiſure, over into *Sicily* he tranſported his army, leaving the *Tarentines* to ſhift for themſelves; yet not leaving them free as he found them, but with a garriſon in their town, to hold them in ſubjection.

As his departure out of *Italy*, was rather grounded on headlong paſſion, than mature advice; ſo were his actions following, until his return unto *Epirus*, rather many and tumultuous, than well ordered or note-worthy. The army which he carried into that Iſle, conſiſted of thirty thouſand

foot, and two thouſand five hundred horſe: with which, ſoon after his deſcent in *Sicily*, he forc'd the *Carthaginians* out of all, in effect, that they held therein. He alſo won the ſtrong City of *Eryx*; and having beaten the *Mamertines* in battel, he began to change condition, and turn tyrant. For he drove *Soſtratus* (to whom his cruelty was ſuſpected) out of the iſland, and put *Thenon* of *Syracuſe* to death, being jealous of his greatneſs; which two perſons had faithfully ſerved him, and delivered the great and rich city of *Syracuſe* into his hands. After this, his fortunes declined ſo faſt, as he ſerved himſelf, and ſalved the diſ-reputation of his leaving *Sicily*, by an embaſſage ſent him from the *Tarentines*, and *Samnites*, imploring his preſent help againſt the *Romans*, who, ſince his leaving *Italy*, had well near diſpoſſeſs'd them of all that they had.

Taking this fair occaſion, he imbarked for *Italy*; but was firſt beaten by the *Carthaginian* gallies, in his paſſage; and ſecondly aſſailed in *Italy* it ſelf, by eighteen hundred *Mamertines*, that attended him in the ſtraits of the country. Laſtly, after he had recovered *Tarentum*, he fought a third battel with the *Romans*, led by *M. Curius*, who was victorious over him, and forced him out of *Italy*, into his own *Epirus*.

A prince he was far more valiant than conſtant, and had he been but a general of an army for ſome other great king or ſtate, and had been directed to have conquered any one country or kingdom, it is to be thought, that he would have purchaſed no leſs honour, than any man of war, either preceding or ſucceeding him; for a greater captain, or a valianter man, hath been no where found. But he never ſtaid upon any enterprize; which was indeed the diſeaſe he had, whereof not long after he died in *Argos*.

SECT. IV.

How Antigonus, *the ſon of* Demetrius, *delivered* Macedon *from the* Gauls. *How* Pyrrhus *won the kingdom of* Macedon *from* Antigonus.

THE virtue of *Soſthenes* being too weak, to defend the kingdom of *Macedon*; and the fortune which had accompanied him againſt *Belgius*, failing him in his attempts againſt *Brennus*: the *Macedonians* were no leſs glad to ſubmit themſelves unto the government of *Antigonus*, than they had formerly been deſirous to free themſelves, from the impotent rule of his father *Demetrius*. His coming into the country, with an army, navy, and treaſure, beſeeming a king, did rather breed good hope in the people, than fill them with much confidence: for he was driven to uſe againſt the *Barbarians*, only thoſe forces which he brought with him, having none other than good wiſhes of the *Macedons* to take his part. *Brennus*, with the main ſtrength of his army, was gone to ſpoil the temple of *Apollo* at *Delphos*, having left no more behind him, than he thought neceſſary to guard the borders of *Macedon*, and *Pannonia*; which were about fifteen thouſand foot, and three thouſand horſe. Theſe could not be idle, but thought to get ſomewhat for themſelves, in the abſence of their fellows: and therefore ſent unto *Antigonus*, offering to ſell him peace, if he would pay well for it; which, by the example of *Ceraunus*, he had learnt (as they thought) not to refuſe. *Antigonus* was unwilling to weaken his reputation, by condeſcending to their proud demands: yet he judged it unfit to exaſperate their furious choler, by uncourteous words or uſage, as *Ceraunus* had overfondly done. Wherefore he entertained their ambaſſadors in very loving and ſumptuous manner with a royal feaſt; wherein he expoſed to their view ſuch abundance of maſſy gold and ſilver, that they were not ſo much delighted with the meat, as with ſight of the veſſels wherein it was ſerved. He thought hereby to make them underſtand how great a prince he was, and how able, if need required, to wage a mighty army.

To which end, he likewiſe did ſhew unto them his camp and navy, but eſpecially his elephants. But all this bravery ſerved only to kindle their greedy appetites; who, ſeeing his ſhips heavy loaden, his camp full of wealth and ill fortified, himſelf (as it ſeemed) ſecure, and his men, both in ſtrength and courage, inferior unto the *Gauls*, thought all time loſt, wherein they ſuffered the preſent poſſeſſors to ſpend the riches which they accounted aſſuredly their own. They returned therefore to their companions, with none other news in their mouths, than of ſpoil and purchaſe; which tale carried the *Gauls* headlong to *Antigonus*'s camp, where they expected a greater booty, than the victory over *Ceraunus* had given to *Belgius*. Their coming was terrrible and ſudden; yet not ſo ſudden, but that *Antigonus* had notice of it, who, diſtruſting the courage of his own men, diſlodged ſomewhat before their arrival, conveyed himſelf, with his whole army and carriage, into certain woods adjoining, where he lay cloſe.

The *Gauls*, finding his camp forſaken, were not haſty to purſue him, but fell to ranſacking the empty cabbins of the ſoldiers, in hope of finding all that was either loſt or hidden. At length, when they had ſearched every place in vain, angry at their loſt labour, they marched with all ſpeed toward the ſea-ſide, that they might fall upon him, whilſt he was buſy in getting his men and carriages a-ſhip-board. But the ſucceſs was no way anſwerable to their expectation; for, being proud of the terror which they had brought upon *Antigonus*, they were ſo careleſs of the ſea-men, that without all order, they fell to the ſpoil of what they found on the ſhore, and in ſuch ſhips as lay on ground.

Part of the army had left *Antigonus*, where he lay in covert, and had ſaved it ſelf by getting aboard the fleet; in which number were ſome well experienced men of war, who diſcovering the much advantage offered unto them, by the deſperate preſumption of their enemies, took courage, and encouraged others, to lay manly hold upon the opportunity. So the whole number both of ſoldiers and mariners, landing together, with great reſolution, gave ſo brave a charge upon the diſordered *Gauls*, that their contemptuous boldneſs was thereby changed into ſudden fear; and they, after a great ſlaughter, driven to caſt themſelves into the ſervice of *Antigonus*.

The fame of this victory cauſed all the barbarous nations in thoſe quarters, to re-entertain their ancient belief of the *Macedon* valour; by which the terrible and reſiſtleſs oppreſſors of ſo many countries were overthrown.

To ſpeak more of the *Gauls*, in this place; and to ſhew how, about theſe times, three tribes of them paſſed over into *Aſia* the leſs, with their wars and conqueſts there, I hold it needleſs: the victorious arms of the *Romans*, taming them hereafter in the countries which now they won, ſhall give better occaſion to rehearſe theſe matters briefly.

Howſoever the good ſucceſs of *Antigonus* got him reputation among the barbarous people, yet his own ſoldiers, that without his leading had won this victory, could not thereupon be perſwaded to think him a good man of war, knowing that he had no intereſt in the honour of the ſervice, wherein his conduct was no better, than creeping into a wood.

This

This (as presently will appear) was greatly helpful unto *Pyrrhus*; though, as yet, he knew not so much. For *Pyrrhus*, when his affairs in *Italy* stood upon hard terms, had sent unto *Antigonus* for help; not without threats, in case it were denied. So was he sure to get either a supply, wherewith to continue his war against the *Romans*, or some seeming honourable pretence to forsake *Italy*, under colour of making his word good, in seeking revenge. The threats which he had used in bravery, mere necessity forced him, at his return into *Epirus*, to put in practice.

He brought home with him eight thousand foot and five hundred horse; an army too little to be employed, by his restless nature, in any action of importance; yet greater than he had means to keep in pay. Therefore he fell upon *Macedon*, intending to take what spoil he could get, and make *Antigonus* compound with him, to be freed from trouble. At his first entrance into this business, two thousand of *Antigonus*'s soldiers revolted unto *Pyrrhus*; and many cities, either willingly or perforce, received him. Such fair beginnings easily perswaded the courage of this daring prince to set upon *Antigonus* himself, and to hazard his fortune, in trial of a battel, for the whole kingdom of *Macedon*.

It appears, that *Antigonus* had no desire to fight with this hot warrior; but thought it the wisest way, by protracting of time, to weary him out of the country. For *Pyrrhus* overtook him in a strait passage, and charged him in the rear, wherein were the *Gauls* and the elephants, which were thought the best of his strength; a manifest proof that he was in retreat. The *Gauls* very bravely sustain'd *Pyrrhus*'s impression, yet were broken at length (when most of them were slain) after a sharp fight; wherein, it seems, that *Antigonus*, keeping his *Macedon phalanx* within the streight, and not advancing to their succour, took away their courage, by deceiving their expectation. The captains of the elephants were taken soon after, who, finding themselves expos'd to the same violence that had consumed so many of the *Gauls*, yielded themselves and the beasts. All this was done in full view of *Antigonus* and his *Macedonians*, to their great discomfort; which emboldened *Pyrrhus* to charge them where they lay in their strength. Where the *phalanx* could be charged only in a front, it was a matter of extreme difficulty (if not impossible) to force it. But the *Macedonians* had seen so much, that they had no desire to fight against *Pyrrhus*, who discovered so well their affections, that he adventured to draw near in person, and exhort them to yield. Neither the common soldier, nor any leader, refused to become his follower. All forsook *Antigonus*, a few horse-men excepted, that fled along with him to *Thessalonica*, where he had some small forces left, and money enough to entertain a greater power, had he known where to levy it. But whilst he was thinking how to allure a sufficient number of the *Gauls* into his service, whereby he might repair his loss, *Ptolemy* the son of *Pyrrhus* came upon him; and easily defeating his weak forces, drove him to fly from the parts about *Macedon*, to those towns afar off in *Peloponnesus*, in which he had formerly lurked, before such time as he looked abroad into the world, and made himself a king.

This good success revived the spirits of the *Epirot*, and caused him to forget all sorrow of his late misfortunes in the *Roman* war; so that he sent for his son *Helenus* (whom he had left with a garrison in the castle of *Tarentum*) willing him to come over into *Greece*, where was more matter of conquest, and let the *Italians* shift for themselves.

SECT. V.

How Pyrrhus *failed for* Sparta *without success. His enterprize upon* Argos, *and his death.*

PYRRHUS had now conceived a great hope, that nothing should be able to withstand him, seeing that in open fight he had vanquished the *Gauls*, beaten *Antigonus*, and won the kingdom of *Macedon*. There was not in all *Greece*, nor indeed in all the lands that *Alexander* had won, any leader of such name and worth, as deserved to be set up against him; which filled him with the opinion that he might do what he pleased. He raised therefore an army, consisting of twenty-five thousand foot, two thousand horse, and twenty-four elephants; pretending war against *Antigonus*, and the giving liberty to those towns in *Peloponnesus*, which the same *Antigonus* held in subjection; though it was easily discovered, that such great preparations were made for accomplishment of some design more important, than war against a prince already vanquished, and almost utterly dejected; especially the *Lacedemonians* feared this expedition, as made against their state. For *Cleonymus*, one of their kings, being expelled out of his country, had betaken himself to *Pyrrhus*, who readily entertained him, and promised to restore him to his kingdom. This promise was made in secret, neither would *Pyrrhus* make shew of any displeasure that he bare unto *Sparta*; but contrariwise, profess'd that it was his intent to have two of his younger sons trained up in that city, as in a place of noble discipline. With such colours he deluded men, even till he entered upon *Laconia*, where presently he demeaned himself as an open enemy; excusing himself, and his former dissembling words, with a jest; *That he followed herein the* Lacedemonian *custom, of concealing what was truly purposed.* It had been indeed the manner of the *Lacedemonians*, to deal in like sort with others, whom, in the time of their greatness, they sought to oppress; but now they complained of that as falshood in *Pyrrhus*, which they always practised as wisdom, till it made them distrusted, forsaken, and almost contemptible. Nevertheless, they were not wanting to themselves in this dangerous extremity; for the old men and women laboured in fortifying the town, causing such as could bear arms to reserve themselves fresh against the assault, which *Pyrrhus* had unwisely deferred, upon assurance of prevailing.

Sparta was never fortified before this time, otherwise than with armed citizens. Soon after this (it being built upon uneven ground, and, for the most part, hard to approach) the lower and more accessible places were fenced with walls; at the present, only trenches were cast, and barricadoes made with carts, where the entrance seemed most easy. Three days together it was assailed by *Pyrrhus* exceeding fiercely, and no less stoutly defended. The desperate courage of the citizens preserved the town the first day, whereinto the violence of *Pyrrhus* had forced entrance the second day, but that his wounded horse threw him to the ground, which made his soldiers more mindful of saving the person of their king, than of breaking into the city, though already they had torn in sunder the barricadoes. Presently after this, one of *Antigonus*'s captains got into *Sparta* with a good strength of men, and *Areus* the king returned out of *Crete* (where he had been helping his friends in war) with two thousand men, little knowing the danger in which his own country stood, until he was almost at home. These succours did not more animate the *Spartans*, than kindle in *Pyrrhus* a desire

a deſire to prevail againſt all impediments. But the third day's work ſhewed, how great his error had been in forbearing to aſſault the town at his firſt coming; for he was ſo manfully repelled, that he ſaw no likelihood of getting the place, otherwiſe than by a long ſiege; in which tedious courſe he had no deſire to ſpend his time.

Antigonus had now raiſed an army, though not ſtrong enough to meet the enemy in plain field, yet able to hinder all his purpoſes. This made *Pyrrhus* doubtful what way to take, being diverſly affected, by the difficulty of his enterprize in hand, and the ſhame of taking a repulſe in his firſt attempt. Whilſt he was thus perplexed, letters came from *Argos*, inviting him thither, with promiſe to deliver that city into his hands.

Civil diſſention raging then hotly in *Argos*, cauſed the heads of ſeveral factions, to call in *Pyrrhus* and *Antigonus*; but the coming of theſe two princes taught the citizens wit, and made them deſirous to rid their hands of ſuch powerful aſſiſtants, as each of the two kings pretended himſelf to be. *Antigonus* told the *Argives*, that he came to ſave them from the tyranny of *Pyrrhus*; and that he would be gone, if they needed not his help. On the other ſide, *Pyrrhus* would needs perſwade them, that he had none other errand, than to make them ſafe from *Antigonus*; offering in like manner to depart, if they ſo deſired.

The *Argives* took ſmall pleaſure in hearing the fox and kite at ſtrife, which of them ſhould keep the chickens from the enemy; and therefore prayed them both to divert their powers ſome other way. Hereunto *Antigonus* readily condeſcended, and gave hoſtages to aſſure his word; for he was the weaker, and ſtood in need of good-will. But *Pyrrhus* thought it enough to promiſe; hoſtages he would give none to his inferiors, eſpecially, meaning deceit. This made them ſuſpect his purpoſe to be ſuch, as indeed it was. Yet he leſs regarded their opinions, than to hold them worthy of aſſurance, by giving ſuch a bond as he intended to break ere the next morning.

It was concluded, that a gate of the city ſhould be opened by night unto *Pyrrhus*, by his complices within *Argos*; which was accordingly performed. So his army, without any tumult, entered the city; till the elephants, with towers on their backs, cloyed the way, being too high to paſs the gate. The taking off and ſetting on again of thoſe towers, with the trouble thereto belonging, did both give alarm to the city, and ſome leiſure to take order for defence, before ſo many were entered as could fully maſter it. *Argos* was full of ditches, which greatly hindered the *Gauls* (that had the vanguard) being ignorant of the ways in the dark night. The citizens, on the other ſide, had much advantage, by their knowledge of every by-paſſage; and ſetting upon the enemies on all ſides, did put them to great loſs, and more trouble.

Pyrrhus therefore underſtanding by the confuſed noiſe and unequal ſhoutings of his own men, that they were in diſtreſs, entered the city in perſon, to take order for their relief, and aſſurance of the place. But the darkneſs, the throng, and many other impediments, kept him from doing any thing of moment, until break of day. Then began he to make his paſſage by force, and ſo far prevailed, that he got into the market-place. It is ſaid, that ſeeing in that place the image of a wolf and a bull, in ſuch poſture as if they had been combatant, he called to mind an oracle, which threatned him with death when he ſhould behold a bull fighting with a wolf; and that hereupon he made retreat.

Indeed the coming of *Antigonus* to the reſcue, the diſorder and confuſion of his own men, with divers ill accidents, gave him reaſonable cauſe to have retired out of the city, though the wolf and bull had been away. The tumult was ſuch, that no directions could be heard; but as ſome gave back, ſo did others thruſt forward, and the *Argives*, preſſing hard upon him, forced *Pyrrhus* to make good his retreat with his own ſword. The tops of the houſes were covered with women, that ſtood looking on the fight. Among theſe was one, that ſaw her own ſon in dangerous caſe, fighting with *Pyrrhus*. Wherefore, ſhe took a tile-ſtone or ſlate, and threw it ſo violently down on the head of *Pyrrhus*, that he fell to the ground aſtoniſhed with the blow; and lying in that caſe, had his head cut off.

Thus ended the reſtleſs ambition of *Pyrrhus*, together with his life; and thus returned the kingdom of *Macedon* to *Antigonus*, who forthwith poſſeſſed the army, the body, and the children of his enemy. The body of *Pyrrhus* had honourable funeral, and was given by *Antigonus* unto *Helenus*, his ſon, which young prince he graciouſly ſent home into his father's kingdom of *Epirus*. From this time forwards, the race of *Antigonus* held the kingdom of *Macedon*; the poſterity of *Seleucus* reigned over *Aſia* and *Syria*; and the houſe of *Ptolemy* had quiet poſſeſſion of *Egypt*, until ſuch time as the city of *Rome*, ſwallowing all up, digeſted theſe, among other countries, into the body of her own empire.

The End of the Fourth **Book**.

THE

THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD:

INTREATING of the

Times from the ſettled Rule of ALEXANDER's *Succeſſors in the Eaſt, until the* ROMANS, *prevailing over all, made Conqueſt of* ASIA *and* MACEDON.

The FIFTH BOOK.

CHAP. I.

Of the Firſt Punic *War.*

SECT. I.

A diſcuſſion of that problem of Livy; *Whether the* Romans *could have reſiſted the great* Alexander? *That neither the* Macedonian *nor the* Roman *ſoldier, was of equal valour to the* Engliſh.

THAT queſtion handled by *Livy*; *Whether the great* Alexander *could have prevailed againſt the* Romans, *if, after his eaſtern conqueſt, he had bent all his forces againſt them*, hath been, and is, the ſubject of much diſpute; which (as it ſeems to me) the arguments on both ſides do not ſo well explain, as doth the experience that *Pyrrhus* hath given of the *Roman* power in his days. For, if he, a commander (in *Hannibal*'s judgment) inferiour to *Alexander*, tho' to none elſe, could with ſmall ſtrength of men, and little ſtore of money, or of other needful helps in war, vanquiſh them in two battels, and endanger their eſtate, when it was well ſettled, and held the beſt part of *Italy* under a confirmed obedience: what would *Alexander* have done, that was abundantly provided of all which is needful to a conqueror, wanting only matter of employment, coming upon them before their dominion was half ſo well ſettled? It is eaſy to ſay, that *Alexander* had no more than thiry thouſand foot, and four thouſand horſe (as indeed, at his firſt paſſage into *Aſia*, he carried over not many more) and that

that the reſt of his followers were no better than baſe effeminate *Aſiatics*. But he that conſiders the armies of *Perdictas*, *Antipater*, *Craterus*, *Eumenes*, *Ptolemy*, *Antigonus*, and *Lyſimachus*, with the actions by them performed, every one of which (to omit others) commanded only ſome fragment of this dead emperor's power; ſhall eaſily find, that ſuch a reckoning is far ſhort of the truth.

It were needleſs to ſpeak of treaſure, horſes, elephants, engines of battery, and the like: of all which the *Macedonian* had abundance; the *Roman* having nought, ſave men and arms. As for ſea-forces; he that ſhall conſider after what ſort the *Romans*, in their firſt *Punic* war, were trained, in the rudiments of navigation, ſitting upon the ſhoar, and beating the ſand with poles, to practiſe the ſtroke of the oar, as not daring to lanch their ill-built veſſels into the ſea; will eaſily conceive, how far too weak they would have proved in ſuch ſervices.

Now for helpers in war; I do not ſee, why all *Greece* and *Macedon*, being abſolutely commanded by *Alexander*, might not well deſerve to be laid in balance againſt thoſe parts of *Italy*, which the *Romans* held in ill-aſſured ſubjection. To omit therefore all benefit, that the eaſtern world, more wealthy indeed than valiant, could have afforded unto the *Macedonian*: let us only conjecture, how the ſtates of *Sicily* and *Carthage*, neareſt neighbours to ſuch a quarrel (had it happened) would have ſtood affected. The *Sicilians* were, for the moſt part, *Grecians*; neither is it to be doubted, that they would readily have ſubmitted themſelves unto him, that ruled all *Greece* beſides them. In what terms they commonly ſtood, and how ill they were able to defend themſelves, it ſhall appear anon. Sure it is, that *Alexander*'s coming into thoſe parts, would have brought exceſſive joy to them that were fain to get the help of *Pyrrhus*, by offering to become his ſubjects. As for the *Carthaginians*; if *Agathocles*, the tyrant of *Syracuſe*, hated of his people, and ill able to defend his own beſieged city, could, by adventuring to ſail into *Afric*, put their dominion, yea, and *Carthage* it ſelf, in extream hazard; ſhall we think that they would have been able to withſtand *Alexander*? But, why do I queſtion their ability, ſeeing that they ſent embaſſadors, with their ſubmiſſion, as far as *Babylon*, ere the war drew near them? wherefore it is manifeſt, that the *Romans* muſt, without other ſuccour, than perhaps of ſome few *Italian* friends (of which yet there were none that forſook them not, at ſome time, both before and after this) have oppoſed their valour, and good military diſcipline, againſt the power of all countries, to them known, if they would have made reſiſtance. How they could have ſped well, in undertaking ſuch a match, it is uneaſy to find in diſcourſe of human reaſon. It is true, that virtue and fortune work wonders; but it is againſt cowardly fools, and the unfortunate: for whoſoever contends with one too mighty for him, either muſt excell in theſe, as much as his enemy goes beyond him in power; or elſe muſt look, both to be overcome, and to be caſt down ſo much the lower, by how much the opinion of his fortune and virtue renders him ſuſpected, as likely to make head another time againſt the vanquiſher. Whether the *Roman*, or the *Macedonian*, were in thoſe days the better ſoldier, I will not take upon me to determine: tho' I might, without partiality, deliver mine own opinion, and prefer that army, which followed not only *Philip* and *Alexander*, but alſo *Alexander*'s princes after him, in the greateſt dangers of all ſorts of war; before any, that *Rome* either had, or in long time after did ſend forth. Concerning fortune, who can give a rule that ſhall always hold? *Alexander* was victorious in every battel that he fought; and the *Romans* in the iſſue of every war. But foraſmuch as *Livy* hath judged this a matter worthy of conſideration; I think it a great part of *Rome*'s good fortune, that *Alexander* came not into *Italy*: where, in three years after his death, the two *Roman* conſuls, together with all the power of that ſtate, were ſurpriſed by the *Samnites*, and enforced to yield up their arms. We may therefore permit *Livy* to admire his own *Romans*, and to compare with *Alexander* thoſe captains of theirs, which were honoured ſufficiently, in being thought equal to his followers: that the ſame conceit ſhould blind our judgment, we cannot permit without much vanity.

Now in deciding ſuch a controverſy, methinks it were not amiſs, for an *Engliſhman*, to give ſuch a ſentence between the *Macedonians* and *Romans*, as the *Romans* once did (being choſen arbitrators) between the [a] *Ardeates* and *Aricini*, that ſtrove about a piece of land; ſaying, that it belonged unto neither of them, but unto the *Romans* themſelves.

If therefore it be demanded, whether the *Macedonian*, or the *Roman*, were the beſt warriour? I will anſwer, the *Engliſhman*. For it will ſoon appear, to any that ſhall examine the noble acts of our nation in war, that they were performed by no advantage of weapon; againſt no ſavage or unmanly people; the enemy being far ſuperiour unto us in numbers, and all needful proviſions; yea, as well trained as we, or commonly better, in the exerciſe of war.

In what ſort *Philip* won his dominion in *Greece*, what manner of men the *Perſians* and *Indians* were, whom *Alexander* vanquiſhed; as likewiſe of what force the *Macedonian phalanx* was, and how well appointed, againſt ſuch arms as it commonly encountered; any man, that hath taken pains to read the fore-going ſtory of them, doth ſufficiently underſtand. Yet was this *phalanx* never, or very ſeldom, able to ſtand againſt the *Roman* armies; which were embattelled in ſo excellent a form, as I know not, whether any nation beſide them have uſed, either before or ſince. The *Roman* weapons likewiſe, both offenſive and defenſive, were of greater uſe, than thoſe with which any other nation hath ſerved, before the fiery inſtruments of gunpowder were known. As for the enemies, with which *Rome* had to do, we find, that they, which did over-match her in numbers, were as far overmatched by her, in weapons; and that they, of whom ſhe had little advantage in arms, had as little advantage of her in multitude. This alſo (as *Plutarch* well obſerveth) was a part of her happineſs; that ſhe was never over-lay'd with too great wars at once.

Hereby it came to paſs, that having at firſt increaſed her ſtrength, by acceſſion of the *Sabines*; having won the ſtate of *Alba*, againſt which ſhe adventured her own ſelf, as it were in wager, upon the heads of three champions: and having thereby made herſelf princeſs of *Latium*; ſhe did afterwards, by long war, in many ages, extend her dominion over all *Italy*. The *Carthaginians* had well-near oppreſſed her, but their ſoldiers were mercenary; ſo that for want of proper ſtrength, they were eaſily beaten at their own doors. The *Etolians*, and

[a] Liv. Dec. 1. l. 3.

with

with them, all, or the moſt of *Greece*, aſſiſted her againſt *Philip* the *Macedonian*; he being beaten, did lend her his help to beat the ſame *Etolians*. The wars againſt *Antiochus* and other *Aſiatics*, were ſuch, as gave to *Rome* ſmall cauſe of boaſt, though much of joy: for thoſe oppoſites were as baſe of courage, as the lands which they held were abundant of riches. *Sicily*, *Spain*, and all *Greece*, fell into her hands by uſing her aid, to protect them againſt the *Carthaginians* and *Macedonians*.

I ſhall not need to ſpeak of her other conqueſts; it was eaſy to get more when ſhe had gotten all this. It is not my purpoſe to diſgrace the *Roman* valour (which was very noble) or to blemiſh the reputation of ſo many famous victories: I am not ſo idle. This I ſay; that among all their wars, I find not any wherein their valour hath appeared comparable to the *Engliſh*. If my judgment ſeem over-partial, our wars in *France* may help to make it good.

Firſt therefore it is well known, that *Rome* (or perhaps all the world beſides) had never any ſo brave a commander in war as *Julius Ceſar*; and that no *Roman* army was comparable unto that which ſerved under the ſame *Ceſar*. Likewiſe it is apparent, that this gallant army, which had given fair proof of the *Roman* courage, in good performance of the *Helvetian* war when it firſt entred into *Gaul*, was nevertheleſs utterly diſheartened when *Ceſar* led it againſt the *Germans*. So that we may juſtly impute all that was extraordinary in the valour of *Ceſar*'s men, to their long exerciſe, under ſo good a leader, in ſo great a war. Now let us in general compare with the deeds done by theſe beſt of *Roman* ſoldiers, in their principal ſervice, the things performed in the ſame country by our common *Engliſh* ſoldiers, levied in haſte from following the cart, or ſitting on the ſhop-ſtall; ſo ſhall we ſee the difference. Herein will we deal fairly, and believe *Ceſar*, in relating the acts of the *Romans*, but will call the *French* hiſtorians to witneſs what actions were performed by the *Engliſh*. In *Ceſar*'s time *France* was inhabited by the *Gauls*, a ſtout people, but inferior to the *French*, by whom they were ſubdued; even when the *Romans* gave them aſſiſtance. The country of *Gaul* was rent in ſunder (as *Ceſar* witneſſeth) into many lordſhips, ſome of which were governed by petty kings, others by the multitude; none ordered in ſuch ſort as might make it appliable to the neareſt neighbour. The factions were many, and violent; not only in general through the whole country, but between the petty ſtates; yea, in every city, and almoſt in every houſe. What greater advantage could a conqueror deſire? Yet there was a greater. *Arioviſtus*, with his *Germans*, had over-run the country, and held much part of it in a ſubjection, little different from mere ſlavery; yea, ſo often had the *Germans* prevailed in war upon the *Gauls*, that the *Gauls* (who had ſometimes been the better ſoldiers) did hold themſelves no way equal to thoſe daily invaders. Had *France* been ſo prepared unto our *Engliſh* kings, *Rome* itſelf by this time, and long ere this time, would have been ours. But when king *Edward* III. began his war upon *France*, he found the whole country ſettled in obedience to one mighty king; a king, whoſe reputation abroad was no leſs than his puiſſance at home; under whoſe enſign the king of *Bohemia* did ſerve in perſon; at whoſe call the *Genoeſe* and other neighbour ſtates were ready to take arms: finally, a king, unto whom one [a] prince gave away his dominion for love, [b] another ſold away a goodly city and territory for money. The country lying ſo open to the *Roman*, and being ſo well fenced againſt the *Engliſh*, it is note-worthy, not who prevailed moſt therein (for it were mere vanity to match the *Engliſh* purchaſes with the *Roman* conqueſt) but whether of the two gave the greater proof of military virtue therein. *Ceſar* himſelf doth witneſs, that the *Gauls* complained of their own ignorance in the art of war, and that their own hardineſs was over-maſtered by the ſkill of their enemies. Poor men, they admired the *Roman* towers and engines of battery, raiſed and planted againſt their walls, as more than human works. What greater wonder is it that ſuch a people was beaten by the *Roman*, than that the *Caribes*, a naked people, but valiant as any under the ſky, are commonly put to the worſe by ſmall numbers of *Spaniards*? Beſides all this, we are to have regard of the great difficulty that was found in drawing all the *Gauls*, or any great part of them, to one head, that with joint forces they might oppoſe their aſſailants; as alſo the much more difficulty of holding them long together. For hereby it came to paſs, that they were never able to make uſe of opportunity, but ſometimes compelled to ſtay for their fellows, and ſometimes driven to give or take battel, upon extreme diſadvantages, for fear leſt their companies ſhould fall aſunder; as indeed, upon any little diſaſter, they were ready to break, and return every one to the defence of his own. All this, and (which was little leſs than all this) great odds in weapon, gave to the *Romans* the honour of many gallant victories. What ſuch help, or what other worldly help, than the golden metal of their ſoldiers had our *Engliſh* kings againſt the *French*? Were not the *French* as well experienced in feats of war? yea, did they not think themſelves therein our ſuperiors? were they not in arms, in horſe, and in all proviſion, exceedingly beyond us? let us hear what a *French* [c] writer ſaith of the inequality that was between the *French* and *Engliſh*, when their king *John* was ready to give the onſet upon the *Black Prince*, at the battel of *Poitiers*. John *had all advantages over* Edward, *both of number, force, ſhew, country, and conceit (the which is commonly a conſideration of no ſmall importance in worldly affairs) and withal, the choice of all his horſemen (eſteemed then the beſt in* Europe) *with the greateſt and wiſeſt captains of his whole realm.* And what could he wiſh more?

I think it would trouble a *Roman* antiquary to find the like example in their hiſtories; the example, I ſay, of a king brought priſoner to *Rome* by an army of eight thouſand, which he had ſurrounded with forty thouſand, better appointed, and no leſs expert warriors. This I am ſure of, that neither *Syphax* the *Numidian*, followed by a rabble of half ſcullions, as *Livy* rightly terms them, nor thoſe cowardly kings *Perſeus* and *Gentius*, are worthy patterns. All that have read of *Creſſy* and *Agincourt* will bear me witneſs, that I do not alledge the battel of *Poitiers*, for lack of other, as good examples of the *Engliſh* virtue; the proof whereof hath left many a hundred better marks in all quarters of *France*, than ever did the valour of the *Romans*. If any man impute theſe

[a] *The Dauphin of* Viennois. [b] *The king of* Majorca. [c] John de Serres. [d] Jean avoit tout l'avantage par deſſus Edouard, le nombre, la force, le luſtre, le pays, le prejuge (qui n'eſt pas communement une conſideration de peu d'importance aux affaires du monde) & avec ſoi l'elite de ſa Cavallerie, lors eſtimée la meilleure de tout ſon royaume.

victories

victories of ours to the long-bow, as carrying farther, piercing more ſtrongly, and quicker of diſcharge than the *French* croſs-bow: my anſwer is ready; that, in all theſe reſpects, it is alſo (being drawn with a ſtrong arm) ſuperior to the muſket; yet is the muſket a weapon of more uſe. The gun and the croſs-bow are of like force, when diſcharged by a boy or a woman, as when by a ſtrong man: weakneſs, or ſickneſs, or a ſore finger, makes the long bow unſerviceable. More particularly, I ſay, that it was the cuſtom of our anceſtors to ſhoot, for the moſt part, *point-blanck*: and ſo ſhall he perceive, that will note the circumſtances of almoſt any one battel. This takes away all objection: for when two armies are within the diſtance of a butt's length, one flight of arrows, or two at the moſt, can be delivered before they cloſe. Neither is it in general true, that the long-bow reacheth farther, or that it pierceth more ſtrongly than the croſs-bow; but this is the rare effect of an extraordinary arm, whereupon can be grounded no common rule. If any man ſhall aſk, How then came it to paſs that the *Engliſh* won ſo many great battels, having no advantage to help him? I may, with beſt commendation of modeſty, refer him to the *French* hiſtorian; who, relating the victory of our men at *Crevant*, where they paſſed a bridge in the face of the enemy, uſeth theſe words; [a] *The* Engliſh *comes with a conquering bravery, as he that was accuſtomed to gain every where, without any ſtay: he forceth our guard placed upon the bridge to keep the paſſage.* Or I may cite another place of the ſame author, where he tells how the *Britons*, being invaded by *Charles* VIII, king of *France*, thought it good policy to apparel twelve hundred of their own men in *Engliſh* caſſocks, hoping that the very ſight of the *Engliſh* red croſs would be enough to terrify the *French*. But I will not ſtand to borrow of the *French* hiſtorians (all which, excepting *De Serres*, and *Paulus Æmilius*, report wonders of our nation) the propoſition which firſt I undertook to maintain; *That the military virtue of the* Engliſh *prevailing againſt all manner of difficulties, ought to be preferred before that of the* Romans, *which was aſſiſted with all advantages that could be deſired.* If it be demanded; Why then did not our kings finiſh the conqueſt, as *Ceſar* had done? my anſwer may be (I hope without offence) that our kings were like the race of the *Æacidæ*, of whom the old poet *Ennius* gave this note; *Bellipotentes ſunt magè quam ſapientipotentes*; They were more warlike than politic. Whoſo notes their proceedings, may find, that none of them went to work like a conqueror, ſave only king *Henry* V, the courſe of whoſe victories it pleaſed God to interrupt by his death. But this queſtion may eaſily be anſwered, if another be firſt made; Why did not the *Romans* attempt the conqueſt of *Gaul*, before the time of *Ceſar?* why not after the *Macedonian* war? why not after the *Punic*, or after the *Numantian?* At all theſe times they had good leiſure, and then eſpecially had they both leiſure, and fit opportunity, when, under the conduct of *Marius*, they had newly vanquiſhed the *Cimbri* and *Teutones*, by whom the country of *Gaul* had been piteouſly waſted. Surely the words of *Tully* were true; that with other nations the *Romans* fought for dominion, with the *Gauls* for preſervation of their own ſafety.

Therefore they attempted not the conqueſt of *Gaul*, until they were lords of all other countries to them known. We, on the other ſide, held only the one half of our own iſland; the other half being inhabited by a nation (unleſs perhaps in wealth and numbers of men ſomewhat inferior) every way equal to our ſelves; a nation anciently and ſtrongly allied to our enemies the *French*, and in that regard enemies to us. So that our danger lay both before and behind us; and the greater danger at our backs, where commonly we felt, always we feared, a ſtronger invaſion by land, than we could make upon *France*, tranſporting our forces over-ſea.

It is uſual with men that have pleaſed themſelves in admiring the matters which they find in ancient hiſtories, to hold it a great injury done to their judgment, if any take upon him, by way of compariſon, to extol the things of later ages. But I am well perſwaded, that as the divided virtue of this our iſland, hath given more noble proof of it ſelf; than under ſo worthy a leader, that *Roman* army could do, which afterwards could win *Rome*, and all her empire, making *Ceſar* a monarch: ſo hereafter, by God's bleſſing, who hath converted our greateſt hindrance into our greateſt help, the enemy that ſhall dare try our forces, will find cauſe to wiſh that, avoiding us, he had rather encountered as great a puiſſance, as was that of the *Roman* empire. But it is now high time that, laying aſide compariſons, we return to the rehearſal of deeds done; wherein we ſhall find how *Rome* began, after *Pyrrhus* had left *Italy*, to ſtrive with *Carthage* for dominion, in the firſt *Punic* war.

SECT. II.

The eſtate of Carthage, *before it entred into war with Rome.*

THE city of *Carthage* had ſtood above ſix hundred years, when firſt it began to contend with *Rome* for the maſtery of *Sicily*. It forewent *Rome* one hundred and fifty years in antiquity of foundation; but in the honour of great atchievements, it excelled far beyond this advantage of time. For *Carthage* had extended her dominion in *Africa* it ſelf, from the weſt part of *Cyrene*, to the ſtreights of *Hercules*, about fifteen hundred miles in length, wherein ſtood three hundred cities. It had ſubjected all *Spain*, even to the *Pyrenean* mountains, together with all the iſlands in the *Mediterranean* ſea, to the weſt of *Sicily*, and of *Sicily* the better part. It flouriſhed about ſeven hundred and thirty years, before the deſtruction thereof by *Scipio*, who, beſides other ſpoils, and all that the ſoldiers reſerved, carried thence four hundred and ſeventy thouſand weight of ſilver; which make of our money (if our pounds differ not) fourteen hundred and ten thouſand pounds ſterling. So as this glorious city ran the ſame fortune, which many other great ones have done both before and ſince. The ruin of the goodlieſt pieces of the world, fore-ſhews the diſſolution of the whole.

About one hundred years after ſuch time as it was caſt down, the ſenate of *Rome* cauſed it to be rebuilt; and by *Gracchus* it was called *Junonia:* it was again and again abandoned and re-peopled, taken and retaken; by *Genſericus* the *Vandal*, by *Belliſarius*, under *Juſtinian*, by the *Perſians*, by the *Egyptians*, and by the *Mahometans*. It is now nothing. The ſeat thereof was exceeding ſtrong, and, while the *Carthaginians* commanded the ſea, invincible. For the ſea compaſſed it about, ſaving that it was tied to the main by a neck of land, which paſſage had two mile and more of breadth (*Appian* ſaith three mile and one furlong) by which we may be induced to believe the common report, that the city it ſelf

[a] John de Serres.

was

was above twenty miles in compaſs; if not that of *Strabo*, affirming the circuit to have been twice as great.

It had three walls without the wall of the city, and between each of thoſe three or four ſtreets, with vaults under-ground of thirty foot deep, in which they had place for three hundred elephants and all their food. Over theſe they had ſtables for four thouſand horſe, and granaries for all their provender. They had alſo lodgings in theſe ſtreets between theſe out-walls for four thouſand horſe-men and twenty thouſand foot-men, which (according to the diſcipline uſed now by thoſe of *China*) never peſtered the city. It had, towards the ſouth part, the caſtle of *Byrſa*, to which *Servius* gives twenty-two furlongs in compaſs, that make two miles and a half. This was the ſame piece of ground which *Dido* obtained of the *Libyans*, when ſhe got leave to buy only ſo much land of them as ſhe could compaſs with an ox-hide. On the weſt ſide it had alſo the ſalt ſea, but in the nature of a ſtanding pool; for a certain arm of land, faſtned to the ground on which the city ſtood, ſtretched it ſelf toward the weſt continent, and left but ſeventy foot open for the ſea to enter. Over this ſtanding ſea was built a moſt ſumptuous arſenal, having their ſhips and gallies riding under it.

The form of their commonwealth reſembled that of *Sparta*; for they had titulary kings, and the *Ariſtocratical* power of ſenators. But (as *Regius* well obſerveth) the people in latter times uſurped too great authority in their councils. This confuſion in government, together with the truſt that they repoſed in hired ſoldiers, were helping cauſes of their deſtruction in the end. Two other more forcible cauſes of their ruin, were their avarice and their cruelty. [a] Their avarice was ſhewed both in exacting from their vaſſals (beſides ordinary tributes) the one [b] half of the fruits of the earth; and in conferring of great offices, not upon gentle and merciful perſons, but upon thoſe who could beſt tyrannize over the people, to augment their treaſures. Their cruelty appeared in putting them to death without mercy, that had offended through ignorance. The one of theſe rendered them odious to their vaſſals, whom it made ready, upon all occaſions, to revolt from them: the other did break the ſpirits of their generals, by preſenting, in the heat of their actions abroad, the fear of a cruel death at home. Hereby it came to paſs, that many good commanders of the *Carthaginian* forces, after ſome great loſs received, have deſperately caſt themſelves, with all that remained under their charge, into the throat of deſtruction; holding it neceſſary, either to repair their loſſes quickly, or to ruin all together; and few of them have dared to manage their own beſt projects after that good form wherein they firſt conceived them, for fear leſt the manner of their proceeding ſhould be miſinterpreted: it being the *Carthaginian* rule to crucify not only the unhappy captain, but even him whoſe bad counſel had proſperous event. The faults wherewith in general they of *Carthage* are taxed by *Roman* hiſtorians, I find to be theſe; luſt, cruelty, avarice, craft, unfaithfulneſs, and perjury. Whether the *Romans* themſelves were free from the ſame crimes, let the trial be referred unto their actions. The firſt league between *Carthage* and *Rome* was very ancient, having been made the year following the expulſion of *Tarquin*. In that league the *Carthaginians* had the ſuperiority, as impoſing upon the *Romans* the more ſtrict conditions. For it was agreed, that the *Romans* ſhould not ſo much as have trade in ſome part of *Afric*, nor ſuffer any ſhip of theirs to paſs beyond the head-land, or cape, then called the *Fair Promontory*, unleſs it were by force of tempeſt; whereas on the other ſide, no haven in *Italy* was forbidden to the *Carthaginians*. A ſecond league was made long after, which (howſoever it hath pleaſed [c] *Livy* to ſay, that the *Romans* granted it at the *Carthaginians* intreaty) was more ſtrict than the former; prohibiting the *Romans* to have trade in any part of *Africa*, or in the iſland of *Sardinia*.

By theſe two treaties it may appear, that the *Carthaginians* had an intent not only to keep the *Romans* (as perhaps they did other people) from getting any knowledge of the ſtate of *Afric*; but to countenance and uphold them in their troubling all *Italy*, whereby they themſelves might have the better means to occupy all *Sicily*, whilſt that iſland ſhould be deſtitute of *Italian* ſuccours. Hereupon we find good cauſe of the joy that was in *Carthage*, and of the crown of gold weighing twenty-five pounds, ſent from thence to *Rome*, when the *Samnites* were overthrown. But the little ſtate of *Rome* prevailed faſter in *Italy*, than the great power of *Carthage* did in *Sicily*. [d] For that mighty army of three hundred thouſand men, which *Hannibal* conducted out of *Afric* into *Sicily*, was conſumed by peſtilence; many great fleets were devoured by tempeſts; and howſoever the *Carthaginians* prevailed at one time, the *Sicilians*, either by their own valour, or by aſſiſtance of their good friends out of *Greece*, did at ſome other time repair their own loſſes, and take revenge upon theſe invaders. But never were the people of *Carthage* in better hope of getting all *Sicily*, than when the death of *Agathocles* the tyrant had left the whole iſland in combuſtion; the eſtate of *Greece* being ſuch at that time, that it ſeemed impoſſible for any ſuccour to be ſent from thence. But whilſt the *Carthaginians* were buſy in making their advantage of this good opportunity, *Pyrrhus*, invited by the *Tarentines* and their fellows, came into *Italy*, where he made ſharp war upon the *Romans*. Theſe news were unpleaſing to the *Carthaginians*, who, being a ſubtil nation, eaſily foreſaw that the ſame buſy diſpoſition which had brought this prince out of *Greece* into *Italy*, would as eaſily tranſport him over into *Sicily*, as ſoon as he could finiſh his *Roman* war. To prevent this danger, they ſent *Mago* ambaſſador to *Rome*, who declared in their name, that they were ſorry to hear what miſadventure had befallen the *Romans*, their good friends, in this war with *Pyrrhus*; and that the people of *Carthage* were very willing to aſſiſt the ſtate of *Rome*, by ſending an army into *Italy*, if their help were thought needful againſt the *Epirots*.

It was indeed the main deſire of the *Carthaginians*, to hold *Pyrrhus* ſo hardly to his work in *Italy*, that they might, at good leiſure, purſue their

[a] *In* Pol. Ariſt. l. 2. c. 9. [b] *The* Turks *at this day do alſo take the one half of the poor man's corn that labours the earth; yea, they take tribute both of the bodies and of the ſouls of the Chriſtians their vaſſals, by bereaving them of their ableſt children, and bringing them up in the* Mahometan *religion. The* Iriſh *take the fourth ſheaf, and were wont to eat up with their horſe-men, foot-men, and dogs, what they pleaſed of the other three parts remaining. The huſbandman and the yeoman of* England *are the freeſt of all the world; and reaſon good, for of them have the bodies of our victorious armies been compounded. And it is the freeman, and not the ſlave, that hath courage, and the ſenſe of ſhame deſerved by cowardiſe. How free the* Engliſh *yeomen have been in times not long ſince paſt,* Fortescue *hath ſhewed in his praiſe of our country's laws. But I may ſay, that they are more free now than ever, and our nobility and gentry more ſervile; for ſince the exceſſive bravery, and vain expence of our grandees, hath taught them to raiſe their rents; ſince by incloſures, and diſmembring of manors, the court-baron, and the court-leet, the principalities of the gentry of* England *have been diſſolved, the tenants having paid unto their lords their rack-rent, owe them now no ſervice at all, and (perchance) as little love.* [c] Liv. Dec. 1. l. 7. [d] Xenoph. Græc. Hiſt. l. 2.

buſineſs in *Sicily*, which cauſed them to make ſuch a goodly offer. But the *Romans* were too high-minded, and refuſed to accept any ſuch aid of their friends, leſt it ſhould blemiſh their reputation, and make them ſeem unable to ſtand by their own ſtrength. Yet the meſſage was taken lovingly, as it ought, and the former league between *Rome* and *Carthage* renewed, with covenants added, concerning the preſent buſineſs; that if either of the two cities made peace with *Pyrrhus*, it ſhould be with reſervation of liberty to aſſiſt the other, in caſe that *Pyrrhus* ſhould invade either of their dominions. All this notwithſtanding, and notwithſtanding that the ſame *Mago* went and treated with *Pyrrhus*, uſing all means to ſound his intentions (a matter very difficult where one upon every new occaſion changeth his own purpoſes;) yet *Pyrrhus* found leiſure to make a ſtep into *Sicily*, where, though in fine, he was neither getter nor ſaver, yet he clean defeated the purpoſes of *Carthage*, leaving them at his departure from thence, as far from any end, as when they firſt began.

So many diſaſters in an enterprize, that, from the firſt undertaking, had been ſo ſtrongly purſued through the length of many generations, might well have induced the *Carthaginians* to believe, that an higher providence reſiſted their intendment. But their deſire of winning that fruitful iſland was ſo inveterate, that, with unwearied patience, they ſtill continued in hope of ſo much the greater harveſt, by how much their coſt and pains therein buried had been the more. Wherefore they re-continued their former courſes; and, by force or practice, recovered in few years all their old poſſeſſions; making peace with *Syracuſe*, the chief city of the iſland, that ſo they might the better enable themſelves to deal with the reſt.

Somewhat before this time a troop of *Campanian* ſoldiers, that had ſerved under *Agathocles*, being entertained within *Meſſina* as friends, and finding themſelves too ſtrong for the citizens, took advantage of the power that they had to do wrong, and, with perfidious cruelty, ſlew thoſe that truſted them; which done, they occupied the city, lands, goods, and wives of thoſe whom they had murdered. Theſe mercenaries called themſelves *Mamertines*. Good ſoldiers they were, and like enough it is, that mere deſperation of finding any that would approve their barbarous treachery, added rage unto their ſtoutneſs. Having therefore none other colour of their proceedings, than *the law of the ſtronger*, they overran all the country round about them.

In this courſe at firſt they ſped ſo well, that they did not only defend *Meſſina* againſt the cities of *Sicily* confederate; to wit, againſt the *Syracuſians*, and others; but they rather won upon them, yea, and upon the *Carthaginians*, exacting tribute from many neighbouring places. But it was not long ere fortune turning her back to theſe *Mamertines*, the *Syracuſians* won faſt upon them; and finally, confining them within the walls of *Meſſina*, they alſo with a powerful army beſieged the city. It happened ill, that about the ſame time a contention began between the *Syracuſian* ſoldiers then lying at *Megara*, and the citizens of *Syracuſe*, and governors of the commonwealth; which proceeded ſo far, that the army elected two governors among themſelves; to wit, *Artemidorus*, and *Hieron*, that was afterwards king. *Hieron* being, for his years, excellently adorned with many virtues, although it was contrary to the policy of that ſtate to approve any election made by the ſoldiers; yet for the great clemency he uſed at his firſt entrance, was, by general conſent, eſtabliſhed and made governor. This office he rather uſed as a ſcale, thereby to climb to ſome higher degree, than reſted content with his preſent preferment.

In brief, there was ſomewhat wanting, whereby to ſtrengthen himſelf within the city, and ſomewhat without it, that gave impediment to his obtaining and ſafe keeping of the place he ſought; to wit, a powerful party within the town, and certain mutinous troops of ſoldiers without, often and eaſily moved to ſedition and tumult. For the firſt, whereby to ſtrengthen himſelf, he took to wife the daughter of *Leptines*, a man of the greateſt eſtimation and authority among the *Syracuſians*. For the ſecond, leading out the army to beſiege *Meſſina*, he quartered all thoſe companies which he had ſuſpected on the one ſide of the city, and leading the reſt of his horſe and foot unto the other ſide, as if he would have aſſaulted it in two ſeveral parts, he marched away under covert of the town walls, and left the mutineers to be cut in pieces by the beſieged. So returning home, and levying an army of his own citizens, well trained and obedient, he haſted again towards *Meſſina*, and was by the *Mamertines* (grown proud by their former victory over the mutineers) encountered in the plains of *Myleum*, where he obtained a moſt ſignal victory; and leading with him their commander captive into *Syracuſe*, himſelf, by common conſent, was elected and ſaluted king. Hereupon the *Mamertines* finding themſelves utterly enfeebled, ſome of them reſolved to give themſelves to the *Carthaginians*, others to crave aſſiſtance of the *Romans*; to each of whom the ſeveral factions diſpatched ambaſſadors for the very ſame purpoſe.

The *Carthaginians* were ſoon ready to lay hold upon the good offer; ſo that a captain of theirs got into the caſtle of *Meſſina*, whereof they that had ſent for him gave him poſſeſſion. But within a little while, they that were more inclinable to the *Romans*, had brought their companions to ſo good agreement, that this captain, either by force or by cunning, was turned out of doors, and the town reſerved for other maſters.

Theſe news did much offend the people of *Carthage*, who crucified their captain, as both a traitor and coward; and ſent a fleet and army to beſiege *Meſſina*, as a town that rebelled, having once been theirs. *Hieron*, the new made king of *Syracuſe* (to gratify his people, incenſed with the ſmart of injuries lately received) added his forces to the *Carthaginians*, with whom he entered into league for exterminating the *Mamertines* out of *Sicily*. So the *Mamertines* on all ſides were cloſed up within *Meſſina*, the *Carthaginians* lying with a navy at ſea, and with an army on the one ſide of the town, whilſt *Hieron* with his *Syracuſians* lay before it on the other ſide.

In this their great danger came *Appius Claudius*, the *Roman* conſul, with an army to the ſtreights of *Sicily*; which paſſing by night with notable audacity, he put himſelf into the town, and ſending meſſengers to the *Carthaginians*, and to *Hieron*, required them to depart; ſignifying unto them, that the *Mamertines* were now become confederates with the people of *Rome*, and that therefore he was come to give them protection, even by force of war, if reaſon would not prevail.

This meſſage was utterly neglected, and ſo began the war between *Rome* and *Carthage*; wherein it will then be time to ſhew, on which part was the juſtice of the quarrel, when ſome actions of the *Romans*, lately foregoing this, have been firſt conſidered.

SECT.

SECT. III.

The beginning of the first Punic *war. That it was unjustly undertaken by the* Romans.

WHEN *Pyrrhus* began his wars in *Italy*, the city of *Rhegium* being well affected to *Rome*, and not only fearing to be taken by the *Epirot*, but much more distrusting the *Carthaginians*, as likely to seize upon it in that busy time, sought aid from the *Romans*, and obtained from them a legion, consisting of four thousand soldiers, under the conduct of *Decius Campanus*, a *Roman* Prefect, by whom they were defended and assured for the present. But after a while, this *Roman* garrison, considering at good leisure the fact of the *Mamertines*, committed in *Messina* (a city in *Sicily*, situate almost opposite to *Rhegium*, and no otherwise divided than by a narrow sea, which severeth it from *Italy*) and rather weighing the greatness of the booty, than the odiousness of the villany by which it was gotten, resolved finally to make the like purchase, by taking the like wicked course. Confederating therefore themselves with the *Mamertines*, they entertained their hosts of *Rhegium* after the same manner, dividing the spoil and all which that state had among themselves.

When complaint was made to the senate and people of *Rome* of this outrage, they finding their honour thereby greatly stained (for no nation in the world made a more severe profession of justice than they did, during all the time of their growing greatness) resolved, after a while, to take revenge upon the offenders; and this they performed shortly after, when they had quenched the fires kindled in *Italy* by *Pyrrhus*. For, notwithstanding that those *Romans* in *Rhegium* (as men for the foulness of their fact, hopeless of pardon) defended themselves with an absolute resolution, yet in the end the assailants forced them, and those, which escaped the present fury, were brought bound to *Rome*, where, after the usual torments by whipping inflicted, according to the custom of the country, they had their heads stricken from their shoulders, and the people of *Rhegium* were again restored to their former liberties and estates.

This execution of justice being newly performed, and the fame thereof sounding honourably through all quarters of *Italy*, messengers came to *Rome* from *Messina*, desiring help against the *Carthaginians* and *Syracusians*, that were in a readiness to inflict the like punishment upon the *Mamertines* for the like offence. A very impudent request it was which they made, who, having both given example of that villany to the *Roman* soldiers, and helped them with joint forces to make it good, intreat the judges to give them that assistance, which they were wont to receive from their fellow-thieves.

The *Romans* could not suddenly resolve whether the way of honesty or of profit were to be followed; they evermore pretended the one, but they many times walked in the other. They considered how contrary the course of succouring the *Mamertines* was to their former counsels and actions, seeing for the same offences they had lately put to torment and to the sword their own soldiers, and restored the oppressed to their liberty. Yet, when they beheld the description of the *Carthaginian* dominion, and that they were already lords of the best parts of *Africa*, of the *Mediterranean* islands, of a great part of *Spain*, and some part of *Sicily* itself, whilst also they feared, that *Syracuse* therein seated (a city in beauty and riches little at that time inferior to *Carthage*, and far superior to *Rome* itself) might become theirs; the safety of their own estate spake for these *Mamertines*, who, if they (driven to despair by the *Romans*) should deliver *Messina*, with those other holds that they had, into the hands of the *Carthaginians*, then would nothing stand between *Carthage* and the lordship of all *Sicily*; for *Syracuse* itself could not, for want of succour, any long time subsist, if once the *Carthaginians*, that were masters of the sea, did fasten upon that passage from the main land. It was further considered, that the opportunity of *Messina* was such, as would not only debar all succours out of the continent from arrival in *Sicily*, but would serve as a bridge, whereby the *Carthaginians* might have entrance into *Italy* at their own pleasure.

These considerations of profit at hand, and of preventing dangers that threatened from afar, did so prevail above all regard of honesty, that the *Mamertines* were admitted into confederacy with the *Romans*, and *Ap. Claudius*, the consul, presently dispatched away for *Messina*, into which he entred, and undertook the protection of it, as is shewed before. The besiegers were little troubled with his arrival, and less moved with his requiring them to desist from their attempt. For they did far exceed him in number of men; the whole island was ready to relieve them in their wants, and they were strong enough at sea to hinder any supply from getting into the town. All this *Appius* himself well understood, and against all this he thought the stiff metal of his *Roman* soldiers a sufficient remedy. Therefore he resolved to issue out into the field, and to let the enemies know, that his coming was to send them away from the town, not to be besieged by them within it.

In executing this determination, it was very beneficial to him, that the enemy lay encamped in such sort, as one quarter was not well able to relieve another in distress. *Hieron* was now exposed to the same danger, whereinto he had wilfully cast his own mutinous followers not long before; only he was strong enough (or thought so) to make good his own quarter without help of others. Against him *Appius Claudius* issued forth, and (not attempting by unexpected sally to surprize his trenches) arranged his men in order of battel, wherewith he presented him. The *Syracusian* wanted not courage to fight, but surely he wanted good advice; else would he not have hazarded all his power against an enemy of whom he had made no trial, when it had been easy, and as much as was required, to defend his own camp. It may be, that he sought to get honour wherewith to adorn the beginning of his reign, but he was well beaten, and driven to save himself within his trenches, by which loss he learned a point of wisdom that stood him and his kingdom in good stead all the days of his life. It was a foolish desire of revenge that had made the *Syracusians* so busy in helping those of *Carthage* against the *Mamertines*.

Had *Messina* been taken by the *Carthaginians*, *Syracuse* itself must have sought help from *Rome*, against those friends which it now so diligently assisted. *Hieron* had (in respect of those two mighty cities) but a small stock, which it behoved him to govern well; such another loss would have made him almost bankrupt, therefore he quietly brake up his camp and retired home, intending to let them stand to their adventures that had hope to be gainers by the bargain. The next day, *Claudius* perceiving the *Sicilian* army gone, did with great courage, and with much alacrity of his soldiers, give charge upon the *Carthaginians*, wherein he sped so well, that the enemy forsook both field and camp, leaving

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ing all the country open to the *Romans*, who, having ſpoiled all round without reſiſtance, intended to lay ſiege unto the great city of *Syracuſe*.

Theſe proſperous beginnings, howſoever they animated the *Romans*, and filled them with hopes of attaining to greater matters than at firſt they had expected, yet did they not imprint any form of terror in the city of *Carthage*, that had well enough repaired greater loſſes than this, in which no more was loſt than what had been prepared againſt the *Mamertines* alone, without any ſuſpicion of war from *Rome*.

Now in this place I hold it ſeaſonable to conſider of thoſe grounds whereupon the *Romans* entred into this war, not how profitable they were, nor how agreeable to rules of honeſty (for queſtionleſs the enterprize was much to their benefit, though as much to their ſhame;) but how allowable in ſtrict terms of lawfulneſs, whereupon they built all their allegations in maintenance thereof. That the *Mamertines* did yield themſelves and all that they had into the *Romans* hands (as the *Campanes*, diſtreſſed by the *Samnites*, had done) I cannot find, neither can I find how the meſſengers of thoſe folk, whereof one part had already admitted the *Carthaginians*, could be enabled to make any ſuch ſurrendry in the publick name of all.

If therefore the *Mamertines*, by no lawful ſurrendry of themſelves and their poſſeſſions, were become ſubject unto *Rome*, by what better title could the *Romans* aſſiſt the *Mamertines* againſt their moſt ancient friends the *Carthaginians*, than they might have aided the *Campanes* againſt the *Samnites*, without the ſame condition? which was (as they themſelves confeſſed) by none at all. But let it be ſuppoſed, that ſome point ſerving to clear this doubt is loſt in all hiſtories. Doubtleſs it is, that no company of pirates, thieves, outlaws, murtherers, or ſuch other malefactors, can, by any good ſucceſs of their villany, obtain the privilege of civil ſocieties, to make league or truce, yea, or to require fair war; but are by all means, as moſt pernicious vermin, to be rooted out of the world. I will not take upon me to maintain that opinion of ſome *Civilians*, that a prince is not bound to hold his faith with one of theſe; it were a poſition of ill conſequence: This I hold, that no one prince or ſtate can give protection to ſuch as theſe as long as any other is uſing the ſword of vengeance againſt them, without becoming acceſſary to their crimes. Wherefore we may eſteem this action of the *Romans* ſo far from being juſtifiable, by any pretence of confederacy made with them, as that contrariwiſe, by admitting this neſt of murtherers and thieves into their protection, they juſtly deſerved to be warred upon themſelves by the people of *Sicily*; yea, although *Meſſina* had been taken, and the *Mamertines* all ſlain, ere news of this confederacy had been brought unto the beſiegers. The great *Alexander* was ſo far perſwaded herein, that he did put to the ſword all the *Branchiadæ* (a people in *Sogdiana)* and raſed their city, notwithſtanding that they joyfully entertained him as their lord and king, becauſe they were deſcended from a company of *Mileſians*, who, to gratify king *Xerxes* had robbed a temple, and were by him rewarded with the town and country, which theſe of their poſterity enjoyed. Nevertheleſs, in courſe of human juſtice, long and peaceable poſſeſſion gives *jus acquiſitum*, a kind of right by preſcription, unto that which was at firſt obtained by wicked means, and doth free the deſcendants from the crime of their anceſtors, whoſe villanies they do not exerciſe. But that the ſame generation of thieves, which by a deteſtable fact hath purchaſed a rich town, ſhould be acknowledged a lawful company of citizens, there is no ſhew of right. For even the conqueror, that by open war obtaineth a kingdom, doth not confirm his title by thoſe victories which gave him firſt poſſeſſion, but length of time is requiſite to eſtabliſh him, unleſs by ſome alliance with the ancient inheritors he can better the violence of his claim, as did our king *Henry* I. by his marriage with *Maud*, that was daughter of *Malcolm*, king of the *Scots*, by *Margaret*, the niece of *Edmund Ironſide*. Wherefore I conclude, that the *Romans* had no better ground (if they had ſo good) of juſtice in this quarrel, than had the *Goths*, *Huns*, *Vandals*, and other nations, of the wars that they made upon the *Roman* empire, wherein *Rome* herſelf, in the time of her viſitation, was burnt to the ground.

SECT. IV.

Of the iſland of Sicily.

†. I.

The quality of the iſland, and the firſt inhabitants thereof.

THE defence of the *Mamertines*, or the poſſeſſion of *Meſſina*, being now no longer, ſince the firſt victories of *Appius Claudius*, the objects of the *Roman* hopes; but the dominion of all *Sicily* being the prize for which *Rome* and *Carthage* are about to contend: it will be agreeable unto the order, which in the like caſes we have obſerved, to make a brief collection of things concerning that noble iſland, which hath been the ſtage of many great acts, performed as well before and after, as in this preſent war.

That *Sicily* was ſometime a *Peninſula* or *Demy Iſle* adjoining to *Italy*, as a part of *Brutium* in *Calabria* near unto *Rhegium*, and afterwards by violence of tempeſt ſevered from the ſame, it is a general opinion of all antiquity; but at what certain time this diviſion happened, there is no memorial remaining in any ancient writer. *Strabo*, [a] *Pliny*, and *Dionyſius* affirm, that it was cauſed by an earthquake; [b] *Silius* and *Caſſiodorus*, do think it to have been done by the rage and violence of the tide and ſurges of the ſea. Either of theſe opinions may be true; for ſo was *Eubœa* ſevered from *Bœotia*, *Atalante* and *Macris* from *Eubœa*, *Scilly* here in *England* from the cape of *Cornwall*, and *Britain* itſelf (as may ſeem by *Verſtegan*'s arguments) from the oppoſite continent of *Gaul*; but for *Sicily*, they which lend their ears to fables, do attribute the cauſe of it to *Neptune* (as *Euſtathius* witneſſeth) who with his three-forked mace, in favour of *Jocaſtus*, the ſon of *Æolus*, divided it from the main land, and ſo made it an iſland, which before was but a *Demy Iſle*, that by that means he might the more ſafely inhabit and poſſeſs the ſame. [c] *Diodorus Siculus*, moved by the authority of *Heſiodus*, aſcribeth the labour of ſundring it from *Italy* to *Orion*; who, that he might be compared to *Hercules* (cutting through the rocks and mountains) firſt opened the *Sicilian* ſtreights, as *Hercules* did thoſe of *Gibraltar*.

They, which value the iſlands of the midland ſea, according to their quantity and content, do make this the greateſt, as *Euſtathius* and *Strabo*, who affirm this, not only to excel the reſt for big-

[a] Plin. l. 2. c. 91. [b] Sil. l. 5. [c] Orion. l. 4. c. 14. Diod. l. 6. Ovid. de Faſt. 4.

neſs

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THE SEA TYRRENUM
THE AFRICAN SEA
The manner of the fight, between Nycias and the Siracusans in their own Port
Syracusæ
Lipara
Vulcan's Temple
Rhegium
Messana or Zancle
Tauromenia or Naxos
Aetna M.
Asines F.
Simethus F.
Cyclopum scopuli
Catana
Torias F.
Tratilum
Mergentium
Leontium
Megara or Hybla
Thapsus
Syracusæ
Trinacia
SYRACUSII
Anapus F.
Lepas
Cyparis F.
Erincus
Diana F.
The overthrow of Nicias
Florus
Asinaglus F.
Tathera
Pachynus P.
Callipohs
Motya
Camerina
Hypsa F.
Sicanus F.
Himera or Gela F.
Gela
Agrigentum
Heraclia or Minoa
SICANIAREGO
Lucus F.
Herbesus
Macorium
Enna
Himera F.
Himera
Erbessus
Macella
Panormus
Motyra
Elyma
Crinisus
Segesta
Erræ
Veneris cryanæ
Drepanum
Phorbantia
Acithius F.
Lilybaeum
Hiera
Aegusa
Mazara
Selinus
Selinus F.
Entella
Thermu
Atys F.
Sesivo F.
Ascurus F.
Cyclopes
Chrystis F.
Arsenal
CARTHAGE
Vtica
Castra Cornelya
Macra
Gephyra
Aquæ ductus
TUNIS
Hippo Diarrytos
Appollinis pmont
Carthage
Tunis
E. Bowen Sculp.

neſs, but alſo for goodneſs of ſoil. As concerning the form of this iſland, *Pomponius Mela* ſaith, it is like that capital letter of the *Greeks* which they call *Delta*, namely, that it hath the figure of a triangle, which is generally known to be true. That the whole iſland was conſecrated to *Ceres* and *Proſerpina*, all old writers with one conſent affirm. To *Ceres* it was dedicated, becauſe it firſt taught the rules of ſetting and ſowing of corn; to *Proſerpina*, not ſo much for that ſhe was from hence violently taken by *Pluto*, as becauſe (which *Plutarch* and *Diodorus* do report for truth) that *Pluto*, as ſoon as ſhe, uncovering herſelf, firſt ſhewed herſelf to be ſeen of him, gave her the dominion thereof.

Of the fertility and riches of this country, there is a famous teſtimony writ by *Cicero*, in his ſecond oration againſt *Verres*, where he ſaith, that *Marcus Cato* did call it the *granary and ſtore-houſe of the commonwealth, and the nurſe of the vulgar ſort.* The ſame *Cicero* doth add in that place, that it was not only the ſtore-houſe of the people of *Rome*, but alſo that it was accounted for a well furniſhed treaſury. For without any coſt or charge of ours (ſaith he) it hath uſually cloathed, maintained, and furniſhed our greateſt armies with leather, apparel and corn. [a] *Strabo* reporteth almoſt the ſame thing of it. Whatſoever *Sicily* doth yield (ſaith *Solinus)* whether by the ſun and temperature of the air, or by the induſtry and labour of man, it is accounted next unto thoſe things that are of beſt eſtimation; were it not, that ſuch things as the earth firſt putteth forth are extremely overgrown with ſaffron. *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith, that in the fields near unto *Leontium*, and in divers other places of this iſland, wheat doth grow of itſelf, without any labour or looking to of the huſbandman. *Martianus* ſheweth, that there were in it ſix colonies, and ſixty cities; there are that reckon more, whereof the names are found ſcatteringly in many good authors.

Now beſides many famous acts done by the people of this iſland, as well in peace as war, there be many other things which have made it very renowned; as the birth of *Ceres*, the raviſhing of *Proſerpina*, the giant *Enceladus*, the mount *Ætna*, *Scylla* and *Charybdis*, with other antiquities and rarities; beſides thoſe learned men the noble mathematician *Archimedes*, the famous geometrician *Euclides*, the painful hiſtorian *Diodorus*, and *Empedocles* the deep philoſopher.

That *Sicily* was at firſt poſſeſſed and inhabited by giants, *Læſtriogones*, and *Cyclopes*, barbarous people and uncivil, all hiſtories and fables do jointly with one conſent aver. Yet *Thucydides* ſaith, that theſe ſavage people dwelt only in one part of the iſland. Afterwards the *Sicani*, a people of *Spain* poſſeſſed it. That theſe *Sicani* were not bred in the iſle (although ſome do ſo think) *Thucydides* and *Diodorus* do conſtantly avouch.

Of theſe it was named *Sicania*. Theſe *Sicani* were invaded by the *Siculi*; who, inhabiting that part of *Latium* whereon *Rome* was afterwards built, were driven by the *Pelaſgi* from their own ſeats, and finding no place upon the continent which they were able to maſter and inhabit, paſſed over into this iſland, three hundred years before the *Greeks* ſent any colonies thither: And (ſaith *Philiſtus*) eighty years before the fall of *Troy*. Theſe *Siculi* gave the name of *Sicilia* to the iſland, and making war upon the *Sicani*, drove them from the eaſt and northern part thereof into the weſt and ſouth. At their landing they firſt built the city *Zancle*, afterwards called *Meſſina*; and after that *Catana*, *Leontium*, and *Syracuſe* itſelf, beating from thence the *Etolians*, who long before had ſet up a town in that place. As for the name of *Syracuſe*, it was not known till ſuch time as *Archias* of *Corinth* (long after) won that part of the iſland from the *Siculi*; neither did the *Siculi* at their firſt arrival diſpoſſeſs the *Etolians* thereof, but ſome hundred years after their deſcent, and after ſuch time as they had founded the cities before-named, with *Neæ*, *Hybla*, *Trinacia*, and divers others.

After theſe *Siculi* came another nation out of *Italy*, called *Morgetes*, who were thence driven by the *Oenotrians*. Theſe ſat down in that part of *Sicily* where they afterwards raiſed the cities of *Morgentum* and *Leontium*. For at this time the *Siculi* were divided, and by a civil war greatly infeebled. Among theſe ancient ſtories, we find the laſt voyage, and the death of *Minos*, king of *Crete*. *Thucydides*, an hiſtorian of unqueſtionable ſincerity, reports of *Minos*, that he made conqueſt of many iſlands, and ſome ſuch buſineſs, perhaps, drew him into *Sicily*. But the common report is, that he came thither in purſuit of *Dedalus*. The tale goes thus: *Dedalus* flying the revenge of *Minos*, came into *Sicily* to *Cocalus*, king of the *Sicani*, and during his abode there, he built a place of great ſtrength near unto *Megara*, for *Cocalus* to lay up his treaſure in, together with many notable works, for which he was greatly admired and honoured.

Among the reſt, he caſt a ram in gold, that was ſet up in the temple of *Venus Erycina*; which he did with ſo great art, as thoſe that beheld it, thought it rather to be living than counterfeit.

Now *Minos*, hearing that *Cocalus* had entertained *Dedalus*, prepares to invade the territory of *Cocalus*; but when he was arrived, *Cocalus* doubting his own ſtrength, promiſeth to deliver *Dedalus*. This he performs not, but in the mean while kills *Minos* by treaſon, and perſwades the *Cretans*, *Minos*'s followers, to inhabit a part of *Sicily*; the better (as it ſeems) to ſtrengthen himſelf againſt the *Siculi*. Hereunto the *Cretans* (their king being dead) gave their conſent, and built for themſelves the city of *Minoa*, after the name of their king *Minos*. After, they likewiſe built the town of *Engium*, now called *Gange*; and theſe were the firſt cities built by the *Greeks* in *Sicily*, about two ages before the war of *Troy*; for the grand-children of *Minos* ſerved with the *Greeks* at the ſiege thereof.

But after ſuch time as the *Cretans* underſtood, that their king had by treaſon been made away, they gathered together a great army to invade *Cocalus*; and landing near unto *Camicus*, they beſieged the ſame five years, but in vain. In the end (being forced to return without any revenge taken) they were wrack'd on the coaſt of *Italy*; and having no means to repair their ſhips, nor the honour they had loſt, they made good the place whereon they fell, and built *Hyria*, or *Hyrium*, between the two famous ports of *Brunduſium* and *Tarentum*. Of theſe *Cretans* came thoſe nations afterwards called *Iapyges* and *Meſſapii*.

After the taking of *Troy*, *Egeſtus* and *Elymus* brought with them certain troops into *Sicily*, and ſeated themſelves among the *Sicani*, where they built the cities of *Egeſta* and *Elyma*.

[b] Strabo, l. 6.

It is ſaid that *Æneas* viſited theſe places in his paſſage into *Italy*, and that ſome of the *Trojans*, his followers, were left behind him in theſe towns of *Sicily*; whereof there want not good authors that make *Æneas* himſelf the founder.

About the ſame time the *Phenicians* ſeized upon the promontories of *Pachinus* and *Lilybæum*, and upon certain ſmall iſles adjoining to the main iſland; which they fortified, to ſecure the trades that they had with the *Sicilians*; like as the *Portugals* have done in the *Eaſt-Indies*, at *Goa*, *Ormus*, *Moſambique*, and other places. But the *Phenicians* ſtay'd not there; for after they had once aſſured their deſcents, they built the goodly city of *Panormus*, now called *Palermo*.

Theſe we find were the nations that inhabited the iſle of *Sicily* before the war of *Troy*, and ere the *Greeks* in any numbers began to ſtraggle in thoſe parts.

It may perchance ſeem ſtrange to the reader, that in all ancient ſtory he finds one and the ſame beginning of nations after the flood; and that the firſt planters of all parts of the world were ſaid to be mighty and giant-like men; and that as *Phenicia*, *Egypt*, *Libya* and *Greece*, had *Hercules*, *Oreſtes*, *Anteus*, *Typhon*, and the like; as *Denmark* had *Starchaterus*, remembred by [a] *Saxo Grammaticus*; as *Scythia*, *Britany*, and other regions had giants for their firſt inhabitants: ſo this iſle of *Sicily* had her *Læſtriogones* and *Cyclopes*. This diſcourſe I could alſo reject for fained and fabulous, did not *Moſes* make us know, that the *Zamzummims*, *Emims*, *Anakims*, and Og of *Baſhan*, and others, which ſometime inhabited the mountains and deſarts of *Moab*, *Ammon*, and mount *Seir*, were men of exceeding ſtrength and ſtature, and of the races of giants; and were it not that [b] *Tertullian*, St. *Auguſtine*, *Nicephorus*, *Procopius*, *Iſidore*, *Pliny*, *Diodore*, *Herodotus*, *Solinus*, *Plutarch*, and many other authors, have confirmed the opinion. Yea, *Veſputius*, in his ſecond navigation into *America*, hath reported, that himſelf hath ſeen the like men in thoſe parts. Again, whereas the ſelf-ſame is written of all nations that is written of any one, as touching their ſimplicity of life, their mean fare, their feeding on acorns and roots, their poor cottages, the covering of their bodies with the ſkins of beaſts, their hunting, their arms and weapons, and their warfare, their firſt paſſages over great rivers and arms of the ſea upon rafts of trees tied together; and afterwards, their making boats, firſt of twigs and leather, then of wood; firſt with oars, and then with ſail; that they eſteemed as gods the firſt finders out of arts; as of huſbandry, of laws, and of policy; it is a matter that makes me neither to wonder at, nor to doubt of it. For they all lived in the ſame newneſs of time, which we call old-time, and had all the ſame want of his inſtruction, which (after the Creator of all things) hath by degrees taught all mankind. For other teaching had they none, that were removed far off from the *Hebrews*, who inherited the knowledge of the firſt patriarchs, than that from variable effects they began by time and degrees to find out the cauſes: from whence came philoſophy natural, as the moral did from diſorder and confuſion, and the law from cruelty and oppreſſion.

But it is certain, that the age of time hath brought forth ſtranger and more incredible things than the infancy. For we have now greater giants for vice and injuſtice than the world had in thoſe days for bodily ſtrength; for cottages and houſes of clay and timber we have raiſed palaces of ſtone; we carve them, we paint them, and adorn them with gold; inſomuch, as men are rathe known by their houſes, than their houſes by them; we are fallen from two diſhes to two hundred; from water to wine and drunkenneſs; from the covering of our bodies with the ſkins of beaſts, not only to ſilk and gold, but to the very ſkins of men. But to conclude this digreſſion, time will alſo take revenge of the exceſs which it hath brought forth; *Quam longa dies peperit, longiorque auxit, longiſſima ſubruet*; Long time brought forth, longer time increaſed it, and a time longer than the reſt ſhall overthrow it.

†. II.

The plantation of the Greeks *in* Sicily.

WHEN the firſt inhabitants had contended long enough about the dominion of all *Sicily*, it happened that one *Theocles*, a *Greek*, being driven upon that coaſt by an eaſterly wind, and finding true the commendations thereof which had been thought fabulous, being delivered only by poets, gave information to the *Athenians* of this his diſcovery, and propoſed unto them the benefit of this eaſy conqueſt, offering to become their guide. But *Theocles* was as little regarded by the *Athenians*, as *Columbus*, in our grand-fathers times, was by the *Engliſh*. Wherefore he took the ſame courſe that *Columbus* afterwards did. He over-laboured not himſelf in perſwading the noble *Athenians* (who thought themſelves to be well enough already, to their own profit, but went to the *Chalcidians*, that were needy and induſtrious, by whom his project was gladly entertained. By theſe was built the city of *Naxus*, and a colony planted of *Eubeans*.

But the reſt of the *Greeks* were wiſer than our weſtern princes of *Europe*; for they had no pope that ſhould forbid them to occupy the void places of the world. *Archias* of *Corinth* followed the *Eubeans*, and, landed in *Sicily*, near unto that city called afterward [c] *Syracuſe*; of which that part only was then compaſſed with a wall, which the *Etolians* called *Homothermon*; the *Greeks Naſos*; the *Latins Inſula*. He, with his *Corinthians*, having overcome the *Siculi*, drove them up into the country; and after a few years, their multitudes increaſing, they added unto the city of the iſland that of *Acradina*, *Tycha*, and *Neapolis*. So as well by the commodity of the double port, capable of

[a] Saxo G. in præfat. hiſt. [b] Tertul. de Reſurr. Aug. de Civit. Dei, l. 15. c. 9. Et quæſt. in Gen. Niceph. l. 2. c. 37. Procop. l. 2. de Bello Goth. Plin. l. 7. c. 2. [c] Syracuſe, *as* Cicero *relates, was the greateſt and moſt goodly city of all that the* Greeks *poſſeſs'd. For the ſituation is both ſtrong and of an excellent proſpect, from every entrance by land or ſea. The port was (for the moſt part) environed with beautiful buildings; and that part which was without the city, was on both ſides bank'd up, and ſuſtained with beautiful walls of marble. The city itſelf was one of the greateſt in the world: For it had in compaſs (as* Strabo *reporteth) without the treble wall thereof,* 180 *furlongs, which made of our miles about* 18. *It was compounded of four cities* (Strabo *ſaith of five*) *to wit,* Inſula, Acradina, Tycha *and* Neapolis; *of which greatneſs the ruins and foundations of the walls do yet witneſs. After ſuch time as the* Dores *of* Peloponneſus *had driven out the* Sicilians, *this goodly city, for a long time, became the ſeat of tyrants. The firſt whereof was* Gelo; *the ſecond,* Hiero, *the elder; the third,* Thraſybulus; *the fourth and fifth,* Dionyſius *the elder and younger; the ſixth,* Dion; *the ſeventh,* Agathocles; *the eighth,* Pyrrhus; *the ninth,* Hiero *the younger; the tenth and laſt,* Hieronymus: *who, being ſlain at* Leontium, *at length the* Romans *conquered it under the conduct of* Marcellus.

as many ſhips as any haven of that part of *Europe*, as by the fertility of the ſoil; *Syracuſe* grew up in great haſte to be one of the goodlieſt towns of the world. In ſhort time the *Greeks* did poſſeſs the better part of all the ſea-coaſt, forcing the *Sicilians* to withdraw themſelves into the faſt and mountainous parts of the iſland, making their royal reſidence in *Trinacia*.

Some ſeven years after the arrival of *Archias*; the *Chalcidians*, encouraged by the ſucceſs of the *Corinthians*, did aſſail and obtain the city of *Leontium*, built and poſſeſſed by the *Siculi*. In brief, the *Greeks* won from the *Siculi*, and their aſſociates, the cities of *Catana* and *Hybla*, which, in honour of the *Megarians* that forced it, they called *Megara*.

About five and forty years after *Archias* had taken *Syracuſe*; *Antiphemus* and *Entimus*, the one from *Rhodes*, the other from *Crete*, brought an army into *Sicily*, and built *Gela*; whoſe citizens, one hundred and eight years after, did erect that magnificent and renowned city of *Agrigentum*, governed according to the laws of the *Dorians*.

The *Syracuſians* alſo, in the ſeventieth year after their plantation, did ſet up the city of *Acra*, in the mountains; and in the nineteenth year *Caſmena*, in the plains adjoining; and again, in the hundred and thirtieth year of their dwelling in *Syracuſe*, they built *Camerina*; and ſoon after that, *Enna*, in the very center of the iſland. So did the *Cumani*, about the ſame time, recover from the *Siculi* the city of *Zancle*, which they had founded in the ſtreight between *Sicily* and *Italy*. They of *Zancle* had been the founders of *Himera*.

Not long after this, *Dorieus* the *Lacedemonian* built *Heraclia*; which the *Phenicians* and *Carthaginians*, fearing the neighbourhood of the *Spartans*, ſoon after invaded and ruined, tho' the ſame were again ere long re-edified.

Selirius alſo was built by a colony of *Megara*: and *Zancle* was taken by the *Meſſenians*; who having loſt their own country, gave the name thereof unto this their new purchaſe. Such were the beginnings of the greateſt cities in this iſland.

† III.

Of the government and affairs of Sicily, *before* Dionyſius's *tyranny*.

THE moſt part of the cities in *Sicily*, were governed by the rule of the people, till ſuch time as *Phalaris* began to uſurp the ſtate of *Agrigentum*, and to exerciſe all manner of tyranny therein.

This was that *Phalaris*, to whom *Perillus*, the cunning artificer of a deteſtable engine, gave an hollow bull of braſs, wherein to incloſe men, and ſcorch them to death: praiſing the device with this commendation; that the noiſe of one tormented therein, ſhould be like the bellowing of a bull. The tyrant gave a due reward to the inventor, by cauſing the firſt trial to be made upon himſelf. He reigned one and thirty years, ſaith *Euſebius*; others give him but ſixteen: howſoever it were, one *Telemachus*, in the end, fell upon him with the whole multitude of *Agrigentum*, and ſtoned him to death; being thereto animated by *Zeno*, even whilſt the tyrant was tormenting the ſame *Zeno* to make him confeſs ſome matter of conſpiracy.

After the death of *Phalaris*, the citizens recovered their liberty, and enjoy'd it long, till *Thero* uſurped the government of the common-wealth: at which time alſo *Panetius* made himſelf lord of *Leontium*; and *Cleander*, of *Gela*: but *Cleander*, having ruled ſeven years, was ſlain by one of the citizens. *Cleander* being dead, his brother *Hippocrates* ſucceeded in his room, and greatly afflicted the people of *Naxos*, of *Zancle* or *Meſſina*, and of *Leontium*; whom, with divers others of the ancient inhabitants, he forced to acknowledge him their lord. He alſo made war with the *Syracuſians*, and in the end got from them, by compoſition, the city of *Camerina*. But when he had reigned ſeven years, he was ſlain in a battel againſt the *Siculi*, before *Hybla*.

At this time did the *Syracuſians* change their form of government, from *Popular* to *Ariſtocratical*; a preparation towards a principality, whereinto it was ſoon after changed. After the death of *Hippocrates*, *Gelon* (deſcended from the *Rhodians*, which together with the *Cretans* had long before, among other of the *Greeks*, ſeated themſelves in *Sicily*) that had commanded the forces of *Hippocrates*, in the former war, with notable ſucceſs, became lord of *Gela*. He, after his maſter's death, breaking the truſt committed unto him by *Hippocrates* over his children, and being in poſſeſſion of *Gela*, took the occaſion and advantage of a contention in *Syracuſe*, between the magiſtrates and the people. For coming with a ſtrong army to the ſuccour of the governours, driven out by the multitude, they elected him their prince, being the firſt, and (indeed) the moſt famous, that ever governed the *Syracuſians*. [a] This change happened in the ſecond year of the three-ſcore and twelfth *Olympiad*; wherein the better to eſtabliſh himſelf, he took to wife the daughter of *Thero*, who had alſo uſurped the ſtate of *Agrigentum*.

Now this *Gelon*, the ſon of *Dinomenes*, had three brethren; *Hiero*, *Polyzelus*, and *Thraſybulus*: to the firſt of which he gave up the city of *Gela*, when he had obtained the principality of *Syracuſe*. For, after that time, all his thoughts travelled in the ſtrengthening, beautifying, and amplifying of *Syracuſe*. He defaced *Camerina*, that a little before was fallen from the obedience of the *Syracuſians* who built it, and brought the citizens to *Syracuſe*. The *Megarians*, that had moved a war againſt him, he overcame; the richer ſort he brought to *Syracuſe*; and the people he ſold for ſlaves. In like manner dealt he with other places upon the like occaſion. Not long after this, *Thero*, a prince of the *Agrigentines*, having diſpoſſeſſed *Terillus* of his city *Himera*, the *Carthaginians* were drawn into the quarrel by *Anaxilus*, lord of *Meſſina*, father-in-law to *Terillus*: and *Gelon* alſo was ſolicited by his father-in-law, *Thero*. *Gelon* was content, and in fine, after divers conflicts, the *Carthaginians*, and other *Africans*, led by *Amilcar*, were overthrown by [b] *Gelon*: and an hundred and fifty thouſand of them left their bodies in *Sicily*.

This *Gelon* it was, to whom the *Athenians* and *Lacedemonians* ſent for ſuccour, when *Xerxes* with his huge army paſs'd the *Helleſpont*. He, for their relief, having armed thirty thouſand ſoldiers, and two hundred ſhips, refuſed nevertheleſs to ſend them into *Greece*, becauſe they refuſed him the commandment of one of their armies, either by ſea or by land. So he uſed to their embaſſadors only this ſaying, *That their ſpring was withered*; accounting the army, by him prepared, to be the very flower of the *Greek* nation.

a Pauſan. l. 6. b Herod. & Diod.

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The *Carthaginians*, after this great loſs received, fearing the invaſion of their own country, ſent to *Gelon* by their embaſſadors, to deſire peace; who grants it them on theſe conditions: That from thenceforth they ſhould not ſacrifice their children to *Saturn*: That they ſhould pay him two thouſand talents of ſilver; and preſent him with two armed ſhips, in ſign of amity. Theſe conditions the *Carthaginians* not only willingly accepted, but with the two thouſand talents, and the ſhips for war, they ſent unto *Demarata*, *Gelon*'s wife, a crown, valued at an hundred talents of gold, with other preſents. Whereby we ſee that ſome nations and ſome natures are much the better for being well beaten. The wars ended, and *Sicily* in peace, *Gelon* beautified the temples of the gods, and erected others in honour of them. So being exceedingly beloved and honoured of his ſubjects, he left the world, and left for his ſucceſſor his brother *Hiero*. *Philiſtus* and *Pliny* report, that when his body was burnt, according to the cuſtom of that age, a dog of his, which always waited on him, ran into the fire, and ſuffered himſelf to be burnt with him.

To *Gelon*, *Hiero* his brother ſucceeded; a man rude, cruel, covetous, and ſo ſuſpicious of his brethren *Polyzelus* and *Thraſybulus*, as he ſought by all means to deſtroy them. Notwithſtanding all this; by the converſation which he had with *Simonides*, he became of better condition, and greatly delighted with the ſtudy of good arts. Divers quarrels he had, as well with *Theron* of *Agrigentum*, as with other cities: all which he ſhortly after compounded, and gave a notable overthrow to the *Carthaginians*, whom *Xerxes* had incited to invade *Sicily*, fearing the ſuccours which *Gelon* had prepared, to aid the *Grecians*, againſt him. He alſo overthrew in battel, *Thraſydeus* the ſon of *Theron*, and thereby reſtored the *Agrigentines* to their former liberty. But in the end he loſt the love of the *Syracuſians*; and after he had reigned eleven years, he left the kingdom to his brother *Thraſybulus*, who became a moſt unjuſt and bloody tyrant. *Thraſybulus* enjoy'd his principality no longer than ten months. For notwithſtanding the force of mercenary ſoldiers, which he entertained for his guards, he was beaten out of *Syracuſe* by the citizens; to whom, being beſieged in *Acradina*, he reſtored the government, and was baniſhed the iſland. From thence he ſailed into *Greece*, where he died a private man, among the *Locrians*.

And now had the *Syracuſians* recovered again their former liberty, as all the reſt of the cities did, after which they had never ſought, had the ſucceſſors of *Gelon* inherited his virtue, as they did the principality of *Syracuſe*. For in all changes of eſtates, the preſervation ought to anſwer the acquiſition. Where a liberal, valiant, and adviſed prince, hath obtained any new ſigniory, and added it to that of his own, or exalted himſelf from being a private man, to the dignity of a prince; it behoveth the ſucceſſor to maintain it by the ſame way and art, by which it was gotten.

To conclude, *Syracuſe* (tho' not without blows, ere ſhe could cleanſe her ſelf of the creatures and lovers of *Gelon*) was now again become miſtreſs of her ſelf, and held her ſelf free well near threeſcore years, to the time of *Dionyſius*; tho' ſhe were in the mean while greatly indangered by a citizen of her own, called *Tindario*.

Now, to prevent the greatneſs of any one among them, for the future, they deviſed a kind of baniſhment of ſuch among them as were ſuſpected; taking pattern from the *Athenian Oſtraciſm*. They called this their new deviſed judgment of exile, *Petaliſmus*, wherein every one wrote upon an olive leaf (as at *Athens* they wrote upon ſhells) the name of him, whom he would have expelled the city. He that had moſt ſuffrages againſt him, was baniſhed for five years. Hereby, in a ſhort time it came to paſs, that thoſe of judgment, and beſt able to govern the common-wealth, were by the worſt able, either ſuppreſs'd or thruſt out of the city. Yea, ſuch as feared this law, tho' they had not yet felt it, withdrew themſelves as ſecretly as they could, ſeeking ſome place of more ſecurity, wherein to maintain themſelves. And good reaſon they had ſo to do; ſeeing there is nothing ſo terrible in any ſtate, as a powerful and authoriſed ignorance. But this law laſted not long. For their neceſſity taught them to aboliſh it, and reſtore again the wiſer ſort to the government; from which, the nobility having practiſed to baniſh one another, the ſtate became altogether popular. But after a while, being invaded by *Ducetius*, king of the *Sicilians*, that inhabited the inner part of the iſland (who had already taken *Enna*, and ſome other of the *Grecian* cities, and overthrown the army of the *Agrigentines*) the *Syracuſians* ſent forces againſt him, commanded by an unworthy citizen of theirs, called *Bolcon*. This their captain made nothing ſo much haſte to find *Ducetius*, againſt whom he was imploy'd, as he did to fly from the army he led, as ſoon as *Ducetius* preſented him battel. So, for want of conduct, the greateſt number of the *Syracuſians* periſhed.

But making better choice among thoſe whom they had baniſhed, they levy other troops: by whom, in concluſion, *Ducetius* being beaten, ſubmitteth himſelf, and is conſtrained to leave the iſland for a time. Yet it was not long ere he returned again, and built the city *Callatina* on the ſea-ſide.

Ducetius being dead; all the *Greek* cities did in a ſort acknowledge *Syracuſe*: *Trinacia* excepted; which alſo by force of arms, in the fourſcore and fifth *Olympiad*, they brought to reaſon.

But they do not long enjoy this their ſuperintendency. For the citizens of *Leontium*, being oppreſs'd by them, ſeek aid from the *Athenians*, about the ſixth year of the *Peloponneſian* war. In this ſuit they prevailed by the eloquence of *Gorgias* their orator; and got an hundred *Athenian* gallies to ſuccour them, under the leading of *Laches*, and *Charoades*. To this fleet the *Leontines* and their partners added one hundred more; with which forces, and with ſome ſupplies brought by *Sophocles*, *Pythodorus*, *Eurymedon*, and other *Athenian* captains, they invaded the territories of the *Syracuſians*, and their partiſans; won and loſt divers places; took *Meſſina*; and in the ſeventh year of the *Peloponneſian* war, loſt it again. They alſo, at the ſame time, attempted *Himera*, but in vain. The fire of this quarrel took hold upon many cities, which invaded each other's territory with great violence. But when they had wearied themſelves on all hands, and yet could ſee no iſſue of the war; the *Leontines*, without the advice of the *Athenians*, came to an accord with the *Syracuſians*, and were admitted into their ſociety with equal freedom. So the *Athenians*, who hoped to have greatned themſelves in *Sicily*, by the diviſion and civil war, were diſappointed of their expectation, by the good agreement of the *Sicilians*, and fain to be gone with the broken remainder of their fleet. This they knew not how to amend; but (according to the cuſtom of popular eſtates) by taking revenge upon their own commanders. So they baniſhed *Pythodorus*,

Pythodorus and *Sophocles*, and laid an heavy fine upon *Eurymedon*. Shortly after this, followed the moſt memorable war that ever was made by the *Greeks* in *Sicily*; which was that of the *Athenians* againſt the *Selinuntines* and *Syracuſians*, in favour of the cities of *Egeſta*, *Leontium*, and *Catana*. They of *Selinus* had oppreſſed the *Egeſtans*, and they of *Syracuſe* the *Leontines*, and the *Catanians*; which was the ground of the war. For the *Athenians* undertook the protection of their old friends; and, in hatred of the *Athenians*, aid from *Lacedemon* was ſent to the *Syracuſians*. The *Lacedemonians* dealt plainly, having none other end than that which they pretended, namely, to help a people of their own tribe, that craved their ſuccour, being in diſtreſs. The *Athenians* ſcarce knew what to pretend, for their preparations were ſo great, as diſcovered their intent to be none other than the conqueſt of the whole iſland; yet they, which had called them in, were ſo blinded with their own paſſions, that they would not believe their own eyes, which preſented unto them a fleet and army far greater than the terrible report of fame had made it.

In this expedition the city of *Athens* had engaged all her power, as regarding not only the greatneſs of the enterprize, but the neceſſity of finiſhing it in a ſhort ſpace of time. For the *Lacedemonians* (as hath already been ſhewed in due place) ſtood at that time in ſuch broken terms of peace with *Athens*, as differed not much from open war. Wherefore it was thought neceſſary either to ſpare no coſt in this great expedition, or altogether to forbear it, which was likely to be hindered by wars at home, if their proceedings were ſlack abroad. And ſurely, had not the deſire of the *Athenians* been overpaſſionate, the arguments of *Nicias* had cauſed them to abſtain from ſo chargeable a buſineſs, and to reſerve their forces for a more needful uſe. But young counſels prevailed againſt the authority of ancient men, that were more regardful of ſafety than of honour.

Of this buſineſs mention hath been already made, in that which we have written of the *Peloponneſian* war. But what was there delivered in general terms, as not concerning the affairs of *Greece*, otherwiſe than by conſequence, doth in this place require a more perfect relation, as a matter wherein the whole ſtate of *Sicily* was like to have felt a great converſion.

Though *Alcibiades* had prevailed againſt *Nicias*, in exhorting the people to this great voyage; yet *Nicias*, together with *Alcibiades* and *Lamachus*, was appointed to be one of the chief commanders therein.

Theſe had commiſſion and direction, as well to ſuccour the *Segeſtans*, and to re-eſtabliſh the *Leontines*, caſt out of their places by the *Syracuſians*, as alſo by force of arms to ſubject the *Syracuſians*, and all their adherents in *Sicily*, and compel them by tribute to acknowledge the *Athenians* for their ſupreme lords. To effect which, the fore-named captains were ſent off with an hundred and thirty gallies, and five thouſand one hundred ſoldiers, beſides the thirty ſhips of burden, which tranſported their victuals, engines, and other munitions for the war; and theſe were *Athenians*, *Mantineans*, *Rhodians*, and *Candians*: [a] there were, beſides theſe, ſix thouſand *Megarians* light armed, with thirty horſemen.

With theſe troops and fleets they arrive at *Rhegium*, where the *Rhegians* refuſe to give them entry; but ſell them victuals for their money. From thence they ſent to the *Egeſtans*, to know what treaſure they would contribute towards the war, ſeeing, for their ſakes, they had entered thereinto. But they found, by their anſwers, that theſe *Egeſtans* were poor, and that they had abuſed the *Athenian* ambaſſadors with falſe ſhews of gold, having in all but thirty talents. The *Athenians* further were diſcouraged, when they found that the *Rhegians*, their ancient friends, and allied unto the *Leontines*, refuſed to truſt them within their walls. Hereupon *Nicias* adviſeth to depart towards the *Selinuntines*, and to force them, or perſwade them to an agreement with the *Egeſtans*; as likewiſe to ſee what diſburſements the *Egeſtans* could make, and ſo return again into *Greece*, and not to waſte *Athens* in a needleſs war. *Alcibiades*, on the other ſide, would ſollicit the cities of *Sicily* to confederacy againſt the *Syracuſians*, and *Selinuntines*, whereby to force them unto reſtitution of all that they had taken from the *Leontines*. *Lamachus*, he perſwades them to aſſail *Syracuſe* it ſelf, before it were prepared againſt them. But in the end (being excluded out of divers cities) they ſurprize *Catana*; and there they take new counſel how to proceed. Thence they employed *Nicias* to thoſe of *Egeſta*, who received from them thirty talents towards his charges, and one hundred and twenty talents more there were of the ſpoils they had gotten in the iſland. Thus, the ſummer being ſpent in idle conſultations and vain attempts, the *Athenians* prepare to aſſail *Syracuſe*. But *Alcibiades*, having been accuſed at home in his abſence, was ſent for back by the *Athenians*, to make his anſwer, and the army was left to the conduct of *Nicias* and *Lamachus*. Theſe commanders obtain a landing-place very near unto *Syracuſe*, by this device.

They employ to *Syracuſe* an inhabitant of *Catana*, whom they truſt, and inſtruct him to promiſe unto the *Syracuſians*, that he would deliver into their hands all the *Athenians* within *Catana*. Hereupon the *Syracuſians* draw thitherward with their beſt forces. But in the mean while, the *Athenians* ſetting ſail from *Catana*, arrive at *Syracuſe*, where they land at fair eaſe, and fortify themſelves againſt the town. Shortly after this, they fight, and the *Syracuſians* had the loſs; but the *Athenians* wanting horſe, could not purſue their victory to any great effect. They then retire themſelves, with a reſolution to refreſh their army at *Catana*, for the winter-ſeaſon. From thence they made an attempt upon *Meſſina*, hoping to have taken it by an intelligence, but in vain; for *Alcibiades* had diſcovered ſuch as were traitors within the city to the *Meſſinians*. This he now did, in deſpight of his own citizens the *Athenians*, becauſe they had recalled him from his command, with a purpoſe either to have put him to death, or to have baniſhed him; whereof being aſſured by his friends, he took his way towards the *Lacedemonians*, and to them he gave miſchievous counſel againſt his country. While this winter yet laſted, the *Syracuſians* ſent ambaſſadors to *Lacedemon* and *Corinth* for aid; as likewiſe the *Athenian* captains in *Sicily*, ſend to *Athens* for ſupplies; which both the one and the other obtained.

In the ſpring following (which was the beginning of the eighteenth year of the *Peloponneſian* war) the *Athenians* in *Sicily* ſail from the port of *Catana* to *Megara*, forſaken of the inhabitants; from whence foraging the country, they obtain ſome ſmall victories over the ſtragling *Syracuſians*; and, at their return to *Catana*, they receive a ſupply of two hundred men at arms, but without horſe, which they hoped to furniſh in the iſland, from the *Segeſtans*,

[a] Thucyd. l. 6. c. 9.

and other their adherents: they were alſo ſtrengthned with a company of archers, and with three hundred talents in money.

Hereupon they take courage, and encamp near *Syracuſe*, upon the banks of the great port, repelling the *Syracuſians* that ſallied to impeach their intrenchments. They alſo received from their confederates four hundred horſe-men, with two hundred other horſe, to mount their men at arms. *Syracuſe* was now in effect block'd up, ſo as hardly any ſuccours could enter, but ſuch as were able to force their paſſage: yet the *Athenians* receive divers loſſes; among which it was not the leaſt, that *Lamachus*, one of their beſt commanders, was ſlain.

In the mean while, *Gylippus* and *Python*, with the *Lacedemonian* and *Corinthian* forces, arrive, and take land at *Himera*. The citizens of *Himera*, and of *Gela*, together with the *Selinuntines*, join with them; ſo that with theſe, and his own troops, *Gylippus* ventured to march over-land towards *Syracuſe*. The *Syracuſians* ſend a part of their forces to meet him, and conduct him. The *Athenians* prepare to encounter them, expecting his arrival near unto the city, upon a place of advantage. At the firſt encounter they had the better of their enemies, by reaſon that the *Syracuſian* horſe-men could not come to fight in thoſe ſtreights; but ſoon after, *Gylippus*, charging them again, brake them, and conſtrained *Nicias* to fortify himſelf within his camp. Whereupon *Nicias* made the ſtate of his affairs known by his letters to the *Athenians*; ſhewing, that without great ſupplies by ſea and land, the enterprize would be loſt, together with the ſmall army remaining. Theſe letters received, the *Athenians* appoint two other generals, *Eurymedon* and *Demoſthenes*, to join with *Nicias*; the one they diſpatch preſently with ſome ſupply; the other they ſend after him in the ſpring following.

In the mean while *Gylippus*, at *Syracuſe*, fights with the *Athenians* both by ſea and land; ſometimes with ill, ſometimes with good ſucceſs; but in concluſion, he took from them their fort near unto *Syracuſe*, at the promontory called *Plymmyrrium*, wherein the *Athenians* loſt their treaſure, and a great part of all their proviſions. Notwithſtanding which loſs, and that the *Athenians* themſelves in *Greece* were (in effect) beſieged within *Athens*, by the *Lacedemonians*; yet were they moſt obſtinate in proſecuting the war in *Sicily*, and diſpatched away *Demoſthenes* with new ſuccours. *Demoſthenes*, in his way towards *Sicily*, encountered with *Polyanthes* the *Corinthian* with his fleet, both the captains being bound for *Sicily*; the one to ſuccour *Nicias*, the other *Gylippus*. The loſs between them was in effect equal, and neither ſo broken, but that each of them proſecuted the enterprize they had in hand. But before the ſuccours arrive to either, *Gylippus* and *Ariſton* had aſſailed the *Athenians* in the great port of *Syracuſe*, and in a ſea-fight put them to the worſt, to the great diſcouragement of the *Athenians*. On the neck of this, *Demoſthenes* arrived with ſeventy-three gallies, charged with foot-men; and (blaming the ſloth of *Nicias*) he invaded the *Syracuſians* the ſame day that he arrived. But he made more haſte than he had good ſpeed, being ſhamefully beaten and repulſed with great loſs. Hereupon *Demoſthenes* and *Eurymedon* determine to riſe up from before *Syracuſe*, and return to the ſuccour of *Athens*; but *Nicias* diſputed to the contrary, pretending that he had good intelligence within *Syracuſe*, whereby he learned that the town could not long hold out.

Whatſoever *Nicias*'s intelligence was, upon the arrival of a new ſupply into the town, the *Athenians* had all conſented to depart, and to lodge at *Catana*, had not an eclipſe of the moon, boding (as was thought) ill ſucceſs, cauſed them to defer their departure. But this ſuperſtition coſt them dear. For the *Syracuſians*, *Lacedemonians*, and *Corinthians*, with ſeventy-ſeven ſail of gallies, entered the great port of *Syracuſe*, wherein the *Athenians* kept their fleet, and whereon they had fortified themſelves. The *Athenians*, in the ſame port, encountered them with eighty-ſix gallies, commanded by *Eurymedon*; in which the *Athenian* fleet was beaten by the leſſer number, and *Eurymedon* ſlain. Now, though it were ſo that the *Syracuſians* received the more loſs by *land* (for the fight was general;) yet when the *Athenians* were beaten by ſea, in which kind they thought themſelves invincible, they were wonderfully caſt down. For it was well ſaid of *Gylippus* to the *Syracuſians*; *When any people do find themſelves vanquiſhed in that manner of fight, and with thoſe weapons in which they perſwade themſelves that they exceed all others, they not only loſe their reputation, but their courage.* The *Athenians*, beſides the gallies ſunk and wrack'd, had 17 taken and poſſeſſed by the enemy; and with great labour and loſs they defended the reſt from being fired, having drawn them within a palliſado, in one corner of the port, unadviſedly; for it is as contrary to a ſea-war, to thruſt ſhips into a ſtreight room and corner, as it is to ſcatter foot in a plain field againſt horſe; the one ſubſiſting by being at large, the other by cloſe embatteling.

The *Syracuſians* having now weakened the *Athenian* fleet, reſolve to impriſon them within the port. And to that purpoſe they range all their gallies in the mouth of the haven, being about a mile over, and there they came to anchor; filling the out-let with all manner of veſſels, which they man moſt ſtrongly, becauſe the *Athenians*, being now made deſperate, ſhould not with double ranks of gallies break through the *Syracuſian* fleet, which lay but ſingle, becauſe they were forced to range themſelves over all the out-let of the port. They therefore not only moored themſelves ſtrongly by their anchors, but chained the ſides of their gallies together, and laid behind them again certain ſhips, which ſerved in the former war for victuallers; to the end, that if any of their gallies were ſunk, or the chain which joined them to their fellows broken, the *Athenians* might yet find themſelves a ſecond time entangled and arreſted. To diſorder alſo thoſe *Athenian* gallies which came on in form of a wedge, to break through and force a paſſage, the *Syracuſians* had left within theſe gallies and ſhips inchained together a certain number of looſe ones, to ſtop their courſe and fury; for where the way of any veſſel uſing oar or ſails is broken, and their ſpeed fore-ſlowed, they cannot force with any weight and violence the reſiſtance oppoſing.

On the other ſide, the *Athenians* knew that they were utterly loſt, except, with an invincible reſolution, they could make their way, and break down this great bridge of boats; or (at leaſt) force a paſſage through them in ſome part or other; which they reſolve to hazard with all their ſhipping (to the number of one hundred and ten of all ſorts) and with all the ſtrength of their land-army, in them embarked. But the gallies, which were within the bridge of boats, did ſo diſorder the *Athenian* fleet, ere they came to force the bridge, as, albeit ſome few of them had broken through the chains; yet, being ſtopped by the ſhips without, and aſſailed by other looſe gallies of the *Syracuſians*, which were purpoſely left at large in the ſea, they were either taken or ſunk. Three great diſadvantages the *Athenians* had; the firſt, that fighting within a haven,

and

and (as it were) in a ſtreight, they had no room to turn themſelves, nor to free themſelves one from another, being entangled; the ſecond, that having over-peſtered their gallies with ſoldiers, who uſed offenſive arms of darts and ſlings, they had not place upon the decks to ſtretch their arms; the third was, the diſcomfortable end for which they fought, namely, to force a paſſage, by which they might ſave themſelves by running away. To be ſhort, the fight was no leſs terrible than the confuſion, the ſlaughter great on all ſides, and the noiſe and the cries ſo loud and lamentable, as that no direction could be heard. But in the end, the *Athenians*, as many as ſurvived, were beaten back to the land, with the loſs of ſixty of their gallies, broken, ſunk, or abandoned. The *Syracuſians* did alſo loſe twenty of theirs, with *Python*, the commander of the *Corinthians*. The reſt of the *Athenian* gallies running themſelves into the bottom of the port, ſaved themſelves by the help and countenance of the land-army, there fortified. In this deſperate eſtate, the *Athenian* commanders go to counſel. *Demoſthenes* perſwades them to furniſh with freſh ſoldiers thoſe few gallies which remained; and, while the *Syracuſians* were triumphing, and made ſecure by their preſent victory, to ſet upon them, and forcing their way out of the port, to return to *Athens*. This was no ill counſel; for, as we have heard of many great captains (yea, the greateſt number of all that have been victorious) that have neglected the ſpeedy proſecution of a beaten enemy; ſo might we produce many examples of thoſe, who, having ſlept ſecurely in the boſom of good ſucceſs, have been ſuddenly awakened by the rallied companies of a broken army, and have thereby loſt again all the honour and advantage formerly gotten. But *Nicias* oppoſeth the advice of *Demoſthenes*; others ſay, that the ſea-men were againſt it. Whereupon abandoning their gallies, they all reſolve to march over-land to the cities of their confederates, till ſome more favourable fortune ſhould call them thence. On the other ſide, *Gylippus*, and other the *Lacedemonian* and *Corinthian* captains, with *Hermocrates*, exhort the *Syracuſians* to put themſelves preſently into the field, and to ſtop all the paſſages leading to thoſe cities of their enemies, to which the *Athenians* might make their retreat. But many were weary, and many were wounded, and many of them thought that they had done enough for the preſent. Which humour in ſome of our commanders at *Cadez*, loſt us both the *Indian* fleet, and the ſpoils of many other neighbouring places. *Hermocrates* the *Syracuſian*, finding it a loſt labour to perſwade his countrymen to any haſty proſecution, deviſed this good ſtratagem, thereby to gain time; not doubting, but that after a day or two, he ſhould draw them willingly out. He ſent two or three horſe-men out of *Syracuſe* by night, willing them to find *Nicias*, and (after they had aſſured him that they were of the *Athenians* faction) to give him advice not to march away over-haſtily from the place wherein he was fortified; alledging, that the *Syracuſians* had lodged their army, which could not long ſtay there upon the paſſages and places of advantage, leading towards the cities of their allies. Theſe tidings *Nicias* eaſily believed, and put off his journey to the third day; for men newly beaten, are (for the moſt part) more fearful than wiſe, and to them every thiſtle in the field appears, by night, a man at arms.

The third day (leaving all their gallies, and all their baggage) they remove, being pierced and purſued with the lamentable out-cries of thoſe that were ſick and hurt, whom they abandon to the cure of their enemy's ſwords. The reſt march away, to the number of forty thouſand, and make their firſt paſſage by force over the river of *Anapus*, notwithſtanding the oppoſition of their enemies. But being every day charged in their marches, and by the *Syracuſian* horſe-men beaten in from foraging and proviſion of food, they grow weak and heartleſs. The *Syracuſians* alſo poſſeſs the mountain *Lepas*, by which they were to paſs towards *Camerina*, and thereby force them to fall back again towards the ſea-coaſt, and to take what way they could, being unable to proceed in their journey intended. Many hard ſhifs they made in difficult paſſages, and blind marches by night, which they were fain to endure, as having none other means to eſcape from the enemy that purſued them, and held them waking with continual ſkirmiſhing. To keep all in order, *Nicias* undertook the leading of the vanguard, and *Demoſthenes* conducted the rear. At the river *Erineus*, *Nicias* takes the ſtart of a whole night's march, leaving *Demoſthenes* to make the retreat, who being encompaſſed, and over-preſſed with numbers, ſurrenders himſelf. The conditions he obtained, were far better than he could have hoped for; and the faith of his enemies far worſe than he ſuſpected; for he was afterwards, with *Nicias*, murthered in priſon. The army of *Demoſthenes* being diſſolved, they purſue *Nicias* with the greater courage, who being utterly broken upon the paſſage of the river *Aſſinarus*, ſurrendered himſelf to *Gylippus* upon honeſt conditions. *Gylippus* ſought to preſerve him, and to have had the honour to have brought theſe two to *Sparta*; *Nicias*, as a noble enemy to the *Lacedemonians*, and who, at the overthrow which they received at *Pylus*, by the *Athenians*, had ſaved the lives of the vanquiſhed; *Demoſthenes*, as one that had done to *Lacedemon* the greateſt hurt. *Hermocrates* alſo, the commander of the *Syracuſian* army, diſſwaded the reſt, by all the art he had, from uſing any barbarous violence after ſo noble a victory. But the cruel and cowardly ſort (cowardiſe and cruelty being inſeparable paſſions) prevailed, and cauſed theſe brave captains to be miſerably murthered; one part of their ſoldiers to be ſtarved in loathſom priſons, and the reſt ſold for ſlaves. This was the ſucceſs of the *Sicilian* war, which took end at the river *Aſſinarus*, the twenty-fourth day of *May*, in the ninety-firſt *Olympiad*.

The *Athenians* being beaten out of *Sicily*, the *Egeſtans* (for whoſe defence againſt the *Selinuntines*, this late war had been taken in hand) fearing the victorious *Syracuſians*, ſought help from the *Carthaginians*, to whom they offered themſelves and their city as their vaſſals. The *Carthaginians*, though ambitious enough of enlarging their dominion in *Sicily*, yet conſidering the proſperity of the *Syracuſians*, and their late victories over the *Athenians*, they ſtaid a while to diſpute of the matter, whether they ſhould refuſe or accept the offer made unto them; for the *Selinuntines* were ſtreightly allied to the *Syracuſians*, as may appear by what is paſt. In the end, the ſenators of *Carthage* reſolve upon the enterprize; and (by a trick of their *Punic* wit) to ſeparate the *Syracuſians* from the *Selinuntines*, they ſend embaſſadors to *Syracuſe*; praying that city, as in the behalf of the *Egeſtans*, to compel the *Selinuntines* to take reaſon, and to reſt content with ſo much of the lands in queſtion, as they of *Syracuſe* ſhould think meet to allow them. The *Syracuſians* approved the motion, for it tended to their own honour. But the *Selinuntines* would make no ſuch appointment; rather they took it ill, that the *Syracuſians*, with whom they had run one courſe of fortune in the *Athenian* war, ſhould offer to trouble them by interpoſing

terpoſing as arbitrators, in a buſineſs that themſelves could end by force. This was right as the *Carthaginians* would have it. For now could they of *Selinus* with an ill grace crave aid of *Syracuſe*, and the *Syracuſians* as ill grant it unto thoſe that had refuſed to ſtand to the arbitrement, which the *Carthaginians* would have put into their hands. Hereupon an army of three hundred thouſand men is ſet out from *Carthage*, under the conduct of *Hannibal*, nephew to that *Amilcar*, who (as you have heard before) was overthrown with the great *Carthaginian* army at *Himera* by *Gelon*. *Hannibal* was exceeding greedy of this employment, that he might take revenge, as well of his uncle's as of his father's death, the one of them having been ſlain by the *Himerans*, the other by thoſe of *Selinus*. Both theſe cities *Hannibal*, in this war, won by force of arms, ſack'd them and burnt them; and having taken three thouſand of the *Himerans* priſoners, he cauſed them to be led unto the place where *Amilcar* was ſlain, and buried them there.

After this followed ſome trouble at *Syracuſe*, occaſioned by the baniſhment of *Hermocrates*, who had lately been general of the *Syracuſian* forces againſt the *Athenians*. The malice of his enemies had ſo far prevailed with the ingrateful multitude, that he was condemned to exile for his mere virtue, at ſuch time as he was aiding the *Lacedemonians* in their war againſt *Athens*, wherein he did great ſervice. All the honeſter ſort within *Syracuſe* were ſorry for the injury done unto him, and ſought to have him repealed. *Hermocrates* himſelf returning into *Sicily*, gathered an army of ſix thouſand, with which he began to repair *Selinus*, and by many noble actions, laboured to win the love of his citizens; but the faction that oppoſed him was the ſtronger. Wherefore he was adviſed to ſeize upon a gate of *Syracuſe*, with ſome ſtrength of men, whereby his friends within the town might have the better means to riſe againſt the adverſe party. This he did; but preſently the multitude fell to arms, and ſet upon him, in which conflict he was ſlain. But his ſon-in-law, *Dionyſius*, ſhall make them wiſh *Hermocrates* alive again.

†. IV.

Of Dionyſius *the tyrant*; *and others, following him, in* Syracuſe.

THE *Syracuſians* had enjoyed their liberty about threeſcore years, from the death of *Thraſybulus*, to the death of *Hermocrates*; at which time *Dionyſius* was raiſed up by God to take revenge, as well of their cruelty towards ſtrangers, as of their ingratitude towards their own beſt citizens. For, before the time of *Dionyſius*, they had made it their paſtime to reward the virtue of their worthieſt commanders with death or diſgrace; which cuſtom they muſt now be taught to amend.

Dionyſius obtained the principality of *Syracuſe*, by the ſame degrees that many others before him had made themſelves maſters of other cities, and of *Syracuſe* itſelf. For, being made *Prætor*, and commanding their armies againſt the *Carthaginians* and other their enemies, he behaved himſelf ſo well, that he got a general love among the people and men of war. Then began he to follow the example of *Piſiſtratus*, that made himſelf Lord of *Athens*; obtaining a band of ſix hundred men to defend his perſon; under pretence, that his private enemies, being traiterouſly affected to the ſtate of *Syracuſe*, had laid plots how to murther him, becauſe of his good ſervices. He doubled the pay of the ſoldiers; alledging, that it would encourage them to fight manfully; but intending thereby to aſſure them to himſelf. He perſwaded the citizens to call home out of exile thoſe that had been baniſhed, which were the beſt men of *Syracuſe*; and theſe were afterwards at his devotion, as obliged unto him by ſo great a benefit. His firſt favour among the *Syracuſians*, grew from his accuſation of the principal men. It is the delight of baſe people to reign over their betters; wherefore, gladly did he help them to break down, as fetters impriſoning their liberty, the bars that held it under ſafe cuſtody. Long it was not, ere the chief citizens had found whereat he aimed. But what they ſaw, the people would not ſee; and ſome that were needy, and knew not how to get offices without his help, were willing to help him, though they knew his purpoſes to be ſuch, as would make all the city to ſmart. He began early to hunt after the tyranny, being but twenty-five years of age when he obtained it: belike, it was his deſire to reign long. His firſt work of making himſelf abſolute lord in *Syracuſe*, was the poſſeſſion of the citadel; wherein was much good proviſion, and under it the gallies were moored. This he obtained by allowance of the people; and having done this, he cared for no more, but declared himſelf without all ſhame or fear: the army, the chief citizens reſtored by him from baniſhment, all the needy ſort within *Syracuſe*, that could not thrive by honeſt courſes; and ſome neighbour-towns bound unto him, either for his help in war, or for eſtabliſhing the faction reigning at that preſent, were wholly affected to his aſſiſtance. Having therefore gotten the citadel into his hands, he needed no more, ſave to aſſure what he had already. He ſtrengthened himſelf by divers marriages; taking firſt to wife the daughter of *Hermocrates*, and after her, two at once; the one a *Locrian*, *Doris*, by whom he had *Dionyſius*, his ſucceſſor; the other *Ariſtomache*, the daughter of *Hipparinus*, and ſiſter to *Dion*, honourable men in *Syracuſe*, which bare unto him many children, that ſerved to fortify him with new alliances.

Yet it was not long ere ſome of the *Syracuſians* (envying his proſperity) incited the multitude, and took arms againſt him, even in the novelty of his rule. But their enterprize was more paſſionately than wiſely governed. He had ſhamefully been beaten by the *Carthaginians* at *Gela*; which as it vexed the *Sicilian* men at arms, making them ſuſpect that it was his purpoſe to let the *Carthaginians* waſte all, that he might afterwards take poſſeſſion of the deſolate places; ſo it inflamed them with a deſire to free themſelves from his tyranny. They departed therefore from him, and marched haſtily to *Syracuſe*, where they found friends to help them: there they forced his palace, ranſacked his treaſures, and ſo ſhamefully abuſed his wife, that, for the grief thereof, ſhe poiſoned her ſelf. But he follow'd their heels apace, and firing a gate of the city by night, entered ſoon enough to take revenge, by making a ſpeedy riddance of them; for he ſpared none of his known, no, not of his ſuſpected enemies. After that, he grew ſo doubtful of his life, as he never durſt truſt barber to trim him, nor any perſon, no, not ſo much as his brother, to enter into his chamber unſtripped and ſearched. He was the greateſt robber of the people that ever reigned in any ſtate; and withal the moſt unreſpectively cruel.

After this, he ſeparated with fortification that part of the city called the iſland, from the reſt; like as the *Spaniard* did the citadel of *Antwerp*: therein he lodged his treaſures and his guards.

He then began to make war upon the free cities of *Sicily*; but while he lay before *Herbeſſe*, an inland town, the *Syracuſians* rebelled againſt him; ſo as, with great difficulty, he recovered his citadel;

from

from whence, having allured the old ſoldiers of the *Campanians*, who forced their paſſage through the city with twelve hundred horſe, he again recovered the maſtery over the *Syracuſians:* and when a multitude of them were buſied in gathering in their harveſt, he diſarmed all the townſmen remaining, and new ſtrengthened the fort of the iſland with a double wall. He incloſed that part alſo called *Epipoles*; which, with threeſcore thouſand labourers, he finiſhed in three weeks, being two leagues in compaſs. He then built two hundred new gallies, and repaired one hundred and ten of the old; forged one hundred and forty thouſand targets, with as many ſwords and head-pieces, with fourteen thouſand corſlets, and all other ſuitable arms. Which done, he ſent word to the *Carthaginians* (greatly enfeebled by the plague) that except they would abandon the *Greek* towns which they held in *Sicily*, he would make war upon them; and, not ſtaying for anſwer, he took the ſpoil of all the *Phenician* ſhips and merchandiſe within his ports; as king *Philip* the ſecond did of our *Engliſh* before the war in our late queen's time. He then goes to the field with fourſcore thouſand foot and three thouſand horſe, and ſends his brother *Leptines* to ſea with two hundred gallies and five hundred ſhips of burthen. Moſt of the towns which held for *Carthage*, yielded unto him, ſaving *Panormus*, *Segeſta* or *Egeſta*, *Ancyræ*, *Motya*, and *Entella*. Of theſe, he firſt won *Motya* by aſſault, and put all therein to the ſword; but before *Egeſta* he loſt a great part of his army, by a ſally of the citizens. In the mean while *Himilco* arrives, but ere he took land, he loſt in a fight at ſea with *Leptines* fifty ſhips of war, and five thouſand ſoldiers, beſides many ſhips of burthen. This notwithſtanding, he recovered again *Motya* upon his firſt deſcent. From thence marching towards *Meſſina*, he took *Lypara*, and (ſoon after) *Meſſina*, and razed it to the ground. Now began *Dionyſius* greatly to doubt his eſtate. He therefore fortified all the places he could in the territory of the *Leontines*, by which he ſuppoſed that *Himilco* would paſs toward *Syracuſe*, and he himſelf took the field again with 34000 foot and 1000 horſe. Now, hearing that *Himilco* had divided his army into two parts, marching with the one half over-land, and ſending *Mago* with the other by ſea: he ſent *Leptines* his brother to encounter *Mago*. But *Leptines* was utterly beaten by the *Carthaginians*; twenty thouſand of his men were ſlain, and an hundred of his gallies loſt. It is very ſtrange, and hardly credible, which yet good authors tell us, that one city ſhould be able to furniſh five hundred ſail of ſhips, and two hundred gallies (for ſo many did *Syracuſe* arm in this war;) and more ſtrange it is, that in a battel at ſea, without any great artillery or muſket-ſhot, twenty thouſand ſhould be ſlain in one fight. In all our fights againſt the *Turks*, of which that at *Lepanto* was the moſt notable, we hear of no ſuch number loſt; nor in any other fight by ſea, that ever happened in our age, nor before us. When *Charles* the fifth went to beſiege *Algier*, he had in all his fleet, tranſports and others, but two hundred and fifty ſail of ſhips, and ſixty-five gallies: for the furniſhing of which fleet he ſought help from all the cities and ports of *Spain*, *Naples*, and the reſt of *Italy*. But in old times it was the manner to carry into the field, upon extremity, as many as were needful, of all that could bear arms, giving them little wages, or other allowance: in our days it is not ſo, neither indeed is it often requiſite. Upon this overthrow, *Dionyſius* poſts away to *Syracuſe*, to ſtrengthen it: *Himilco* follows him, and beſiegeth the town both by land and ſea. But the tyrant having received aid from the *Lacedemonians*, under the conduct of *Pharacidas*, puts himſelf to ſea, to make proviſion for his citizens, who in his abſence take twenty of the *Carthaginian* gallies, and ſink four. Hereupon, finding their own ſucceſs proſperous, and that of the tyrant exceeding ill, having alſo at the preſent weapons in their hands, they conſult how to recover their liberty. And this they had done, had not *Pharacidas* the *Lacedemonian* reſiſted them. It alſo fell out, to his exceeding advantage, that the plague was ſo increaſed, and ſo violent among the *Carthaginians*, as it is ſaid, that above 100000 of them died thereof. He therefore, with the power that he could gather together, ſets upon them both by ſea and land; and having ſlain great numbers of them, forceth *Himilco* to deſire peace. This peace *Dionyſius* ſold him for a great ſum of money, on condition that he ſhould ſteal away with his *Carthaginians* only; which he baſely accepted, betraying the reſt of the *Africans* and *Spaniards*. Yet no faith was kept with him, for he was purſued, and left many of his *Carthaginians* behind him. The reſt of the *Africans* fell under the ſwords of their enemies; only the *Spaniards*, after they had a while bravely defended themſelves, were (after their ſubmiſſion) entertained, and ſerved the conqueror.

Many ſuch examples of perfidious dealing have I noted in other places, and can hardly forbear to deliver unto memory the like practices, when they met with their matches: that which happened unto *Monſieur de Piles*, was very ſuitable to this treachery, wherewith *Dionyſius* purſued *Himilco*. I was preſent when *De Piles* related the injury done unto him. He had ſurrendered *St. John de Angely* to the *French* king *Charles* IX. who beſieged him therein. He ſurrendered it upon promiſe made by the faith of a king, that he ſhould be ſuffered to depart in ſafety, with all his followers. Yet, in preſence of the king himſelf, of the duke of *Anjou* his brother, general of his army, of the queen-mother, and of divers dukes and marſhals of *France*, he was ſet upon and broken in his march, ſpoiled of all that he had, and forced to ſave his life by flight, leaving the moſt of his ſoldiers dead upon the place; the king's hand and faith, warranting him to march away with enſigns diſplay'd, and with all his goods and proviſions, no whit availing him. It needs not therefore ſeem ſtrange, that an heathen tyrant ſhould thus break his faith, ſince kings, profeſſing chriſtianity, are bold to do the like, or command their captains to do it for them.

Dionyſius, after this great victory, took care to re-edify *Meſſina*. *Mago*, who ſtaid in *Sicily*, to hold up the *Carthaginians* therein, is again beaten by *Dionyſius*, who is alſo beaten by the *Tauromenians*. A new ſupply of fourſcore thouſand ſoldiers is ſent from *Carthage* to *Mago*; but theſe take eggs for their money, and make peace with *Dionyſius*, leaving the *Sicilians* in *Tauromenium* to ſhift for themſelves, whom *Dionyſius*, after a long ſiege, overcame, and gave their city to his mercenary ſoldiers.

He then paſſed into *Italy*, obtained divers victories there, brought the *Rhegians* on their knees, forced them to pay him one hundred and fourſcore thouſand crowns, to furniſh him with threeſcore gallies, and to put in an hundred pledges, for aſſurance of their future obſervance of covenants. This he did, not with any purpoſe to perform unto them the peace that they had ſo dearly bought; but that having taken from them their gallies, he might beſiege them, and ruin them utterly with the more eaſe. Now, to the end he might not, without ſome colour, falſify the faith that he had given to them; he pre-

tended to want victuals for his army, at ſuch time as he ſeemed ready to depart out of *Italy*, and ſent to them to furniſh him therewith, promiſing to return them the like quantity, at his coming home to *Syracuſe*.

His reſolution was, that if they refuſed to furniſh him, he would then make their refuſal the cauſe of his quarrel; if they yielded to aid him with the proportion which he deſired, that then they ſhould not be able, for want of food, to endure a ſiege any long time againſt him. For to ruin them he had fully determined, at what price ſoever. And great reaſon he had to take revenge of them, if he had done it fairly, and without breach of faith. For when, in the beginning of his reign, he deſired them to beſtow a daughter of ſome of their nobility upon him for a wife, they anſwered, that they had not any one fit for him, ſave the hangman's daughter. Princes do rather pardon ill deeds than villainous words. *Alexander* the great, forgave many ſharp ſwords, but never any ſharp tongues; no, though they told him but truly of his errors. And certainly, it belongs to thoſe that have warrant from God, to reprehend princes, and to none elſe, eſpecially in public.

It is ſaid, that *Henry* IV. of *France* had his heart more inflamed againſt the Duke of *Biron*, for his over-bold and biting taunts that he uſed againſt him before *Amiens*, than for his conſpiracy with the *Spaniard* or *Savoyan*; for he had pardoned ten thouſand of ſuch as had gone farther, and drawn their ſwords againſt him. The contemptuous words that Sir *John Parret* uſed of our late queen *Elizabeth* were his ruin, and not the counterfeit letter of the romiſh prieſt produced againſt him. So fared it with ſome other greater than he, that thereby ran the ſame and a worſe fortune ſoon after.

To be ſhort, he made them know new bread from old. He aſſaulted their town on all ſides, which he continued to do eleven months, till he won it by force. He uſed his victory without mercy, eſpecially againſt *Phyton*, who had commanded within it.

Some other wars he made with the *Carthaginians*, after the taking and raiſing of this city, and thoſe with variable ſucceſs. For as in one encounter he ſlew *Mago* with ten thouſand *Africans*, ſo the ſon of *Mago* beat him, and ſlew his brother *Leptines*, with fourteen thouſand of his ſoldiers. After which he bought his peace of the *Carthaginians*, as they had formerly done of him, following therein the advice of proſperity and adverſity, as all kings and ſtates do.

When he had reigned eight and thirty years he died; ſome ſay in his bed peaceably, which is the moſt likely, though others report it otherwiſe. A cruel man he was, and a faithleſs; a great poet, but a fooliſh one. He entertained *Plato* a while, but afterwards, for ſpeaking againſt his tyranny, he gave order to have him ſlain or ſold for a ſlave. For he could endure no man that flattered him not beyond meaſure. His paraſites therefore ſtiled his cruelty, *The hate of evil men*; and his lawleſs ſlaughter, *The ornaments and effects of his juſtice*. True it is, that flatterers are a kind of vermin which poiſon all the princes of the world, and yet they proſper better than the worthieſt and valianteſt men do: And I wonder not at it; for it is a world; and as our *Saviour Chriſt* hath told us, *The world will love her own*.

To this *Dionyſius*'s ſon, of the ſame name, ſucceeded, and inherited both his kingdom and his vices. To win the love of the people, he pardoned and releaſed out of priſon a great number of perſons, by his father lock'd up and condemned. Withal, he remitted unto his citizens divers payments by his father impoſed upon them. Which done, and thereby hoping that he had faſtened unto himſelf the people's affections, he caſt off the ſheep's ſkin, and put on that of the wolf. For being jealous of his own brethren, as men of more virtue than himſelf, he cauſed them all to be ſlain, and all the kindred that they had by their mother's ſide. For *Dionyſius* his father (as hath been ſaid) had two wives; *Doris* of *Locris*, and *Ariſtomache* a *Syracuſian*, the ſiſter of *Dion*, which brother-in-law of his he greatly enriched.

By *Doris* he had this *Dionyſius*, who ſucceeded unto him; and by *Ariſtomache* he had two ſons and two daughters; of which the elder, called *Sophroſyne*, he gave in marriage to his eldeſt ſon, and her half brother *Dionyſius*; the younger, called *Areta*, he beſtowed on his brorher *Theorides*; after whoſe death, *Dion* took her to wife, being his neice.

This *Dion*, a juſt and valiant man, finding that *Dionyſius* had abandoned all exerciſe of virtue, and that he was wholly given over to ſenſuality, prevailed ſo much with *Plato*, whoſe diſciple he had been, as he drew him into *Sicily* to inſtruct the young king. And having perſwaded the king to entertain him, he wrought ſo well with him, as *Dionyſius* began to change condition, to change tyranny into monarchy, and to hold the principality that he had, rather by the love of his people and the national laws, than by the violence of his guards and garriſons. But this goodneſs of his laſted not long. For *Philiſtus* the hiſtorian, and other his paraſites that hated *Dionyſius*'s ſeverity, wrought him out of the tyrant's favour, and cauſed him ſoon after to be baniſhed out of *Sicily*, to the great grief of the whole nation. For whereas *Dion* had made offer to the king, either to compound the quarrels between him and the *Carthaginians*, of whom *Dionyſius* ſtood in great fear, or (at leaſt) if they refuſed it, to furniſh him with fifty gallies at his own charge, during the war againſt them: his enemies found means, by ſiniſter interpretation, to convert his good will into matter of treaſon. They told *Dionyſius*, that all the great commendations given of *Plato*, had tended to none other end, than to ſoften his mind, and to make him neglect his own affairs by the ſtudy of philoſophy; whilſt *Dion*, in the mean time, having furniſhed fifty gallies, under colour of the king's ſervice, had it in his own power, either to deliver to the *Syracuſians* their former liberty, or to make himſelf lord and ſoveraign of their ſtate.

It is likely, that the honeſt and liberal offer which he made to ſerve the king with ſo great a preparation at his own charge, begot him many enemies. For they that had ſerved the king for none other end than to raiſe and enrich themſelves, and had already been raiſed and enriched, thought themſelves bound to make the ſame offer that *Dion* had made, if the king had had the grace to conceive it aright. But theſe covetous and ignorant cowards, that had neither the knowledge, nor the daring that *Dion* had, were bold to ſtile his *Love* and *Liberality*, *Pride* and *Preſumption*, and heartened the young king in his oppreſſing and eating up his own people, of whoſe ſpoils they themſelves ſhared no ſmall portion. I have heard it, that when *Charles* V. had the repulſe at *Algier* in *Africa*, *Ferdinando Corteſe*, one of the braveſt men that ever *Spain* brought forth, offered unto the emperor to continue the ſiege at his own charge. But he had never good day after it. For they that envied his victories, and his conqueſt of *Mexico* in the *Weſt-Indies*,

perſwaded

perſwaded the emperor, that *Corteſe* ſought to value himſelf above him, and to have it ſaid, that what the emperor could not, *Corteſe* had effected, and was therefore more worthy of the empire than he that had it.

When *Dion* was newly baniſhed, the tyrant was contented at firſt to ſend him the revenues of his lands, and permit him to diſpoſe of his moveables at his own pleaſure: not without giving hope to recall him in ſhort time. Had he continued in this good mood, like enough it is, that *Dion* would have been well pleaſed to live well, as he did at *Athens*. But after ſome time, *Dionyſius* made port-ſail of this nobleman's goods, and thereby urged him to take another courſe, even to ſeek the reſtitution of his country to liberty. The virtues of *Dion*, eſpecially his great liberality, had purchaſed much love in *Greece*. This love made him ſuſpected and hated of the tyrant: but it ſtood him in good ſtead, when he ſought to raiſe men, with whoſe help he might return into *Sicily*. Yet he got not above eight hundred (for he carried the matter cloſely) to follow him in this adventure. But many of them were men of quality, and fit to be leaders. Neither did he doubt of finding in *Syracuſe*, as many as ſhould be needful, that would readily aſſiſt him. Therefore he landed boldly in *Sicily*, marched to *Syracuſe*, entred the city without reſiſtance; armed the multitude, and won all, ſave the citadel.

Dionyſius was then abſent in *Italy*, but he quickly had advertiſement of this dangerous accident. Wherefore he returned haſtily to *Syracuſe:* whence, after many vain treaties of peace, and ſome forceable attempts to recover the town, he was faign to depart; leaving yet the caſtle to the cuſtody of *Apollocrates*, his eldeſt ſon. Yet ere he went, his minion *Philiſtus*, coming with a ſtrength of men to aſſiſt him, was beaten, taken, and put to death by torment. But *Dion*, for the recovery of his country's liberty, had the ſame reward that all worthy men have had from popular eſtates. He was diſgraced, aſſaulted, and forced to abandon the city. He retireth himſelf to the *Leontines*, who receive him with great joy. Soon after his departure from *Syracuſe*, new troops enter the caſtle: they ſally out, aſſail, ſpoil and burn a great part of the city. *Dion* is ſent for, with humble requeſt: yet, ere he could arrive, *Dionyſius*'s ſoldiers were retired; and the townſmen thinking themſelves ſecure, ſhut the gates againſt *Dion*. But the next night, they of the caſtle ſally again with greater fury than ever; they kill man, woman, and child, and ſet fire in all parts of the town. In this their extremity, *Dion* comes the ſecond time to their ſuccour; the love of his country ſurmounting all the injuries that he had received. He ſets upon the garriſon of the caſtle with the one part of his army; and quencheth the fire, every where kindled with the other part. In concluſion, after he had conquered both the fire and the ſword, that had well near burnt to aſhes and depopulated *Syracuſe*, he recovered the caſtle, with the munition and furniture thereof, and ſent *Apollocrates* after *Dionyſius* his father into *Italy*. But their malice, of whom he had beſt deſerved, and whom he had loved moſt, gave an untimely end to his days. For he was ſoon after this his victory, murdered by *Calippus*; who, after he had with ill ſucceſs, a while governed *Syracuſe*, was ſlain with the ſame dagger, with which he had murthered *Dion*.

Ten years after the death of *Dion*, *Dionyſius*, with the aſſiſtance of his friends in *Italy*, recovers his eſtate, and returns to *Syracuſe*, driving *Nyſæus* thence, whom he found governour therein. The better ſort of the citizens, fearing, more than ever, his cruelty, fly to *Icetes*,, a *Syracuſian* born, and then ruling the *Leontines*. *Icetes* enters into confederacy with the *Carthaginians*, hoping by their aſſiſtance, not only to prevail againſt *Dionyſius*, but by the hatred of the *Syracuſians* towards *Dionyſius*, to make him alſo lord of their city. The *Syracuſians* being deſervedly afflicted on all ſides, ſend to the *Corinthians* for ſuccour. *Icetes* alſo ſends thither, and diſſwades the *Corinthians*, as well as he can, from intermedling in the buſineſs. He tells them by his meſſengers, that he had entered into league with the *Carthaginians*, who were ſo ſtrong by ſea, that it was not in the power of *Corinth* to land an army in *Sicily*. But the *Corinthians*, being by this treaſon of *Icetes*, more inraged than diſſwaded, ſent *Timoleon* with nineteen gallies to deliver *Syracuſe* from tyranny. In the mean while, *Icetes* had entered *Syracuſe*, and with the help of the *Carthaginians*, driven *Dionyſius* into the caſtle, wherein he beſieged him.

Icetes, being himſelf a tyrant in *Leontium*, rather ſought how to enlarge his power, than how to deliver his country. Therefore, hearing that *Timoleon* was arrived at *Rhegium*, he ſent to perſwade him to return his fleet, for that all things were (in effect) eſtabliſhed in *Sicily*. The *Carthaginian* gallies were alſo in the ſame port of *Rhegium*; whoſe captains adviſed *Timoleon* to get him gone in peace. They had far more gallies there than he had, and were like to compel him, if he would not be perſwaded. *Timoleon* finding himſelf over-maſtered, makes requeſt to the *Carthaginian* captains, that they would be pleaſed to enter into *Rhegium*, and there, in an open aſſembly of the people, to deliver unto him thoſe arguments for his return, which they had uſed to him in private; that he might, by public teſtimony, diſcharge himſelf to the ſenate of *Corinth*.

The *Carthaginians* perſwading themſelves, that a victory obtained by a few fair words, was without loſs, and far more eaſy than that of many blows and wounds, yielded to *Timoleon*'s deſire. But while the orations were delivering, *Timoleon*, favoured by the *Rhegians*, ſtole out of the preſs; and having ſet ſail before the gates were opened to the *Carthaginians*, he recovered the port of *Tauromenium*, where he was joyfully received by *Andromachus* the governour. From thence he marched towards *Adranum*, where ſurpriſing *Icetes*'s army, he ſlew a part thereof, and put the reſt to run. It is the nature of victory to beget friends. The *Adranitans* joined with him, and ſo did *Mamercus* the tyrant of *Catana*. *Dionyſius* alſo ſent to *Timoleon*, offering to ſurrender the caſtle of *Syracuſe* into his hands: as thinking it better to yield up himſelf, and the places which he could not defend, unto the *Corinthians*, than either to *Icetes*, whom he diſdained, or the *Carthaginians*, whom he hated. Now *Timoleon*, who within fifty days after his arrival, had recovered the caſtle of *Syracuſe*, and ſent *Dionyſius* to *Corinth*, to live there a private man, was ſtill invaded by the armies, and moleſted by the practiſes of *Icetes*. For he beſieged the *Corinthians* within the caſtle of *Syracuſe*, and attempted (but in vain) the murther of *Timoleon*.

The *Corinthians* ſend unto *Timoleon* a ſupply of two thouſand foot, and two hundred horſe, which are ſtaid in *Italy* by foul weather. *Icetes* is ſtrengthned with threeſcore thouſand *Africans*, brought unto him by *Mago* (all which he lodgeth within *Syracuſe*) and with an hundred and fifty gallies to keep the port. This was the firſt time that ever the *Carthaginians* had dominion within the walls

of

of that city. With this great army, *Icetes* aſſaulteth the caſtle. *Timoleon* ſends them victuals and ſuccour in ſmall boats by night from *Catana*. *Mago* and *Icetes* do therefore reſolve to beſiege *Catana*; but they were no ſooner on their way towards it, with part of their forces, than *Leon*, captain of the *Corinthians*, ſallied out of the caſtle, and took that part of *Syracuſe*, called *Acradina*, which he fortified.

In the mean while the two thouſand *Corinthians* arrive: with whom, and two thouſand other ſoldiers, *Timoleon* marched towards *Syracuſe*. *Mago* abandoneth *Icetes*, being frighted out of *Sicily* (which he might eaſily have conquered) with an idle rumour of treaſon. This made him return to *Carthage*, where the general exclamation againſt his cowardize, did ſo much affright him, that for fear of farther puniſhment, he hanged himſelf. *Timoleon* enters the city, and beats down the caſtle (which he called *the neſt of tyrants*) to the ground. But he found the city, when the ſtrangers were fled, in effect deſolate, ſo as their horſes did feed on the graſs growing in the market-place. Therefore he writes to *Corinth* for people to re-inhabit it. Ten thouſand are ſent out of *Greece*; many come from *Italy*, others from other parts of the iſland.

But a new ſtorm ariſeth. *Aſdrubal* and *Amilcar*, *Carthaginians*, arrive about *Lilybeum*, with threeſcore and ten thouſand ſoldiers tranſported (with all their proviſion) in a thouſand ſhips of burthen, and two hundred gallies. *Timoleon* marcheth thither, and chargeth this great army upon the paſſage of a river.

A tempeſt of rain, hail, and lightning, with boiſtrous winds beating upon the faces of the *Carthaginians*, they were utterly broken: ten thouſand ſlain, five thouſand taken, with all their carriages and proviſions: among which, there were found a thouſand corſlets, gilt and graven. After this, [a] *Timoleon* gave an overthrow to *Icetes*, and following his victory, took him, with his ſon *Eupolemus*, and the general of his horſe, priſoners, whom he cauſed all to be ſlain: and afterwards (which was imputed to him for great cruelty) he ſuffered *Icetes*'s wives and daughters to be put to death. But this was the revenge of God upon *Icetes*, who (after the murther of *Dion*) had cauſed *Arete*, *Dion*'s wife, and a young child of his, with *Ariſtomache* his ſiſter, to be caſt into the ſea.

He again prevailed againſt *Mamercus*, tyrant of *Catana*, and won *Catana* it ſelf. *Mamercus* fled to *Hippon*, tyrant of *Meſſina*: but *Timoleon* purſuing him, won the town, delivering *Hippon* to his citizens, who tormented him to death. The ſame end had *Mamercus*, and all other, the tyrants in *Sicily*.

Finally, he made peace with the *Carthaginians*; on condition, that they ſhould not paſs the river of *Lycus*. After this, he lived in great honour among the *Syracuſians*, till his death, and was ſolemnly buried by them in the market-place of their city: the day of his funerals being for ever ordained to be kept holy among them.

After ſuch time as *Timoleon* had delivered *Syracuſe* from the tyranny of *Dionyſius*, and brought peace to the whole iſland, the inhabitants enjoyed their liberty in peace about twenty years. The cities and temples were repaired, the trade renewed, the merchant ſailed in ſafety, and the labouring man enjoyed the fruits of the earth in quiet. But it was impoſſible that a nation, which neither knew how to govern, nor how to obey; which could neither endure kings, nor men worthy to be kings to govern them, ſhould any long time ſubſiſt.

Twenty years after the death of *Timoleon*, there ſtarted up one *Agathocles* among them, a man of baſe birth, and of baſer condition, who, from a beggar to a common ſoldier, from a ſoldier to a captain, and ſo from degree to degree, riſing to be a pretor; finally, became lord and ſoveraign of the *Syracuſians*. Many fortunes he ran, and underwent as many dangers ere he obtained the principality. For he had more than once attempted it, and was therein both beaten and baniſhed. A paſſing valiant man he was, and did notable ſervice, as well for thoſe by whom he was imploy'd, as alſo for the *Syracuſians*, and againſt them. For in their wars againſt thoſe of *Enna* and the *Campanes*, he did them memorable ſervice: and on the contrary, as memorable ſervice for the *Murgantines*, againſt the *Syracuſians*. For, being entertained by the people of *Murgantia*, and made general of their forces, he ſack'd *Leontium*; and beſieged *Syracuſe* ſo ſtreightly, that the citizens were driven to crave aid, even from their ancient and natural enemies, the *Carthaginians*. *Amilcar* was ſent by the *Carthaginians* to relieve *Syracuſe*. With him *Agathocles* wrought ſo well, that he got him to make peace between himſelf and the *Syracuſians*, binding himſelf by promiſe and oath, to remain a friend and ſervant to the eſtate of *Carthage* for ever after. *Amilcar* entertained the buſineſs, and compounded the quarrels between *Agathocles* and the *Syracuſians*. *Agathocles* is choſen pretor, he entertains five thouſand *Africans*, and divers old ſoldiers of the *Murgantines*, under colour of a purpoſe to beſiege *Herbita*. With theſe, and with the aſſiſtance of the poor and diſcontented *Syracuſians* (the city being alſo divided into many factions) he aſſails the ſenators, kills all his enemies and oppoſites, divides the ſpoil of the rich among the poor, and gives liberty to his ſoldiers to rob, to raviſh, and to murder, for two whole days and nights, without controulment: the third day, when they had blunted their barbarous appetites, and ſtrewed the ſtreets with ten thouſand dead carcaſſes, beſides thoſe that had broken their necks over the walls, their fury had no further ſubject to work on.

Agathocles, in an aſſembly of the people (being an eloquent knave) perſwaded them, that for the violent ſickneſs, by which the common-wealth was utterly conſumed, he found no better than the violent remedies which he had adminiſtred; and that he had affected no other thing, than the reducing of the ſtate from an *Oligarchy*, or the rule of a few tyrannous magiſtrates, to the ancient and indifferent *Democracy*, by which it had been governed, from the firſt inſtitution, with ſo great glory and proſperity. This he did, to have the crown clap'd on his head (as it were) perforce. For, as he knew that he had left none living within the city fit nor able to exerciſe the office of a magiſtrate; ſo knew he right well, that all they, which had aſſiſted in the murther and ſpoil of their fellow citizens, had no other hope of defence, than the ſupport of a lawleſs lord, who had been partaker with them in their villanies and cruelties committed. So as this rabble, his oration ended, proclaimed him king: again and again, ſaluting, and adoring him by that name, as if it had been given to him by ſome lawful election. Hence had our king *Richard* the third a piece of his pattern; but the one was of baſe, the other of kingly parents; the one took liberty from a common-wealth, the other ſought only to ſucceed in a

[a] Plut. in vit. Tim.

monarchy;

monarchy; the one continued his cruelty to the end, the other, after he had obtained the crown, ſought, by making good laws, to recover the love of his people.

The life of this tyrant is briefly written by *Juſtin*; more largely and particularly by *Diodorus Siculus*: the ſum whereof is this. The ſame *Amilcar*, that had brought him into *Syracuſe*, and that had lent him five thouſand men to help in the maſſacre of the citizens, was alſo content to wink at many wrongs that he did unto the confederates of the *Carthaginians*. It was the purpoſe of *Amilcar*, to ſettle *Agathocles* in his tyranny, and to let him vex and waſte the whole iſland, becauſe it was thereby like to come to paſs, that he ſhould reduce all *Sicily* into ſuch terms, as would make it become an eaſy prey to *Carthage*. But when the cities confederate with the *Carthaginians* ſent their embaſſadors with complaint of this ill dealing to *Carthage*; the *Punic* faith (ſo much taunted by the *Romans*, as no better than meer falſhood) ſhewed it ſelf very honourable, in taking order for the redreſs. Embaſſadors were ſent to comfort the *Sicilians*, and to put *Agathocles* in mind of his covenants; *Amilcar* was recalled home into *Afric*, and a new captain appointed to ſucceed in his charge, with ſuch forces, as might compel *Agathocles* to reaſon, if otherwiſe he would not hearken to it. All this tended to ſave their confederates from ſuffering ſuch injuries in the future. For that which was paſt (ſince it could not be recalled) they took order to have it ſeverely puniſhed. *Amilcar* was accuſed ſecretly, and by way of ſcrutiny: the ſuffrages being given, but not calculated, and ſo reſerved until he ſhould return. This was not ſo cloſely handled, but that *Amilcar* had ſoon notice of it. In managing his buſineſs with *Agathocles*, it is likely that he had an eye to his own profit, as well as to the publick benefit of his country. For he had made ſuch a compoſition with the *Syracuſian*, as gave him not only means to weaken others, but to ſtrengthen himſelf both in power and authority, even againſt the *Carthaginians*. Such is commonly the cuſtom of thoſe that hope to work their own ends by cunning practices; thinking to deal ſubtilly, and finally, they ſpin their threads ſo ſmall, that they are broken with the very wind. *Amilcar* ſaw that his *Carthaginians* had a purpoſe to deal ſubſtantially, and that therefore it would be hard for him to make them follow his crooked devices: which if he could not do, it was to be expected, that their anger would break out into ſo much the greater extremity, by how much the more they had concealed it. Therefore he followed the example which ſome of his foregoers had taught him; and for fear of ſuch a death as the judges might award him, he ended his own life in what ſort he thought beſt. This deſperation of *Amilcar* ſerved to inform *Agathocles* of the *Carthaginians* intent. He ſaw they would not be deluded with words, and therefore reſolved to get the ſtart of them in action. He diſſembled no longer; but, inſtead of ſpoil and robbery, made open war upon all their adherents. He had made the better part of *Sicily* his own ere the *Carthaginian* forces arrived: which thinking to have encountered an ill eſtabliſhed tyrant, found him ready, as a king, to defend his own, and give them ſharp entertainment. They were beaten by him, and their navy was ſo tempeſt-beaten, that they could neither do good by land nor ſea, but were glad to leave their buſineſs undone, and return into *Afric*.

The *Carthaginians* prepare a new fleet: which being very gallantly manned and furniſhed, was broken by foul weather, and the beſt part of it caſt away, even whilſt it was yet within kenning of their city. But *Amilcar*, the ſon of *Giſco*, gathering together the remainders of this ſhip-wrack, was bold to paſs over into *Sicily*, and landed not far from *Gela*: where *Agathocles* was ſoon ready to examine the cauſe of their coming. Many ſkirmiſhes paſſed between them, in which (commonly) the *Syracuſian* had the better. But his good ſucceſs begat preſumption; whereby he loſt a battel, more important than all the other fights. One adverſe chance is enough to overthrow the ſtate of a tyrant, if it be not upheld by great circumſpection. The war was ſoon transferred to the walls of *Syracuſe*, within which *Agathocles* was cloſed up, and driven to make his laſt defence by their help, who may be judged to have loved him not very greatly. But the inhabitants of *Syracuſe*, after that great maſſacre of the principal men, made in the beginning of this new tyranny, were (for the moſt part) ſuch as had been either mercenary ſoldiers, infranchiſed ſlaves, or baſe and needy people; helpers in eſtabliſhing the preſent government, and executioners of the murthers and ſpoil committed in that change. If there were any other (as ſome there were) they were ſo well obſerved, and withal ſo fearful, that they durſt not ſtir. But it was not enough, that they all agreed in the common defence of themſelves and their city; famine was likely to grow upon them, and enforce them to change their reſolution. In this neceſſity *Agathocles* adventured upon a ſtrange courſe, which the event commended as wiſe. He imbarked as many as he thought meet in thoſe veſſels that rode in the haven; and committing the government of the city to his brother *Antander*, willed the people to be of good courage, for that (as he told them) he had bethought himſelf of a mean, both to raiſe the ſiege, and to repair all other loſſes. A *Carthaginian* fleet lay in the mouth of the haven, both to hinder the entrance of victuallers, and to keep the beſieged from iſſuing forth.

Now at ſuch time as *Agathocles* was ready to depart, advertiſement came that many ſhips of burthen laden with corn and other proviſions, were drawing near unto *Syracuſe*. To intercept theſe, the *Carthaginians* hoiſe ſail, and launch forth into the deep. They were not far gone when they might behold *Agathocles* iſſuing forth of the port, with purpoſe (as they thought) to give convoy unto his victuallers. Hereupon they wheel about, and make amain towards him, as thinking him the better booty. He neither abode their coming, nor fled back into the city, but made all ſpeed towards *Afric*, and was purſued by the *Carthaginians*, as long as the day would give them light. In the mean ſeaſon the victuallers were gotten into *Syracuſe*, which was the more plentifully relieved by their coming, for that *Agathocles* had unburthened the place of no ſmall number. When the *Carthaginian* admiral perceived; firſt, that by purſuing two fleets at once, he had miſſed of them both; and ſecondly, that *Agathocles* returned not again, but was gone to ſeek his fortune elſewhere; he thought it good to purſue thoſe that were fled, and to attend ſo well upon them, that they ſhould not have leiſure to do miſchief in ſome other part.

The *Carthaginian* navy followed *Agathocles* (whether by chance, or by relation of ſuch as had met with him at ſea) directly towards *Afric*, and overtook him after ſix days. He had (at the firſt) a great ſtart of them, ſo that (belike) they rowed hard, and wearied themſelves in ſeeking their own misfortune. For he fought with them, and beat them, and having

ving ſunk or taken many, drove the reſt to fly which way they could, laden with ſuch ſtrange tidings of his voyage.

When *Agathocles* had landed his men in *Afric*, then did he diſcover unto them his project; letting them underſtand, that there was no better way to divert the *Carthaginians*, not only from *Syracuſe*, but from all the iſle of *Sicily*, than by bringing the war to their own doors. For here (ſaid he) they have many that hate them, and that will readily take arms againſt them, as ſoon as they perceive that there is an army on foot which dares to look upon their walls. Their towns are ill fortified, their people untrained and unexperienced in dangers; the mercenary forces, that they levy in theſe parts, will rather follow us than them, if we offer greater wages than they can give: which we may better promiſe and make good, by letting them have ſome ſhare with us in all the wealth of the *Carthaginians*, than our enemies can do, by making ſome addition to their ſtipends. Thus he talked, as one already maſter of all the riches in *Afric*, and with many brave words encouraged his men ſo well, that they were contented to ſet fire on all their ſhips (reſerving one or two to uſe as meſſengers) to the end that no hope ſhould remain, ſave only in victory. In this heat of reſolution, they win by force two cities, which, after they had throughly ſacked, they burnt to the ground, as a mark of terror to all that ſhould make reſiſtance. The *Carthaginians* hearing this, are amazed, thinking that *Amilcar* is broken, and his whole army deſtroyed in *Sicily*. This impreſſion ſo diſmays them, that when they know the truth of all, by ſuch as had eſcaped in the late ſea-fight, yet ſtill they fear, and know not what. They ſuſpect *Amilcar*'s faith, who had ſuffered *Agathocles* to land in *Afric*; they ſuſpect their principal citizens at home of a meaning to betray *Carthage* unto the enemy; they raiſe a great army, and know not unto whoſe charge they may ſafely commit it.

There were at that time two famous captains in the city, *Hanno* and *Bomilcar*; great enemies, and therefore the more unlikely to conſpire againſt the common-wealth. Theſe are made generals of the army levied, which far exceeded the forces of *Agathocles*. But it ſeldom happens, that diſſenſion between commanders produceth any fortunate event. Neceſſity drave *Agathocles* to fight, and the courage of his men, reſolved to deal with the whole multitude of the *Carthaginians*, made eaſy the victory againſt the one half of them. For *Bomilcar* would not ſtir: but ſuffered *Hanno* to be cut in pieces.

The reputation of this great victory brought over a king of the *Africans*, from the *Carthaginian* ſociety, to take part with *Agathocles*, who purſuing his victory, wins many towns, and ſends word to *Syracuſe* of his good ſucceſs. The *Carthaginians* alſo ſend into *Sicily*, willing *Amilcar* their general to ſuccour the ſtate of *Afric*, which was in danger to be loſt, whilſt he was travelling in the conqueſt of *Sicily*. *Amilcar* ſends them five thouſand men: all his forces he thought it not needful to tranſport, as hoping rather to draw *Agathocles* back into *Sicily*, than to be drawn home by one that could ſcarce retain his own kingdom. But theſe good hopes had a bad iſſue. He ſpent ſome time in winning a few towns that adhered unto the *Syracuſians:* and having brought his matters to ſome good order, he conceived a ſudden hope of taking *Syracuſe* by ſurpriſe. It was a pretty (though tragical) accident, if it were true, as *Tully* relates it. *Amilcar* had a dream, which told him that he ſhould ſup the next day within *Syracuſe*. His fancy begot this dream, and he verily believed it. He made more haſte than good ſpeed towards the city; and coming upon it on the ſudden, had good hope to carry it. But his enemies were prepared for him, and had laid an ambuſh to intrap him, whereinto he fell. So he was carried priſoner into the city, in which it was likely that he had no great cheer to his ſupper; for they ſtruck off his head, and ſent it into *Afric* (a welcome preſent) to *Agathocles*.

This good ſucceſs of things at home did put ſuch courage into the *Sicilian* army, that *Agathocles* was bold to wear a crown, and ſtile himſelf *King of Afric*. He had allured *Ophellas*, king of the *Cyrenians*, to take his part, by promiſes to deliver the country into his hands; for that (as he ſaid) it was ſufficient unto himſelf to have diverted the *Carthaginians* from *Sicily*, wherein (after this war ended) he might reign quietly. *Ophellas* came with a great army, and was friendly entertained; but the traiterous *Sicilian* taking an advantage, did murther this his aſſiſtant; and afterwards, by good words and great promiſes, drew all the *Cyrenian* army to follow him in his wars. Thus his villany found good ſucceſs, and he ſo prevailed in *Africa*, that he got leiſure to make a ſtep into *Sicily*. Many towns in *Sicily* had embraced a deſire of recovering their liberty, thinking it high time to fight at length for their own freedom, after that they had ſo long been expoſed (as a reward of victory) either unto aliens, or to tyrants of their own country. Theſe had prevailed far, and gotten many to take their parts, as in a common cauſe; when the coming of *Agathocles* abated their high ſpirits, and his good ſucceſs in many fights compelled them to obedience. Out of *Sicily* he returned into *Africa*, where his affairs ſtood in very bad terms. *Archagathus* his ſon had loſt a battel, and (which was worſe) had ill means to help himſelf, his army being in mutiny for lack of pay. But *Agathocles* pacified the tumult, by the accuſtomed promiſes of great booty and ſpoil. It had now been time for him to offer peace to the *Carthaginians*, which to obtain, they would (queſtionleſs) have given to him both money enough to pay his army, and all that they then held in *Sicily*. For their city had been diſtreſſed, not only by this his war, but by the treaſon of *Bomilcar*, who failed not much of making himſelf tyrant over them. But ambition is blind. *Agathocles* had all his thoughts fixed upon the conqueſt of *Carthage* itſelf; out of which dream he was awaked by the loſs of a battel, not ſo memorable in regard of any accident therein, as of the ſtrange events following it. The *Carthaginians*, after their great misfortunes in this war, had renewed their old ſacrifices of children to *Saturn*, from which they had abſtained ever ſince they made peace with *Gelon*. And now they made choice of ſome, the goodlieſt of their priſoners taken in the battel, to offer unto the ſaid idol, in way of thankfulneſs for their victory. The fire, with which theſe unhappy men were conſumed, caught hold upon the lodgings neareſt unto the altar, and ſpreading itſelf farther through the camp, with the deſtruction of many men, cauſed ſuch a tumult as is uſual in the like caſes. At the ſame time the like accident of fire burnt up the pavilion of *Agathocles*. Hereupon both the armies fled away, each of them believing that the noiſe in the adverſe camp was a ſign of the enemies coming to invade it. But the *Carthaginians* had a ſafe retreat: *Agathocles*, by a ſecond error, fell into a new calamity. In the beginning of this his flight

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in the dark, he met with his own *African* ſoldiers, and thinking them to be enemies (as indeed one half of them had revolted from him to the *Carthaginians*, in the laſt battel) he began to aſſail them, and was ſo ſtoutly reſiſted, that he loſt in this blind fight above four thouſand of his men. This did ſo diſcourage his proud heart, that being fallen from the near hope of taking the city of *Carthage*, unto ſome diſtruſt of his own ſafety, he knew no more how to moderate his preſent weak fears, than lately he had known how to govern his ambition. Therefore he took the way that came next into his head; which was, to ſteal cloſely aboard his ſhips with his younger ſon (the elder he ſuſpected of inceſt and ambition) and ſo to fly into *Sicily*, thinking it the beſt courſe to ſhift for himſelf, as wanting veſſels wherein to tranſport his army. His elder ſon *Archagathus*, perceiving his drift, arreſted him, and put him under cuſtody; but by means of a ſudden tumult he was let looſe, eſcaped, and fled alone, leaving both his ſons behind him. His flight being noiſed through the army, all was in uproar, and extremity of rage cauſed not only the common ſoldiers, but even ſuch as had been friends to the tyrant, to lay hold upon his two ſons and kill them. That this flight of *Agathocles* was extremely baſe, I need not uſe words to prove; that his fear was truly, as all fear is ſaid to be, a paſſion, depriving him of the ſuccours which reaſon offered, the ſequel doth manifeſt. His forſaken ſoldiers being now a headleſs company, and no longer an army to be feared, obtained nevertheleſs a reaſonable compoſition from the *Carthaginians*, to whom they ſold thoſe places whereof they had poſſeſſion for nineteen talents. Likewiſe *Agathocles* himſelf, having loſt his army, did nevertheleſs, by the reputation of this late war, make peace with *Carthage* upon equal terms.

After this, the tyrant, being delivered from foreign enemies, diſcovered his bloody nature in moſt abominable cruelties among the *Sicilians*. His wants and his fears urged him ſo violently, that he was not ſatisfied with the ſpoils of the rich, or the death of thoſe whom he held ſuſpected, but in a beaſtly rage depopulated whole cities. He deviſed new engines of torment; wherein, ſtriving to exceed the bull of *Phalaris*, he made a frame of braſs that ſhould ſerve to ſcorch mens bodies, and withal give him leave to behold them in their miſery. So deviliſh is the nature of man, when reaſon, that ſhould be his guide, is become a ſlave to his brutiſh affections. In theſe miſchiefs he was ſo outragious, that he neither ſpared ſex nor age; eſpecially when he was informed of the ſlaughter of his children in *Afric*. But this was not the way to preſerve his eſtate; it threw him into new dangers. They, whom he had chaſed out of their country, took arms againſt him, and drove him into ſuch fear, that he was fain to ſeek the love at *Carthage*, which by ruling well he might have had in *Sicily*. He freely delivered into the *Carthaginians* hands all thoſe towns of the *Phenicians* in *Sicily*, belonging unto them, which were in his poſſeſſion. They requited him honourably with great ſtore of corn, and with four hundred talents of gold and ſilver. So (though not without much trouble and hazard) he prevailed againſt the rebels, and ſettled his eſtate. Having no further buſineſs left in *Sicily*, he made a voyage into *Italy*. There he ſubdued the *Brutains*, rather by terror of his name than by any force, for they yielded at his firſt coming. This done, he went to the iſle of *Lipara*, and made the inhabitants buy peace with one hundred talents of gold. But when he had gotten this great ſum, he would needs exact a greater; and finding plainly that they had no more left, he was bold to ſpoil the temples of their gods. Herein (methinks) he did well enough. For how could he believe thoſe to be gods that had continually given deaf ears to his horrible perjuries? Then he returned richly home, with eleven ſhips laden with gold; all which, and all the reſt of his fleet were caſt away by foul weather at ſea, one galley excepted, in which he himſelf eſcaped, to ſuffer a more miſerable end. A grievous ſickneſs fell upon him that rotted his whole body, ſpreading itſelf through all his veins and ſinews. Whilſt he lay in this caſe, all deſiring his end, ſave only *Theogenia* (a wife that he had taken out of *Egypt*) and her ſmall children; his nephew, the ſon of *Archagathus* before-mentioned, and a younger ſon of his own, began to contend about the kingdom. Neither did they ſeek to end the controverſy by the old tyrant's deciſion; they regarded him not ſo much. But each of them laid wait for the other's life, wherein the nephew ſped ſo well, that he ſlew his uncle, and got his grandfather's kingdom without aſking any leave. Theſe tidings wounded the heart of *Agathocles* with fear and ſorrow. He ſaw himſelf without help like to become a prey to his ungracious nephew, from whom he knew that no favour was to be expected, either by himſelf, or by thoſe whom only he now held dear, which were *Theogenia* and her children. Therefore he adviſed her and them to fly before they were ſurprized; for that otherwiſe they could by no means avoid either death, or ſomewhat that would be worſe. He gave them all his treaſures and goods, wherewith he even compelled them (weeping, to leave him deſolate, in ſo wretched a caſe) to embark themſelves haſtily, and make ſpeed into *Egypt*. After their departure, whether he threw himſelf into the fire, or whether his diſeaſe conſumed him, there was none left that cared to attend him; but he ended his life as baſely, as obſcurely, and in as much want as he firſt began it.

After the death of *Agathocles* it was, that the *Mamertines* his ſoldiers traiterouſly occupied *Meſſina*, and infeſted a great part of the iſland. Then alſo did the *Carthaginians* begin to renew their attempts of conquering all *Sicily*. What the nephew of *Agathocles* did, I cannot find. Likely it is, that he quickly periſhed. For the *Sicilians* were driven to ſend for *Pyrrhus* to help them, who had married with a daughter of *Agathocles*. But *Pyrrhus* was ſoon weary of the country (as hath been ſhewed before) and therefore left it, propheſying, that it would become a goodly champion field, wherein *Rome* and *Carthage* ſhould fight for ſuperiority. In which buſineſs how theſe two great cities did ſpeed, the order of our ſtory will declare.

SECT. V.

A re-continuation of the Roman *war in* Sicily. *How* Hieron, *king of* Syracuſe, *forſook the* Carthaginians, *and made his peace with* Rome.

WHEN *Appius Claudius*, following the advantage of his victory gotten at *Meſſina*, brought the war unto the gates of *Syracuſe*, and beſieged that great city, *Hieron* found it high time for him to ſeek peace; knowing that the *Carthaginians* had neither any reaſon to be offended with him for helping himſelf by what means he could, when they were not in caſe to give him aſſiſtance; and foreſeeing withal, that when once he had purchaſed his quiet from the *Romans*, it would be free for him to ſit ſtill without fear or moleſtation, whilſt

Rome

Rome and *Carthage* were fighting for the maſtery. In this good mood the new *Roman* conſuls, *M. Valerius* and *C. Octacilius*, found him, and readily embraced the offer of his friendſhip. Yet they made uſe of their preſent advantage, and ſold him peace for an hundred (ſome ſay two hundred) talents.

Theſe conſuls had brought a great army into *Sicily*, yet did they nothing elſe in effect than bring over *Hieron* to their ſide. If the *Syracuſian* held them buſied (which I find not, otherwiſe than by circumſtances, as, by the ſum of money impoſed upon him, and by their performing none other piece of ſervice) all the whole time of their abode in the iſland; then was his departure from the friendſhip of *Carthage* no leſs to his honour, than it was to his commodity. For by no reaſon could they require, that he ſhould ſuffer his own kingdom to run into manifeſt peril of ſubverſion for their ſakes, that ſhould have received all the profit of the victory; ſeeing they did expoſe him to the whole danger, without ſtraining themſelves to give him relief. But the *Carthaginians* had lately made good proof of the ſtrength of *Syracuſe* in the days of *Agathocles*, and therefore knew that it was able to bear a very ſtrong ſiege. And hereupon it is like that they were the more ſlack in ſending help; if (perhaps) it were not ſome part of their deſire, that both *Rome* and *Syracuſe* ſhould weaken each one the other, whereby their own work might be the eaſier againſt them both. Yet indeed, the caſe of the beſieged city was not the ſame when the *Romans* lay before it, as it had been when the *Carthaginians* attempted it. For there was great reaſon to try the uttermoſt hazard of war againſt the *Carthaginians*, who ſought no other thing than to bring it into ſlavery; not ſo againſt the *Romans*, who thought it ſufficient if they could withdraw it from the party of their enemies. Beſides, it was not all one to be governed by *Agathocles* or by *Hieron*. The former of theſe cared not what the citizens endured, ſo long as he might preſerve his own tyranny: the latter, as a juſt and good prince, had no greater deſire than to win the love of his people, by ſeeking their commodity; but including his own felicity within the public, laboured to uphold both by honeſt and faithful dealing. Hereby it came to paſs that he enjoyed a long and happy reign, living dear to his own ſubjects, beloved of the *Romans*, and not greatly moleſted by the *Carthaginians*; whom, either the conſideration, *that they had left him to himſelf ere he left their ſociety*, made unwilling to ſeek his ruin; or their more earneſt buſineſs with the *Romans*, made unable to compaſs it.

SECT. VI.

How the Romans *beſiege and win* Agrigentum. *Their beginning to maintain a fleet. Their firſt loſs and firſt victory by ſea. Of ſea-fight in general.*

HIERON having ſided himſelf with the *Romans*, aided them with victuals and other neceſſaries; ſo that they preſuming upon his aſſiſtance, recal ſome part of their forces. The *Carthaginians* find it high time to beſtir them; they ſend to the *Ligurians*, and to the troops they had in *Spain*, to come to their aid; who being arrived, they made the city of *Agrigentum* the ſeat of war againſt the *Romans*, filling it with all manner of munition.

The *Roman* conſuls having made peace with *Hieron* return into *Italy*, and in their places, *Lucius Poſthumius* and *Quintus Mamilius* arrive. They go on towards [a] *Agrigentum*, and finding no enemy in the field they beſiege it, though it were ſtuffed with fifty thouſand ſoldiers. After a while, the time of harveſt being come, a part of the *Roman* army range the country to gather corn, and thoſe at the ſiege grow negligent; the *Carthaginians* ſally furiouſly, and endanger the *Roman* army, but are in the end repelled into the town with great loſs; but by the ſmart felt on both ſides the aſſailants redoubled their guards, and the beſieged kept within their covert. Yet the *Romans*, the better to aſſure themſelves, cut a deep trench between the walls of the city and their camp, and another on the outſide thereof, that neither the *Carthaginians* might force any quarter ſuddenly by a ſally, nor thoſe of the country without break upon them unawares; which double defence kept the beſieged alſo from the receiving any relief of victuals and munitions, whilſt the *Syracuſian* ſupplies the aſſailants with what they want. The beſieged ſend for ſuccour to *Carthage*, after they had been in this ſort pent up five months. The *Carthaginians* embark an army with certain elephants, under the command of *Hanno*, who arrives with it at *Heraclea*, to the weſt of *Agrigentum*. *Hanno* puts himſelf into the field, and ſurpriſeth *Erbeſus*, a city wherein the *Romans* had beſtowed all their proviſion. By means hereof, the famine without grew to be as great as it was within *Agrigentum*, and the *Roman* camp no leſs ſtreightly aſſieged by *Hanno*, than the city was by the *Romans*; inſomuch, as if *Hieron* had not ſupply'd them, they had been forced to abandon the ſiege. But ſeeing that this diſtreſs was not enough to make them riſe, *Hanno* determined to give them battel. To which end departing from *Heraclea*, he makes approach unto the *Roman* camp. The *Romans* reſolve to ſuſtain him, and put themſelves in order. *Hanno* directs the *Numidian* horſe-men to charge their vantguard, to the end to draw them further on; which done, he commands them to return as broken, till they came to the body of the army, that lay ſhadowed behind ſome riſing ground. The *Numidians* perform it accordingly; and while the *Romans* purſued the *Numidians*, *Hanno* gives upon them, and having ſlaughtered many, beats the reſt into their trenches.

[a] Agrigentum *was a goodly city built by the* Geloi, *under conduct of* Ariſton *and* Pyſtilus. *The compaſs was ten miles about the walls; and it had ſometimes in it eight hundred thouſand inhabitants. This city, by reaſon of the fertility of the ſoil, and the neighbourhood of* Carthage, *grew in a ſhort ſpace from ſmall beginnings to great glory and riches. The plenty and luxury thereof was ſo great, as it cauſed* Empedocles *to ſay, that the* Agrigentines *built palaces of ſuch ſumptuoſity, as if they meant to live for ever; and made ſuch feaſts, as if they meant to die the next day. But their greateſt pomp and magnificence was in their goodly temples and theaters, water-conduits and fiſh-ponds, the ruins whereof at this day are ſufficient arguments, that* Rome *itſelf could never boaſt of the like. In the porch of the temple of* Jupiter Olympius (*by which we may judge of the temple itſelf*) *there was ſet out on one ſide the full proportion of the giants fighting with the gods, all cut out in poliſhed marble of divers colours; a work, the moſt magnificent and rare that ever hath been ſeen: on the other ſide, the war of* Troy, *and the encounters which happened at that ſiege, with the perſonages of the heroes that were doers in that war, all of the like beautiful ſtone, and of equal ſtature to the bodies of thoſe men in ancient times: in compariſon of which, the latter works of that kind are but petty things and mere trifles. It would require a volume to expreſs the magnificence of the temples of* Hercules, Æſculapius, Concord, Juno Lucina, Chaſtity, Proſerpina, Caſtor *and* Pollux: *wherein the maſterpieces of thoſe exquiſite painters and carvers,* Phidias, Zeuxis, Myron, *and* Polycletus *were to be ſeen. But in proceſs of time it ran the ſame fortune that all other great cities have done, and was ruined by calamities of war, whereof this war preſent brought unto it not the leaſt.*

After

After this encounter, the *Carthaginians* made no other attempt for two months, but lay ſtrongly incamped, waiting until ſome opportunity ſhould invite them. But *Hannibal*, that was beſieged in *Agrigentum*, as well by ſigns as meſſengers, made *Hanno* know, how ill the extremity which he endured, was able to brook ſuch dilatory courſes. *Hanno* thereupon a ſecond time provoked the conſuls to fight. But his elephants being diſordered by his own vantguard, which was broken by the *Romans*, he loſt the day, and with ſuch as eſcaped he recovered *Heraclea*. *Hannibal* perceiving this, and remaining hopeleſs of ſuccour, reſolved to make his own way. Finding therefore that the *Romans*, after this day's victory, wearied with labour, and ſecured by their good fortune, kept negligent watch in the night, he ruſh'd out of the town with all the remainder of his army, and paſs'd by the *Roman* camp without reſiſtance. The conſuls purſue him in the morning, but in vain; ſure they were, that he could not carry the city with him, which with little ado the *Romans* entred, and pitifully ſpoiled. The *Romans*, proud of this victory, purpoſe henceforth rather to follow the direction of their preſent good fortunes, than their firſt determinations. They had reſolved in the beginning of this war, only to ſuccour the *Mamertines*, and to keep the *Carthaginians* from their own coaſts; but now they determine to make themſelves lords of all *Sicily*; and from thence, being favoured with the wind of good ſucceſs, to ſail over into *Africa*. It is the diſeaſe of kings, of ſtates, and alſo of private men, to covet the greateſt things, but not to enjoy the leaſt; the deſire of that which we neither have nor need, taking from us the true uſe and fruition of what we have already. This curſe upon mortal men was never taken from them, ſince the beginning of the world to this day.

To proſecute this war, *Lucius Valerius*, and *Titus Octacilius*, two new conſuls, are ſent into *Sicily*. Whereupon, the *Romans* being maſters of the field, many inland towns gave themſelves unto them. On the contrary, the *Carthaginians* keeping ſtill the lordſhip of the ſea, many maritimate places became theirs. The *Romans* therefore, as well to ſecure their own coaſts, often invaded by the *African* fleets, as alſo to equal themſelves in every kind of warfare with their enemies, determine to make a fleet. And herein fortune favoured them with this accident, that being altogether ignorant in ſhipwrights craft, a ſtorm of wind thruſt one of the *Carthaginian* gallies of five banks to the ſhore.

Now had the *Romans* a pattern, and by it they began to ſet up an hundred *Quinqueremes*, which were gallies rowed by five on every bank, and twenty of three on a bank; and while theſe were in preparing, they exerciſed their men in the feat of rowing. This they did after a ſtrange faſhion. They placed upon the ſea-ſands many ſeats, in order of the banks in gallies, whereon they placed their watermen, and taught them to beat the ſand with long poles, orderly, and as they were directed by the maſter, that ſo they might learn the ſtroke of the galley, and how to mount and draw their oars.

When their fleet was finiſhed, ſome rigging and other implements excepted, *C. Cornelius*, one of the new conſuls (for they changed every year) was made admiral; who being more in love with this new kind of warfare, than well adviſed, paſs'd over to *Meſſina* with ſeventeen gallies, leaving the reſt to follow him. There he ſtay'd not, but would needs row along the coaſt to *Lipara*, hoping to do ſome piece of ſervice. *Hannibal*, a *Carthaginian*, was at the ſame time governor in *Panormus*, who being advertiſed of this new ſeaman's arrival, ſent forth one *Boodes*, a ſenator of *Carthage*, with twenty gallies to entertain him. *Boodes*, falling upon the conſul unawares, took both him and the fleet he commanded. When *Hannibal* received this good news, together with the *Roman* gallies and their conſul, he grew no leſs fool-hardy than *Cornelius* had been. For he, fancying to himſelf to ſurprize the reſt of the *Roman* fleet, on their own coaſt, ere they were yet in all points provided, fought them out with a fleet of fifty ſail; wherewith falling among them he was well beaten, and leaving the greater number of his own behind him, made an hard eſcape with the reſt; for of one hundred and twenty gallies, the *Romans* under *Cornelius* had loſt but ſeventeen, ſo as one hundred and three remained, which were not eaſily beaten by fifty.

The *Romans* being advertiſed of *Cornelius*'s overthrow, make haſte to redeem him, but give the charge of their fleet to his colleague *Duilius*. *Duilius*, conſidering that the *Roman* veſſels were heavy and ſlow, the *African* gallies having the ſpeed of them, deviſed a certain engine in the prow of his gallies, whereby they might faſten or grapple themſelves with their enemies, when they were (as we call it) board and board, that is, when they brought the gallies ſides together. This done, the weightier ſhips had gotten the advantage, and the *Africans* loſt it. For neither did their ſwiftneſs ſerve them, nor their mariners craft, the veſſels wherein both nations fought being open; ſo that all was to be carried by the advantage of weapon, and valour of the men. Beſides this, as the heavier gallies were accidentally likely to cruſh and crack the ſides of the lighter and weaker, ſo were they, by reaſon of their breadth, more ſteady; and thoſe that beſt kept their feet could alſo beſt uſe their hands. The example may be given between one of the long boats of his majeſty's great ſhips, and a *London* barge.

Certainly, he that will happily perform a fight at ſea, muſt be ſkilful in making choice of veſſels to fight in; he muſt believe, that there is more belonging to a good man of war upon the waters than great during; and muſt know, that there is a great deal of difference between fighting looſe or at large, and grapling. The guns of a ſlow ſhip pierce as well, and make as great holes as thoſe in a ſwift. To clap ſhips together without conſideration, belongs rather to a mad-man than to a man of war; for by ſuch an ignorant bravery was *Peter Stroſſie* loſt at the *Azores*, when he fought againſt the Marquis of *Santa Cruz*. In like ſort had the lord *Charles Howard*, admiral of *England*, been loſt in the year 1588, if he had not been better adviſed, than a great many malignant fools were, that found fault with his demeanor. The *Spaniards* had an army aboard them, and he had none; they had more ſhips than he had, and of higher building and charging, ſo that had he intangled himſelf with thoſe great and powerful veſſels, he had greatly endangered this kingdom of *England*. For twenty men upon the defences are equal to an hundred that board and enter; whereas then, contrariwiſe, the *Spaniards* had a hundred for twenty of ours, to defend themſeves withal. But our admiral knew his advantage, and held it; which had he not done, he had not been worthy to have held his head. Here to ſpeak in general of ſea-fight (for particulars are fitter for private hands than for the preſs) I ſay, that a fleet of twen-

ty ſhips, all good ſailors and good ſhips, have the advantage on the open ſea of an hundred as good ſhips, and of ſlower ſailing. For if the fleet of an hundred ſail keep themſelves near together in a groſs ſquadron, the twenty ſhips charging them upon any angle ſhall force them to give ground, and to fall back upon their own next fellows; of which, ſo many as entangle, are made unſerviceable or loſt. Force them they may eaſily; becauſe the twenty ſhips which give themſelves ſcope, after they have given one broad ſide of artillery, by clapping into the wind, and ſtaying, they may give them the other; and ſo the twenty ſhips batter them in pieces with a perpetual volley; whereas thoſe that fight in a troop have no room to turn, and can always uſe but one and the ſame beaten ſide. If the fleet of an hundred ſail give themſelves any diſtance, then ſhall the leſſer fleet prevail, either againſt thoſe that are a-rear and hindmoſt, or againſt thoſe, that, by advantage of over-ſailing their fellows, keep the wind: and if upon a lee-ſhore, the ſhips next the wind be conſtrained to fall back into their own ſquadron, then it is all to nothing that the whole fleet muſt ſuffer ſhipwrack, or render itſelf. That ſuch advantage may be taken upon a fleet of unequal ſpeed, it hath been well enough conceived in old time; as by that oration of *Hermocrates* in *Thucydides*, which he made to the *Syracuſians*, when the *Athenians* invaded them, it may eaſily be obſerved.

Of the art of war by ſea, I had written a treatiſe for the lord *Henry*, prince of *Wales*; a ſubject, to my knowledge, never handled by any man, ancient or modern; but God hath ſpared me the labour of finiſhing it by his loſs; by the loſs of that brave prince; of which, like an eclipſe of the ſun, we ſhall find the effects hereafter. Impoſſible it is to equal words and ſorrows; I will therefore leave him in the hands of God that hath him. *Curæ leves loquuntur, ingentes ſtupent.*

But it is now time to return to the beaten *Carthaginians*, who, by loſing their advantage of ſwift boats, and boarding the *Romans*, have loſt fifty ſail of their gallies: as on the other ſide, their enemies, by commanding the ſeas, have gotten liberty to ſail about the weſt part of *Sicily*, where they raiſed the ſiege laid unto *Segeſta* by the *Carthaginians*, and won the town of *Macella*, with ſome other places.

SECT. VII.

Divers enterfeits of war between the Romans *and* Carthaginians, *with variable ſucceſs. The* Romans *prepare to invade* Afric, *and obtain a great victory at ſea.*

THE victory of *Duilius*, as it was honoured at *Rome* with the firſt naval triumph that was ever ſeen in that city, ſo gave it unto the *Romans* a great encouragement to proceed in their wars by ſea; whereby they hoped, not only to get *Sicily*, but all the other iſles between *Italy* and *Africa*, beginning with *Sardinia*, whither ſoon after they ſent a fleet for that purpoſe. On the contrary ſide, *Amilcar* the *Carthaginian*, lying in *Panormus*, carefully waited for all occaſions that might help to recompenſe the late misfortune; and, being advertiſed that ſome quarrel was grown between the *Roman* ſoldiers and their auxiliaries, being ſuch as cauſed them to incamp apart, he ſent forth *Hanno* to ſet upon them, who taking them unawares, buried four thouſand of them in the place. Now during the continuance of the land-war in *Sicily*, *Hannibal*, who had lately been beaten by ſea, but eſcaped unto *Carthage*, meaning to make amends for his former error, obtained the truſt of a new fleet, wherewith he arrived at *Sardinia*: the conqueſt of which iſland the *Romans* had entertained for their next enterprize. Now it ſo fell out, that the *Romans* croſſing the ſeas from *Sicily*, arrived in the port where *Hannibal* with his new fleet anchored. They ſet upon him unawares, and took the better part of the fleet which he conducted, himſelf hardly eſcaping the danger. But it little availed him to have eſcaped from the *Romans*. His good friends the *Carthaginians* were ſo ill pleaſed with this his ſecond unfortunate voyage, that they hanged him up for his diligence; for (as it hath been ſaid of old) *Non eſt bis in bello peccare*; In war it is too much to offend twice.

After this, it was long ere any thing of importance was done by the conſuls, till [a] *Panormus* was beſieged; where, when the *Romans* had ſought in vain to draw the *Carthaginians* into the field, being unable to force that great city, becauſe of the ſtrong garriſon therein beſtowed: they then departed from thence, and took certain inland towns, as *Mytiſtratum*, *Enna*, *Camerina*, *Hippana*, and others, between *Panormus* and *Meſſina*. The year following, *C. Atilius* the conſul, who commanded the *Roman* fleet, diſcovered a company of the *Carthaginian* gallies, ranging the coaſt; and, not ſtaying for his whole number, purſued them with ten of his. But he was well beaten for the haſte he made, and loſt all, ſave the galley which tranſported him; wherein himſelf eſcaped with great labour. But ere all was done, the reſt of *Atilius*'s fleet was gotten up; who renewing the fight, recovered from the *Carthaginians* a double number of theirs; by which the victory remaining doubtful, both challenge it. Now to try at once which of theſe two nations ſhould command the ſeas, they both prepare all they can. The *Romans* make a fleet of three hundred and thirty gallies, the *Carthaginians* of three hundred

a *If we may give credit to antiquities, which* Fazellus, *a diligent writer, hath left us in his hiſtory of* Sicily; Panormus, *now called* Palermo, *is one of the firſt cities that hath been built in all* Europe. *For whereas* Thucydides *ſeems to make it a colony of the* Phenicians; Ranzanus, in libello de Panormo, lib. 6. *affirms, that it was firſt and long before the time which* Thucydides *ſets down, founded by the* Chaldeans, *and* Damaſcenes. *To prove which, he tells us of two inſcriptions upon marble, in the* Hebrew *character, found at* Panormus *in the time of* William II, *king of* Sicily, *that were then beheld of all the citizens and other ſtrangers, which being tranſlated into* Latin, *ſay as followeth.* Vivente Iſaac filio Abraæ, & regnante in Idumæa, atque in valle Damaſcena, Eſau filio Iſaac; ingens Hebræorum manus, quibus adjuncti ſunt multi Damaſceni, atque Phœnices, profecti in hanc triangularem inſulam, ſedes perpetuas locaverunt in hoc amœniſſimo loco, quem Panormum nominaverunt. *In the other marble are found theſe words.* Non eſt alius Deus præter unum Deum; non eſt alius Potens, præter eundem Deum, &c. Hujus turris præfectus eſt Saphu filius Eliphaz filii Eſau, fratris Jacob filii Iſaac, filii Abrahami: & turri quidem ipſi nomen eſt Baych; ſed turri huic proximæ nomen eſt Pharah. *And this inſcription (ſaith* Fazellus) *was found entire in the caſtle* Baych, *in the year* 1534. *Now whether theſe inſcriptions were truly as ancient as theſe men believe they were, I leave every man to his own faith. But that the city was of aged times, it appears by* Thucydides, *who affirmeth, when the* Greeks *poſt firſt into* Sicily, *that then the* Phenicians *inhabited* Panormus; *which certain it is they did in the firſt* Punic *war; to wit, the* Carthaginians, *who were* Phenicians, *from whom the* Romans (A. Aquilius *and* C. Cornelius) *commanding this army, took it.* And when *Marcellus* beſieged *Syracuſe*, it ſent him in aid three thouſand ſoldiers. But it was rather confederate than ſubject to the *Romans*. For *Cicero* againſt *Verres*, names it among the free cities of *Sicily*. After *Syracuſe* deſtroyed, it became the firſt city and regal ſeat, as well of the *Goths* and *Saracens* in that iſland, as of the emperors of *Conſtantinople*; of the *Normans*, *French* and *Aragonians*; which honour it holds to this day, and is much frequented for the excellent wine which grows about it.

and

and fifty, [a] *Triremes*, *Quadriremes*, and *Quinqueremes*.

The *Romans* reſolve to tranſport the war into *Africa*, the *Carthaginians* to arreſt them on the coaſt of *Sicily*. The numbers with which each of them filled their fleet, was (perhaps) the greateſt that ever fought on the waters. By *Polybius*'s eſtimation, there were in the *Roman* gallies an hundred and forty thouſand men; and in thoſe of *Carthage*, an hundred and fifty thouſand; reckoning one hundred and twenty ſoldiers, and three hundred rowers to every galley, one with the other. The *Roman* fleet was divided into four parts, of which the three firſt made the form of a wedge or triangle; the two firſt ſquadrons making the flanks, and the third ſquadron the baſe; the point thereof (wherein were the two conſuls as admirals) looking toward the enemy, and the middle ſpace lying empty. Their veſſels of carriage were towed by the third ſquadron. After all, came up the fourth, in form of a *Creſcent*, very well manned, but exceeding thin, ſo that the horns of it incloſed all the third ſquadron, together with the corners of the firſt and ſecond. The order of the *Carthaginian* fleet I cannot conceive by relation; but by the manner of the fight afterwards, I conjecture that the front of their fleet was thin, and ſtretched in a great length, much like to that which the *French* call *Combat en haii*; a long front of horſe, and thin: which form, ſince the piſtol prevailed over the lance, they have changed. Behind this firſt out-ſtretched front their battalions were more ſolid. For *Amilcar*, admiral of the *Carthaginians*, had thus ordered them of purpoſe (his gallies having the ſpeed of the *Romans*) that when the firſt fleet of the *Romans* haſted to break through the firſt gallies they ſhould all turn tail, and the *Romans* purſuing them (as after a victory) diſorder themſelves, and for eagerneſs of taking the runaways, leave their own three ſquadrons far behind them. For ſo it muſt needs fall out, ſeeing that the third ſquadron towed their horſe-boats and victuallers, and the fourth had the rearward of all. According to *Amilcar*'s direction it ſucceeded. For when the *Romans* had charged and broken the thin front of the *Carthaginian* firſt fleet, which ran away, they forthwith gave after them with all ſpeed poſſible, not ſo much as looking behind them for the ſecond ſquadron. Hereby the *Romans* were drawn near unto the body of the *Carthaginian* fleet led by *Amilcar*, and by him (at the firſt) received a great loſs, till their ſecond ſquadron came up, which forced *Amilcar* to betake him to his oars. *Hanno* alſo, who commanded the right wing of the *Carthaginian* fleet, invaded the *Roman* rearward, and prevailed againſt them. But *Amilcar* being beaten off, *Marcus Atilius* fell back to their ſuccour, and put the *Carthaginians* to their heels, as not able to ſuſtain both ſquadrons. The rear being relieved, the conſuls came to the aid of their third battalion, which towed the victuallers, which was alſo in great danger of being beaten by the *Africans*; but the conſuls joining their ſquadrons to it, put the *Carthaginians* on that part alſo to running. This victory fell to the *Romans*, partly by the hardineſs of their ſoldiers, but principally, for that *Amilcar* being firſt beaten, could never after join himſelf to any of his other ſquadrons, that remained as yet in a fair likelihood of prevailing, ſo long as they fought upon even terms, and but ſquadron to ſquadron. But *Amilcar* forſaking the fight, thereby left a full fourth part of the *Roman* fleet unengaged, and ready to give ſuccour to any of the other parts that were oppreſs'd. So as in concluſion, the *Romans* got the honour of the day; for they loſt but four and twenty of theirs, whereas the *Africans* loſt thirty that were ſunk, and threeſcore and three that were taken.

Now, if *Amilcar*, who had more gallies than the *Romans*, had alſo divided his fleet into four ſquadrons (beſides thoſe that he ranged in the front to draw on the enemies, and to engage them) and that, while he himſelf fought with one ſquadron that charged him, all the reſt of the enemies fleet had been at the ſame time entertained, he had prevailed; but the ſecond ſquadron being free came to the reſcue of the firſt, by which *Amilcar* was oppreſs'd; and *Amilcar* being oppreſs'd and ſcattered, the conſuls had good leiſure to relieve both their third and fourth ſquadron, and got the victory.

Charles V, among other his precepts to *Philip* II, his ſon, where he adviſeth him concerning war againſt the *Turks*, tells him, that in all battels between them and the *Chriſtians*, he ſhould never fail to charge the *Janiſaries* in the beginning of the fight, and to engage them at once with the reſt. For (ſaith he) the *Janiſaries*, who are always reſerved entire in the rear of the battel, and in whom the *Turk* repoſeth his greateſt confidence, come up in a groſs body, when all the troops on both ſides are diſbanded and in confuſion, whereby they carry the victory before them without reſiſtance. By the ſame order of fight and reſervation did the *Romans* alſo prevail againſt other nations. For they kept their *Triarii* in ſtore (who were the choice of their army) for the upſhot and laſt blow. A great and victorious advantage it hath ever been found, to keep ſome one or two good troops to look on, when all elſe are diſbanded and engaged.

SECT. VIII.

The Romans *prevail in* Afric. Atilius *the conſul propoundeth intolerable conditions of peace to the* Carthaginians. *He is utterly beaten, and made priſoner.*

NOW the *Romans*, according to their former reſolution, after they had repaired and victualled their fleet, ſet ſail for *Africa*, and arrived at the promontory of *Hercules*, a great head-land, ſomewhat to the eaſt of the port of *Carthage*, and ſome forty leagues from *Heraclea* in *Sicily*, where *Amilcar* himſelf as yet ſtaid. From this head-land (leaving the entrance into *Carthage*) they coaſted the eaſt-ſide of the promontory, till they came to *Clypea*, a town about fifty *Engliſh* miles from it. There they diſembarked, and prepared to beſiege *Clypea*, which, to eaſe them of labour, was yielded unto them. Now, had they a port of their own on *Africa* ſide, without which all invaſions are fooliſh. By this time were the *Africans* alſo arrived at their own *Carthage*, fearing that the *Roman* fleet and army had directed themſelves thither; but being advertiſed that they had taken *Clypea*, they made proviſions of all ſorts both by ſea and land for their defence. The *Romans* ſend to *Rome* for directions, and in the mean while waſte all round about them. The order given from the ſenate, was, that one of the conſuls ſhould remain with the

[a] *The* Quinqueremes *are gallies, wherein every oar hath five men to draw it; the* Quadriremes *had four to an oar, and the* Triremes *three. Some have thought that the* Quinqueremes *had five ranks of oars one over an another; and the other gallies (ratcably) fewer. But had this been ſo, they muſt then have had five decks each over other, which hath ſeldom been ſeen in ſhips of a thouſand tons; neither could the third, fourth and fifth ranks, have reached unto the water with their oars.*

army,

army, and that the other ſhould return with the fleet into *Italy*. According to this direction, *Manlius* the conſul is ſent home to *Rome*, whither he carried with him twenty thouſand *African* captives, with all the *Roman* fleet and army, except forty ſhips, fifteen thouſand foot and five hundred horſe that were left with *Atilius*.

With theſe forces, *Regulus* eaſily won ſome towns and places that were unwalled, and laid ſiege to others; but he performed no great matter before he came to *Adis*. Yet I hold it worthy of relation, that near unto the river of *Bagrada* he encountered with a ſerpent of one hundred and twenty foot long, which he ſlew, not without loſs of many ſoldiers, being driven to uſe againſt it ſuch engines of war as ſerved properly for the aſſaulting of towns. At *Adis* he met with the *Carthaginian* army, whereof the captains were *Hanno* and *Boſtar*, together with *Amilcar*, who had brought over out of *Sicily* five thouſand foot and five hundred horſe to ſuccour his country. Theſe (belike) had an intent rather to weary him out of *Africa*, by weary protraction of time, than to undergo the hazard of a main fight. They were careful to hold themſelves free from neceſſity of coming to blows, yet had they a great deſire to ſave the town of *Adis* out of his hands. Intending therefore to follow their general purpoſe, and yet to diſturb him in the ſiege of *Adis*; they encamp near unto him, and ſtrongly (as they think) on the top of an hill; but thereby they loſe the ſervices both of their elephants and of their horſe-men. This diſadvantage of theirs *Regulus* diſcovers, and makes uſe of it. He aſſails them in their ſtrength, which they defend a while; but in fine, the *Romans* prevail, and force them from the place, taking the ſpoil of their camp. Following this their good fortune at the heels, they proceed to [a] *Tunis*, a city within ſixteen miles of *Carthage*, which they aſſault and take.

By the loſs of this battel at *Adis*, and more eſpecially by the loſs of *Tunis*, the *Carthaginians* were greatly diſmay'd. The *Numidians*, their next neighbours towards the weſt, inſult upon their misfortunes, invade and ſpoil their territory, and force thoſe that inhabit abroad to forſake their villages and fields, and to hide themſelves within the walls of *Carthage*. By reaſon hereof a great famine at hand threatens the citizens. *Atilius* finds his own advantage, and aſſures himſelf that the city could not long hold out; yet he feared leſt it might defend it ſelf until his time of office, that was near expired, ſhould be quite run out, whereby the new conſuls were like to reap the honour of obtaining it. Ambition therefore, that hath no reſpect but to it ſelf, perſwades him to treat of peace with the *Carthaginians*. But he propounded unto them ſo unworthy and baſe conditions, as thereby their hearts, formerly poſſeſſed with fear, became now ſo couragious and diſdainful, that they reſolved either to defend their liberty, or to die to the laſt man. To ſtrengthen this their reſolution, there arrived at the ſame time a great troop of *Greeks*, whom they had formerly ſent to entertain. Among theſe was a very expert ſoldier, named *Xantippus*, a *Spartan*; who being informed of what had paſſed, and of the overthrow which the *Carthaginians* received near unto *Adis*, gave it out publickly, that the ſame was occaſioned by default of the commanders, and not of the nation. This bruit ran till it came to the ſenate; *Xantippus* is ſent for, gives the reaſon of his opinion; and in concluſion, being made general of the *African* forces, he puts himſelf into the field. The army which he led conſiſted of no more than twelve thouſand foot and four thouſand horſe, with an hundred elephants. No greater were the forces wherewith the *Carthaginians* fought for all that they had, liberty, lives, goods, wives, and children; which might well make it ſuſpected that the armies by ſea, before ſpoken of, were miſnumbered; the one conſiſting of an hundred and forty thouſand, the other of an hundred and fifty thouſand; were it not commonly found that they, which uſe the ſervice of mercenary ſoldiers, are ſtronger abroad than at their own doors.

Xantippus, taking the field with this army, marched directly towards the *Romans*; and ranging his troops upon fair and level ground, fitteſt both for his elephants and horſe, preſented them battel. The *Romans* wondered much whence this new courage of their enemies might grow; but confident they were that it ſhould be ſoon abated. Their chief care was, how to reſiſt the violence of the elephants. Againſt them they placed the *Velites*, or light-armed ſoldiers, as a forlorn hope; that theſe might, either with darts and other caſting weapons, drive back the beaſts upon the enemies, or at leaſt break their violence, and hinder them from ruſhing freely upon the legions. To the ſame end they made their battels deeper in file than they had been accuſtomed to do. By which means, as they were the leſs ſubject unto the impreſſion of the elephants; ſo were they ſo much the more expoſed unto the violence of horſe, wherein the enemy did far exceed them. The elephants were placed by *Xantippus*, all in one rank, before his army, which followed them at a reaſonable diſtance: his horſe-men, and ſome light-armed foot of the *Carthaginian* auxiliaries were in the wings. The firſt onſet was given by the elephants, againſt which the *Velites* were ſo unable to make reſiſtance, that they brake into the battalions following, and put them into ſome diſorder. In this caſe, the depth of the *Roman* battel was helpful; for when the beaſts had ſpent their force in piercing through a few of the firſt ranks, the ſquadrons nevertheleſs perſiſted in their order, without opening. But the *Carthaginian* horſe, having at the firſt encounter, by reaſon of their advantage in number, driven thoſe of *Atilius* out of the field, began to charge the *Roman* battalions in flank, and put them in great diſtreſs; who being forced to turn face every way, could neither paſs forward, nor yet retire; but had much ado to make good the ground whereon they ſtood. In the mean while, ſuch of the *Romans* as had eſcaped the fury of the elephants, and left them at their backs, fell upon the *Carthaginian* army, that met them in very good array. It was no even match; the one were a diſordered company, wearied with labour, and hurt; the other freſh, and well prepared to have dealt with the enemy upon equal terms. Here was therefore a greater ſlaughter with little fight, the *Romans* haſtily recoiling to the body of their army, which being ſurrounded with the enemy, and ſpent with travel, fell all to rout, upon the defeat of theſe troops, that open the way to a general overthrow. So the *Carthaginians* obtained a full victory, deſtroying the whole

* *This city was taken from the* Turks *by* Charles *the fifth, in the year* 1536, *and was one of the three keys which he gave in charge to* Philip *the ſecond his ſon, to keep ſafe; to wit, this* Tunis, *the key of* Afric; Fluſhing, *the key of the* Netherlands; *and* Cadiz, *the key of* Spain. *But two of theſe* Philip *ſo loſt, that he never found them again; the third, our* Engliſh *were bold, in the time of the renowned queen* Elizabeth, *to wring out of his hands; where we ſtaid not to pick any lock, but broke open the doors, and having rifled all, threw it into the fire.*

Roman

Roman army, ſave two thouſand, and taking five hundred priſoners, together with *Atilius* the conſul. Of their own they loſt no more than eight hundred mercenaries, which were ſlain when the fight began by two thouſand of the *Romans*, that, wheeling about to avoid the elephants, bare down all before them, and made way even to the *Carthaginian* trenches. Theſe were the two thouſand that eſcaped, when the whole army behind them was routed. All the reſt were either taken or ſlain. Hereby fortune made the *Romans* know, that they were no leſs her vaſſals, than were the *Carthaginians*; how inſolent ſoever they had been in their propoſition of peace, as if they had purchaſed from her the inheritance of their proſperity, which ſhe never gave nor ſold to any mortal man. With what joy theſe news were welcomed, when they came to *Carthage*, we may eaſily conjecture; and what great things the virtue of one man hath often brought to paſs in the world, there are many examples to prove, no leſs than this of *Xantippus*; all of them confirming that ſentence of *Eurypides*, *Mens una ſapiens, plurium vincit manus*; Many mens hands equal not one wiſe mind.

After this great ſervice done to the *Carthaginians*, *Xantippus* returned into *Greece*; whether for that he was more injured than honoured, or for what other cauſe, it is unknown.

The death of *Atilius Regulus* the conſul, was very memorable. He was ſent from *Carthage* to *Rome*, about the exchange and ranſom of priſoners on both ſides; giving his faith to return, if the buſineſs were not effected. When he came to *Rome*, and plainly ſaw that his country ſhould loſe by the bargain, ſo far was he from urging the ſenate unto compaſſion of his own miſery, that he earneſtly perſwaded to have the priſoners in *Afric* left to their ill deſtinies. This done, he returned to *Carthage*, where, for his pains taken, he was rewarded with an horrible death. For this his conſtancy and faith, all writers highly extol him; but the *Carthaginians* ſeem to have judged him an obſtinate and malicious enemy, that neither in his proſperity would hearken to reaſon, nor yet in his calamity would have the natural care to preſerve himſelf and others, by yielding to ſuch an office of humanity, as is common in all wars (not grounded upon deadly hatred) only in regard of ſome ſmall advantage. Whatſoever the *Carthaginians* thought of him, ſure it is, that his faithful obſervance of his word given, cannot be too much commended. But that grave ſpeech, which he made in the ſenate againſt the exchange of priſoners, appears in all reaſon to have proceeded from a vain-glorious frowardneſs, rather than from any neceſſity of ſtate. For the exchange was made ſoon after his death, wherein the *Romans* had the worſt bargain, by ſo much as *Regulus* himſelf was worth. As for the authority of all hiſtorians that magnify him in this point, we are to conſider that they live under the *Roman* empire; *Philinus* the *Carthaginian*, perhaps, did cenſure it otherwiſe. Yet the death which he ſuffered with extreme torments, could not be more grievous to him, than it was diſhonourable to *Carthage*. Neither do I think that the *Carthaginians* could excuſe themſelves herein, otherwiſe than by recrimination; ſaying, that the *Romans* deſerved to be no better intreated, foraſmuch as it was their ordinary practice to uſe others in the like ſort. Cruelty doth not become more warrantable, but rather more odious, by being cuſtomary. It was the *Roman* faſhion to whip almoſt to death, and then to behead the captains of their enemies whom they took; yea, although they were ſuch as had always made fair wars with them. Wherefore it ſeems not meet, in reaſon, that they ſhould cry out againſt the like tyrannical inſolence in others, as if it were lawful only in themſelves.

The conſideration both of this misfortune, that rewarded the pride of *Atilius*'s intolerable demands, and of the ſudden valour whereinto the *Carthaginians* fear was changed by mere deſperation, calls to remembrance the like inſolency of others in proſperity, that hath bred the like reſolution in thoſe to whom all reaſonable grace hath been denied. In ſuch caſes I never hold it impertinent to add unto one, more teſtimonies, approving the true rules from which our paſſions carry us away.

In the year 1378, the *Genoeſe* won ſo faſt upon the *Venetians*, as they not only drove their gallies out of the ſea, but they brought their own fleet within two miles of *Venice* it ſelf. This bred ſuch an amazement in the citizens of *Venice*, that they offered unto the *Genoeſe* (their ſtate reſerved) whatſoever they would demand. But *Peter Doria*, blown up with many former victories, would hearken to no compoſition, ſave the yielding of their city and ſtate to his diſcretion. Hereupon the *Venetians* being filled with diſdain, thruſt out to ſea with all their remaining power, and aſſail *Doria* with ſuch deſperate fury, that they brake his fleet, kill *Doria* himſelf, take nineteen of his gallies, fourſcore boats of *Padoua*, and four thouſand priſoners; recover *Chiozza*, and all the places taken from them; and following their victory, enter the port of *Genoa*, enforcing the *Genoeſe* baſely to beg peace, to their extreme diſhonour and diſadvantage, being beaten; which being victorious, they might have commanded, to their greateſt honour and advantage. The like happened to the earl of *Flanders*, in the year 1380, when having taken a notable, and withal an over-cruel revenge upon the *Gantois*, he refuſed mercy to the reſt, who in all humility ſubmitting themſelves to his obedience, offered their city, goods, and eſtates, to be diſpoſed at his pleaſure. This when he had unadviſedly refuſed, and was reſolved to extinguiſh them utterly, they iſſue out of their city with five thouſand choſen men, and armed with a deſperate reſolution, they charge the earl, break his army, enter *Bruges* (pell-mell) with his vanquiſhed followers, and enforce him to hide himſelf under an heap of ſtraw in a poor cottage, out of which, with great difficulty, he eſcaped, and ſaved himſelf. Such are the fruits of inſolency.

SECT. IX.

How the affairs of Carthage *proſpered after the victory againſt* Atilius: *How the* Romans, *having loſt their fleet by tempeſt, reſolve to forſake the ſeas: the great advantages of a good fleet in war, between nations divided by the ſea.*

BY the reputation of this late victory, all places that had been loſt in *Afric*, return to the obedience of *Carthage*. Only *Clypea* ſtands out, before which the *Carthaginias* ſet down, and aſſail it, but in vain: for the *Romans* hearing of the loſs of *Atilius*, with their forces in *Afric*, and withal, that *Clypea* was beſieged, make ready a groſs army, and tranſport it in a fleet of three hundred and fifty gallies, commanded by *M. Æmilius* and *Ser. Fulvius* their conſuls. At the promontory of *Mercury*, two hundred *Carthaginian* gallies ſet out on purpoſe, upon the bruit of their coming, encounter them, but greatly to their coſt: for the *Romans* took by force an hundred and fourteen of their fleet, and drew them after them to *Clypea*, where they ſtaid no longer than to take in their own men that had been beſieged; and this done, they made amain towards *Sicily*, in hope

hope to recover all that the *Carthaginians* held therein. In this haſty voyage, they deſpiſe the advice of the pilots, who pray them to find harbour in time, for that the ſeaſon threatened ſome violent ſtorms, which ever happened between the riſing of *Orion* and of the [a] *Dog-ſtar*. Now although the pilots of the *Roman* fleet had thus forewarned them of the weather at hand, and certified them withal, that the ſouth coaſt of *Sicily* had no good ports, wherein to ſave themſelves upon ſuch an accident; yet this victorious nation was perſwaded that the wind and ſeas feared them no leſs than did the *Africans*; and that they were able to conquer the elements themſelves. So refuſing to ſtay within ſome port, as they were adviſed, they would needs put out to ſea; thinking it a matter much helping their reputation, after this victory againſt the *Carthaginian* fleet, to take a few worthleſs towns upon the coaſt. The mercileſs winds in the mean while overtake them, and near unto *Camerina*, overturn and thruſt headlong on the rocks all but eighty, of three hundred and forty ſhips; ſo as their former great victory was devoured by the ſeas, before the fame thereof recovered *Rome*.

The *Carthaginians* hearing what had happened, repair all their warlike veſſels, hoping once again to command the ſeas: they are alſo as confident of their land-forces ſince the overthrow of *Atilius*. They ſend *Aſdrubal* into *Sicily* with all their old ſoldiers, and an hundred and forty elephants, embarked in two hundred gallies. With this army and fleet he arrives at *Lilybæum*, where he begins to vex the partizans of *Rome*. But adverſity doth not diſcourage the *Romans*: they build in three months (a matter of great note) one hundred and twenty ſhips, with which, and the remainder of their late ſhipwrack, they row to *Panormus*, or *Palermo*, the chief city of the *Africans* in *Sicily*, and ſurround it by land and water: after a while they take it, and, leaving a garriſon therein, return to *Rome*.

Very deſirous the *Romans* were to be doing in *Africa*: to which purpoſe they employed *C. Servilius* and *C. Sempronius* their conſuls. But theſe wrought no wonders. Some ſpoil they made upon the coaſts of *Africa*, but fortune robbed them of all their gettings. For in their return, they were firſt ſet upon the ſands, and like to have periſhed near unto the leſſer *Syrtes*, where they were fain to heave all over-board, that ſo they might get off: then, having with much ado doubled the cape of *Lilybæum*, in their paſſage from *Panormus* towards *Italy*, they loſt an hundred and fifty of their ſhips by foul weather. A greater diſcouragement never nation had; the god of the wars favoured them no more, than the god of the waters afflicted them. Of all that *Mars* enriched them with upon the land, *Neptune* robbed them upon the ſeas: for they had now loſt, beſides what they loſt in fight, four hundred and ſix ſhips and gallies, with all the munition and ſoldiers tranſported in them.

The exceeding damage hereby received, perſwaded them to give over their navigation, and their fight by ſea, and to ſend only a land-army into *Sicily*, under *L. Cæcilius* and *F. Furius* their conſuls. Theſe they tranſported in ſome ſixty ordinary paſſage-boats, by the ſtreights of *Meſſina*, that are not above a mile and a half broad from land to land. In like ſort the overthrow which *Atilius* received in *Africa*, occaſioned chiefly by the elephants, made them leſs cholerick againſt the *Carthaginians* than before; ſo that for two years after they kept the high and woody grounds, not daring to fight in the fair and champion countries. But this late reſolution of forſaking the ſeas laſted not long; for it was impoſſible for them to ſuccour thoſe places which they held in *Sicily*, without a navy; much leſs to maintain the war in *Africa*. For whereas the *Romans* were to ſend forces from *Meſſina* to *Egeſta*, to *Lilybæum*, and to other places in the extreme weſt parts of *Sicily*, making ſometimes a march of above one hundred and forty *Engliſh* miles by land, which could not be performed with an army, and the proviſions that follow it, in leſs than fourteen days, the *Carthaginians* would paſs it with their gallies in forty-eight hours.

An old example we have of that great advantage of tranſporting armies by water, between *Canutus* and *Edmund Ironſide*. For *Canutus*, when he had entered the *Thames* with his navy and army, and could not prevail againſt *London*, ſuddenly embarked; and ſailing to the weſt, landed in *Dorſetſhire*, ſo drawing *Edmund* and his army thither. There finding ill entertainment, he again ſhipped his men, and entered the *Severn*, making *Edmund* to march after him to the ſuccour of *Worceſterſhire*, by him greatly ſpoiled. But when he had *Edmund* there, he ſailed back again to *London*, by means whereof he both wearied the king, and ſpoiled where he pleaſed, ere ſuccour could arrive. And this was not the leaſt help which the *Netherlands* have had againſt the *Spaniards*, in the defence of their liberty, that, being maſters of the ſea, they could paſs their army from place to place unwearied and entire, with all the munition and artillery belonging unto it, in the tenth part of the time wherein their enemies have been able to do it. Of this, an inſtance or two. The count *Maurice* of *Naſſau*, now living, one of the greateſt captains, and of the worthieſt princes, that either the preſent or preceding ages have brought forth, in the year 1590, carried his army by ſea with forty cannons to *Breda*; making countenance either to beſiege *Boiſleduc* or *Gertrevidenbergh*; which the enemy (in prevention) filled with ſoldiers and victuals. But, as ſoon as the wind ſerved, he ſuddenly ſet ſail, and arriving in the mouth of the *Meuſe*, turned up the *Rhine*, and thence to *Yſſel*, and ſet down before *Zutphen*. So before the *Spaniards* could march over-land round about *Holland*, above eighty miles, and over many great rivers with their cannon and carriage, *Zutphen* was taken. Again, when the *Spaniſh* army had overcome this weariſom march, and were now far from home, the prince *Maurice* making countenance to ſail up the *Rhine*, changed his courſe in the night; and ſailing down the ſtream, he was ſet down before *Hulſt* in *Brabant*, ere the *Spaniards* had knowledge what was become of him. So this town he alſo took, before the *Spaniſh* army could return. Laſtly, the *Spaniſh* army was no ſooner arrived in *Brabant*, than the prince *Maurice*, well attended by his good fleet, having fortified *Hulſt*, ſet ſail again, and preſented himſelf before *Nimeguen* in *Gelders*, a city of notable importance, and maſtered it.

a *There is no part of the world, which hath not ſome certain times of outragious weather, beſides their accidental ſtorms. We have upon our coaſt a* Michaelmas *flaw, that ſeldom or never fails. In the* Weſt-Indies, *in the months of* Auguſt *and* September, *thoſe moſt forcible winds which the* Spaniards *call the* Nortes, *or north winds, are very fearful: and therefore they that navigate in thoſe parts, take harbour till thoſe months take end.* Charles *the fifth, being as ill adviſed in paſſing the ſeas towards* Algier *in the winter-quarter, contrary to the counſel of* A. Doria, *as he was in like unſeaſonable times to continue his ſiege before* Metz *in* Lorain, *loſt* 140 *ſhips by tempeſt, and fifteen gallies, with all in effect in them of men, victuals, horſes, and munition; a loſs no leſs great, than his retreat both from before the one and the other, was extreme diſhonourable.*

And

And to ſay the truth, it is impoſſible for any maritime country, not having the coaſts admirably fortified, to defend it ſelf againſt a powerful Enemy that is maſter of the ſea. Hereof I had rather, that *Spain* than *England* ſhould be an example. Let it therefore be ſuppoſed, that King *Philip* the ſecond, had fully reſolved to hinder Sir *John Norris* in the year 1589, from preſenting *Don Antonio*, king of *Portugal*, before the gates of *Liſbon*; and that he would have kept off the *Engliſh*, by power of his land-forces, as being too weak at ſea, through the great overthrow of his mighty *Armada*, by the fleet of queen *Elizabeth*, in the year foregoing. Surely, it had not been hard for him to prepare an army, that ſhould be able to reſiſt our eleven thouſand. But where ſhould this his army have been beſtowed? if about *Lisbon*, then would it have been eaſie unto the *Engliſh*, to take, ranſack, and burn the town of *Groin*, and to waſte the country round about it. For the great and threatening preparations of the earl of *Altemira*, the marquis of *Saralba*, and others, did not hinder them from performing all this. Neither did the haſty levy of eight thouſand, under the earl of *Andrada*, ſerve to more effect, than the increaſe of honour to Sir *John Norris* and his aſſociates: conſidering that the *Engliſh* charged theſe at *Puente de Burgos*, and paſſing the great bridge, behind which they lay, that was flanked with ſhot, and barricaded at the further end, routed them, took their camp, took their general's ſtandard with the king's arms, and purſued them over all the country, which they fired. If a royal army, and not (as this was) a company of private adventurers, had thus begun the war in *Galicia*; I think it would have made the *Spaniards* to quit the guard of *Portugal*, and make haſte to the defence of their St. *Jago*, whoſe temple was not far from the danger. But had they held their firſt reſolution, as knowing that Sir *John Norris*'s main intent was to bring *Don Antonio* with an army into his kingdom, whither coming ſtrong, he expected to be readily and joyfully welcomed, could they have hindered his landing in *Portugal?* did not he land at *Penicha*, and march over the country to *Lisbon*, ſix days journey? did not he (when all *Don Antonio*'s promiſes failed) paſs along by the river of *Lisbon* to *Caſcaliz*, and there, having won the fort, quietly embark his men, and depart? but theſe, though no more than an handful, yet were they *Engliſh*. Let us conſider of the matter it ſelf, what another nation might do, even againſt *England*, in landing an army, by advantage of a fleet, if we had none. This queſtion, *whether an invading army may be reſiſted at their landing upon the coaſt of* England, *were there no fleet of ours at the ſea to impeach it*; is already handled by a learned gentleman of our nation, in his obſervations upon *Ceſar*'s *Commentaries*, that maintains the affirmative. This he holds only upon ſuppoſition; *in abſence of our ſhipping:* and comparatively, as that it is a more ſafe and eaſy courſe to defend all the coaſt of *England*, than to ſuffer any enemy to land, and afterwards to fight with him. Surely I hold with him, that it is the beſt way to keep our enemy from treading upon our ground: wherein if we fail, then muſt we ſeek to make him wiſh that he had ſtaid at his own home. In ſuch a caſe, if it ſhould happen, our judgments are to weigh many particular circumſtances that belong not unto this diſcourſe. But making the queſtion general and poſitive, *whether* England, *without help of her fleet, be able to debar an enemy from landing?* I hold that it is unable ſo to do; and therefore I think it moſt dangerous to make the adventure. For the incouragement of a firſt victory to an enemy, and the diſcouragement of being beaten to the invaded, may draw after it a moſt perilous conſequence.

It is true, that the marſhal *Monluc*, in his commentaries, doth greatly complain that by his wanting forces, wherewith to have kept the frontier of *Guienne*, they of the *Proteſtant* religion, after the battel of *Moncounter*, entered that country, and gathered great ſtrength and relief thence; for if the king (ſaith he) would have given me but reaſonable means, *j'euſe bien garde a Monſieur l' admiral, de faire boire ſes chevaux en la Garonne*; *I would have kept the admiral from watering his horſes in the river of* Garonne. *Monſieur de Langey*, on the contrary ſide, prefers the not fighting upon a frontier with an invaded enemy, and commends the delay; which courſe the conſtable of *France* held againſt the emperour *Charles*, when he invaded *Provence*. Great difference I know there is, and a diverſe conſideration to be had, between ſuch a country as *France* is, ſtrengthened with many fortified places; and this of ours, where our ramparts are but of the bodies of men. And it was of invaſions upon firm land, that theſe great captains ſpake, whoſe entrances cannot be uncertain. But our queſtion is, of an army to be tranſported over-ſea, and to be landed again in an enemy's country, and the place left to the choice of the invader. Hereunto I ſay, that ſuch an army cannot be reſiſted on the coaſt of *England*, without a fleet to impeach it; no, nor on the coaſt of *France*, or any other country; except every creek, port, or ſandy bay, had a powerful army in each of them to make oppoſition. For let his whole ſuppoſition be granted; that *Kent* is able to furniſh twelve thouſand foot; and that thoſe twelve thouſand be laid in the three beſt landing places within that country, to wit, three thouſand at *Margate*, three thouſand at the *Neſſe*, and ſix thouſand at *Foulkſton*, that is ſomewhat equally diſtant from them both; as alſo that two of theſe troops (unleſs ſome other order be thought more fit) be directed to ſtrengthen the third, when they ſhall ſee the enemies fleet to bend towards it: I ſay, that notwithſtanding this proviſion, if the enemy, ſetting ſail from the iſle of *Wight*, in the firſt watch of the night, and towing their long boats at their ſterns, ſhall arrive by dawn of day at the *Neſſe*, and thruſt their army on ſhore there; it will be hard for thoſe three thouſand that are at *Margate* (twenty and four long miles from thence) to come time enough to re-inforce their fellows at the *Neſſe*. Nay, how ſhall they at *Foulkſton* be able to do it, who are nearer by more than half the way? ſeeing that the enemy, at his firſt arrival, will either make his entrance by force, with three or four hundred ſhot of great artillery, and quickly put the firſt three thouſand, that were intrenced at the *Neſſe*, to run; or elſe give them ſo much to do, that they ſhall be glad to ſend for help to *Foulkſton*, and perhaps to *Margate*: whereby thoſe places will be left bare. Now let us ſuppoſe, that all the twelve thouſand *Kentiſh* ſoldiers arrive at the *Neſſe*, ere the enemy can be ready to diſimbark his army, ſo that he ſhall find it unſafe to land in the face of ſo many prepared to withſtand him; yet muſt we believe that he will play the beſt of his own game; and (having liberty to go which way he liſt) under covert of the night, ſet ſail towards the eaſt, where what ſhall hinder him to take ground, either at *Margate*, the *Downs*, or elſewhere, before they at the *Neſſe* can be well aware of his departure? certainly, there is nothing more eaſy than to do it. Yea, the like may be

be ſaid of *Weymouth*, *Purbeck*, *Poole*, and of all landing places on the ſouth coaſt. For there is no man ignorant, that ſhips, without putting themſelves out of breath, will eaſily out-run the ſoldiers that coaſt them. *Les armées ne volent poynt en poſte*; *armies neither fly, nor run poſt*, ſaith a marſhal of *France*. And I know it to be true, that a fleet of ſhips may be ſeen at ſun-ſet, and after it, at the *Lizard*; yet by the next morning they may recover *Portland*; whereas an army of foot ſhall not be able to march it in ſix days. Again, when thoſe troops lodged on the ſea-ſhores, ſhall be forced to run from place to place in vain, after a fleet of ſhips, they will at length ſit down in the mid-way, and leave all at adventure. But ſay it were otherwiſe; that the invading enemy will offer to land in ſome ſuch place, where there ſhall be an army of ours ready to receive him: yet it cannot be doubted, but that when the choice of all our trained Bands, and the choice of our commanders and captains, ſhall be drawn together (as they were at *Tilbury*, in the year 1588.) to attend the perſon of the prince, and for the defence of the city of *London*: they that remain to guard the coaſt, can be of no ſuch force, as to encounter an army like unto that, wherewith it was intended that the prince of *Parma* ſhould have landed in *England*.

The Iſle of *Tercera* hath taught us by experience, what to think in ſuch a caſe. There are not many iſlands in the world, better fenced by nature, and ſtrengthened by art: it being every-where hard of acceſs; having no good harbour wherein to ſhelter a navy of friends; and upon every cove or watering place a fort erected, to forbid the approach of an enemy's boat. Yet when *Emanuel de Sylva*, and *Monſieur de Chattes*, that held it to the uſe of *Don Antonio*, with five or ſix thouſand men, thought to have kept the marquis of *Santa Cruz*, from ſetting foot on ground therein; the marquis having ſhewed himſelf in the Road of *Angra*, did ſet ſail ere any was aware of it, and arrived at the *Port des Moles*, far diſtant from thence, where he won a fort, and landed, ere *Monſieur de Chattes*, running thither in vain, could come to hinder him. The example of *Philip Stroſſie*, ſlain the year before, without all regard of his worth, and of three hundred *French* Priſoners murthered in cold blood, had inſtructed *de Chattes* and his followers, what they might expect at that marquis's hands: therefore it is not like that they were ſlow in carrying relief to *Port de Moles*. Whether our *Engliſh* would be perſwaded to make ſuch diligent haſte from *Margate* to the *Neſſe*, and back again, it may be doubted. Sure I am, that it were a greater march than all the length of *Tercera*; whereof the *Frenchmen* had not meaſured the one half, when they found themſelves prevented by the more nimble ſhips of *Spain*.

This may ſuffice to prove, that a ſtrong army, in a good fleet, which neither foot nor horſe is able to follow, cannot be denied to land where it liſt, in *England*, *France*, or elſewhere, unleſs it be hindered, encountered, and ſhuffled together, by a fleet of equal or anſwerable ſtrength.

The difficult landing of our *Engliſh* at *Fayal*, in the year 1597, is alledged againſt this: which example moves me no way to think that a large coaſt may be defended againſt a ſtrong fleet. I landed thoſe *Engliſh* in *Fayal* my ſelf, and therefore ought to take notice of this inſtance. For whereas I find an action of mine cited, with omiſſion of my name; I may, by a civil interpretation, think, that there was no purpoſe to defraud me of any honour; but rather an opinion, that the enterpriſe was ſuch, or ſo ill managed, as that no honour could be due unto it. There were indeed ſome which were in that voyage, who adviſed me not to undertake it: and I hearkned unto them ſomewhat longer than was requiſite; eſpecially, whilſt they deſired me to reſerve the title of ſuch an exploit (though it were not great) for a greater perſon. But when they began to tell me of difficulty, I gave them to underſtand the ſame which I now maintain, that it was more difficult to defend a coaſt, than to invade it. The truth is, that I could have landed my men with more eaſe than I did; yea, without finding any reſiſtance, if I would have rowed to another place; yea, even there where I landed, if I would have taken more company to help me. But without fearing any imputation of raſhneſs, I may ſay, that I had more regard of reputation, in that buſineſs, than of ſafety. For I thought it to belong unto the honour of our prince and nation, that a few iſlanders ſhould not think any advantage great enough, againſt a fleet ſet forth by queen *Elizabeth*: and further, I was unwilling that ſome *Low-Country* captains, and others, not of mine own ſquadron, whoſe aſſiſtance I had refuſed, ſhould pleaſe themſelves with a ſweet conceit) though it would have been ſhort, when I had landed in ſome other place) *that for want of their help I was driven to turn tail.* Therefore I took with me none but men aſſured, commanders of mine own ſquadron, with ſome of their followers, and a few other gentlemen, voluntiers, whom I could not refuſe; as Sir *William Brooke*, Sir *William Harvey*, Sir *Arthur Gorges*, Sir *John Scot*, Sir *Thomas Ridgeway*, Sir *Henry Thinne*, Sir *Charles Morgan*, Sir *Walter Chute*, *Marcellus Throckmorton*, captain *Laurence Kemis*, captain *William Morgan*, and others, ſuch as well underſtood themſelves and the enemy: by whoſe help, with God's favour, I made good the enterpriſe I undertook. As for the *working of the ſea*, *the ſteepneſs of the cliffs*, and other troubles, that were not new to us, we overcame them well enough. And theſe (notwithſtanding) made five or ſix companies of the enemies, who ſought to impeach our landing, abandon the wall, whereon their muſquetiers lay on the reſt for us, and won the place of them without any great loſs. This I could have done with leſs danger, ſo that it ſhould not have ſerved for example of a rule, that failed even in this example: but the reaſons before alledged (together with other reaſons well known to ſome of the gentlemen above named, though more private than to be here laid down) made me rather follow the way of bravery, and take the ſhorter courſe, having it ſtill in mine own power to fall off when I ſhould think it meet. It is eaſily ſaid, that *the enemy was more than a coward* (which yet was more than we knew;) neither will I magnify ſuch a ſmall piece of ſervice, by ſeeking to prove him better, whom had I thought equal to mine own followers, I would otherwiſe have dealt with. But for ſo much as concerns the Propoſition in hand; he that beheld this, may well remember, that the ſame enemy troubled us more in our march towards *Fayal*, than in our taking the ſhore; that he ſought how to ſtop us in place of his advantage; that many of our men were ſlain or hurt by him, among whom Sir *Arthur Gorges* was ſhot in that march; and that ſuch, as (thinking all danger to be paſt, when we had won good footing) would needs follow us to the town, were driven by him, to forſake the pace of a man of war, and betake themſelves to an haſty trot.

For

For end of this digreſſion, I hope that this queſtion ſhall never come to tryal; his majeſty's many moveable forts will forbid the experience. And although the *Engliſh* will no leſs diſdain, than any nation under heaven can do, to be beaten upon their own ground, or elſewhere, by a foreign enemy; yet to entertain thoſe that ſhall aſſail us, with their own beef in their bellies, and before they eat of our *Kentiſh* Capons, I take it to be the wiſeſt way. To do which, his majeſty, after God, will employ his good ſhips on the ſea, and not truſt to any intrenchment upon the ſhore.

SECT. X.

How the Romans *attempt again to get the maſtery of the ſeas. The victory of* Cæcilius *the* Roman *conſul at* Panormus. *The ſiege of* Lilybæum. *How a* Rhodian *gally entred* Lilybæum *at pleaſure, in deſpight of the* Roman *fleet. That it is a matter of great difficulty to ſtop the paſſage of good ſhips. The* Romans, *by reaſon of grievous loſſes received under* Claudius *and* Junius *their conſuls, abandon the ſeas again.*

WHEN, without a ſtrong navy, the *Romans* found it altogether impoſſible, either to keep what they had already gotten in *Sicily*, or to enlarge their dominions in *Africa*, or elſewhere: they reſolved once again, notwithſtanding their late miſadventures, to ſtrengthen their fleet and ſhips of war. So cauſing fifty new gallies to be built, and the old to be repaired, they gave them in charge (together with certain legions of ſoldiers) to the new conſuls, *C. Atilius*, and *L. Manlius*. On the other ſide, *Aſdrubal* perceiving that the *Romans*, partly by reaſon of the ſhipwrack which they had lately ſuffered, partly by reaſon of the overthrow which they received by *Xantippus* in *Africa*, were leſs daring than they had been in the beginning of the war; and withal, that one of the conſuls was returned into *Italy*, with the one half of the army; and that *Cæcilius*, with only the other half, remained at *Panormus*: he removed with the *Carthaginian* forces from *Lilybæum* towards it, hoping to provoke *Cæcilius* to fight: but the conſul was better adviſed. For when *Aſdrubal* had made his approaches ſomewhat near the Town, *Cæcilius* cauſed a deep trench to be cut a good diſtance without the ditch of the city: between which and his trench he left ground ſufficient to embattle a legion of his ſoldiers. To theſe he gave order, that they ſhould advance themſelves, and paſs over the new trench, till ſuch time as the *African* elephants were thruſt upon them. From thoſe beaſts he commanded them to retire, by ſlow degrees, till they had drawn on the elephants to the brink of the new trench, which they could by no means paſs. This they performed accordingly; for when the elephants were at a ſtand, they were ſo gauled and beaten, both by thoſe ſoldiers that were on the inſide of the trench, and by thoſe that lay in the trench it ſelf, that being enraged by their many wounds, they brake back furiouſly upon their own footmen, and utterly diſordered them. *Cæcilius* eſpying this advantage, ſallied with all the force he had, and charging the other troops, that ſtood embattled, he utterly brake them, and put them to their heels, making a great ſlaughter of them, and taking all their elephants.

The report of this victory being brought to *Rome*, the whole ſtate, filled with courage, prepared a new fleet of two hundred ſail, which they ſent into *Sicily*, to give end to that war, that had now laſted fourteen years. With this fleet and army the *Romans* reſolve to attempt *Lilybæum*, the only place of importance which the *Carthaginians* held in *Sicily*, and all (indeed) ſave *Drepanum*, that was near adjoyning. They ſit down before it, and poſſeſs themſelves of all the places of advantage near unto it, eſpecially of ſuch as command the haven, which had a very difficult entrance. They alſo beat to the ground ſix towers of defence, and by forcible engines weaken ſo many other parts of the city, as the defendants begin to deſpair: yet *Himilco*, commander of the place, faileth not in all that belongs to a man of war: all that is broken, he repaireth with admirable diligence; he maketh many furious ſallies, and giveth to the *Romans* all the affronts that poſſibly could be made: he hath in garriſon (beſides the citizens) ten thouſand ſoldiers, among which there are certain lieutenants, and other petty officers, that conſpire to render and betray the town. But the matter is revealed by an *Achean*, called *Alexon*, who had formerly, in danger of the like treaſon, ſaved *Agrigentum*. *Himilco* uſeth the help of *Alexon* to aſſure the hired ſoldiers, and employeth *Hannibal* to appeaſe the troops of the *Gauls*, which did waver, and had ſent their agents to the enemy. All promiſe conſtancy and truth; ſo that the traitors, being unable to perform what they had undertaken, are fain to live in the *Roman* camp as fugitives, that had wrought no good whereby to deſerve their bread. In the mean while, a ſupply of ten thouſand ſoldiers is ſent from *Carthage* to their relief, having *Hannibal*, the ſon of *Amilcar*, for their conductor; who, in deſpight of all reſiſtance, enter'd the port and city, to the incredible joy of the beſieged. The old ſoldiers, together with the new companies (thereto perſwaded by *Himilco* with hope of great reward) reſolve to ſet upon the *Romans* in their trenches, and either force them to abandon the ſiege, or (at leaſt) to take from them, or ſet on fire, their engines of battery. The attempt is preſently made, and purſued to the uttermoſt, with great ſlaughter on both ſides. But the *Romans* being more in number, and having the advantage of the ground, hold ſtill their places, and with extream difficulty defend their engines.

They of *Carthage* deſire greatly to underſtand the ſtate of things at *Lilybæum*, but know not how to ſend into the town. A certain *Rhodian* undertakes the ſervice, and having received his diſpatch, ſails with one gally to *Æguſa*, a little iſland near *Lilybæum*. Thence, taking his time, he ſteered directly with the port; and having a paſſing ſwift gally, he paſs'd through the beſt of the channel, and recovered the water-gate, ere any of thoſe, which the *Romans* had to guard the port, could thruſt from the ſhores on either ſide.

The next day, neither attending the covert of the dark night, nor dreading to be boarded by the *Roman* gallies, who waited his return, he ſet ſail, and ſhipping his oars (his gally being exceeding quick of ſteerage, and himſelf expert in all parts of the channel) recovered the haven's mouth, and the ſea, in deſpight of all the purſuit made after him. Then finding himſelf out of danger of being incompaſſed by many, he turned again towards the mouth of the haven, challenging any one, if any one durſt come forth, to undertake him. This enterpriſe, and the well performing of it, was very remarkable, and much wonder'd at in thoſe days: and yet, where there was no great artillery, nor any other weapons of fire to kill afar off, the adventure which this *Rhodian* made, was not greatly hazardous: for in this age, a valiant and judicious man of war will not fear to paſs by the beſt appointed fort of *Europe*, with the help of a good tide, and a leading gale of wind, no, though forty pieces

of great artillery open their mouths againſt him, and threaten to tear him in pieces.

In the beginning of our late queen's time, when *Denmark* and *Sweden* were at war, our *Eaſt-land* fleet, bound for *Leif-land*, was forbidden by the king of *Denmark* to trade with the ſubjects of his enemies, and he threatened to ſink their ſhips if they came through the ſtreights of *Elſenour*. Notwithſtanding this, our merchants (having a ſhip of her majeſty's, called the *Minion*, to defend them) made the adventure; and ſuſtaining ſome vollies of ſhot, kept on their courſe. The king made all the proviſion he could to ſtop them or ſink them at their return. But the *Minion*, commanded (as I take it) by *William Burrough*, leading the way, did not only paſs out with little loſs, but did beat down with artillery, a great part of the fort of *Elſenour*, which at that time was not ſo well rampard, as now perhaps it is: and the fleet of merchants that followed him, went through without any wound received. Neither was it long ſince, that the duke of *Parma*, beſieging *Antwerp*, and finding no poſſibility to maſter it, otherwiſe than by famine, laid his cannon on the bank of the river, ſo well to purpoſe, and ſo even with the face of the water, that he thought it impoſſible for the leaſt boat to paſs by. Yet the *Hollanders* and *Zelanders*, not blown up by any wind of glory, but coming to find a good market for their butter and cheeſe, even the poor men, attending their profit when all things were extream dear in *Antwerp*, paſſed in boats of ten or twelve tun, by the mouth of the duke's cannon, in deſpight of it, when a ſtrong weſterly wind, and a tide of flood favoured them; as alſo with a contrary wind, and an ebbing water, they turned back again: ſo as he was forced, in the end, to build his *Stockado* overthwart the river, to his marvellous trouble and charge.

The fort *St. Philip* terrified not us in the year 1596, when we enter'd the port of *Calais*; neither did the fort at *Puntal*, when we were enter'd, beat us from our anchoring by it, though it play'd upon us with four demi-cannons within point-blank, from ſix in the morning till twelve at noon. The ſiege of *Oſtend*, and of many other places, may be given for proof, how hard a matter it is to ſtop the paſſage of a good ſhip, without another as good to encounter it. Yet this is true, that where a fort is ſo ſet, as that of *Angra* in *Tercera*, that there is no paſſage along beſide it, or that the ſhips are driven to turn upon a bow line towards it, wanting all help of wind and tide; there, and in ſuch places, is it of great uſe, and fearful; otherwiſe not.

But to return to our adventurous *Rhodian:* He arrives in ſafety at *Carthage*, and makes them know the eſtate of *Lilybæum*. Others alſo, after this, take upon them to do the like, and perform it with the ſame ſucceſs. The *Romans* therefore labour to choak the channel, and, for that purpoſe, fill many merchant ſhips with great ſtones, and ſink them therein. The force of the tides clears it again in part: but they grounded ſo many of thoſe great-bellied boats in the beſt of the entrance, as at laſt it made a manifeſt riſing and heap, like a ragged iſland, in the paſſage. Hereby it came to paſs, that a *Carthaginian* gally taking her courſe by night, and not ſuſpecting any ſuch impediment, ran her ſelf aground thereon, and was taken. Now comes the brave *Rhodian*, thinking to enter as he had done before: but this *Carthaginian* gally, a little before taken, gave him chaſe, and gathered upon him; he finds what ſhe is, both by her form, and by her ſwiftneſs: and being not able to run from her, reſolved to fight with her: but ſhe is too well manned for him, ſo that he is beaten and taken.

Lilybæum, after this, is greatly diſtreſſed; the ſoldiers being worn with labour and watching. But in this deſpair there roſe ſo violent a tempeſt, as ſome of the *Romans* wooden towers, by which they overtopt the walls of *Lilybæum*, were over-turned. A *Greek* ſoldier undertakes to fire thoſe that were fallen, and performs it: for the fire was no ſooner kindled, but being blown unto by the bellows of a tempeſt, it increaſed ſo faſt, as it became reſiſtleſs, and in the end burned all to aſhes, and melted the brazen heads of the battering Rams. Hereupon, deſpair and wearineſs hinder the *Romans* from repairing their engines; ſo that they reſolve, by a long ſiege, to ſtarve the defendants.

Upon relation of what had paſs'd, a ſupply of ten thouſand ſoldiers is ſent from *Rome*, under *M. Claudius*, the conſul. He arrives at *Meſſina*, and marcheth over land to *Lilybæum*; where having reinforced the army, and ſupplied the gallies with new rowers, he propounds the ſurpriſe of *Drepanum*, a city on the other ſide of the bay of *Lilybæum*. This ſervice the captains and ſoldiers willingly embrace. So the conſul imbarks his troops, and arrives on the ſudden in the mouth of the port. *Adherbal* is governor of the town, a valiant and prudent man of war, who being ignorant of the new ſupply arrived at *Lilybæum*, was at firſt amazed at their ſudden approach; but having recovered his ſpirits, he perſwades the ſoldiers, rather to fight abroad than to be incloſed. Herewithal he promiſeth great rewards to ſuch, as by their valour ſhall deſerve them; offering to lead them himſelf, and to fight in the head of his fleet. Having ſufficiently encouraged his men, he thruſts into the ſea towards the *Romans*. The conſul, deceived of his expectation, calls back the foremoſt gallies, that he might now marſhal them for defence. Hereupon ſome row backward, ſome forward, in great confuſion. *Adherbal* finds and follows his advantage, and forceth the conſul into a bay at hand, wherein he rangeth himſelf, having the land on his back, hoping thereby to keep himſelf from being incompaſſed. But he was thereby, and for want of ſea-room, ſo ſtreightned, as he could not turn himſelf any way from his enemies, nor range himſelf in any order. Therefore, when he found no hope of reſiſtance, keeping the ſhore on his left hand, he thruſt out of the bay with thirty gallies beſides his own, and ſo fled away: all the reſt of his fleet, to the number of ninety and four ſhips, were taken or ſunk by the *Carthaginians*. *Adherbal* for this ſervice is greatly honoured at *Carthage*; and *Claudius*, for his indiſcretion and flight, as much diſgraced at *Rome*.

The *Romans*, notwithſtanding this great loſs, armed threeſcore gallies, with which they ſend away *L. Junius*, their conſul, to take charge of their buſineſs in *Sicily*. *Junius* arrives at *Meſſina*, where he meets with the whole remainder of the *Roman* fleet, thoſe excepted which rode in the port of *Lilybæum*. One hundred and twenty gallies he had; and, beſides theſe, he had gotten together almoſt eight hundred ſhips of burthen, which were laden with all neceſſary proviſions for the army. With this great fleet he arrives at *Syracuſe*, where he ſtays a while, partly to take in corn, partly to wait for ſome that were too ſlow of ſail, to keep company with him along from *Meſſina*. In the mean time, he diſpatcheth away towards *Lilybæum*, his *Queſtors* or treaſurers; to whom he commits the one half of his victuallers, with ſome gallies for their convoy.

Adherbal was not careleſs, after his late victory, but ſtudied how to uſe it to the beſt advantage.

The

The ſhips and priſoners that he had taken, he ſent to *Carthage*. Of his own gallies he delivered thirty to *Carthalo*, who had threeſcore and ten more under his own charge, and ſent him to try what good might be done againſt the *Roman* fleet, in the haven of *Lilybæum*. According to this direction, *Carthalo* ſuddenly enters the mouth of that haven, where he finds the *Romans* more attentive to the keeping in the beſieged *Carthaginians*, than to the defence of their own againſt another fleet. So he chargeth them, boards and takes ſome, and fires the reſt. The *Roman* camp takes alarm, and haſtens to the reſcue. But *Himilco*, governor of the town, is not behind-hand, who ſallies out at the ſame time, and putting the *Romans* to great diſtreſs, gives *Carthalo* good leiſure to go through with his enterpriſe.

After this exploit, *Carthalo* ran all along the ſouth coaſt of *Sicily*, deviſing how to work miſchief to the enemy, wherein fortune preſented him with a fair occaſion, which he wiſely managed. He was advertiſed by his ſcouts, that they had deſcried near at hand, a great fleet, conſiſting of all manner of veſſels. Theſe were the victuallers, which the conſul *Junius*, more haſtily than providentially, had ſent before him towards *Lilybæum*. *Carthalo* was glad to hear of their coming, for he and his men were full of courage, by reaſon of their late victories. Accounting therefore the great multitude of *Roman* hulks approaching, to be rather a prey, than a fleet likely to make a ſtrong oppoſition, he haſtens to encounter them. It fell out according to his expectation. The *Romans* had no mind to fight but were glad to ſeek ſhelter in an open road, full of rocks, under covert of a poor town, belonging to their party; that could help to ſave them only from the preſent danger, by lending them engines and other aid wherewith to beat off the *Carthaginians* that aſſailed them. *Carthalo* therefore having taken a few of them, lay waiting for the reſt, that could not long ride under thoſe rocks, but would be forced, by any great change of wind, either to put out into the deep, or to ſave their men how they could, by taking land, with the loſs of all their ſhipping. Whilſt he was buſied in this care, the conſul *Junius* drew near, and was diſcovered. Againſt him *Carthalo* makes out, and finds him altogether prepared to fight, as being wholly ignorant of that which had happened. The conſul had neither means to fly, nor ability to fight: therefore he likewiſe ran into a very dangerous creek, thinking no danger ſo great as that of the enemy. The *Carthaginian* ſeeing this, betakes himſelf to a ſtation between the two *Roman* fleets, where he watcheth to ſee which of them would ſtir firſt, with a reſolution to aſſault that which ſhould firſt dare to put it ſelf into the ſea. So as now all the three fleets were on the ſouth coaſt of *Sicily*, between the promontory of *Pachinus* and *Lilybæum*; a tract exceeding dangerous, when the wind ſtormed at ſouth. The *Carthaginians*, who knew the times of tempeſt, and their ſigns, finding belike ſome ſwelling billow (for ſo we do in the weſt of *England*, before a ſoutherly ſtorm) haſted to double the cape of *Pachinus*, thereby to cover themſelves from the rage at hand. But the *Romans*, who knew better how to fight than how to navigate, and never found any foul weather in the entrails of their beaſts, their ſooth-ſayers being all land-prophets, were ſuddenly overtaken with a boiſterous ſouth wind, and all their gallies forced againſt the rocks, and utterly wracked.

This Calamity ſo diſcouraged the *Romans*, that they reſolved again to forſake the ſeas, and truſt only to the ſervice of their legions upon firm ground. But ſuch a reſolution cannot long hold. Either they muſt be ſtrong at ſea, or elſe they muſt not make war in an iſland, againſt thoſe that have a mightier fleet. Yet are they to be excuſed, in regard of the many great calamities which they had ſuffered through their want of ſkill. Here I cannot forbear to commend the patient virtue of the *Spaniards*. We ſeldom or never find that any nation hath endured ſo many miſadventures and miſeries as the *Spaniards* have done in their *Indian diſcoveries*. Yet perſiſting in their enterpriſes, with an invincible conſtancy, they have annexed to their kingdom ſo many goodly provinces, as bury the remembrance of all dangers paſt. Tempeſts and ſhipwracks, famine, overthrows, mutinies, heat and cold, peſtilence, and all manner of diſeaſes, both old and new, together with extream poverty, and want of all things needful, have been the enemies, wherewith every one of their moſt noble diſcoverers, at one time or other, hath encountered. Many years have paſſed over ſome of their heads, in the ſearch of not ſo many leagues: yea, more than one or two, have ſpent their labour, their wealth, and their lives, in ſearch of a golden kingdom, without getting further notice of it, than what they had at their firſt ſetting forth. All which notwithſtanding, the third, fourth, and fifth undertakers have not been diſheartned. Surely, they are worthily rewarded with thoſe treaſuries, and paradiſes, which they enjoy; and well they deſerve to hold them quietly, if they hinder not the like virtue in others, which (perhaps) will not be found.

SECT. XI.

The city of Eryx *is ſurprized by the* Romans, *and recovered by* Amilcar; *who ſtoutly holds war with them five years. The* Romans *having emptied their common treaſury, build a new fleet, at the charges of private men. The great victory at ſea of* Luctatius *the conſul; whereby the* Carthaginians *are forced to crave peace. The conditions of the peace between* Rome *and* Carthage.

THE *Romans* were careful, to ſupply with all induſtry, by land, the want of ſtrength at ſea. Therefore they continue the ſiege of *Lilybæum*, and ſeek to make ſure to themſelves all places, whither the enemies ſhips could not bring relief. The conſul *Junius*, to cure the wound of diſhonour. which he had received, bethought him what enterprizes to undertake. In the end he reſolved to attempt the mountain and city of *Eryx*, with the temple of *Venus Erycina*, which was the faireſt and richeſt of all the iſland; and of theſe, by cunning or treaſon, he got poſſeſſion. *Eryx* was commodiouſly ſeated between *Drepanum* and *Panormus*; ſo that it ſeemed a fit place for a garriſon, that ſhould reſtrain the *Carthaginians* from making roads into the country. Wherefore *Junius* fortified both the top of the mountain, and the firſt entrance of the paſſage from the bottom (both which places were very defenſible) with a good ſtrength of men. But ſhortly after, in the 18th year of this war, the *Carthaginians* ſent forth *Amilcar*, ſirnamed *Barcas*, father of the great *Hannibal*, with a fleet and army, who ſailing to the coaſts of *Italy*, did throughly repay the ſpoils which the *Romans* made in *Africa*. For he firſt of all waſted and deſtroyed the territories of the *Locrines*, and of the *Brutians*, that were dependants of *Rome*. Then entered he into *Sicily*, and finding there no walled

walled city in the *Carthaginians* power, that ſerved fitly to infeſt the *Romans*, he occupied a piece of ground of great advantage, and lodged his army thereon; to confront as well the *Romans*, that were in *Panormus*, as thoſe that kept about *Eryx*, putting himſelf between both armies with admirable reſolution.

The place that *Amilcar* had ſeized upon, was not only very ſtrong by ſituation, but had the command of a port; whereby it gave him opportunity, to ſcour all the coaſt of *Italy* with his fleet, waſting all along as far as to *Cuma*. In the iſle of *Sicily* he held the *Romans* to hard work, lying near unto *Panormus*, where, in three years abode, he did many notable acts, though not of much conſequence, for that the enemy could never be drawn to hazard the main chance. Having wearied himſelf and the *Romans* long enough about *Panormus*, he undertook a ſtrange piece of work at *Eryx*. The *Roman* garriſons, placed there by *Junius*, on the top and at the bottom of the mountain, were very ſtrongly lodged. Nevertheleſs, *Amilcar* found a way, lying towards the ſea-ſide, by which he conveyed his men into the city of *Eryx*, that was about the midſt of the aſcent, ere the enemy knew of it. By this it came to paſs, that the *Romans*, which kept the top of the mountain, were ſtraightly held (as it were) beſieged. And no leſs was *Amilcar* himſelf reſtrained, by both of theſe garriſons, and ſuch as came to relieve them. There he found them paſtime about two years more; hoping ſtill to weary out thoſe that lay over his head, as they on the contrary did their beſt to thruſt him out of thoſe quarters.

At this time, all the care, both of the *Romans* and of the *Carthaginians*, was bent unto the proſecuting of this buſineſs at *Eryx*. Wherein it ſeems true (as *Hannibal*, [a] in *Livy*, ſpake unto *Scipio*) that the affairs of *Carthage* never ſtood in better terms, ſince the beginning of the war, than now they did. For whereas the *Romans* had utterly forſaken the ſeas, partly by reaſon of their great loſſes, partly upon confidence of their land-forces, which they held reſiſtleſs; *Amilcar*, with a ſmall army, had ſo well acquitted himſelf, to the honour of his country, that by the trial of five years war, the *Carthaginian* ſoldier was judged equal, if not ſuperior, to the *Roman*. Finally, when all, that might be, had been deviſed and done, for the diſlodging of this obſtinate warrior, no way ſeemed better to the ſenate of *Rome*, than once again to build a fleet; whereby, if the maſtery of the ſea could once be gotten, it was likely that *Amilcar*, for lack of ſupply, ſhould not long be able to hold out. But in performing this, extream difficulty was found. The common treaſury was exhauſted, and the coſt was not little, that was requiſite unto ſuch an enterprize. Wherefore there was no other way left, than to lay the burden upon private purſes. Divers of the principal citizens undertook to build (each at his own charges) one *Quinquereme*; which example wrought ſo well, that they, whoſe ability would not ſerve to do the like, joined with ſome others, and laying their money together, concurred two or three of them, in building of another, with condition to be repaid, when the war was finiſhed. By this voluntary contribution, they made and furniſhed 200 new *Quinqueremes*, taking for their pattern, that excellent ſwift-rowing galley which they had gotten from the *Rhodian*, in the port of *Lilybæum*, as was ſhewed before. The charge of this fleet was committed to *C. Luctatius Catulus*, who paſſed with the ſame into *Sicily* the ſpring following, and entered the port of *Drepanum*, endeavouring by all means to have forced the city. But being advertiſed that the *Carthaginian* fleet was at hand, and being mindful of the late loſſes which his predeceſſors had received, he was careful to put himſelf in order, againſt their arrival.

Hanno was admiral of the *Carthaginian* fleet; a man (as his actions declare him) wiſe in picture, exceedingly formal, and ſkilful in the art of ſeeming reverend. How his reputation was firſt bred, I do not find, but it was upheld by a factious contradiction; of things undertaken by men more worthy than himſelf. This quality procured unto him (as it hath done to many others) both good-liking among the ancient ſort, whoſe cold temper is averſe from new enterprizes, and therewithal an opinion of great foreſight, confirmed by every loſs received. More particularly, he was gracious among the people, for that he was one of the moſt grievous oppreſſors of their ſubject provinces; whereby he procured unto the *Carthaginians* much wealth, but therewithal ſuch hatred, as turned it all to their great loſs. He had ere this been employed againſt the *Numidians*, and wild *Africans*, that were more like to rovers, than to ſoldiers, in making war. Of thoſe fugitive Nations, he learned to neglect more manly enemies, to his own great diſhonour, and to the great hurt of *Carthage*; which loſt not more by his bad conduct, than by his malicious counſel, when, having ſhewed himſelf an unworthy captain, he betook himſelf to the long robe. Yet is he much commended in *Roman* hiſtories, as a temperate man, and one that ſtudied how to preſerve the league between *Carthage* and *Rome*. In which regard, how well he deſerved of his own country, it will appear hereafter: how beneficial he was to the *Romans*, it will appear, both hereafter, and in his preſent voyage; wherein he reduced the *Carthaginians* to a miſerable neceſſity of accepting, upon hard conditions, that peace which he thenceforth commended.

Hanno had very well furniſhed his navy, with all needful proviſions for the ſoldiers at *Eryx* (for dexterity in making preparation was the beſt of his qualities;) but he had neither been careful in training his mariners, to the practice of ſea-fight, nor in manning his galleys with ſtout fellows. He thought, that the fame of a *Carthaginian* fleet was enough to make the unexpert *Romans* give way: forgetting, that rather the reſiſtleſs force of tempeſts, than any other ſtrength of oppoſition, had made them to forſake the ſeas. Yet in one thing he had either conceived aright, or elſe was ſent forth well inſtructed. It was his purpoſe, firſt of all, to ſail to *Eryx*, and there to diſcharge his ſhips of their lading: and having thus lightened himſelf, he meant to take aboard ſome part of the land-army, together with *Amilcar* himſelf, by whoſe help he doubted not, but that he ſhould be able to make his enemy repent of his new adventure to ſea. This was a good courſe if it could have been performed. But *Catulus* uſed all poſſible diligence, to prevent the execution of this deſign: not becauſe he was informed of the enemy's purpoſe, but for that he knew it to be the beſt for them, and for that he feared no danger ſo greatly, as to encounter with *Amilcar*. Wherefore, although the weather was very rough, and the ſeas went high, when the *Carthaginian* fleet was deſcried; yet he rather choſe to fight with the enemy, that had the wind

[a] Liv. Dec. 3. l. 10.

of

of him, than to ſuffer this convoy to paſs along to *Eryx*, upon unlikely hope of better opportunity in the future. All that *Hanno* ſhould have done, *Catulus* had performed. He had carefully exerciſed his men in rowing; he had lightened his gallies of all unneceſſary burthens; and he had taken aboard the choice men of the *Roman* land-ſoldiers. The *Carthaginians* therefore, at the firſt encounter, were utterly broken and defeated, having 50 of their gallies ſtemmed and ſunk, and 70 taken, wherein were few leſs than 10000 men, that were all made priſoners: the reſt, by a ſudden change of wind, eſcaping to the iſle of *Hieroneſus*.

The ſtate of *Carthage*, utterly diſcouraged by this change of fortune, knew not whereon to reſolve. Means to repair their fleet in any time there were none left; their beſt men of war by ſea were conſumed; and *Amilcar*, upon whoſe valour and judgment the honour and ſafety of the commonwealth reſted, was now ſurrounded by his enemies in *Sicily*, where he could not be relieved. In this extremity, they make diſpatch unto *Amilcar* himſelf, and authorize him to take what courſe ſhould ſeem beſt unto his excellent wiſdom; leaving all concluſions to his election and ſole counſel.

Amilcar, whom no adverſity, accompanied with the leaſt hope or poſſibility of recovery, had ever vanquiſhed, looking over every promiſe, true or falſe, that the preſent time could make him (for to attend any thing from the future he was not able) reſolved to make tryal, whether his neceſſity might be compounded upon any reaſonable terms. He therefore ſent to *Lutatius* the conſul an overture of peace: who conſidering it well, gathered ſo many arguments from the preſent poverty of the *Roman* ſtate, waſted beyond expectation in the former war, that he willingly hearkened unto it. So, in concluſion, an accord was made, but with proviſion, that it ſhould hold none otherwiſe, than if the ſenate and people of *Rome* would ratify it with their allowance.

The conditions were: firſt, that the *Carthaginians* ſhould clearly abandon the iſle of *Sicily*. Secondly, that they ſhould never undertake upon *Hieron* king of *Syracuſe*, nor invade any part of his territories, nor the territories of any of his friends and allies. Thirdly, that they ſhould ſet at liberty, and ſend back into *Italy*, all the *Romans*, whom they held priſoners, without ranſom. Laſtly, that they ſhould pay unto the *Romans* two thouſand and two hundred talents; which make, after 600 *French* Crowns to the talent, thirteen hundred and twenty thouſand crowns: the ſame to be delivered within 20 years next following.

Theſe articles were ſent to *Rome*, where they were not thoroughly approved: but ten commiſſioners were ſent into *Sicily*, to make perfect the agreement. Theſe commiſſioners added a thouſand talents to the former ſum; and required a ſhorter time of payment. Further alſo, they took order, that the *Carthaginians* ſhould not only depart out of *Sicily* it ſelf, but ſhould alſo withdraw their companies out of all the other iſlands between it and *Italy*, renouncing their whole intereſt therein.

Such was the end of the firſt *Punic war*, that had laſted about twenty-four years without intermiſſion; in which time the *Romans* had loſt, by fight or ſhipwreck, about ſeven hundred *Quinqueremes*, and the *Carthaginians*, about five hundred: the greatneſs of which loſſes, doth ſerve to prove the greatneſs both of theſe two cities, and of the war it ſelf; wherein I hold good the judgment of *Polybius*, that the *Romans*, in general, did ſhew themſelves the braver Nation; and *Amilcar*, the moſt worthy captain.

CHAP. II.

Of divers actions paſſing between the firſt and ſecond Punic *wars.*

SECT. I.

Of the cruel war begun between the Carthaginians *and their own mercenaries.*

THE *Romans*, having partly by force, and partly by compoſition, thruſt the *Carthaginians* out of *Sicily*, and all the little iſlands thereunto adjacent, gave them rather means and leiſure to help themſelves in a following war, than cauſe to hold themſelves contented with the preſent peace. It is an ancient and true rule, [a] *Quòd leges à victoribus dicuntur, accipiuntur à victis*; *that laws are given by the conquerors, and received of the conquered.* But the *Romans* had either forgotten the anſwer that was made unto them, by one of the *Privernates*; or elſe had forgotten to follow it, in this weighty buſineſs. For one of *Privernum*, after a rebellion, defending in the ſenate the cauſe of his city, was demanded by a ſenator, *what peace the* Romans *might hope for, or aſſure themſelves of, if they quitted their preſent advantage over them*; he anſwered in theſe words, *ſi bonam dederitis, & fidam & perpetuam*; *ſi malam, haud diuturnam*; *if the peace be good and faithful that you give us, it will be perpetual*; *if it be ill, then of little continuance.* To this anſwer, the ſenate, at that time, gave ſuch approbation, that it was ſaid, *viri & liberi vocem auditam*; *an credi poſſet, ullum populum, aut hominem denique in ea conditione, cujus eum pœniteat, diutius quàm neceſſe ſit manſurum? that it was the ſpeech of a manly, and a free man*; *for who could believe, that any people, or indeed any one man, would continue longer in an over-burdened eſtate, than mere neceſſity did enforce?* Now, if the *Romans* themſelves could make this judgment of thoſe nations, who had little elſe, beſides their manly reſolution, to defend their liberty; ſurely, they groſsly flattered themſelves, in preſuming, that the *Carthaginians*, who neither in power nor in pride, were any way inferior unto themſelves, would ſit down any longer by the loſs and diſhonour received, than until they could recover their legs, and the ſtrength, which had a while failed them, to take revenge. But occaſion, by whom (while well entertained) not only private men, but kings and publick ſtates, have more prevailed, than by any proper proweſs or virtue, with-held the tem-

[a] Q. Curt. l. 4.

peſt from the *Romans* for a time, and turned it moſt fearfully upon *Africa*, and the *Carthaginians* themſelves.

For after that the firſt *Punic* war was ended, *Amilcar*, leaving *Eryx*, went to *Lilybæum*, from whence moſt conveniently the army might be tranſported into *Afric*: the care of which buſineſs he committed unto *Geſco*, to whom, as to a man of approved ſufficiency, he delivered over his charge. *Geſco* had an eſpecial conſideration of the great ſums wherein *Carthage* was indebted unto theſe mercenaries; and, withal, of the great diſability to make payment. Therefore he thought it the wiſeſt way to ſend them over (as it were) by handfuls, a few at a time; that ſo the firſt might have their diſpatch, and be gone ere the ſecond or third companies arrived. Herein he dealt providently; for it had not been hard to perſwade any ſmall number, lodged within ſo great a city as *Carthage*, unto ſome ſuch reaſonable compoſition as the preſent emptineſs of the common treaſury did require: ſo that the firſt might have been friendly diſcharged, and a good precedent left unto the ſecond and third, whilſt their disjunction had made them unable to recover their whole due by force. But the *Carthaginians* were of a contrary opinion. They thought to find, in the whole army, ſome that would be contented to gratify the publick ſtate, by remitting a great part of their own due; and hoped, by ſuch an example, to draw all the multitude to the like agreement and capitulation. So they detained the firſt and ſecond comers, telling them, that they would make an even reckoning with all together. Thus every day the number increaſed, and many diſorders (a thing incident among ſoldiers) were committed; which much diſquieted the city, not accuſtomed unto the like. In this regard, it was thought fit to remove them all to ſome other place, where they might be leſs troubleſome. This muſt be done by ſome colourable words of perſwaſion; for their number was already ſo great, that it was not ſafe to offend them too far. Wherefore it is deviſed, that they ſhould all attend to the coming of their fellows at *Sicca*, receiving every one a piece of gold to bear his charges in the mean while. This motion is accepted, and the ſoldiers began to diſlodge, leaving behind them their wives, their children, and all their baggage, as meaning ſhortly to fetch away all, when they came back for their pay. But the *Carthaginians* have no fancy to their returning into the town, and therefore compel them to truſs up their fardels, that they might have no occaſion left to make any errands thither. So to *Sicca* they removed, with all their goods, and there lay waiting for news of their fellows arrival, and their own pay. Buſineſs they had none to do, and therefore might eaſily be drawn to mutiny; the whole argument of their diſcourſe inclining them to nothing elſe. Their daily talk was, how rich they ſhould be when all their money came in; how much would fall to every ſingle ſhare, and for how long time the city was behind-hand with them in reckoning. They were all grown arithmeticians; and he was thought a man of worth, that could find moſt reaſon to increaſe their demands to the very higheſt, even beyond their due. No part of their long ſervice was forgotten, but the comfortable words and promiſes of their captains, leading them forth to any dangerous fight, were called to mind, as ſo many obligations not to be cancelled, without ſatisfying their expectation by ſome unordinary largeſs.

Thus the time paſſeth away, until, the whole army being arrived and lodged in *Sicca*, *Hanno* comes thither to clear the accompt. Now is the day come, wherein they ſhall all be made rich, eſpecially if they can hold together in maintaining ſtoutly the common cauſe. So think they all, and aſſemble themſelves to hear what good news this meſſenger had brought; with a full reſolution to help his memory, in caſe he ſhould happen to forget any part of the many promiſes made unto them; all which were to be conſidered in their donative. *Hanno* begins a very formal oration; wherein he bewails the poverty of *Carthage*; tells them how great a ſum of money is to be paid unto the *Romans*; reckons up the exceſſive charges whereat the commonwealth had been in the late war; and finally, deſires them to hold themſelves contented with part of their pay, and out of the love which they bare unto the city, to remit the reſt. Few of them underſtood his diſcourſe, for the *Carthaginian* army was compoſed of ſundry nations; as *Greeks*, *Africans*, *Gauls*, *Ligurians*, *Spaniards*, and others, all of different languages. Yet they ſtared upon him, and were (as I think) little pleaſed with his very geſture. But when ſuch as conceived the whole tenor of his ſpeech, had informed the reſt what cold comfort he brought, they were all enraged, and fared like mad-men; ſo that nothing would ſerve to appeaſe them. *Hanno* would fain have aſſwaged their fury, but he knew not how; for he leſs underſtood their diſſonant loud noiſes, than they did his oration. An army collected out of ſo many countries, that have no one language common to all, or to the greater part of them, is neither eaſily ſtirred up to mutiny, nor eaſily pacified, when once it is broken into outrage. The beſt that *Hanno* can do, is to uſe the help of interpreters and meſſengers. But theſe interpreters miſtake his meaning, ſome for want of ſkill, others of ſet purpoſe, and ſuch as deliver his errands in the worſe ſenſe, are beſt believed. Finally, they think themſelves much abuſed by the *Carthaginians*, and reſolve to demand their own in peremptory terms at a nearer diſtance. In this mood they leave *Sicca*, and march as far as *Tunis*, that is within a very little of *Carthage*, and there they encamp.

Now begin the *Carthaginians* to find their own error. It is a good rule:

> *Curandum inprimis, ne magna injuria fiat*
> *Fortibus & miſeris:*
>
> Have ſpecial care, that valiant poverty
> Be not oppreſs'd with too great injury.

But this proud city having neglected the rule, hath alſo been careleſs in providing to ſecure her ſelf againſt the inconvenience that might follow. She had ſuffered the whole multitude, whereunto ſhe was like to give cauſe of diſcontent, to join it ſelf into one body, when the ſeveral troops might eaſily have been diſperſed: ſhe hath turned out of her gates the wives, children, and goods, of theſe poor men, which had ſhe retained in ſhew of kindneſs, ſhe might have uſed them as hoſtages for her own ſafety; and by employing a miſerable penny-father in her negociation with men of war, ſhe hath weakned the reputation of her braveſt captains, that might beſt have ſerved to free her from the threatning no danger. Yet likely it is, that *Amilcar* had deſire to be uſed as an inſtrument in defrauding his own ſoldiers of their wages, eſpecially conſidering that as he beſt could bear witneſs of their merits, ſo was he not ignorant that means to content them were not wanting, if the citizens had been willing thereunto. Hereunto may be added a probable conjecture, that *Hanno*, with his accomplices, who at this very time was a bitter enemy to *Amilcar*,

car, had the boldneſs to impoſe the blame of his own wretched counſel, upon the liberal promiſes made by the captains. *Amilcar* therefore did wiſely in ſuffering thoſe that maligned him to have the managing of their own plot, and to deal the cards which themſelves had ſhuffled. This they continued to do as fooliſhly as they had at firſt begun. They furniſh a market at *Tunis* for the ſoldiers, whom they ſuffered to buy what they liſt, and at what price they liſt. They ſend ever and anon ſome of their ſenators into the camp, who promiſe to ſatisfy all demands, as far forth as it ſhould be poſſible. And thus, by ſhifting from one extreme to another, they make the ſoldiers underſtand into what fear the city was driven; which cannot but add much inſolency to the paſſions already ſtirred up.

This ſudden change of weather, and the true cauſe of it, is quickly found by the army, which thereupon grows wiſe; and finding the ſeaſon fit, labours to make a great harveſt. Money muſt be had, and without any abatement. This is granted. Many have loſt their horſes in the publick ſervice of the ſtate. The ſtate ſhall pay for them. They had lived ſome years, by making hard ſhift, without receiving their allowance of victuals from *Carthage*. If they had lived, they wanted not meat; therefore what was this to the *Carthaginians?* Was it not all one, whether the ſhips did bring in proviſion, or their captain direct them where to fetch it? But this would not ſerve. They ſaid that they had been ſometimes driven to buy, and that (ſince they could not remember how much, or at what rate they bought) they would be paid for their proviſion during the whole time, and according to the deareſt price that wheat had borne whilſt the war laſted. Such are now the demands of theſe mutineers, who might eaſily have been ſatisfied with far leſs charges, and far more honour, by receiving their due at the firſt. But now they make no end of craving: for whilſt the *Carthaginians* were perplexed about this corn-money, the ſoldiers have deviſed many more tricks, whereby to extort a greater ſum of money, without all regard of ſhame. Since therefore no good end could be found of theſe controverſies, which daily did multiply, it was thought convenient that one of the *Carthaginians*, which had commanded in *Sicily*, ſhould be choſen by the ſoldiers, to reconcile all differences. Hereunto the army condeſcended, and made choice of *Geſco*; partly out of good liking to him, who had ſhewed himſelf at all times a friendly man to them, and careful of their good, eſpecially when they were to be tranſported into *Afric*; partly out of a diſlike which they had conceived of *Amilcar*, for that he had not viſited them in all this buſy time. So *Geſco* comes among them, and to pleaſe them the better, comes not without money, which might give better countenance to his proceedings, than barren eloquence had done to the negociation of *Hanno*. He calls unto him firſt of all the captains, and then the ſeveral nations apart; rebuking them gently for that which had paſſed; adviſing them temperately concerning the preſent; and exhorting them to continue their love unto the ſtate, which had long entertained them, and would needs always be mindful of their good ſervices. After this he began to put hand to his purſe, offering to give them their whole pay in hand, and then after to conſider of other reckonings at a more convenient time. This had been well accepted, and might have ſerved to bring all to a quiet paſs, if two ſeditious ring-leaders of the multitude had not ſtood againſt it.

There was in the camp one *Spendius*, a ſturdy fellow, and audacious, but a ſlave; that in the late war had fled from a *Roman*, whom he ſerved, and therefore ſtood in fear, leſt he ſhould be delivered back to his maſter; at whoſe hands he could expect no leſs than to be whipped and crucified. This wretch could find no better way to prolong his own life, than by raiſing ſuch troubles as might ſerve to withdraw men from care of private matters, and make his own reſtitution impoſſible, were his maſter never ſo importunate. With *Spendius* there aſſociated himſelf one *Matho*, an hot headed man, that had been ſo forward in ſtirring up the tumult, as he could not chuſe but fear, leſt his own death ſhould be made an example to deter others from the like ſeditious behaviour. This *Matho* deals with his countrymen the *Africans*, telling them, that they were in far worſe condition than either the *Gauls*, the *Greeks*, the *Spaniards*, or any other foreign mercenaries. For (ſaith he) *Theſe our companions have no more to do than to receive their wages, and ſo get them gone; but we, that are to ſtay behind in* Africa, *ſhall be called to another manner of account when we are left alone; ſo that we ſhall have cauſe to wiſh that we had returned home beggars, rather than loaden with the money, which (little though it be) ſhall break our backs. Ye are not ignorant how tyrannically thoſe our haughty maſters of* Carthage *do reign over us. They think it reaſonable that our lives and goods ſhould be at their diſpoſition, which they have at other times been accuſtomed to take from us, even without apparent cauſe, as it were, to declare their ſoveraignty; what will they now do, ſeeing that we have demeaned our ſelves as free-men, and been bold to ſet a good face on the matter, demanding our own, as others have done? Ye all do know that it were a very ſhame for us, if having been as forward in every danger of war as any other men, we ſhould now ſtand quaking like ſlaves, and not dare to open our mouths, when others take liberty to require their due. This notwithſtanding ye may aſſure your ſelves, that we are like to be taught better manners as ſoon as our fellows are gone; in regard of whom, they are content to ſhadow their indignation with a good, but a forced countenance. Let us therefore be wiſe, and conſider that they hate and fear us. Their hatred will ſhew it ſelf, when their fear is once paſt; unleſs we now take our time, and, whilſt we are the ſtronger, enfeeble them ſo greatly, that their hatred ſhall not be able to do us wrong. All their ſtrength conſiſteth in money, wherewithal they have hired others againſt us, and us againſt others. At the preſent they have neither money nor friends. The beſt army that ever ſerved them, whereof we are no ſmall part, lies at their gates, ready to help us if we be men. A better opportunity cannot be expected, for were our ſwords once drawn, all* Afric *would riſe on our ſide. As for the* Carthaginians, *whither can they ſend for help? The caſe it ſelf is plain, but we muſt quickly reſolve. Either we muſt prevent the diligence of* Geſco, *by incenſing theſe* Gauls *and* Spaniards, *and procuring them to draw blood; or elſe it behoveth us to pleaſe our good maſters, by joining with them againſt our fellows, yea, by offering to forgive unto them all our wages, if ſo (peradventure) they may be won to forgive us, or not over-cruelly to puniſh our faults already committed. He is moſt worthily a wretched ſlave, that neither hath the care to win his maſter's love, nor the courage to attempt his own liberty.*

By ſuch perſwaſions *Matho* wins the *African* ſoldiers to his own purpoſe. They are not now ſo greedy of money, as of quarrel; which he that ſeeks, will not miſs to find. When *Geſco* therefore offered

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to pay them their whole ſtipend preſently, but referred their other demands for horſes and victuals, to ſome other more convenient time, they break into great outrage, and ſay, that they will have all, even all at once, and that out of hand. In this tumult, the whole army flock together about *Matho* and *Spendius*, whoſe diligence is not wanting to add more fuel to the fire already blazing. *Matho* and *Spendius* are the only men to whom the ſoldiers will hearken; if any other ſtand up to make a ſpeech, a ſhower of ſtones flying about his ears, puts him to ſilence, that he ſhall never afterwards ſpeak word more. Neither ſtay they to conſider what it is that any man would ſay; enough hath been ſaid already by thoſe good ſpokeſmen, ſo that no other word (though perhaps to the ſame purpoſe) can be heard, ſave only, *throw, throw.*

Now the rebellion begins to take form. *Matho* and *Spendius* are choſen captains, who, followed by a deſperate crew of ruffians, will ſuffer no man to make his own peace, but purſue their own ends, under fair pretence of the common cauſe. All which notwithſtanding, *Geſco* is not wanting to the good of his country, but adventures himſelf upon their other fury. One while he deals with the captains, and principal men, taking them by the hand, and giving gentle words; another while he works with the ſeveral nations, putting them all in hope of their own hearts deſire, if any reaſon would content them. None of them are ſo ſullen as the *Africans*; indeed, none of them had ſo good cauſe. They require him peremptorily to give them their own, and not to feed them with words. The truth is, that they are not ſo covetous as they ſeem, but will be more glad of an ill anſwer, than of a good payment. This is more than *Geſco* knows; he ſeeth not that *Matho* hath any more than bare words to beſtow upon them: wherefore, as rebuking their inconſiderate heat, he tells them, that they may do well, if they ſtand in want of money, to ſeek it of their captain *Matho.* This is enough. Shall he both defraud them and deride them? They ſtay no longer, but lay violent hands upon the treaſure that he had brought; yea, upon him alſo, and all that are with him, as intending to take this in part of payment, and for the reſt, to take another courſe. *Matho* and *Spendius* are glad of this. It had little pleaſed them to ſee their fellows begin to grow calm by his fair language; wherefore they caſt into bonds both him and all the *Carthaginians* that they can find, that ſo the army may be freed from danger of good admonition, which they call treaſon. After this follows open war. *Matho* ſollicits all *Afric*, and his ambaſſadors are every-where well entertain'd. Neither is it neceſſary to uſe perſwaſion, the very fame of this rebellion ſufficeth to draw the whole country into it. Now muſt the *Carthaginians* be plagued for thoſe oppreſſions with which they have plagued others. It is true, that adverſity hath never been untold of her errors; and as ſhe is ever aſſured to hear her own, ſo commonly with her own ſhe undergoes thoſe of other men. The *Africans*, finding the *Carthaginians* hang under the wheel, tell them boldly, that their impoſitions were mercileſs; that they took from them the one half of their corn, that they doubled their tributes in all things elſe, and that they inflicted upon their vaſſals the greateſt puniſhments for the leaſt offences. Theſe cruelties the *Carthaginians* themſelves have forgotten; but the people, that have ſuffered ſo much, retain all in perfect memory. Wherefore not only ſuch as can bear arms, are ready to do ſervice in this great commotion; but the very women bring forth their jewels and other ornaments, offering all to ſail for the maintenance of ſo juſt a quarrel. By this great forwardneſs, and liberal contribution, *Matho* and *Spendius* are ſupplied with a ſtrong aid of three-ſcore and ten thouſand *Africans*: and are moreover furniſhed with money, not only to ſatisfy the preſent appetite of their men, but ſufficient to continue the war begun, though it ſhould be of long endurance.

SECT. II.

Divers obſervations upon this war with the mercenaries.

†. I.

Of tyranny, and how tyrants are driven to uſe the help of mercenaries.

HERE let us reſt a while, as in a convenient breathing-place; whence we may take a proſpect of the ſubject, over which we travel. Behold a tyrannical city, perſecuted by her own mercenaries with a deadly war. It is a common thing, as being almoſt neceſſary, that a tyranny ſhould be upheld by mercenary forces: it is common that mercenaries ſhould be falſe: and it is common that all war made againſt tyrants ſhould be exceeding full of hate and cruelty. Yet we ſeldom hear that ever the ruin of a tyranny is procured or fought by thoſe that were hired to maintain the power of it: and ſeldom or never do we read of any war that hath been proſecuted with ſuch inexpiable hatred, as this that is now in hand.

That which we properly call tyranny, is *a violent form of government, not reſpecting the good of the ſubject, but only the pleaſure of the commander.* I purpoſely forbear to ſay, that it is the unjuſt rule of one over many: for very truly doth *Cleon* in *Thucydides* tell the *Athenians*, that their dominion over their ſubjects was none other than a mere tyranny; though it were ſo, that they themſelves were a great city, and a popular eſtate. Neither is it peradventure greatly needful, that I ſhould call this form of commanding, *violent*; ſince it may well and eaſily be conceived, that no man willingly performs obedience to one regardleſs of his life and welfare, unleſs himſelf be either a mad-man, or (which is little better) wholly poſſeſſed with ſome extream paſſion of love. The practice of tyranny is not always of a like extremity; for ſome lords are more gentle than others to their very ſlaves; and he that is moſt cruel to ſome, is mild enough towards others, though it be but for his own advantage. Nevertheleſs, in large dominions, wherein the ruler's diſcretion cannot extend it ſelf unto notice of the difference which might be found between the worth of ſeveral men, it is commonly ſeen, that the taſte of ſweetneſs, drawn out of oppreſſion, hath ſo good a reliſh, as continually inflames the tyrant's appetite, and will not ſuffer it to be reſtrained with any limits of reſpect. Why ſhould he ſeek out bounds to preſcribe unto his deſires, who cannot endure the face of one ſo honeſt as may put him in remembrance of any moderation? It is much that he hath gotten, by extorting from ſome few: by ſparing none, he ſhould have riches in goodly abundance. He hath taken a great deal from every one: but every one could have ſpared more. He hath wrung all their purſes, and now he hath enough: but (as covetouſneſs is never ſatisfied) he thinks that all this is too little for a ſtock, though it were indeed a good yearly income. Therefore he deviſeth new tricks of robbery, and is not better pleaſed with the gains, than with the art of getting.

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He is hated for this, and he knows it well: but he thinks by cruelty to change hatred into fear. So he makes it his exerciſe to torment and murther all whom he ſuſpecteth: in which courſe, if he ſuſpect none unjuſtly, he may be ſaid to deal craftily: but if innocency be not ſafe, how can all this make any conſpirator to ſtand in fear, ſince the traitor is no worſe rewarded than the quiet man? Wherefore he can think upon none other ſecurity, than to diſarm all his ſubjects; to fortify himſelf within ſome ſtrong place; and, for defence of his perſon and ſtate, to hire as many luſty ſoldiers as ſhall be thought ſufficient. Theſe muſt not be of his own country: for if not every one, yet ſome one or other might chance to have a feeling of the publick miſery. This conſidered, he allures unto him a deſperate rabble of ſtrangers, the moſt unhoneſt that can be found; ſuch as have neither wealth nor credit at home, and will therefore be careful to ſupport him, by whoſe only favour they are maintained. Now, leſt any of theſe, either by deteſtation of his wickedneſs, or (which in wicked men is moſt likely) by promiſe of greater reward than he doth give, ſhould be drawn to turn his ſword againſt the tyrant himſelf: they ſhall all be permitted to do as he doth; to rob, to raviſh, to murther, and to ſatisfy their own appetites in moſt outragious manner; being thought ſo much the more aſſured to their maſter, by how much the more he ſees them grow hateful to all men elſe. Conſidering in what age, and in what language I write, I muſt be fain to ſay, that theſe are not dreams: tho' ſome *Engliſhmen* perhaps, that were unacquainted with hiſtory, lighting upon this leaf, might ſuppoſe this diſcourſe to be little better. This is to ſhew, both how tyranny grows to ſtand in need of mercenary ſoldiers, and how thoſe mercenaries are, by mutual obligation, firmly aſſured unto the tyrant.

†. II.

That the tyranny of a city over her ſubjects, is worſe than the tyranny of one man: and that a tyrannical city muſt likewiſe uſe mercenary ſoldiers.

NOW concerning the tyranny, wherewith a city or ſtate oppreſſeth her ſubjects; it may appear ſome ways to be more moderate than that of one man: but in many things it is more intolerable. A city is jealous of her dominion, but not (as is one man) fearful of her life: the leſs need hath ſhe therefore to ſecure her ſelf by cruelty. A city is not luxurious in conſuming her treaſures, and therefore needs the leſs to pluck from her ſubjects. If war, or any other great occaſion, drive her to neceſſity of taking from her ſubjects more than ordinary ſums of money, the ſame neceſſity makes either the contribution eaſy, or the taking, excuſable. Indeed no wrongs are ſo grievous and hateful, as thoſe that are inſolent. *Remember* (ſaith *Caligula* the emperor to his grandmother *Antonia*) *that I may do what I liſt, and to whom I liſt.* Theſe words were accounted horrible, though he did her no harm. And *Juvenal* reckons it as the complement of all torments, inflicted by a cruel *Roman* dame upon her ſlaves; that whilſt ſhe was whipping them, ſhe painted her face, talked with her goſſips, and uſed all ſigns of neglecting what thoſe wretches felt. Now ſeeing that the greateſt grievances wherewith a domineering ſtate offendeth her ſubjects, are free from all ſenſe of indignity; likely it is, that they will not extremely hate her, although deſire of liberty make them weary of her empire. In theſe reſpects it is not needful, that ſhe ſhould keep a guard of licentious cut-throats, and maintain them in all villany, as a *Dionyſius* or *Agathocles* muſt do: her own citizens are able to terrify, and to hold perforce in obedience, all malecontents. Theſe things, conſidered alone by themſelves, may ſerve to prove, that a city is ſcarce able to deſerve the name of a tyranneſs, in the proper ſignification.

All this notwithſtanding, it ſhall appear, That the miſeries, wherewith a tyrant loadeth his people, are not ſo heavy, as the burthens impoſed by a cruel city. Not without ſome appearance of truth, it may be ſaid, that luſt, and many other private paſſions, are no way incident to a city or corporation. But to make this good, we ſhall have need to uſe the help of ſuch diſtinctions as the argument in hand doth not require. Was not *Rome* laſcivious, when *Cato* was fain to riſe and leave the theater, to the end, that the reverend regard of his gravity might not hinder the people from calling for a ſhew of naked courteſans, that were to be brought upon the open ſtage? By common practice, and general approved cuſtom, we are to cenſure the quality of a whole ſtate; not by the private virtue or vice of any one man, nor by metaphyſical abſtraction of *the univerſal* from *the ſingular*; or of *the corporation*, from *thoſe of whom it is compounded.* I ſay therefore (as I have ſaid elſewhere) that it were better to live under one pernicious tyrant, than under many thouſands. The reaſons proving this, are too many to ſet down: but few may ſuffice. The deſires of one man, how inordinate ſoever, if they cannot be ſatisfied, yet they may be wearied; he is not able to ſearch all corners; his humour may be found, and ſoothed; age, or good advice, yea, or ſome unexpected accident, may reform him: all which failing, yet is there hope, that his ſucceſſour may prove better. Many tyrants have been changed into worthy kings: and many have ill uſed their ill-gotten dominion, which, becoming hereditary to their poſterity, hath grown into the moſt excellent form of government, even a lawful monarchy. But they, that live under a tyrannical city, have no ſuch hope: their miſtreſs is immortal, and will not ſlacken the reins until they be pulled out of her hands, and her own mouth receive the bridle of a more mighty charioteer. This is woful: yet their preſent ſufferings make them leſs mindful of the future. New flies, and hungry ones, fall upon the ſame ſore, out of which others had already ſucked their fill. A new governor comes yearly among them, attended by all his poor kindred and friends, who mean not to return home empty to their hives, without a good lading of wax and honey. Theſe fly into all quarters, and are quickly acquainted with every man's wealth, or whatſoever elſe, in all the province, is worthy to be deſired. They know all a man's enemies, and all his fears, becoming themſelves, within a little ſpace, the enemies that he feareth moſt. To grow into acquaintance with theſe maſterful gueſts, in hope to win their friendſhip, were an endleſs labour (yet it muſt be undergone) and ſuch as every one hath not means to go about: but were this effected, what availeth it? The love of one governor is purchaſed with gifts: the ſucceſſor of this man, he is more loving than could be wiſhed, in reſpect of a fair wife or daughter: then comes the third, perhaps of the contrary faction at home, a bitter enemy to both his fore-goers, who ſeeks the ruin of all that have been inward with them. So the miſeries of this tyranny are not ſimple, but interlaced (as it were) with the calamities of civil war. The *Romans* had a law *de repetundis*, or *of recovery*, againſt extorting magiſtrates: yet we find, that it ſerved not wholly to reſtrain their provincial go-

vernors, who preſuming on the favour of their own citizens, and of their kindred and friends at home, were bold in their provinces, to work all theſe enormities rehearſed, though ſomewhat the more ſparingly, for fear of judgment. If the ſubjects of *Rome* groaned under ſuch oppreſſions, what muſt we think of thoſe that were vaſſals unto *Carthage?* The *Romans* impoſed no burthenſome tributes; they loved not to hear that their empire was grievous; they condemned many noble citizens, for having been ill governors. At *Carthage* all went quite contrary; the rapines newly deviſed by one magiſtrate, ſerved as precedents to inſtruct another; every man reſolved to do the like, when it ſhould fall to his turn; and he was held a notable ſtateſman, whoſe robberies had been ſuch, as might afford a good ſhare to the common treaſure. Particular examples of this *Carthaginian* practice are not extant: the government of *Verres* the *Roman* in *Sicily*, that is lively ſet out by *Tully*, may ſerve to inform us, what was the demeanour of theſe *Punic rulers*, who ſtood in fear of no ſuch condemnation as *Verres* underwent. By proſecuting this diſcourſe, I might infer a more general propoſition, That a city cannot govern her ſubject provinces ſo mildly as a king: but it is enough to have ſhewed, That the tyranny of a city is far more intolerable than that of any one moſt wicked man.

Suitable to the cruelty of ſuch lords, is the hatred of their ſubjects: and again, ſuitable to the hatred of the ſubjects, is the jealouſy of their lords. Hence it followed, that in wars abroad, the *Carthaginians* durſt uſe the ſervice of *African* ſoldiers; in *Afric* it ſelf, they had rather be beholden to others that were farther fetch'd. For the ſame purpoſe did *Hannibal*, in the ſecond *Punic war*, ſhift his mercenaries out of their own countries; [a] *Ut Afri in Hiſpaniâ, Hiſpania in Africâ, melior procul ab domo futurus uterque miles, velut mutuis pignoribus obligati ſtipendia facerent. That the* Africans *might ſerve in* Spain, *the* Spaniards *in* Afric, *being each of them like to prove the better ſoldiers, the farther they were from home, as if they were obliged by mutual pledges.* It is diſputable, I confeſs, whether theſe *African* and *Spaniſh* hirelings, could properly be termed mercenaries: for they were ſubject unto *Carthage*, and carried into the field, not only by reward, but by duty. Yet ſeeing their duty was no better than enforced, and that it was not any love to the ſtate, but mere deſire of gain, that made them fight. I will not nicely ſtand upon propriety of a word, but hold them, as *Polybius* alſo doth, no better than mercenaries.

† III.

The dangers growing from the uſe of mercenary ſoldiers, and foreign auxiliaries.

THE extreme danger, growing from the employment of ſuch ſoldiers, is well obſerved by *Machiavel:* who ſheweth, that they are more terrible to thoſe whom they ſerve, than to thoſe againſt whom they ſerve. They are ſeditious, unfaithful, diſobedient, devourers and deſtroyers of all places and countries, whereinto they are drawn, as being held by no other bond than their own Commodity. Yea, that which is moſt fearful among ſuch hirelings, is, that they have often, and in time of greateſt extremity, not only refuſed to fight, in their defence, who have entertained them; but revolted unto the contrary part, to the utter ruin of thoſe princes and ſtates that have truſted them. Theſe mercenaries (ſaith *Machiavel*) which filled all *Italy*, when *Charles* the eighth of *France* did paſs the *Alps*, were the cauſe that the ſaid *French* king won the realm of *Naples*, with his buckler without a ſword. Notable was the example of *Sforza*, the father of *Francis Sforza*, duke of *Milan*; who being entertained by queen *Joan* of *Naples*, abandoned her ſervice on the ſudden; and forced her to put her ſelf into the hands of the king of *Arragon*. Like unto his father was *Francis Sforza*, the firſt of that race, duke of *Milan:* who, being entertained by the *Milaneſe*, forced them to become his ſlaves; even with the ſame army which themſelves had levied for their own defence. But *Lodovick Sforza*, the ſon of this *Francis*, by the juſt judgment of God, was made a memorable example unto poſterity, in loſing his whole eſtate by the treachery of ſuch faithleſs mercenaries, as his own father had been. For, having waged an army of *Switzers*, and committed his dutchy, together with his perſon, into their hands; he was by them delivered up unto his enemy the *French* king, by whom he was incloſed in the caſtle of *Loches* to his dying day.

The like inconvenience is found, in uſing the help of foreign auxiliaries. We ſee, that when the emperour of *Conſtantinople* had hired 10000 *Turks*, againſt his neighbour princes; he could never, either by perſwaſion or force, ſet them again over ſea upon *Aſia* ſide: which gave beginning to the *Chriſtian* ſervitude, that ſoon after followed. *Alexander*, the ſon of *Caſſander*, ſought aid of the great *Demetrius:* but *Demetrius*, being entred into his kingdom, ſlew the ſame *Alexander* who had invited him, and made himſelf king of *Macedon*. *Syracon* the *Turk* was called into *Egypt* by *Sanar* the *Soldan*, againſt his oppoſite: but this *Turk* did ſettle himſelf ſo ſurely in *Egypt*, that *Saladine* his ſucceſſor became lord thereof; and of all *the holy land*, ſoon after. What need we look about for examples of this kind; every kingdom, in effect, can furniſh us. The *Britons* drew the *Saxons* into this our country; and *Mac Murrough* drew the *Engliſh* into *Ireland:* but the one and the other ſoon became lords of thoſe two kindoms.

Againſt all this may be alledged, the good ſucceſs of the *United Provinces* of the *Netherlands*, uſing none other than ſuch kind of ſoldiers, in their late war. Indeed theſe *Low-countries* have many goodly and ſtrong cities, filled with inhabitants that are wealthy, induſtrious, and valiant in their kind. They are ſtout ſea-men, and therein is their excellency; neither are they bad, at the defence of a place well fortified: but in open field they have ſeldom been able to ſtand againſt the *Spaniard*. Neceſſity therefore compelled them to ſeek help abroad: and the like neceſſity made them forbear to arm any great numbers of their own. For, with money raiſed by their trade, they maintained the war: and therefore could ill ſpare, unto the pike and muſket, thoſe hands, that were of more uſe in helping to fill the common purſe. Yet what of this? they ſped well. Surely they ſped as ill as might be, whilſt they had none other than mercenary ſoldiers. Many fruitleſs attempts, made by the prince of *Orange*, can witneſs it: and that brave commander, count *Lodowick* of *Naſſau*, felt it to his grief, in his retreat from *Groeninghen*; when in the very inſtant, that required their ſervice in fight, his mercenaries cried out aloud for money, and ſo ran away. This was not the only time, when the hired ſoldiers of the *States*, have

[a] Liv. Dec. 5. l. 1.

either

either ſought to hide their cowardice under a ſhew of greedineſs; or at leaſt, by meer covetouſneſs, have ruined in one hour the labour of many months. I will not ſtand to prove this by many examples; for they themſelves will not deny it. Neither would I touch the honour of *Monſieur*, the duke of *Anjou*, brother to the *French* king; ſave that it is folly to conceal what all the world knows. He that would lay open the danger of foreign auxiliaries, needeth no better pattern. It is commonly found, that ſuch aiders made themſelves lords over thoſe, to whom they lend their ſuccour: but where ſhall we meet with ſuch another as this *Monſieur*, who, for his protection promiſed, being rewarded with the lordſhip of the country, made it his firſt work, to thruſt by violence a galling yoke upon the people's necks? well, he lived to repent it, with grief enough. Even whilſt he was counterfeiting unto thoſe about him, that were ignorant of his plot, an imaginary ſorrow for the poor burghers of *Antwerp*, as verily believing the town to be ſurprized and won; the death of the count St. *Aignan*, who fell over the wall, and the cannon of the city, diſcharged againſt his own troops, informed him better what had happened; ſhewing that they were his own *French*, who ſtood in need of pity. Then was his feigned paſſion changed into a very bitter anguiſh of mind; wherein ſmiting his breaſt, and wringing his hands, he exclaimed, *Helas mon Dieu, que veux tu faire de moy; alas, my God, what wilt thou do with me?* So the affairs of the *Netherlands* will not ſerve to prove, that there is little danger in uſing mercenary ſoldiers, or the help of foreign auxiliaries. This notwithſtanding, they were obedient unto neceſſity, and ſought help of the *Engliſh*, *Scotch*, and *French*: wherein they did wiſely, and proſpered. For when there was in *France* a king partaker with them in the ſame danger; when the queen of *England* refuſed to accept the ſoveraignty of their country, when they offered, yet being provoked by the *Spaniard* their enemy, purſued him with continual war; when the heir of *England* reigned in *Scotland*, a king too juſt and wiſe (though not engaged in any quarrel) either to make profit of his neighbour's miſeries, or to help thoſe that had attempted the conqueſt of his own inheritance: then might the *Netherlanders* very ſafely repoſe confidence, in the forces of theſe their neighbour-countries. The ſoldiers that came unto them from hence, were (to omit many other commendations) not only regardful of the pay that they ſhould receive; but well affected unto the cauſe that they took in hand: or if any were cold in his devotion, to the ſide whereon he fought; yet was he kept in order, by remembrance of his own home, where the *Engliſh* would have rewarded him with death, if his faith had been corrupted by the *Spaniard*. They were therefore truſted with the cuſtody of cities; they were held as friends, and patrons; the neceſſity of the poorer ſort was relieved, before the pay-day came, with *lendings*, and other helps, as well as the ability of the ſtates could permit. When three ſuch princes, reigning at one time, ſhall agree ſo well, to maintain againſt the power of a fourth, injurious (or at leaſt ſo ſeeming) to them all, a neighbour-country, of the ſame religion, and to which they are all lovingly affected: then may ſuch a country be ſecure of her auxiliaries, and quietly intend her trade, or other buſineſs, in hope of like ſucceſs. But theſe circumſtances meet ſo ſeldom, as it may well hold true in general, *that mercenary, and foreign auxiliary forces, are no leſs dangerous, than the enemy, againſt whom they are entertained.*

†. IV.

That the moderate government of the Romans *gave them aſſurance to uſe the ſervice of their own ſubjects in their wars. That in man's nature there is an affection breeding tyranny, which hindereth the uſe and benefit of the like moderation.*

HERE it may be demanded, whether alſo the *Romans* were not compelled to uſe ſervice of other ſoldiers in their many great wars, but performed all by their own citizens? for if it were their manner to arm their own ſubjects; how happened it, that they feared no Rebellion? if ſtrangers; how then could they avoid the inconveniencies above rehearſed? the anſwer is; that their armies were compounded uſually of their own citizens, and of the *Latins*, in equal number: to which they added, as occaſion required, ſome companies of the *Campanes*, *Hetrurians*, *Samnites*, or other of their ſubjects, as were either intereſted in the quarrel, or might beſt be truſted. They had, about theſe times (though ſeldom they did employ ſo many) ten *Roman* legions; a good ſtrength, if all other help had been wanting: which ſerved to keep in good order their ſubjects, that were always fewer in the army than themſelves. As for the *Latins*, if conſanguinity were not a ſufficient obligation; yet many privileges and immunities, which they enjoyed, made them aſſured unto the ſtate of *Rome*: under which they lived almoſt at liberty, as being bound to little elſe, than to ſerve it in war. It is true, that a yoke, how eaſy ſoever, ſeems troubleſome to the neck that hath been accuſtomed to freedom. Therefore many people of *Italy* have taken occaſion of ſeveral advantages, to deliver themſelves from the *Roman* ſubjection. But ſtill they have been reclaimed by war; the authors of rebellion have been ſharply puniſhed; and the people, by degrees, have obtained ſuch liberty, as made them eſteem none otherwiſe of *Rome*, than as the common city of all *Italy*. Yea, in proceſs of time it was granted unto many cities, and thoſe far off removed, even to *Tarſus* in *Cilicia*, where St. *Paul* was born, that all the burgeſſes ſhould be free of *Rome* it ſelf. This favour was conferred abſolutely upon ſome; upon ſome, with reſtraint of giving voice in election of magiſtrates, or with other ſuch limitation, as was thought fit. Hereunto may be added, that it was their manner, after a great conqueſt, to releaſe unto their new ſubjects half of their tribute which they had been wont to pay unto their former lords, which was a ready way, to bring the multitude into good liking of their preſent condition; when the review of harder times paſt ſhould rather teach them to fear a relapſe, than to hope for better in the future, by ſeeking innovation. Neither would it be forgotten, as a ſpecial note of the *Romans* good government, [a] that when ſome, for their well-deſerving, have had the offer to be made citizens of *Rome*; they have refuſed it, and held themſelves better contented with their own preſent eſtate. Wherefore it is no marvel, that *Petellia*, a city of the *Brutians* in *Italy*, choſe rather to endure all extremity of war, [b] than, upon any condition, to forſake the *Romans*; even when the *Romans* themſelves had confeſſed, that they were unable to help theſe their ſubjects, and therefore willed them to look

[a] Liv. Dec. 3. l. 3. [b] Liv. ibid.

to

to their own good, as having been faithful to the utmoſt. Such love purchaſed theſe mild governours, without impairing their majeſty thereby. The ſum of all is: they had, of their own, a ſtrong army; they doubled it, by adjoining thereunto the *Latins*; and they further increaſed it, as need required, with other help of their own ſubjects: all, or the moſt of their followers, accounting the proſperity of *Rome* to be the common good.

The moderate uſe of ſoveraign power being ſo effectual, in aſſuring the people unto their lords, and conſequently, in the eſtabliſhment or enlargement of dominion: it may ſeem ſtrange, that the practice of tyranny, whoſe effects are contrary, hath been ſo common in all ages. The like, I know, may be ſaid, of all vice, and irregularity whatſoever. For it is leſs difficult (whoſoever think otherwiſe) and more ſafe, to keep the way of juſtice and honeſty, than to turn aſide from it; yet commonly our paſſions do lead us into by-paths. But where luſt, anger, fear, or any the like affection, ſeduceth our reaſon; the ſame unruly appetite either bringeth with it an excuſe, or at leaſt-wiſe taketh away all cauſe of wonder. In tyranny it is not ſo: foraſmuch as we can hardly deſcry the paſſion, that is of force to inſinuate it ſelf into the whole tenour of a government. It muſt be confeſſed, that lawleſs deſires have bred many tyrants: yet ſo, that theſe deſires have ſeldom been hereditary or long-laſting; but have ended commonly with the tyrant's life, ſometimes before his death; by which means the government hath been reduced to a better form. In ſuch caſes, the ſaying of *Ariſtotle* holds,[a] *that tyrannies are of a ſhort continuance.* But this doth not ſatisfy the queſtion in hand. Why did not the *Carthaginians* exerciſe tyranny? why did the *Athenians?* why have many other cities done the like? If in reſpect of their general good; how could they be ignorant, that this was an ill courſe for the ſafety of the weal publick? If they were led hereunto by any affection; what was that affection, wherein ſo many thouſand citizens, divided and ſubdivided within themſelves by factions, did all concur, notwithſtanding the much diverſity of temper, and the vehemency of private hatred among them? Doubtleſs, we muſt be fain to ſay, that tyranny is, by it ſelf, a vice diſtinct from others. A man, we know, is *animal politicum*, apt, even by nature, to command, or to obey; every one in his proper degree. Other deſires of mankind, are common likewiſe unto brute beaſts; and ſome of them, to bodies wanting ſenſe: but the deſire of rule belongeth unto the nobler part of reaſon; whereunto is alſo anſwerable an aptneſs to yield obedience. Now as hunger and thirſt are given by nature, not only to man and beaſt, but unto all ſorts of vegetables, for the ſuſtentation of their life: as fear, anger, luſt, and other affections are likewiſe natural, in convenient meaſure, both unto mankind, and to all creatures that have ſenſe, for the ſhunning or repelling of harm, and ſeeking after that which is requiſite: even ſo is this deſire of ruling or obeying engrafted by nature in the race of man, and in man only as a reaſonable creature, for the ordering of his life, in a civil form of juſtice. All theſe in-bred qualities are good and uſeful. Nevertheleſs, hunger and thirſt are the parents of gluttony and drunkenneſs, which, in reproach, are called beaſtly, by an improper term: ſince they grow from appetites, found in leſs worthy creatures than beaſts, and are yet not ſo common in beaſts, as in men. The effects of anger, and of ſuch other paſſions as deſcend no lower than unto brute beaſts, are held leſs vile; and perhaps not without good reaſon: yet are they more horrible, and puniſhed more grievouſly, by ſharper laws, as being in general more pernicious. But as no corruption is worſe, than of that which is beſt; there is not any paſſion, that nouriſheth a vice more hurtful unto mankind, than that which iſſueth from the moſt noble root, even the depraved affection of ruling. Hence ariſe thoſe two great miſchiefs, of which hath been an old queſtion in diſpute, whether be the worſe; that all things, or that nothing, ſhould be lawful. Of theſe, a dull ſpirit, and overloaden by fortune, with power whereof it is not capable, occaſioneth the one; the other proceedeth from a contrary diſtemper, whoſe vehemency the bounds of reaſon cannot limit. Under the extremity of either, no country is able to ſubſiſt: yet the defective dulneſs, that permitteth any thing, will alſo permit the execution of law, to which, mere neceſſity doth enforce the ordinary magiſtrate; whereas tyranny is more active, and pleaſeth it ſelf in the exceſs, with a falſe colour of juſtice. Examples of ſtupidity, and unaptneſs to rule, are not very frequent, tho' ſuch natures are every-where to be found: for this quality troubles not it ſelf in ſeeking empire; or if, by ſome error of fortune, it encounter therewithal (as when *Claudius*, hiding himſelf in a corner, found the empire of *Rome*) ſome friend, or elſe a wife, is not wanting to ſupply the defect, which alſo cruelty doth help to ſhadow. Therefore this vice, as a thing unknown, is without a name. Tyranny is more bold, and feareth not to be known, but would be reputed honourable: for it is *proſperum & fœlix ſcelus, a fortunate miſchief*, as long as it can ſubſiſt. *There is no reward or honour* (ſaith *Peter Charron*) *aſſigned to thoſe, that know how to increaſe, or to preſerve human nature: all honours, greatneſs, riches, dignities, empires, triumphs, trophies, are appointed for thoſe, that know how to afflict, trouble, or deſtroy it. Ceſar*, and *Alexander*, have unmade and ſlain each of them, more than a million of men: but they made none, nor left none behind them. Such is the error of man's judgment, in valuing things according to the common opinion. But the true name of tyranny, when it grows to ripeneſs, is none other than *Ferity*: the ſame that *Ariſtotle* ſaith to be worſe than any vice. It exceedeth indeed all other vices, iſſuing from the paſſions incident both to man and beaſt; no leſs than perjury, murder, treaſon, and the like horrible crimes, exceed in villany, the faults of gluttony and drunkenneſs, that grow from more ignoble appetites. Hereof *Sciron*, *Procruſtes*, and *Pityocamptes*, that uſed their bodily force to the deſtruction of mankind, are not better examples, than *Phalaris*, *Dionyſius* and *Agathocles*, whoſe miſchievous heads were aſſiſted by the hands of deteſtable ruffians. The ſame barbarous deſire of lordſhip, tranſported thoſe old examples of *Ferity*, and theſe latter tyrants, beyond the bounds of reaſon: neither of them knew the uſe of rule, nor the difference between free-men and ſlaves.

The rule of the huſband over the wife, and of parents over their children, is natural, and appointed by God himſelf; ſo that it is always, and ſimply, allowable and good. The former of theſe is, as the dominion of reaſon over appetite: the latter is the whole Authority, which one free-man can have over another. The rule of a king is no more, nor none other, than of a common father over his whole country: which he that

[a] Ariſt. Pol. lib. 5. c. 12.

knows

knows what the power of a father is, or ought to be, knows to be enough. But there is a greater, and more maſterly rule, which God gave unto *Adam*, when he ſaid; [a] *Have dominion over the fiſh of the ſea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth*: which alſo he confirmed unto *Noah*. and his children, ſaying, [b] *The fear of you, and the dread of you, ſhall be upon every beaſt of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fiſhes of the ſea; into your hands are they delivered.* He, who gave this dominion to man, gave alſo an aptitude to uſe it. The execution of this power hath ſince extended it ſelf over a very great part of mankind. There are indeed no ſmall numbers of men, whoſe diſability to govern themſelves, proves them, according to *Ariſtotle*'s doctrine, to be naturally ſlaves.

Yet find I not in ſcripture any warrant to oppreſs men with bondage, [c] unleſs the lawfulneſs thereof be ſufficiently intimated, where it is ſaid, that a man ſhall not be puniſhed for the death of a ſervant, whom he hath ſlain by correction, if the ſervant live a day or two, becauſe [d] *he is his money*; or elſe by captivity of the [e] *Midianitiſh* girls, which were mande bond-ſlaves, and the ſanctuary had a part of them for *the Lord's tribute*. Doubtleſs, the cuſtom hath been very antient; [f] for *Noah* laid this curſe upon *Canaan*, that he ſhould be *a ſervant of ſervants*; and *Abraham* had of *Pharaoh*, among other gifts, *men-ſervants*, [g] *and maid-ſervants*, which were none other than ſlaves. Chriſtian religion is ſaid to have abrogated this old kind of ſervility; but ſurely they are deceived that think ſo. [h] St. *Paul* deſired the liberty of *Oneſimus*, whom he had won unto Chriſt; yet wrote he for this unto *Philemon*, by way of requeſt, craving it as a benefit, not urging it as a duty. Agreeable hereto is the direction which the ſame St. *Paul* giveth unto ſervants; [i] *Let every man abide in the ſame calling wherein he was called: art thou called, being a ſervant? care not for it, but if thou mayſt be made free, chuſe it rather.* It is true, that chriſtian religion hath procured liberty unto many, not only in regard of piety, but for that the chriſtian maſters ſtood in fear of being diſcovered by their ſlaves unto the perſecutors of religion. *Mahomet* likewiſe, by giving liberty to his followers, drew many into his impiety; but whether he forbad it, as unlawful, unto his ſectators to hold one another of them in bondage, I cannot tell; ſave that by the practice of the *Turks* and *Moors*, it ſeems he did not. In *England* we had many bond-ſervants, until the time of our laſt civil wars; and I think that the laws concerning villanage are ſtill in force, of which the lateſt are the ſharpeſt. And now, ſince ſlaves were made free, which were of great uſe and ſervice, there are grown up a rabble of rogues, cut-purſes, and other the like trades; ſlaves in nature, though not in law.

But whether this kind of dominion be lawful, or not, *Ariſtotle* hath well proved that it is natural. And certainly we find not ſuch a latitude of difference in any creature, as in the nature of man; wherein (to omit the infinite diſtance in eſtate of the elect and reprobate) the wiſeſt excel the moſt fooliſh by far greater degree, than the moſt fooliſh of men doth ſurpaſs the wiſeſt of beaſts. Therefore, when commiſeration hath given way to reaſon, we ſhall find that nature is the ground even of maſterly power, and of ſervile obedience, which is thereto correſpondent. But it may be truly ſaid, that ſome countries have ſubſiſted long without the uſe of any ſervility; as alſo it is true, that ſome countries have not the uſe of any tame cattel. Indeed, the affections which uphold civil rule are (though more noble) not ſo ſimply needful unto the ſuſtentation either of our kind, as are luſt, and the like; or of every one, as are hunger and thirſt, which notwithſtanding are the loweſt in degree. But where moſt vile and ſervile diſpoſitions have liberty to ſhew themſelves begging in the ſtreets, there may we more juſtly wonder how the dangerous toil of ſeafaring-men can find enough to undertake them, than how the ſwarm of idle vagabonds ſhould increaſe, by acceſs of thoſe that are weary of their own more painful condition. This may ſuffice to prove, that in mankind there is found ingrafted, even by nature, a deſire of abſolute dominion, whereunto the general cuſtom of nations doth ſubſcribe; together with the pleaſure which moſt men take in flatterers, that are the baſeſt of ſlaves.

This being ſo, we find no cauſe to marvel how tyranny hath been ſo riſe in all ages, and practiſed not only in the ſingle rule of ſome vicious prince, but even by conſent of whole cities and eſtates; ſince other vices have likewiſe gotten head, and born a general ſway, notwithſtanding that the way of virtue be more honourable and commodious. Few there are that have uſed well the inferior paſſions, how then can we expect that the moſt noble affections ſhould not be diſordered? In the government of wife and children, ſome are utterly careleſs, and corrupt all by their dull connivency; others, by maſterly rigor, hold their own blood under condition of ſlavery. To be a good governor, is a rare commendation; and to prefer the weal-publick above all reſpects whatſoever, is the virtue juſtly termed heroical. Of this virtue, many ages afford not many examples. *Hector* is named by *Ariſtotle*, as one of them; and deſervedly, if this praiſe be due to extraordinary heighth of fortitude, uſed in defence of a man's own country. But if we conſider, that a love of the general good cannot be perfect, without reference to *the Fountain of all goodneſs*, we ſhall find that no moral virtue, how great ſoever, can, by it ſelf, deſerve the commendation of *more than virtue*, as the heroical doth. Wherefore we muſt ſearch the ſcriptures for patterns hereof; ſuch as *David*, *Joſaphat*, and *Joſias* were. Of chriſtian kings, if there were many ſuch, the world would ſoon be happy. It is not my purpoſe to wrong the worth of any, by denying the praiſe where it is due, or by preferring a leſs excellent. But he that can find a king religious and zealous in God's cauſe, without enforcement either of adverſity, or of ſome regard of ſtate; a procurer of the general peace and quiet, who not only uſeth his authority, but adds the travel of his eloquence, in admoniſhing his judges to do juſtice; by the vigorous influence of whoſe government, civility is infuſed, even into thoſe places that have been the dens of ſavage robbers and cut-throats; one that hath quite aboliſhed a ſlaviſh *Brehon* law, by which an whole nation of his ſubjects were held in bondage; and one, whoſe higher virtue and wiſdom doth make the praiſe not only of nobility, and other ornaments, but of abſtinence from the blood, the wives, and the goods of thoſe that are under his power, together with a world of chief commendations belonging unto ſome good princes, to appear leſs regardable; he, I ſay, that can find ſuch a king, findeth

[a] Gen. i. 28. [b] Gen. ix. 2. [c] Ariſt. Pol. l. 1. c. 3. [d] Exod. xxi. 21. [e] Num. xxxi. 9. [f] Gen. ix. 25.
[g] Gen. xii. 16. [h] *Epiſt. to* Philem. v. 14. [i] 1 Cor. vii. 20, 21.

[a]n example worthy to add unto virtue an honourable title, if it were formerly wanting. Under ſuch a king, it is likely, by God's bleſſing, that a land ſhall flouriſh with increaſe of trade in countries before unknown; that civility and religion ſhall be propagated into barbarous and heathen countries; and that the happineſs of his ſubjects, ſhall cauſe the nations far off removed, to wiſh him their ſovereign. I need not add hereunto, that all the actions of ſuch a king, even his bodily exerciſes, do partake of virtue; ſince all things tending to the preſervation of his life and health, or to the mollifying of his cares (who, fixing his contemplation upon God, ſeeketh how to imitate the unſpeakable goodneſs, rather than the inacceſſible majeſty, with both of which himſelf is endued, as far as human nature is capable) do alſo belong to the furtherance of that common good which he procureth. Leſt any man ſhould think me tranſported with admiration, or other affection, beyond the bounds of reaſon, I add hereunto, that ſuch a king is nevertheleſs a man, muſt die, and may err; yet wiſdom and fame ſhall ſet him free from error, and from death, both with and without the help of time. One thing I may not omit, as a ſingular benefit (though there be many others beſides) redounding unto this king, as the fruit of his goodneſs. The people that live under a pleaſant yoke, are not only loving to their ſoveraign lord, but free of courage, and no greater in muſter of men, than of ſtout fighters, if need require; whereas on the contrary, he that ruleth as over ſlaves, ſhall be attended, in time of neceſſity, by ſlaviſh minds, neither loving his perſon, nor regarding his or their own honour. Cowards may be furious, and ſlaves outragious, for a time; but among ſpirits that have once yielded unto ſlavery, univerſally it is found true, that [a] *Homer* ſaith, *God bereaveth a man of half his virtue, that day when he caſteth him into bondage.*

Of theſe things, I might perhaps more ſeaſonably have ſpoken, in the general diſcourſe of government; but where ſo lively an example of the calamity following a tyrannical rule, and the uſe of mercenaries, thereupon depending, did offer it ſelf, as is this preſent buſineſs of the *Carthaginians*, I thought that the note would be more effectual, than being barely delivered, as out of a common place.

SECT. III.

How the war againſt the mercenaries was diverſly managed by Hanno *and* Amilcar, *with variable ſucceſs. The bloody counſels of the mercenaries, and their final deſtruction.*

BEing now to return unto thoſe mercenaries, from whom I have thus far digreſſed, I cannot readily find by what name henceforth I ſhould call them. They are no longer in pay with the *Carthaginians*, neither care they to pretend that they ſeek their wages already due; ſo that they are neither mercenaries nor mutineers. Had they all been ſubject unto *Carthage*, then might they juſtly have been termed rebels: but *Spendius*, and others, that were the principal part of them, owed none allegiance to that ſtate, which they endeavoured to ſubvert. Wherefore I will borrow the name of their late occupation, and ſtill call them mercenaries, as *Polybius* alſo doth.

Theſe uſing the advantage of their preſent ſtrength, beſieged [b] *Utica* and *Hippagreta*, cities of great importance, as being ſeated upon the weſtern haven of *Carthage*, where it is divided by a neck of land; *Hippagreta* ſtanding inwards upon the great lake, *Utica* farther out upon the ſea. Neither was the camp at *Tunis* abandoned, which lay fitly to hinder the *Carthaginians* from paſſing up into the country; for *Matho* and *Spendius* wanted not men to follow the war in all parts at once.

How the *Carthaginians* were amazed with this unexpected peril, any man may conceive. But the buſineſs it ſelf awakes them haſtily. They are hardly preſs'd on all ſides, and therefore travelled their brains to the uttermoſt, how to ſhake off theſe furious dogs from their ſhoulders, who ſometimes by night, ſometimes by day, came unto the very walls of their city. In this exigence, *Hanno* was made their general, who failed not in his accuſtomed diligence of making all good preparation; but had gotten together whatſoever was needful, as well to relieve a town beſieged, as to batter and aſſail any place defended againſt him. With theſe proviſions, and with an hundred elephants, he came to *Utica* ſo ſuddenly, that the enemies, as men ſurprized, forſook their trenches, and retired themſelves unto a riſing piece of woody ground, where they might be ſafe againſt the violence of his beaſts. *Hanno*, thinking that he had to do with *Numidians*, whoſe cuſtom was, after any loſs, to fly two or three days journey off, preſently entered the town, to ſhew himſelf after this his victory. But theſe good fellows, againſt whom he was to war, had learned of *Amilcar* to retire and fight again, many times in one day, as need required. Therefore, as ſoon as they perceived that he knew not how to uſe a victory, they aſſailed their own camp, and with great ſlaughter, drove the *Carthaginians* out of it, forcing them to hide themſelves within *Utica*, and got poſſeſſion of all the ſtore that *Hanno* had brought for the relief of the town. This bad beginning *Hanno* followed with ſuitable indiſcretion, loſing the benefit of many fair opportunities, and ſuffering the enemies to take poſſeſſion of all the entrance from *Carthage* to the firm land.

The *Carthaginians* perceiving this, were exceedingly troubled, and did therefore let fall their ſheet-anchor, ſending to the field their great captain *Amilcar*, whom they furniſhed with ten thouſand foot of ſupply, and ſeventy elephants. *Amilcar* had work enough to do before he ſhould be able to meet with the enemy upon equal ground; for, beſides other places of advantage that the mercenaries had occupied, *Hanno* had ſuffered them to win the only bridge, by which the river *Macra*, or *Bagradas*, was paſſable unto theſe that were to travel into the continent. This river had not many fords, nor thoſe eaſy for a ſingle man to get over; but upon them all was kept ſuch guard, as gave to *Amilcar* little hope of prevailing in ſeeking way by force. As for the bridge it ſelf, *Matho* and his followers were there lodged, and had there built a town, wherein to lie commodiouſly, intentive only to the cuſtody thereof. But *Amilcar* had obſerved, that the very mouth of *Bagradas* uſed to be ſometimes cloyed with ſand and gravel, that was driven in by certain cuſtomary winds, and could not be driven out again by force of that ſlow river, till the wind falling, or changing, ſuffered the weight of the

[a] Hom. Odyſſ. l. 17. [b] Utica *is ſeated in the great bay that enters into* Carthage, *not far within the promontory* of Apollo. *At this time it is called* Porto Farina, *or* Biſerta; *and by the* Africans *themſelves* Garel Melha. Niger *ſaith, that the town it ſelf is ruined, and the place whereon it ſtood, now called* Mazachares. *It was very ancient, and built before* Carthage, *ſaith* Silius. *As it flouriſhed before* Carthage *was ſet up, ſo did it after* Carthage *was thrown down by the* Romans *in the third* Punic *war. Famous it was by the death of* Cato *the younger, who held it againſt* Ceſar. Victor, *that worthy divine, was biſhop thereof in the time of* Genſeric *the* Arrian, *who lived all the time of that tyrant, and hath written the ſtory of his cruelties.*

waters

waters to diſburthen their channel. Hereof he made uſe, and taking his opportunity, paſſed the river, contrary to all expectation, either of the enemy, or of his own citizens.

There was no need to bid *Spendius* look about him, when once it was heard that *Amilcar* was come over into *Bagradas*; all the mercenaries were troubled with the news, knowing that they were no longer to deal with the improvident gravity of *Hanno*, but with an able ſpirit, even with their own maſter in the art of war, whom they admired, though they hated him. But this fear was ſoon changed into preſumption; when more than fifteen thouſand of their own ſociety were come from *Utica*, and other ten thouſand from the guard of the bridge. Their army was far greater than that of *Amilcar*'s, and they were in their own judgment the better men; upon which confidence they reſolved to charge him on all ſides, and beat him down in deſpight of his worth and reputation. With this reſolution they attended upon him, watching for ſome advantage, and ſtill exhorting one another to play the men, and give the onſet. Eſpecially they that followed him in the rear had a mind to begin the fight; whereunto their promptneſs was ſuch, as took from them their former circumſpection. *Amilcar* held his way towards the bridge, keeping himſelf on plain grounds, that were fitteſt for the ſervice of his elephants, which he placed in front of his army. Neither made he ſhew of any deſire to fight, but ſuffered the raſhneſs of his enemies to increaſe, till it ſhould break into ſome diſorder. At length, perceiving that with more boldneſs than good heed, they followed him ſo near, as would be little for their good, if he ſhould turn upon them, he haſtened his march, even to ſuch a pace, as made a ſhew little differing from plain flight. The mercenaries preſently fell upon his ſkirts; believing, that for fear of them he was ready to run away. But whilſt they confuſedly, as in ſudden opinion of victory, were driving at the heels of thoſe who had the rear, *Amilcar* wheeled about and met him in the face, charging them hotly, but in very good order; ſo that, amazed with the apprehenſion of unexpected danger, they fled without making any reſiſtance. In this overthrow there were ſix thouſand of the mercenaries ſlain, and about two thouſand taken; the reſt fled, ſome to the camp at *Utica*, others to the town at the bridge, whither *Amilcar* followed them ſo faſt that he won the place eaſily; the enemies being thence alſo fled into *Tunis*, as not having recollected their ſpirits to make it good.

The fame of this victory, together with the diligence of *Amilcar* in purſuing it, cauſed many towns revolted, partly by fear, partly by force, to return to their former obedience. Yet was not *Matho* wanting to himſelf in this dangerous time. He ſent about *Numidia* and *Africa* for new ſupplies, admoniſhing the people now or never to do their beſt, for the recovery of their freedom; he perſwaded *Spendius* and *Autaritus*, that was captain of the *Gauls*, to wait upon *Amilcar*, and always to keep the higher grounds, or at leaſt the foot of ſome hill, where they might be ſafe from the elephants; and he himſelf continued to preſs the town of *Hippagreta* with an hard ſiege. It was neceſſary for *Amilcar*, in paſſing from place to place, as his buſineſs required, to take ſuch ways as there were, for all the country lay not level. Therefore *Spendius*, who ſtill coaſted him, had once gotten a notable advantage of ground; the *Carthaginians* lying in a plain ſurrounded with hills, that were occupied by the mercenaries, with their *Numidian* and *African* ſuccours. In this difficulty the fame of *Amilcar*'s perſonal worth did greatly benefit his country. For *Naravaſus*, a young gentleman commanding over the *Numidians*, was glad of this occaſion, ſerving to get the acquaintance and love of ſo brave a man, which he much deſired: and therefore came unto *Amilcar*, ſignifying his good affection to him, with offer to do him all ſervice. *Amilcar* joyfully entertained this friend, promiſing unto him his own daughter in marriage, and ſo won from the enemies two thouſand horſe, that following *Naravaſus*, turned unto the *Carthaginians* ſide. With this help he gave battel unto *Spendius*, wherein the *Numidian* laboured to approve his own valour to his new friend. So the victory was great; for there were ſlain ten thouſand of *Spendius*'s fellows, and four thouſand taken priſoners; but *Spendius* himſelf, with *Autarius* the *Gaul*, eſcaped to do more miſchief. *Amilcar* dealt very gently with his priſoners, pardoning all offences paſt, and diſmiſſing as many as were unwilling to become his followers; yet with condition, that they ſhould never more bear arms againſt the *Carthaginians*, threatening to take ſharp revenge upon all that ſhould break this covenant.

This humanity was vehemently ſuſpected by *Matho*, *Spendius*, and *Autarius*, as tending to win from them the hearts of their ſoldiers. Wherefore they reſolved to take ſuch order, that not a man among them ſhould dare to truſt in the good nature of *Amilcar*, nor to hope for any ſafety whilſt *Carthage* was able to do him hurt. They counterfeited letters of advertiſement, wherein was contained, that ſome of their company, reſpective only of their private benefit, and careleſs of the general good, had a purpoſe to betray them all unto the *Carthaginians*, with whom they held intelligence; and that it was needful to look well unto *Geſco* and his companions, whom theſe traitors had a purpoſe to enlarge. Upon this theme *Spendius* makes an oration to the ſoldiers, exhorting them to fidelity; and ſhewing with many words, that the ſeeming humanity of *Amilcar* toward ſome, was none other than a bait wherewith to intrap them all at once together; as alſo telling them what a dangerous enemy *Geſco* would prove if he might eſcape their hands. While he is yet in the middle of his tale were letters come to the ſame purpoſe. Then ſteps forth *Autarius*, and ſpeaks his mind plainly; ſaying, that it were the beſt, yea, the only way, for the common ſafety, to cut off all hope of reconciliation with *Carthage*; that if ſome were deviſing to make their own peace, it would go hard with thoſe that had a care of the war; that it were better to make an end of *Geſco*'s life, than to trouble themſelves with looking to his cuſtody; that by ſuch a courſe every one ſhould be engaged in the preſent action, as having none other hope left than in victory alone; finally, that ſuch as would ſpeak here-againſt, were worthy to be reputed traitors. This *Autarius* was in great credit with the ſoldiers, and could ſpeak ſundry languages, in ſuch ſort, that it was underſtood by all. According to his motion therefore it was agreed, that *Geſco* and all the other priſoners ſhould forthwith be put to horrible death by torments. Nevertheleſs there were ſome, who, for love of *Geſco*, fought to alter this intended cruelty, but they were forthwith ſtoned to death, as a document unto others; and ſo the decree was put in execution. Neither were they therewithal contented; but further ordained, that all *Carthaginian* priſoners which they took ſhould be ſerved in like ſort; and that the ſubjects or friends

friends of *Carthage* ſhould loſe their hands, and ſo be ſent home; which rule they obſerved ever afterwards.

Of this cruelty I need ſay no more, than that it was moſt execrable ferity. As for the counſel of uſing it, it was like unto the counſel of *Achitophel*; *All* Iſrael *ſhall hear that thou art abhorred of thy father; then ſhall the hands of all that are with thee be ſtrong.* Such are the fruits of deſperation. He that is paſt all hope of pardon is afraid of his own fellows, if they be more innocent; and, to avoid the puniſhment of leſs offences, committeth greater. The cowardiſe of offenders, and the revengeful ſpirits of thoſe that have been wronged, are breeders of this deſperation: to which may be added ſome deficiency of laws, in diſtinguiſhing the puniſhments of malefactors according to the degree of their ſeveral crimes. A coward thinks all proviſion too little for his own ſecurity. *If* Phocas *be a coward* (ſaid the emperor *Mauritius*) *then is he murtherous.* To be ſtedfaſt and ſure in taking revenge is thought a point of honour, and a defenſative againſt new injuries. But wrongfully; for it is oppoſite to the rule of Chriſtianity; and ſuch a quality diſcovered, makes them deadly enemies, who otherwiſe would have repented, and ſought to make amends for the wrong done in paſſion. This was it which wrought ſo much woe to the *Carthaginians*, teaching *Matho* and his *Africans* to ſuſpect even their gentleneſs, as the introduction to extreme rigour. Like unto the errors of princes and governors are the errors of laws. Where one and the ſame puniſhment is awarded unto the leſs offence, and unto the greater, he that hath adventured to rob a man, is eaſily tempted to kill him, for his own ſecurity.

Againſt theſe inconveniences, mercy and ſeverity, uſed with due reſpect, are the beſt remedies. In neither of which *Amilcar* failed. For, as long as theſe his own ſoldiers were any way likely to be reclaimed by gentle courſes, his humanity was ready to invite them; but when they were tranſported with beaſtly outrage, beyond all regard of honeſty and ſhame, he rewarded their villainy with anſwerable vengeance, caſting them unto wild beaſts to be devoured.

Until this time, *Hanno*, with the army under his command, had kept himſelf apart from *Amilcar*, and done little, as may ſeem, for that nothing is remembered of him ſince his late loſſes. Neither was *Amilcar* ſorry to want his help, as being able to do better without him. But when the war grew to ſuch extremity as threatened utter ruin to one or the other ſide, then was *Hanno* ſent for, and came to *Amilcar*, with whom he joined his forces. By this acceſs of ſtrength *Amilcar* was not enabled to do more than in former times; rather he could now perform nothing; ſuch was the hatred between him and his unworthy colleague. The towns of *Utica* and *Hippagreta*, that had ſtood always firm on the *Carthaginian* party, did now revolt unto the enemy, murthering all the ſoldiers that they had in garriſon, and caſting their bodies forth, without ſuffering them to be buried. The proviſions brought by ſea for maintenance of the army, were loſt in foul weather; and *Carthage* itſelf ſtood in danger of being beſieged, about which *Matho* and *Spendius* conſulted, whilſt one of the *Carthaginian* generals did (as it were) bind the others hands.

It hath in all ages been uſed as the ſafeſt courſe, to ſend forth in great expeditions, two generals of one army. This was the common practice of thoſe two mighty cities *Athens* and *Rome*, which other ſtates and princes have often imitated; perſwading themſelves, that great armies are not ſo well conducted by one as by two; who, out of emulation to excel each other, will uſe the greater diligence. They have alſo joined two chief commanders in equal commiſſion, upon this further conſideration; the better to reſtrain the ambition of any one that ſhould be truſted with ſo great a ſtrength. For hereof all common-weals have been jealous, having been taught by their examples, that have made themſelves tyrants over thoſe cities and ſtates that have employed them. In this point the *Venetians* have been ſo circumſpect, as they have, for the moſt part, truſted ſtrangers, and not their own, in all the wars that they have made. It is true, that the equal authority of two commanding in chief, ſerveth well to bridle the ambition of one or both, from turning upon the prince or ſtate that hath given them truſt; but in managing the war itſelf, it is commonly the cauſe of ill ſucceſs. In wars made near unto *Rome* itſelf, when two good friends were conſuls, or ſuch two at leaſt as concurred in one deſire of triumph; which honour (the greateſt of any that *Rome* could give) was to be obtained by that one year's ſervice; it is no marvel, though each of the conſuls did his beſt, and referred all his thoughts unto none other end than victory: Yet in all dangerous caſes, when the conſuls proceeded otherwiſe than was deſired, one dictator was appointed, whoſe power was neither hindered by any partner, nor by any great limitation. Neither was it indeed the manner to ſend forth both the conſuls to one war; but each went whither his lot called him, to his own province, unleſs one buſineſs ſeemed to require them both, and they alſo ſeemed fit to be joined in the adminiſtration. Now, although it was ſo that the *Romans* did many times prevail with their joint generals; yet was this never or ſeldom, without as much concord as any other virtue of the commanders. For their modeſty hath often been ſuch, that the leſs able captain, though of equal authority, hath willingly ſubmitted himſelf to the other, and obeyed his directions. This notwithſtanding, they have many times, by ordaining two commanders of one army, received great and moſt dangerous overthrows; whereof in the ſecond *Punic* war we ſhall find examples. On the contrary ſide, in their wars moſt remote, that were always managed by one, they ſeldom failed to win exceeding honour, as hereafter ſhall appear. Now, of thoſe ten generals which ſerved the *Athenians* at the battel of *Marathon*, it may truly be ſaid, that had not their temper been better than the judgment of the people that ſent them forth, and had not they ſubmitted themſelves to the conduction of *Miltiades*, their affairs had found the ſame ſucceſs which they found at other times, when they coupled *Nicias* and *Alcibiades* together in *Sicily*; the one being ſo over-wary, and the other ſo haſty, as all came to nought that they undertook; whereas *Cimon* alone, as alſo *Ariſtides* and others, having ſole charge of all, did their country and common-weal moſt remarkable ſervice. For it is hard to find two great captains of equal diſcretion and valour; but that the one hath more of fury than of judgment, and ſo the contrary, by which the beſt occaſions are as often over-ſlip'd, as at other times many actions are unſeaſonably undertaken. I remember it well, that when the prince of *Condy* was ſlain after the battel of *Jarnac* (which prince, together with the admiral *Chaſtillon*, had the conduct of the *Proteſtant* army) the *Proteſtants* did greatly bewail the loſs of the ſaid prince, in reſpect of his religion, perſon and birth; yet comforting themſelves, they thought it rather an advancement

vancement than an hindrance to their affairs. For ſo much did the valour of the one out-reach the adviſedneſs of the other, as whatſoever the admiral intended to win by attending the advantage, the prince adventured to loſe, by being over-confident in his own courage.

But we need no better example than of the *Carthaginians* in this preſent buſineſs; who, though they were ſtill ſick of their ill-grounded love to *Hanno*, and were unwilling to diſgrace him; yet ſeeing that all ran towards ruin, through the diſcord of the generals, committed the deciſion of their controverſies unto the army that ſerved under them. The judgment of the army was, that *Hanno* ſhould depart the camp; which he did; and *Hannibal* was ſent in his ſtead, one that would be directed by *Amilcar*, and that was enough.

After this, the affairs of *Carthage* began to proſper ſomewhat better. *Matho* and *Spendius* had brought their army near unto the city, and lay before it as in a ſiege. They might well be bold to hope and adventure much, having in their camp above fifty thouſand, beſides thoſe that lay abroad in garriſons. Nevertheleſs, the city was too ſtrong for them to win by aſſault, and the entrance of victuals they could not hinder, if any ſhould be ſent in by friends from abroad.

Hieron, king of *Syracuſe*, though during the wars in *Sicily* he aſſiſted the *Romans*, and ſtill continued in their alliance, yet now ſent ſuccours to the *Carthaginians*, fearing their fall, and conſequently his own; becauſe, if no other ſtate gave the *Romans* ſomewhat to trouble their diſgeſtion, the principality of *Syracuſe* would ſoon be devoured by them. The *Romans* alſo gave them ſome ſlender aſſiſtance, and for the preſent, refuſed good offers made unto them by the mercenaries. This they did to ſhew a kind of noble diſpoſition; which was indeed but counterfeit, as the ſequel manifeſtly proved.

Whilſt *Matho* and his followers were buſily preſſing the city, *Amilcar* was as diligent in waiting at their backs and cutting off all that came to their ſupply; ſo that finding themſelves more ſtraitly beſieged by him than *Carthage* was by them, they purpoſed to deſiſt from their vain attempt, and try ſome other courſe. Hereupon they iſſue into the field; where *Spendius*, and one *Zarcas*, an *African* captain aſſiſting the rebellion, take upon them to find *Amilcar* work, leaving *Matho* in *Tunis*, to negotiate with their friends, and take a general care of the buſineſs. The elephants of *Carthage*, and horſe of *Naravaſus*, made *Spendius* fearful to deſcend into the plains. Wherefore he betook himſelf to his former method of war, keeping the mountains and rough grounds, or occupying the ſtraiteſt paſſages, wherein the deſperate courage of his men might ſhew itſelf with little diſadvantage. But *Amilcar* had more ſkill in this art than could be matched by the labour of *Spendius*. He drew the enemy to many ſkirmiſhes; in all which the ſucceſs was ſuch, as added courage to his own men, and abated the ſtrength and ſpirit of the rebels. Thus he continued provoking them night and day; ſtill intrapping ſome of them, and ſometimes giving them the overthrow in plain battel, until at length he got them into a ſtraight, whence ere they ſhould get out, he meant to take of them a good account. Their judgment was enough to perceive their own diſadvantage; and therefore they had the leſs ſtomach to fight, but awaited for help from *Tunis*. *Amilcar* prudently foreſeeing, that neceſſity might teach them to dare impoſſibilities, uſed the benefit of their preſent fear, and ſhut them cloſe up with trench and rampart. There they waited miſerably for ſuccour that came not; and having ſpent all their victuals, were ſo pinched with hunger, that they fed upon the bodies of their priſoners. This they ſuffered patiently, as knowing that they had not deſerved any favour from *Carthage*, and hoping that their friends at *Tunis* would not be unmindful of them. But when they were driven to ſuch extremity that they were fain to devour their own companions, and yet ſaw none appearance or likelihood of relief, their obſtinacy was broken, and they threatened their captains with what they had deſerved, unleſs they would go forth to *Amilcar*, and ſeek ſuch peace as might be gotten. So *Spendius*, *Zarcas* and *Autarius*, fell to conſultation, wherein it was reſolved to obey the multitude, and yield themſelves, if it were ſo required, unto the death, rather than to periſh by the hands of their own companions. Hereupon they ſend to crave parley, which is granted; and theſe three come forth to talk with *Amilcar* in perſon. What they could ſay unto him it is hard to conjecture; yet, by the conditions which *Amilcar* granted, it ſeems that they took the blame upon themſelves, and craved pardon for the multitude. The conditions were, that the *Carthaginians* ſhould chuſe out of the whole number of theſe enemies any ten whom they pleaſed, to remain at their diſcretion; and that the reſt ſhould all be diſmiſſed, each in his ſhirt, or in one ſingle coat. When the peace was thus concluded, *Amilcar* told theſe ringleaders, that he choſe them preſently as part of the ten, and ſo commanded to lay hands on them; the reſt he forthwith went to fetch, with his whole army in order. The rebels, who knew not that peace was concluded upon ſo gentle articles, thought themſelves betrayed; and therefore amazedly ran to arms. But they wanted captains to order them, and the ſame aſtoniſhment that made them break the covenants of peace, whereof they were ignorant, gave unto *Amilcar* both colour of juſtice in accompliſhing revenge, and eaſe in doing the execution. They were all ſlain, being forty thouſand or more in number.

This was a famous exploit, and the news thereof exceeding welcome to *Carthage*, and terrible to the revolted cities of *Africa*. Henceforward, *Amilcar*, with his *Naravaſus* and *Hannibal*, carried the war from town to town, and found all places ready to yield: *Utica* and *Hippagreta* only ſtanding out, upon fear of deſerved vengeance; and *Tunis* being held by *Matho*, with the remainder of his army. It was thought fit to begin with *Tunis*, wherein lay the chief ſtrength of the enemy. Coming before this town they brought forth *Spendius*, with his fellows, in view of the defendants, and crucified them under the walls, to terrify thoſe of his old companions that were ſtill in arms. With this rigour the ſiege began, as if ſpeedy victory had been aſſured. *Hannibal* quartered on that part of *Tunis* which lay towards *Carthage*, *Amilcar* on the oppoſite ſide; too far aſunder to help one another in ſudden accidents, and therefore it behoved each to be the more circumſpect.

Matho from the walls beheld his own deſtiny in the miſery of his companion, and knew not how to avoid it otherwiſe, than by a caſt at dice with fortune. So he broke out upon that part of the *Carthaginian* army that lay ſecure, as if all danger were paſt, under the command of *Hannibal*; and with ſo great and unexpected fury he ſallied, that after an exceeding ſlaughter he took *Hannibal* priſoner; on whom, and thirty the moſt noble of the *Carthaginian* priſoners, he preſently revenged the death of *Spendius* by the ſame torture. Of this

Amilcar knew nothing till it was too late; neither had he ſtrength enough remaining, after this great loſs, to continue the ſiege, but was fain to break it up, and remove unto the mouth of the river *Bagradas*, where he encamped.

The terror was no leſs within *Carthage* upon the fame of this loſs, than had been the joy of the late great victory. All that could bear arms were ſent into the field under *Hanno*, whom, it ſeems, they thought the moſt able of their captains ſurviving the late accidents of war. If there were any law among them forbidding the employment of one ſole general near unto their city (for they are known to have truſted one man abroad) the time did not permit, in this haſty exigent, to deviſe about repealing it. But thirty principal men are choſen by the ſenate to bring *Hanno* to *Amilcar*'s camp, and by all good perſwaſions to reconcile them. This could not be effected in one day. It nearly touched *Amilcar* in his honour, that the careleſneſs of *Hannibal* ſeemed to be imputed unto him, by ſending his enemy to moderate his proceedings. Nevertheleſs, after many conferences, the authority of the ſenators prevailed; *Amilcar* and *Hanno* were made friends; and thenceforth, whilſt this war laſted, *Hanno* took warning by *Hannibal*'s calamities to follow good directions, though afterwards he returned to his old and deadly hatred.

In the mean ſeaſon *Matho* was come abroad; as meaning to uſe the reputation of his late ſucceſs, whilſt it gave ſome life unto his buſineſs. He had reaſon to do as he did, but he wanted ſkill to deal with *Amilcar*. The ſkirmiſhes and light exerciſes of war, wherein *Amilcar* trained his *Carthaginians*, did ſo far abate the ſtrength, and withal diminiſh the credit of *Matho*, that he reſolved try the fortune of one battel; wherein either his own deſire ſhould be accompliſhed, or his cares ended. To this concluſion the *Carthaginians* were no leſs prone than *Matho*, as being weary of theſe long troubles and inſupportable expences; confident in the valour of their own men, which had approved itſelf in many trials, and well aſſured of *Amilcar*'s great worth, whereunto the enemy had not what to oppoſe. According to this determination, each part was diligent in making proviſion, inviting their friends to help, and drawing forth into the field all that lay in garriſon.

The iſſue of this battel might have been foretold without help of witchcraft. *Matho* and his followers had nothing whereon to preſume, ſave their daring ſpirits, which had been well cooled by the many late ſkirmiſhes, wherein they had learned how to run away. The *Carthaginians* had reaſon to dare, as having often been victorious, and in all points elſe they had the better of their enemies; eſpecially (which is worth all the reſt) they had ſuch a commander, as was not eaſily to be matched in that age. Neither was it likely, that the deſire of liberty ſhould work ſo much, in men accuſtomed to ſervitude, as the honour of their ſtate would, in citizens, whoſe future and preſent good lay all at once engaged in that adventure. So the *Carthaginians* won a great victory, wherein moſt of the *Africans* their enemies were ſlain; the reſt fled into a town which was not to be defended, and therefore they all yielded, and *Matho* himſelf was taken alive. Immediately upon this victory, all the *Africans* that had rebelled made ſubmiſſion to their old maſters: *Utica* only and *Hippagreta* ſtood out, as knowing how little they deſerved of favour. But they were ſoon forced to take what conditions beſt pleaſed the victors. *Matho* and his fellows were led to *Carthage* in triumph; where they ſuffered all torments that could be deviſed, in recompence of the miſchiefs which they had wrought in this war. The war had laſted three years and about four months, when it came to this good end: which the *Carthaginians*, whoſe ſubjects did not love them, ſhould with leſs expence, by contenting their mercenaries, have prevented in the beginning.

SECT. IV.

How the mercenaries of the Carthaginians, *that were in* Sardinia, *rebelled: and were afterwards driven out by the* iſlanders. *The faithleſs dealing of the* Romans *with the* Carthaginians, *in taking from them* Sardinia, *contrary to the peace.*

WHILST *Matho* and *Spendius* were making terrible combuſtion in *Afric*, other mercenaries of the *Carthaginians* had kindled the like fire in *Sardinia*: where murdering *Boſtar* the governour, and other *Carthaginians*, they were in hope to get, and hold that iſland to their own uſe. Againſt theſe one *Hanno* was ſent with a ſmall army (ſuch as could be ſpared in that buſy time) conſiſting likewiſe of mercenaries, levied on the ſudden. But theſe companions that followed *Hanno*, finding it more for their ſafety, and preſent profit, to join themſelves with thoſe that were already revolted, than to endanger themſelves by battel, for the good of that common-weal, of which they had no care, began to enter into practice with the *Sardinian* rebels; offering to run one courſe of fortune with them in their enterprize. This their offer was kindly taken; but their faith was ſuſpected. Wherefore, to take away all jealouſie and diſtruſt, they reſolved to hang up their commander *Hanno*, and performed it. A common practice it hath been in all ages, with thoſe that have undertaken the quarrel of an unjuſt war, to enjoin the performance of ſome notorious and villanous act, to thoſe that come into them as ſeconds, with offer to partake, and to aſſiſt the impious purpoſes which they have in hand. It is indeed the beſt pawn, that deſperate men can deliver to each other, to perform ſome ſuch actions, as are equally unpardonable to all.

By ſuch a kind of cruelty did the ungrateful *Mantineans* murder a garriſon of *Achaians*, ſent unto them for their defence againſt the *Lacedemonians* by *Aratus*; who, when he had formerly poſſeſs'd himſelf of their city, by right of war, did not only ſpare the ſack and ſpoil thereof, but gave them equal freedom with the reſt of the cities united. Theſe *Revolts* are alſo common in our court-wars; where, in the conqueſts of new fortunes, and making of new parties, and factions, without the depreſſion or deſtruction of old friends, we cannot be received and truſted by old enemies. *Ce ſont les coups de vieille eſcrime. Theſe* (ſay the *French*) *be the blows of the old art of fencing.*

Theſe mercenaries in *Sardinia* were no whit leſs violent in their purpoſes, than were *Spendius* and his Aſſociates: only they wanted a *Matho* among them, to negotiate with the inhabitants of the province. The iſlanders were no leſs glad, than the ſoldiers, that the *Carthaginians* were expelled the country: but they could not agree about the profit of the victory. The *Sardinians* thought that it was enough, if they rewarded the ſoldiers for their pains taken. Contrariwiſe, the ſoldiers were of opinion, that the title of the *Carthaginians* to that iſle, was devolved unto themſelves, by right of conqueſt. The ſame quarrel would (in likelihood) have riſen, between *Spendius* with his mercenaries, and their *African* friends, if the common deſire of both

both had once taken effect: unleſs the riches of *Carthage*, had ſerved to content them all. But in *Sardinia*, where there was none other valuable reward, than poſſeſſion and rule of the country, the matter was not eaſily taken up. So they fell to blows; which, how they were dealt I know not; but finally, the mercenaries were driven out, and compelled to ſave themſelves in *Italy*. Before their departure out of *Sardinia*, they had invited the *Romans* into it, with as good right, as the *Mamertines* had called them into *Sicily*. Yet this offer was refuſed, upon reaſons that follow.

Some *Italian* merchants had relieved *Matho* and *Spendius* with corn; of whom the *Carthaginians* took almoſt five hundred, and held them in priſon. Hereof was made a great complaint: ſo that the *Romans* ſent ambaſſadors to *Carthage*, requiring ſatisfaction. It was no time for the *Carthaginians* to diſpute: they quietly yielded to releaſe them all. This was ſo kindly taken, that they forbad all their merchants, to trade thenceforth with the rebels; admoniſhing them to carry all proviſions to *Carthage*. And upon the ſame reaſon, did they forbear to meddle with *Sardinia*, or to accept the city of *Utica*, offering it ſelf unto their ſubjection. This might have ſerved, as a notable example of the *Roman* faith, to all poſterity: had not the iſſue proved, that it was mere regard of greater profit; which kept them ſo temperate, no longer than the hope laſted of thriving better thereby, than they ſhould have done by open breach of faith. The whole eſtate of *Carthage* depended, at that time, upon the virtue of *Amilcar*: who, had he been overthrown by *Spendius* or *Matho*, in one main battel, that mighty city muſt either have fallen into the barbarous hands of mercileſs villains, or have humbled her ſelf under protection of the *Romans*, with whom ſhe had lately ſtriven for ſuperiority. That extream neceſſity, whereinto *Matho* reduced the city, by the fortune of one ſally made out of *Tunis*, is enough to prove, that *Carthage* was not far from ſuch a miſerable choice. Wherefore it was not unwiſely done of the *Romans*, to make ſuch demonſtration of kindneſs, and honourable dealing, as might invite a rich, but ſinking ſhip to run her ſelf aground upon their ſhore. But when all was well ended in *Afric*, and the *Carthaginians* began to prepare for the recovery of *Sardinia*, then did ambition put off her goodly vizor. The *Romans* perceiving that *Carthage*, beyond their hope, had recovered her feet again, began to ſtrike at her head. They entertained the proffer of thoſe mercenaries, that were fled out of *Sardinia*; and they denounced war againſt this enfeebled and impoveriſhed city, under a ſhameleſs pretence, *that the preparations made for* Sardinia, *were made indeed againſt* Rome *it ſelf*. The *Carthaginians* knew themſelves unable to reſiſt; and therefore yielded to the *Romans* demand; renouncing unto them all their right in *Sardinia*. But this was not enough. They would have twelve hundred talents, in recompence belike (for I ſee not what reaſon they could alledge) of the great fear which they had endured, of an invaſion from *Carthage*. It is indeed plain, that they impudently ſought occaſion of war. But neceſſity taught the *Carthaginians* patience; and the money was paid, how hardly ſoever it was raiſed. From this time forward, let not *Rome* complain of the *Punic* faith, in breach of covenants: ſhe her ſelf hath broken the peace already, which *Amilcar* purpoſeth to make her dearly repent; but what *Amilcar* lives not to perform, ſhall be accompliſhed by *Hannibal* his renowned ſon.

SECT. V.

How the affairs of Carthage *went between the* African *rebellion, and the ſecond* Punic *war.*

THE injurious dealing of the *Romans*, expreſſing their deſire to pick a quarrel, ſerved to inſtruct the *Carthaginians* in a neceſſary leſſon. That either they muſt make themſelves the ſtronger, or elſe reſolve to be obedient unto thoſe that were more mighty. In a city long accuſtomed to rule, the braver determination eaſily took place: and the beſt means were thought upon, for the increaſe of puiſſance and empire. The ſtrength, and the jealouſy of the *Romans*, forbad all attempts upon the *Mediterranean* ſeas; but the riches of *Spain*, that lay upon the *Ocean*, were unknown to *Rome*: wherefore that province might ſerve, both to exerciſe the *Carthaginians* in war, and to repair their decayed forces, with all needful ſupplies. Of this *Spaniſh* expedition, the charge and ſoveraign truſt was committed unto *Amilcar*: upon whom his country did wholly repoſe it ſelf; in hope to recover ſtrength by his means, that had ſaved it from ruin.

Hanno, with ſome other envious men, that were of his faction, took little pleaſure in the general love and honour, which daily increaſed towards *Amilcar* and his friends. Yet could they not deny him to be the moſt worthy of command in all the city: only they commended peace and quietneſs; adviſing men to beware of provoking the *Romans*, in whoſe amity, they ſaid, that the felicity of *Carthage* did conſiſt. By ſuch diſcourſes, harſh to the ears of good citizens, who had feeling of the wrong done to their common-weal, they got none other reputation, than of ſingularity: which the ignorant ſort ſuſpected to be wiſdom.

But the glory of *Amilcar* was continually upheld and enlarged, by many notable ſervices that he did, to the ſingular benefit of his country. He paſſed the ſtreights of *Hercules* (now called the ſtreights of *Gibraltar*) and landed on the weſtern coaſt of *Spain*; in which country, during nine years that he lived there, he ſubjected unto the ſtate of *Carthage* the better part of all thoſe provinces. But finally, in a battel that he fought with a nation in *Portugal*, called the *Vettones* (defending himſelf a long time with an admirable reſolution) he was invironed and ſlain: carrying with him to the grave the ſame great honour and fame, by which, in many ſignal victories, he had acquired the name of a ſecond *Mars*.

After the death of *Amilcar*, *Aſdrubal* his ſon-in-law was made general of the *Carthaginian* forces in *Spain*. This was a good man of war; but far better in practice and cunning, than in deeds of arms. By his notable dexterity in matter of negotiation, he greatly enlarged the dominion of *Carthage*: adding ſo many ſubjects and confederates thereunto, that the *Romans* began to grow jealous again of this haſty increaſe. He built a goodly city, upon a commodious haven, in the kingdom of *Granada*, oppoſite to that of *Oran* in *Africa*, and gave it the name of *New Carthage*, which to this day it nearly retaineth, being called now *Carthagena*.[a] With this ſucceſs of the *Carthaginians* in *Spain*, the *Romans* were not a little troubled, but begin to cauſe their own negligence. For

[a] *The* Spaniards *have ſince built a city of the ſame name in the* Weſt-Indies: *which being peopled by them in the year* 1532, *was ſack'd by the* Engliſh *in the year* 1585.

whereas

whereas they had formerly taken ſo much pains to beat them out of the iſle of *Sicily*, as ſuſpecting their neighbourhood there; they had now, by cumbering themſelves in a war of far leſs importance (whereof I ſhall ſpeak anon) given them leiſure, without interruption, to recover upon their own continent, a dominion by far exceeding, both in the bodies of men and in revenue, that which the *Romans* had taken from them. But how to help this, at the preſent they knew not; for they daily expected to be invaded by the *Gauls*, their ancient enemies, and neareſt neighbours to the weſt. But he needeth little help of force, that knoweth himſelf to be feared: it is enough if he requeſt, ſince his requeſt ſhall have the virtue of a command.

Yet were the *Romans* utterly deſtitute of all good colour, that might help them to intermeddle in *Spain*. The *Spaniards* were then unacquainted with *Rome*, whereof (in probability) they ſcarce had heard the name: ſo that there were no *Mamertines*, nor other ſuch rebels, to call in *Roman* ſuccours. But in the enterprize of *Sardinia*, the *Romans* had learned an impudent pretence, that might alſo ſerve their turn in *Spain*. For though it were apparent, that the *Spaniſh* affairs had no relation to the peace between theſe two cities; and though it were nothing likely, that *Aſdrubal* had any purpoſe, to extend his victories unto the gates of *Rome*, or to any of the *Roman* frontiers: yet (as if ſome ſuch matter had been ſuſpected) they ſent unto him, requiring that he ſhould forbear to proceed any further, than to the river of *Iberus*. In addreſſing their meſſengers, rather to *Aſdrubal*, than to the city of *Carthage*; they ſeem to have hoped, that howſoever the generality of the *Carthaginians* had ſweetly ſwallowed many bitter pills, to avoid all occaſion of war with *Rome*: yet the bravery of one man might prove more faſtidious, and, reſenting the injury, return ſuch anſwer, as would entangle his whole country in the quarrel, that they ſo much deſired; and might embrace at leiſure, when once they had found apparent cauſe. But *Aſdrubal* finely deluded their expectation. He pretended no manner of diſlike at all: and whereas they would have this inſolent covenant inſerted into the articles of peace, he took upon him to do it, of his own power, with ſuch appearance of conformity to their will, that they went their ways contented, and ſought no further.

If it had been ſo, that the ſtate of *Carthage*, thereunto preſſed by the *Romans*, for fear of preſent war, had ratified this new compoſition made by *Aſdrubal*, yet ſhould it not have ſtood bound in honour, to obſerve the ſame carefully, unleſs an oath had alſo been extorted, to make all ſure. But ſince all paſſed quietly, under the bare authority of *Aſdrubal*, this capitulation was none other in effect, than a ſecond breach of peace; whereof the *Romans* might be accuſed more juſtly, than they could accuſe the *Carthaginians* of perjury, (as they after did) for refuſing to ſtand to it.

By this treaty with *Aſdrubal*, the *Romans* won ſome reputation in *Spain*. For when it was once conceived by the *Spaniards*, that the city which would needs be miſtreſs over them, ſtood in fear her ſelf, of receiving blows from a ſtouter dame, there were ſoon found ſome, that by offering themſelves to the protection of *Rome*, became (as they thought) fellow-ſervants with *Carthage*. But the *Carthaginians* will ſhortly teach them another leſſon. The *Saguntines*, a people on the ſouth-ſide of *Iberus*, entred into confederacy with the *Romans*, and were gladly accepted. Surely it was lawful unto the *Romans*, to admit the *Saguntines*, or any other people (neither ſubject, nor open enemy in war to the *Carthaginians*) into their ſociety: and unlawful it was unto the *Carthaginians*, to uſe violence towards any that ſhould thus once become confederate with *Rome*. Nevertheleſs, if we conſider the late agreement made with *Aſdrubal*, we ſhall find that the *Romans* could have none other honeſt colour of requiring it, than an implicit covenant of making the river *Iberus* a bound, over which they themſelves would not paſs, in any diſcovery or conqueſt by them intended to be made upon *Spain*: in which regard, they might have ſome honeſt pretence to require the like of the *Carthaginians*; though *Rome* as yet had no foot, on the one ſide of *Iberus*, whereas *Carthage*, on the other ſide of that river, held almoſt all the country. Howſoever it were, this indignity was not ſo eaſily digeſted, as former injuries had been. For it was a matter of ill conſequence, that the nations which had heard of no greater power than the *Carthaginian*, ſhould behold *Saguntum* reſting ſecurely among them, upon confidence of help from a more mighty city. Wherefore either in this reſpect; or for that the ſenſe is moſt feeling of the lateſt injuries; or rather for that now the *Carthaginians* were of power to do themſelves right, war againſt *Saguntum* was generally thought upon, let the *Romans* take it how they liſt. In ſuch terms were the *Carthaginians*, when *Aſdrubal* died, after he had commanded in *Spain* eight years: (being ſlain by a ſlave, whoſe maſter he had put to death) and the great *Hannibal*, ſon of the great *Amilcar*, was choſen general in his ſtead.

SECT. VI.

The eſtate of Greece *from the death of* Pyrrhus, *to the reign of* Philip *the ſon of* Demetrius *in* Macedon.

IN the long term of the firſt *Punic* war, and the vacation following, between it and the ſecond, the eſtate of *Greece*, after the death of *Pyrrhus*, was grown ſomewhat like unto that, wherein *Philip* of *Macedon* had found it; though far weaker, as in an after-ſpring. The whole country had recovered, by degrees, a form of liberty: the petty tyrannies (bred of thoſe inferior captains, which in the times of general combuſtion, had ſeized each upon ſuch ſmall towns as he could get) were, by force or accident, extirpated and reformed; and ſome ſtates were riſen to ſuch greatneſs, as not only ſerved to defend themſelves, but to give protection to others. This converſion to the better, proceeded from the like diſſenſions and tumults in *Macedon*, as had been in *Greece*, when *Philip* firſt began to incroach upon it. For after many quarrels and great wars, about the kingdom of *Macedon*, between *Antigonus* the elder, *Caſſander*, *Demetrius*, *Lyſimachus*, *Seleucus*, *Pyrrhus*, and the *Gauls*, *Antigonus*, the ſon of *Demetrius*, finally got and held it, reigning ſix and thirty years; yet ſo, that he was divers times thence expelled, not only by the *Gauls*, and by *Pyrrhus*, as hath been already ſhewed, but by *Alexander* the ſon of *Pyrrhus* the *Epirot*, from whoſe father he had hardly won it. This happened unto him by the revolt of his ſoldiers, even at ſuch time, as having overthrown with great ſlaughter an army of the *Gauls*, he was converting his forces againſt the *Athenians*, whom he compelled to receive his garriſons. But his young ſon *Demetrius* raiſed an army, wherewith he chaced *Alexander*, not only out of *Macedon*, but out of his own *Epirus*, and reſtored his father to the kingdom.

By

By the help of this young prince *Demetrius*, (though in another kind) *Antigonus* got into his poſſeſſion the citadel of *Corinth*; which was juſtly termed *the fetter of Greece*. This citadel; called *Acrocorinthus*, ſtood upon a ſteep rockly hill on the north-ſide of the town; and was by nature and art ſo ſtrong, that it ſeemed impregnable. It commanded the town; which was of much importance, as occupying the whole breadth of the *Iſthmus*, that running between the *Egean* and *Ionic* ſeas, joineth *Peloponneſus* to the main of *Greece*. Wherefore he that held poſſeſſion of this caſtle, was able to cut off all paſſage by land, from one half of *Greece* unto the other; beſides the commodity of the two ſeas, upon both of which, this rich and goodly city had commodious havens. *Alexander*, the ſon of *Polyſperchon*, and, after his death, *Crateſipolis*'s wife, had gotten *Corinth* in the great ſhuffling of provinces and towns, that was made between *Alexander*'s princes. Afterwards it paſſed from hand to hand, until it came, I know not how, to one *Alexander*; of whom I find nothing elſe, than that he was thought to be poiſoned by this *Antigonus*, who deceived his wife *Nicæa* thereof, and got it from her by a trick. The device was this: *Antigonus* ſent his young ſon *Demetrius* to *Corinth*, willing him to court *Nicæa*, and ſeek her in marriage. The fooliſh old widow perceived not how unfit a match ſhe was for the young prince, but entertained the fancy of marriage; whereto the old king was even as ready to conſent, as was his ſon to deſire it, and came thither in perſon to ſolemnize it. Hereupon all *Corinth* was filled with ſacrifices, feaſts, plays, and all ſorts of games: in the midſt of which, *Antigonus* watched his time, and got into the caſtle, beguiling the poor lady, whoſe jealouſy had been exceeding diligent in keeping it. Of this purchaſe he was ſo glad, that he could not contain himſelf within the gravity beſeeming his old age. But as he had ſtollen it, ſo was it again ſtollen from him: neither lived he to revenge the loſs of it, being already ſpent with age.

Demetrius, the ſon of this *Antigonus*, ſucceeding unto his father, reigned ten years. He made greater proof of his virtue before he was king, than after. The *Dardanians*, *Etolians*, and *Achaians*, held him continually buſied in war; wherein his fortune was variable, and for the more part ill. About theſe times the power of the *Macedonians* began to decay: and the *Grecians* to caſt off their yoke.

Philip, the only ſon of *Demetrius*, was a young child when his father died; and therefore *Antigonus*, his uncle, had the charge of the kingdom, during the minority of the prince; but he aſſumed the name and power of a king, though he reſpected *Philip* as his own ſon, to whom he left the crown at his death. This *Antigonus* was called the *Tutor*, in regard of his protectorſhip; and was alſo called *Doſon*, that is as much as *Willgive*, becauſe he was ſlow in his liberality. He repreſſed the *Dardanians*, and *Theſſalians*, which moleſted his kingdom, in the beginning of his reign. Upon confidence of this good ſervice, he took ſtate upon him, as one that rather were king in his own right, than only a protector. Hereupon the people fell to mutiny; but were ſoon appeaſed by fair words, and a ſeeming unwillingneſs of his to meddle any more with the government. The *Achaians* took from him the city of *Athens*, ſoon after *Demetrius*'s death; and likely they were to have wrought him out of all or moſt that he held in *Greece*, if their own eſtate had not been endangered by a nearer enemy. But civil diſſenſion, which had overthrown the power of *Greece*, when it flouriſhed moſt, overthrew it eaſily now again, when it had ſcarcely recovered ſtrength after a long ſickneſs; and gave to this *Antigonus* no leſs authority therein, than *Philip*, the father of *Alexander*, got by the like advantage.

Theſe *Achaians*, from ſmall beginnings, had increaſed in ſhort time to great ſtrength and fame: ſo that they grew the moſt redoubted nation of all the *Greeks*. By the equality of their laws, and by their clemency (notwithſtanding that they were a long time held under by the *Macedonians* and *Spartans*) they did not only draw all others by their love and alliance; but induced, through their example, the reſt of the cities of *Peloponneſus*, to be governed by one law, and to uſe one and the ſame ſort of weights, meaſure, and money.

Aratus, the *Sicyonian*, was the firſt that united them again; and gave them courage, after that they had been by the *Macedonian* captains divided into many principalities. In elder times they were governed by kings, as moſt of the great cities of *Greece* were; to which kind of rule they firſt ſubjected themſelves, after the deſcent of the *Heraclidæ*, when *Tiſamenus* the ſon of *Oreſtes* poſſeſs'd the territory of *Achaia*. In this eſtate they continued to the time of *Gyges*; after whom, when his ſons ſought to change the legal government of their predeceſſors into tyranny, they expelled them, and made their ſtate popular; as ſeeming moſt equal. This form of common-weal had continuance, with ſome ſmall changes according to the diverſity of times, till the reign of *Philip* and *Alexander*, kings of *Macedon*: who tempeſt-like overturned all things in that part of the world. For thoſe twelve cities, called *the cities of alliance*, whereof *Helice*, and *Bura* or *Olenus*, the ſea had eaten up a little before the battel of *Leuctres*; were, by diſturbance of the *Macedonians*, divided from each other, and trained into a war, no leſs fooliſh than cruel, among themſelves. But in the one hundred and four and twentieth *Olympiad*, in which, or near it, *Ptolemy* the ſon of *Lagus*, *Lyſimachus*, *Seleucus*, and *Ptolemy Ceraunns*, left the world; two of the ten remaining cities and people, namely, the *Patrenſes* and the *Dimei*, united themſelves, and laid the foundation of that general accord, and re-union, which after followed. For having been, ſome of them partiſans with ſundry *Macedonian* captains, and others having been governed by petty kings, they began to faſten themſelves in a ſtrong league of amity, partly in the *Olympiad* before ſpoken of, and partly at ſuch a time as *Pyrrhus* made his firſt voyage into *Italy*. Now after the uniting of the *Patrenſes* and *Dimei*, to whom all the cities of *Tritea*, and *Phara*, joined themſelves, *Egira* chaſed out her garriſons: and the *Burians*, killing their kings, entred with the *Ceraunians*, into the ſame confederacy. Theſe cities, for twenty and five years, uſed the ſame form of government with the *Achaians*; who, by a ſenatory and two pretors, ordered all things in their common-weal; and ſoon after, by one pretor, or commander: of which *Marcus Carynenſis* was the firſt, and *Aratus* the ſecond.

This *Aratus* was a noble young gentleman of *Sicyon*, who living at *Argos* in exile, whilſt his country was oppreſſed by tyrants, found means, through the help of other baniſhed men, to enter their own city by night, with ladders; whence they chaced the tyrant, and reſtored the people to liberty. This was in the time of *Antigonus Gonatus*, king of *Macedon*, a prince more buſy in watching what to get among the *Greeks*, than wiſe in looking to his own. For fear of *Antigonus*, the *Sicyonians* entered into the *Achaian* league: which, though at that time it received more increaſe, by their acceſſion, than it

added ſtrength to them; yet the benefit of this conjunction ſerved well enough againſt *Antigonus*, whoſe ſubtilty was ſomewhat greater than his valour. As the induſtry and counſel of *Aratus* delivered his country from bondage, and fortified it by the *Achaian* league; ſo further, by his great liberality, with the exceeding great coſt of one hundred and fifty talents, he pacified the inexplicable controverſies between the baniſhed *Sicyonians*, which returned with him, and the other citizens that had poſſeſſion of theſe mens lands; as alſo with the ſame money he drew many others to aſſiſt him in thoſe enterprizes following, that redounded to the ſingular good of all *Achaia*. The money he obtained of *Ptolemy Euergetes*, king of *Egypt*, who partly had a deſire to hold ſome ſtrong and ſure friendſhip in *Greece*, partly was delighted with the converſation of *Aratus* himſelf, that made a dangerous voyage to him into *Egypt*, and fed his pleaſure in goodly pictures, with the gift of many curious pieces, wherein the workmen of *Sicyon* excelled.

The firſt of *Aratus*'s great attempts, was the ſurprize of the *Acrocorinthus*, or citadel of *Corinth*, which he won by night, being thereinto guided by ſome thieves that he had hired for the purpoſe, who living in the place, had practiſed to rob *Antigonus*'s treaſury, paſſing in and out by a ſecret path among the rocks. Yet was he fain to fight for it, ere he could get it, though indeed *Antigonus*'s ſoldiers were rather overcome by their own fear, than by any force of the aſſailants; as miſtruſting leſt the *Achaians* were more in number, than in truth they were, and having loſt the advantages of the place already, upon which they had preſumed, before they were aware of any enemy.

In theſe kind of night-ſervices, ambuſhments, ſurprizes, and practices, *Aratus* was very cunning, adventurous, and valiant: in open field and plain battel he was as timorous. By this ſtrange mixture of cowardice and courage, he miniſtred argument of diſputation to philoſophers and others; whether a valiant man (as he was eſteemed, and in ſome caſes approved) might look pale and tremble when he began battel; and whether the virtue of fortitude were diverſified by the ſundry natures of men, and in a manner confined unto ſeveral ſorts of action. In reſolving which doubts, it may be ſaid, that all virtue is perfected in man by exerciſe, wherein they are trained by occaſion, though a natural inclination ſtandeth in need of little practice; whereas the defect hereof muſt be ſupplied with much inſtruction, uſe, good ſucceſs, and other help; yet hardly ſhall grow abſolute in general. Such was *Aratus* in matter of war. In ſincere affection to his country he was unreproveable, and ſo acknowledged, as his following actions will truly teſtify.

When *Acrocorinthus* was taken, and joined unto the commonwealth of *Achaia*, the *Megarians* revolted ſoon after from *Antigonus*, and entered into the ſame corporation. So did the *Trezenians*, and the *Epidaurians*, whereby this new-erected ſtate grew ſo powerful, that it adventured to take *Athens* from the *Macedonians*; and *Argos*, and *Megalopolis* from tyrants that held them. The enterprize upon *Athens* was of none effect; for though *Aratus* waſted the iſle of *Salamis*, to ſhew his ſtrength, and ſent home the *Athenian* priſoners without ranſom, to allure the city by ſhew of love; yet the *Athenians* ſtirred neither againſt him, nor for him, as being now grown honeſt ſlaves to the *Macedonians*. Upon *Argos* the adventure was carried more ſtrongly. The *Achaians* came ſometimes to the gates of the city, but the people ſtirred not: once they entered into it, and might have won it, if the citizens would have lent any help to the recovery of their own freedom; ſundry times, and with diverſe events, they fought with the tyrants (who roſe up one after another in *Argos*) in open field, and ſlew one of them in battel; but all ſufficed not, until at length *Ariſtomachus* the tyrant was ſo terrified, perſwaded, and hired by *Aratus*, that he conſented to reſign his eſtate. The like did *Xenon* the tyrant of *Hermione*, and *Cleonymus*, that had oppreſſed the *Phliaſians*. Whilſt this buſineſs with the *Argives* was on foot, *Lyſiadas* the tyrant of *Megalopolis* was ſo well handled by *Aratus*, that, without compulſion, he gave liberty to his city, and annexed it to the council of *Achaia*; whereby he got ſuch credit, that he was choſen general of their forces (which was a yearly office, and might not be held two years together by one man) every ſecond year for a certain while, he and *Aratus* ſucceeding one another by turns. But thoſe late tyrants and new citizens, *Lyſiadas* and *Ariſtomachus* were carried with private paſſion, from care of the general good; in which courſes they oppoſed *Aratus*, to the great hurt of *Achaia*, as ſhall appear in due time.

The *Acheans* having obtained ſo much puiſſance and reputation, that *Ptolemy* king of *Egypt* was become patron of their alliance, and (in title of honour) general of their forces by ſea and land, made open war upon *Demetrius* the ſon of *Antigonus Gonatas*, for the liberty of *Athens*. It is ſtrange, and worthy of noting, that when *Aratus* in this quarrel had loſt a battel, the *Athenians* wore garlands in ſign of joy, to flatter their good lords the *Macedonians*, that had won the victory. Such were now the *Athenians* become, in whom the rule was verified, that holds true in general of the multitude, *Aut humiliter ſervit, aut ſuperbè dominatur*; It is either baſe in ſervice, or inſolent in command. Nevertheleſs, when *Demetrius* was dead, *Aratus* performed that by money which he could not by force; and corrupting the captain of the *Macedonian* garriſon, purchaſed liberty to the *Athenians*, who thenceforth held good correſpondence with the *Acheans*, loving them, and ſpeaking well of them, which was all that they could do; but into their corporation they entered not, ſcorning it, belike, in regard of their own out-worn glory.

Now as the commonwealth of *Achaia* daily increaſed within *Peloponneſus*, by juſtice and honeſty; ſo did the *Etolians*, in the utter part of *Greece*; yea, and within *Peloponneſus* it ſelf, wax very powerful, by ſturdineſs of body, and rude courage in fight, without the help of any other virtue. They had ſtoutly defended themſelves againſt *Antipater* and *Craterus*; partly by daring to do and ſuffer much, partly by the natural ſtrength and faſtneſs of their country; but eſpecially by the benefit of the time, which called away theſe famous captains to other buſineſs, as hath been related. They had moleſted *Caſſander*, in favour of *Antigonus*; and were themſelves as much plagued by him, and by the *Acarnanians*, a little, but ſtout nation, that took his part. Afterwards they had to do with *Demetrius* the ſon of the firſt *Antigonus*, and more or leſs, with all the kings of *Macedon* ſucceeding him. They likewiſe held often war with the *Acarnanians*, *Athamanians*, *Epirots*, and many cities in *Peloponneſus*; ſo that they were hardened with perpetual travel, ſeldom putting off their armour. But their hardineſs ill deſerved the name of valour, ſeeing they had no regard of honeſty or friendſhip; meaſuring all things by their own inſolent will, and thinking all people baſe-minded, that were not as fierce and outragious as themſelves.

Theſe

Theſe *Etolians* had lately made great ſpoils in *Peloponneſus*, and occupied a good part of the country. They had invaded the friends of the *Acheans*, taken and ſacked *Pallene*; where, although they were ſoundly beaten by *Aratus*, yet their deſire of gain made them greedy of a new voyage thither, as to a country wherein ſomewhat was to be gotten. But they were forced to look another way, by *Demetrius* the ſon of *Antigonus Gonatas*, who preſſed them ſo hardly, that they were driven to ſeek help of the *Acheans*, which they obtained. The war, which the *Acheans* made upon *Demetrius*, without *Peloponneſus*, in *Attica*, though it tended to expelling the *Macedons* out of *Greece*; yet the benefit thereof redounded chiefly unto the *Etolians*, at whoſe inſtance it was ſet on foot, for thereby were the *Macedonian* forces diverted from them. Neither was this good turn unacknowledged; though very baſely the *Etolians*, giving thanks in words, deviſed how to requite the benefit with ſome great miſchief. They ſaw that the *Acheans* were deſirous to bring all *Peloponneſus* into their alliance and corporation; of which intent the *Lacedemonians* were very jealous. Wherefore theſe *Etolians* laboured earneſtly to ſet the *Lacedemonians* and *Acheans* together by the ears; hoping that if this might come to paſs, they themſelves ſhould be called in to help (it ſkilled not on what ſide) and ſo get no ſmall ſhare both in booty and territory. Neither did they forbear to communicate this their device unto *Antigonus*, offering to make him partaker of their gain, whom they knew to be offended with the many loſſes that this kingdom had ſuſtained by the *Acheans*. Of this plot *Aratus* was aware, who therefore determined to ſuffer many indignities, rather than to give the *Lacedemonians* cauſe to take arms. But this reſolution was taken ſomewhat too late, and not altogether in his own power to hold. He had been medling with the *Arcadians*, that were dependants of *Lacedemon*, and thereby had provoked the *Lacedemonians* to look about them; ſeeing that all *Peloponneſus*, excepting themſelves, the *Eleans*, and a few *Arcadians* their friends (who alſo were attempted) was already become *Achean*.

The city of *Sparta* was in ill caſe about theſe times, and ſubject to the injuries of any ſtronger neighbour. *Pyrrhus* had greatly weakened it. The *Etolians*, entering *Laconia* with an army, had carried away fifty thouſand ſlaves; and, which was worſe, their diſcipline was corrupted, avarice and luxury reigned among them, the poor was oppreſſed by the rich; and the generoſity of ſpirit, that had ſometime been their general virtue, was hardly now to be found among the beſt of them. There were left in *Sparta* no more than ſeven hundred natural citizens, of whom not above one hundred had lands, all the reſt were needy people, and deſirous of innovation. Hereupon followed inteſtine ſedition, which endangered the city moſt of all. *Agis*, a good king, who ſought to reform the diſorders of the ſtate, exhorted the people to a ſtrict obſervation of *Lycurgus*'s Laws. To which purpoſe he cauſed them to paſs an Act for the aboliſhing of all debts, and equal diviſion of lands. All the younger and poorer ſort were glad of this; but the rich men oppoſed it. Theſe had recourſe to *Leonidas* the other king (for in *Sparta* were two kings) who took their part, being himſelf a diſſolute man, as one trained up in the court of *Syria*, whence alſo he had his wife. In this contention *Leonidas* was expelled the city, and a new king choſen in his ſtead. But *Agis*'s friends and counſellors in this enterprize, abuſed his good meaning to their own private commodity. They were haſty to take away all debts, and cancel all bonds, for they themſelves were deeply indebted; but the diviſion of lands they afterwards hindered, becauſe their own poſſeſſions were great. Hence aroſe a tumult in *Sparta*, which theſe men increaſed, by their foul oppreſſion of the poorer citizens. So that in fine, *Leonidas* was brought home, and reſtored to his kingdom, and the two adverſe kings driven to take ſanctuary; out of which *Cleombrotus*, the late made king, was diſmiſſed into exile: but *Agis* was trained forth, drawn into priſon, and there by his enemies condemned and ſtrangled, together with his mother, and his old grandmother. The like to this was never known in *Sparta*; and (which is the more odious) this cruelty proceeded from the *Ephori*, magiſtrates that ſhould have given patronage to the laws, uſing their power, and more power than to them belonged, againſt a king that had proceeded orderly in reforming the city, as the law required.

The death of *Agis* was much lamented by all good citizens, and ſerved to eſtabliſh the impotent rule of a few tyrannical oppreſſors. In which caſe *Aratus* might well hope to adjoin *Lacedemon* to the *Achean* commonwealth, though it were great injuſtice to take ſuch advantages, and attempt by force, that which would have redounded to the general good of *Peloponneſus*, and to the benefit of *Sparta* it ſelf, if it could have been wrought by perſwaſion.

But the ſame man that redreſſed the diſorders of *Sparta*, and revenged the death of *Agis*, did alſo requite the unjuſt attempts of the *Acheans*, even in their own kind; obtruding upon them by force, an union of all *Peloponneſus*, though little to their good liking, for that the *Lacedemonians* and their king ſhould have been the principal; not they and their prætor. *Leonidas* having thus cauſed *Agis* to be ſlain, took his wife, that was very rich and beautiful, and gave her in marriage (perforce) to his own ſon *Cleomenes*. This young prince fell greatly enamoured on his wife, and ſought to win her affection, as well as he had her perſon. He diſcourſed much with her about the purpoſe of her former huſband *Agis*, and, by pitying his misfortune, began to entertain a deſire of accompliſhing that wherein *Agis* had failed. So coming himſelf to be king whilſt he was very young, he gladly embraced all occaſions of war; for that he hoped by ſtrong hand to effect that, which *Agis*, by proceeding formally, in ſo corrupt an eſtate of the city, had attempted to his own ruin. Therefore, when the *Ephori* gave him in charge to take and fortify *Atheneum*, a temple on the marches of *Laconia*, to which both they and the *Megalopolitans* pretended title: he readily performed it. Hereof *Aratus* made no complaint, but ſought to take by ſurprize *Tegea* and *Orchomenus*, cities then confederate with the *Lacedemonians*; wherein his intelligence failing, he loſt the labour of a painful night's travel, and diſcovered his enmity to *Sparta*, of which *Cleomenes* was nothing ſorry. By theſe degrees the war began. In the entrance whereto *Aratus* had diſcovered the *Etolian* practice, and therefore would have ſtaid the quarrel from proceeding too far. But *Lyſiadas* and *Ariſtomachus* would needs fight, and he could do no other than be ruled by them; eſpecially ſeeing *Cleomenes* was ſo urgent. *Ariſtomachus* was at that time general of the *Acheans* (he and *Lyſiadas* being of great account, ſince they had abandoned their tyranny) who ſent unto *Aratus*, lying then in *Athens*, and required his aſſiſtance in a journey to be made into *Laconia*. No diſſwaſions of *Aratus* would ſerve; therefore he came in perſon, and took part of a buſineſs little pleaſing him in the preſent, and leſs in the future. When he met

met with *Cleomenes*, he durſt not fight, but oppoſed himſelf againſt *Ariſtomachus*, who deſired to give battel; yet had the *Acheans* twenty thouſand foot and one thouſand horſe in their army, whereas *Cleomenes* had no more than five thouſand in all. This gave reputation to the *Lacedemonian*, and raiſed an ill report upon *Aratus*; which *Lyſiadas* helped to make worſe, by accuſing his cowardiſe. Nevertheleſs, the *Acheans* would not fall out with *Aratus* their benefactor, but choſe him their general the year following, againſt *Lyſiadas* his accuſer, that ſued for the place. Being general himſelf, it behoved him to confute with deeds the ſlanderous words of *Lyſiadas*. Therefore he purpoſed to ſet upon the *Eleans*; but was met withal on the way, near unto the mount *Lyceus*, by *Cleomenes*, who vanquiſhed him in a great battel, and drove him to hide himſelf all night for fear; ſo that he was thought to have been ſlain. This miſadventure *Aratus* recompenſed by a trick of his own more natural occupation, performing with his broken army that which could hardly have been expected, had he been victorious; for, whilſt there was no ſuſpicion of any great matter that he could undertake, he ſuddenly wrought with ſome of the *Mantineans*, who did let him into their city. The *Mantineans* did once before join themſelves with the *Achaians*; but ſhortly, upon fear, or ſome other paſſion, they gave themſelves to the *Etolians*, and from the *Etolians*, preſently after this victory, to *Cleomenes*, from whom immediately they were thus won. For this their levity they were not puniſhed, but freely admitted now again into the *Achean* ſociety. As this good ſucceſs repaired the credit of *Aratus*, ſo another battel almoſt ruined it. *Cleomenes* and he encountered near unto *Megalopolis*, where the *Acheans* had ſomewhat of the better at the firſt, but their general durſt not follow his advantage. Thereupon *Lyſiadas*, of whom we ſpake before, grew ſomewhat impatient with anger; and, taking with him all the horſe, brake upon the *Lacedemonians*, whom he routed at the beginning, but purſuing them too far into places of hard paſſage, he was ſlain by them, and his followers driven back upon their own companions, in ſuch ſort, that finally, all the army was diſordered, and put to flight. This was a great loſs, and incenſed the *Acheans* againſt *Aratus*; yet their indignation proceeded no further, than that they refuſed to make any longer contribution towards the pay of thoſe mercenaries which he had waged. This *Aratus* took patiently, and followed the war nevertheleſs; wherein, though *Cleomenes* won ſome towns, and *Aratus* got the better in one ſmall fight, yet little of importance was done, the *Acheans* being weary, and the *Spartan* king intentive to another buſineſs.

Cleomenes, having led into the field all that were like to hinder his purpoſe, and tired them with painful journeys, forſook the *Achean* war on a ſudden, and came unexpected home to *Sparta*, where he ſlew the *Ephori*, and reſtored by force the ancient diſcipline of *Lycurgus*. Then gave he an account of his doings, and ſhewing by what degrees the *Ephori* had incroached upon the power of kings, and many diſorders had grown in the city, he juſtified his proceedings, and forthwith began to make equal diviſion of the lands, reducing all to the firſt inſtitution. He alſo ſupplied the defect of citizens, by chuſing new out of ſuch as were friends to the ſtate, and valiant men; ſo that henceforth his country might not altogether ſtand in need of mercenary help, as it lately had done, to ſave it from the *Etolians*, *Illyrians*, and ſuch other enemies. All this was diſpatched in great haſte; the *Spartans* well ſatisfied, and *Cleomenes* himſelf ready in the field, ere his enemies could take any advantage of this his domeſtic troubles.

The *Acheans*, hearing of this great alteration in *Sparta*, thought that it would be long ere *Cleomenes* durſt iſſue forth of the city, for fear of ſome rebellion. But it was not long ere they heard that he had waſted all the country of *Megalopolis*; had ranged over all *Arcadia* at his pleaſure; and was admitted into *Mantinea*, and ready to take other places, even of *Achaia*. Theſe news diſpleaſed them not a little; but they muſt patiently endure to hear worſe. For, when *Cleomenes* had ſhaken off the power of the *Ephori*, that curbed his authority, he proceeded more roundly in his work, being better obeyed, and by better men. His *Lacedemonians* reſumed their ancient courage; and he himſelf had the heart to demand the principality of *Greece*. He did not therefore henceforth contend about the poſſeſſion of a few towns, but adventured to win or loſe all. The *Etolians*, in favour of his attempt, declared themſelves on his ſide; and, whereas he had gotten *Mantinea*, *Tegea*, and other places, to which they had ſome title, they willingly renounced all their intereſt unto him.

Aratus did apprehend the danger of his country, and ſaw that *Antigonus* with the *Etolians*, or perhaps without them, would ſhortly make an end of that which *Cleomenes* had thus begun. Therefore he deviſed how to provide againſt the worſt, and either to repair all, or (if it could not be) to ſave all from utter ruin. The office of general, when it was next put upon him, he refuſed; fearing to be ſo far preſs'd as to hazard in one battel all the force of his country, to which as he had never any affection, nor perchance courage, ſo was his manner of warfare otherwiſe. For he commonly attempted by ſurprize, and defended upon the advantage of place, after the manner of the *Iriſh*, and of all other nations, overcharged with numbers of men. Yet did he not forſake the care of the weal publick, though, in aiming at the general good, it ſeems that private paſſion drew him into an ill courſe. He ſaw that *Megalopolis* could not be defended without making a dangerous hazard of battel; that *Mantinea* had not only opened her gates unto *Cleomenes*, but ſlain the *Achean* garriſon that lay therein; that other towns had yielded unto him without compulſion; and that *Ariſtomachus*, once tyrant of *Argos*, and ſince general of the *Acheans*, was now revolted unto the enemy, following the fortune of *Cleomenes*. *Ptolemy* was too far off to help, and the nearneſs of *Antigonus* was very dangerous; yet might be uſeful, if this king would (as *Polybius* ſaith) like others, be friend or enemy, as ſhould beſt agree with his own profit. To make trial hereof, *Aratus* practiſed with ſome of *Megalopolis*, whom he found apt unto his purpoſe, and inſtructed them how to deal with both *Antigonus* and the *Acheans*.

The city of *Megalopolis* had been well affected to the *Macedonians* ever ſince the time of *Philip* the father of *Alexander*, who had obliged it unto him by ſome ſpecial benefits. At this time it lay neareſt unto the danger; was very faithful, and therefore deſerved ſuccour, yet could not well be relieved by the *Acheans* with their own proper ſtrength. Wherefore it was thought meet that ambaſſadors ſhould be ſent unto the general council of *Achaia*, requeſting leave and good allowance to try the favour of *Antigonus* in their neceſſity. This was granted, for lack of what elſe to anſwer, and the ſame ambaſſadors diſpatched away to *Antigonus*. They did their own errand briefly; telling

ling him of the good will and reſpect which their city had of long time born unto him and his predeceſſors; of their preſent need, and how it would agree with his honour to give them aid. But when they delivered the more general matter, wherein *Aratus* had given them inſtructions, ſhewing how the ambition of *Cleomenes*, and violence of the *Etolians*, might redound to his own great loſs or danger, if the one and the other were not in time prevented; how *Aratus* himſelf did ſtand affected; and what good likelihood there was of reducing the *Acheans* under the patronage of *Macedon*; then began *Antigonus* to lend a more attentive ear to their diſcourſe. He embraced the motion; and, to give it the more life, he wrote unto the *Megalopolitans*, that his help ſhould not be wanting, ſo far forth as it might ſtand with the *Acheans* good liking. Particularly he commended himſelf by theſe meſſengers to *Aratus*; aſſuring them, that he thought himſelf highly bound to this honourable man, whoſe former actions he now perceived, not to have been grounded upon any hatred to the *Macedonians*, but only upon a juſt and worthy love to his own nation. With this anſwer they return to *Megalopolis*; and are preſently ſent away to the council of *Achaia*, there to make ſome ſpeedy concluſion, as the neceſſity of the time required.

The *Acheans* were glad to hear that *Antigonus* was ſo inclinable to their deſire, and therefore were ready to entertain his favour with all good correſpondence. Hereunto *Aratus* gave his conſent, and praiſed the wiſdom of his countrymen, that ſo well diſcerned the beſt and likelieſt means of their common ſafety: adding nevertheleſs, that it was not amiſs firſt of all to try their own ability; which if it failed, then ſhould they do well to call in this gracious prince, and make him their patron and protector. Thus he ſhewed himſelf moderate, in that which himſelf of all others did moſt wiſh; to the end, that he might not afterwards ſuſtain the common reprehenſion, if any thing fell out amiſs, ſince it might appear, that he had not been author of this decree, but only followed, and that leiſurably, the general conſent.

Nevertheleſs, in true eſtimation, this fineneſs of *Aratus* might have been uſed with his greater commendation, in a contrary courſe. For it had been more honourable to make an end of the war, by yielding unto *Cleomenes* that power which they gave unto *Antigonus*; ſince thereby he ſhould both have freed his country from all further trouble; and withal, ſhould have reſtored unto the univerſal ſtate of *Greece* that honourable condition whereof the *Macedonians* had bereft it. But it is commonly found (which is great pity) that virtue having riſen to honour by degrees, and confirmed itſelf (as it were) in the ſeat of principality, by length of time, and ſucceſs of many actions, can ill endure the haſty growth of any other's reputation, whereby it ſees itſelf likely to be over-topped. Other cauſe to deſpiſe the *Lacedemonians* there was none, than that they lately had been in dangerous caſe; neither could any reaſon be found why *Aratus* ſhould prefer *Antigonus* before *Cleomenes*, than that he had ſtood in doubt of the one, when he thought himſelf more mighty than the other. Wherefore he was juſtly plagued, when he ſaw his own honours reverſed by the inſolent *Macedonians*; and, inſtead of living as a companion with *Cleomenes*, that was deſcended of a long race of kings, the poſterity of *Hercules*, was fain to do ſacrifice unto *Antigonus* as unto a God; and was finally poiſoned by *Philip*, whoſe nobility was but of five deſcents, and whom perhaps he might have ſeen his fellows, if he had not made them his lords. By this inclination to the *Macedonians* the love of *Ptolemy* was loſt; who forthwith took part with *Cleomenes*, though he did not ſupply him with ſuch liberality as he had uſed to the *Acheans*; being warned, as may ſeem by their example, to be more wary, both in truſting and diſburſing. *Cleomenes* himſelf, whilſt this buſineſs with *Antigonus* was a foot, paſſed thro' *Arcadia* with an army, and laboured by all means to draw the *Acheans* to battel. At the city of *Dymes* in *Achaia* were aſſembled all the remaining forces of the nation; with which it was concluded to make trial, whether perhaps they might amend their eſtate without ſeeking help of the *Macedonian*. Thither went *Cleomenes*, and there fought with them; where he had ſo great a victory, that the enemy was no longer able to keep the open field. The calamity was ſuch, that *Aratus* himſelf durſt not take upon him to be their general, when his turn came in the next election. Wherefore the *Acheans* were compelled to ſue for peace; which was granted upon this eaſy condition: That they ſhould not arrogate unto themſelves the command of *Peloponneſus*, but ſuffer the *Lacedemonians* (as in former ages) to be their leaders in war. Hereunto if they would condeſcend, he promiſed unto them, that he would preſently reſtore all places taken from them, and all his priſoners ranſom-free: alſo, that they ſhould enjoy their own laws and liberties without moleſtation. This gentle offer of *Cleomenes* was very pleaſing to the *Acheans*, who deſired him to come to the city of *Lerna*, where a Parliament ſhould be held for the concluſion of the war.

Now ſeemed the affairs of *Greece* likely to be ſettled in better order than they had ever been ſince the beginning of the *Peloponneſian* wars; yea, or ſince the *Perſian* invaſion, when God, who had otherwiſe diſpoſed of theſe matters, hindred all with a draught of cold water, which *Cleomenes* drank in a great heat, and thereupon fell extreme ſick, and ſo could not be preſent at *Lerna*, but cauſed the parliament to be deferred to another time. Nevertheleſs, he ſent home the chief of his priſoners, to ſhew that he meant none other than good faith. By this fair dealing he confirmed the *Acheans* in their deſire of his friendſhip, who aſſembled again at *Argos*, there to eſtabliſh the league. But *Aratus* was violently bent againſt it, and ſought by great words and terrible threats to make his countrymen afraid of reſolving. When all would not ſerve turn, he betook himſelf to his cunning, and ſent word to *Cleomenes*, that he ſhould do well to leave his army behind him, and come alone into *Argos*, receiving hoſtages for ſafety of his perſon. *Cleomenes* was already far on his way when he met with this advertiſement, and took it in ill part that he ſhould be thus deluded. For it had been an eaſy matter to have told him ſo much at the firſt, and not to have made him come ſo far with an army, which afterwards he muſt diſmiſs. Yet that, which chiefly ſeemed to have troubled him, was the drift of his oppugners, who ſought thereby, either to make him wait without the gates, and deal only with themſelves and their meſſengers; or, if he would adventure himſelf into the city, then to deprive him of all royal ſhew that might breed reſpect of him in the multitude. This was that indeed which *Aratus* feared, and for which he ſought to hinder his coming thither in perſon, leſt the people, hearing the promiſes of *Cleomenes* ratified by his own mouth, ſhould preſently be won with his gentle words, and finiſh the bargain without more ado. Therefore *Cleomenes* wrote unto the

whole council, bitterly complaining againſt theſe juggling tricks; and *Aratus* was not far behind with him in as bitter an oration. So between fear of the one, and reverence of the other, the aſſembly knew not how to proceed, but abruptly broke up, leaving all, as it were, to fortune. *Cleomenes* took his advantage of their preſent weakneſs, and renewed the war. Many cities yielded unto him willingly, many he forced; and partly by force, partly by terror, he won *Argos*, which never king of *Sparta* before him could do. In this caſe *Aratus* ſent his own ſon to *Antigonus*, entreating him to defer no time, but come preſently to relieve the diſtreſſed *Acheans*. *Antigonus* gave as good words as could be wiſhed; ſaving, that he utterly refuſed to do any thing, unleſs he might firſt have *Acrocorinthus* put into his hands. This demand was ſomewhat like unto that of the hunter, who promiſed to help the horſe againſt his enemy the ſtag; but with condition, that the horſe ſhould ſuffer himſelf to be ſaddled and bridled. *Aratus* was herewithal contented, but wanted all honeſt colour to do it, ſeeing the *Corinthians* had no way deſerved to be thus given away to the *Macedonians*. Yet at length an occaſion was found; for that the *Corinthians* perceiving what he intended, were minded to arreſt him. So he withdrew himſelf out of their city, and ſent word to *Antigonus* that the caſtle ſhould be ready to let him in. The *Corinthians* on the other ſide ran to *Cleomenes*, who loſt no time, but made haſte with them to *Corinth*, where he ſought how to get poſſeſſion of their caſtle, or at leaſt to ſave it from *Antigonus*, by ſurrounding it with trenches, that none might iſſue nor enter without his leave. Whilſt this was in doing, he took ſpecial order that *Aratus*'s houſe and goods within the town ſhould be ſafely kept for the owner, to whom he ſent meſſenger after meſſenger, deſiring him to come to an agreement, and not to bring in the barbarous *Macedonians* and *Illyrians* to *Peloponneſus:* promiſing, that if he would hearken to theſe perſwaſions, then would he give him double the ſame penſion which he had been wont to receive of king *Ptolemy*. As for the caſtle of *Corinth*, which was the gate of *Peloponneſus*, and without which none could hold aſſured ſoveraignty of the country, he deſired that it might not be committed unto his own diſpoſition, but be jointly kept by the *Lacedemonians* and *Acheans*. All this entreaty ſerved to no purpoſe; for *Aratus*, rejecting utterly the motion, ſent his own ſon as an hoſtage to *Antigonus*, and laboured with the *Acheans* to put *Acrocorinthus* into his hands. Which when *Cleomenes* underſtood, he ſeized upon the goods of *Aratus* in *Corinth*, and waſted all the country of *Sicyon*, whereof this his adverſary was native.

Antigonus, in the mean time, drew near to the *Iſthmus*; having paſſed with his army through *Eubœa*, becauſe the *Etolians* held the ſtreights of *Thermopylæ* againſt him. This they did, either in favour of *Cleomenes*, which they pretended; or in doubt of the greatneſs whereunto the *Macedonians* might attain by the good ſucceſs of this journey. At his coming thither he found the *Lacedemonians* ready to forbid his entrance, and that with ſufficient ſtrength, yet with no purpoſe to hazard battel, but rather to weary him thence with hunger, againſt which he came not well provided. *Antigonus* therefore laboured hard to make his way by force, but he was not able ſo to do; he ſecretly got into the *Corinthian* haven, but was violently driven out again with great loſs of men: finally, he reſolved to turn aſide and ſeek a paſſage over the gulf of *Corinth* to *Sicyon*, or ſome other part of *Achaia*; but this required much time, and great preparation, which was not eaſily made.

In this perplexity, news from *Argos* came by ſea that greatly comforted *Antigonus*, and no leſs troubled his enemies. The *Acheans* were gotten into that city, and the garriſon, which *Cleomenes* had left therein, though it was not driven out of the citadel, yet was hardly diſtreſſed, and ſtood in need of preſent help. *Argos* had always been enemy to *Sparta*, and well affected to the kings of *Macedon*. When *Cleomenes* took it, he forbore to chaſe out thoſe whom he moſt ſuſpected; partly at the entreaty of friends, and partly for that they all made ſhew to be glad of his proſperity. They were glad indeed of *Cleomenes*'s victory, both in *Argos* and elſewhere, as many as hoped that he would cauſe all debtors to be diſcharged from their creditors, as he had lately done in *Sparta*. But that which *Cleomenes* had done in *Sparta* was agreeable to the *Spartan* inſtitution; in other places, where it would have been tyrannical, he did it not. Thereupon, ſuch as were diſappointed of their unjuſt hopes began to turn good commonwealth's-men, and called him tyrant for his doings at home, becauſe he would not do the like abroad. So they took their time, invited the *Acheans*, aſſailed his garriſon, cut in pieces the reſcue that he ſent, and compelled him at length to forſake the defence of *Corinth*, and look unto the enemies that were behind his back. For when he underſtood, by continual meſſages, that his men, which held the citadel at *Argos*, were almoſt loſt, he began to fear, leſt his labour in guarding the entry ſhould grow frivolous, the *Acheans* in the mean while ſpoiling all that lay within. Therefore he forſook his cuſtody of the *Iſthmus*, and made all haſte towards *Argos*; which if he could ſave, he meant to truſt fortune with the reſt. And ſo far he prevailed at his coming to *Argos*, that both *Argives* and *Acheans* were glad to houſe themſelves, leaving him maſter of the ſtreets; when the horſemen of *Antigonus* were diſcovered afar off, haſting to relieve the citizens, and *Antigonus* himſelf (to whom *Corinth* was yielded, as ſoon as the *Spartan* had turned his back) following apace with the body of his army. *Cleomenes* therefore had no more to do than to make a ſafe retreat. This he did, and got him home into *Laconia*, loſing in ſhort ſpace all or moſt of that which he had been long in getting.

Antigonus having ſhewed himſelf at *Argos*, and commended the citizens, went into *Arcadia*, where he won ſuch caſtles as were held for *Cleomenes*, and reſtored them to the old poſſeſſors. This done, he took his way to *Ægium*, where was held a parliament by the *Acheans*, to whom he declared the cauſe of his coming, and ſpoke brave words, that filled them with hope. The *Acheans* were not behind with him, but made him captain-general over them and their confederates; and further entered into covenant with him, that they ſhould not deal with any prince or ſtate, either by writing or by ambaſſador, without his conſent. All this while, and ſomewhat longer, *Aratus* was the only man that ſeemed to rule the king's heart; carrying him to *Sicyon*, his own town (for winter was come on) where he not only feaſted him as a great prince, but ſuffered more than human honours, as ſacrifices and the like, to be done unto him. This example of *Aratus* and his *Sicyonians* was followed by the reſt of *Achaia*, which had made (forſooth) a very wiſe bargain, if, inſtead of *Cleomenes* that would have been a king, it had obtained the protection

tection of a god. But this god was poor, and wanting wherewith to pay his *Macedonians*, impoſed the burthen upon the *Acheans*. This was hardly taken, yet worſe muſt be endured in hope of better. Neither was *Aratus* himſelf over-carefully reſpected, when the ſtatues of thoſe tyrants, which he had thrown down in *Argos*, were again erected by *Antigonus*; or when the ſtatues which he had erected, of thoſe that had taken *Acrocorinthus* with him, were all thrown down by the ſame king, and one only left unto himſelf at his earneſt entreaty. It might therefore appear that this god was alſo ſpightful. Nevertheleſs, in taking revenge upon thoſe that offended him, *Aratus* did ſatisfy his own paſſion by the aid of theſe *Macedonians*. For with extreme torments he did put *Ariſtomachus* to death, who had been once tyrant of *Argos*, afterwards general of the *Acheans*, and, from them revolting unto *Cleomenes*, did fall at length into their hands. In like ſort handled he (though not as yet) the *Mantineans*, for their ingratitude and cruelty ſhewed to the *Acheans*. For he ſlew all the principal citizens, and ſold the reſt, men, women and children, all for bond-ſlaves; dividing the ſpoil, two parts to the *Macedonians*, and the third to the *Acheans*. The town itſelf was given by *Antigonus* to the *Argives*, who peopled it with a colony of their own; and *Aratus*, having charge of this buſineſs, cauſed it to be new-named *Antigonia*. Surely of this cruelty there can be no better excuſe, than even the flattery which *Aratus* was driven to uſe to *Antigonus*; foraſmuch as it was a token of ſervility, whereinto they had urged and brought him; whom he, as in revenge thereof, did thus requite. But leaving to ſpeak of this change, which the coming in of the *Macedonian* wrought, in the civil ſtate of the *Acheans*, let us return unto his war againſt the *Lacedemonians*.

The next ſummer *Antigonus* won *Tegea*, *Mantinea*, *Orchomenus*, *Herea* and *Telphuſſa*. *Mantinea* he diſpeopled, as was ſaid before; in *Orchomenus* he placed a garriſon of his *Macedonians*; the reſt he reſtored to the *Acheans*, with whom he wintered at *Ægium*, where they held a parliament. Once only *Cleomenes* had met him this year, and that was on the borders of *Laconia*, where he lay ready to defend his own territory. The reaſon why he ſtirred no further, nor followed *Antigonus* to *Mantinea*, and to thoſe other towns that he won, was this: He had few ſoldiers, and not money enough to wage more. *Ptolemy* the *Egyptian* promiſed much, but would perform nothing; unleſs he might have *Cleomenes*'s own mother, and his children in pledge. Theſe were ſent into *Egypt*; yet the aid came not. For *Ptolemy* was ſlow, as dealing in the buſineſs of *Greece*, rather for his mind's ſake, than upon any apprehenſion of neceſſity. *Cleomenes* therefore provided for himſelf, as well as his own ability would ſerve. He manumiſed all the *Heilotes*, which were the *Lacedemonian* ſlaves; taking money for their liberty, and arming two thouſand of them after the *Macedonian* faſhion. Having thus increaſed his forces, he came on the ſudden to *Megalopolis* that lay ſecure, as having defended itſelf in more dangerous times, and having now *Antigonus* near at hand in *Ægium*. The town he won; but after he was entred, all that were fit to bear arms roſe haſtily againſt him; and though they could not drive him out, yet ſaved the multitude, to whom they gave a port free for their eſcape. He ſent after the citizens, offering the goods to them again, if they would be of his party. But they bravely refuſed his offer; wherefore he ſacked and ruined it, carrying with him to *Sparta* a great booty that he found therein. Theſe news aſtoniſhed the *Acheans* at *Ægium*, who thereupon broke up their parliament. *Antigonus* ſent haſtily for his *Macedonians* out of their wintering quarters, but they were ſo long in coming, that *Cleomenes* was ſafely gone home. Therefore he returned them back to their lodgings, and went himſelf to *Argos*, there to paſs the reſt of this unlucky winter, ſomewhat further from the eyes of the grieved *Acheans*. When he had lain a while at *Argos*, *Cleomenes* was at the gates, with no great number of men, yet with more than *Antigonus* had then about him. The *Argives* perceiving that their country would be ſpoiled if *Antigonus* did not iſſue into the field, were very earneſt with him to go forth and fight. But he was wiſer than to be moved by their clamours, and ſuffered them to ſee their villages burnt, to bid him reſign his office of protector unto ſome that were more valiant, and to ſatisfy their paſſions with fooliſh words, rather than he would be overcome in fight, and thereby loſe more honour than could eaſily be repaired. By this *Cleomenes* had his deſire in weakening the reputation of his enemy, though he thereby added neither followers nor other ſtrength unto *Lacedemon*.

Afterwards, when the ſeaſon was more fit for war, *Antigonus* gathered together all his troops, meaning to requite theſe bravado's of his enemy, with the conqueſt of *Sparta*. *Cleomenes* on the other ſide laboured to keep the war from his own gates, and therefore entred upon the country of *Argos*, where he made ſuch havock as drew *Antigonus* thither, from his intended invaſion of *Laconia*. Many great affronts the *Macedonian* was fain to endure in coaſting the *Spartan* king; that ranging over the country of the *Argives*, *Phliaſians* and *Orchomenians*, drove a garriſon of his out of *Oligyris*; and did ſacrifice, as it were before his face, in the ſuburbs of *Argos*, without the temple of *Juno*, that was ſhut up; ſending unto him in ſcorn to borrow the keys. Theſe were light things, yet ſerved to diſhearten the *Achean* ſide, and to fill the enemy with courage, which was no matter of light importance. Therefore he concluded to lay apart all other regard of things abroad, and to put all to hazard, by ſetting up his reſt, without any more delay, upon *Sparta* itſelf. He had in his army eight and twenty thouſand foot, and twelve hundred horſe, collected out of ſundry nations, as *Macedonians*, *Illyrians*, *Gauls*, *Epirots*, *Beotians*, *Acarnanians* and others, together with the *Acheans*, and their friends of *Peloponneſus*. *Cleomenes* had of all ſorts twenty thouſand, with which he lay at *Selaſia*, fortifying ſlightly the other paſſages into *Laconia*, through which the *Macedonians* were not likely to ſeek entrance. *Antigonus* coming to *Selaſia*, found the enemy ſo ſtrongly incamped, upon and between the hills of *Eva* and *Olympus*, that he was conſtrained to ſpend much time there, before he could advance any one foot; neither lay it in his power to come haſtily to blows, which he greatly deſired, without the hazard of his whole army, in aſſailing of their well-defenced camp. But at length (as it happens, when men are weary both of their hopes and fears) both kings being reſolved to make an end one way or other, *Antigonus* attempted with his *Illyrians* to force that part which lay on the hill *Eva*; but his *Illyrians* were ſo ill ſeconded by the *Achean* foot, that the *Spartan* horſe and light-armed foot, incamped in the ſtrait valley between thoſe hills, iſſuing forth, fell upon their ſkirts, and not only diſordered them, but were like to have endangered all the reſt. If *Cleomenes* himſelf had ſtood in that part of the bat-

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tel, he would have made great uſe of ſuch a fair beginning. But *Euclidas*, his brother, a more valiant than ſkilful ſoldier, commanded in that wing: who neither followed this advantage, nor took ſuch benefit as the ground afforded, whereon he lay. *Philopœmen* the *Arcadian* of *Megalopolis*, who afterwards proved a famous captain, ſerved them on horſe, as a private young man, among the *Acheans*. He ſeeing that all was like to go to rout, if their *Illyrians* were driven to fall back upon the army following them, perſwaded the captains of the *Achean* horſe, to break upon the *Spartan* mercenaries. But they would not: partly deſpiſing his youth and want of charge; partly, for that *Antigonus* had given order, that they ſhould keep their places, until they received a ſign from him, which was not as yet. *Philopœmen*, perceiving them to be more orderly, than well adviſed, entreated ſome of his own countrymen to follow him; gave a charge on the *Spartans*, and forced them, not only to leave the *Illyrians*, but ſeek how to ſave themſelves. Being ſo far advanced, he found the place which the *Illyrians* had attempted, like enough to be won, through the ſkilfulneſs of him that held it. Wherefore he alighted, and perſwaded the men at arms his companions to do the like: the folly of *Euclidas* being manifeſt, who kept the top of the hill, and ſtirred not to hinder thoſe that aſcended, but waited for them in a plain, where they might fight upon even terms. So he recovered the hill top; where, though he was ſore hurt, yet he made good the place that he had gotten, until the whole army came up to him; by which the *Lacedemonians* were beaten from it, with great ſlaughter of them in their deſcent. This overthrow, and death of *Euclidas*, made *Cleomenes* loſe the day: who fighting bravely on the other ſide, upon *Olympus*, againſt *Antigonus* himſelf, was like to have been ſurrounded and loſt, if he had not withdrawn himſelf with an extraordinary ſpeed. In this battel ended the glory of *Lacedemon*, which, as a light ready to go out, had with a great, but not long blaze, ſhined more brightly of late, than in many ages paſt.

Cleomenes fled unto *Sparta*, where he had no deſire to ſtay, finding only two hundred left, of ſix thouſand *Spartans* that had led unto this battel, and moſt of his hired ſoldiers dead, or gone away. So he perſwaded his people to yield themſelves unto *Antigonus*; and promiſing to do all that ſhould at any time lie in his own power, for their good, he haſted away to the ſea-ſide (where he had ſhipping long before provided againſt all that might happen) and imbarked himſelf for *Egypt*. He was lovingly entertained by *Ptolemy Euergetes*, who undertook to reſtore him to his kingdom; and (perhaps) meant no leſs, as being much delighted with his gallant behaviour and qualities. In the mean ſeaſon he had a penſion allowed him, of four and twenty talents yearly. But this *Ptolemy* died; and his ſon *Ptolemy Philopater* ſucceeded him: a vicious young prince, wholly governed by lewd women and baſe men, unmindful of all virtue, and hating any in whom it was found. When therefore *Cleomenes* was deſirous to return into *Greece*, whither the troubles in *Peloponneſus* did ſeem to unite him; *Ptolemy* and his minions, would neither give him aid; nor yet dared to diſmiſs him (as he deſired) to try his own friends in *Greece*, becauſe he was too well acquainted with the weakneſs of *Egypt*: nor well knew how to detain him againſt his will. At length they deviſed matter againſt him, and made him priſoner. The laſt act of him was, that with thirty of his countrymen, he undertook a deſperate enterpriſe: breaking out of the priſon, and provoking the *Alexandrians* to rebel and ſeek their liberty. In which attempt he ſlew ſome enemies of his that he met; and having walked up and down the ſtreets without reſiſtance (no man offering to take his part, or, which is very ſtrange, to fight againſt him on the king's behalf) he, and his companions, agreed together to be miniſters of their own death. Upon his dead body *Ptolemy* was bold to ſhew his own indignation; and ſlew his mother and children, that had been ſent thither as hoſtages, together with the wives of his adherents, as many as were there, attending upon the old queen. Such was the end of *Cleomenes*; a generous prince, but ſon of *Leonidas*, who had cauſed *Agis*, with his mother and grand-mother, to come to ſuch a bloody end, as now befel his own wife, ſon and grand-children.

After the victory at *Sallaſia*, *Antigonus* without reſiſtance entred *Sparta*: whereinto never the force of an enemy, before him, could make way. He kindly entreated the citizens, and left them to their own laws and government: tarrying there no longer than two or three days; after which he haſtened out of *Peloponneſus*, and never returned. The cauſe of his ſpeedy departure was, an advertiſement that he received out of *Macedon*; how the *Illyrians* over-ran, and deſtroyed the country. Had theſe news come a little ſooner, or had *Cleomenes* either deferred the fight a few days longer, or at leaſtwiſe tarried a few days after the fight in *Sparta*, the Kingdom of *Lacedemon* would have ſtood, and perhaps have extended it over all *Greece*. But God had otherwiſe determined.

Antigonus fought a great battel with the *Illyrians*, and overcame them. Yet therein he caught his bane; not by any wound, but by over-ſtraining his voice; wherewith he brake a vein that bled inwardly, and in ſhort ſpace finiſhed his life, who was troubled before with a conſumption of the lungs. His kingdom deſcended unto *Philip*, the ſon of *Demetrius*, being then a boy; as alſo about the ſame time it was, that *Antiochus*, ſurnamed (I know not why) *the Great*; and *Ptolemy Philopater*, began to reign in *Aſia*, and *Egypt*, boys all. Of theſe, *Ptolemy*, though old enough to love harlots when he firſt was king, yet continued a boy, all the ſeventeen years of his reign. The unripe age of *Philip* and *Antiochus* bred ſuch inteſtine inconvenience to their kingdoms, as is uſual in the minority of princes; but their elder years brought them acquainted with the *Romans*; upon which occaſion, when it comes, we ſhall more ſeaſonably ſpeak of them, and of their kingdoms, more at large.

SECT. VII.

How the Illyrians *infeſted the coaſt of* Greece; *and how they were ſubdued by the* Romans.

WHILST things thus paſſed in *Greece*, and whilſt the *Carthaginians* were buſy in their conqueſt of *Spain*, the *Romans* had found themſelves work among the *Sardinians* and *Corſicans*, that were eaſily ſubdued at firſt, and eaſily vanquiſhed again, when they rebelled. They made alſo war with the *Illyrians*, wherein they got much honour with little pain. With the *Gauls* they had much ado, that laſted not long; being rather, as [a] *Livy* ſaith, a tumult than a war. So that by all theſe light exerciſes, their valour was hardly kept

[a] Liv. l. 21.

from

from ruſt. How they got the iſlands in the *Mediterranean* ſea, it hath been ſhewed before: of their dealings with *Illyrians* and *Gauls*, it is not mete to be utterly ſilent.

The *Illyrians* inhabited the country now called *Slavonia*: a troubleſome nation, impatient of reſt, and continually making war for gain, without either regard of friend or foe. They were invited by *Demetrius* king of *Macedon*, to help the *Mydionians*, his friends, that were beſieged by the *Etolians*; for that they refuſed to be of their ſociety. Before the *Illyrian* ſuccours came, the *Mydionians* were ſo far ſpent, that the *Etolians* contended about the booty: the old pretor, or chief magiſtrate of their nation, who was going out of his office, claiming to have the honour of the victory, and the diviſion of the ſpoil to be referred unto him; for that he had, in a manner, brought the ſiege to an end, and won the town: others, that were in hope to be choſen into the office, contradicting this, and deſiring that old orders might be kept. It was a pretty ſtrife, and ſomewhat like to that of the *French* in latter ages, who thought upon dividing the prey, before they had won the victories, which anon they loſt, at *Poitiers* and *Agincourt*. The *Etolians* wiſely compounded the difference, ordering it thus; that the old, and the new pretor, ſhould be jointly intitled in the victory, and have equal authority in diſtribution of the gettings. But the *Illyrians* finiſhed the ſtrife much more elegantly, and after another faſhion. They arrived, and landed, ere any was aware of them; they fell upon the *Etolians*; and though good reſiſtance was made, yet got the victory, partly by force of their multitude, partly by the help of the *Mydionians*, that were not idle in their own buſineſs, but ſtoutly ſallied out of the town. Many of the *Etolians* were ſlain, more were taken, their camp and all their baggage was loſt: the *Illyrians* took the ſpoil, and went their way; the *Mydionians* erected a trophy, inſcribing the names, both of their old and new magiſtrate (for they alſo choſe new Officers at the ſame time) as the *Etolians* had directed them by example.

The ſucceſs of this voyage, highly pleaſed *Agron* king of the *Illyrians*: not only in regard of the money, wherewith *Demetrius* had hired his aſſiſtance, or of the booty that was gotten; but for that having vanquiſhed the ſtouteſt of the *Greeks*, he found it not uneaſy, to enrich himſelf by ſetting upon the leſs warlike. For joy of this he feaſted, and drank ſo immoderately, that he fell into a *Pleureſy*, which in a few days ended his life. His kingdom, together with his great hopes, he left unto *Teuta*, his wife.

Teuta gave her people free liberty to rob all ſorts at ſea, making no difference between friend and foe; as if ſhe had been ſole miſtreſs of the ſalt waters. She armed a fleet, and ſent it to *Greece*: willing her captains, to make war where they found advantage, without any further reſpect. Theſe fell with the weſtern coaſt of *Peloponneſus*, where they invaded the *Eleans* and *Meſſenians*. Afterwards they returned along by *Epirus*, and ſtayed at the city of *Phenice*, to take in victuals and other neceſſaries. There lay in *Phenice* eight hundred *Gauls*; that having been mercenaries of the *Carthaginians*, went about to betray, firſt *Agrigentum*, then *Eryx*, to the *Romans*; but failing to do either, they nevertheleſs revoked, and were their miſdeeds diſarmed, and ſent to ſea by the *Romans*, yet entertained by theſe *Epirots*, and truſted to lie in garriſon within their town. The *Gauls* were ſoon grown acquainted with the *Illyrians*, to whom they betrayed *Phenice*; which deſerved none other, in truſting them. All *Epirus* was preſently in arms, and haſtened to drive out thoſe unwelcome gueſts. But whilſt the *Epirots* lay before the town, there came news into their camp, of another *Illyrian* army, that was marching thither by land, under one *Scerdilaïdas*, whom queen *Teuta* had ſent to help his fellows. Upon this advertiſement, a part of them is ſent away towards *Antigonia*, to make good that town, and the ſtreights adjoining, by which theſe new comers muſt enter into their country; another part of them remains at *Phenice*, to continue the ſiege. Neither the one, nor the other, ſped well in their buſineſs. For *Scerdilaïdas* found means to join with his fellows, and they that were beſieged within *Phenice*, ſallied out of the town, and gave ſuch an overthrow to the *Epirots*, as made them deſpair of ſaving their country, without great and ſpeedy help from abroad. Wherefore ambaſſadors were ſent to the *Acheans* and *Etolians*, craving their help, with very pitiful terms of entreaty. They obtained their ſuit; neither was it long, before an army, ſent by theſe two nations, was ready in *Epirus*, to preſent battel unto *Scerdilaïdas*. But *Scerdilaïdas* was called home, by letters from *Teuta* the queen, that ſignified a rebellion of ſome *Illyrians* againſt her: ſo that he had no mind to put his forces to hazard, but offered compoſition, which was accepted. The agreement was, that the *Epirots* might ranſom their town, and all their people that were priſoners; and that the *Illyrians* ſhould quietly depart, with all their booty and ſlaves. Having made this profitable and honourable bargain, the *Illyrians* returned into their own country by land, ſending their booty away by ſea.

At their coming home, they found no ſuch great trouble, as that which they brought, or had occaſioned in this voyage. For in fulfilling the commandment of their queen, they had taken many *Italian* merchants, whilſt they lay at *Phenice*; and made them good prize. Hereof the complaints, made unto the *Roman* ſenate, were ſo frequent, that ambaſſadors were ſent to require of *Teuta*, that ſhe ſhould abſtain from doing ſuch injuries. Theſe ambaſſadors found her very jolly; both for the riches which her fleet had brought in, and for that ſhe had, in ſhort ſpace, tamed her rebels, and brought all to good order, ſave only the town *Iſſa*, which her forces held ſtreightly beſieged. Swelling with this proſperity, ſhe could hardly afford a good look to the *Romans*, that found fault with her doings, and calling them by a true name, *Piracy*, required amends. Yet, when their ſpeech was ended, ſhe vouchſafed to tell them, that injury in publick ſhe would do them none: as for private matters, no account was to be made of them; neither was it the manner of kings to forbid their ſubjects to get commodity, how they beſt could by ſea. But (ſaid the younger of the two ambaſſadors) we *Romans* have a manner, and a very valuable one, to take revenge in publick, of thoſe private wrongs that are borne out by publick authority: therefore we ſhall teach you, God willing, to reform your kingly manners, and learn better of us. Theſe words the queen took ſo impatiently, that no revenge could ſatisfy her, but the death of him that had ſpoken them. Wherefore, without all regard of the common law of nations, ſhe cauſed him to be ſlain, as if that had been the way to ſet her heart at reſt; which was indeed the means to diſquiet and afflict it ever after.

The *Romans*, provoked by this outrage, prepare two great armies; the one by ſea, conſiſting of two hundred ſail, commanded by *C. Fulvius*;

the other by land, led by *A. Poſthumus*. They trouble not themſelves any more with requiring ſatisfaction; for this injury is of ſuch a nature, as muſt be requited with mortal war. It is indeed contrary to all human law, to uſe violence towards ambaſſadors: the reaſon and ground whereof ſeems to be this; that ſince, without mediation, there would never be an end of war and deſtruction, therefore it was equally received by all nations, as a leſſon taught by nature, that ambaſſadors ſhould paſs freely, and in ſafety, between enemies. Nevertheleſs, as I take it, this general law is not without limitation. For, if any king or ſtate lay hold upon ambaſſadors ſent by their enemies, not unto themſelves, but unto ſome third, whom they ſhould draw into the quarrel; then it is as lawful to uſe violence to thoſe ambaſſadors (thus employed, to make the war more terrible) as it is to kill the men of war, and ſubjects, of an enemy. And ſo might the *Athenians* have anſwered it, when they ſlew the *Lacedemonian* ambaſſadors, that were ſent to *Xerxes*, to draw him into a war upon the *Athenians*. Neither are thoſe ambaſſadors, which practiſe againſt the perſon of that prince, in whoſe countries they reſide, warranted by any law whatſoever. For, whereas the true office of an ambaſſador reſiding, is the maintenance of amity; if it be not lawful for one prince, to practiſe againſt the life of another; much leſs may an ambaſſador do it without incurring juſtly the ſame danger of puniſhment, with other traitors; in which caſe, his place gives him no privilege at all. But we will leave this diſpute to the *Civilians*, and go on with the revenge, taken by the *Romans*, for the ſlaughter of their ambaſſador *Coruncanus*.

The *Illyrian* queen was ſecure of the *Romans*, as if they would not dare to ſtir againſt her. She was indeed in an error; that hath undone many of all ſorts, greater and leſs than ſhe, both before and ſince; *having more regard unto fame, than unto the ſubſtance of things*. The *Greeks* were at that time more famous than the *Romans*; the *Etolians* and *Epirots* had the name of the moſt warlike people in *Greece*; theſe had ſhe eaſily vanquiſhed, and therefore thought, that with the *Romans* ſhe ſhould be little troubled. Had ſhe conſidered, that her whole army, which wrought ſuch wonders in *Greece*, was not much greater, than of ten thouſand men; and that nevertheleſs it prevailed as much, by odds of number, as by valour or ſkill in arms; ſhe would have continued to uſe her advantage, againſt thoſe that were of more fame than ſtrength, with ſuch good caution, that ſhe ſhould not have needed to oppoſe her late gotten reputation, againſt thoſe that were more mighty than her ſelf. But ſhe was a woman, and did what ſhe liſted. She ſent forth a greater fleet than before, under *Demetrius* of *Pharos*; with the like ample commiſſion to take all that could be gotten. This fleet divided it ſelf, and one part of it fell with [a] *Dyrrachium*, the other with *Corcyra*. *Dyrrachium* was almoſt ſurpriſed by the *Illyrians*; yet was it reſcued by the ſtout citizens. In [b] *Corcyra* the *Illyrians* landed, waſted the iſle, and beſieged the town. Hereupon the *Etolians* and *Acheans* were called in to help: who came, and were beaten in a fight at ſea; loſing, beſides others of leſs note, *Marcus Carynenſis*, the firſt pretor of *Achaia*, whom *Aratus* ſucceeded. The town of *Corcyra*, diſmayed with this overthrow, opened the gates unto *Demetrius Pharius*, who took poſſeſſion of it with an *Illyrian* garriſon, ſending the reſt of his forces to beſiege *Dyrrachium*. In the mean ſeaſon, *Teuta* was angry with her captain *Demetrius*: I know not why; but ſo, as he reſolved to try any other courſe, rather than to truſt her.

The *Romans* were even ready to put to ſea, though uncertain which way to take, when advertiſement was brought to *C. Fulvius* the conſul, of *Demetrius*'s fear and diſcontent. Likely it was, that ſuch an occaſion might greatly help to advance the buſineſs in hand; wherefore the conſul ſailed thither, where he found the town of *Corcyra* ſo well prepared to his hand by *Demetrius*, that it not only received him willingly, but delivered into his power the *Illyrian* garriſon, and ſubmitted it ſelf unto the *Roman* protection.

After this good beginning, the conſul ſailed along the coaſt to [c] *Apollonia*, accompanied with *Demetrius*, whom he uſed thenceforth as his counſellor and guide. To *Apollonia* came alſo *Poſthumus* the other conſul, with the land-army, numbered at twenty-thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe. Thence they haſten towards *Dyrrachium*, which the *Illyrians* had beſieged; but upon news of the *Roman* army, they diſperſe themſelves. From thence the *Romans* enter *Illyria*, and take *Parthedia*; beat the *Illyrians* by ſea, take twenty of their ſhips, and enforce the queen *Teuta* to forſake the coaſt, and to cover her ſelf in *Riſon*, far within the land. In the end, part of the *Romans* haſte them homeward, and leave the beſt places of *Illyria* in the hands of *Demetrius*; another part ſtays behind, and proſecutes the war in ſuch ſort, that *Teuta* was forced to beg peace, which ſhe obtained upon miſerable conditions; to wit, that ſhe ſhould quit the better part of *Illyria*, and pay tribute for the reſt; and from thenceforth never ſend any of her ſhips of war towards the coaſts of *Greece*, beyond the iſland of *Liſſa*, except it were ſome one or two veſſels unarmed, and by way of trade

After this *Illyrian* war, the *Romans* ſent ambaſſadors into divers parts of *Greece*, ſignifying their love to the country, and how, for good-will thereunto, they had made war with good ſucceſs upon *Teuta*, and her people. They hoped, belike, that ſome diſtreſſed cities would take this occaſion to deſire their patronage; which if it happened, they were wiſe enough to play their own games: but no ſuch matter fell out. The ambaſſadors were only rewarded with thanks, and a decree made at *Corinth*, that the *Romans* thenceforth might be partakers of the *Iſthmian* paſtimes. This was an idle courteſy, but well meant by the vain *Greeks*, and therefore well taken by the *Romans*, who by this *Illyrian* expedition got nothing in *Greece*, ſave a little acquaintance, that ſhall be more hereafter.

SECT. VIII.

Of the war between the Romans *and* Gauls, *ſomewhat before the coming of* Hannibal *into* Italy.

THE *Gauls*, that dwelt in *Lombardy*, were the next againſt whom the *Romans* took arms. Theſe were a populous nation, and often moleſted *Rome*; ſometimes with their own forces, and ſometimes with the aſſiſtance of thoſe that inhabited *France*. Once their fortune was good, when they took *Rome* and burnt it; though the iſſue of that war proved not anſwerable to the beginning, if we

[a] Dyrrachium, *ſometime called* Epidamus, *and now* Durazzo, *ſeated upon the* Adriatic Sea, *between the iſlands of* Pharos *and* Corcyra. [b] Corcyra, *an iſland of the* Adriatic Sea, *not far from* Durazzo, *called now* Corfu, *and in the poſſeſſion of the* Venetians. [c] Apollonia, *a city near* Dyrrachium, *or* Durazzo, *upon the ſea-coaſt*. Pinetus *calls it* Siſſopolis.

may

may give credit unto *Roman* hiſtorians. In following times their ſucceſs was variable, and commonly bad. Many overthrows they received; and, if they got any victory, it yielded them no profit, but was ſoon extorted out of their hands: they were indeed more fierce, than well adviſed; lightly ſtirred up to war, and lightly giving over. At the firſt brunt, they were ſaid to be more than men; but when that was paſt, leſs than women. The *Romans* were acquainted with their temper by long experience, and knew how to handle them; yet gave always careful heed to their approach, were it only bruited: for the danger of them was ſudden and uncertain, by reaſon of their neighbourhood, and want of intelligence among them. Few of their attempts upon *Rome* were called wars, but *tumultus Gallici*, tumults of the *Gauls*; and rightly: for they gave many alarms to *Italy*, and uſed to riſe with great armies; but after a few days march, and ſometimes before their ſetting forth, any ſmall occaſion ſerved to diſperſe them. Having received an overthrow, they would reſt ten or twelve years, ſometimes twenty or thirty, till they were ſtirred up again by younger heads, unacquainted with the danger. Whilſt they reſted, the ſtate of *Rome*, that againſt theſe made only defenſive war, had leiſure to grow, by ſetting upon others. Herein God provided well for that monarchy, which he intended to raiſe; that the *Gauls* never fell upon *Italy* with a mighty power, in the time of any other great and dangerous war. Had they attempted to conquer it, whilſt *Pyrrhus* was travelling in the ſame enterprize, or in either of the two former *Punic* wars; it may be doubted what would have become of this imperious city. But it ſeems that the *Gauls* had no better intelligence in the affairs of *Italy*, than ſtrangers had in *Gaul*; at leaſt, they knew not how to uſe their times, and were therefore like to ſmart, whenſoever the enemies, whom they had much provoked, and little hurt, ſhould find leiſure to viſit them at their own home; which was now after the firſt *Punic* war. Once before this, the *Romans* had been bold to ſet upon the *Gauls* in their own country, and that was three years before the coming of *Pyrrhus* into *Italy*. At that time the *Senones*, a tribe of the *Gauls*, invading *Hetruria*, and beſieging *Arretium*, had won a great battel, and ſlain *L. Cecilius*, with the moſt of his army. *Mannius Curius*, the new conſul, ſent ambaſſadors to them, to treat about ranſom of priſoners; but theſe ambaſſadors they ſlew. Therefore, when fortune turned to the better, the *Romans* followed it ſo well, that they expelled theſe *Senones* out of their country, and ſent a colony of their own to inhabit it. This cauſed the [a] *Boij*, another people of *Gaul*, to fear the like meaſure, who thereupon took arms, and drew the *Hetrurians* to their ſide: but the *Romans* overthrew them in two great battels, and thereby made them ſue for peace, which laſted until this end of the *Illyrian* war.

It vexed the *Gauls* to ſee a *Roman* colony planted in their country, who had been accuſtomed to enlarge their bounds, by driving out their neighbours perforce; wherefore they laboured with the *Tranſalpines* (ſo the *Romans* called thoſe in *France*, as lying from them beyond the *Alps*, though to us they were nearer, like as they called *Ciſalpines*, or *By-hither the Alps*, thoſe who dwelt between them and the mountains) to draw them to their party; reaſonably preſuming, that as their disjunction had cauſed their loſs, ſo their union might recompenſe it with large amends: but the buſineſs was ſo fooliſhly carried, that the *Ciſalpines* and *Tranſalpines* fell together by the ears, putting the *Romans* only to a tumult, without further trouble of war. Soon after, they were urged by a greater indignity, to go more ſubſtantially to work; for *C. Flaminius*, a popular man in *Rome*, propoſed a decree, which was ratified by the people; that beſides one colony already planted in the territory of the *Senones*, as many more ſhould be carried thither as would ſerve to people the whole country between *Ancona* and *Ariminum*, exterminating utterly thoſe *Gauls*. Such an offer, were it made in *England*, concerning either *Virginia* or *Guinea* it ſelf, would not over-joy the multitude: But the commonalty of *Rome* took this in ſo good part, notwithſtanding all danger joined with the benefit, that *Flaminius* had ever after their good-will.

This dreadful precedent extremely diſpleaſed the *Boij*, who being neighbours to *Ariminum*, feared the like diſplantation. And, becauſe the reſt of the *Gauls* had reaſon to reſolve that themſelves alſo ſhould be rooted out by degrees, the great nation of the *Inſubrians*, which inhabited the dutchy of *Milan*, joined with the *Boij*, and upon a common purſe entertained the *Geſſates*, nations about *Rhodanus*, wageable as the *Switzers* in theſe times. The *Geſſates* having received a great impreſt, come to the field under the conduct of their kings, *Concolitanus* and *Aneroeſtus*, who, with the *Boij* and *Inſubrians*, compound an army of fifty thouſand foot and twenty thouſand horſe, and thoſe of the beſt men, and beſt appointed, that ever invaded the *Roman* territory; to whom the *Senogalli*, that had been beaten out of their poſſeſſions, gave a great increaſe of ſtrength. On the contrary ſide, the *Venetians*, and the [b] *Cenomanni*, adhered to the *Romans*, as better believing in their proſperity and riſing fortune: for fear of whoſe incurſions therefore, the *Gauls* were forced to leave a good part of their army on the frontier of *Milan*: with the reſt of their forces they entered into *Tuſcany*. The *Romans* hearing of this danger, ſend *Æmilius* to *Rimine*, to ſtop their paſſage; and in the place of *C. Atilius*, their other conſul, who then was in *Sardinia*, they employ one of their pretors for the defence of *Tuſcany*.

Being at this time greatly troubled with the conſideration of this powerful army which the *Gauls* had aſſembled, they cauſed a view to be taken as well of all their own forces, as of thoſe of their allies, who were no leſs willing than themſelves to oppoſe the incurſions of the barbarous people; fearing, as they had cauſe, that their own deſtruction could not be prevented, otherwiſe than by the good fortune of *Rome*. The numbers found in this muſter deſerve to be recorded, becauſe they ſet out the power of the *Romans* in thoſe days. With the conſuls they ſent forth to the war four legions of their own, every legion conſiſting of five thouſand two hundred foot and three hundred horſe, and of their allies thirty thouſand foot and two hundred horſe. There were alſo appointed for ſupplies (if any miſadventure came to theſe) of the *Sabines* and *Hetrurians* fifty thouſand foot and four thouſand horſe; which army was to be lodged in the border of *Hetruria*. Of the *Umbri* and *Sarſinates*, which inhabited the *Apenines*, there were twenty thouſand, and of the *Venetians* and *Cenomans* other twenty thouſand; which latter armies were directed to invade the *Boij*, that, forcing them to defend their own territories, the ge-

[a] *There were divers natisns of the* Boij; *as in* Pannonia, Illyria, Germany, *in* Bourbonois *in* France, *and in* Aquitane; *but theſe* Boij *were of the* French *race, and dwelt at this time about the mouth of the river of* Po. [b] Cenomanni, *are the people about* Bergamo, *on the north ſide of the river* Po *in* Italy. *There were alſo of theſe* Cenomanni *in* France, *and inhabited the country of* Main.

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neral army of the *Gauls* ſhould be thereby greatly diminiſhed. There were beſides theſe, to be ready againſt all uncertain chances of war, thirty thouſand foot and fifteen hundred horſe, garriſoned in *Rome* it ſelf, of their own people; and of their allies thirty two thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe. Over and above theſe great troops, in the roll of the *Latins*, that was ſent unto the ſenate, there were numbered eighty thouſand foot and five thouſand horſe; in that of the *Samnites* ſeventy thouſand foot and ſeven thouſand horſe; in that of the [a] *Iapyges*, and *Meſſapyges*, fifty thouſand foot and ſixteen thouſand horſe; the *Lucans* ſent a liſt of thirty thouſand foot and three thouſand horſe; the [b] *Marſi*, [c] *Marracini*, [d] *Ferentani*, and the *Veſtini*, of twenty thouſand foot and four thouſand horſe. The *Romans* had alſo two legions in *Sicily*, and about *Tarentum*, containing eight thouſand four hundred foot and four hundred horſe. So as of the *Romans* and *Campans* jointly, reckoning men armed, and fit to bear arms, there were regiſtered two hundred and fifty thouſand foot and twenty-three thouſand horſe; of which, reckoning the *Romans* apart, there were an hundred and fifty thouſand foot and about ſix thouſand horſe. Caſting up the whole forces of all the provinces in *Italy*, both of the *Romans* and their confederates, it amounted to ſeven hundred thouſand foot and ſeventy thouſand horſe; but the number is ſomewhat miſcaſt by *Polybius*, not with a purpoſe to enrich himſelf by the dead pays; for where he reckons nine hundred horſe too many, he falls ſhort nine thouſand two hundred of the foot.

How great ſoever this muſter was, it ſeems to have been like unto that which *Lodowick Sforza* made, when *Lewis* the twelfth invaded *Milan*; at what time, the better to encourage himſelf, and his ſubjects, he took a roll of all perſons able to bear arms within the dutchy, though indeed he were never able to bring a tenth part of them into the field. Certain it is, that the battels of *Trebia*, *Traſymene*, and *Canne*, did not conſume any ſuch proportion as was anſwerable to this large account; yet were the *Romans* fain to arm their ſlaves, even for want of other ſoldiers, after their overthrow at *Canne*. Wherefore the marvel is not great, that the *Carthaginians* and others were little terrified with report of ſuch a multitude; for all heads are not fit for helmets, though the *Roman* citizens were, in general, as good fighting men as elſewhere might be found.

Notwithſtanding all theſe counter-preparations, the *Gauls* keep on their way; and, entering into *Tuſcany*, deſtroy, and put to fire and ſword all that lay before them. From thence they march directly towards *Rome*, hoping to find the *Romans* rather in deliberation, than in the field: but their intelligence fails them. For the *Roman* army, ſent into *Tuſcany*, having taken ſome other way than they did, and, finding that it had miſſed of them, came again faſt after them, to arreſt them in their journey. Hereof when they heard the rumour, fearing to be charged on their backs, they turned head, and in the ſame evening diſcovered the *Roman* army, by whom they encamped. It was now a matter of apparent neceſſity, that fight they muſt; wherefore they helped themſelves with a ſtratagem, that ſhewed no great fineneſs of wit, but ſuch as well beſeemed thoſe that had none other occupation than war, and ſtood them in good ſtead at the preſent. In the dead of the night, they cauſe their foot to march away, but not far, leaving their horſe in guard; to whom they give order to come off at the firſt light of day, with ſuch a ſpeed, as might rather argue a running away, than a retreat, as if they had not dared to abide battel. The *Romans*, interpreting this their haſty departure, as the *Gauls* deſired they ſhould, follow them in diſorder. The *Gauls* return, charge them, and kill ſix thouſand upon the place; the reſt take a piece of ground of advantage, and defend themſelves, till *L. Æmilius*, being at *Ariminum*, comes to their ſuccour. Upon the coming of the conſul, the *Gauls* conſult whether they ſhould give the *Romans* battel, or forbear. In which diſpute, *Aneroeſtus*, one of their kings, perſwades them rather to return into their own countries; where, after they had diſpoſed of the great ſpoils and riches which they had gotten, they ſhould then renew the war, being without carriage, peſter, or other impediment. This advice they all embrace; for ſeeing they that were mercenaries, had obtained what they came for, to wit, the ſpoils of their enemies, they thought it wiſdom to hazard neither it nor themſelves any further.

This indeed had been a good reſolution, if they had taken it before the enemy had been in ſight. But as well in the wars of theſe latter ages, as in former times, it hath ever been found extreme dangerous to make a retreat in the head of an enemy's army; for although they that retire, do often turn head, yet in always going on from the purſuing enemy, they find within a few miles either ſtreight, hedge, ditch, or place of diſadvantage, which they are inforced to paſs in diſorder. In ſuch caſes, the ſoldier knows it as well as the captain, that he, which forſakes the field, perceives and fears ſome advantage of the enemies. Fear, which is the betrayer of thoſe ſuccours that reaſon offereth, when it hath once poſſeſſed the heart of man, it caſteth thence both courage and underſtanding: they that make the retreat, are always in fear to be abandoned; they that lead the way, fear to be engaged, and ſo the hindmoſt treads on his heels that is foremoſt; and conſequently all disband, run, and periſh, if thoſe that favour the retreat be not held to it by men of great courage. The miſerable overthrow that the *French* received in *Naples* in the year 1503, upon a retreat made by the marquis of *Sal*, doth teſtify no leſs; for although a great troop of *French* horſe ſuſtained the purſuing enemy a long time, and gave the foot leiſure to trot away; yet being retarded by often turnings, the *Spaniſh* foot overtook, and defeated them utterly. During the wars between the *Imperialiſts* and the *French*, *Boiſi* and *Mont* were loſt at *Brignolles*, who in a bravery would needs ſee the enemy, before they left the field. So was *Stroſi* overthrown by the marquis of *Marignan*, becauſe he could not be perſwaded to diſlodge the night before the marquis's arrival. Therefore did the *French* king *Francis* the firſt wiſely, when, without reſpect of point of honour, he diſlodged from before *Landerſey* by night, as many other the moſt adviſed captains (not finding themſelves in caſe to give battel) have done. *Je ne trouve point* (ſaith the marſhal *Monluc*) *au fait des armes choſe ſi difficile, qu'une retraite*; I find nothing in the art of war ſo difficult, as to make a ſafe retreat. A ſure rule it is, that there is leſs diſhonour to diſlodge in the dark, than to be beaten in the light. And hereof M. *de la Noüe* gives this judgment of a day's retreat, made in *France* preſently before the battel of *Moncountour*. For (ſaith he) ſtaying upon our reputation in ſhew, *not to diſ-*

[a] Iapyges *and* Meſſapyges *ſeem to be one nation, who are alſo called* Salentines, Peucecians, Apulians, *and* Calabrians. *The country is now* Apulia, *containing the northermoſt head-land of* Calabria. [b] *A people of the kingdom of* Naples. [c] Ptolemy *calls them a people of* Italy. [d] *A people of* Campania, *called to this day* Ferentines, *ſaith* Leander.

lodge

lodge by night; we loſt our reputation indeed, by diſlodging by day; whereby we were forced to fight upon our diſadvantage, and to our ruin. And yet did that worthy gentleman count *Lodowick* of *Naſſau*, brother to the late famous prince of *Orange*, make the retreat at *Moncountour* with ſo great reſolution, as he ſaved the one half of the proteſtant army, then broken and disbanded, of which my ſelf was an eye-witneſs, and was one of them that had cauſe to thank him for it.

Now the *Gauls*, embracing the ſame advice (as they take it) of one of their kings, turn their backs to the enemy, and their faces homeward. *Æmilius* follows them as near as he can, without engaging himſelf, attending his advantage. In the mean while, *C. Atilius* the other conſul, with the legions of *Sardinia*, lands at *Piſa*; ſo as the *Gauls*, incloſed between two armies, are forced to fight: they therefore equally ſtrengthen their rear and front. To ſuſtain *Æmilius*, they appoint the *Geſſates* and the *Milanois*; in the front they range the *Piemontois*, and the reſt of the *Gauls* inhabiting upon the river of *Po*. The manner of the fight *Polybius* deſcribeth at large, which was well fought of all hands: but in the end the *Gauls* fell, and ſo did *Atilius* the conſul, who died in the place, accompanied with the two kings of the *Gauls Concolitanus* and *Aneroeſtus*, with forty thouſand of their vaſſals.

After this fatal overthrow the *Gauls* loſt courage, and, ere long, all that they held in *Italy*; for they were invaded the year following this overthrow, by the new conſuls *Fulvius* and *Manlius*. The *Romans* knew well how to uſe their victory; they gave not ten, twenty, or thirty years time, to the *Gauls*, to repair their forces, as the *Gauls* had done to them.

Theſe new conſuls bear the *Boij*, but by reaſon of the great rains that fell, and the great peſtilence that reigned, they were compelled for that preſent to ſurceaſe. In the ſecond year, *Furius* and *Flaminius* invade the *Milanois*, and prevail very far, being ſtrongly aſſiſted by the *Cenomauni* and the *Venetians*. Nevertheleſs, theſe conſuls were revoked out of their province by the ſenate of *Rome*, and compelled to reſign their office; becauſe the *augures*, or ſoothſayers, had found, that ſome token or other of the birds (in which, and all ſorts of their divination, the *Romans* were extremely ſuperſtitious) had not only foreſhewed little good when they were choſen, but had alſo nullified the election. *C. Flaminius*, receiving letters of this revocation from the ſenate, and being otherwiſe advertiſed of the contents, was not haſty to open them; but firſt gave battel unto the enemies, vanquiſhed them, and ſpoiled their country; then peruſed the letters, and returning home, obtained a triumph, ſore againſt the will of the ſenate, and not altogether with goodliking of the people, who yet bare him out, for that he ſided in faction with the commonalty, though a man of great nobility.

This was that *Flaminius*, who had propounded the decree for dividing the country of the *Senones* among the people of *Rome*. He was the firſt, or one of the firſt, that underſtanding the majeſty of *Rome* to be indeed wholly in the people, and no otherwiſe in the ſenate, than by way of delegacy, or grand commiſſion; did not ſtand highly upon his birth and degree, but courted the multitude, and taught them to know and uſe their power over himſelf, and his fellow ſenators, in reforming their diſorders. For this, the commons highly eſteemed him, and the ſenators as deeply hated him: but he had the ſurer ſide, and found imitators that roſe by the ſame art, which in proceſs of time, grew the only or chief way to preferment.

Flaminius and his colleague being depoſed, *M. Claudius Marcellus*, and *Cn. Cornelius Scipio*, were choſen conſuls for the reſt of that year. The *Gauls* about this time deſired peace, and were like to have obtained it, though the new conſuls were againſt it, as fearing to want work. But when thirty thouſand of the *Geſſates*, following their king *Britomarus*, were come over the *Alps*, and joined with the *Inſubrians*, all other diſcourſe, than of preſent war, was at an end. So the conſuls haſted into their province, where they beſieged *Acerre*, a town not far from *Novaro* (ſo far had the *Romans* pierced already) in the dutchy of *Milan*. To divert them from this ſiege, *Britomarus* ſat down before *Claſtidium*, a town in the ſame tract, with great part of his forces, leaving the reſt, with the *Inſubrians*, to attend upon the conſuls at *Acerre*, and to look to the defence of *Milan*: but this would not ſuffice to make the *Romans* break up their ſiege. *Marcellus*, taking with him the greateſt part of the horſe, and ſix hundred foot lightly armed, thought to deal well enough with thoſe at *Claſtidium*. *Britomarus* heard of the conſul's coming, and met him upon the way ſo ſuddenly, that the *Romans* had no leiſure to reſt themſelves after their journey, but were compelled inſtantly to fight: herein *Britomarus* had done well, if he had not forthwith, in a raſh bravery, loſt his game at a caſt. He had advantage enough in number both of horſe and foot; but he thought ſo well of his own perſonal valour, that he rode out ſingle before his army, provoking any one to fight with him. *Marcellus* was no leſs daring than the barbarous king; whether more wiſe in this action, I will not diſpute; he was more fortunate, and that ſufficed to commend him. He ſlew and diſarmed *Britomarus* in preſence of both armies, whereby his own men took ſuch courage, and his enemies were ſo diſmayed, that without much trouble of fight, the *Romans* obtained a great victory.

This was the third and laſt time that ever any *Roman* general ſlew the general of the enemies with his own hand. To this kind of victory belonged a peculiar triumph, whereof only *Romulus*, *Coſſus*, and this *Marcellus*, had the honour; yet I dare ſay, that the two *Scipio's*, and divers other *Roman* captains, eſpecially *Ceſar*, were better men of war than any of theſe three; though they never offered up to *Jupiter*, *Opima ſpolia*, *The armour of a general ſlain by themſelves*, *when they were generals*, nor perhaps affected ſo to do.

After this victory, *Acerre* was yielded to the *Romans*, and *Milan* ſoon after, with all that belonged to the *Ciſalpines* or *Gauls* that dwelt in *Lombardy*. Thus was that valiant and mighty nation, that had ſo many years vexed the ſtate of *Rome*, and in former times taken the city it ſelf, brought to nothing in a ſhort time; their pleaſant and fertile territory poſſeſſed by the *Romans*; and the remainder of their nation, inhabiting *Italy*, ſo many as would not ſubject their necks to the *Roman* yoke, either forced to abandon their countries, or to hide themſelves in the cold and barren mountains, like out-laws and thieves. And thus did the *Romans* ſpend the twenty-three years following the peace made with *Carthage*. In part of which time, they were at ſuch leiſure, that they cloſed up the temple of *Janus*, which they never did before (it ſtanding always open when they had any war) ſave once, in the reign of *Numa*; nor in long time after, until the reign of *Auguſtus*. But this their preſent happineſs was not to laſt long; a dangerous war, and perhaps the greateſt that ever had been, was to come unto their gates; which being well ended, they might boldly undertake to extend their monarchies as far as their ambition could reach.

CHAP. III.

Of the ſecond Punic *war.*

SECT. I.

The wars of Hannibal *in* Spain. *Quarrels between the* Romans *and* Carthaginians. Hannibal *beſiegeth and taketh* Seguntum, *whilſt the* Romans *are buſied with the* Illyrians. *War proclaimed between* Rome *and* Carthage.

HANNIBAL the ſon of *Amilcar*, was about ſix and twenty years old when he was choſen general of the *Carthaginian* forces in *Spain*: he was elected by the army, as ſoon as *Aſdrubal* was dead, and the election was ratified by the ſtate of *Carthage*, wherewith *Hanno* and his complices were nothing pleaſed. This was now the third of the *Barchine* family (ſo called of *Amilcar*, whoſe ſirname was *Barcas*) that had command in chief over the men of war; which honour would, perhaps, have been leſs envied by theſe domeſtic enemies, if the allies and friends of the *Barchine* houſe had not alſo borne the whole ſway in government, and been the only men regarded both by the ſenate and the people. This general good-will, as it was firſt purchaſed by the moſt worthy deſerts of *Amilcar*, in ſaving his country from imminent ruin, enlarging the dominion thereof, and enriching it with treaſures and great revenues; ſo was it retained by the ſame good arts among his friends and followers. *Hanno* therefore, and his partizans, being neither able to tax the virtue of their enemies, that was unreproveable, nor to perform the like ſervices unto the common-weal, had nothing left whereby to value themſelves, excepting the general reprehenſion of war, and cautelous advice of not provoking the *Romans*. This they ſeaſoned otherwhiles with detraction, ſaying, that the *Barchine* faction went about to oppreſs the liberty of the city. But their malicious words were unregarded, and, if it were factious to bear ill-will to *Rome*, then were all the citizens (very few excepted) no leſs *Barchine* than *Hannibal* himſelf: for it was long ſince apparent, that the oath of the *Romans* to the articles of peace, afforded no ſecurity to *Carthage*, were ſhe never ſo quiet and officious, unleſs ſhe would yield to become their ſubject. Since therefore the peace was like to hold no longer, than until the *Romans* could find ſome good advantage to renew the war, it was rather deſired by the *Carthaginians*, that whilſt their own ſtate was in good caſe, the war ſhould begin; than, that in ſome unhappy time of famine or peſtilence, or after ſome great loſs of army or fleet, they ſhould be driven to yield unto the impudent demands of their enemies, and to give away baſely their lands and treaſures, as they had lately done; or miſerably fight upon terms of diſadvantage.

This diſpoſition of his countrymen *Hannibal* well underſtood; neither was he ignorant (for his father and other friends had long time deviſed of this buſineſs) that, in making war with the *Romans*, it was no ſmall advantage to get the ſtart of them. If once he could bring an army into *Italy* without moleſtation, there was good hope that he ſhould find friends and aſſiſtance, even of thoſe people that helped to increaſe the *Roman* army in foreign wars. But this could never be effected, if the matter were openly diſputed at *Carthage*; for it was to be doubted, that the *Carthaginians*, how glad ſoever they would be to hear that he had ſet the war on foot, would nevertheleſs be ſlow and timorous, as commonly men are in the beginning of great enterprizes, if the matter were referred to their deliberation; which if it ſhould happen, then were the *Romans* like to be made acquainted not only with the generalities of his purpoſe, but with ſuch particulars as muſt be diſcourſed of in procuring allowance to his deſign. This might ſuffice to diſorder the whole project; wherefore he reſolved to lay ſiege unto *Saguntum*, which might ſeem not greatly to concern the *Romans*, and would highly pleaſe the *Carthaginians*, that had freſh in mind the indignity of that *Spaniſh* town's allegiance, with their half friends. So ſhould he aſſay both the patience of his enemies, and the diſpoſition of his own citizens.

Having thus concluded, he nevertheleſs went fair and orderly to work; and, beginning with thoſe that lay next in his way, approaching unto *Saguntum* by degrees. This he did (ſaith *Livy*) to give ſome colour to his proceedings; as if he had not principally intended the war againſt *Saguntum*, but had been drawn thither by courſe of buſineſs: yet reaſon teacheth plainly, that without regard of ſuch formalities, it was needful to finiſh the conqueſt of the reſt, before he did any thing that ſhould provoke the *Romans*. Firſt therefore he entered upon the territory of the [a] *Olcades*, and having beſieged *Althea* (*Livy* calleth it *Carteia*) their chief city, he became in a few days maſter not only thereof, but of all the other towns of their country. This nation, which he firſt undertook, being ſubdued, and the winter at hand, he reſted his army in *New Carthage*, or *Carthagena*, and imparted liberally to the ſoldiers the ſpoils he had gotten in his late conqueſt.

In the ſpring following he purſued the war againſt the [b] *Vaccæi*, and without any great difficulty, won firſt *Salmantica*, now called *Salamanca*; and after it, [c] *Arbucala*, by aſſault, though not without a long ſiege, and great difficulty. But in his return, he was put to the height both of his courage and of his martial judgment; for all ſuch of the *Vaccæi* as were able to bear arms, being made deſperate by the ſpoil of their country, with thoſe of *Salamanca*, and of the *Olcades*, that had eſcaped in the late overthrow, joining themſelves with the *Toletans*, compounded an army of an hundred thouſand able men, and ſtayed *Hannibal* on the banks of the river *Tagus*, which runneth to the ſea by *Lisbon* in *Portugal*. Theſe four nations having had experience of *Hannibal*'s invincible courage, and that he never ſaw enemy upon whom he durſt not give charge, were throughly reſolved that his natural valour would at this time no leſs neglect the cold advice of diſcretion, than at other times it had ſeemed to do, when the like great occaſion perſwaded him to uſe it. But he that makes himſelf a body of cryſtal, that all men may look through him, and diſcern all the parts of his diſpoſition, makes himſelf withal an aſs; and

[a] *A people (ſaith* Stephanus*) near the river of* Ebro. *But in the old deſcription of* Spain, *in* Ortelius, *they are found near* Tagus; *and by* Suidas, *not far from* New Carthage. [b] *A people of* Caſtile *the old.* [c] Arbucala, *or* Albricala, *an inland city of the* Vaccæi *in* Arragon.

thereby

thereby teacheth others, either how to ride or drive him. Wiſe men, though they have ſingle hearts in all that is juſt and virtuous; yet they are like coffers with double bottoms; which when one looks into, being opened, they ſee not all they hold on the ſudden, and at once. It is true, that this ſubtil *Carthaginian*, when he ſerved under *Aſdrubal*, was, of all the men of mark in the army, the moſt adventurous. But that which may beſeem a captain or inferior commander, doth not always become a chief; though it hath ſometime ſucceeded well with ſuch great ones, as have been found more fortunate than wiſe. At this time, our great man of war knew as well how to diſſemble his courage, as at other times to make it good. For he withdrew himſelf from the river ſide, as if fearful to ford it, thereby to draw over that great multitude from their banks of advantage. The *Spaniards*, apprehending this in ſuch ſort as *Hannibal* deſired that they ſhould, thruſt themſelves in fury and diſorder into the ſwift ſtream, with a purpoſe to charge the *Carthaginians*, abandoning (as they thought for fear) the defences on the contrary ſide. But when *Hannibal* ſaw them in their way, and well near over, he turned back his elephants to entertain them at their landing, and thruſt his horſe-men both above and beneath them into the river. Theſe carrying a kind of *Lance de gay*, ſharp at both ends, which they held in the midſt of the ſtaff, had ſuch an advantage over the foot that were in the river, under their ſtrokes, clattered together, and unable to move or ſhift their bodies as on firm ground, that they ſlew all thoſe (in a manner) without reſiſtance, which were already entered into the water, and purſued the reſt, that fled like men amazed, with ſo great a ſlaughter, as from that day forward there was not any *Spaniard* on that ſide the river of *Iberus* (the *Saguntines* excepted) that had the daring to lift up their hands againſt the *Carthaginians*.

The *Saguntines* perceiving the danger towards them, cried before they were hurt. They ſent ambaſſadors to *Rome*, and bemoaned themſelves, as likely to ſuffer that which afterwards they ſuffered indeed, only becauſe of their alliance and friendſhip with this honourable city, which the *Carthaginians* hated. This tale moved the ſenate, but much more a report, that *Saguntum* was already beſieged. Hereupon ſome cry out that war ſhould be proclaimed by land and ſea; as alſo, that the two conſuls ſhould be ſent with armies, the one into *Spain*, the other into *Afric*. But others went more *Roman*-like to work, and carried it. So it was only concluded, that ambaſſadors ſhould be ſent into *Spain* to view the ſtate of their confederates, which were indeed none other than the *Saguntines*. For if *Hannibal* intended war againſt *Rome*, it was likely that he would give them, ere it were long, a more plauſible occaſion to take arms againſt him: if he had no ſuch purpoſe, yet would it be in their power to determine what they lifted themſelves, upon the report of theſe ambaſſadors; and this their gravity, in being not too raſh at firſt, would ſerve to countenance their following decree. Of theſe ambaſſadors *Livy* reports, that they found *Hannibal* before *Saguntum*, but could not get audience of him, and therefore went to *Carthage*, where alſo they were not regarded nor heard. But *Polybius*, an hiſtorian of ſincerity leſs queſtionable, tells, that they found him at *Carthagena*, and had conference with him, though ſuch as left them doubtful. This is more agreeable to the reſt of *Hannibal*'s whole courſe. And ſurely we might wonder, why the *Carthaginians* ſhould afterwards admit a more peremptory ambaſſage (as *Livy* confeſſeth) and fall to diſputation about the covenants of peace, if they had rejected that which was ſent upon none other pretence than prevention of war.

Whilſt the ambaſſadors paſſed to and fro, *Hannibal* prepared not only his forces, but ſome *Roman* pretences againſt *Saguntum*. He found out *Mamertines*, or people that ſhould do as the *Mamertines* in *Sicily* had done for the *Romans*, and implore his help againſt the *Saguntines*. Theſe were the *Turdetani*, a nation adjoining to *Saguntum*, and having many quarrels with them (as happens commonly among neighbours) of which *Hannibal* himſelf had hatched ſome. Finding therefore ſuch an occaſion, whatſoever it was, as made him able to ſay, that the *Saguntines* had firſt provoked him ere he meddled with them; he made no more ado but ſat down with his whole power before their town. He was now more ſecure than he had formerly been of his own citizens; for that they had not entertained the *Roman* ambaſſadors with any trembling reverence, as of late years they had been wont. Nevertheleſs, he was glad of any handſome colour to ſhadow his actions; not only becauſe the war, which he ſo much deſired, was not proclaimed; but that he might not be checked in his courſe as an open enemy, before he could ſet foot in *Italy*. The *Romans* had the like, tho' contrary deſire. They were glad of the quarrel; as hoping, that *Carthage*, with all thereto belonging, ſhould thereby in ſhort ſpace become their own. Yet were they not haſty to threaten before they were ready to ſtrike; but meant to temporize, until they had an army in readineſs to be ſent into *Spain*, where they thought to make *Saguntum* the ſeat of the war.

In the mean while, *Demetrius Pharius*, whom the *Romans* had made king over a great part of *Illyria*, rebelled againſt them; either for that he found himſelf over-ſtraitly tied up by them with hard conditions, or rather becauſe he was of an unthankful diſpoſition. The commotion of the *Gauls*, and afterwards the fame of the *Carthaginian* war, emboldened him to deſpiſe his benefactors and patrons, whom he ought to have defended and aided in all perils, even with the hazard of his whole eſtate, which he had received of their gift. But he was a traitor to his own queen, and therefore dealt according to his kind, with thoſe that had rewarded him for being ſuch. Firſt, he built ſhips, and ſpoiled the iſles of *Greece*, againſt the covenants to which he was bound. Then he adventured further, and ſeized upon ſome places that the *Romans* kept in their own hands. If he had begun ſooner, or rather if he had ſtay'd ſomewhat longer, he might have ſped better. For the buſineſs with the *Gauls* was ended; with *Hannibal* not throughly begun: when he declared himſelf, by his doings, an enemy, and was vanquiſhed. The *Roman* conſul, *Emilius*, was ſent againſt him; who in ſeven days won the ſtrong town of *Dimalum*, and thereby brought ſuch terror upon the country round about, that ambaſſadors were ſent from all places to yield themſelves, without putting him to further pains: only the city of *Pharus*, in which *Demetrius* lay prepared to reſiſt, which he might have done long, if the hot-headed rebel had not been too fooliſh. *Emilius* landed a great part of his army in the iſle of *Pharus* by night, and beſtowed them in covert, preſenting himſelf the next morning with twenty ſhips before the town, and offering to force the haven. *Demetrius* with all his power iſſued out againſt the conſul,

conſul, and was ſoon intercluded from the town by thoſe that lay in ambuſh. Wherefore he fled away through by-paths to a creek, where he had ſhipping ready for him, and embarked himſelf, leaving all his eſtate unto them of whoſe liberality he firſt had it.

This buſineſs, though it were ſoon diſpatched, yet prevented it not the ſiege of *Saguntum*, before which *Hannibal* ſat down, ere *Emilius* was landed in *Illyria*. In the beginning of the ſiege the *Carthaginians* were much diſcouraged, by reaſon of the brave ſallies made by the *Saguntines*; in one of which their general received a dangerous wound in the thigh, that cauſed him to lie many days unable to move. Nevertheleſs he was not unmindful of his work in the mean while, but gave order to raiſe certain moveable towers, that might equal thoſe which were built on the walls of the city, and to prepare to batter the curtains, and make a breach. Theſe being finiſhed and apply'd, had ſoon wrought their effect. A great and large breach was made by the fall of divers towers, and a great length of wall, wherein an hot aſſault was given; but it was ſo well ſuſtained by the *Saguntines*, as the *Carthaginians* were not only beaten from the breach, and out of ſome ground within the town, which upon the firſt fury they had won; but they were purſued even to their own trenches and camp. Nevertheleſs the *Carthaginian* army, wherein were about an hundred and fifty thouſand men, did ſo weary the townſmen with continual travail, that at length it got within the walls; and was only hindred from taking full poſſeſſion of the city, by ſome counter-works of the *Saguntines*, that were alſo ready to be won. In this extremity there was one *Alcon* a *Saguntine*, that conveyed himſelf out of the town, to treat with *Hannibal* for ſome accord. But the conditions which the *Carthaginian* offered were ſo ſevere, and without all compaſs of honour, as *Alcon* durſt not return to propound them to his countrymen. For *Hannibal* demanded all that they had, gold, ſilver, plate, and other riches within the city; yea, the city itſelf to be abandoned by the citizens; promiſing, that he would aſſign ſome other place for their habitation; not allowing them to carry out with them any other thing wherewith to ſuſtain themſelves, than the cloaths on their backs; or other arms to defend them, than there nails and teeth. Yet might they far better have ſubmitted themſelves unto this miſerable appointment (ſeeing thereby they might have enjoyed their lives, and ſaved the honour of their wives and daughters) than to have reſted at the diſcretion of the conqueror, as ſoon after they did; by whom their wives and daughters were deflowered before their own faces, and all put to ſword that were above fourteen years of age. For it was a poor comfort, which a great number of them took, when not daring to fight, and ſell their blood at the deareſt rate, they ſhut themſelves up like moſt wretched creatures in their own houſes, and therein burnt themſelves with all they had, ſo dying unrevenged. The treaſures found in *Saguntum*, which were very great, *Hannibal* kept, therewith to pay his army: the ſlaves and other booty he divided among his ſoldiers, reſerving ſome things of choice, wherewith to preſent his friends at *Carthage*, and to animate them unto the war.

Theſe tidings exceedingly vexed the *Romans*, who had good cauſe to be angry at their own ſlowneſs, in forbearing to ſend help unto the *Saguntines*, that held out eight months, looking ſtill for ſuccour, but in vain. Wherefore they determined to repair their honour by taking ſharp revenge. To this end they ſent ambaſſadors again to *Carthage*, demanding only, *Whether it were by general conſent and allowance of the* Carthaginians, *that* Hannibal *had made war upon* Saguntum; which, if they granted (as it ſeemed they would) then to give them defiance. Hereunto anſwer was made in the ſenate of *Carthage*, to this effect. That this their ſecond embaſſage, howſoever qualified with mild words, was indeed more inſolent than the former. For in that they only required juſtice againſt *Hannibal*; but in this, the very ſtate and commonwealth of *Carthage* was urged to plead guilty, or not guilty. But (ſaid the *Carthaginian* ſpeaker) whether the general of our army in *Spain*, in beſieging *Saguntum*, have only followed his own counſel, or whether he did it by direction from us, it is not the queſtion which the *Romans* ought to aſk us. That which is indeed worthy examination or diſpute, is; *Whether it were lawful or unlawful for* Hannibal *to do as he hath done*. For it belongs to us to call our own commanders in queſtion, and to puniſh them according to their faults and errors; to you, to challenge us, if we have done any thing contrary to our late league and contract. It is true, that in our negotiation with *Luctatius* the conſul, the allies of both nations were comprehended; but the *Saguntines* were not then of your allies, and therefore no parties to the peace then made; for of your allies in the future, or of ours, there was no diſpute. As touching the laſt agreement between you and *Aſdrubal*, wherein you will ſay, that the *Saguntines* were comprehended by name; it is you that have taught us how to anſwer that particular. For whatſoever you found in the treaty between us and *Luctatius*, to your own diſadvantage, you caſt it upon your conſul's preſumption, as promiſing thoſe things for which he had no warrant from the ſenate and people of *Rome*. If then it be lawful for the *Romans* to diſavow the actions of their conſuls and commanders, concluding any thing without punctual and preciſe warrant, the ſame liberty may we alſo aſſume, and hold ourſelves no way bound in honour to perform thoſe bargains which *Aſdrubal* hath made for us, without our commandment and conſent.

This was an impertinent anſwer, and little better than a mere cavil. For *Luctatius* the conſul, in his treaty of peace with the *Carthaginians*, had expreſly referred the allowance thereof to the people of *Rome*. It had been therefore much better to have dealt plainly, and to have alledged, that after this league was made and confirmed on both parts, it was broken by the *Romans*, in robbing the *Carthaginians* of the iſle of *Sardinia*, and withal of twelve hundred talents; which perjury the ſtate of *Carthage*, being now grown able, would revenge with open war. As for the *Saguntines*, it little ſkilled that the *Romans* had admitted them into confederacy, and forthwith inſerted their names into the treaty of peace with *Aſdrubal*; ſeeing that the treaty with *Aſdrubal*, and all other buſineſs between *Rome* and *Carthage*, following the violence and breach of peace, in taking away *Sardinia*, were no better than *Roman* injuries, as implying this commination; *Do whatſoever we require, elſe will we make war, without regard of our oath which we have already broken.*

But this the *Carthaginians* did not alledge, forgetting, in heat of contention (as *Polybius* takes it) the beſt of their plea. Yet ſince *Livy* himſelf doth remember and acknowledge, that the taking of *Sardinia* from the *Carthaginians*, did inflame the ſpirit of *Amilcar* with deſire of revenge; we may

may reaſonably think, that the mention of this injury was omitted, not ſo much upon forgetfulneſs, as for that it was not thought convenient, by ripping up ſuch ancient matter of quarrel, to ſhew that the war, now towards, had long been thought upon, and like to be made with extraordinary force, in other manner than heretofore. In concluſion, the *Carthaginian* ſenate moved the *Roman* ambaſſadors to deliver unto them in plain terms the purpoſes of thoſe that ſent them, and the worſt of that which they had long determined againſt them: as for the *Saguntines*, and the confining of their armies within *Iberus*, thoſe were but their pretences. Whereupon Q. *Fabius* gathering up the ſkirt of his gown, as if ſomewhat had been laid in the hollow thereof, made this ſhort reply: I have here (quoth he) in my gown-ſkirt both peace and war; make you (my maſters of the ſenate) election of theſe two, which of them you like beſt, and purpoſe to embrace. Hereat all cried out at once; Even which of them you yourſelf have a fancy to offer us. Marry then (quoth *Fabius*) take the war, and ſhare it among you. Which all the aſſembly willingly accepted.

This was plain dealing. To wrangle about pretences, when each part had reſolved to make war, it was merely frivolous. For all theſe diſputes of breach of peace have ever been maintained by the party unwilling, or unable to ſuſtain the war. The ruſty ſword and the empty purſe do always plead performance of covenants. There have been few kings or ſtates in the world that have otherwiſe underſtood the obligation of a treaty, than with the condition of their own advantage; and commonly (ſeeing peace between ambitious princes and ſtates, is but a kind of breathing) the beſt adviſed have rather begun with the ſword than with the trumpet. So dealt the *Arragonois* with the *French* in *Naples*; *Henry* II. of *France*, with the *Imperialiſts*, when he wrote to *Briſac*, to ſurprize as many places as he could ere the war broke out; *Don John*, with the *Netherlands*, and *Philip* II. of *Spain*, with the *Engliſh*, when in the great imbargo he took all our ſhips and goods in his ports.

But *Hannibal*, beſides the preſent ſtrength of *Carthage*, and the common feeling of injuries received from theſe enemies, had another private and hereditary deſire, that violently carried him againſt the *Romans*. His father *Amilcar*, at what time he did ſacrifice, being ready to take his journey into *Spain*, had ſolemnly bound him by oath, to purſue them with immortal hatred, and to work them all poſſible miſchief, as ſoon as he ſhould be a man, and able. *Hannibal* was then about nine years old when his father cauſed him to lay his hand upon the altar and make this vow; ſo that it was no marvel, if the impreſſion were ſtrong in him.

That it is inhuman to bequeath hatred in this ſort, as it were by legacy, it cannot be denied. Yet for mine own part, I do not much doubt, but that ſome of thoſe kings with whom we are now in peace, have received the like charge from their predeceſſors, that as ſoon as their coffers ſhall be full, they ſhall declare themſelves enemies to the people of *England*.

SECT. II.

Hannibal *takes order for the defence of* Spain *and* Africa. *His journey into* Italy.

WAR being thus proclaimed, *Hannibal* reſolved not to put up his ſword which he had drawn againſt the *Saguntines*, until he had therewith opened his paſſage unto the gates of *Rome*. So began the ſecond *Punic* war; ſecond to none that ever the ſenate and people of *Rome* ſuſtained. *Hannibal* wintered at *Carthagena*, where he licenſed his *Spaniſh* ſoldiers to viſit their friends, and refreſh themſelves againſt the ſpring. In the mean while, he gave inſtructions to his brother *Aſdrubal* for the government of *Spain* in his abſence. He alſo took order to ſend a great many troops of *Spaniards* into *Africa*, to equal the numbers of *Africans* formerly drawn into *Spain*; to the end, that ſo the one nation might remain as pledges and gages for the other. Of the *Spaniards*, he tranſported into *Africa* thirteen thouſand eight hundred and fifty foot, and twelve hundred horſe; alſo eight hundred ſlingers of the [a] *Baleares*. Beſides theſe, he ſelected four thouſand foot, all young men, and of quality, out of the beſt cities of *Spain*, which he appointed to be garriſon'd in *Carthage* itſelf, not ſo much in regard of their forces, as that they might ſerve for hoſtages; for among thoſe four thouſand, the beſt of the *Spaniſh* citizens, and thoſe that ſwayed moſt in their ſeveral ſtates, had their ſons or kinſmen. He alſo left with his brother, to guard the coaſts and ports, fifty and ſeven gallies, whereof thirty ſeven were preſently armed and appointed for the war. Of *Africans* and other nations ſtrangers, he left with him above twelve thouſand foot, and two thouſand horſe, beſides one and twenty elephants.

Having in this ſort taken order for the defence of *Spain* and *Africa*, he ſent diſcoverers before him to view the paſſages of the *Pyrenean* mountains, and of the *Alps*. He alſo ſent ambaſſadors to the mountaineers of the *Pyrenees*, and to the *Gauls*, to obtain a quiet paſſage, that he might bring his army entire into *Italy*, and not be compelled to diminiſh his forces by any war in the way, till he came to encounter the *Romans*. His ambaſſadors and diſcoverers being returned with good ſatisfaction; in the beginning of the ſpring he paſs'd over the river of *Iberus*, with an army conſiſting of fourſcore and ten thouſand foot, and twelve thouſand horſe. All thoſe parts of *Spain*, into which he had not entered before, he now ſubdued; and appointed *Hanno* (not that old enemy of his houſe, who ſat ſtill at *Carthage*) to govern *Spain* on the eaſt-ſide of *Iberus*, to whom he left an army of ten thouſand foot, and one thouſand horſe. Being arrived at the borders of *Spain*, ſome of his *Spaniſh* ſoldiers returned home, without aſking leave; which that others might not alſo do or attempt, he courteouſly diſmiſſed many more that ſeemed willing to be gone. Hereby it came to paſs, that the journey ſeemed the leſs tedious unto thoſe that accompanied him, as being not inforced by compulſion. With the reſt of his army, conſiſting now but of fifty thouſand foot, and nine thouſand horſe, he paſs'd the *Pyrenees*, and entred into *Gaul*. He found the *Gauls* that bordered upon *Spain* ready in arms to forbid his entrance into their country; but won them, with gentle ſpeech, and rich preſents that he beſtowed upon their leaders, to favour his expedition. So without any moleſtation he came to the bank of *Rhodanus*; where dwelt, on each ſide of the river, a people called *Volcæ*. Theſe were unacquainted with the cauſe of his coming, and therefore ſought to keep him from paſſing over the water. But he was greatly aſſiſted by ſome of thoſe *Gauls* that in-

[a] Majorca *and* Minorca.

habited on the weſt-ſide of *Rhodanus*, to wit, by thoſe of *Vivaretz* and *Lionnois*. For although many of them had tranſported themſelves and their goods into the country of *Dauphine*, thinking to defend the further bank againſt him; yet ſuch as remained, being very deſirous to free their country of ſo many ill gueſts, were better pleaſed to have their countrymen well beaten, which had abandoned them, than to have their own ſtore of corn and cattle waſted, by the long ſtay of ſo great an army as lay upon them. For which reaſon they helped him to make boats, informed him of another more eaſy paſſage higher up the river, and lent him guides. When the veſſels for tranſportation of his army were in readineſs, he ſent *Hanno*, the ſon of *Bomilcar*, up the river; himſelf in the mean while making countenance to enter the ford below. The end of this labour was, that *Hanno*, charging the *Gauls* unawares upon their own ſide, and *Hannibal*, at the ſame time, paſſing the river in their faces, the further bank was won, though with ſome difficulty, and the enemies diſperſed. Yet was he greatly troubled in conveying over his elephants, who marvellouſly feared the water. He was therefore driven to make raffs of trees, and cover them with earth and turf; whereof he faſtened one to each bank, that might ſerve as a bridge, to and from another of the ſame ſort, but looſe, upon which the beaſts were towed over.

Having paſt this firſt brunt, and overcome both the rage of the river, and of thoſe that defended it, he was viſited by the princes of the *Gauls Ciſalpines*, that inhabited *Piedmont* and *Milan*, who lately had revolted from the *Romans*. Theſe informed him of the paſſages of the *Alps*, that they were not ſo difficult as common report made them, and from theſe he received guides, with many other encouragements. All which notwithſtanding; he found himſelf extremely incumbered by the *Savoyards*; and loſt, both of his carriages and of his *Carthaginians*, more than willingly he would, or had formerly thought that he ſhould. For he was twice mainly aſſailed by them before he could recover the plain countries on the other ſide. And whereas this journey over the mountains coſt him fifteen days travel, he was every day, more or leſs, not only charged by thoſe mountaineers, but withal extremely beaten with grievous weather and ſnow; it being the beginning of winter when he began and overcame this paſſage. But the fair and fertile plains, which were now ready to receive them, with the aſſiſtance and conduct of the *Ciſalpine Gauls*, who by their proper forces had ſo often invaded the *Roman* territory, gave them great comfort and encouragement to go on; having nothing elſe of difficulty remaining, but that which from the beginning they made account to overcome by their proper valour and reſolution; namely, the *Roman* armies and reſiſtance.

SECT. III.

How the Romans *in vain ſolicited the* Spaniards *and* Gauls *to take their part. The rebellion of the* Ciſalpine Gauls *againſt the* Romans.

THE countries of *Spain* and *Gaul*, through which the *Carthaginians* marched thus far, had been ſolicited before by the ſame *Roman* ambaſſadors, who had denounced the war at *Carthage*. Theſe, as they were inſtructed by the ſenate, took *Spain* in their way homeward from *Carthage*, with a purpoſe to draw into the *Roman* alliance as many of the cities and princes as they could; at leaſt to diſſwade them from contracting any friendſhip with the *Carthaginians*. The firſt which they attempted, were the *Volſcians*, a people in *Spain*; from whom, in open aſſembly, they received by one that ſpake for the reſt, this uncomfortable anſwer: With what faith (ſaith he) can ye *Romans* perſwade us to value your alliance, or to prefer it before the friendſhip of the *Carthaginians*; ſeeing we are taught by the example of the *Saguntines*, to be more wiſe than ſo? For they, relying on your faith and promiſed aſſiſtance, have been utterly rooted out, and deſtroyed by the *Carthaginians*; whom they might elſe have held their aſſured friends, and good neighbours, as we, and other the people of *Spain*, have found them. Ye may therefore be gone, with this reſolution from us, that for our parts (and, ſo I think, I may anſwer for the reſt of our countrymen) the *Romans* henceforth are not to expect any kindneſs at our hands; who are reſolved, never to make account of their protection, nor amity. From the *Volſcians*, the ambaſſadors took their way towards the *Gauls*; uſing their beſt arguments to perſwade them not to ſuffer the *Carthaginians* to paſs into *Italy*, through their territory: and withal greatly glorifying themſelves, their ſtrength, and large dominion. But the *Gauls* laugh'd them to ſcorn, and had hardly the patience to hear them ſpeak. For ſhall we (ſaid one of their princes) by reſiſting *Hannibal*'s paſſage into *Italy*, entertain a war which is not meant to be made againſt us? Shall we hold the war among our ſelves, and in our own territory, by force, which marcheth with a ſpeedy pace from us, towards our ancient enemies? Have the *Romans* deſerved ſo well of us, and the *Carthaginians* ſo ill, that we ſhould ſet fire on our own houſes, to ſave theirs from burning? No, we know it well, that the *Romans* have already forced ſome nations of ours, out of their proper territory and inheritance; and conſtrained others, as free as themſelves, to pay them tribute. We will not therefore make the *Carthaginians* our enemies, who have no ways yet offended us, nor we them.

With this unpleaſing anſwer the ambaſſadors returned home; carrying no good news, of friends likely to help them; but rather ſome aſſurance from the people of *Maſſilia*, which were confederates with *Rome*, that the *Gauls* were determined to take part with their enemy. Of this inclination, the *Ciſalpine Gauls* gave haſty proof. For when the news was brought into *Italy*, that the *Carthaginians* had paſſed *Iberus*, and were on the way towards *Rome*; this alone ſufficed to ſtir up the *Boij*, and *Inſubrians*, againſt the *Romans*. Theſe people were lately offended at the plantation of new *Roman* colonies, at *Cremona* and *Placentia*, within their territories. Relying therefore upon the *Carthaginian* ſuccour, which they ſuppoſed to be now at hand, they laid aſide all regard of thoſe hoſtages, which they had given to the *Romans*, and fell upon the new colonies. The towns it ſeems that they could not win; for *Hannibal* ſhortly after failed to get them. But they forced the *Roman* commiſſioners (who belike were abroad in the country) to fly to *Modena*, where they beſieged them. The ſiege of *Modena* had continued ſome ſmall time; when the *Gauls*, having little ſkill in aſſaulting cities, waxed weary, and ſeemed deſirous to have peace, and to come to ſome good accord with the *Romans*. This they did of purpoſe to draw on ſome meeting; that they might therein lay hand upon the *Roman* deputies, thereby to redeem their hoſtages, in way of exchange. And it fell out, in part, according to their wiſh. For the *Romans* ſent out ambaſſadors to treat with them,

and

and to conclude a peace; whom they detained. *Manlius* the pretor, who lay in theſe quarters with an army, hearing this outrage, marched in all haſte to the relief of the beſieged. But the *Gauls*, having laid a ſtrong ambuſh in a wood joining to the way, fell upon the pretor ſo opportunely, as he was utterly overthrown, and all his followers left dead in the place; a few excepted, that recovered, by faſt running, a little village, but defenſible, upon the river of *Po*. When this was heard at *Rome*, *C. Attilius*, another of the pretors, was haſtily ſent to relieve the beſieged, with a legion, and five thouſand of the *Roman* aſſociates: which forces were taken out of the conſul's army, and ſupplied by a new levy.

As the *Gauls* were too raſh and haſty; ſo were the *Romans* too ſlow, and indeed too ill-adviſed, in the beginning of this war. They were not perſwaded, that *Carthage*, which had almoſt ſervilely endured ſo many indignities, in time of the late peace; would be ſo brave and couragious on the ſudden, as to attempt the conqueſt of *Italy* it ſelf. Wherefore they appointed one of their conſuls, to make war in *Spain*, the other in *Afric*: reſting ſecure of all danger at home. *Titus Sempronius* took his way toward *Afric*, with an hundred and ſixty *Quinqueremes*, or gallies, of five to an oar, which preparation may ſeem to threaten even the city of *Carthage*, to which it ſhall not come near. *P. Cornelius Scipio*, the other conſul, made all poſſible haſte, by way of *Genoa*, into *Provence*; and uſed ſuch diligence, having the wind alſo favourable, as in five days he recovered *Maſſilia*. There he was advertiſed, of *Hannibal*'s having paſſed the river of *Rhodanus*, whom he thought to have found buſy yet a while in *Spain*. *Hannibal* had alſo news of the conſul's arrival; whereof he was neither glad nor ſorry, as not meaning to have to do with him. Each of them ſent forth ſcouts, to diſcover the others number and doings: *Hannibal*, about five hundred *Numidians*; *Scipio*, three hundred of his better appointed *Roman* horſe. Theſe met and fought, and the *Numidians* were beaten; yet could not the *Romans* greatly brag, having ſlain only two hundred, and loſt of their own, one hundred and forty. But when *Scipio* drew near, to have met with the *Carthaginians*, he found, they were gone three days before; and that (as he then found aſſuredly true) with an intent to look upon the walls of *Rome*. This interrupted his intended voyage into *Spain*. Nevertheleſs he ſent away thither his brother *Cn. Cornelius Scipio*, with the greateſt part of the fleet and army, to try what might be done againſt *Aſdrubal* and the other *Carthaginian* lieutenants in that country. He himſelf, taking with him a few choice bands, returned by ſea to *Piſa*; and ſo paſſing through *Tuſcany* to *Lombardy*, drew together the broken troops of *Manlius* and *Attilius*, that lately had been beaten by the *Gauls*: with which forces he made head againſt the enemy, thinking to find him over-laboured, with travel of his painful journey.

SECT. IV.

Scipio *the* Roman *conſul overcome by* Hannibal *at* Ticinum. *Both of the* Roman *conſuls beaten by* Hannibal, *in a great battel at* Trebia.

FIVE months *Hannibal* had ſpent in his tedious journey from *Carthagena*; what great muſter he could make, when he had paſſed the *Alps*, it is not eaſily found. Some reckon his foot at an hundred thouſand, and his horſe at twenty thouſand; others report them to have been only twenty thouſand foot, and ſix hundred horſe. *Hannibal* himſelf, in his monument which he raiſed, in the temple of *Juno Lucina*, agreeth with the latter ſum. Yet the *Gauls*, *Ligurians*, and others that joined with him, are likely to have mightily increaſed his army in ſhort ſpace. But when he marched eaſtward from the banks of *Rhodanus*, he had with him eight and thirty thouſand foot, and eight thouſand horſe; of which all, ſave thoſe remembred by himſelf in the inſcription of his altar in *Juno*'s temple, are like to have periſhed, by diſeaſes, enemies, rivers, and mountains; which miſchiefs had devoured, each, their ſeveral ſhares.

Having newly paſſed the *Alps*, and ſcarce refreſhed his wearied army in the country of *Piedmont*; he ſought to win the friendſhip of the [a] *Taurini*, who lay next in his way. But the *Taurini* held war at that time with the *Inſubrians*, which were his good friends; and refuſed (perhaps for the ſame cauſe) his amity. Wherefore he aſſaulted their town, and won it by force in three days. Their ſpoil ſerved well to hearten his army; and their calamity, to terrify the neighbour places. So the *Gauls*, without more ado, fell unto his ſide: many for fear (many alſo for good-will, according to their former inclination. This diſpoſition ran through the whole country: which joined, or was all in a readineſs to join with the *Carthaginians*; when the news of *Scipio* the conſul's arrival, made ſome to be more adviſed than the reſt. The name of the *Romans* was terrible in thoſe quarters; what was in the *Carthaginians*, experience had not yet laid open. Since therefore the *Roman* conſul was already gotten through the moſt defenſible paſſages, ere any ſpeech had been heard of his approach: many ſat ſtill for very fear, who elſe would fain have concluded a league with theſe new-come friends; and ſome, for greater fear, offered their ſervice againſt the *Carthaginians*, whom nevertheleſs they had wiſhed well to ſpeed.

This wavering affection of the province, whereinto they were entered, made the two generals haſten to the trial of a battel. Their meeting was at *Ticinum*, now called *Pavia*; where each of them wondered at the other's expedition: *Hannibal* thinking it ſtrange, that the conſul whom he had left behind him on the other ſide of the *Alps*, could meet him in the face, before he had well warmed himſelf in the plains; *Scipio* admiring the ſtrange adventure of paſſing thoſe mountains, and the great ſpirit of his enemy. Neither were the ſenate at *Rome* little amazed at *Hannibal*'s ſucceſs, and ſudden arrival. Wherefore they diſpatched a meſſenger in all haſte unto *Sempronius*, the other conſul, that was then in *Sicily*, giving him to underſtand hereof: and letting him further know, that whereas he had been directed to make the war in *Africa*, it was now their pleaſure that he ſhould forbear to proſecute any ſuch attempt, but that he ſhould return the army under his charge, with all poſſible ſpeed, to ſave *Italy* it ſelf. According to this order, *Sempronius* ſent off his fleet from *Lilybæum*, with direction to land the army at *Ariminum*, a port town not far from *Ravenna*; quite another way from *Carthage*, whither he was making haſte. In the mean while, *Scipio* and *Hannibal* were come ſo near, that fight they muſt, ere they could part aſunder. Hereupon, both of them prepared the minds of their ſoldiers, by the beſt arguments they had: unto which *Hannibal* added the rhetoric of

[a] *Theſe dwelt about* Turin, *a goodly city, now ſubject unto the duke of* Savoy; *which from them took the name of* Auguſta Taurinorum.

a preſent

a preſent example, that he ſhewed upon certain priſoners of the *Savoyards*, which he brought along with him, fitted for the purpoſe, into *Italy*. For theſe, having been no leſs miſerably fettered and chained, than ſparingly fed; and withal ſo often ſcourged on their naked bodies, as nothing was more in their deſire, than to be delivered from their miſeries by any kind of preſent death, were brought into the middle of the army; where it was openly demanded, which of them would fight hand to hand with ſome other of his companions, till the one of them were ſlain, with condition, being the victor, to receive his liberty, and ſome ſmall reward. This was no ſooner propounded, than all of them together accepted the offer. Then did *Hannibal* cauſe his lots to be caſt, which of them ſhould enter the liſt, with ſuch weapons, as the chieftains of the *Gauls* were wont to uſe in ſingle combats. Every one of theſe unhappy men wiſhed, that his own lot might ſpeed; whereby it ſhould at leaſt be his good fortune, to end his miſeries by death, if not to get a reward by victory. That couple, whoſe good hap it was to be choſen, fought reſolvedly: as rather deſiring, than fearing death; and having none other hope, than in vanquiſhing. Thus were ſome few couples matched, it ſkilled not how equally: for all theſe poor creatures were willing, upon whatſoever uneven terms, to rid themſelves out of ſlavery. The ſame affection that was in theſe combatants, and in their fellows which beheld them, wrought alſo upon the *Carthaginians*, for whom the ſpectacle was ordained. For they deemed happy, not only him, that by winning the victory had gotten his liberty, together with an horſe and armour, but even him alſo, who being ſlain in fight, had eſcaped that miſerable condition, unto which his companions were returned. Their general perceiving what impreſſion this dumb ſhew had wrought in them, began to admoniſh them of their own condition, ſpeaking to this effect: That he had laid before them an example of their own eſtates: ſeeing the time was at hand, wherein they were all to run the ſame fortune, that theſe ſlaves had done; all to live victorious and rich; or all to die, or (which theſe priſoners eſteemed far more grievous) to live in a perpetual ſlavery: that none of them all, in whom was common ſenſe, could promiſe to himſelf any hope of life by flight; ſince the mountains, the rivers, the great diſtance from their own countries, and the purſuit of mercileſs enemies, muſt needs retrench all ſuch impotent imaginations. He therefore prayed them to remember, that they, who had even now praiſed the fortune both of the victor, and of the vanquiſhed, would make it their own caſe; ſeeing that there was never any in the world, appointed with ſuch a reſolution, that had ever been broken, or beaten by their enemies. On the contrary, he told them, that the *Romans*, who were to fight upon their own ſoil, and in view of their own towns; who knew as many ways to ſave themſelves by flight, as they had bodies of men to fight withal, could no way entertain ſuch a reſolution as theirs: ſeeing the ſame neceſſity (to which nothing ſeems impoſſible) did no way preſs them, or conſtrain them. In this ſort did *Hannibal*, with one ſubſtantial argument, *that there was no mean between victory and death*, encourage his companions. For (ſaith a great captain of *France*) *la commodite de la retraicte advance la fuite*; *the commodity of a retreat doth greatly advance a flat running away*.

Scipio, on the other ſide, after that he had given order for the laying of a bridge over the river of *Ticinus*, did not neglect to uſe the beſt arguments and reaſons he could to encourage the army he led; putting them in mind of the great conqueſts and victories of their anceſtors; againſt how many nations they had prevailed, and over how many princes their enemies they had triumphed. As for this army commanded by *Hannibal*, although it were enough to tell them, that it was no better than of *Carthaginians*, whom in their late war they had ſo often beaten by land and ſea; yet he prayed them withal to conſider, that at this time it was not only ſo diminiſhed in numbers, as it rather ſeemed a troop of brigants and thieves, than an army likely to encounter the *Romans*; but ſo weather-beaten, and ſtarved, as neither the men nor horſes had ſtrength or courage to ſuſtain the firſt charge that ſhould be given upon them. Nay (ſaid he) ye your ſelves may make judgment what daring they have now remaining, after ſo many travels and miſeries; ſeeing when they were in their beſt ſtrength, after they had paſſed the *Roan*, their horſe-men were not only beaten by ours, and driven back to the very trenches of their camp, but *Hannibal* himſelf, fearing our approach, ran head-long towards the *Alps*; thinking it a leſs diſhonour to die there by froſt, famine, and precipitation, than by the ſharp ſwords of the *Romans*, which had ſo often cut down his people both in *Africa*, and in *Sicily*. It was not long after this, ere the two generals met, each being far advanced before the groſs of his army with his horſe; and the *Roman* having alſo with him ſome light-armed foot, to view the ground, and the enemy's countenance. When they diſcovered the approach one of the other, *Scipio* ſent before him his horſemen of the *Gauls* to begin the fight, and beſtowing his darters in the void ground between their troops, to aſſiſt them; himſelf with his *Roman* men at arms followed ſoftly in good order. The *Gauls* (whether deſirous to try the metal of the *Carthaginians*, or hoping thereby to get favour of the *Romans*) behaved themſelves couragiouſly, and were couragiouſly oppoſed; yet their foot, that ſhould have aided them, ſhrank at the firſt brunt, or rather fled cowardly away, without caſting a dart, for fear of being trodden down by the enemy's horſe. This notwithſtanding, the *Gauls* maintained the fight, and did more hurt than they received, as preſuming that they were well back'd; neither was the conſul unmindful to relieve them, their hardineſs deſerving his aid, and the haſty flight of thoſe that ſhould have ſtood by them, admoniſhing him that it was needful. Wherefore he adventured himſelf ſo far, that he received a dangerous wound, and had been left in the place, if his ſon (afterwards ſurnamed *Africanus*) had not brought him off; though others give the honour of this reſcue to a *Ligurian* ſlave. Whilſt the *Romans* were buſied in helping their conſul, an unexpected ſtorm came driving at their backs, and made them look about how to help themſelves. *Hannibal* had appointed his *Numidian* light-horſe to give upon the *Romans* in flank, and to compaſs them about, whilſt he with his men at arms ſuſtained their charge, and met them in the face. The *Numidians* performed this very well; cutting in pieces the ſcattered foot, that ran away at the firſt encounter; and then falling on the backs of thoſe, whoſe looks were faſtened upon *Hannibal* and *Scipio*. By this impreſſion the *Romans* were ſhuffled together, and routed; ſo that they all betook them to their ſpeed, and left unto their enemies the honour of the day.

When *Scipio* ſaw his horſe-men thus beaten, and the reſt of his army thereby greatly diſcouraged, he thought it a point of wiſdom, having loſt ſo many of his fleet upon the firſt puff of the wind, to take

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port with the reſt before the extremeſt of the tempeſt overtook him; for he ſaw by the lowring morning what manner of day it was like to prove: therefore his battel of foot being yet unbroken, he, in a manner, ſtole the retreat, and recovered the bridge over *Ticinus*, which he had formerly built. But notwithſtanding all the haſte that he made, he left ſix hundred of his rear behind him, who were the laſt that ſhould have paſſed, and ſtaid to break the bridge. Herein he followed this rule of a good man of war, *Si certamen quandoque dubium videatur, tacitam miles arripiat fugam: fuga enim aliquando laudanda*; which muſt be underſtood in this ſort: *If a general of an army, by ſome unproſperous beginnings, doubt the ſucceſs, or find his army fearful or wavering, it is more profitable to ſteal a ſafe retreat, than to abide the uncertain event of battel.*

It was two days after ere *Hannibal* could paſs the river, *Scipio* the whilſt refreſhing his men, and eaſing himſelf of his wound in *Placentia:* but as ſoon as *Hannibal* preſented his army before the town, offering battel to the *Romans*, who durſt not accept it, nor iſſue forth of their camp, the *Gauls*, that hitherto had followed *Scipio* for fear, gathered, out of his fear, courage to forſake him. They thought that now the long-deſired time was come, in which better chieftains and ſoldiers than *Aneroeſtus*, *Britomarus*, and *Geſſates*, were come to help them, if they had the hearts to help themſelves. Wherefore the ſame night they fell upon the *Roman* camp, wounded, and ſlew many; eſpecially of thoſe guards that kept watch at the gate, with whoſe heads in their hands they fled over to the *Carthaginians*, and preſented their ſervice. *Hannibal* received them exceeding courteouſly, and diſmiſſed them to their own places, as men likely to be of more uſe to him, in perſwading the reſt of their nation to become his confederates, than in any other ſervice at the preſent.

About the fourth watch of the night following, the conſul ſtole a retreat, as he had done before; but not with the like eaſe and ſecurity. *Hannibal* had a good eye upon him, and ere he could get far, ſent the *Numidians* after him, following himſelf with all his army. That night the *Romans* had received a great blow, if the *Numidians*, greedy of ſpoil, had not ſtaid to ranſack their camp, and thereby given time to all, ſave ſome few in rear, that were ſlain or taken, to paſs the river of *Trebia*, and ſave themſelves. *Scipio*, being both unable to travel by reaſon of his wound, and withal finding it expedient to attend the coming of his fellow-conſul, encamps himſelf ſtrongly upon the banks of *Trebia*. Neceſſity required that he ſhould ſo do; yet this diminiſhed his reputation, for every day more and more of the *Gauls* fell to the *Carthaginian* ſide; among whom came in the *Boij*, that brought with them the *Roman* commiſſioners, which they had taken in the late inſurrection. They had hitherto kept them as pledges, to redeem their own hoſtages; but now they deliver them up to *Hannibal*, as tokens and pledges of their affections towards him, by whoſe help they conceived better hope of recovering their own men and lands. In the mean while *Hannibal*, being in great ſcarcity of victuals, attempted the taking of *Claſtidium*, a town wherein the *Romans* had laid up all their ſtore and munition: but there needed no force, a *Brunduſian*, whom the *Romans* had truſted with keeping it, ſold it for a little money.

The news of theſe diſaſters brought to *Rome*, filled the ſenate and people rather with a deſire of haſty revenge, than any great ſorrow for their loſs received; ſeeing that, in a manner, all their foot, wherein their ſtrength and hope conſiſted, were as yet entire. They therefore haſted away *Sempronius*, that was newly arrived, towards *Ariminum*, where the army, by him ſent out of *Sicily*, awaited his coming. He therefore haſted hither, and from thence he marched ſpeedily towards his colleague, who attended him upon the banks of *Trebia*. Both the armies being joined in one, the conſuls deviſed about that which remained to be done: *Sempronius* receiving from *Scipio* the relation of what had paſſed ſince *Hannibal*'s arrival, the fortune of the late fight, and by what error or miſadventure the *Romans* were therein foiled, which *Scipio* chiefly laid on the revolt and treaſon of the *Gauls*.

Sempronius, having received from *Scipio* the ſtate of the affairs in thoſe parts, ſought by all means to try his fortune with *Hannibal*, before *Scipio* were recovered of his wounds, that thereby he might purchaſe to himſelf the ſole glory of the victory, which he had already, in his imagination, certainly obtained. He alſo feared the election of the new conſuls, his own time being well near expired. But *Scipio* perſwaded the contrary, objecting the unſkilfulneſs of the new-come ſoldiers; and withal, gave him good reaſon to aſſure him, that the *Gauls*, naturally unconſtant, were upon terms of abandoning the party of the *Carthaginians*; thoſe of them inhabiting between the rivers of *Trebia* and *Po* being already revolted. *Sempronius* knew all this as well as *Scipio*; but being both guided and blinded by his ambition, he made haſte to find out the diſhonour which he might otherwiſe eaſily have avoided. This reſolution of *Sempronius* was exceeding pleaſing to *Hannibal*, who feared nothing ſo much as delay and loſs of time; for the ſtrength of his army, conſiſting in ſtrangers, to wit, in *Spaniards* and *Gauls*, he no leſs feared the change of affection in the one, than the impatience of the other; who, being far from their own home, had many paſſions moving them to turn their faces towards it. To further the deſire of *Sempronius*, it fell out ſo, that about the ſame time the *Gauls* inhabiting near unto *Trebia*, complained of injuries done by the *Carthaginians*. They did not ſupply *Hannibal* with neceſſaries, as he ſuppoſed that they might have done; although he daily reprehended their negligence, telling them, that for their ſakes, and to ſet them at liberty, he had undertaken this expedition. Seeing therefore how little they regarded his words, he was bold to be his own carver, and took from them by force as much as he needed of that which they had. Hereupon they fly to the *Romans* for help, and, to make their tale the better, ſay, that this wrong is done them, becauſe they refuſed to join with *Hannibal*. *Scipio* cared not much for this; he ſuſpected their falſhood, and was aſſured of their mutability: but *Sempronius* affirmed, that it ſtood with the honour of *Rome* to preſerve their confederates from ſuffering injury, and that thereby might be won the friendſhip of all the *Gauls*. Therefore he ſent out a thouſand horſe, which coming unlooked for upon *Hannibal*'s foragers, and finding them heavy loaden, cut many of them in pieces, and chaſed the reſt even into their own camp. This indignity made the *Carthaginians* ſally out againſt them, who cauſed them to retire faſter than they came. *Sempronius* was ready to back his own men, and repelled the enemies. *Hannibal* did the like. So that at length all the *Roman* army was drawn forth, and a battel ready to be fought, if the *Carthaginian* had not refuſed it.

This victory (for ſo the conſul would have it called) made the *Romans* in general deſirous to try the main chance in open field: all the perſwaſions

of *Scipio* to the contrary notwithſtanding. Of this diſpoſition *Hannibal* was advertiſed by the *Gauls*, his ſpies, that were in the *Roman* camp. Therefore he bethought himſelf how to help forward the victory, by adding ſome ſtratagem to his forces: he found in the hollow of a water-courſe, over-grown with high reeds, a fit trench to cover an ambuſh. Therein he caſt his brother *Mago*, with a thouſand choice horſe, and as many foot. The reſt of his army, after they had well warmed, and well fed themſelves in their camp, he led into the field, and marched towards the conſul. Early in the morning he had ſent over *Trebia* ſome companies of *Numidian* light-horſe to brave the enemy, and draw him forth to a bad dinner, ere he had broken his faſt. *Sempronius* was ready to take any opportunity to fight; and therefore not only iſſued out of his camp, but forded the river of *Trebia*, in a moſt cold and miſerable day, his foot being wet almoſt to the arm-holes; which, together with the want of food, did ſo enfeeble and cool their courages, as they wanted force to handle the arms they bare. Strong they were in foot, as well of their own nation, as of the *Latins*: having of the one, ſixteen, of the other, twenty thouſand. The maſs of theſe they ranged in a groſs battalion, guarded on the flanks with three thouſand horſe: thruſting their light-armed, and darters, in looſe troops in the head of the reſt, in the nature of a vantguard. The *Carthaginian* numbers of foot, were in a manner equal to their enemies; in horſe, they had by far the better, both in number and goodneſs. When therefore the *Roman* horſe, ranged on the flanks of their foot, were broken by the *Numidians*; when their foot were charged both in front and flank, by the *Spaniards*, *Gauls*, and elephants; when finally the whole army was unawares preſs'd in the rear, by *Mago* and his two thouſand, that roſe out of their place of ambuſh: then fell the *Romans*, by heaps, under the enemies ſwords; and being beaten down, as well fighting in diſorder, as flying towards the river, by the horſemen that purſued them, there eſcaped no more of ſix and thirty thouſand, than ten thouſand of all ſorts, horſe and foot.

Three great errors *Sempronius* committed, of which every one deſerved to be recompenſed with the loſs that followed. The firſt was, that he fought with *Hannibal* in a champain, being by far inferior in horſe, and withal thereby ſubject to the *African* elephants, which, in incloſed or uneven grounds and wood-lands, would have been of no uſe. His ſecond error was, that he made no diſcovery of the place upon which he fought; whereby he was groſsly over-reach'd, and inſnared, by the ambuſh which *Hannibal* had laid for him. The third was, that he drench'd his footmen with empty ſtomachs, in the river of *Trebia*, even in a moſt cold and froſty day, whereby in effect they loſt the uſe of their limbs. For, as one ſaith well; *There is nothing more inconvenient and perilous, than to preſent an army tired with travel, to an enemy freſh and fed; ſince where the ſtrength of body faileth, the generoſity of mind is but as an unprofitable vapour.*

The broken remainder of the *Roman* army, was collected by *Scipio*, who got therewith into *Placentia*; ſtealing away the ſame night, which was exceeding rainy, from the *Carthaginians*, who either perceived him not, becauſe of the ſhowers; or would not perceive him, becauſe they were overwearied. *Sempronius* eſcaped with extream danger; flying through the country that was overrun by the enemies horſe. He was attended by more, than were requiſite in a ſecret flight; yet by fewer, than could have made reſiſtance, if the enemy had met with him. Nevertheleſs he got away, and came to *Rome*, where he did his office in chooſing new conſuls for the year following: and then returned into his province, with a freſh ſupply againſt *Hannibal*.

SECT. V.

The departure of Hannibal *from the* Ciſalpine Gauls *into* Hetruria. Flaminius *the* Roman *conſul ſlain; and his army deſtroyed by the* Carthaginians, *at the lake of* Thraſymene.

THE winter growing on apace, was very ſharp, and unfit for ſervice: to the great contentment of the *Romans*, who being not able to keep the field, lay warm in *Placentia*, and *Cremona*. Yet *Hannibal* did not ſuffer them to reſt very quiet: but vexed them with continual alarms; aſſailing divers places; and taking ſome; beating the *Gauls* their adherents; and winning the *Ligurians* to his party, who preſented him, in token of their faithful love, with two *Roman* queſtors or treaſurers, two colonels and five gentlemen, the ſons of ſenators, which they had intercepted. Theſe, and in general all ſuch priſoners as he had of the *Romans*, he held in ſtreight places, loaden with irons, and miſerably fed: thoſe of their followers he not only well entreated, but ſent them to their countries without ranſom; with this proteſtation, That he therefore undertook the war in *Italy* to free them from the oppreſſion of the *Romans*. By theſe means he hoped, and not in vain, to draw many of them to his party and aſſiſtance. But the *Gauls* were not capable of ſuch perſwaſions. They ſtood in fear, leſt he ſhould make their country the ſeat of war, and perhaps take it from them. They were alſo more grieved than reaſon willed them, at his feeding upon them, and waſting their territory. Wherefore ſome of them conſpired againſt his life; others admoniſhed him of the danger: and theſe that gave him the advice, were ready ſoon after to practiſe againſt him; but were in like ſort detected. He was therefore glad to uſe perriwigs of hair, and falſe beards of divers colours, to the end that he might not be deſcried, nor known, to thoſe that ſhould undertake to make him away. Fain he would have paſſed the *Apennines*, upon the firſt appearance of ſpring; but was compelled by the violence of weather, to tarry among the *Gauls*, till he had ſeen more ſwallows than one. At length, when the year was ſomewhat better opened, he reſolved to take his leave of theſe giddy companions, and bring the war nearer to the gates of *Rome*. So away he went, having his army greatly increaſed with *Ligurians* and *Gauls*; more ſerviceable friends abroad, than in their own country. That the paſſage of the *Apennine* mountains was troubleſome, I hold it needleſs to make any doubt. Yet ſince the *Roman* armies found no memorable impediment, in their marches that way: the great vexation which fell upon *Hannibal*, when he was travelling through and over them, ought in reaſon to be imputed rather to the extremity of winter, that makes all ways foul, than to any tolerable difficulty in that journey. Nevertheleſs, to avoid the length of way, together with the reſiſtance and fortifications, which may not improbably be thought to have been erected upon the ordinary paſſages towards *Rome*: he choſe at this time, though it were with much trouble, to travel through the fens and rotten grounds of *Tuſcany*. In thoſe mariſhes and bogs, he loſt all his elephants, ſave one, together with the uſe of one of his eyes; by the moiſtneſs

moiſtneſs of the air, and by lodging on the cold ground, and wading through deep mire and water. In brief, after he had with much ado recovered the firm and fertile plains; he lodged about *Arretium*: where he ſomewhat refreſhed his wearied followers, and heard news of the *Roman* conſuls.

C. Flaminius, and *Cn. Servilius* had of late been choſen conſuls for this year: *Servilius*, a tractable man, and wholly governed by advice of the ſenate; *Flaminius*, an hot-headed popular orator, who having once been robbed (as he thought) of his conſulſhip, by a device of the ſenators, was afraid to be ſerved ſo again, unleſs he quickly finiſhed the war. This jealous conſul thought it not beſt for him to be at *Rome*, when he entred into his office; leſt his adverſaries, by faining ſome religious impediment, ſhould detain him within the city, or find other buſineſs for him at home, to diſappoint him of the honour, that he hoped to get in the war. Wherefore he departed ſecretly out of the town, and meant to take poſſeſſion of his office, when the day came, at *Ariminum*. The *Fathers* (ſo the ſenators were called) highly diſpleaſed with this, revoked him by ambaſſadors: but he neglected their injunction; and, haſting to meet with the *Carthaginians*, took his way to *Arretium*, where he ſhortly found them.

The fiery diſpoſition of this conſul, promiſed unto *Hannibal* great aſſurance of victory. Therefore he provoked, with many indignities, the vehement nature of the *Roman*; hoping thereby to draw him unto fight, ere *Servilius* came with the reſt of the army. All the country between *Feſule* and *Arretium* he put to fire and ſword, even under the conſul's noſe; which was enough to make him ſtir, that would not have ſitten ſtill, though *Hannibal* had been quiet. It is true, that a great captain of *France* hath ſaid, *Pays gaſté n'eſt pas perdu*; *a waſted country is not thereby loſt*. But by this waſte of the country, *Flaminius* thought his own honour to be much impaired, and therefore advanced towards the enemy. Many adviſed him (which had indeed been beſt) to have patience a while, and ſtay for his colleague. But of this he could not abide to hear: ſaying, that he came not to defend *Arretium*, whilſt the *Carthaginians* went burning down all *Italy* before them, to the gates of *Rome*. Therefore he took horſe, and commanded the army to march. It is reported as ominous, that one of their enſigns ſtuck ſo faſt in the ground, as it could not be plucked up by the enſign-bearer. Of this tale, whether true or falſe, *Tully* makes a jeſt: ſaying, that the cowardly knave did faintly pull at it (as going now to fight) having hardly pitched it into the earth. Neither was the anſwer of *Flaminius* (if it were true) diſagreeable hereto: for he commanded, that it ſhould be digged up, if fear had made the hands too weak to lift it up; aſking withal, whether letters were not come from the ſenate, to hinder his proceedings. Of this their jealouſy, both he, and the ſenate that gave him cauſe, are likely to repent.

All the territory of *Cortona*, as far as to the lake of *Thraſymene*, was on a light fire, which whilſt the conſul thought to quench with his enemies blood, he purſued *Hannibal* ſo unadviſedly, that he fell with his whole army, into an ambuſh cunningly laid for him, between the mountains of *Cortona*, and the lake. There was he charged unawares on all ſides (ſave only where that lake of *Peruſia* permitted neither his enemies to come at him, nor him to flie from them) knowing not which way to turn, or make reſiſtance. So was he ſlain in the place, accompanied with fifteen thouſand dead carcaſſes of his countrymen. About ſix thouſand of his men, that had the vantguard, took courage, as for the moſt part it happens, out of deſperation; and, breaking through the enemies, that ſtood in their way, recovered the tops of the mountains. If theſe had returned, and given charge upon the *Carthaginians* backs, it was thought that they might have greatly amended, if not wholly altered, the fortune of the day. But that violence of their fear, which, kindled by neceſſity, had wrought the effects of hardineſs; was well aſſwaged, when they ceaſed to deſpair, of ſaving their lives by flight. They ſtood ſtill, in a cold ſweat, upon the hill-top; hearing under them a terrible noiſe, but not any ways diſcovering how things went, becauſe of the great fog that held all that morning. When it grew toward noon, the air was cleared, and they might plainly diſcern the lamentable ſlaughter of their fellows. But they ſtaid not to lament it: for it was high time, they thought, to be gone, ere they were deſcried, and attacked by the enemies horſe. This they ſhould have thought upon ſooner, ſince they had no mind to return unto the fight. For deſcried they were, and *Maharbal* ſent after them; who overtook them by night in a village, which he ſurrounded with his horſe: and ſo they yielded the next day, rendering up their arms, upon his promiſe of their lives and liberties.

This accord *Hannibal* refuſed to confirm; ſaying, that it was made by *Maharbal*, without ſufficient warrant, as wanting his authority to make it good. Herein he taught them (yet little to his own honour) what it was to keep no faith: and fitted them with a trick of their own. For, if it were lawful unto the *Romans* to alter covenants, or add unto them what they had liſted; if the *Carthaginians* muſt be fain to pay certain hundreds, and yet more hundreds of talents, beſides their firſt bargain; as alſo to renounce their intereſt in *Sardinia*, and be limited in their *Spaniſh* conqueſts, according to the good pleaſure of the *Romans*, whoſe preſent advantage is more ample, than the conditions of the late concluded peace: then can *Hannibal* be as much a *Roman*, as themſelves; and make them know, that perfidiouſneſs gaineth no more in proſperity, than it loſeth in the change of fortune. Fifteen thouſand *Italian* priſoners, or thereabout, he had in his hands: of which, all that were not *Romans*, he ſet free without ranſom; proteſting, as he had done before, that it was for their ſakes, and to free them and others from the *Roman* tyranny, that he had undertaken this war. But the *Romans* he kept in ſtrait priſon, and in fetters; making them learn to eat hard meat. This was a good way, to breed in the people of *Italy*, if not a love of *Carthage*, yet a contempt of *Rome*: as if this war had not concerned the general ſafety, but only the preſerving of her own neck from the yoke of ſlavery, which her over-ſtrong enemies would thruſt upon her in revenge of her oppreſſions. But an ancient reputation, confirmed by ſucceſs of many ages, is not loſt in one or two battels. Wherefore more is to be done, ere the *Carthaginians* can get any *Italian* partiſans.

Preſently after the battel of *Thraſymene*, *C. Centronius*, with four thouſand *Roman* horſe, drew near unto the camp of *Hannibal*. He was ſent from *Ariminum*, by *Servilius* the other conſul, to increaſe the ſtrength of *Flaminius*: but coming too late, he increaſed only the miſadventure. *Maharbal* was employed by *Hannibal*, to intercept this company, who finding them amazed with the report

which

which they had newly heard of the great overthrow, charged them, and brake them: and killing almoſt half of them, drove the reſt unto an high piece of ground, whence they came down, and ſimply yielded to mercy, the next day. *Servilius* himſelf was, in the mean time, ſkirmiſhing with the *Gauls*; againſt whom he had wrought no matter of importance, when the news was brought him of his colleague's overthrow and death in *Hetruria*, that made him haſten back to the defence of *Rome*.

In theſe paſſages, it is eaſy to diſcern the fruits of popular jealouſy, which perſwaded the *Romans* to the yearly change of their commanders in the wars, which greatly endangered, and retarded the growth of that empire. Certain it is, that all men are far better taught by their own errors, than by the examples of their fore-goers. *Flaminius* had heard, in what a trap *Sempronius* had been taken up but the year before, by this ſubtil *Carthaginian*; yet ſuffered he himſelf to be caught ſoon after in the ſame manner. He had alſo belike forgotten, how *Sempronius*, fearing to be prevented by a new conſul, and ambitious of the ſole honour of beating *Hannibal* in battel, without help of his companion *Scipio*, had been rewarded with ſhame and loſs: elſe would he not, contrary to all good advice, have been ſo haſty to fight, before the arrival of *Servilius*. If *Sempronius* had been continued in his charge, it is probable that he would have taken his companion with him the ſecond time, and have ſearched all ſuſpected places, proper to have ſhadowed an ambuſh: both which this new conſul *Flaminius* neglected. We may boldly avow it, that by being continued in his government of *France* ten years, *Ceſar* brought that mighty nation, together with the *Helvetians*, and many of the *Germans*, under the *Roman* yoke; into which parts, had there been every year a new lieutenant ſent, they would hardly, if ever, have been ſubdued. For it is more than the beſt wit in the world can do, to inform itſelf, within one year's compaſs, of the nature of a great nation, of the factions, of the places, rivers, and of all good helps, whereby to proſecute a war to the beſt effect. Our princes have commonly left their deputies in *Ireland* three years; whence, by reaſon of the ſhortneſs of that their time, many of them have returned as wiſe as they went out; others have profited more, and yet when they began but to know the firſt rudiments of war, and government, fitting the country, they have been called home, and new apprentices ſent in their places, to the great prejudice both of this and that eſtate. But it hath ever been the courſe of the world, rather to follow old errors, than to examine them: and of princes and governours, to up-hold their ſlothful ignorance, by the old examples and policy of other ages and people; though neither likeneſs of time, of occaſion, or of any other circumſtance, have perſwaded the imitation.

SECT. VI.

How Q. Fabius, *the* Roman *dictator, ſought to conſume the force of* Hannibal, *by lingering war.* Minutius *the maſter of the horſe, honoured and advanced by the people for bold and ſucceſsful attempting adventures raſhly upon* Hannibal, *and is like to periſh with his army, but reſcued by* Fabius.

GREATLY were the *Romans* amazed, at this their ill ſucceſs, and at the danger apparent; which threatened them in more terrible manner, than ever did war, ſince *Rome* it ſelf was taken. They were good ſoldiers; and ſo little accuſtomed to receive an overthrow, that when *Pyrrhus* had beaten them, once and again, in open field, all *Italy* was ſtrangely affected with his ſucceſs, and held him in admiration, as one that could work wonders. But *Pyrrhus*'s quarrel was not grounded upon hate: he only ſought honour, and fought (as it were) upon a bravery: demeaning himſelf like a courteous enemy. This *Carthaginian* deteſted the whole *Roman* name; againſt which he burned with deſire of revenge. *Ticinum*, *Trebia*, and *Thraſymene*, witneſſed his purpoſe, and his ability. Which to withſtand, they fled unto a remedy that had long been out of uſe, and created a dictator. The dictator's power was greater than the conſuls, and ſcarcely ſubject unto controul of the whole city. Wherefore this officer was ſeldom choſen, but upon ſome extremity, and for no longer time than ſix months. He was to be named by one of the conſuls, at the appointment of the ſenate: though it were ſo, that the conſul (if he ſtood upon his prerogative) might name whom he pleaſed. At this time, the one conſul being dead, and the other too far off, the people took upon them, as having ſupream authority, to give up the dignity, by their election, to Q. *Fabius Maximus*, the beſt reputed man of war in the city. *Novum factum, novum conſilium expetit; contrary winds, contrary courſes.* Q. *Fabius* choſe *M. Minutius Rufus* maſter of the horſe; which officer was cuſtomarily, as the dictator's lieutenant; though this *Minutius* grew afterwards famous, by taking more upon him.

The firſt act of *Fabius*, was the reformation of ſomewhat amiſs in matter of religion: a good beginning, and commendable; had the religion been alſo good. But if it were true (as [a] *Livy* reports it) that the books of *Sibyl* were conſulted, and gave direction in this buſineſs of devotion; then muſt we believe, that thoſe books of *Sibyl*, preſerved in *Rome*, were dictated by an evil ſpirit. For it was ordained, that ſome vow, made in the beginning of this war to *Mars*, ſhould be made anew, and amplified; as having not been rightly made before: alſo that great plays ſhould be vowed unto *Jupiter*, and a temple to *Venus*; with ſuch other trumpery. This vehemency of ſuperſtition, proceeds always from vehemency of fear. And ſurely this was a time, when *Rome* was exceedingly diſtempered with paſſion; whereof that memorable accident, of two women that ſuddenly died, when they ſaw their ſons return alive from *Thraſymene*, may ſerve to bear witneſs; though it be more properly an example of motherly love. The walls and towers of the city were now repaired and fortified; the bridges upon rivers were broken down; and all care taken for defence of *Rome* it ſelf. In this tumult, when the dictator was newly ſet forth againſt *Hannibal*; word was brought, that the *Carthaginian* fleet had intercepted all the ſupply that was going to *Cn. Scipio* in *Spain*. Againſt theſe *Carthaginians*, *Fabius* commanded *Servilius* the conſul to put to ſea; and, taking up all the ſhips about *Rome* and *Oſtia*, to purſue them: whilſt he, with the legions, attended upon *Hannibal*. Four legions he had levied in haſte: and from *Ariminum* he received the army, which *Servilius* the conſul had conducted thither.

With theſe forthwith he followed apace after *Hannibal*; not to fight, but to affront him. And

[a] Liv. l. 22.

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knowing well, what advantage the *Numidian* horſe had over the *Romans*, he always lodged himſelf on high grounds, and of hard acceſs. *Hannibal* in the mean while, purſuing his victory, had ranged over all the country, and uſed all manner of cruelty towards the inhabitants; eſpecially to thoſe of the *Roman* nation, of whom he did put to the ſword all that were able to bear arms. Paſſing by *Spoletum* and *Ancona*, he encamped upon the *Adriatic* ſhores; refreſhed his diſeaſed, and over-travelled companies; armed his *Africans* after the manner of the *Romans*; and made his diſpatches for *Carthage*, preſenting his friends, which were in effect all the citizens, with part of the ſpoils he had gotten. Having refreſhed his army, fed his horſes, cured his wounded ſoldiers, and (as *Polybius* hath it) healed his horſe heels of the ſcratches, by waſhing their paſterns in old wine; he followed the coaſt of the *Adriatic* ſea towards *Apulia*, a northern province of the kingdom of *Naples*; ſpoiling the *Marrucini*, and all other nations lying in his way. In all this ground that he over-ran, he had not taken any one city; only he had aſſayed *Spoletum*, a colony of the *Romans*; and finding it well defended, preſently gave it over.

The malice of a great army is broken, and the force of it ſpent, in a great ſiege. This the *Proteſtant* army found true at *Poictiers*, a little before the battel of *Moncounter*; and their victorious enemies, anon after, at St. *Jean de Angeley*. But *Hannibal* was more wiſe. He would not engage himſelf in any ſuch enterpriſe, as ſhould detain him, and give the *Romans* leave to take breath. All his care was to weaken them in force and reputation; knowing, that when once he was abſolute maſter of the field, it would not be long ere the walled cities would open their gates, without expecting any engine of battery. To this end he preſented *Fabius* with battel, as ſoon as he ſaw him; and provoked him with all manner of bravado's. But *Fabius* would not bite. He well knew the differences between ſoldiers bred up, ever ſince they were boys, in war and in blood, trained and hardened in *Spain*, made proud and adventurous by many victories there, and of late by ſome notable acts againſt the *Romans*; and ſuch as had no oftner ſeen the enemy, than been vanquiſhed by him. Therefore he attended the *Carthaginian* ſo near, as he kept him from ſtragling too far; and preſerved the country from utter ſpoil. He inured his men by little and little, and made them acquainted with dangers by degrees; and he brought them firſt to look on the lion afar off, that in the end they might ſit on his tail.

Now *Minutius* had a contrary diſpoſition, and was as fiery as *Flaminius*; taxing *Fabius* with cowardice and fear. But all ſtirred not this well-adviſed commander. For wiſe men are no more moved with ſuch noiſe, than with wind bruiſed out of a bladder. There is nothing of more indiſcretion and danger, than to purſue misfortune: it waſteth it ſelf ſooner by ſufferance, than by oppoſition. It is the invading army that deſires battel: and this of *Hannibal*, was both the invading, and the victorious. *Fabius* therefore ſuffered *Hannibal* to croſs the *Apennines*, and to fall upon the moſt rich and pleaſant territory of *Campania*; neither could he by any arguments be perſwaded, to adventure the *Roman* army in battel: but being far too weak in horſe, he always kept the hills and faſt grounds. When *Hannibal* ſaw he could by no means draw this wary dictator to fight; that the winter came on; and that the towns ſtood firm for the *Romans*, whoſe legion were in ſight, though afar off; he reſolved to reſt his army, that was loaden with ſpoil, in ſome plentiful and aſſured place, till the following ſpring. But ere this can be done, he muſt paſs along by the dictator's camp, that hung over his head on the hills of *Calicula* and *Caſilinum*: for other way there was none, by which he might iſſue out of that goodly garden-country, which he had already waſted, into places more abundant of proviſion for his wintering. It was by mere error of his guide, that he firſt entred within theſe ſtreights. For he would have been directed unto *Caſſinum*, whence he might both aſſay the fair city of *Capua*, which had made him friendly promiſes under-hand, and hinder the *Romans* from coming near it to prevent him. But his guide miſunderſtood the *Carthaginian* pronunciation, and conducted him awry another way, from *Caſſinum* to *Caſilinum*, whence *Fabius* hoped that he ſhould not eaſily eſcape. Now began the wiſdom of *Fabius* to grow into credit; as if he had taken the *Carthaginians* in a trap, and won the victory without blows. But *Hannibal* reformed this opinion, and freed himſelf, by a ſlight invention, yet ſerving the turn as well as a better. In driving the country, he had gotten about two thouſand kine; whoſe horns he dreſſed with dry faggots, and ſetting fire to them in a dark night, cauſed them to be driven up the hills. The ſpectacle was ſtrange, and therefore terrible; eſpecially to thoſe that knew it to be the work of a terrible enemy. What it ſhould mean, *Fabius* could not tell: but thought it a device to circumvent him; and therefore kept within his trenches. They that kept the hill-tops, were horribly afraid, when ſome of theſe fiery monſters were gotten beyond them; and ran therefore haſtily away, thinking that the enemies were behind their backs, and fell among the light-armed *Carthaginians*, that were no leſs afraid of them. So *Hannibal*, with his whole army, recovered ſure ground, without moleſtation: where he ſtayed till the next morning; and then brought off his light foot-men, with ſome ſlaughter of the *Romans*, that began to hold them in ſkirmiſh. After this, *Hannibal* made ſemblance of taking his journey towards *Rome*: and the dictator coaſted him in the wonted manner, keeping ſtill on high grounds, between him and the city, whilſt the *Carthaginians* waſted all the plains. The *Carthaginian* took *Geryon*, an old ruinous town in *Apulia*, forſaken by the inhabitants, which he turned into barns, and ſtore-houſes for winter, and incamped under the broken walls. Other matter of importance he did none: but the time paſſed idly, till the dictator was called away to *Rome*, about ſome buſineſs of religion, and left the army in charge with *Minutius*, the maſter of the horſe.

Minutius was glad of this good occaſion to ſhew his own ſufficiency. He was fully perſwaded, that his *Romans*, in plain field, would be too hard for the *Africans* and *Spaniards*: by whom if they had been foiled already twice or thrice, it was not by open force, but by ſubtilty and ambuſh, which he thought himſelf wiſe enough to prevent. All the army was of his opinion; and that ſo earneſtly, as he was preferred by judgment of the ſoldiers, in worthineſs to command, before the cold and wary *Fabius*. In this jollity of conceit, he determined to fight. Yet had he been peremptorily forbidden ſo to do, by the dictator; the breach of whoſe command was extreme peril of death. But the honour of the victory, which he held undoubtedly his own; the love of the army, and the friends that he had at home bearing office in *Rome*, were enough to ſave him from the dictator's rods and

axes, took he the matter never ſo heinouſly. *Hannibal* on the other ſide was no leſs glad, that he ſhould play with a more adventurous gameſter. Therefore he drew near, and, to provoke the *Romans*, ſent forth a third part of his army to waſte the country. This was boldly done, ſeeing that *Minutius* encamped hard by him: but it ſeems, that he now deſpiſed thoſe whom he had ſo often vanquiſhed. There was a piece of high ground between the two camps, which becauſe it would be commodious to him that could occupy it, the *Carthaginians* ſeized upon by night with two thouſand of their light-armed. But *Minutius*, by plain force, won it from them the next day; and entrenching himſelf thereupon, became their nearer neighbour.

The main buſineſs of *Hannibal* at this time was, to provide abundantly, not only for his men, but for his horſes, which he knew to be the chief of his ſtrength, that he might keep them in good heart againſt the next ſummer: if, beſides this, he could give the *Romans* another blow, it would increaſe his reputation, encourage his own men, terrify his enemies, and give him leave to forage the country at will. Since therefore *Minutius* did not in many days iſſue forth of his camp, the *Carthaginian* ſent out (as before) a great number of his men to fetch in harveſt. This advantage *Minutius* wiſely eſpied and took. For he led forth his army, and ſetting it in order, preſented battel to *Hannibal*, that was not in caſe to accept it, even at his own trenches. His horſe, and all his light armature, divided into companies, he ſent abroad againſt the foragers; who being diſperſed over all the fields, and laden with booty, could make no reſiſtance. This angred *Hannibal*, that was not able to help them; but worſe did it anger him when the *Romans* took heart to aſſail his trenches. They perceived that it was mere weakneſs which held him within his camp, and therefore were bold to deſpiſe his great name, that could not reſiſt their preſent ſtrength. But in the heat of the buſineſs, *Aſdrubal* came from *Geryon* with four thouſand men, being informed of the danger by thoſe that had eſcaped the *Roman* horſe. This emboldened *Hannibal* to iſſue forth againſt the *Romans*, to whom nevertheleſs he did not ſuch hurt as he had received.

For this piece of ſervice *Minutius* was highly eſteemed by the army, and more highly by the people at *Rome*, to whom he ſent the news, with ſomewhat greater boaſt than truth. It ſeemed no ſmall matter, that the *Roman* army had recovered ſpirit, ſo far forth that dared to ſet upon *Hannibal* in his own camp; and that in ſo doing it came off with the better. Every man therefore praiſed the maſter of the horſe, that had wrought this great alteration; and conſequently, they grew as far out of liking with *Fabius* and his timorous proceedings, thinking that he had not done any thing wiſely in all his dictatorſhip, ſaving that he choſe ſuch a worthy lieutenant; whereas indeed in no other thing had he ſo greatly erred. But the dictator was not ſo joyful of a little good luck, as angry with the breach of diſcipline, and fearful of greater danger thereon likely to enſue. He ſaid, that he knew his own place, and what was to be done; that he would teach the maſter of the horſe to do ſo likewiſe, and make him give account of what he had done, if he were dictator; ſpeaking it openly, that good ſucceſs iſſuing from bad counſel was more to be feared than calamity; foraſmuch as the one bred a fooliſh confidence, the other taught men to be wary. Againſt theſe ſermons every one cried out, eſpecially *Metellus*, a tribune of the people; which office warranted him to ſpeak, and do what he liſt without fear of the dictator. "It is not enough (ſaid he) that this our only man, choſen to be general, and lord of the town in our greateſt neceſſity, hath done no manner of good, but ſuffered all *Italy* to be waſted before his eyes, to the utter ſhame of our ſtate; unleſs he alſo hinders others from doing better than himſelf can, or dares? It were good to conſider what he means by this. Into the place of *C. Flaminius* he hath not choſen any new conſul all this while; *Servilius* is ſent away to ſea. I know not why; *Hannibal* and he, have, as it were, taken truce; *Hannibal* ſparing the dictator's grounds (for *Hannibal* had indeed forborn to ſpoil ſome grounds of *Fabius*, that ſo he might bring him into envy and ſuſpicion;) and the dictator giving him leave to ſpoil all others without impeachment. Surely his drift is even this: he would have the war to laſt long, that he himſelf might be long in office, and have the ſole government both of our city and armies. But this muſt not be ſo. It were better that the commonalty of *Rome*, which gave him this authority, ſhould again take it from him, and confer it upon one more worthy. But leſt, in moving the people hereto, I ſhould ſeem to do him injury, thus far forth I will regard his honour; I will only propound, that the maſter of the horſe may be joined in equal authority with the dictator; a thing not more new, nor leſs neceſſary, than was the electing of this dictator by the people.

Though all men, even the ſenators, were ill perſwaded of the courſe which *Fabius* had taken againſt *Hannibal*, as being neither plauſible, nor ſeeming beneficial at the preſent; yet was there none ſo injurious as to think, that his general intent and care of the weal publick was leſs than very honourable. Whereas therefore it was the manner in paſſing of any act, that ſome man of credit and authority, beſides the propounder, ſhould ſtand up, and formally deliver his approbation; not one of the principal citizens was found ſo impudent as to offer that open diſgrace, both unto a worthy perſonage, and (therewithal) unto that dignity, whoſe great power had freed the ſtate at ſeveral times from the greateſt dangers. Only *C. Terentius Varro*, who the year before had been pretor, was glad of ſuch an opportunity to win the favour of the multitude. This fellow was the ſon of a butcher, afterwards became a ſhop-keeper; and, being of a contentious ſpirit, grew, by often brablings, to take upon him as a pleader, dealing in poor mens cauſes. Thus by little and little he got into office, and roſe by degrees, being advanced by thoſe, who in hatred of the nobility favoured his very baſeneſs. And now he thought the time was come for him to give an hard puſh at the conſulſhip; by doing that which none of the great men, fearing or favouring one another, either durſt or would. So he made an hot invective, not only againſt *Fabius*, but againſt all the nobility; ſaying, that it grieved them to ſee the people do well, and take upon them what belonged unto them in matter of government; that they ſought to humble the commons by poverty, and to impoveriſh them by war; eſpecially by war at their own doors, which would ſoon conſume every poor man's living, and find him other work to think upon than matter of ſtate. Therefore he bad them to be wiſe; and ſince they had found one (this worthy maſter of the horſe) that was better affected unto them and his country, to reward him according to his good deſerts; and give him authority accordingly as was propounded by the tribune,

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that ſo he might be encouraged and enabled to proceed as he had begun. So the act paſſed.

Before this buſy day of contention, *Fabius* had diſpatched the election of a new conſul, which was *M. Atilius Regulus*, in the room of *C. Flaminius*; and, having finiſhed all requiſite buſineſs, went out of town, perceiving well that he ſhould not be able to withſtand the multitude, in hindering the decree. The news of *Minutius*'s advancement was at the camp as ſoon as *Fabius*: ſo that his old lieutenant, and new colleague, began to treat with him as a companion; aſking him at the firſt, in what ſort he thought it beſt to divide their authority; whether that one one day, and the other the next, or each of them ſucceſſively, for ſome longer time, ſhould command in chief. *Fabius* briefly told him, that it was the pleaſure of the citizens to make the maſter of the horſe equal to the dictator, but that he ſhould never be his ſuperior: he would therefore divide the legions with him by lot, according to the cuſtom. *Minutius* was not herewith greatly pleaſed; for that with half of the army he could not work ſuch wonders as otherwiſe he hoped to accompliſh. Nevertheleſs he meant to do his beſt, and ſo taking his part of the army, encamped about a mile and a half from the dictator. Needful it was (though *Livy* ſeems to tax him for it) that he ſhould ſo do. For where two ſeveral commanders are not ſubordinate one unto another, nor joined in commiſſion, but have each entire and abſolute charge of his own followers, there are the forces (though belonging unto one prince or ſtate) not one, but two diſtinct armies; in which regard one camp ſhall not hold them both without great inconvenience. *Polybius* neither finds fault with this diſjunction, nor yet reports that *Fabius* was unwilling to command in chief ſucceſſively (as the two conſuls uſed) with *Minutius*, by turns. He ſaith, that *Minutius* was very refractory, and ſo proud of his advancement, that continually he oppoſed the dictator: who thereupon referred it to his choice, either to divide the forces between them, as is ſaid before, or elſe to have command over all by courſe. This is likely to be true. For natures impatient of ſubjection, when once they have broken looſe from the rigour of authority, love nothing more than to conteſt with it; as if herein conſiſted the proof and aſſurance of their liberty.

It behoved the maſter of the horſe to make good the opinion which had thus advanced him. Therefore he was no leſs careful of getting occaſion to fight, then was *Fabius* of avoiding the neceſſity. That which *Minutius* and *Hannibal* equally deſired could not long be wanting. The country lying between them was open and bare, yet as fit for ambuſh as could be wiſhed: for that the ſides of a naked valley adjoining, had many and ſpacious caves; able, ſome one of them, to hide two or three hundred men. In theſe lurking places *Hannibal* beſtowed five hundred horſe, and five thouſand foot; thruſting them ſo cloſe together, that they could not be diſcovered. But leſt by any miſadventure they ſhould be found out, and buried in their holes, he made offer betimes in the morning to ſeize upon a piece of ground that lay on the other hand; whereby he drew the eyes and the thoughts of the *Romans* from their more needful care, to buſineſs little concerning them. Like unto this was the occaſion, which, not long before, had provoked *Minutius* to adventure upon the *Carthaginians*. Hoping therefore to increaſe his honour, in like ſort as he got it, he ſent firſt his light armature, then his horſe, and at length (ſeeing that *Hannibal* ſeconded his own troops with freſh companies) he followed in perſon with the legions. He was ſoon caught, and ſo hotly charged on all ſides, that he knew neither how to make reſiſtance, nor any ſafe retreat. In this dangerous caſe, whilſt the *Romans* defended themſelves, loſing many, and thoſe of their beſt men, *Fabius* drew near in very good order to relieve them. For this old captain, perceiving afar off, into what extremity his new colleague had raſhly thrown himſelf and his followers, did the office of a good citizen; and regarding more the benefit of his country, than the diſgrace which he had wrongfully ſuſtained, ſought rather to approve himſelf by haſting to do good, than by ſuffering the enemy to feel the reward of his doing ill. Upon *Fabius*'s approach *Hannibal* retired, fearing to be well wetted with a ſhower from the cloud (as he termed the dictator) that had hung ſo long on the hill-tops. *Minutius* forthwith ſubmitted himſelf to *Fabius*, by whoſe benefit he confeſſed his life to have been ſaved. So from this time forwards the war proceeded coldly, as the dictator would have it; both whilſt his office laſted, which was not long, and likewiſe afterwards, when he delivered up his charge unto the conſuls, that followed his inſtructions.

Servilius the conſul had purſued in vain a *Carthaginian* fleet, to which he came never within kenning. He ran along all the coaſt of *Italy*, took hoſtages of the *Sardinians* and *Corſicans*, paſſed over into *Africa*, and there negligently falling to ſpoil the country, was ſhamefully beaten aboard his ſhips, with the loſs of a thouſand men. Weighing anchor therefore in all haſte, he returned home by *Sicily*; and (being ſo required by the dictator's letters) repaired to the camp with his fellow-conſul, where they took charge of the army.

SECT. VII.

The Roman *people, deſirous to finiſh the war quickly, chuſe a raſh and unworthy conſul. Great forces levied againſt* Hannibal. Hannibal *taketh the* Romans *proviſions in the caſtle of* Cannæ. *The new conſuls ſet forth againſt* Hannibal.

WITH little pleaſure did they of the poorer ſort in *Rome* hear the great commendations that were given to *Fabius* by the principal citizens. He had indeed preſerved them from receiving a great overthrow; but he had neither finiſhed the war, nor done any thing in appearance thereto tending. Rather it might ſeem, that the reputation of this his own worthy act, was likely to countenance the ſlow proceedings, or perhaps the cowardiſe (if it were no worſe) of thoſe that followed him, in protracting the work to a great length. Elſe, what meant the conſuls to ſit idle the whole winter, contrary to all former cuſtom; ſince it was never heard before, that any *Roman* general had willingly ſuffered the time of his command to run away without any performance; as if it were honourable to do juſt nothing? Thus they ſuſpected they knew not what; and were ready, every man, to diſcharge the grief and anger of his own private loſs, upon the ill adminiſtration of the publick.

This affection of the people was very helpful to *C. Terentius Varro*, in his ſuit for the conſulſhip. It behoved him to ſtrike while the iron was hot; his own worth being little or none, and his credit over-weak, to make way into that high dignity. But the commonalty were then in ſuch a mood, as abundantly ſupplied all his defects. Wherein to help he had a kinſman, *Bibius Herenutus*, then tribune of the people; who ſpared not to uſe the liberty

liberty of his place, in ſaying what he liſted, without all regard of truth or modeſty. This bold orator ſtuck not to affirm, that *Hannibal* was drawn into *Italy*, and ſuffered therein to range at his pleaſure, by the noblemen; that *Minutius*, indeed, with his two legions, was likely to have been overthrown, and was reſcued by *Fabius* with the other two; but, had all been joined together, what they might have done, it was apparent, by the victory of *Minutius*, when he commanded over all as maſter of the horſe; that without a *Plebeian* conſul, the war would never be brought to an end; that ſuch of the *Plebeians* as had long ſince been advanced to honour by the people, were grown as proud as the old nobility, and contemned the meaner ſort, ever ſince themſelves were freed from contempt of the more mighty; that therefore it was needful to chuſe a conſul, who ſhould be altogether a *Plebeian*, a mere new man, one that could boaſt of nothing but the people's love, nor could wiſh more than to keep it, by well deſerving of them. By ſuch perſwaſions the multitude was won to be wholly for *Terentius*, to the great vexation of the nobles, who could not endure to ſee a man raiſed for none other virtue than his detracting from their honour, and therefore oppoſed him with all their might. To hinder the deſire of the people, it fell out, or at leaſt was alledged, that neither of the two preſent conſuls could well be ſpared from attending upon *Hannibal*, to hold the election. Wherefore a dictator was named for that purpoſe, and he again depoſed; either (as was pretended) for ſome religious impediment, or becauſe the fathers deſired an *Inter-regnum*, wherein they might better hope to prevail in choice of the new conſuls. This *Inter-regnum* took name and being in *Rome* at the death of *Romulus*, and was in uſe at the death of other kings. The order of it was this: All the fathers or ſenators, who at the firſt were an hundred, parted themſelves into tens or decuries, and governed ſucceſſively by the ſpace of five days, one decury after another in order; yet ſo, that the lictors or virgers, carrying the faſces or bundles of rods and axes, waited only upon the chief of them with theſe enſigns of power. This cuſtom was retained in times of the conſuls; and put in uſe, when by death or any caſualty, there wanted ordinary magiſtrates of the old year, to ſubſtitute new for the year following. The advantage of the fathers herein was, that if the election were not like to go as they would have it, there needed no more than to ſlip five days, and then all to begin anew; by which interruption the heat of the multitude was commonly well aſſwaged. Upon ſuch change of thoſe that were preſidents of the election, it was alſo lawful unto new petitioners to ſue for the magiſtracies that lay void, which otherwiſe was not allowed; but a time limited, wherein they ſhould publickly declare themſelves to ſeek thoſe offices. But no device would ſerve againſt the general favour born unto *Terentius*. One *Inter-regnum* paſſed over, and the malice of the fathers, againſt the virtue (as it was believed) of this mean, but worthy man, ſeemed ſo manifeſt, that when the people had urged the buſineſs to diſpatch, only *Terentius* was choſen conſul; in whoſe hand it was left to hold the election of his colleague. Hereupon all the former petitioners gave over. For whereas men of ordinary mark had ſtood for the place before, it was now thought meet, that both to ſupply the defect, and to bridle the violence of this unexpert and hot-headed man, one of great ſufficiency and reputation, ſhould be joined with him, as both companion and oppoſite. So *L. Æmilius Paulus*, he who few years ſince had overcome the *Illyrians*, and chaced *Demetrius Pharius* out of his kingdom, was urged by the nobility to ſtand for the place; which he eaſily obtained, having no competitor. It was not the deſire of this honourable man to trouble himſelf any more in ſuch great buſineſs of the common-wealth. For, notwithſtanding his late good ſervice, he and *M. Livius*, that had been his companion in office, were afterwards injuriouſly vexed by the people, and called unto judgment; wherein *Livius* was condemned, and *Æmilius* hardly eſcaped. But of this injuſtice they ſhall put the *Romans* well in mind each of them in his ſecond conſulſhip, wherein they ſhall honourably approve their worth; the one of them nobly dying in the moſt grievous loſs, the other bravely winning in the moſt happy victory that ever befel that common-wealth.

Theſe new conſuls, *Varro* and *Paulus*, omitted no part of their diligence in preparing for the war; wherein though *Varro* made the greater noiſe, by telling what wonders he would work, and that he would aſk no more than once to have a ſight of *Hannibal*, whom he promiſed to vanquiſh the very firſt day, yet the providence and care of *Paulus* travelled more earneſtly toward the accompliſhment of that, whereof his fellow vainly boaſted. He wrote unto the two old conſuls *Servilius* and *Atilius*, deſiring them to abſtain from hazard of the main chance; but nevertheleſs to ply the *Carthaginians* with daily ſkirmiſh, and weaken them by degrees, that when he and his colleague ſhould take the field, with the great army which they were now levying, they might find the four old legions well accuſtomed to the enemy, and the enemy well weakened to their hands. He was alſo very ſtrict in his muſters, wherein the whole ſenate aſſiſted him ſo carefully, as if in this action they meant to refute the ſlanders with which *Terentius* and his adherents had burdened them. What number of men they raiſed it is uncertain. Fourſcore thouſand foot at the leaſt, and ſix thouſand horſe; they were ſtrong in the field when the day came, which *Varro* had ſo greatly deſired of looking upon *Hannibal*.

Hiero, the old king of *Syracuſe*, as he had relieved the *Carthaginians* when they were diſtreſſed by their own mercenaries, ſo did he now ſend help to *Rome*, a thouſand archers and ſlingers, with great quantity of wheat, barley, and other proviſions; fearing nothing more, than that one of theſe two mighty cities ſhould deſtroy the other, whereby his own eſtate would fall to ruin, that ſtood upright by having them ſomewhat even-ballanced. He gave them alſo counſel to ſend forces into *Africa*; if (perhaps) by that means they might divert the war from home. His gifts and good advice were lovingly accepted, and inſtructions were given to *Titus Octacilius* the pretor, which was to go into *Sicily*, that he ſhould accordingly paſs over into *Africa*, if he found it expedient.

The great levies which the *Romans* made at this time, do much more ſerve to declare their puiſſance than any, though larger, account by poll, of ſuch as were not eaſily drawn into the field, and fitted for ſervice. For, beſides theſe armies of the conſuls, and that which went into *Sicily*, twenty five thouſand with *L. Poſthumius Albanus*, another of the pretors, went againſt the *Gauls* to reclaim that province, which the paſſage of *Hannibal* through it had taken from them. The contemplation of this their preſent ſtrength might well embolden them to do as they did. They ſent ambaſſadors

baſſadors to *Philip* the ſon of *Demetrius*, king of *Macedon*, requiring him to deliver into their hands *Demetrius Pharius*; who having been their ſubject and rebel, was fled into his kingdom. They alſo ſent to the *Illyrians* to demand their tribute, whereof the day of payment was already paſt. What anſwer they received it is not known; only this is known, that *Demetrius Pharius* was not ſent unto them, and that *Philip* henceforth began to have an eye upon them, little to their good. As for the *Illyrian* money, by the ſhifts that they were driven ſoon after to make, it will appear, that the one half of it (how little ſoever) would have been welcome to *Rome*, and accepted without any cavil about forfeiture for non-payment of the whole.

Whilſt the city was buſied in theſe cares, the old conſuls lay as near unto *Hannibal* as poſſibly they could, without incurring the neceſſity of a battel. Many ſkirmiſhes they had with him, wherein their ſucceſs for the moſt part was rather good than great. Yet one miſchance not only blemiſhed the honour of their other ſervices, but was indeed the occaſion to draw on the miſery following. *Hannibal*, for the moſt part of that time made his abode at *Geryon*, where lay all his ſtore for the winter. The *Romans*, to be near him, lodged about *Cannuſium*; and, that they might not be driven to turn aſide for all neceſſaries, to the loſs of good opportunities, they beſtowed much of their proviſions in the caſtle of *Cannæ*; for the town was razed the year before. This place *Hannibal* won, and thereby not only furniſhed himſelf, but compelled his enemies to want many needful things, unleſs they would be troubled with far carriage. Beſides this, and more to his advantage, he enabled himſelf to abide in that open country, fit for the ſervice of his horſe, longer than the *Romans*, having ſo many mouths to feed, could well endure to tarry, without offering battel, which he moſt deſired. Of this miſhap, when *Servilius* had informed the ſenate, letting them underſtand how this piece, taken by *Hannibal*, would ſerve him to command no ſmall part of the country adjacent; it then ſeemed needful, even unto the fathers themſelves, to adventure a battel with the *Carthaginian*, rather than ſuffer him thus to take root in the ground of *Italy*. Nevertheleſs, anſwer was returned unto *Servilius*, that he ſhould have patience yet awhile, for that the conſuls would ſhortly be there with a power ſufficient to do as need required.

When all things were ready in the city, and the ſeaſon of the year commodious to take the field, the two conſuls, with their army, ſet forth againſt *Hannibal*. This was always done with great ſolemnity; eſpecially, whenſoever they went forth to war againſt any noble or redoubted enemy. For ſacrifices and ſolemn vows were made unto *Jupiter*, and the reſt of their gods, for good ſucceſs and victory; which being performed, the generals, in warlike attire, with an honourable train of the principal men, not only ſuch as were of their kindred and alliance, or followed them to the war as volunteers, for love; but a great number of others that meant to abide at home, were accompanied on their way, and diſmiſſed with friendly leave-taking, and good wiſhes. At this time all the fathers and the whole nobility waited upon *Æmilius Paulus*, as the only man whom they thought either worthy of this honour, or likely to do his country remarkable ſervice. *Terentius*, his attendants were the whole multitude of the poorer citizens; a troop no leſs in greatneſs than the other was in dignity. At the parting, *Fabius*, the late dictator, is ſaid to have exhorted the conſul *Paulus* with many grave words, to ſhew his magnanimity, not only in dealing with the *Carthaginians*, but (which he thought harder) in bridling the outragious folly of his fellow-conſul. The anſwer of *Paulus* was, that he meant not again to run into danger of condemnation by offending the mutitude; that he would do his beſt for his country; but if he ſaw his beſt were likely to be ill taken, he would think it leſs raſhneſs to adventure upon the enemies ſword, than upon the malice of his own citizens.

SECT. VIII.

Diſſenſion between the two Roman *conſuls. Whether it be likely, that* Hannibal *was upon point of flying out of* Italy, *when the* Romans *preſſed him to fight. The great battel of* Cannæ.

THESE new generals arriving at the camp, diſmiſſed *M. Atilius*, one of the laſt year's conſuls, requeſting it becauſe of his age and weakneſs; *Servilius* they retained with them as their aſſiſtant. The firſt thing that *Æmilius* thought neceſſary, was, to hearten his ſoldiers with good words; who, out of their bad ſucceſs hitherto, had gathered more cauſe of fear than of courage. He willed them to conſider, not only now, their victories in times paſt againſt the *Carthaginians*, and other more warlike nations than were the *Carthaginians*; but even their own great numbers, which were no leſs than all that *Rome* at the preſent was able to ſet forth. He told them in what danger their country ſtood; how the ſtate and ſafety thereof reſted upon their hands; uſing ſome ſuch other common matter of perſwaſion. But the moſt effectual part of his oration was, that *Hannibal*, with this his terrible army, had not yet obtained one victory by plain force and valour; but that only by deceit and ambuſh he had ſtolen the honour which he had gotten at *Trebia* and *Thraſymene*. Herewithal he taxed the inconſiderate raſhneſs of *Sempronius* and *Flaminius*; of whom the one ſaw not his enemies until he was ſurrounded by them, the other ſcarce ſaw them when they ſtruck off his head, by reaſon of the thick miſt, through the darkneſs whereof he went groping (as it were blindfold) into their ſnares. Finally, declaring what advantages they had againſt the enemy, and how deſtitute the enemy was of thoſe helps by which he had hitherto prevailed againſt them; he exhorted them to play the men, and do their beſt. They were eaſily perſwaded; for the contemplation of their own multitude, and confidence of the *Roman* virtue in matter of arms, gave them cauſe to think, that under a captain ſo well experienced, and every way ſufficient, as *Æmilius* was known to be, they ſhould eaſily prevail againſt the *Carthaginians*, that came far ſhort of them in all things elſe, ſave craft, which would not always thrive. But in one thing they miſtook the meaning of their general. It was his deſire that they ſhould have heart to fight, not that they ſhould uſe the patience of waiting a convenient ſeaſon. But they, having pre-conceived a victory, thought all delays to be impediments, and thereby ſought to rob themſelves of their beſt help, which was good conduct. They remembered what talk they had heard at *Rome*, and were themſelves affected with the vulgar deſire of ending the war quickly, wherein ſince *Æmilius* had acknowledged, that the advantage was theirs, why did he make them forbear to uſe it? Thus thought the common ſoldier, and thus alſo thought the conſul *Terentius*, who was no leſs popular in the camp than he had been in the city. Expectation is always tedious; and never more, than when the event is of moſt

importance. All men longed, both at *Rome* and in the army, to be freed from the doubtful paſſions of hope and fear: therefore *Terentius*, who haſtened their deſire to effect, was likely to win more thanks than ſhould his colleague, though greater in performance. Thus, while the *Romans* think themſelves to have the better of their enemies, they fall into an inconvenience, than which few are more dangerous; diſſenſion of their chief commanders. *Varro* would fight, *Æmilius* would ſo too; but ſaid that it was not yet time: why? becauſe the enemy muſt ſhortly diſlodge, and remove hence into places leſs fit for his horſe. But ſhall the *Romans* wait, till *Hannibal*, having eaten up his laſt year's proviſions, return into *Campania* to gather a ſecond harveſt? This would (ſaid *Varro*) favour too much of *Q. Fabius:* And your haſte (ſaid *Paulus*) doth favour no leſs of *C. Flaminius*. Their deeds were like their words; for they commanded by turns interchangeably every day. *Æmilius* lodged ſix miles from *Hannibal*, where the ground was ſomewhat uneven. Thither, if the *Carthaginians* would take pains to come, he doubted not to ſend them away in ſuch haſte, as they ſhould not leave running till they were out of *Italy*. But they came not. *Terentius* therefore the next day deſcended into the plains; his colleague holding him, and beſeeching him to ſtay. Nevertheleſs, he ſat down cloſe by *Hannibal*, who, as an unbidden gueſt gave him but a rude welcome and entertainment. The *Carthaginian* horſe and light armature fell upon the *Roman* vant-courers, and put the whole army in tumult, whilſt it was yet in march; but they were beaten off, not without loſs, for that the *Romans* had, among their *Velites*, ſome troops weightily armed, whereas the *Carthaginians* had none. The day following, *Æmilius*, who could not handſomely withdraw the army out of that level ground, encamped upon the river *Aufidus*, ſending a third part of his forces over the water, to lie upon the eaſtern bank, where they entrenched themſelves. He never was more unwilling to fight than at this preſent, becauſe the ground ſerved wholly for the advantage of his enemy, with whom he meant to deal, when occaſion ſhould draw him to more equal terms. Therefore he ſtirred not out of his trenches, but fortified himſelf, expecting when *Hannibal* ſhould diſlodge, and remove towards *Geryon*, *Cannæ*, or ſome other place, where his ſtore lay, for want of neceſſaries; whereof an army foraging the country was not likely to carry about with it ſufficient quantity for any long time.

Here it would not be paſſed over with ſilence, that *Livy* differeth much in his relation from *Polybius*; telling many ſtrange tales of the miſery into which *Hannibal* had been driven, and of baſe courſes that he deviſed to take, if the *Romans* could have retained their patience a little longer. He had (ſaith *Livy*) but ten days proviſion of meat. He had not money to pay his ſoldiers. They were an unruly rabble, gathered out of ſeveral nations, ſo that he knew not how to keep them in order; but that from murmuring they fell to flat exclamations, firſt, about their pay and provant, and afterwards for very famine. Eſpecially the *Spaniards* were ready to forſake him, and run over to the *Roman* ſide. Yea, *Hannibal* himſelf, was once upon the point to have ſtolen away into *Gaul* with all his horſe, and left his foot unto their miſerable deſtinies. At length, for lack of all other counſel, he reſolved to get him as far as he could from the *Romans*, into the ſouthermoſt parts of *Apulia*; to the end, that both his unfaithful ſoldiers might find the more difficulty in running from him, and that his hunger might be relieved with the more early harveſt. But whilſt he was about to put this device in execution, the *Romans* preſſed him ſo hard, that they even forced him unto that which he moſt deſired, even to fight a battel upon open champain ground, wherein he was victorious. It was not uncommendable in *Livy*, to ſpeak the beſt of his own citizens; and, where they did ill, to ſay, that, without their own great folly, they had done paſſing well. Further alſo he may be excuſed; as writing only by report. For thus he ſaith; [a] *Hannibal de fugâ in Galliam* [*dicitur*] *agitâſſe*; Hannibal [*is ſaid*] *to have bethought himſelf of flying into* Gaul: where he makes it no more than a matter of hearſay; as perhaps was all the reſt of this relation. As for the proceſs itſelf, it is very incredible. For if *Hannibal*, coming out of *Gaul*, through the mariſhes and bogs of *Hetruria*, could find victuals enough, and all things needful unto his army, the ſummer foregoing: what ſhould hinder him to do the like this year? eſpecially ſeeing he had played the careful huſband in making a great harveſt; ſince he had long been maſter of the open field; and beſides, had gotten, by ſurprize, no ſmall part of the *Romans* proviſions? Suitable hereunto is all the reſt. If *Hannibal* had taken nothing but corn and cattel; his ſoldiers might perhaps have fallen into mutiny for pay. But he brought gold with him into *Italy:* and had ſo well increaſed his ſtock, ſince he came into that country, that he had armed his *African* ſoldiers, all *Roman-like*; and loaden his followers with ſpoil: having left wherewith to redeem as many of his own, as were taken by the enemy; when the *Romans* were not willing, as finding it not eaſy, to do the like. In this point therefore, we are to attend the general agreement of hiſtorians: who give it as a principal commendation unto *Hannibal*, that he always kept his army free from ſedition, though it were compoſed of ſundry nations; no leſs different in manners, religion, and almoſt in nature, than they were in languages: and well might he ſo do, having not only pronounced, that which of his men ſoever fought bravely with his enemy, was thereby a *Carthaginian*; but ſolemnly proteſted and ſwore (beſides other rewards) to make as many of them, as ſhould deſerve and ſeek it, free citizens of *Carthage*. The running away into *Gaul* was a ſenſeleſs device. *Hannibal*, being there with his whole army, took ſo little pleaſure in the country and people, that he made all haſte to get him out of it. And what ſhould he now do there with his horſe? or how could he be truſted, either there or elſewhere? yea, how could he deſire to live; having betrayed all his army, and relinquiſhed his miſerable foot, to the butchery of their enemies? This tale therefore *Plutarch* omitteth; who, in writing the life of *Hannibal*, takes in a manner all his Directions from *Livy*. But of this and the like it is enough to ſay, that all hiſtorians love to extol their own countrymen; and where a loſs cannot be diſſembled, nor the honour of the victory taken from the enemy, and given unto blind fortune, there to lay all the blame on ſome ſtrange miſgovernment of their own forces: as if they might eaſily have won all, but loſt all through ſuch folly, as no enemy can hope to find in them another time.

Now let us return back to the two armies,

[a] Liv. l. 22.

where

where they lie encamped on the river *Aufidus*. *Varro* was perſwaded, that it concerned him in honour, to make good his word unto the people of *Rome:* and, ſince he had thus long waited in vain, to get the conſent of *Paulus* now at length to uſe his own authority; and, without any more diſputing of the matter, to fight when his own day came. When therefore it was his turn to command; at the firſt break of day he began to paſs the river, without ſtaying to bid his colleague good morrow. But *Paulus* came to him; and ſought, as in former times, to have diſſwaded him, from putting the eſtate of his country to a needleſs hazard. Againſt whoſe words and ſubſtantial arguments, *Terentius* could alledge none other, than *point of honour*. *Hannibal* had preſented them battel at their trenches: ſhould they endure this bravado? He had ſent his *Numidians* over the river but even the day before, who fell upon the *Romans* that were fetching water to the leſſer camp; and drove them ſhamefully to run within their defences, which alſo they made offer to aſſail: muſt this alſo be ſuffered? He would not endure it: for it could not but weaken the ſpirit of the *Roman* ſoldier; which as yet was lively, and full of ſuch courage, as promiſed aſſured victory. When *Æmilius* perceived, that he could not hinder the obſtinate reſolution of his companion; he took all care, that what he ſaw muſt be done, might be done well. Ten thouſand *Roman* foot he cauſed to be left behind, in the greater camp, oppoſite unto the *Carthaginian*; to the intent, that either *Hannibal* might be compelled, to leave behind him ſome anſwerable number, for defence of his trenches (which out of his paucity he was leſs able to ſpare from the battel, than were the *Romans*;) or that theſe ten thouſand, falling upon the *Carthaginian* camp, when the fight began, and taking it with all the wealth therein, might thereby (as commonly do ſuch accidents) terrify and diſtract the enemies in the heat of fight. This done; the two conſuls went over the water with their army to the leſſer camp, whence alſo they drew forth their men, and ranged them in order of battel: the ground on the eaſt part of the river, ſeeming perhaps more fit for marſhalling of their army. *Hannibal* was glad of this, as he had great cauſe; and, without any delay, paſſed likewiſe over, ſomewhat higher up the ſtream, which ran from the ſouth; leaving in his own camp ſo many, as he thought would ſerve to defend it, and no more. To encourage his men; he bad them look about them, and view the ground well, upon which they were to fight. They did ſo. And could you (ſaid he) pray for any greater fortune, than to join battel with the *Romans* upon ſuch a level ground, where the ſtronger in horſe are ſure to prevail? They all aſſented to him; and ſhewed by their countenances, that they were very glad of it. Well then (ſaid he further) ye are firſt of all to thank the Gods, that have brought them hither; and then us, that have trained them along, and drawn them into neceſſity of playing for their lives, where they are ſure to loſe them. As for theſe *Romans*, I was fain to encourage you againſt them, when ye met them firſt: but now ye may even encourage your ſelves, by calling to mind that they are the men, whom ye have as often beaten as ſeen. Of one thing only I will put you in mind: That whereas hitherto you fought for other reſpects; as, to drive them before you out of *Gaul*; and to win the open country, and fields of *Italy*; both of which ye have obtained: now are ye to fight for the towns themſelves, and all the riches within them, which this victory ſhall make yours. Therefore play the ſtout ſoldiers; and, ere many hours paſs, ye ſhall be lords of all that the *Romans* hold.

When he had ſaid this; his brother *Mago* came to him, whom he had ſent to view the countenance of the enemy. *Hannibal* aſked him, what news; and what work they were likely to have with theſe *Romans?* Work enough (anſwered *Mago*) for they are an horrible many. As horrible a many as they are (thus *Hanuibal* replied) I tell thee, brother, that among them all, ſearch them never ſo diligently, thou ſhalt not find one man, whoſe name is *Mago*. With that he fell a laughing, and ſo did all that ſtood about him: which gladded the ſoldiers, who thought their general would not be ſo merry, without great aſſurance. Whether it were ſo, that *Hannibal*, in the pride of his victories already gotten, valued one *Mago* above many thouſand *Romans*; or whether he intimated, that the *Romans* were no leſs troubled with thinking upon *Mago* and his companions, than was *Mago* with beholding their huge multitude; or whether he meant only to correct the ſad mood of his brother with a jeſt, and ſhew himſelf merry unto the ſoldiers: this his anſwer was more manly, than was the relation of his diſcoverer. But if *Hannibal* himſelf had been ſent forth by *Mago*, to view the *Romans*; he could not have returned with a more gallant report in his mouth, than that which captain *Gam*, before the battel of *Agincourt*, made unto our king *Henry* the fifth: ſaying, that of the *Frenchmen*, there were enough to be killed; enough to be taken priſoners; and enough to run away. Even ſuch words as theſe, or ſuch pleaſant jeſts as this of *Hannibal*, are not without their moment; but ſerve many times, when battel is at hand, to work upon ſuch paſſions, as muſt govern more of the buſineſs: eſpecially, where other needful care is not wanting; without which they are but vain boaſts.

In this great day, the *Carthaginian* excelled himſelf; expreſſing no leſs perfection of his military ſkill, than was greatneſs in his ſpirit and undertakings. For, to omit the commodiouſneſs of the place, into which he had long before conceived the means to draw his enemies to battel; he marſhalled his army in ſuch convenient order, that all hands were brought to fight, where every one might do beſt ſervice. His darters, and ſlingers of the *Baleares*, he ſent off before him, to encounter with the *Roman Velites*. Theſe were looſe troops, anſwerable in a manner to thoſe, which we call now by a *French* Name *Enfans perdues*; but when we uſe our own terms, *the Forlorn Hope*. The groſs of his army following them he ordered thus: His *Africans*, armed after the *Roman* manner, with the ſpoils which they had gotten at *Trebia*, *Thraſymene*, or elſewhere; and well trained in the uſe of thoſe weapons, that were of more advantage, than thoſe wherewith they had formerly ſerved; made the two wings, very deep in file. Between theſe he ranged his *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, armed, each after their own country manner; their ſhields alike; but the *Gauls* uſing long broad ſwords, that were forcible in a downright ſtroke; the *Spaniards*, ſhort and well-pointed blades, either to ſtrike or thruſt; the *Gauls*, naked from their navel upwards, as confident in their own fierceneſs; the *Spaniards* wearing white caſſocks embroidered with purple. This medley of two nations, differing as well in habit and furniture, as in quality, made a gallant ſhew; and terrible, becauſe ſtrange. The *Gauls* were ſtrong of body, and furious in giving charge; but ſoon wearied, as accuſtomed to ſpend their violence at the firſt brunt, which diſpoſition all that come of them have inherited to this day. The

Spaniards

Spaniards were leſs eager, but more wary; neither aſhamed to give ground, when they were over-preſſed; nor afraid to return, and renew the fight, upon any ſmall encouragement. As the roughneſs of the one, and patience of the other, ſerved mutually to reduce each of them to a good and firm temper; ſo the place which they held in this battel, added confidence jointly unto them both. For they ſaw themſelves well and ſtrongly flanked with *Carthaginians* and other *Africans*; whoſe name was grown terrible in *Spain*, by their conqueſts; and in *Gaul*, by this their preſent war. Since therefore it could not be feared, that any great calamity ſhould fall upon them, whilſt the wings on either ſide ſtood faſt: theſe barbarians had no cauſe to ſhrink, or forbear to imploy the utmoſt of their hardineſs, as knowing that the enemy could not preſs far upon them, without further engaging himſelf than diſcretion would allow. Hereunto may be added that great advantage, which the *Carthaginian* had in horſe: by which he was able, if the worſt had happened, to make a good retreat. The effect of contraries is many times alike. Deſperation begetteth courage; but not greater, nor ſo lively, as doth aſſured confidence. *Hannibal* therefore cauſed theſe *Gauls* and *Spaniards* to advance; leaving void the place wherein they had ſtood, and into which they might fall back, when they ſhould be over-hardly preſſed. So, caſting them into the form of a creſcent, he made them as it were his vantguard: the two points of this great half moon, that looked toward the empty ſpace from which he had drawn it, being narrow and thin, as ſerving only to guide it orderly back, when need ſhould require; the foremoſt part of the ring, ſwelling out toward the enemies, being well ſtrengthned and thickned againſt all impreſſion. The circle hereof ſeemeth to have been ſo great, that it ſhadowed the *Africans*, who ſtood behind it: though ſuch figures, cut in braſs, as I have ſeen of this battel, preſent it more narrow; with little reaſon, as ſhall anon appear: as alſo in the ſame figures it is omitted, that any companies of *Africans*, or others, were left in the rear, to ſecond the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, when they were driven to retreat; though it be manifeſt, that *Hannibal* in perſon ſtood between the laſt ranks of his long battalions, and in the head of his rear, doubtleſs well accompanied with the choice of his own nation. Between the left battalion and the river *Aufidus*, were the *Gauls* and *Spaniſh* horſe, under the command of *Aſdrubal*: On the right wing, toward the wide plains, was *Hanno* (*Livy* ſaith *Maharbal*) with the *Numidian* light-horſe. *Hannibal* himſelf, with his brother *Mago*, had the leading of the rear. The whole ſum of *Hannibal*'s army in the field this day, was ten thouſand horſe, and forty thouſand foot; his enemies having two to one againſt him in foot; and he, five to three againſt them in horſe.

The *Roman* army was marſhalled in the uſual form: but ſomewhat more narrow, and deep, than was accuſtomed; perhaps, becauſe this had been found convenient againſt the *Carthaginians*, in the former war. It was indeed no bad way of reſiſtance againſt elephants, to make the ranks *thick and ſhort*, but the files long; as alſo to ſtrengthen well the rear, that it might ſtand faſt compacted as a wall, under ſhelter whereof the diſordered troops might rally themſelves. Thus much it ſeems, that *Terentius* had learned of ſome old ſoldiers; and therefore he now ordered his battels accordingly, as meaning to ſhew more ſkill, than was in his underſtanding. But the *Carthaginians* had here no elephants with them in the field: their advantage was in horſe; againſt which, this manner of embatteling was very unprofitable; foraſmuch as their charge is better ſuſtained in front, than upon a long flank. As for *Æmilius*; it was not his day of command: he was but an aſſiſtant; and in ſuch caſes it happens often, that wiſe men yield for very wearineſs unto the more contentious. Upon the right hand, and toward the river, were the *Roman* horſe-men, under the conſul *Paulus*: On the left wing was *C. Terentius Varro* the other conſul, with the reſt of the horſe, which were of the *Latins*, and other aſſociates: *Cn. Servilius* the former year's conſul, had the leading of the battel. The ſun was newly riſen, and offended neither part; the *Carthaginians* having their faces northward; the *Romans* towards the ſouth.

After ſome light ſkirmiſh between the *Roman Velites* and *Hannibal*'s darters and ſlingers of the *Baleares*, *Aſdrubal* brake upon the conſul *Paulus*, and was roughly encountred; not after the manner of ſervice on horſe-back, uſed in thoſe times, wheeling about *Alman-like*, but each giving on in a right line, pouldron to pouldron, as having the river on the one hand, and the ſhoulder of the foot on the other hand, ſo that there was no way left, but to pierce and break through. Wherefore they not only uſed their lances and ſwords, but ruſhing violently amongſt the enemies, graſped one another: and ſo their horſes running from under them, fell many to the ground; where, ſtarting up again, they began to deal blows like footmen. In concluſion, the *Roman* horſe were overborn, and driven by plain force to a ſtaggering recoil. This the conſul *Paulus* could not remedy. For *Aſdrubal*, with his boiſterous *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, was not to be reſiſted by theſe *Roman* gentlemen, unequal both in number and in horſemanſhip. When the battels came to joining, the *Roman* legionaries found work enough, and ſomewhat more than enough to break that great creſcent, upon which they firſt fell: ſo ſtrongly for the while, did the *Gauls* and *Spaniſh* foot make reſiſtance. Wherefore the two points of their battel drew towards the midſt; by whoſe aid, theſe oppoſites were forced to disband, and fly back to their firſt place. This they did in great haſte and fear, and were with no leſs haſte and folly purſued. Upon the *Africans*, that ſtood behind them, they needed not to fall foul, both for that there was void room enough, and foraſmuch as the rear, or horns of this moon, pointed into the ſafe retreat, where *Hannibal* with his *Carthaginians* was ready to reinforce them, when time ſhould require. In this haſty retreat, or flight of the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*; it happened, as was neceſſary, that they, who had ſtood in the limb or utter compaſs of the half moon, made the innermoſt or concave ſurface thereof (diſordered and broken though it were) when it was forced to turn the inſide outward, the horns or points thereof, as yet untouched, only turning round, and recoiling very little. So the *Romans*, in purſuing them, were incloſed in an half circle; which they ſhould not have needed greatly to regard (for that the ſides of it were exceeding thin and broken; and the bottom of it, none other than a throng of men routed, and ſeeming unable to make reſiſtance) had all the enemies foot been caſt into this one great body, that was in a manner diſſolved. But whilſt the legions, following their ſuppoſed victory, ruſhed on upon thoſe that ſtood before them, and thereby unwittingly engaged themſelves deeply within the principal ſtrength of the enemies, hedging them in on both hands; the two *African* battalions

lions on either ſide advanced ſo far, that getting beyond the rear of them, they incloſed them, in a manner, behind: and forward they could not paſs far, without removing *Hannibal* and *Mago*, which made that way the leaſt eaſy. Hereby it is apparent, that the great creſcent, before ſpoken of, was of ſuch extent, as covered the *Africans*, who lay behind it undiſcerned, until now. [a] For it is agreed, that the *Romans* were thus empaled *unawares*, and that they behaved themſelves as men that thought upon no other work, than what was found them by the *Gauls*. Neither is it credible, that they would have been ſo mad, as to run headlong with the whole bulk of their army, into the throat of ſlaughter, had they ſeen thoſe weapons bent againſt them at the firſt, which when they did ſee, they had little hope to eſcape. Much might be imputed to their heat of flight, and raſhneſs of inferiour captains: but ſince the conſul *Paulus*, a man ſo expert in war, being vanquiſhed in horſe, had put himſelf among the legions; it cannot be ſuppoſed, that he and they did wilfully thus ingage themſelves. *Aſdrubal* having broken the troops of *Roman* horſe, that were led by the conſul *Paulus*, followed upon them along the river ſide, beating down, and killing as many as he could (which were almoſt all of them) without regard of taking priſoners. The conſul himſelf was either driven upon his own legions, or willingly did caſt himſelf among them, as hoping by them to make good the day, notwithſtanding the defeat of his horſe. But he failed of this his expectation. Nevertheleſs he cheared up his men as well as he could, both with comfortable words, and with the example of his own ſtout behaviour: beating down, and killing many of the enemies with his own hand. The like did *Hannibal* among his *Carthaginians*, in the ſame part of the battel; and with better ſucceſs. For the conſul received a blow from a ſling, that did him great hurt: and though a troop of *Roman* gentlemen, riding about him, did their beſt to ſave him from further harm, yet was he ſo hardly laid at, that he was compelled by wounds and weakneſs, to forſake his horſe. Hereupon all his company alighted, thinking that the conſul had given order ſo to do, as in many battels, the *Roman* men at arms had left their horſes, to help their foot in diſtreſs. When *Hannibal* (for he was near at hand) perceived this, and underſtood that the conſul had willed his horſe-men to diſmount, he was very glad of it, and pleaſantly ſaid, *I had rather he would have delivered them unto me bound hand and foot:* meaning, that he had them now almoſt as ſafe as if they were ſo bound. All this while *C. Terentius Varro*, with the horſe of the aſſociates, in the left wing, was marvellouſly troubled by *Hanno* (or *Maharbal*) and the *Numidians:* who beating up and down about that great ſandy plain, raiſed a foul duſt, which a ſtrong ſouth-wind, blowing there accuſtomarily, drove into the eyes and mouths of the *Romans*. Theſe uſing their advantage both of number and of lightneſs, wearied the conſul and his followers exceedingly, neither giving nor ſuſtaining any charge, but continually making offers, and wheeling about. Yet at the firſt they ſeemed to promiſe him an happy day of it. For when the battels were even ready to join, five hundred of theſe *Numidians* came pricking away from their fellows, with their Shields caſt behind their backs (as was the manner of thoſe which yielded) and throwing down their arms, rendered themſelves. This was good luck to begin withal, if there had been good meaning. *Varro* had not leiſure to examine them, but cauſed them, unweaponed as they were, to get them behind the army, where he bad them reſt quietly till all was done. Theſe crafty adventurers did as he bad them for a while, till they found an opportunity to put in execution the purpoſe for which they had juſt yielded. Under their jackets they had ſhort ſwords and ponyards, beſides which, they found other ſcattered weapons about the field, of ſuch as were ſlain, and therewithal flew upon the hindmoſt of the *Romans*, whilſt all eyes and thoughts were bent another way; ſo that they did great miſchief, and raiſed yet a greater terror. Thus *Hannibal*, in a plain level ground, found means to lay an ambuſh at the back of his enemies. The laſt blow, that ended all fight and reſiſtance, was given by the ſame hand which gave the firſt. *Aſdrubal*, having in ſhort ſpace broken the *Roman* troops of horſe, and cut in pieces all, ſave the company of *Æmilius*, that ruſhed into the groſs of his foot, and a very few beſides, that recovered ſome narrow paſſage between the river and their own battalions, did not ſtay to charge upon the face of the legions, but fell back behind the rear of his own, and fetching about, came up to the *Numidians*, with whom he joined, and gave upon *Terentius*. This fearful cloud, as it was ſhewed at the firſt appearance what weather it had left behind it on the other ſide; ſo did it prognoſticate a diſmal ſtorm unto thoſe upon whom it was ready now to fall. Wherefore *Terentius*'s followers, having wearied themſelves much in doing little, and ſeeing more work toward than they could hope to ſuſtain, thought it the beſt way to avoid the danger by preſent flight. The conſul was no leſs wiſe than they, in apprehending the greatneſs of his own peril, nor more deſperate in ſtriving to work impoſſibilities; it being impoſſible, when ſo many ſhrank from him, to ſuſtain the impreſſion alone, which he could not have endured with their aſſiſtance. Now he found that it was one thing to talk of *Hannibal* at *Rome*, and another to encounter him. But of this, or ought elſe, excepting haſty flight, his preſent leiſure would not ſerve him to conſider. Cloſe at the heels of him and his flying troops followed the *Numidians*, appointed by *Aſdrubal* unto the purſuit, as fitteſt for that ſervice. *Aſdrubal* himſelf, with the *Gauls* and *Spaniſh* horſe, compaſſing about, fell upon the backs of the *Romans*, that were, ere this, hardly diſtreſſed, and in a manner ſurrounded on all parts elſe. He brake them eaſily, who before made ill reſiſtance, being incloſed and laid at on every ſide, not knowing which way to turn. Here began a pitiful ſlaughter, the vanquiſhed multitude thronging up and down, they knew not whither, or which way, whilſt every one ſought to avoid thoſe enemies whom he ſaw neareſt. Some of the *Roman* gentlemen that were about *Æmilius*, got up to horſe, and ſaved themſelves; which though it is hardly underſtood how they could do, yet I will rather believe it, than ſuppoſe that *Livy* ſo reporteth, to grace thereby his hiſtory with this following tale. Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, *galloping along by a place, where he ſaw the conſul ſitting all bloodied upon a ſtone, intreated him to riſe and ſave himſelf, offering him his aſſiſtance and his horſe. But* Paulus *refuſed it, willing* Lentulus *to ſhift for himſelf, and not to loſe time; ſaying, that it was not his purpoſe to be brought again into judgment by the people, either as an accuſer of his colleague, or as guilty himſelf of that day's loſs. Further, he willed* Lentulus *to commend him to the*

[a] Plut. in vit. Hannib.

ſenate, and in particular to Fabius; *willing them to fortify* Rome *as faſt and as well as they could; and telling* Fabius, *that he lived and died mindful of his wholſome counſel.* Theſe words (peradventure) or ſome to like purpoſe, the conſul uttered to *Lentulus*, either when againſt his will he was drawn to that battel, or when he beheld the firſt defeat of his horſe, at what time he put himſelf in the head of his legions. For I doubt not but *Hannibal* knew what he ſaid a good while before this, when he thought the conſul and his troop in little better caſe than if they had been bound. The whole groſs of the *Romans* was incloſed indeed as within a ſack, whereof the *African* battalions made the ſides, the *Spaniards*, *Gauls*, and *Hannibal* with his *Carthaginians*, the bottom, and *Aſdrubal*, with his horſe, cloſed up the mouth; in which part they firſt of all were ſhuffled together, and began the rout, wherein all the reſt followed. *Æmilius* therefore, who could not ſit his horſe, whilſt the battel yet laſted, and whilſt the ſpaces were ſomewhat open, by which he might have withdrawn himſelf, was now (had he never ſo well been mounted) unable to fly, having in his way ſo cloſe a throng of his own miſerable followers, and ſo many heaps of bodies as fell apace in that great carnage. It ſufficeth unto his honour, that in the battel he fought no leſs valiantly, than he had warily before both abſtained himſelf, and diſſwaded his fellow-conſul from fighting at all. If, when the day was utterly loſt, it had lain in his power to ſave his own life, unto the good of his country, never more needing it; I ſhould think that he either too much diſeſteemed himſelf, or being too faintly minded, was weary of the world, and his unthankful citizens. But if ſuch a reſolution were praiſe-worthy in *Æmilius*, as proceeding out of *Roman* valour; then was the *Engliſh* virtue of the lord *John Talbot*, viſcount *Liſle*, ſon to that famous earl of *Shrewsbury*, who died in the battel of *Chaſtillon*, more highly to be honoured. For *Æmilius* was old, grievouſly, if not mortally wounded, and accountable for the overthrow received; *Talbot* was in the flower of his youth, unhurt, eaſily able to have eſcaped, and not anſwerable for that day's misfortune, when he refuſed to forſake his father; who foreſeeing the loſs of the battel, and not meaning to ſtain his actions paſt by flying in his old age, exhorted this his noble ſon to be gone and leave him.

In this terrible overthrow died all the *Roman* foot, ſave two or three thouſand, who (as *Livy* ſaith) eſcaped into the leſſer camp, whence, the ſame night, about ſix hundred of them brake forth, and joining with ſuch of thoſe in the greater camp as were willing to try their fortune, conveyed themſelves away ere morning, about four thouſand foot and two hundred horſe, partly in whole troops, partly diſperſed into *Cannuſium*: the next day the *Roman* camps, both leſs and greater, were yielded unto *Hannibal* by thoſe that remained in them. *Polybius* hath no mention of this eſcape; only he reports, that the ten thouſand whom *Æmilius* had left on the weſt ſide of *Aufidus* (as was ſhewed before) to ſet upon the camp of *Hannibal*, did as they were appointed; but ere they could effect their deſire, which they had well-near done, the battel was loſt, and *Hannibal* coming over the water to them, drove them into their own camp, which they quickly yielded, having loſt two thouſand of their number. Like enough it is, that at the firſt ſight of *Hannibal* coming upon them with his victorious army, a great number of theſe did fly, and thereby eſcaped, whilſt their fellows, making defence in vain, retired into their camp, and held the enemy buſied. [a] For about two legions they were (perhaps not half full, but made up by addition of others, whoſe fault or fortune was alike) that having ſerved at *Cannæ*, were afterwards extremely diſgraced by the ſtate of *Rome*, for that they had abandoned their companions fighting. Of the *Roman* horſe, what numbers eſcaped, it is uncertain; but very few they were that ſaved themſelves in the firſt charge, by getting behind the river; *Terentius* the conſul recovered *Venuſia*, with threeſcore and ten at the moſt in his company. That he was ſo ill attended, it is no marvel; for *Venuſia* lay many miles off to the ſouthward; ſo that his neareſt way thither had been through the midſt of *Hannibal*'s army, if the paſſage had been open. Therefore it muſt needs be, that when once he got out of ſight, he turned up ſome by-way, ſo diſappointing the *Numidians* that hunted *contre*. Of ſuch as could not hold pace with the conſul, but took other ways, and were ſcattered over the fields, two thouſand, or thereabouts, were gathered up by the *Numidians*, and made priſoners: the reſt were ſlain, all ſave three hundred, who diſperſed themſelves in flight, as chance led them, and got into ſundry towns. There died in this great battel of *Cannæ*, beſides *L. Æmilius Paulus* the conſul, two of the *Roman* queſtors or treaſurers, and twenty-one colonels or tribunes of the ſoldiers, fourſcore ſenators, or ſuch as had borne office, out of which they were to be choſen into the ſenate. Many of theſe were of eſpecial mark, as having been *Ædiles*, pretors, or conſuls; among whom was *Cn. Servilius*, the laſt year's conſul, and *Minutius*, late maſter of the horſe. The number of priſoners taken in this battel, *Livy* makes no greater than three thouſand foot and three hundred horſe; too few to have defended, for the ſpace of one half hour, both the *Roman* camps; which yet the ſame *Livy* ſaith to have been over-cowardly yielded up. We may therefore do better to give credit unto one of the priſoners, whom the ſame hiſtorian ſhortly after introduceth ſpeaking in the ſenate, and ſaying, that they were no leſs than eight thouſand. It may therefore be, that theſe three thouſand were only ſuch as the enemy ſpared, when the fury of execution was paſt; but to theſe muſt be added about five thouſand more, who yielded in the greater camp, when their company were either ſlain or fled. So the reckoning falls out right; which the *Romans*, eſpecially the conſul *Varro*, had before caſt up (as we ſay) without their hoſt; nothing ſo chargeable, as now they find it. On the ſide of *Hannibal* there died ſome four thouſand *Gauls*, fifteen hundred *Spaniards* and *Africans*, and two hundred horſe, or thereabouts; a loſs not ſenſible, in the joy of ſo great a victory; which if he purſued, as *Maharbal* adviſed him, and forthwith marched away towards *Rome*, it is little doubted but that the war had preſently been at an end. But he believed not ſo far in his own proſperity, and was therefore told, That *he knew how to get, not how to uſe a victory.*

SECT. IX.

Of things following the battel at Cannæ.

NOT without good cauſe doth *Polybius* reprehend thoſe two hiſtorians, *Fabius* the *Roman*, and *Philinus* the *Carthaginian*; who regarding more the pleaſure of them, unto whoſe honour they conſecrated their travels, than the truth of things, and information of poſterity, magnified indifferently,

[a] Liv. l. 19.

whether



E. Bowen Sculp.

whether good or bad, all actions and proceedings; the one of his *Carthaginians*; the other of his *Roman Quirites*, and *Fathers* conscript. No man of sound judgment will condemn this liberty of censure which *Polybius* hath used. For, to recompense his juniority (such as it was) he produceth substantial arguments to justify his own relation, and confuteth the vanity of those former authors, out of their own writings, by conference of places ill cohering; which pains, it is to be suspected, that he would not have taken, had he been born in either of those two cities, but have spared some part of his diligence, and been contented to have all men think better and more honourably than it deserved of his own country. The like disease, it is to be feared, that we shall hereafter find in others, and shall have cause to wish that either they were somewhat less *Roman*, or else that some works of their opposite writers were extant, that so we might at least hear both sides speak, being henceforth destitute of *Polybius*'s help, that was a man indifferent. But since this cannot be, we must be sometimes bold to observe the coherence of things, and believe so much only to be true, as dependeth upon good reason, or (at least) fair probability. This attentive circumspection is needful even at the present, such is the repugnancy or forgetfulness which we find in the best narration of things following the battel of *Cannæ*. For it is said, that four thousand foot and horse gathered together about the consul *Terentius* at *Venusia*; that others, to the number of ten thousand, got into *Cannusium*, chusing for their captains young *P. Scipio*, and *Ap. Claudius*; yet that the consul *Terentius Varro*, joining his company unto those of *Scipio* at *Cannusium*, wrote unto the senate, that he had now well near ten thousand men about him; that these letters of the consul were brought to *Rome* when the senate was newly risen, that had been taking order for pacifying those tumults in the city, which grew upon the first bruit of the overthrow; and yet, that ambassadors from *Capua* (after some consultation whether it were meet to send any, or, without further circumstance, to side with *Hannibal*) were sent unto *Terentius*, and found him at *Venusia*, a pretty while before he wrote those letters, which overtook (in a manner) at *Rome* the first news of the overthrow. Among such incoherences, I hold it the best way to omit so much as hath not some particular connexion with matter ensuing; mutual dependency in things of this nature, being no small argument of truth.

When *Hannibal* had sacked the *Roman* camp, and trussed up the spoils, forthwith he dislodged, and marched away into *Samnium*, finding a disposition in the *Hirpines*, and many other people thereabout, to forsake the *Roman* party, and make alliance with *Carthage*. The first town that opened the gates unto him, was *Cossa*, where he laid up his baggage; and leaving his brother *Mago* to take in other places, he hasted into *Campania*. The general affection of the multitude, in all the cities of *Italy*, was inclinable unto him; not only in regard of their grievous losses sustained abroad in the fields, which the *Romans* themselves, who could not hinder him from spoiling the country, especially the poorer sort of them, did hardly endure; but in a loving respect unto that great courtesy (as it seemed) which he used unto such of them as became his prisoners. For as at other times, so now also, after his great victory at *Cannæ*, he had lovingly dismissed as many of the *Italian* confederates of *Rome* as fell into his hands: rebuking them gently for being so obstinate against him that had sought to deliver them from bondage. Neither spared he to win their love with gifts; pretending to admire their valour; but seeking indeed, by all ways and means, to make them his, whilst all other motives were concurrent. At this time also he began to deal kindly (though against his nature) with his *Roman* prisoners: telling them, that he bore no mortal hatred unto their estate; but being provoked by injuries, fought to right himself and his country; and fought with them, to try which of the two cities, *Rome* or *Carthage*, should bear soveraign rule, not which of them should be destroyed. So he gave them leave to choose ten of their number, that should be sent home to treat with the *Fathers* about their ransom: and together with these, he sent *Carthalo* a nobleman of *Carthage*, and general of his horse, to feed the disposition of the senate; whether it were bowed as yet by so much adversity, and could stoop unto desire of peace. But with the *Romans* these arts prevailed not, as shall be shewed in due place. The people of *Italy*, all, or most of them, save the *Roman* colonies, or the *Latins*, were not only weary of their losses past, but entertained a deceivable hope, of changing their old society for a better. Wherefore not only the *Samnites*, *Lucans*, *Brutians*, and *Apulians*, ancient enemies of *Rome*, and not until the former generation utterly subdued, began to reassume their wonted spirits: but the *Campans*, a nation of all other in *Italy* most bound unto the state of *Rome*, and by many mutual affinities therewith as streightly conjoined, as were any save the *Latins*, changed on a sudden their love into hatred, without any other cause found, than change of fortune.

Campania is the most goodly and fruitful province of *Italy*, if not (as some then thought) of all the earth: and the city of *Capua*, answerable unto the country whereof it was head, so great, fair, and wealthy, that it seemed no less convenient a seat of the empire, than was either *Rome* or *Carthage*. But of all qualities, bravery is the least requisite unto soveraign command. The *Campans* were luxurious, idle and proud: and valuing themselves like jays by their feathers, despised the unfortunate virtue of the *Romans* their patrons and benefactors. Yet were there some of the principal among them, as in other cities, that bore special regard unto the majesty of *Rome*, and could not endure to hear of innovation. But the *Plebeian* faction had lately so prevailed with *Capua*, that all was governed by the pleasure of the multitude, which wholly followed the direction of *Pacuvius Calavius*, an ambitious nobleman, whose credit grew, and was upheld by furthering all popular desires: whereof the conjunction with *Hannibal* was not the least. Some of the *Capuans* had offered this city to the *Carthaginian*, shortly after the battel of *Thrasymene*: whereupon chiefly it was, that *Hannibal* made his journey into *Campania*; the dictator *Fabius* waiting upon him. At that time, either the nearness of the *Roman* army, or some other fear of the *Capuans*, hindered them from breaking into actual rebellion. They had indeed no leisure to treat about any articles of new confederacy: or had leisure served, yet were the multitude (whose inconstant love *Hannibal* had won from the *Romans*, by gentle usage, and free dismissing of some prisoners, in good account among them) unable to hold any such negotiation, without advice of the senate, which mainly impugned it. So they that had promised to yield up their town to *Hannibal*, and to meet him on the way with some of their nobility, that should assure him of all faithful meaning; were

driven

driven to ſit ſtill in a great perplexity: as having failed to let in this their new friend, yet ſufficiently diſcovered themſelves, to draw upon them the hatred of the *Romans*. In this caſe were no ſmall number of the citizens: who thereupon grew the more incenſed againſt their ſenate; on whom they caſt all the blame, eaſily pardoning their own cowardice. The people holding ſo tender a regard of liberty, that even the lawful government of magiſtrates grieved them, with an imaginary oppreſſion, had now good cauſe to fear, leſt the ſenators ſhould become their lords indeed, and, by help of the *Romans*, bring them under a more ſtreight ſubjection than ever they had endured. This fear, being ready to break into ſome outrage, *Pacuvius* made uſe of to ſerve his own ambition. He diſcourſed unto the ſenate, as they ſat in council, about theſe motions troubling the city: and ſaid, that he himſelf had both married a *Roman* lady, and given his daughter in marriage to a *Roman*; but, that the danger of forſaking the *Roman* party was not now the greateſt: for that the people were violently bent even to murther all the ſenate, and afterwards to join themſelves with *Hannibal*, who ſhould countenance the fact, and ſave them harmleſs. This he ſpake as a man well known to be beloved himſelf by the people, and privy unto their deſigns. Having throughly terrified the ſenate, by laying open the danger hanging over them: he promiſed nevertheleſs to deliver them all, and to ſet things at quiet, if they would freely put themſelves into his hands, offering his oath, or any other aſſurance that they ſhould demand, for his faithful meaning. They all agreed. Then ſhutting up the court, and placing a guard of his own followers about it, that none might enter nor iſſue forth without his leave; he called the people to aſſembly, and ſpeaking as much ill of the ſenate as he knew they would be glad to hear, he told them that theſe wicked governours were ſurpriſed by his policy, and all faſt, ready to abide what ſentence they would lay upon them. Only thus much he adviſed them, as a thing which neceſſity required, that they ſhould chooſe a new ſenate, before they ſatisfied their anger upon the old. So rehearſing unto them the names of one or two ſenators, he aſked what their judgment was of thoſe. All cried out, that they were worthy of death: chooſe then (ſaid he) firſt of all ſome new ones into their places. Hereat the multitude, unprovided for ſuch an election, was ſilent; until at laſt, ſome one or other adventured to name whom he thought fit. The men ſo nominated, were utterly diſliked by the whole aſſembly; either for ſome known fault, baſeneſs, and inſufficiency; or elſe, even becauſe they were unknown, and therefore held unworthy. This difficulty in the new election appearing more and more, whilſt more were to be choſen (the fitteſt men to be ſubſtituted, having been named among the firſt, and not thought fit enough) *Pacuvius* entreated, and eaſily prevailed with the people, that the preſent ſenate might for this time be ſpared, in hope of amends hereafter; which (doubtleſs) they would make, having thus obtained pardon of all offences paſt. Henceforth, not only the people, as in former times, honoured *Pacuvius*, and eſteemed him their patron; but the ſenators alſo were governed by him, to whom they acknowledged themſelves indebted, for ſaving all their lives. Neither did the ſenate fail after this, by all obſequiouſneſs, to court the people, giving their reins unto their lawleſs will, who elſe were likely to caſt them down: All the city being thus of one mind; only fear of the *Romans* kept them from opening the gates to *Hannibal*. But after the battel at *Cannæ*, this impediment was removed, and few there were that would open their mouths to ſpeak againſt the rebellion. Yet foraſmuch as three hundred principal gentlemen of the *Campans*, did then ſerve the *Romans* in the iſle of *Sicily*: the parents and kinſmen of theſe prevailed ſo far, that ambaſſadors were ſent unto *Terentius* the conſul; to ſee his preſent caſe, and what it could miniſter of hope or fear. Theſe, whereſoever they found him, found him weakly attended, and as weak in ſpirit as in followers. Yet they offered him formally the ſervice of their ſtate; and deſired to know what he would command them. But he moſt baſely lamented unto them, the greatneſs of the *Roman* misfortune: ſaying, that all was loſt, and that the *Campans* muſt now, not help the *Romans*, who had nothing left wherewith to help themſelves, but make war in their defence againſt the *Carthaginians*; as the *Romans* had ſometimes done for the *Campans* againſt the *Samnites*. Hereunto he is ſaid to have added a fooliſh invective, againſt *Hannibal* and his *Carthaginians*: telling, how he had taught them to make bridges of ſlaughtered carcaſes, and to feed upon man's fleſh; with ſuch other ſtuff, as only bewrayed his own fear. As for the *Campans* themſelves, he put them in mind of their preſent ſtrength: they having thirty thouſand foot, and four thouſand horſe; with money, and all proviſions, in abundance. Thus he diſmiſſed them, prouder than they came: and filled them with conceit of getting a great lordſhip; whereas before they were ſomewhat timorous in adventuring to ſeek their own liberty. Having reported this at *Capua*: the ſame ambaſſadors were diſpached away to *Hannibal*, with whom they eaſily made alliance, upon theſe conditions: that the *Campans* ſhould be abſolutely free, and ruled by their own laws; that no citizen of theirs ſhould be ſubject unto any *Carthaginian* magiſtrate, in what caſe ſoever, whether in war, or peace; and, that *Hannibal* ſhould deliver unto the *Campans* three hundred *Roman* priſoners, ſuch as they themſelves would chooſe, whom they might exchange for their gentlemen which were in *Sicil*.

Againſt all this negotiation, *Decius Magius*, an honourable citizen oppoſed himſelf earneſtly: uſing, in vain, many perſwaſions, to the wilful and headſtrong multitude; whom he put in mind of *Pyrrhus* and the *Tarentines*, wiſhing them not to change old friends for new acquaintance. This did he, when they were ſending ambaſſadors to *Hannibal*: and this alſo did he when the new alliance was concluded; but moſt earneſtly, when a *Carthaginian* garriſon was entring the town: at which time he gave advice, either to keep it out, or to fall upon it, and cut it in pieces, that, by ſuch a notable piece of ſervice, they might make amends unto the *Romans*, whom they had forſaken.

Advertiſement hereof was given to *Hannibal*: who lying about *Naples*, not far off, ſent for *Magius* to come ſpeak with him in the camp. This *Magius* refuſed: alledging, that he was, by the late concluded articles, free from ſubjection unto any *Carthaginian*; and therefore would not come. *Hannibal* thereupon haſted himſelf towards *Capua*: forbearing to attempt any further upon *Naples*; which he thought to have taken in his way by *Scalado*, but found the walls too high, and was not well provided, to lay ſiege unto it. At *Capua* he was entertained with great ſolemnity and pomp: all the people iſſuing forth of the town, to behold that great commander, which had won ſo many noble


Numidians
Asdrubal
Africans
Asdrubal
Romans
Africans
Asdrubal
Asidius flumen

noble victories. Having taken his pleaſure in the ſight of that goodly city, and paſſed over his firſt entertainments, he came into their ſenate: where he commended their reſolution, in ſhaking off the *Roman* yoke; promiſing, that ere long all *Italy*, and *Rome* it ſelf, ſhould be driven to acknowledge *Capua* as chief, and receive law from thence. As for *Decius Magius*, who openly took part with the *Romans* their enemies; he prayed them, that they would not think him a *Campan*, but a traitor to the ſtate: and uſe him accordingly, giving ſentence out of hand upon him, as he deſerved. This was granted: and *Magius* delivered unto *Hannibal*; who, unwilling to offend the *Capuans*, at his firſt coming, by putting ſo great a man to death; yet fearing that they might ſue for his liberty, if he kept him alive, thought it beſt to ſend him away to *Carthage*. Thus *Hannibal* ſettled his friendſhip with the *Campans:* among whom, only this *Decius Magius* had openly dared to ſpeak againſt him; being aſſiſted by *Perolla*, the ſon of *Pacuvius*. This *Perolla* would have murdered *Hannibal*, whilſt he was at ſupper, the firſt night of his coming, had not his father's authority kept him from making any ſuch attempt. All the town (beſides) were ſo earneſt in the love of their new ſociety, that they are ſaid to have murdered all the *Romans*, upon whom at the preſent they could lay hand; or (which is all one) to have ſmothered them to death in an hot bath.

The ſame courſe of fortune, with thoſe of *Capua*, ran ſome other towns thereabouts, which depended on this, as their mother-city. *Nola*, *Nuceria*, *Naples*, *Caſiline*, and *Acerræ*, were the cities next adjoining, that ſtood out for the *Romans*. Againſt theſe *Hannibal* went, thinking to find them weakly manned; as they were indeed, though ſtoutly defended.

The *Romans* at this time were not in caſe to put garriſons into all their walled towns; but were fain to leave all places, except a few of the moſt ſuſpected, unto the faith and courage of the inhabitants. *Rome* it ſelf was in extreme fear of *Hannibal*'s coming, at the firſt report of the overthrow at *Cannæ:* and the grief of that loſs was ſo general, and immoderate, that it much diſturbed the proviſion againſt apparent danger. It was hard to judge, whether the loſs already received, or the fear of deſtruction preſently threatening, were the more terrible. All the ſenators found work enough, to ſtint the noiſe and lamentable bewailings, whereof the ſtreets were full. Couriers were ſent forth, to bring aſſured tiding how all went; whereof, when letters from the conſul *Varro* had throughly informed them, they were ſo amazed, that they ran into barbarous ſuperſtition; and taking direction (as was ſaid) from their fatal books, buried alive two men and women, *Gauls* and *Greeks*, in their ox-market. If the books of *Sibyl* gave them ſuch inſtructions, we may juſtly think, that *Sibyl* her ſelf was inſtructed by the devil. Yet is it not improbable, that extremity of fear cauſed them to hearken to wicked ſoothſayers; whoſe deteſtable counſels they afterwards, for their own honour (as aſhamed of ſuch authors) imputed to the books of *Sibyl*. An ambaſſador was ſent to *Delphi*, to conſult the oracle of *Apollo*; and enquire, with what prayers and ſupplications they might pacify the Gods, and obtain an end of theſe calamities. This is enough to diſcover the greatneſs of their fear; though not ſerving to give remedy. At the ſame time came letters out of *Sicily*, from the pretor *Otacilius*, whom the ſenate had appointed, if he found it meet, to paſs over into *Afric*. In theſe were contained news of one *Carthaginian* fleet, that waſted the kingdom of *Hieron*, their good friend and confederate; and of another fleet, riding among the iſles *Ægateis*, which was in readineſs to ſet upon *Lilybæum*, and the reſt of the *Roman* province, if the pretor ſtirred aſide to the reſcue of *Hieron*.

In the midſt of theſe extremities, it was thought needful to call home *Terentius* the conſul, that he might name a dictator to take ſoveraign charge of the weal-publick, with abſolute power, as neceſſity required. It muſt needs ſeem ſtrange, that all ſorts of people went forth to meet the conſul, and bid him welcome home, giving him thanks *for that he had not deſpaired of the weal-publick*. But this was done (as may ſeem) by order from the ſenate; which therein (doubtleſs) provided wiſely for upholding the general reputation. If his coming into the city had renewed the lamentations and out-cries of the people, what elſe would have followed, than a contempt of their wretchedneſs, among thoſe that were ſubject unto their dominion? Now in finding this occaſion (though indeed he gave it not) of beſtowing upon him their welcome and thanks; they noiſed abroad a fame, which came perhaps unto the ears of *Hannibal*, of their magnanimity and confidence, that might ſeem grounded on their remaining ſtrength. This therefore was wiſely done; but whereas *Livy* would have us think that it was done generouſly, and out of great ſpirit, let me be pardoned, if I believe him not. It was done fearfully, and to cover their grief; had they dared to ſhew their indignation, they would have ſtruck off his head, as in few years after, [a] *Cn. Fulvius* had his life brought into queſtion, and was baniſhed by them, being leſs blame-worthy, for a ſmaller offence. *M. Junius*, by appointment of the ſenate, was nominated dictator, and *T. Sempronius* maſter of the horſe. Theſe fell preſently to muſtering of ſoldiers, of whom they raiſed [b] *four* new legions and a thouſand horſe, though with much difficulty, as being fain to take up ſome that were very boys. Theſe four legions are elſewhere forgotten in account of the forces levied by this dictator, and [c] *two* legions only ſet down, that had been enrolled in the beginning of the year for cuſtody of the city. Wherefore it may be, that theſe two legions being drawn into the field, four new ones of *Prætextati*, or ſtriplings, were left in their places. In ſuch raw ſoldiers, and ſo few, little confidence was to be repoſed; for which reaſon they increaſed their number, by adding unto them eight thouſand ſturdy ſlaves, that were put in hope of liberty, if they ſhould deſerve it by manful ſervice. This not ſufficing, the dictator proclaimed, that whoſoever owed money, and could not pay it, or had committed any capital offence, ſhould forthwith be diſcharged of his debt, or puniſhment, if he would ſerve in the war. To arm theſe companies, they were fain to take down out of their temples and porches the ſpoils of their enemies, that had been there ſet up; among which were ſix thouſand armours of the *Gauls*, that had been carried in the triumph of *C. Flaminius*, a little before the beginning of this war. To ſuch mockery had God brought the pride of the *Romans*, as a due reward of their inſolent oppreſſions, that they were fain to iſſue forth of their own gates, in the habit of ſtrangers, when *Hannibal* was ready to encounter them with his *Africans*, armed *Roman*-like.

[a] Liv. l. 26. [b] Liv. l. 22. [c] Liv. l. 23.

About the ſame time it was, that *Carthalo*, with the agents of the priſoners taken at *Cannæ*, came to *Rome*. *Carthalo* was not admitted into the city, but commanded, whilſt he was on the way, to be gone ere night out of the *Roman* territory. To the meſſengers of the captives, audience was given by the ſenate. They made earneſt petition to be ranſomed at the publick charge, not only the tears and lamentation of their poor kinsfolk, but the great need wherein the city then ſtood of able ſoldiers, commending their ſuit, which yet they obtained not. Beſides the general cuſtom of the *Romans* (held by long tradition, and ſtrengthened by a notable precedent, when *Regulus* was overthrown, and taken priſoner in the former war) not to be too tender of ſuch as had yielded to the enemy, much was alledged againſt theſe who now craved ranſom; but the ſpecial point was, that they were wilfully loſt, ſince they might have ſaved themſelves, as others did. It ſufficed not unto theſe poor men to ſay, that their offence was no greater than the conſuls: they were told, that this was great preſumption. The truth was, the ſtate wanted money, and therefore could not want excuſes, whereby to avoid the diſburſement: whether it were ſo, or not, that any ſuch plea was held about this matter of redemption, as we find recorded. Neither muſt we regard it, that the ſlaves which were armed for the war, are ſaid to have coſt more than the ſum did amount unto, that would have ranſomed theſe priſoners. For this is but a tale, deviſed to countenance the *Roman* proceedings, as if they had been ſevere; when as indeed they were ſuitable to the preſent fortune, poor, and ſomewhat beggarly. Hereof it is no little proof, that *Hannibal* valued thoſe *Roman* ſlaves, whom he had taken in the camp among their maſters, at no more than every one the third part of a common ſoldier's ranſom; and likely it is, that he offered them at the price whereat he thought them current. But if we ſhould ſuppoſe, that by trading with *Hannibal*, a better bargain for ſlaves might have been made, than was by the ſtate at home, in dealing with private men; yet muſt we withal conſider, that theſe private men did only lend theſe ſlaves for a while unto the commonwealth, and were afterwards contented [a] *to forbear the price of them* (when by order from the ſenate they were enfranchiſed) until the war ſhould be ended. If *Hannibal* would have given ſuch long day of payment, it is likely that the *Romans* would have been his chapmen; but ſeeing he dealt only for ready money, they choſe rather to ſay, we will not give, than, we cannot. The like auſterity, upon the ſame reaſon, but contrary pretence, was uſed toward the ſoldiers that eſcaped from that great battel. Theſe were charged for having fled, as the priſoners were for not flying, when they might have done ſo. True it is, that in ſuch caſes (if ever) that which they call *raggione del Stato*, may ſerve for an excuſe; when the commonwealth, being driven to a miſerable exigent, is fain to help it ſelf, by doing injuries to private men. And ſo dealt the *Romans* now, condemning all thoſe that had ſerved at *Cannæ*, to be tranſported into *Sicily*; and there to ſerve, not as others did, until they had fulfilled twenty years in the wars, or elſe were fifty years of age; but until this war ſhould be ended, how long ſoever it laſted, and that without reward. The ſame thrifty cenſure was afterwards laid upon others for their miſbehaviour; but never upon any man of quality, ſave only (a good while after this, at better leiſure) upon *Cæcilius Metellus*, and a few other hare-brain'd fools, his companions, who being frighted out of their wits with the terror of ſo great a loſs, were deviſing, after the battel, which way to run out of *Italy*, when *Hannibal* as yet had ſcarce one town within it. The inequality of this rigour grew ſhortly diſtaſteful to the commonalty, and was openly blamed by [b] *a tribune of the people*; nevertheleſs it was quietly digeſted, the excuſe being no leſs apparent than the fault.

M. Junius, the dictator, having diſpatched all needful buſineſs within the city, took the field with twenty-five thouſand men. What he did with this army, I cannot find, nor more of him than this, that he ſpent the time about *Campania*; where (as may be preſumed) he was not idle. To him therefore perhaps it may be aſcribed, that *Hannibal* did no greater evil; for of any evil done to *Hannibal* by the *Romans* in this their weak eſtate, only *Marcellus* had the honour. *Marcellus* being then one of the pretors, lay at *Oſtia* with a fleet, ready to ſet ſail for *Sicily*, having one legion aboard his ſhips, and fifteen hundred other ſoldiers newly taken up; with which forces he was to defend that iſland, and do what harm he could in *Afric*. But hearing of the overthrow at *Cannæ*, he ſent theſe of his new levy to *Rome*, for defence of the city, and marched haſtily with his legion toward *Cannuſium*, delivering the fleet, empty of ſoldiers, to *P. Furius*, his colleague. Thence was he called by the magiſtrates, and chief citizens of *Nola*, to help them, who were like to be forced by the multitude (affected, as were the reſt of the *Campans*) to let in the *Carthaginian*; and knew not how to avoid this otherwiſe, than by ſeeming to deliberate about the articles of this new confederacy. Wherefore he made great journies thitherward, and arrived even time enough to prevent the enemy. Many idle walks *Hannibal* made betwixt *Nola* and *Naples*, aſſaying by fair words and terrible threats the one and the other city. *Naples* was ſtrong, and not infected with any the leaſt touch of diſloyalty: it had alſo a ſure haven, whereby it ſtood in the leſs fear of ſuſtaining much inconvenience, by ſpoil of the lands and villages abroad in the country. But at *Nola* it was thought a valuable conſideration, that *Hannibal* was maſter of the field; which if he had laid waſte, all the poor people were utterly undone. So thought the multitude, and ſuch talk uſed ſome, that had little fear of their own private want or poverty, but a great deſire to gratify the *Carthaginian*. Of theſe, one *L. Bantius* was chief, a ſtout young gentleman and ſoldier of eſpecial mark, well beloved in the city, and one that had done good ſervice to the *Romans*; but was found by *Hannibal* half dead at *Cannæ*, and after much gentle uſage, good attendance, and cure of his wounds, friendly diſmiſſed with liberal gifts. He therefore thought that it concerned him in honour, to return the greateſt thanks he could unto ſo courteous an enemy. *Marcellus*, perceiving this, wrought upon the ſame eaſy nature of the gentleman; and taking notice of him, as if it had been by chance, ſeemed to wonder why one that had ſo well deſerved of the *Roman* ſtate, had not repaired unto him the pretor, who deſired nothing more than ſuch acquaintance. So with many commendations, gifts, and loving entertainment, being himſelf alſo a man highly reputed for his perſonal valour, he made this *Bantius* ſo far in love with him, that nothing could be attempted within *Nola* againſt the *Romans*, whereof he had not preſently advertiſement. At the coming of *Marcellus*, *Hannibal* removed from about *Nola*; and aſſayed, as formerly he had done, the *Neapolitans*; but they had lately

[a] Liv. L. 24. [b] Liv. L. 25.

taken

taken in a *Roman* garriſon, upon confidence whereof they gave him a peremptory anſwer, to his diſcontent. Thence went he to *Nuceria*, which he took by compoſition, and ſo returned back again to *Nola*. He was not ignorant what good affection the common people of *Nola* bore unto him, who although they durſt not ſtir in his quarrel, being over-awed by the *Roman* garriſon; yet if they ſaw *Marcellus* hardly beſtead, and forced to turn his care from watching them within, to repelling the enemy's aſſailing him without, like enough it ſeemed, that they would not be wanting unto the accompliſhment of their own deſires. He therefore brought his army cloſe to the town, and ſkirmiſhed often with *Marcellus*, not in hope thereby to do much good, but only to make ſhew of a meaning to force the town, which he ſought in the mean while to take by intelligence. In the night-time there paſſed meſſages between him and the citizens, his partakers; whereby it was concluded, that if once *Marcellus*, with all his forces, could be trained into the field, the multitude within the town ſhould preſently riſe, and ſeizing upon the gates, exclude him as an enemy. Of this negotiation *Marcellus* was advertiſed, and fearing leſt the conſpirators would ſhortly adventure even to find him buſied within the city, whilſt the *Carthaginians* ſhould ſcale the walls, he thought it the ſureſt way to cut off the enemy's hope, and ſend him away betimes. Wherefore ordering his men in three companies, within three ſeveral gates looking towards the enemy, he gave a ſtreight command that all the citizens ſhould keep their houſes. Thus he lay cloſe a good part of the day, to the enemy's great wonder, againſt whom he had cuſtomarily iſſued forth before more early every day to ſkirmiſh. But when it was further noted, that the walls were bare, and not a man appearing on them, then thought *Hannibal* that ſurely all was diſcovered, and *Marcellus* now buſied with the citizens. Whereupon he bad his men bring ladders, and make ready for the aſſault, which was done in all haſte. But when the *Carthaginians* were at the very walls, and thought nothing leſs than that the *Romans* would meet them in the field, ſuddenly the middle gate was opened, whereat *Marcellus*, with the beſt and oldeſt of his ſoldiers, brake forth upon them with a great noiſe, to make his unexpected ſally the more terrible. Whilſt the *Carthaginians*, much out of order, were ſome of them flying before *Marcellus*, the reſt making head againſt him, the other two gates opened, whereat in like ſort iſſued they of the new-levied companies upon the enemy's backs. The ſudden terror was more available unto the *Romans* than their force; yet the execution was ſo great, that this was accounted as a victory, and reputed one of the braveſt acts performed in all that war; foraſmuch as hereby it was firſt proved, that *Hannibal* might be overcome. After this, *Marcellus*, being freed from his enemies that were departed, took a ſtrict account of the citizens of *Nola*, condemning above ſeventy of high-treaſon, whoſe heads he ſtruck off; and ſo leaving the town in quiet obedience unto their ſenate, went and encamped hard-by about *Sueſſula*. *Hannibal*, in the mean ſeaſon, was gone to *Acerræ*, where, being excluded, he thought it no wiſdom to loſe time in perſwaſions, but laid ſiege unto it, and began on all ſides to cloſe it up. This terrified the people, who knew themſelves unable to hold out. Therefore, before his works were finiſhed, and they quite ſurrounded, they ſtole out by night, and left him the town empty, which he ſacked and burnt. Then hearing news of the dictator, that he was about *Caſiline*, thither went *Hannibal*: as being unwilling, that an enemy ſo near ſhould diſquiet him at *Capua*: where he meant to winter. It ſeems, or rather indeed it is plain, that the late victory of *Marcellus*, had nothing abated the ſpirit of the *Carthaginian*: who durſt with a ſmall part of his army, ſeek out the dictator, that had with him the heart of the *Roman* ſtrength. Wherefore the joy of his enemies, upon ſo ſlight an occaſion as the death of ſome two thouſand of his men, at the moſt, and thoſe not ſlain in plain battel, but by a ſudden eruption; witneſſeth chiefly, in what great fear they ſtood of *Hannibal*, and how creſt-fallen they were: that having three years ſince demanded at *Carthage*, the body of *Hannibal*, to be delivered unto their pleaſure, by his own citizens, could now pleaſe themſelves, as with good news, to hear, that in a ſkirmiſh not far from *Rome* he appeared to be a man, and not reſiſtleſs. At *Caſilinum* the dictator was not: but many companies of *Italians*, confederates of *Rome*, were gotten into the town, and held it. Five hundred of the *Preneſtines* there were, and above four hundred of *Peruſia*, with ſome of the *Latins*. All theſe had the good hap to come too late to the battel of *Cannæ*, being ſent by their ſeveral ſtates to the camp: whither whilſt they were marching, the tidings of that great misfortune encountred them, and ſent them back ſorrowful; for they loved well their lords the *Romans*, under whoſe government they lived happily. So came they all, one after another, to *Caſiline*, where they met and ſtayed. Neither had they ſtayed there long, ere they heard news from *Capua*. How that great city became the ring-leader of all the *Campans* into rebellion. The people of *Caſiline* were affected as they of *Capua*: and therefore fought how to rid their hands of thoſe *Preneſtines* and their fellows; but the ſoldiers were too hard for them, and after many trains laid one for another, at laſt they ſlew all the townſmen in a night, and fortified the *weſtern* part of the town (for it was divided by the river *Vulturnus*) againſt the enemy. If they had run away with the goods, and pretended, that theſe of *Caſiline* were, as the reſt of the *Campans*, all traitors; they themſelves might have been reputed, as no better than the *Mamertines*. But their conſtancy in defence of the place witneſſeth, upon what honeſt reaſons they ſurpriſed it. *Hannibal* came thither, thinking to have encountred with greater forces: but theſe few found him more work than he expected. Divers aſſaults he gave them, but was ſtill repelled with loſs: and many ſallies they made, with variable event. The enemy mined; and they countermined: oppoſing ſo much induſtry to his force, that he was driven to cloſe them up, and ſeek to win them by famine. *T. Sempronius Gracchus*, that was maſter of the horſe, lay with the *Roman* army higher up the river, who fain would have relieved *Caſiline*, but that the dictator, being gone to *Rome*, about ſome matters of religion, had given him expreſs charge not to fight till his return. *Marcellus* from *Sueſſula* could not come, his way being ſtopped by the overflowings of *Vulturnus*; the *Nolans* alſo beſeeching him not to leave them, who were in danger of the *Campans* if he departed. Thus it is reported: but if the water ſtayed his journey, ſuch entreaties were needleſs. Neither is it like, that the dictator tarried at *Rome* ſo long, as till extreme famine had conſumed the garriſon in *Caſiline*. Wherefore it may be thought, that the town was loſt, becauſe the *Romans* durſt not adventure to raiſe the ſiege. Barrels

rels of corn were ſent by night, floating down the river; and when ſome of theſe, being carried away by an eddy of the water, ſtuck among the willows on the bank, whereby this manner of relief was diſcovered and prevented; *Gracchus* caſt a great quantity of nuts into the ſtream, which faintly ſuſtained the poor beſieged men. At length, when all food was ſpent, and whatſoever grew green under the walls was gathered for ſallets; the *Carthaginians* ploughed up the ground: whereon the beſieged preſently ſowed rape-ſeed. *Hannibal* ſeeing this, admired their patience; and ſaid, that he meant not to ſtay at *Caſiline* until the rapes were grown. Wherefore, though hitherto he had refuſed to hearken unto any compoſition, as intending to make them an example to all others, by puniſhing their obſtinacy; yet now he was content to grant them their lives at an indifferent ranſom, which when they had paid, he quietly diſmiſſed them according to his promiſe. Seven hundred *Carthaginians* he placed in *Caſiline*, as a garriſon for defence of the *Campans*; unto whom he reſtored it. To the *Preneſtine* ſoldiers great thanks were given, and loving rewards; among which, they had offer, in regard of their virtue, to be made citizens of *Rome*. But their preſent condition pleaſed them ſo well, that they choſe rather to continue as they were, in *Præneſte*: which is no weak proof of the good eſtate wherein the cities flouriſhed that were ſubject to the *Roman* government. This ſiege of *Caſiline* was not a little beneficial to the *Romans*; as having long detained *Hannibal*, and conſumed much of his time, that might otherwiſe have been better ſpent. For winter overtook him, long before he could diſpatch the buſineſs: which how to quit with his honour he knew not, when he was once engaged. Therefore he wintered at *Capua*: where he refreſhed his army, or rather corrupted it, as all hiſtorians report, and made it effeminate; though, effeminate as it was, he therewithal did often beat the *Romans* in following times, as ſhall appear hereafter.

SECT. X.

Of the great ſupply that was decreed at Carthage, *to be ſent to* Hannibal *in* Italy. *How by the malice of* Hanno, *and ſloth or parſimony of the* Carthaginians, *the ſupply was too long deferred. That the riches of the* Carthaginians *grew faſter, than of the* Romans. *Of* Fabius *and other old* Roman *Hiſtorians, how partial they were in their writings.*

WHEN *Mago*, the ſon of *Amilcar*, had ſpent ſome time about the taking in of ſuch *Italians*, as fell from the *Romans* after the battel at *Cannæ*, his brother *Hannibal* ſent for him to *Capua*, and thence diſpatched him away to *Carthage*, with the joyful meſſage of victory. He told the *Carthaginian* ſenate, with how many *Roman* generals his brother had fought; what conſuls he had chaſed, wounded, or ſlain; how the ſtout *Romans*, that in the former war never ſhunned any occaſion of fight, were now grown ſo calm, that they thought their dictator *Fabius* the only good captain, becauſe he never durſt adventure to come to battel; that, not without reaſon, their ſpirits were thus abated, ſince *Hannibal* had ſlain of them above two hundred thouſand, and taken above fifty thouſand priſoners. He further told them of the *Brutians*, *Apulians*, *Samnites*, *Lucans*, and other people of *Italy*, that following the fortune of thoſe great victories, had revolted unto the *Carthaginians*. Among the reſt he magnified *Capua*, as a goodly city, and fit to be not only (as already it was) head of all the *Capuans*, but the chief ſeat of their dominion in *Italy*: and there he informed them, how lovingly his brother had been entertained, where he meant to reſt that winter, attending their ſupply. As for the war, he ſaid it was even at an end, if they would now purſue it cloſely, and not give the *Romans* any breathing time, wherein to recollect themſelves, and repair their broken forces. He willed them to conſider, that the war was far from home, in the enemies country; that ſo many battels had much diminiſhed his brother's army; that the ſoldiers, who had ſo well deſerved, ought to be conſidered with liberal rewards; and that it was not good to burden their new *Italian* friends, with exactions of money, corn, and other neceſſaries; but that theſe things muſt be ſent from *Carthage*: which the victory would require with large amends. Finally, he cauſed the golden rings, taken from the fingers of the *Roman Knights* that were ſlain, to be poured out openly in the court: which being meaſured, filled (as ſome ſay) three buſhels, or (as others would rather have it) no more than one; adding, that by this might appear the greatneſs of the *Roman* calamity, foraſmuch as none but the [a] principal of that order were accuſtomed to wear that ornament.

Who ſo conſiders the former *Punic* war, may eaſily find, that the ſtate of *Carthage* never did receive, in all the durance thereof, any ſuch hopeful advertiſements from their captains abroad. Wherefore it is no marvel, if the errand of *Mago* found extraordinary welcome. In the vehemency of this joy, *Himilco*, a ſenator adverſe to the faction of *Hanno*, is ſaid to have demanded of that great perſwader unto peace with *Rome*, whether he were ſtill of opinion, that *Hannibal* ſhould be yielded up unto the *Romans*; or whether he would forbid them to give thanks unto the gods, for this their good ſucceſs. Hereunto though it be not likely that *Hanno* made the ſame formal anſwer, which *Livy* puts into his mouth, calling the *Carthaginian* ſenators *Patres conſcripti*, by a term proper to the *Romans*, and putting them in mind of his own ſhameful overthrow received at the iſlands *Ægateis*: yet the ſum of his ſpeech appears to have been no leſs malicious, than it is ſet down, foraſmuch as *Hannibal* himſelf, at his departure out of *Italy*, exclaimed againſt the wickedneſs of this *Hanno*; ſaying, that his hatred againſt the *Barchines*, had oppreſſed their family, when otherwiſe it could not, with the ruin of *Carthage*. Therefore it may well be, that he made ſuch a jeſt of theſe victories, as is reported; ſaying, it ill beſeemed him, who had vanquiſhed the *Romans*, to call for more help, as if he had been beaten; or him, that had taken their camp, filled forſooth with ſpoil, to make requeſt for meat and money. To theſe cavils, if anſwer were needful, it might be ſaid, that other booty than of horſes and ſlaves, little was to be found in the *Roman* camp: the beſt of the ſoldiers carrying no other wealth into the field, than a few [b] ſilver ſtuds in the bridles and trappings of their horſes. If *Hannibal* had taken any main convoy of money and proviſions, going to ſupply all wants of a great army in ſome

[a] *Thus* Livy *reports it: and credible it is, that while* Rome *was poor, the bravery of private men was not altogether ſo great, as the law would have permitted*; *though otherwiſe* Jus Annuli, the wearing of the ring, *was the general privilege of the* Roman Equites. [b] Liv. l. 22.

other

other province (as the two *Scipio's* are afterwards ſaid to have done, when they won the camp of *Aſdrubal*, that carried along with him all the wealth of *Spain*, in his journey to *Italy*) then might ſuch an objection more juſtly have been made unto his demand of a ſupply. But the moſt likely part of *Hanno*'s oration, and where he beſt might hope to prevail, contained a perſwaſion to uſe their fortune with moderation; and now to ſeek peace, whilſt they had ſo much the better in war.

What would have been the iſſue of this counſel, if it had been followed, it were not eaſy to ſay. For though it be likely, that the *Roman* pride would have brooked much indignity, in freeing *Italy* from the danger of war; yet it is not likely, that the faith, ſo often broken to the *Carthaginians* in former times, would have been kept entire, when any opinion of good advantage had called for revenge of ſo many ſhameful overthrows; ſince after this war ended, and a new league concluded, no ſubmiſſive behaviour could preſerve *Carthage* from ruin, no longer than until ſuch time, as *Rome* was at leiſure from all other wars. This counſel therefore of *Hanno*, though it might ſeem temperate, was indeed very peſtilent; and ſerved only to hinder the performance of a noble reſolution. For it was concluded by a main conſent of the ſenate, that forty thouſand *Numidians*, forty elephants, and great abundance of ſilver, ſhould be ſent over to *Hannibal:* and that, beſides theſe, twenty thouſand foot, and four thouſand horſe, ſhould be levied in *Spain*; not only to ſupply, as need ſhould require, the armies in that province, but to be tranſported into *Italy*.

This great aid, had it been as carefully ſent, as it was readily decreed, the *Roman* hiſtorians would not have found cauſe, to tax the retchleſs improvidence of *Hannibal*, in forbearing to march directly from *Cannæ* to *Rome*, or in refreſhing his army among the delights of *Capua:* the next year's work would have finiſhed the buſineſs, with leſs dangerous adventure; and the pleaſures, which his men enjoyed among the *Campans*, would have been commended, as rewards by him well thought upon, wherewith to animate both them and others, that were to be employed in the following war. But either the too much careleſneſs of thoſe, that were loth to make haſte in laying out their money, before extream neceſſity required it; or the crafty malice of *Hanno*, and his fellows, working upon the private humours of men, that had more feeling of their own commodity, than ſenſe of the publick need; utterly perverted, and made unprofitable in the performance, the order that had been ſo well ſet down. The [a] elephants were ſent: and ſome money peradventure; uncertain it is, how long after. But thoſe great forces of threeſcore thouſand foot, and four thouſand horſe, came not into *Italy*, till much was loſt of that which already had been gotten, and a great part of the old *Carthaginian* army was firſt conſumed by time, and ſundry accidents of war. Only ſome ſmall numbers, no way anſwering unto the proportion decreed, were ſent into *Spain*; and the journey of *Aſdrubal* thence through *France* into *Italy* much talked of, but he not enabled thereunto, till many years were paſt, and the *Romans* had recovered their ſtrength.

Here we may note, what great riches the *Carthaginians* drew into their city, both by the tributes received from their ſubjects, and by their wealthy trade of merchandize. For it is not long ſince the war of the mercenaries; and the perfidious tyranny of the *Romans*, extorting, in time of the greateſt neceſſity twelve hundred talents, had exceedingly impoveriſhed *Carthage:* which was before brought into great want, even by the expence of ſo much money, as was to be diſburſed for redeeming of peace, after the loſs at *Ægateis*. Yet we ſee, what great armies of *Numidians*, and *Spaniards*, beſides thoſe already on foot, are appointed to the ſervice in *Italy*, and how little the *Carthaginians* fear the want of money in theſe chargeable undertakings: whereas the *Romans*, on the other ſide, having three or four years together been forced to ſome extraordinary coſt, are fain to go upon credit, even for the price of thoſe ſlaves, which they bought of their own citizens to arm for their defence. Such advantage, in means to enrich their treaſury, had the wealthy merchants of *Carthage*, trading in all parts of the *Mediterranean* ſea, even from *Tyrus* their mother-city in the bottom of the ſtreights unto the great ocean, above the *Romans:* who lived on the fruits of their ground; and received their tributes from people following the ſame courſe of life. When time therefore was come, that the hatred of *Rome* found leiſure to ſhew it ſelf, in the deſtruction of *Carthage*; the impudence of *Roman* falſhood, in ſeeking an honeſt colour wherewith to ſhadow the intended breach of faith, diſcovered plainly whence the jealouſy was bred, that this mighty city would again rebel. For the *Carthaginians*, having given up hoſtages, even before the *Roman* army did ſet forth, to perform whatſoever ſhould be enjoined them, with condition that their city might not be deſtroyed; and having accordingly, when they were ſo required, yielded up all their weapons, and engines of war, the *Romans* told them plainly, that the city of *Carthage*, which was the body of the citizens, ſhould be friendly dealt withal, but the town muſt needs be demoliſhed, and removed into ſome other place, that ſhould be twelve miles diſtant from the ſea. For (ſaid the *Romans*) this trade of merchandize, by which ye now live, is not ſo fit for peaceable men, ſuch as ye promiſe to become hereafter, as is the trade of huſbandry; an wholeſom kind of life, and enduing men with many laudable qualities, which enable their bodies, and make them very apt for converſation. This villainous dealing of the *Romans*, though ſugar'd with gloſſing words, plainly ſhews, what good obſervation the elder *Cato* had made of the haſty growth of *Carthage* in riches. For when, being demanded his opinion in the ſenate about any matter whatſoever it were, he added ſtill this concluſion, *Thus I think; and that* Carthage *ſhould be deſtroyed*; he may ſeem, not only to have had regard unto that preſent wealth, which at his being there he had found in the city, but much more unto theſe times, and the great height whereunto it roſe, even ſuddenly as we ſee, out of many calamities, whilſt the *Romans* thought, that it had not been in caſe to dare ſo terrible a war.

But as the *Carthagians*, in gathering wealth, were more induſtrious and ſkilful than the *Romans*; ſo came they far ſhort of them, in the honourable care of the publick good: having every one, or moſt of them, a more principal regard of his own private benefit. This made them (beſides the negligence commonly found in victors) when the firſt heat of their affection, wherein they conclude to purſue the war ſtrongly, was over-paſt, go more leiſurely to work, than had been requiſite in the

[a] Liv. l. 26.

execution. It was eaſy for *Hanno* to perſwade covetous men, that they ſhould firſt of all defend their own in *Spain*. This might be done with little charges. Afterwards, when that province was ſecured, they might ſend an army into *Italy*; ſo going to work orderly by degrees. For it were no wiſdom to commit all the ſtrength of the commonwealth to one hazard of fortune againſt the enemies; or (which perhaps were worſe) to the government of an ambitious man, and his brethren; who having once (if they could ſo do) finiſhed the war, might eaſily make [a] *Hannibal* a king, and ſubdue *Carthage*, with the forces that ſhe had given them to the conqueſt of *Rome*.

By ſuch malicious working of *Hanno*, and by their own ſlackneſs, incredulity, dulneſs, or niggardize, the *Carthaginians* were perſwaded rather to make ſmall diſburſements in *Spain*, than to ſet up all their reſt at once in *Italy*. Yet was it indeed impoſſible to hold a country of ſo large extent, and ſo open a coaſt as that of *Spain*, free from all incurſion of the enemy; eſpecially the affection of the naturals being (as in a new conqueſt) ill eſtabliſhed. A better way therefore it had been to make a running war, by which the *Romans* might have been found occupied, even with the ordinary *Carthaginian* garriſons, or ſome little addition thereunto. For if it were thought meet to defer the proſecution of their main intendment againſt *Rome* it ſelf, until ſuch time as every little thorn were pulled out of the ſides of ſo great a province, then muſt *Emporiæ* have been beſieged and forced; which, by reaſon of alliance with the *Maſſilians*, gave unto the *Romans*, at all times when they pleaſed, a ready and ſecure harbour. But the town of *Emporiæ* was too ſtrong to be won in haſte; it had long defended it ſelf againſt the *Barbarians*, having not above four hundred paces of wall to the main land, and exceedingly well fortified, a great *Spaniſh* town of the ſame name, lying without it, that was three miles in compaſs, very ſtrong likewiſe, and friend unto the *Grecians*, though not over-much truſted. Wherefore to force this town of *Emporiæ*, that was, beſides the proper ſtrength, like to be ſo well aſſiſted by the *Maſſilians*, *Romans*, and ſome *Spaniards*, would have been a work of little leſs difficulty, than was the *Roman* war (in appearance) after the battel at *Cannæ*; yea, it had been in effect none other, than to alter the ſeat of the war, which *Hannibal* had already fixed, with better judgment, near unto the gates of *Rome*. The difficulty of this attempt being ſuch, as cauſed it altogether to be forborn, great folly it was to be much troubled about expelling the *Romans* utterly out of *Spain*, whom they might more eaſily have diverted thence, and drawn home to their own doors, by making ſtrong war upon their city. For even ſo the *Romans* afterwards removed *Hannibal* into *Afric*, by ſending an army to *Carthage*; and by taking the like courſe, they now endeavour'd to change the ſeat of the war, transferring it out of *Italy* into *Spain*. But the private affections of men regarding the common good no otherwiſe, than as it is acceſſary to their own purpoſes, did make them eaſily wink at opportunities, and hope that ſomewhat would fall out well of it ſelf, though they ſet not to their helping hands. *Hanno* was a malicious wretch; yet they that thought him ſo, were well enough contented to hearken unto his diſcourſes, as long as they were plauſible, and tended to keep the purſe full. In the mean while they ſuffered *Hannibal*, and all the noble houſe of *Amilcar*, to weary themſelves in travel for the commonwealth; which all *Carthage* in general highly commended, but weakly aſſiſted; as if the induſtry of theſe *Barchines* had been ſomewhat more than needful. Surely the *Carthaginians*, in general, were far leſs honourable than the people of *Rome*, not only in government of their ſubject provinces, but in adminiſtration of their own eſtate; few of them preferring the reſpect of the weal-publick above their private intereſt. But as they thrived little in the end, by their parſimony uſed toward their own mercenaries, when the former *Roman* war was finiſhed; ſo the concluſion of this war preſent, will make them complain, with feeling ſighs, of their negligence in ſupplying *Hannibal* after the victory at *Cannæ*; when gladly they would give all their treaſures to redeem the opportunity, that now they let paſs, as if it were coſt enough to ſend a few handfuls into *Spain*.

That both the *Spaniſh* buſineſs, and the ſtate of *Afric* it ſelf, depended wholly, or for the moſt part, upon ſucceſs of things in *Italy*, the courſe of actions following will make manifeſt. Particularly, how matters were ordered in *Spain* by the *Carthaginian* governors, it is very hard, and almoſt impoſſible, to ſet down. For though we muſt not reprehend, in that worthy hiſtorian *Livy*, the tender love of his own country, which made him give credit unto *Fabius* and others; yet muſt we not, for his ſake, believe thoſe lies, which the impartial judgment of *Polybius* hath condemned in the writers that gave them original. It were needleſs to rehearſe all that may be found in [b] *Polybius*, concerning the truth of that *Roman* hiſtorian *Fabius*: one example may ſuffice. He ſaith of *Amilcar* and his men at *Eryx*, in the former war, that having clean ſpent their ſtrength, and being even broken with many miſeries, they were glad to ſubmit themſelves unto the *Romans*. Contrary hereunto, we find in the life of *Amilcar*, ſet down by *Æmilius Probus*, that *Eryx* was in ſuch ſort held by the *Carthaginians*, that it ſeemed to be in as good condition, as if in thoſe parts there had not been any war. Theſe words, being referred to the brave reſolution of the *Carthaginian* ſoldiers, and the ſingular virtue of their general infuſing ſuch ſpirit into them, may be taken as not over-liberal. For in the treaty of peace between *Amilcar* and *Catulus*, when the *Roman* firſt of all required that this garriſon of *Eryx* ſhould lay down their arms, and forſake *Sicily*, threatning, that otherwiſe he would not talk of any compoſition; *Amilcar* boldly bad him chuſe, whether he would talk of it, or no; for that the arms which his country had put into his hands to uſe againſt her enemies, it was not his purpoſe to yield up unto them. Now ſince the *Romans*, contrary to their cuſtom upon like advantages, were content to let *Amilcar* have his will, and not to ſtand with him upon point of honour, whilſt otherwiſe they might quietly rid their hands of him; plain enough it is, that they were far from thinking him a man conſumed with miſeries, as *Fabius* would have him ſeem. Hereunto agrees the relation of *Polybius*, who flatly, and by name, chargeth *Fabius* with untruth; ſaying, that howſoever *Amilcar*, and his ſoldiers, had endured all extremity; yet they behaved themſelves as men that had no ſenſe thereof, and were as far from being either vanquiſhed, or tired, as were their enemies. Such being the difference between *Fabius* (as alſo perhaps between other old writers of the *Roman* ſtory) and thoſe that had more regard of truth,

[a] *Of ſuch ambition* Hanno *directly accuſed* Hannibal, *ſaying, that he made war upon war, that ſo he might live compaſſed with legions, as knowing no other way to make himſelf a king.* Liv. l. 21. [b] Pol. l. 1.

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than of flattering the mighty city of *Rome*; we muſt take it in good part, that howſoever *Livy* introduceth *Hanno*, in one place, joining very fooliſhly his own ſhameful overthrow at the iſlands [a] *Ægateis*, with the great ſervices of *Amilcar* at *Eryx*, as if both of them had had a like event; yet [b] elſewhere he forbeareth not to put a more likely tale (though with as impudent a commemoration of his own unhappy conduct) into the ſame *Hanno*'s mouth, making him ſay, that the affairs of *Carthage* went never better, than a little before the loſs of their fleet in that battel at ſea, wherein himſelf was general. Now concerning the doings of the *Scipio's* in *Spain*, there is cauſe to wiſh that this *Fabius*, with *Val. Antias*, and others of the like ſtamp, had either written (if they could not write more temperately) nothing at all; or that the tender affection of *Livy* to his *Rome*, had not cauſed him to think too well of their relations: which are ſuch as follow.

SECT. XI.

Strange reports of the Roman *victories in* Spain, *before* Aſdrubal, *the ſon of* Amilcar, *followed thence his brother* Hannibal *into* Italy.

IT hath been ſhewed already, how *P. Cornelius Scipio*, the conſul, returning from *Gaul* into *Italy*, to encounter with *Hannibal* at his deſcent from the *Alps*, ſent before him his brother *Cneus*, with part of his fleet and army, into *Spain*. Two *Roman* legions, with fourteen thouſand foot of the confederates, and twelve hundred horſe, had been allotted unto the conſul, therewith to make war in *Spain* againſt *Hannibal*; who ſince he was marching into *Italy* with the ſtrength of his army, *P. Scipio* believed, that a good part of theſe his own forces might well be ſpared from the *Spaniſh* expedition; and therefore made bold to carry ſome of the number back with him, ſending on his brother with the reſt, as his lieutenant. *Publius* himſelf remained in *Italy* all the time of his conſulſhip; which being expired, he was ſent proconſul into *Spain*, by the ſenate, with an army of eight thouſand men, and a fleet of thirty gallies.

The acts of theſe two brethren, in their province, were very great; and, as they are reported, ſomewhat marvellous. For they continually prevailed in *Spain* againſt the *Carthaginians*, whom they vanquiſhed in ſo many battels, and withdrew from their alliance ſo many of the *Spaniards*, their confederates, that we have cauſe to wonder how the enemy could ſo often find means to repair his forces, and return ſtrong into the field. But as the *Romans*, by pretending to deliver the country from the tyranny of *Carthage*, might eaſily win unto their confederacy, as many as were galled with the *African* yoke, and durſt adventure to break it; ſo the antient reputation of the firſt conquerors might ſerve to arm the naturals againſt theſe invaders; and to reclaim thoſe that had revolted unto the *Romans*, were it only by the memory of ſuch ill ſucceſs, as the like rebellion in former times had found. Hereto may be added the *Carthaginian* treaſure, which eaſily raiſed ſoldiers among thoſe valiant, but (in that age) poor, and gold-thirſty nations. Neither was it of ſmall importance, that ſo many of the *Spaniards* had their children, kinſmen and friends, abroad with *Hannibal* in his *Italian* wars, or ſerving the *Carthaginians* in *Afric*. And peradventure, if we durſt be bold to ſay it, the victories of the *Scipio's* were neither ſo many, nor ſo great, as they are ſet out by *Livy*. This we may be bold to ſay, that the great captain *Fabius*, or *Livy* in his perſon, maketh an objection unto *Scipio*, which neither *Scipio*, nor *Livy* for him, doth anſwer, that *if* Aſdrubal *were vanquiſhed, as* Scipio *would ſay, by him in* Spain: *ſtrange it was, and as little to his honour, as it had been extremely dangerous to* Rome, *that the ſame vanquiſhed man ſhould invade* Italy. And it is indeed an incredible narration, that *Aſdrubal* being encloſed on all ſides, and not knowing how to eſcape out of a battel, ſave only by the ſteep deſcent of rocks, over a great river that lay at his back, ran away with all his money, elephants, and broken troops, over *Tagus*, directly toward the *Pyrenees*, and ſo toward *Italy*; upon which he fell with more than threeſcore thouſand armed ſoldiers. Neither do I ſee, how it hangs well together, that he choſe a piece of ground very defenſible, but moſt incommodious for his retreat, if he ſhould happen to be vanquiſhed; and yet, that he ſent all his money and elephants away before him, as not intending to abide the enemy: or how it could be true, that theſe his elephants, being ſo ſent before, could hinder the *Romans* (for ſo are they ſaid to have done in the laſt battel between him and *Scipio*) from breaking into his camp. Wherefore we can no more than be ſorry, that all *Carthaginian* records of this war, and *Spaniſh* (if there were any) being utterly loſt, we can know no more thereof, than what it hath pleaſed the *Romans* to tell us: unto whom it were no wiſdom to give too much credit. In this regard, I will ſummarily run over the doings of the *Scipio's* in *Spain*; not greatly inſiſting on particulars, whereof there is no great certainty.

Cn. Cornelius landed at *Emporiæ*, an haven-town not far within the *Pyrenees*, retaining ſtill the ſame name with little inflexion. That by the fame of his clemency he allured many nations to become ſubject unto *Rome*, as the ſtory begins of him, I could eaſily believe, if I underſtood by what occaſion they had need to uſe his clemency, or he to give ſuch famous example thereof, being a mere ſtranger, and having no juriſdiction in the country. Yet is it certain, that he was a man very courteous, and one that could well inſinuate himſelf into the love of the *Barbarians*; among whom, his dexterity in practice had the better ſucceſs, for that he ſeemed to have none other errand, than ſetting them at liberty. This pretext availed with ſome: others were to be hired with money; and ſome he compelled to yield by force or fear; eſpecially, when he had won a battel againſt *Hanno*. Into all treaties of accord made with theſe people, likely it is that he remembred to inſert this article, which the *Romans* in their alliances never forgot, unleſs in long times paſt, and when they dealt with the *Carthaginians*, or their ſuperiors; [c] *Majeſtatem Pop. Rom. comiter conſervent*, which is, as *Tully* interprets it, *that they ſhould gently* (*or kindly*) *uphold the majeſty of the people of* Rome. This was in appearance nothing troubleſome: yet implied it indeed an obſcure covenant of ſubjection. And in this reſpect it may be true, that the *Spaniards* became [d] *ditionis Romanæ, of the* Roman *Juriſdiction*: though hereafter they will ſay, they had no ſuch meaning. That part of the country wherein *Scipio* landed, was newly ſubdued by *Hannibal* in his paſſage toward *Italy*; and therefore the more eaſily ſhaken out of obedience. Particularly in the *Bargutians*; *Hannibal* had found, at his coming among them, ſuch an apprehenſion of the *Roman* greatneſs, as made him ſuſpect, that any light occaſion would make

[a] Ægatis Inſulas, Erycemque ante oculos proponite, &c. Liv. l. 21. [b] Liv. l. 23. [c] Orat. pro Corn. Balbo. [d] Liv. l. 21.

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them ſtart from the *Carthaginians*. Wherefore he not only appointed *Hanno* governour over them, as over the reſt of the province between *Iberus* and the [a] *Pyrenees*, but made him alſo their *Lord*; that is (as I conceive it; for I do not think he gave the principality of their country unto *Hanno* and his heirs) he made him not only lieutenant-general over them, in matters of war, and things concerning the holding them in obedience to *Carthage*; but took from them all inferior Officers of their own, leaving them to be governed by *Hanno*, at his diſcretion. Theſe therefore had good cauſe to rejoice at the coming of *Scipio*; with whom, others alſo (no doubt) found reaſons to join; it being the cuſtom of all conquered nations, in hatred of their preſent Lords, to throw themſelves indiſcreetly into the protection of others, that many times prove worſe than the former. So were the *Neapolitans* and *Milanois*, in the age of our grandfathers, weary by turns of the *Spaniards* and *French*; as more ſenſible ſtill of the preſent evil which they felt, than regardful of the greater miſchief, whereinto they ran by ſeeking to avoid it. This bad affection of his province, would not ſuffer *Hanno* to temporize. Ten thouſand foot, and a thouſand horſe, *Hannibal* had left unto him: beſides which, it is like, that ſome forces he was able to raiſe out of his province. Therefore he adventured a battel with *Scipio*; wherein he was overthrown and taken. Following this victory, *Scipio* beſieged *Stiſſum*, a town hard by, and won it. But *Aſdrubal*, having paſſed *Iberus*, and coming too late to the relief of *Hanno*, with eight thouſand foot and a thouſand horſe, fell upon the *Roman* ſea-forces, that lay not far about *Tarracon*, whom he found careleſs, as after a victory, roving abroad in the country; and with great ſlaughter drove them aboard their ſhips. This done, he ran up into the country, where he withdrew the *Illergetes* from the *Roman* party, though they had given hoſtages to *Scipio*. *Scipio* in the mean ſeaſon was gone to viſit and aid his fleet: where having ſet things in order, he returned back, and made toward *Aſdrubal*; who durſt not abide his coming, but withdrew himſelf again over *Iberus*. So the *Illergetes*, were compelled by force, having loſt *Athanagia*, their chief city, to pay a fine to the *Romans*, and increaſe the number of their hoſtages. The *Auſetani* likewiſe, confederates of the *Carthaginians*, were beſieged in their chief town; which they defended thirty days; hoping in vain, that the ſharp winter, and great abundance of ſnow that fell, would have made the *Romans* to diſlodge. But they were fain at length to yield: and for this their obſtinacy, they were amerced twenty talents of ſilver. During the ſiege, the *Lacetani* came to help their diſtreſſed neighbours; and were beaten home by *Scipio*, leaving twelve thouſand of their company dead behind them. I cannot but wonder, how theſe *Lacetani*, that are ſaid to be the firſt which embraced the friendſhip of *Scipio*, ſhould, without any cauſe remembred, become *Carthaginian* on a ſudden, in the next news that we hear of them. As alſo it is ſtrange, that all the ſea-coaſt northward of *Iberus*, having lately become voluntarily [b] *ditionis Romanæ*, *ſubject unto* Rome, ſhould, in continuance of the ſtory, after a few lines, hold war againſt *Scipio*, without any aſſiſtance of the *Carthaginians*. Neither can I believe, that *Aſdrubal*, as it were by a charm, ſtirred up the *Illergetes*, making them lay aſide all care of their hoſtages, and take arms in his quarrel; whilſt himſelf had not the daring to ſtand againſt *Scipio*, but ran away, and ſaved himſelf beyond *Iberus*. *Philinus* perhaps, or ſome *Carthaginian* writer, would have told it thus: That *Scipio*, adventuring too far into the country, was beaten by *Aſdrubal* back to his ſhips, whence he durſt not ſtir, until winter came on: at what time this *Carthaginian* returned into the heart of his province, leaving ſome few garriſons to defend thoſe places, that after *Scipio* won, by returning upon them, unlooked for, through a deep ſnow. As for the *Lacetani*, *Illergetes*, and the reſt, we may reaſonably think, that they ſought their own benefit: helping themſelves one while by the *Romans* againſt the *Carthaginians*; and contrariwiſe, upon ſenſe of injuries received, or apprehenſion of more grievous tyranny, under which they feared to be brought by theſe new maſters, hearkening again unto the comfortable promiſes of thoſe, that had ruled them before. For that it was their intent to live under their own country laws, and not under governors ſent from *Rome* or *Carthage*, their demeanour in all ages following may teſtify: even from henceforth unto the days of *Auguſtus Ceſar*; till when they were never thoroughly conquered.

The year following this, *Cn. Scipio* had a victory againſt the *Carthaginians*, in fight at ſea; or rather came unto them, unlooked for, while they rode at anchor, moſt of their men being on ſhore. All their ſhips, that ran not too far on ground, he took, and thereby grew maſter of the whole coaſt; landing at pleaſure, and doing great hurt in all places that were not well defenced. After this victory, above one hundred and twenty nations, or petty eſtates in *Spain*, are ſaid to have ſubmitted themſelves unto the *Romans*, and given hoſtages: whereby *Aſdrubal* was compelled to fly into the utmoſt corners of the land, and hide himſelf in *Luſitania*. Yet it follows; that the *Illergetes* did again rebel; that *Aſdrubal* hereupon came over *Iberus*; and that *Scipio* (though having eaſily vanquiſhed the *Illergetes*) went not forth to meet him, but ſtirred up againſt him the *Celtiberians*, that lately was become his ſubjects and had given him hoſtages. Theſe took from the *Carthaginian* three towns, and vanquiſhed him in two battels, wherein they ſlew fifteen thouſand of his men, and took four thouſand priſoners. Then arrived *P. Scipio*, with the ſupply before-mentioned: and henceforward the two brethren jointly adminiſtred the buſineſs in *Spain*.

The *Carthaginians* being occupied in the *Celtiberian* war, the two *Scipio's* did, *haud cunctanter, without fear or doubt*, paſs over *Iberus*, and beſiege *Saguntum*. Little cauſe of doubt had they, if *Cn.* had already ſubdued many nations beyond it; and among many others, the ſame *Celtiberians*, that with their proper forces were able to vanquiſh *Aſdrubal*. *Boſtar*, the governour of *Saguntum*, a ſimple man, ſuffered himſelf to be perſwaded by one *Acedux*, a *Spaniard*, that the only way to get the favour and hearty good-will of the country, was by freely reſtoring unto them their hoſtages; as reſting, without any pledge, aſſured of their faith. But the crafty *Spaniard*, being truſted with this meſſage and reſtitution of the hoſtages, carried them all to the *Roman* generals: perſwading them, as he had done *Boſtar*, to make the liberality their own. Hereby the *Romans* purchaſed much love: if the tale were true; and if it were *not* rather true, as afterwards, and ere this we find, that all the *Spaniſh* hoſtages were left in new *Carthage*.

[a] Polyb. l. 3.

[b] Liv. l. 21.

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I am weary of rehearſing ſo many particularities, whereof I can believe ſo few. But ſince we find no better certainties, we muſt content our ſelves with theſe.

The year following was like unto this: *Aſdrubal* muſt be beaten again. The two *Scipio's* divide their forces: *Cn.* makes war by land; *P.* by ſea. *Aſdrubal*, with much labour and entreaty, hath gotten four thouſand foot, and five hundred horſe out of *Afric*: he repairs his fleet, and provides every way to make reſiſtance. But all his chief ſea-men, and maſters of his ſhips, revolt unto the *Romans*, becauſe they had been chidden the laſt year for their negligence, which had betrayed the navy. The revolt of theſe ſhip-maſters animates to rebellion the *Carpeſians*, or *Carpetani*, an inland-people about *Toledo*, in the very center of *Spain*. Theſe do much miſchief, ſo that *Aſdrubal* is fain to make a journey to them. His ſudden coming cuts off ſome of them that were found ſcattered abroad in the fields. But they making head, ſo valiantly aſſail him, that they drive him, for fear, to incamp himſelf ſtrongly on an high piece of ground, whence he dares not come forth to give them battel. So they take a town by force, wherein he had laid up all his proviſions; and ſhortly make themſelves maſters of the country round about. This good ſucceſs breeds negligence, for which they dearly pay. *Aſdrubal* comes upon them, takes them unprepared, beats them, kills the moſt of them, and diſperſeth the reſt, ſo that the whole nation yieldeth to him the next day. Then come directions from *Carthage*, that *Aſdrubal* ſhould lead his army forthwith into *Italy*: which we may wonder, why the *Carthaginians* would appoint him to do, if they had been informed by his letters in what hard caſe he was, and had ſo weakly ſupplied him, as is ſhewed before. But thus we find it reported; and that upon the very rumour of this his journey, almoſt all *Spain* was already to fall to the *Romans*. *Aſdrubal* therefore ſends word preſently to *Carthage*, that this muſt not be ſo: or if they will needs have it ſo, that then they muſt ſend him a ſucceſſor, and well attended with a ſtrong army, which to imploy, they ſhould find work more than enough; ſuch notable men were the *Roman* generals. But the ſenate of *Carthage* is not much moved with this excuſe: *Aſdrubal* muſt needs be gone; and *Himilco*, with ſuch forces as are thought expedient for that ſervice, both by land and ſea, is ſent to take the charge of *Spain*. Wherefore *Aſdrubal* hath now no more to do, than to furniſh himſelf with ſtore of money, that he might have wherewithal to win the friendſhip of the *Gauls*; through whoſe countries he muſt paſs, as *Hannibal* had done before him. The *Carthaginians* were greatly to blame, for not remembering to eaſe him of his care. But ſince it can be no better, he lays great impoſitions upon all the *Spaniards* his ſubjects: and having gotten together as much treaſure as he could, onward he marched toward *Iberus*. The *Scipio's* hearing theſe news, are careful how to arreſt him on the way. They beſiege *Ibera* (ſo called of the river's name running by it) the richeſt town in all thoſe quarters, that was confederate with *Aſdrubal*: who thereupon ſteps aſide to relieve it. The *Romans* meet him, and fight a battel with him: which they win the more eaſily, for that the *Spaniards*, his followers, had rather be vanquiſhed at home, than get the victory, and afterwards be haled into *Italy*. Great numbers are ſlain, and few ſhould have eſcaped, but that the *Spaniards* ran away, ere the battels were throughly joined. Their camps the *Romans* take and ſpoil: whereby (queſtionleſs) they are marvellouſly enriched; all the money that could be raked together in *Spain*, being carried along in this *Italian* expedition. This day's event joins all *Spain* to the *Romans*, if any part of the country ſtood in doubt before; and puts *Aſdrubal* ſo far from all thought of travelling into *Italy*, that it leaves him ſmall hope of keeping himſelf ſafe in *Spain*. Of theſe exploits advertiſement is ſent to *Rome*; and letters to the ſenate from *P.* and *Cn. Scipio*, whereof the contents are, [a] That they have neither money, apparel, nor bread, wherewith to ſuſtain their army and fleet; that all is wanting, ſo as unleſs they may be ſupplied from *Rome*, they can neither hold their forces together, nor tarry any longer in the province. Theſe letters come to *Rome* in an evil ſeaſon, the ſenate being ſcarcely able, after the loſs at *Cannæ*, to help it ſelf at home. Yet relief is ſent, how hardly, and how much to the commendations of that love and care, which the private citizens of *Rome* bare unto the commonwealth, ſhall be inſerted elſewhere, into the relation of things whereof the truth is leſs queſtionable. At the coming of this ſupply, the two *Scipio's* purſue *Aſdrubal*, and hunt him out of his lurking holes. What elſe can we think, that remember the laſt news of him, and how fearfully he miſtruſted his own ſafety? They find him, and *Mago*, and *Amilcar*, the ſon of *Bomilcar*, with an army of ſixty thouſand men beſieging *Illiturgi* (which the learned *Ortelius*, and others, probably conjecture to have ſtood where *Carinena* is now, in the kingdom of *Arragon*; for there was *Illiturgis*, afterwards called *Forum Julii*, quite another way) a town of the *Illergetes*, their neareſt neighbours, for having revolted unto the *Romans*. The town is greatly diſtreſſed, but moſt of all, for want of victuals. The *Romans* therefore break through between the enemy's camps, with terrible ſlaughter of all that reſiſt them; and having victualled the place, encourage the townſmen to defend their walls as ſtoutly, as they ſhould anon behold them fighting manfully with the beſiegers in their behalf. [b] So they iſſue forth, about ſixteen thouſand againſt ſixty thouſand; and, killing more of the enemies, than themſelves were in number, drove all the *Carthaginian* commanders, every one, out of his quarter; and took that day, beſides priſoners and other booty, fifty-eight enſigns. The *Carthaginian* army, being thus beaten from *Illiturgi*, fall upon *Incibili*, that ſtood a little ſouthward from the mouth of *Iberus*. The *Spaniards* are blamed, as too greedy of earning money by war, for thus re-inforcing the broken *Carthaginians*. But it may be wondered whence the *Carthaginians* had money to pay them, ſince *Aſdrubal* was lately driven to poll the country, wanting money of his own; and being beaten in this journey, had loſt his wealthy carriages, when his camp was taken after the battel by *Ibera*. Howſoever it happens, the *Carthaginians* (according to their cuſtom) are beaten again at *Incibili*, where there were of them about [c] thirteen thouſand ſlain, and above three thouſand taken, beſides forty-two enſigns, and nine elephants. After this (in a manner) all the people of *Spain* fell from them unto the *Romans*. Thus could *Fabius*, *Valerius Antias*, or ſome other hiſtorian, to whom *Livy* gave credit, conquer all *Spain* twice in one year, by winning famous victories, whereof theſe good captains, *P.* and *Cn. Scipio*, perhaps were not aware.

[a] Liv. l. 23. [b] Liv. l. 23. [c] Liv. l. 23.

The *Romans*, notwithſtanding this large acceſs of dominion, winter on their own ſide of *Iberus*. In the beginning of the next year, great armies of the *Spaniards* riſe againſt *Aſdrubal*, and are overthrown by him. *P. Scipio*, to help theſe his friends, is forced to make great haſte over the river. At *Caſtrum altum*, a place in the mid-way between *New Carthage* and *Saguntum*, famous by the death of *the great Amilcar*, *P. Scipio* encampeth; and ſtores the place with victuals, being ſtrong and defenſible; as intending to make it his ſeat for a while. But the country round about is too full of enemies: the *Carthaginian* horſe have charged the *Romans* in their march, and are gone off clear; falling alſo upon ſome ſtragglers, or ſuch as lagged behind their fellows in march, they have cut off two thouſand of them. Hereupon it is thought behoveful, to retire unto ſome place more aſſured. So *Publius* withdraws himſelf unto *Mons Victoriæ*; that riſing ſomewhat eaſtward from *Incibili*, overlooks the ſouthern out-let of *Iberus*. Thither the *Carthaginians* purſue him: his brother *Cn.* repairs unto him; and *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Geſco*, with a full army, arrives to help his companions. As they lie thus near encamped together, *P. Scipio*, with ſome light-armed, going cloſely to view the places thereabouts, is diſcovered by the enemies, who are like to take him, but that he withdraws himſelf to an high piece of ground; where they beſiege him, till his brother *Cn.* fetch him off. After this (but I know not why) *Caſtulo*, a great city of *Spain*, whence *Hannibal* had taken him a wife, joineth with the *Romans*; though being far diſtant from them, and ſeated on the head of the river *Bœtis*. Nevertheleſs, the *Carthaginians* paſs over *Iberus*, to beſiege *Illiturgi* again, wherein lodgeth a *Roman* garriſon, hoping to win it by famine. We may juſtly wonder, what ſhould move them to neglect the rebellion of *Caſtulo*, yea, and the *Roman* army lying ſo cloſe by them, and to ſeek adventures further off, in that very place wherein they had been ſo grievouſly beaten the year before. But thither they go; and thither follows them *Cn. Scipio* with one legion, who enters the town by force, breaks out upon them the next day, and in two battels kills above twelve thouſand, and takes more than a thouſand of them priſoners, with thirty-ſix enſigns. This victory (doubtleſs) is remarkable, conſidering that the greateſt *Roman* legion at this time conſiſted of no more than five thouſand men. The vanquiſhed *Carthaginians* beſiege *Bigarra*; but that ſiege is alſo raiſed by *Cn. Scipio*. Thence the *Carthaginians* remove to *Munda*, where the *Romans* are ſoon at their heels. There is a great battel fought, that laſteth four hours, wherein the *Romans* get a notable victory; and a more notable would have gotten, had not *Cn. Scipio* been wounded. Thirty-nine elephants are killed, and twelve thouſand men; three thouſand priſoners taken, and fifty-ſeven enſigns. The *Carthaginians* fly to *Auringes*, and the *Romans* purſue them. *Cn. Scipio*, in a litter, is carried into the field, and vanquiſheth the *Carthaginians* again; but kills not half ſo many of them as before; good cauſe why, for there are *fewer* of them left to fight. [a] Notwithſtanding all theſe overthrows, the *Spaniards*, a people framed even by nature to ſet war on foot, quickly fill up the broken troops of *Aſdrubal*; who having alſo hired ſome of the *Gauls*, adventures once more to try his fortune with the *Romans*. But he is beaten again, and loſeth eight thouſand of his men, beſides priſoners, elephants, enſigns, and other appurtenances. After ſo many victories, the *Romans* are even aſhamed to leave *Saguntum* enthralled unto the *Carthaginians*; ſince, in behalf of that city, they had firſt entered into this war. And well may we think it ſtrange, that they had not recovered it long before, ſince we may remember, that long before this they had won all the country once and again. But it muſt not be forgotten, that they had ere now beſieged *Saguntum*, and were fain (as appears) to go their way without it; ſo as they need not to bluſh for having ſo long forborn to do that, which ere now they had attempted, but were unable to perform. At the preſent they win *Saguntum*, and reſtore the poſſeſſion thereof unto ſuch of the poor diſperſed citizens as they can find out. They alſo waſte and deſtroy the country of the *Turdetani*, that had miniſtered unto *Hannibal* matter of quarrel againſt the *Saguntines*. This laſt action (queſtionleſs) was much to their honour, and wherein we may be aſſured, that the *Carthaginians* would have diſturbed them, if they had been able.

But overlooking now this long continuance of great victories which the *Romans* have gotten in *Spain*, other print or token of all their brave exploits we can perceive none, than this recovery of *Saguntum*, excepting the ſtopping of *Aſdrubal*'s journey; which was indeed of greateſt importance, but appertaining to their own defence. For they have landed at *Emporiæ*, an haven-town, built and peopled by a colony of the *Phoceans*, kin to the *Maſſilians*, friends to the *Romans*. They have eaſily won to their party, loſt, recovered, and loſt again, ſome petty bordering nations of the *Spaniards*, that are carried one while by perſwaſion, other whiles by force, and ſometimes by their own unſettled paſſions; and now finally, they have won a town, whereof the *Carthaginians* held entire poſſeſſion, who had rooted out the old inhabitants. Wherefore we may eaſily believe, that when they took *Saguntum* (if they took it not by ſurprize, which is to be ſuſpected, ſince in this action we find no particulars remembered, as when the ſame place was taken by *Hannibal*) they had gotten the better of their enemies in ſome notable fight. In like ſort alſo muſt we think that all thoſe battels lately remembered, after every one of which *Aſdrubal* ſet down before ſome place that had rebelled, or ſeemed ready to rebel, were proſperous unto the *Carthaginians*. For it is not the cuſtom of armies vanquiſhed, to carry the war from town to town, and beleaguer cities of their enemies; but to fortify themſelves within their own places of ſtrength, and therein to attend the levy and arrival of new ſupplies. And ſurely, if the *Romans* had been abſolute maſters of the field, when they won *Saguntum*, they would not have conſumed a whole year following, in practiſing only with the *Celtiberians*, the next adjoining people. Yet made they this, little leſs than two years before. Of theſe *Celtiberians* we hear before, that they have yielded up themſelves unto the *Romans*; for ſecurity of their faith, given hoſtages to *Scipio*; and, at his appointment made war againſt the *Carthaginians*, with their proper forces. Wherefore it is ſtrange, that they are now thus hardly wrought; and, not without expreſs condition of a great ſum, hired to ſerve in the *Roman* camp. How this may hold together, I cannot perceive; unleſs perhaps in thoſe days it were the *Roman* cuſtom, or rather the cuſtom of ſome bad author whom *Livy* follows, to call every meſſenger, or ſtraggler, that entered their camp, an hoſtage of that people from whom he came.

[a] Liv. l. 24.

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The *Celtiberians* at length, hired with great rewards, ſend an army of thirty thouſand to help the *Romans*; out of which, three hundred the fitteſt men are choſen, and carried into *Italy*, there to deal with their countrymen that follow *Hannibal* in his wars. But if any of theſe three hundred return back into *Spain*, it is to be feared, that he brings with him ſuch news of the riches and welfare of *Hannibal*'s men, that all his fellows at home are the leſs unwilling to follow *Aſdrubal*, when he ſhall next have a deſire to lead them into *Italy*. Hereof we find more than probability, when theſe mercenary *Celtiberians* meet the *Carthaginian* army in the field. The two *Scipio's*, preſuming on this acceſs of ſtrength, divide their forces, and ſeek out the enemies, who lie not far off with three armies. *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Amilcar*, is neareſt at hand: even among the *Celtiberians*, at *Anitorgis*. With him *Cn. Scipio* doubts not to take good order: but the fear is, that this one part of the *Carthaginian* forces being deſtroyed, *Mago*, and *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Geſco*, hearing the news, will make uſe of their diſtance, which is five days march, and, by running into the furtheſt parts of the country, ſave themſelves from being overtaken. *Publius* therefore muſt make the more haſte, and take with him the better ſoldiers, that is, two parts of the old *Roman* army; leaving the third part, and all the *Celtiberians*, to his brother. He that hath the longer journey to make, comes ſomewhat the ſooner to his life's end. *Mago*, and *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Geſco*, are not ſtudying how to run away: they find no ſuch neceſſity. They join their forces together; meet with *P. Scipio*; and lay at him ſo hardly, that he is driven to keep himſelf cloſe within his trenches: wherein he thinks himſelf not well aſſured. Eſpecially he is vexed by *Maſaniſſa*, prince of the *Maſſeſyli*, *Numidians* bordering upon *Mauritania*, in the region called now *Tremizen*: to whom the chief honour of this ſervice is aſcribed, for that he becomes afterwards confederate with the *Romans*. In this dangerous caſe *P. Scipio* gets intelligence, that *Indibilis*, a *Spaniſh* prince, is coming with ſeven thouſand and five hundred of the *Sueſſetani*, to join with his enemies. Fearing therefore to be ſtreight ſhut up, and beſieged, he iſſues forth by night, to meet with *Indibilis* upon the way; leaving *T. Fonteius*, his lieutenant, with a ſmall company, to defend the camp. He meets with *Indibilis*; but is not able, according to his hope, to defeat him at the firſt encounter. The fight continues ſo long, that the *Numidian* horſe appear (whom he thought to have been ignorant of his departure) and fall upon the *Romans* on all ſides: neither are the *Carthaginians* far behind; but come ſo faſt upon him in rear, that *P. Scipio*, uncertain which way to turn, yet fighting, and animating his men, where need moſt requireth, is ſtruck through with a launce, and ſlain: very few of his army eſcaping the ſame deſtiny, through benefit of the dark night. The like end hath *Cn. Scipio*, within nine and twenty days after. At his meeting with *Aſdrubal*, the *Celtiberian* mercenaries all forſake him; pretending that they had war in their own country. If *Anitorgis*, where *Aſdrubal* then lay, were, as *Ortelius* following *Beuterus* takes it, a *Celtiberian* town; this was no vain pretence, but an apparent truth. But we may juſtly believe, that they were won by *Aſdrubal*, and eaſily perſwaded to take as much money for not fighting, as they ſhould have had for hazarding their lives. *Cn. Scipio* therefore being unable to ſtay them; and no leſs unable, without their help, either to reſiſt the enemy, or to join with his brother, makes a very violent retreat; herein only differing from plain flight, that he keeps his men together. *Aſdrubal* preſſeth hard upon him: and *Mago*, with *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Geſco*, having made an end of *Publius*, haſten to diſpatch his brother after him. *Scipio* ſteals from them all, by night; but is overtaken the next day by their horſe, and arreſted, in an open place of hard ſtony ground, where grows not ſo much as a ſhrub, unfit for defence of his legions againſt ſuch enemies. Yet a little hill he finds, of eaſy aſcent on every ſide, which he takes for want of a more commodious place, and fortifies with packſaddles, and other luggage, for default of a better palliſado. Theſe weak defences the *Carthaginians* ſoon tear in ſunder: and, breaking in on all hands, leave very few of them alive; that ſaving themſelves, I know not how, within ſome woods adjoining, eſcape unto *T. Fonteius*, whom *Publius* had left in his camp, as is before ſaid. It is a terrible overthrow, they ſay, out of which no man eſcapes. Yet, how they that were thus hemmed in on every ſide, in ſo bare a ground as afforded not a ſhrub to cover them, could break out, and ſhrowd themſelves within woods adjoining, I ſhould much wonder; did not a greater miracle following call away mine attention. *T. Fonteius* is in *P. Scipio*'s camp, on the north-ſide of *Iberus*, fearful (as may be ſuppoſed) of his own life; ſince his general, with two parts of the *Roman* army, had little hope to remain long ſafe within it. Thither comes *L. Martius*, a young *Roman* gentleman, of a notable ſpirit: who having gathered together the ſcattered ſoldiers, and drawn ſome companies out of their garriſons, makes a pretty army. The ſoldiers, being to chooſe a general by moſt voices, prefer this *L. Martius* before *Fonteius*, the lieutenant; as well they may. For *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Geſco*, coming upon them; this *L. Martius* ſo encourageth his men (fondly weeping when he led them forth, upon remembrance of their more honourable generals lately ſlain) and admoniſheth them of their preſent neceſſity, that he beats the *Carthaginians* into their trenches. A notable victory pephaps he might have gotten, but that he wiſely ſounds the retreat; reſerving the fury of his ſoldiers to a greater occaſion. The *Carthaginians* are at firſt amazed, and wonder whence this new boldneſs grows, in enemies lately vanquiſhed, and now again little better than taken: but when they ſee, that the *Roman* dares not follow his advantage, they return to their former ſecurity; and, utterly deſpiſing him, ſet neither *Corps du guard*, nor ſentinel, but reſt ſecure, as if no enemy were near. *Martius* therefore animates his ſoldiers with lively words, and tells them, that there is no adventure more ſafe, than that which is furtheſt from ſuſpicion of being undertaken. They are ſoon perſwaded to follow him, in any deſperate piece of ſervice. So he leads them forth by night, and ſteals upon the camp of *Aſdrubal*: where finding no guard, but the enemies faſt aſleep, or very drowzy, he enters without reſiſtance, fires their cabbins, and gives a terrible alarm; ſo that all afrighted, the *Carthaginians* run head-long one upon another, they know not which way. All paſſages out of their camp, *Martius* hath pre-poſſeſſed, ſo that there is no way to eſcape, ſave by leaping down the rampart: which as many do as can think upon it, and run away toward the camp of *Aſdrubal*, ſon of *Amilcar*, that lay ſix miles off. But *Martius* hath way-laid them. In a valley between their two camps he hath beſtowed a *Roman* cohort, and I know not what number of horſe; ſo that into this

this ambuſh they fall every one, and are cut in pieces. But leſt perchance any ſhould have eſcaped, and give the alarm before his coming; *Martius* haſtens to be there as ſoon as they. By which diligent ſpeed, he comes early in the morning upon this further camp: which with no great difficulty he enters; and partly by force, partly by apprehenſion of danger which the enemies conceived, when they beheld the *Roman* ſhields, foul, and bloodied with their former execution, he drives head-long into flight, all that can ſave themſelves from the fury of the ſword. Thirty-ſeven thouſand of the enemies periſh in this night's work; beſides a thouſand eight hundred and thirty, that are taken priſoners. Hereunto *Valerius Antius* adds, that the camp of *Mago* was alſo taken, and ſeven thouſand ſlain: and that in another battel with *Aſdrubal*, there were ſlain ten thouſand more; beſides four thouſand three hundred and thirty taken priſoners. Such is the power of ſome hiſtorians. *Livy* therefore hath elſewhere well obſerved, that there is none ſo intemperate as *Valerius Antius*, in multiplying the numbers that have fallen in battels. That, whilſt *Martius* was making an oration to his ſoldiers, a flame of fire ſhone about his head, *Livy* reporteth as a common tale, not giving thereto any credit: and temperately concludeth, that this captain *Martius* got a great name; which he might well do, if with ſo ſmall forces, and in ſuch diſtreſs, he could clearly get off from the enemies, and give them any parting blow, though it were far leſs than that which is here ſet down.

Of theſe occurrences *L. Martius* ſent word to *Rome*, not forgetting his own good ſervice, whatſoever it was, but ſetting it out in ſuch wiſe, as the ſenate might judge him worthy to hold the place of their vicegerent in *Spain*: which the better to intimate unto them, he ſtiled himſelf propretor. The *Fathers* were no leſs moved with the tidings, than the caſe required: and therefore took ſuch careful order, for ſupplying their forces in *Spain*, that although *Hannibal* came to the gates of *Rome*, ere the companies, levied to ſerve in that province, could be ſent away; yet would they not ſtay a tide for the defence of the city it ſelf, but ſhipped them in all haſte for *Spain*. As for that title of propretor, which *Martius* had aſſumed, they thought it too great for him, and were offended at his preſumption in uſurping it: foreſeeing well, that it was a matter of ill conſequence, to have the ſoldiers abroad make choice, among themſelves, of thoſe that ſhould command armies and provinces. Therefore *C. Claudius Nero* was diſpatched away, with all convenient haſte, into *Spain*: carrying with him about ſix thouſand of the *Roman* foot, and as many of the *Latins*, with three hundred *Roman* horſe, and of the *Latins* eight hundred.

It happened well, that about theſe times, the affairs of *Rome* began to proſper in *Italy*, and afforded means of ſending abroad ſuch a ſtrong ſupply: otherwiſe, the victories of *Martius* would ill have ſerved, either to keep footing in *Spain*, or to ſtop the *Carthaginian* armies from marching towards the *Alps*. For when *Claudius*, landing with his new forces, took charge of that remainder of the army, which was under *Martius* and *Fonteius*; he found ſurer tokens of the overthrows received, than of thoſe miraculous victories, whereof *Martius* had made his vaunts unto the ſenate. The *Roman* party was forſaken by moſt of the *Spaniſh* friends: whom how to reclaim, it could not eaſily be deviſed. Yet *Claudius* advanced boldly towards *Aſdrubal*, the brother of *Hannibal*: whom he found among the *Auſetani*, near enough at hand, incamped in a place called *Lapides atri*; out of which there was no iſſue, but only through a ſtreight, whereon the *Roman* ſeized at his firſt coming. What ſhould have tempted any man of underſtanding to incamp in ſuch a place, I do not find: and as little reaſon can I find in that which followed. For it is ſaid, that *Aſdrubal*, ſeeing himſelf thus lock'd up, made offer to depart forthwith out of *Spain*, and quit the province to the *Romans*, upon condition, that he and his army might be thence diſmiſſed; that he ſpent many days in entertaining parley with *Claudius* about this buſineſs; that night by night he conveyed his foot-men (a few at a time) through very difficult paſſages, out of the danger; and that finally taking advantage of a miſty day, he ſtole away with all his horſe and elephants, leaving his camp empty. If we conſider, that there were at the ſame time, beſides this *Aſdrubal*, two other *Carthaginian* generals in *Spain*; we ſhall find no leſs cauſe to wonder at the ſimplicity of *Claudius*, who hoped to conclude a bargain for ſo great a country, with one of theſe three chieftains, than at the ſtrange nature of thoſe paſſages, through which the foot-men could hardly creep out by night, the horſe and elephants eaſily following them in a dark miſty-day. Wherefore, in giving belief to ſuch a tale, it is needful that we ſuppoſe, both the danger wherein the *Carthaginians* were, and the conditions offered for their ſafe departure, to have been of far leſs value. Howſoever it was; neither this, nor ought elſe that the *Romans* could do, ſerved to purchaſe any new friends in *Spain*; or to recover the old which they had loſt. Like enough it is, that the old ſoldiers, which had choſen *Martius* their propretor, took it not well, that the ſenate, regardleſs of their good deſerts, had repealed their election, and ſent a propretor whom they fancied not ſo well. Some ſuch occaſion may have moved them to deſire a proconſul, and (perhaps) young *Scipio* by name: as if a title of greater dignity, were needful to work regard in the *Barbarians*; and the beloved memory of *Cn.* and *Publius*, like to do good, were it revived in one of the ſame family. Whether upon theſe, or upon other reaſons; *C. Claudius* was recalled out of the province, and *Publius*, the ſon of *P. Scipio*, ſent proconſul into *Spain*.

This is that *P. Scipio*, who afterwards transferred the war into *Afric*: where he happily ended it, to the great honour and benefit of his country. He was a man of goodly preſence, and ſingularly well conditioned: eſpecially he excelled in temperance continency, bounty, and other virtues that purchaſe love; of which qualities what great uſe he made, ſhall appear in the tenor of his actions following. As for thoſe things that are reported of him, ſavouring a little too much of the great *Alexander*'s vanity; how he uſed to walk alone in the *Capitol*, as one that had ſome ſecret conference with *Jupiter*; how a dragon (which muſt have been one of the gods; and, in likelihood, *Jupiter* himſelf) was thought to have converſed with his mother, entering her chamber often, and vaniſhing away at the coming in of any man; and how of theſe matters he nouriſhed the rumour, by doubtful anſwers; I hold them no better than mere fables, deviſed by hiſtorians, who ſought thereby to add unto the glory of *Rome*: that this noble city might ſeem, not only to have ſurpaſſed other nations in virtue of the generality, but alſo in great worth of one ſingle man. To this end nothing is

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left out, that might ſerve to adorn this *Roman* champion. For it is confidently written, as a matter of unqueſtionable truth, that when a proconſul was to be choſen for *Spain*, there durſt not any captain of the principal citizens offer himſelf as petitioner, for that honourable, but dangerous charge; that the people of *Rome* were much aſtoniſhed thereat; that when the day of election came, all the princes of the city ſtood looking one another in the face, not one of them having the heart to adventure himſelf in ſuch a deſperate ſervice; and finally, that this *P. Cornelius Scipio*, being then about four and twenty years of age, getting up on an high place, where he might be ſeen of all the multitude, requeſted, and obtained, that the office might be conferred upon him. If this were true, then were all the victories of *L. Martius* no better than dreams: and either very unreaſonable was the fear of all the *Roman* captains, who durſt not follow *Claudius Nero*, that not long before was gone into *Spain* propretor; or very bad intelligence they had out of the province, which *Aſdrubal*, the *Carthaginian*, as we heard even now, was ready to abandon. But upon theſe incoherences, which I find in the too partial *Roman* hiſtorians, I do not willingly inſiſt.

P. Scipio was ſent proconſul into *Spain*; and with him was joined *M. Junius Syllanus*, as propretor, and his coadjutor. They carried with them ten thouſand foot, and a thouſand horſe, in thirty *Quinquereme* gallies. With theſe they landed at *Emporiæ*; and marched from thence to *Tarracon* along the ſea-coaſt. At the fame of *Scipio's* arrival, it is ſaid, that ambaſſages came to him apace from all quarters of the province: which he entertained with ſuch a majeſty, as bred a wonderful opinion of him. As for the enemies, they were greatly afraid of him: and ſo much the greater was their fear, by how much the leſs they could give any reaſon for it. If we muſt believe this, then muſt we needs believe, that their fear was even as great as could be: for very little cauſe there was, to be terrified with the fame of ſo young a man, which had as yet performed nothing. All the winter following (or, as ſome think, all the next year) he did nothing, but ſpent the time perhaps, as his foregoers had done, in treating with the *Spaniards*. His firſt enterpriſe was againſt *New Carthage*: upon which he came unexpected, with five and twenty thouſand foot, and two thouſand five hundred horſe, his ſea-forces coaſting him, and moderating their courſe in ſuch wiſe, that they arrived there together with him. He aſſailed the town by land and ſea; and won it by aſſault the firſt day. The *Carthaginians* loſt it, by their too much confidence upon the ſtrength of it: which cauſed them to man it more ſlenderly than was requiſite. Yet it might have been well enough defended, if ſome fiſhermen of *Tarracon* had not diſcovered unto *Scipio*, a ſecret paſſage unto the walls; whereof the townſmen themſelves were either ignorant, or thought (at leaſt) that their enemies could have no notice. This city of *New Carthage*, reſembled the old and great *Carthage* in ſituation; ſtanding upon a demy-iſland, between an haven and a great lake. All the weſtern ſide of the walls, and ſomewhat of the north, was fenced with this lake, which the fiſhermen of *Tarracon* had founded; and finding in ſome part thereof a ſhelf, whereon at low water men might paſs knee-deep, or (at moſt) wading up to the navel, *Scipio* thruſt therein ſome companies of his men; who recovered the top of the walls without reſiſtance: the place being left without guard, as able to defend it ſelf by the natural ſtrength. Theſe falling ſuddenly upon the backs of the *Carthaginians* within the city; eaſily forced a gate, and gave free entrance to the *Roman* army. What booty was found within the town, *Livy* himſelf cannot certainly affirm; but is fain to ſay, that ſome *Roman* hiſtorians told lies without meaſure, in way of amplification. By that ſmall proportion of riches, which was afterward carried by *Scipio* into the *Roman* treaſury, we may eaſily perceive how great a vanity it was to ſay, that all the wealth of *Afric* and *Spain*, was heaped up in that one town. But therein were beſtowed all the *Spaniſh* hoſtages (or at leaſt of the adjoining provinces) whom *Scipio* entreated with ſingular courteſy; reſtoring them unto their kindred and friends, in ſuch gracious manner as doubled the thanks due to ſo great a benefit. Hereupon a prince of the *Celtiberians*, and two petty kings of the *Illergetes* and *Lacetani*, neareſt neighbours to *Tarracon*, and dwelling on the north ſide of *Iberus*, forſook the *Carthaginian* party, and joined with the *Romans*. The ſpeech of *Indibilis*, king of the *Illergetes*, is much commended; for that he did not vaunt himſelf, as commonly fugitives uſe, of the pleaſure which he did unto the *Romans*, in revolting from their enemies; but rather excuſed this his changing ſide, as being thereto compelled by injuries of the *Carthaginians*; and invited by the honourable dealing of *Scipio*. This temperate eſtimation of his new profeſſed friendſhip, was indeed no unſure token, that it ſhould be long laſting. But if the *Illergetes* had long ere this (as we have heard before) forſaken the *Carthaginian* party, and ſtoutly held themſelves as friends to *Cn. Scipio*; then could nothing have been deviſed more vain, than this oration of *Indibilis* their king; excuſing, as new, his taking part with the ſame, when he ſhould have rather craved pardon for his breach of alliance, formerly contracted with the father and the uncle. Moſt likely therefore it is, that howſoever the two elder *Scipio's* had gotten ſome few places among theſe their neighbours, and held them by ſtrength; yet were the *Romans* never maſters of the country, till this worthy commander, by recovering their hoſtages from the *Carthaginians*, and by his great munificence in ſending them home, won unto himſelf the aſſured love and aſſiſtance of theſe princes. The *Carthaginian* generals, when they heard of this loſs, were very ſorry: yet nevertheleſs they ſet a good face on the matter; ſaying, that a young man having ſtol'n a town by ſurpriſe, was too far tranſported and over-joyed; but that ſhortly they would meet with him, and put him in mind of his father and uncle; which would alter his mood, and bring him to a more convenient temper.

Now if I ſhould here interpoſe mine own conjecture; I ſhould be bold to ſay, that the *Carthaginians* were at this time buſy in ſetting forth towards *Italy*; and that *Scipio*, to divert them, undertook *New Carthage*, as his father and uncle, upon the like occaſion, ſat down before *Ibera*. And in this reſpect I would ſuppoſe, that it had not been much amiſs, if the paſſage over the lake had been undiſcovered, and the town held out ſome longer while. For howſoever that particular action was the more fortunate, in coming to ſuch good iſſue upon the firſt day: yet in the generality of the buſineſs, between *Rome* and *Carthage*, it was more to be wiſhed, that *Aſdrubal* ſhould be ſtayed from going into *Italy*, than that half of *Spain* ſhould be taken from him. Whereas therefore it had nothing left to do, that ſhould hinder his journey; *Mago*, and *Aſdrubal*, the ſon

of *Geſco*, were thought ſufficient to hold *Scipio* work, in that lingering war of taking and re-taking towns, whilſt the main of the *Carthaginian* forces, under *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Amilcar*, went to a greater enterpriſe; even to fight in trial of the empire. But the *Roman* hiſtorians tell this after another faſhion; and ſay, that *Aſdrubal* was beaten into *Italy*: whither he ran for fear, as thinking himſelf ill aſſured of the *Spaniards*, as long as they might but hear the name of *Scipio*. *Scipio*, ſay they, coming upon *Aſdrubal*; his vant-coureurs charged ſo luſtily the *Carthaginian* horſe, that they drove them into their trenches: and made it apparent, even by that ſmall piece of ſervice, how full of ſpirit the *Roman* army was, and how dejected the enemy. *Aſdrubal* therefore by night retired out of that even ground, and occupied an hill, compaſſed on three ſides with a river, very ſteep of aſcent, and not eaſy of acceſs on the foreſide; by which himſelf got up, and was to be followed by the *Romans*. On the top of it there was a plain, whereon he ſtrongly incamped himſelf: and in the mid-way, between the top and root of the hill, was alſo another plain; into which he deſcended, more upon bravery, that he might not ſeem to hide himſelf within his trenches, than for that he durſt adventure his army to the hazard of a battel, for which this was no equal ground. But ſuch advantage of place could not ſave him from the *Romans*. They climbed up the hill to him; they recovered even footing with him; drove him out of this lower plain, up into his camp on the hill-top: whither although the aſcent were very difficult, and his elephants beſtowed in the ſmootheſt places to hinder their approach; yet compaſſing about, and ſeeking paſſage where it was hardeſt to be found; but much more ſtrongly breaking their way, where the *Carthaginians* had got up before them, they drove both men and elephants headlong, I know not whither: for it is ſaid, that there was no way to fly. Out of ſuch a battel, wherein he loſt eight thouſand men, *Aſdrubal* is ſaid to have eſcaped; and gathering together his diſperſed troops, to have marched towards the *Pyrenees*, having ſent away his elephants ere the fight began. Nevertheleſs *Mago*, and *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Geſco*, are reported after this, to have conſulted with him about this war; and finally to have concluded, that go he needs muſt, were it but to carry all the *Spaniards* as far as might be, from the name of *Scipio*. How likely this was to have been true, it ſhall appear at his coming into *Italy*; whence theſe incoherent relations of the *Spaniſh* affairs have too long detained us.

SECT. XII.

The great troubles that Hannibal *raiſed in all quarters, to the city of* Rome. Poſthumius, *the* Roman *general, with his whole army, is ſlain by the* Gauls. Philip, *king of* Macedon, *enters into a league with* Hannibal, *againſt the* Romans. *The* Romans *joining with the* Etolians, *make war upon* Philip *in* Greece: *and afterwards conclude a peace with him, the better to intend their buſineſs againſt the* Carthaginians.

WE left *Hannibal* wintering at *Capua*: where he and his new confederates rejoiced (as may be thought) not a little, to hear the good news from *Carthage*, of ſuch mighty aid, as was decreed to be ſent thence unto him. In former times he had found work enough, to carry the *Roman* corn into his own barns, and to drive away their cattel to *Geryon*: his victories affording him little other profit, than ſuſtenance for his army; by making him maſter of the open field. He might perhaps have forc'd ſome walled towns, in like ſort as he did *Geryon*, and the caſtle of *Cannæ*: but had he ſpent much time about the getting of any one place well defended; the hunger, that his army muſt have endured the winter and ſpring following, until corn were ripe, would have grievouſly puniſhed him for ſuch employment of the ſummer. This may have been the reaſon, why he forbore to adventure upon *Rome* after his victory at *Cannæ*. For had he failed (as it was a matter of no certainty) to carry the city at his firſt coming; want of victuals would have compelled him to quit the enterpriſe. Yea, many of the people that opened ſo haſtily their gates unto him, upon the freſh bruit of his glorious ſucceſs, would have taken time of deliberation, and waited perhaps the event of another battel: if being, either for want of means to force the city, or of neceſſaries to continue a ſiege before it, repelled (as might ſeem) from the walls of *Rome*, he had preſented himſelf unto them with a leſſened reputation, ſomewhat later in the year; when time to force their obedience was wanting, unleſs they would freely yield it. But this great part of the care and travel was paſt, when ſo many ſtates of *Italy* were become his: the year following, the *Samnites*, and other old enemies of *Rome*, were like to receive a notable pleaſure of their new alliance with *Carthage*, by helping to lay ſiege unto that proud city, which ſo long had held them in ſubjection. Thus the winter was paſſed over joyfully, ſaving that there came not any tidings of the preparations, to ſecond the welcome report of thoſe mighty forces, that were decreed and expected. The ſpring drew on: and of the promiſed ſupply, there arrived no more, than only the elephants. How late it was ere theſe came, I find not: only we find, that after this he had above thirty of them; whereas all, ſave one, that he brought over the *Alps*, had been loſt in his journey through the marſhes of *Hetruria*. Very bad excuſe of this exceeding negligence, they that brought the elephants could make unto *Hannibal*. If they were his friends, they told him truly, what miſchiefs the perſwaſion of *Hanno* wrought among the too niggardly *Carthaginians*. Otherwiſe, they might perhaps inform him, that it was thought a ſafer, though a farther way about, to paſs along through *Spain* and *Gaul*, as he himſelf had done; and increaſe the army, by hiring the *Barbarians* in the journey; than to commit the main ſtrength of their city, to the hazard of the ſeas: eſpecially wanting a commodious haven, to receive the fleet that ſhould carry ſuch a number of men, horſes, and elephants, with all needful proviſions. With theſe allegations *Hannibal* muſt reſt content; and ſeek, as well as he can, to ſatisfy his *Italian* confederates. Therefore, when time of the year ſerved, he took the field: and having finiſhed what reſted to be done at *Caſilinum*, ſought to make himſelf maſter of ſome good haven-town thereabout, that might ſerve to entertain the *Carthaginian* fleet; or take from his enemies at home all excuſe, which they might pretend by want thereof. To the ſame purpoſe, and to do what elſe was needful, he ſent *Himilco* unto the *Locrians*, and *Hanno* to the *Lucans*: not forgetting at once to aſſay all quarters of *Italy*, yea, the iſles of *Sicily* and *Sardinia*; ſince the ſiege of *Rome* muſt needs be deferred unto another year. *Hanno* made an ill journey of it, being met, or overtaken, by *T. Sempronius Longus*: who ſlew about two thouſand of his men, with the loſs of fewer than three hundred *Romans*.

mans. But *Himilco* ſped far better. By help of the *Brutians*, his good friends, he won *Petellia*, or *Petilia*, by force, after it had held out ſome months. He won likewiſe *Conſentia*, and *Croton*, that was forſaken by the inhabitants. Alſo the city of *Locri*, which was of great importance, yielded unto him; as did all other places thereabout, except only the town of *Rhegium*, over-againſt *Sicily*.

The great faith of the *Petilians* is worthy to be recorded, as a notable teſtimony of the good government under which the *Roman* ſubjects lived. As for the *Samnites*, *Campans*, and others, whoſe earneſtneſs in rebellion may ſeem to prove the contrary, we are to conſider, that they had lately contended with *Rome* for ſoveraignty, and were now tranſported with ambition; which reaſon can hardly moderate, or benefits allay. The *Petilians*, in the very beginning of their danger, did ſend to *Rome* for help, where their meſſengers received anſwer from the ſenate, that the publick misfortunes had not left means to relieve their aſſociates that were ſo far diſtant. The *Petilian* meſſengers (ambaſſadors they are termed, as were all others, publickly ſent from cittes of the *Roman* ſubjection, that had a private juriſdiction within themſelves) fell down to the ground, and humbly beſought the fathers not to give them away, promiſing to do and ſuffer whatſoever was poſſible in defence of their town againſt the *Carthaginians*. Hereupon the ſenate fell to conſultation again, and having throughly conſidered all their forces remaining, plainly confeſſed, that it was not in their power to give any relief. Wherefore theſe ambaſſadors were willed to return home, and to bid their citizens provide hereafter for their own ſafety, as having already diſcharged their faith to the utmoſt. All this notwithſtanding, the *Petilians* (as was ſaid) held out ſome months; and having ſtriven in vain to defend themſelves, when there was no apparent poſſibility, gave to the *Carthaginians* a bloody victory over them, being vanquiſhed as much by famine, as by any violence of the aſſailants.

The *Romans* at this time were indeed in ſuch ill caſe, that *Hannibal*, with a little help from *Carthage*, might have reduced them into terms of great extremity. For whereas, in a great bravery, before their loſs at *Cannæ*, they had ſhewed their high minds, by entertaining the care of things far off, notwithſtanding the great war that lay upon them ſo near at hand; it now fell out miſerably all at once, that their fortune abroad was no whit better than at home. *L. Poſthumius Albinus*, their pretor, they had ſent with an army of twenty-five thouſand into *Gaul*; to the *Illyrian* king *Pineus*, they had ſent for their tribute due, whereof the pay-day was paſt, willing him, if he deſired forbearance, to deliver hoſtages for his performance of what was due; and to *Philip*, king of *Macedon*, they had ſent to require, that he ſhould deliver up unto them *Demetrius Pharius*, their ſubject and rebel, whom he had received. But now from all quarters they hear tidings little ſuitable to their former glorious conceits. *Poſthumius*, with all his army, was cut in pieces by the *Gauls*, in ſuch ſort, that ſcarce ten men eſcaped. The manner of his overthrow was very ſtrange. There was a great wood, call'd by the *Gauls Litana*, through which he was to paſs. Againſt his coming, the enemies had ſawed the trees ſo far, that a little force would ſerve to caſt them down. When therefore *Poſthumius*, with his whole army, was entered into this dangerous paſſage, the *Gauls*, that lay about the wood, began to caſt down the trees; which falling one againſt another, bore all down ſo faſt, that the *Romans* were over-whelmed, men and horſes, in ſuch wiſe, that no more eſcaped than is ſaid before. How this tedious work of ſawing ſo many trees, could take deſired effect, and neither be perceived, nor made fruſtrate, either by ſome wind, that might have blown all down before the *Romans* entered, or by ſome other of thoſe many accidents whereto the device was ſubject, I do not well conceive. Yet ſome ſuch thing may have been done, and what failed in the ſtratagem, ſupplied with the enemy's ſword. It is not perhaps worthy to be omitted, as a monument of the ſavage condition wherewith *Lombardy*, a country now ſo civil, was infected in elder times, that of *Poſthumius*'s ſkull being cleanſed, and trimmed up with gold, a drinking cup was made, and conſecrated in their principal temple, as an holy veſſel for the uſe of the prieſt in their ſolemnities. Of this great overthrow, when word was brought to *Rome*, the amazement was no leſs than the calamity. But ſorrow could give no remedy to the miſchief; and anger was vain, where they wanted forces to revenge. Tribute from the *Illyrians* there came none, neither do I find that any was a ſecond time demanded: this we find, that with *Pleuratus* and *Scerdiletus*, *Illyrian* kings, as alſo with *Gentius*, who reigned within a few years following, the *Romans* dealt upon even terms, intreating their aſſiſtance againſt *Philip* and *Perſeus*, not commanding their duty as vaſſals. The *Macedonian* troubled them yet a little further; for having aſſured his affairs in *Greece*, and enjoying leiſure to look into the doings abroad, he ſent ambaſſadors to *Hannibal*, with whom he made a league upon theſe conditions; that the king in perſon ſhould come into *Italy*, and with all his forces by land and ſea aſſiſt the *Carthaginians* in the *Roman* war, until it were finiſhed; that *Rome* and all *Italy*, together with all the ſpoil therein to be gotten, ſhould be left entire unto the ſtate of *Carthage*; and that afterwards *Hannibal*, with his army, ſhould paſs into *Greece*, and there aſſiſt *Philip* until he had ſubdued all his enemies (which were the *Etolians*, *Thracians*, king *Antiochus*, and others) leaving probably unto him the full poſſeſſion of that country, and the iſles adjoining. But ſuch pre-diſpoſition of kingdoms and provinces, is lightly controlled by the divine providence, which therein ſhews it ſelf not (as *Herodotus* falſly terms it, and like an atheiſt) envious or malicious, but very juſt and majeſtical, in upholding that unſpeakable greatneſs of ſoveraignty, by which it rules the whole world, and all that therein is.

The firſt ambaſſadors that *Philip* ſent, fell into the *Romans* hands, in their journey towards *Hannibal*; and being examined what they were, adventured upon a bold lie, ſaying, that they were ſent from the king of *Macedon* to *Rome*, there to make a league with the ſenate and people, and offer his help in this time of great neceſſity. Theſe news were ſo welcome, that the joy thereof took away all care of making better enquiry. So they were lovingly feaſted, and friendly diſmiſſed, with guides that ſhould lead them the way, and ſhew them how to avoid the *Carthaginians*. But they being thus inſtructed concerning their journey, fell wilfully into the camp of *Hannibal*, who entertained them after a better faſhion, and concluded the buſineſs about which they came upon the points before remembered. In their return homeward, they happened again unluckily to be deſcried by the *Roman* fleet, which, miſtruſting them to be of the *Carthaginian* party, gave them chace. They did their beſt to have eſcaped, but being overtaken, they ſuffered the *Romans* to come aboard, and truſting to the lie that once had ſerved them, ſaid it again, that having been ſent from king *Philip* to make a league with the people

of

of *Rome*, they were not able, by reaſon of the *Carthaginians* lying between, to get any farther than to *M. Valerius*, the pretor, unto whom they had ſignified the good affection of the king their maſter. The tale was now leſs credible than before, and (which marred all) *Geſco*, *Boſtar*, and *Mago*, with their followers, *Carthaginians* that were ſent with them from *Hannibal* to ratify the agreement, being preſently detected, made the matter apparent. Wherefore a little inquiſition ſerved to find all out; ſo that at length *Hannibal*'s own letters to king *Philip* were delivered up, and the whole buſineſs confeſſed. The ambaſſadors and their followers were ſent cloſe priſoners to *Rome*, where the chief of them were caſt into priſon, and the reſt ſold for bond-ſlaves. Yet one of their ſhips that eſcaped, carried word into *Macedon* of all that had happened. Whereupon a new ambaſſage was ſent, that went and returned with better ſpeed; concluding as was agreed before, only with ſome loſs of time.

The *Romans* were exceedingly perplexed, thinking with what heavy weight this *Macedonian* war, in an evil hour, was likely to fall upon them, when their ſhoulders were over-burdened with the load of the *Carthaginian*. Yet they took a noble reſolution, and ſuitable unto that whereby they kept off the ſtorm, that elſe would have beaten upon them from *Spain*. They judged it more eaſy with ſmall forces to detain *Philip* in *Greece*, than with all their ſtrength to reſiſt him in *Italy*. And herein they were in the right. For that the very reputation of a king of *Macedon*, joining with *Hannibal* in ſuch a time, would have ſufficed to ſhake the allegiance not only of the *Latins*, and other their moſt faithful ſubjects, but even of the *Roman* colonies that held all privileges of the city, it will appear by the following ſucceſs of things. *M. Valerius*, the pretor, with twenty *Quinquereme* gallies, was appointed to attend upon the *Macedonian*, and to ſet on foot ſome commotion in *Greece*, or to nouriſh the troubles already therein begun. *Philip* was buſy about the ſea-towns that looked towards *Italy*, ſetting upon *Apollonia*; and thence falling upon *Oricum*, which he won, and ſo returned to *Apollonia* again. The *Epirots* craved help of *M. Valerius*, or rather accepted his kind offers, who had none other buſineſs to do. The garriſon that *Philip* had left in *Oricum*, was ſtrong enough to hold the townſmen in good order; but not to keep out the *Romans*, of whoſe daring to attempt any thing againſt him on that ſide the ſea, *Philip* as then had no ſuſpicion. *Valerius* therefore eaſily re-gained the town, and ſent thence a thouſand men, under *Nævius Criſpus*, an undertaking and expert captain, which got by night into *Apollonia*. Theſe made a notable ſally, and brake into *Philip*'s trenches with ſo great ſlaughter, that they forced him to forſake his camp, and raiſe the ſiege. The king purpoſed (as it is ſaid) to have departed thence by ſea; but *Valerius*, coming with his fleet from *Oricum*, ſtopped up the mouth of the river; ſo that he was fain to burn his ſhips (which belike were no better than long-boats) and depart ill furniſhed of carriages by land. After this, *Valerius* dealt with the *Etolians*, a nation always enemy to the crown of *Macedon*, and eaſily perſwaded them (being ſo affected, as hath elſewhere been ſhewed) to make ſtrong war on *Philip*, wherein he promiſed them great aſſiſtance from the *Romans*. That which moſt moved the troubleſome ſpirits of the *Etolians*, was the hope of getting *Acarnania*, after which they had gaped long; and whereof the *Roman* was as liberal in making promiſe, as if already it had been his own. So a league was made between them, and afterwards ſolemnly publiſhed at *Olympia* by the *Etolians*, and by the *Romans* in their capitol. The conditions were, that from *Etolia* to *Corcyra*, in which ſpace *Acarnania* was contained, all the country ſhould be ſubdued, and left unto the *Etolians*; the pillage only to be given to the *Romans*. And that if the *Etolians* made peace with *Philip*, it ſhould be with proviſion to hold no longer, than whilſt he abſtained from doing injury to the *Romans*, or their aſſociates. This was indeed the only point whereat *Valerius* aimed, who promiſed as much on the *Romans* behalf, that they ſhould not make peace with the *Macedonian*, unleſs it were with like condition of including the *Etolians*. Into this league was place reſerved for the *Lacedemonians* and *Eleans*, as to thoſe that had made or favoured the ſide of *Cleomenes* againſt the *Macedonian*, to enter at their pleaſure. The like regard was had of *Attalus*, *Pleuratus*, and *Scerdiletus*; the firſt of which reigned at *Pergamus*, in *Aſia* the leſs, a prince hereafter much to be ſpoken of; the other two held ſome part of *Illyria*, about which the *Romans* were ſo far from contending with them, that gladly they ſought to get their friendly acquaintance. But the names of theſe aſſociates are thruſt into the treaty, rather to give it countenance, than for any readineſs which they diſcloſe to enter thereinto. The *Etolians* alone, and chiefly *Scopas*, their pretor, with *Dorymachus*, and others, are yet-a-while the only men of whom the *Roman* generals muſt make much; as the late *French* king *Henry* the fourth, when he had only the title of *Navarre*, was ſaid to court the majors of *Rochelle*. *Philip* was not idle, when he heard whereunto the *Etolians* tended. He repaired his army, made a countenance of war upon the *Illyrians*, and other his borderers, that were wont in times of danger to infeſt the kingdom of *Macedon*; waſted the country about *Oricum* and *Apollonia*, and over-running the *Pelagonians*, *Dardanians*, and others, whom he held ſuſpected, came down into *Theſſaly*, whence he made ſhew as if he would invade *Ætolia*. By the fame of this expedition, he thought to ſtir up all the *Greeks* adjoining againſt the *Etolians*, whom they generally deteſted as a neſt of robbers, troubleſome to all the country. To which purpoſe, and to hinder the *Etolians* from breaking into *Greece*, he left *Perſeus*, his ſon and heir, with four thouſand men, upon their borders: with the reſt of his army, before greater buſineſs ſhould overtake and entangle him, he made a long journey into *Thrace*, againſt a people called the *Medes*, that were wont to fall upon *Macedon*, whenſoever the king was abſent. The *Etolians*, hearing of his departure, armed as many as they could againſt the *Acarnanians*, in hope to ſubdue thoſe their daily enemies, and win their little country, ere he ſhould be able to return. Hereto it much availed, that the *Romans* had already taken *Oeniadæ* and *Naxos*, *Acarnanian* towns, conveniently ſituated to let in an army, and conſigned them unto the *Etolians*, according to the tenor of the contract lately made with them. But the ſtout reſolution of the *Acarnanians*, to die (as we ſay) every mother's ſon of them, in defence of their country; together with the great haſte of the *Macedonian* (who laid aſide all other buſineſs) to ſuccour theſe his friends, cauſed the *Etolians* to forſake their enterprize. When this expedition was given over, the *Romans* and *Etolians* fell upon *Ancyræ*, which they took; the *Romans* aſſailing it by ſea, the *Etolians* by land. The *Etolians* had the town, and the *Romans* the ſpoil.

For theſe good ſervices *M. Valerius* was choſen conſul at *Rome*; and *P. Sulpicius* ſent in his ſtead, to keep the war on foot in *Greece*. But beſides the *Roman* help, *Attalus*, out of *Aſia*, came over to aſſiſt

aſſiſt the *Etolians*. He was chiefly moved, by his own jealouſy of *Philip*'s greatneſs: though ſomewhat alſo tickled with the vanity, of being choſen by the *Etolians* their principal magiſtrate; which honour, though no better than titulary, he took in very loving part. Againſt the forces which *Attalus* and the *Romans* had ſent, being joined with the main power of *Etolia*, *Philip* tried the fortune of two battels: and was victorious in each of them. Hereupon theſe his troubleſome neighbours deſired peace of him; and uſed their beſt means to get it. But when the day, appointed for the concluſion thereof, was come; their ambaſſadors, inſtead of making ſubmiſſion, propoſed unto him ſuch intolerable conditions, as ill beſeemed vanquiſhed men to offer; and might therefore well teſtify, that their minds were altered. It was not any love of peace, but fear of being beſieged in their own towns, that had made them deſirous of compoſition. This fear being taken away, by the encouragements of *Attalus* and the *Romans*, they were as fierce as ever: and thruſt a garriſon of their own, and ſome *Roman* friends, into *Elis*; which threatened *Achaia*, wherein *Philip* then lay. The *Romans*, making a cut over the ſtreight from *Naupactus*, waſted the country in a terrible bravery: wherein *Philip* requited them; coming upon them in haſte from the *Nemean* games (which he was then celebrating) and ſending them faſter away, but nothing richer than they came.

In the heat of this contention, *Pruſius*, king of *Bithynia*, fearing the growth of *Attalus*, no leſs than *Attalus* held ſuſpected the power of *Philip*; ſent a navy into *Greece*, to aſſiſt the *Macedonian* party. The like did the *Carthaginians*: and upon greater reaſon; as being more intereſted in the ſucceſs of his affairs. *Philip* was too weak by ſea: and though he could man ſome two hundred ſhips; yet the veſſels were ſuch, as could not hold out againſt the *Roman Quinqueremes*. Wherefore it behoved him, to uſe the help of his good friends the *Carthaginians*. But their aid came ſomewhat too late: which might better at firſt have kept thoſe enemies from faſtning upon any part of *Greece*; than afterwards it could ſerve to drive them out, when they had pierced into the bowels of that country. Ere *Philip* could attempt any thing by ſea; it was needful that he ſhould correct the *Eleans*, bad neighbours to the *Achaians* his principal confederates. But in aſſailing their town, he was encountred by the *Etolian* and *Roman* garriſon; which drove him back with ſome loſs. In ſuch caſes, eſpecially where God intends a great converſion of empire, fame is very powerful in working. The king had received no great detriment, in his retreat from *Elis*: rather he had given teſtimony of his perſonal valour, in fighting well on foot, when his horſe was ſlain under him. He had alſo ſoon after taken a great multitude of the *Eleans*, to the number of four thouſand; with ſome twenty thouſand head of cattel, which they had brought together into a place of ſafety, as they thought, when their country was invaded. But it had happened, that in his purſuit of the *Roman* foragers about *Sicyon*, his horſe running haſtily under a low tree, had torn off one of the horns, which (after the faſhion of thoſe times) the king wore in his creſt. This was gathered up by an *Etolian*; who carried it home, and ſhewed it as a token of *Philip*'s death. The horn was well known, and the tale believed. All *Macedon* therefore was in an uproar: and not only the borderers ready to fall upon the country, but ſome captains of *Philip* eaſily corrupted; who thinking to make themſelves a fortune in that change of things, ran into ſuch treaſon, as they might better hope to make good, than to excuſe. Hereupon the king returned home; leaving not three thouſand men to aſſiſt his friends the *Acheans*. He alſo took order, to have beacons erected, that might give him notice of the enemies doings; upon whom he meant ſhortly to return. The affairs of *Macedon*, his preſence quickly eſtabliſhed. But in *Greece* all went ill-favouredly; eſpecially in the iſle of *Eubea*, where one *Plator* betrayed to *Attalus*, and the *Romans*, the town of *Oreum*, ere *Philip* could arrive to help it; where alſo the ſtrong city of *Chalcis* was likely to have been loſt, if he had not come the ſooner. He made ſuch haſty marches, that he had almoſt taken *Attalus* in the city of *Opus*. This city, lying over-againſt *Eubea*, *Attalus* had won, more through the cowardize of the people, than any great force that he had uſed. Now becauſe the *Roman* ſoldiers had defrauded him in the ſack of *Oreum*, and taken all to themſelves: it was agreed, that *Attalus* ſhould make his beſt profit of the *Opuntians*; without admitting the *Romans* to be his ſharers. But whilſt he was buſy, in drawing as much money as he could out of the citizens: the ſudden tidings of *Philip*'s arrival, made him leave all behind him, and run away to the ſea-ſide, where he got aboard his ſhips; finding the *Romans* gone before, upon the like fear. Either the indignity of this miſadventure; or tidings of *Pruſias* the *Bithynian* his invaſion upon the kingdom of *Pergamus*; made *Attalus* return home, without ſtaying to take leave of his friends. So *Philip* recovered *Opus*; won *Torone*, *Tritonos*, *Drymus*, and many ſmall towns in thoſe parts; performing likewiſe ſome actions, of more bravery than importance, againſt the *Etolians*. In the mean ſeaſon, *Machanidas*, the tyrant of *Lacedemon*, had been buſy in *Peloponneſus*; but hearing of *Philip*'s arrival, was returned home.

The *Lacedemonians*, hearing certain report of *Cleomenes*'s death in *Egypt*, went about to chooſe two new kings; and to conform themſelves to their old manner of government. But their eſtate was ſo far out of tune, that their hope of redreſſing things within the city, proved no leſs unfortunate, than had been their attempts of recovering a large dominion abroad. *Lycurgus*, a tyrant, roſe up among them: unto whom ſucceeded this *Machanidas*; and ſhortly after came *Nabis*, that was worſe than both of them. They held on the *Etolian* and *Roman* ſide, for fear of the *Acheans*, that were the chief confederates of *Philip*, and hated extremely the name both of *Tyrant*, and of *Lacedemonian*. But of theſe we ſhall ſpeak more hereafter.

Philip entring into *Achaia*, and ſeeing his preſence had brought the contentment of aſſurance to that country, ſpake brave words to the aſſembly of their ſtates, ſaying, that he had to do with an enemy, that was very nimble, and made war by running away. He told how he had followed them to *Chalcis*, to *Oreum*, to *Opus*, and now into *Achaia*: but could no where find them; ſuch haſte they made, for fear of being overtaken. But flight, he ſaid, was not always proſperous: he ſhould one day light upon them; as ere this he ſundry times had done, and ſtill to their loſs. The *Achaians* were glad to hear theſe words; and much the more glad, in regard of his good deeds accompanying them. For he reſtored unto their nation ſome towns, that were in his hand, belonging to them of old. Likewiſe to the *Megalopolitans* their confederates, he rendred *Aliphera*. The *Dymeans*, that had been taken by the *Romans*, and ſold for ſlaves, he ſought out, ranſomed, and put in quiet poſſeſſion of their own

city. Further, paſſing over the *Corinthian* gulf, he fell upon the *Etolians:* whom he drove into the mountains and woods, or other their ſtrongeſt holds; and waſted their country. This done, he took leave of the *Acheans:* and returning home by ſea, viſited the people that were his ſubjects, or dependants; and animated them ſo well, that they reſted fearleſs of any threatening danger. Then had he leiſure to make war upon the *Dardanians*, ill neighbours to *Macedon:* with whom nevertheleſs he was not ſo far occupied, but that he could go in hand with preparing a fleet of an hundred gallies, whereby to make himſelf maſter of the ſea; the *Romans* (ſince the departure of *Attalus*) having not dared to meet or purſue him, when he lately ran along the coaſt of *Greece*, faſt by them where they lay.

This good ſucceſs added much reputation to the *Macedonian*; and emboldened him to make ſtrong war upon the *Etolians*, at their own doors. As for the *Romans*; either ſome diſpleaſure, conceived againſt their confederates, or ſome fear of danger at home, when *Aſdrubal* was ready to fall upon *Italy*, cauſed them to give over the care of things in *Greece*, and leave their friends there to their own fortunes. The *Etolians* therefore, being driven to great extremity, were fain to ſue for peace unto *Philip*, and accept it, upon whatever conditions it beſt pleaſed him. The agreement was no ſooner made, than *P. Sempronius*, with ten thouſand foot, a thouſand horſe, and thirty five gallies, came over in great haſte (though ſomewhat too late) to trouble it. Hearing how things went in *Etolia*, he turned aſide to *Dyrrachium* and *Apollonia*; making a great noiſe, as if with theſe his own forces he would work wonders. But it was not long, ere *Philip* came to viſit him; and found him tame enough. The king preſented him battel: but he refuſed it; and ſuffering the *Macedonians* to waſte the country round about, before his eyes, kept himſelf cloſe within the walls of *Apollonia*; making ſome overtures of peace: which cauſed *Philip* to return home quietly. The *Romans* had not ſo great cauſe to be diſpleaſed with the *Etolians*, as had *Philip*, to take in evil part the demeanor of the *Carthaginians*. For notwithſtanding the royal offer that he made them, to ſerve their turn in *Italy*, and aſſiſt them in getting their hearts deſire, before he would expect any requital: they had not ſent any fleet, as in reaſon they ought, and as (conſidering his want of ſufficient ability by ſea) it is likely they were bound, either to ſecure the tranſportation of his army, or to free his coaſt from the *Roman* and *Etolian* Pyracies. Only once they came to his help, which was, at his laſt journey into *Achaia*. But they were gone again before his arrival: having done nothing; and pretending fear of being taken by the *Romans*, even at ſuch time as *Philip*, with his own navy, durſt boldly paſs by ſea, and found none that durſt oppoſe him. This wretchleſs dealing of the *Carthaginians*, may therefore ſeem to have been one of *Hanno*'s tricks; whereof *Hannibal* ſo bitterly complained. For it could not but grieve this malicious man exceedingly, to hear, that ſo great a king made offer to ſerve in perſon under *Hannibal*, and required the aſſiſtance of the ſame *Hannibal*, as of a man likely to make monarchs, and alter the affairs of the world at pleaſure. Therefore he had reaſon, ſuch as envy could ſuggeſt, to perſwade the *Carthaginians* unto a ſafe and thrifty courſe: which was, not to admit into the fellowſhip of their *Italian* wars ſo mighty a prince, whom change of affection might make dangerous to their empire; or his much affection unto *Hannibal*, more dangerous to their liberty. Rather they ſhould do well to ſave charges, and feed the *Macedonian* with hopes, by making many promiſes of ſending a fleet, and ſome other ſuccours. This would coſt nothing: yet would it ſerve to terrify the *Romans*, and compel them to ſend part of their forces from home; that might find this enemy work abroad. So ſhould the *Roman* armies be leſſened in *Italy*; and *Philip*, when once he was engaged in the war, be urged unto the proſecution by his own neceſſity, putting the *Carthaginians* to little or no charges; yea, ſcarce to the labour of giving him thanks. Now if it might come to paſs, as *Hannibal* every day did promiſe, that *Rome*, and all *Italy*, ſhould within a while be at the devotion of *Carthage*; better it were that the city ſhould be free, ſo as the troubleſome *Greeks* might addreſs their complaints unto the *Carthaginians*, as competent judges between them and the *Macedonian*, than that *Hannibal*, with the power of *Afric*, ſhould wait upon *Philip*, as his executioner, to fulfill his will and pleaſure, in doing ſuch injuries, as would both make the name of a *Carthaginian* hateful in *Greece*, and oblige *Philip* to be no leſs impudent, in fulfilling all requeſts of *Hannibal*. Whether the counſel of *Hanno*, and his fellows, were ſuch as this; or whether the *Carthaginians*, of their own diſpoſition without his advice, were too ſparing, and careleſs, the matter (as far as concerned *Philip*) came to one reckoning. For they did him no manner of good: but rather dodged with him; even in their little courteſie which they moſt pretended. And this perhaps was part of the reaſon, why he began the building of an hundred gallies, as if he would let them and others know, whereto his proper ſtrength would have reached, had he not vainly given credit to faithleſs promiſes. When therefore the *Etolians* had ſubmitted themſelves already: and when the *Romans* deſired his friendſhip, as might be thought, for very fear of him; with reputation enough, and not as a forſaken client of the *Carthaginians*, but a prince able to have ſuccoured them in their neceſſity, he might give over the war, and, without reprehenſion, leave them to themſelves. For he had wilfully entered into trouble for their ſakes: but they deſpiſed him, as if the quarrel were merely his own, and he unable to manage it. The vanity of which their conceits would appear unto them, when they ſhould ſee, that with his proper ſtrength he had finiſhed the war, and concluded it highly to his honour. So the year following it was agreed, by mediation of the *Epirots*, *Acarnanians*, and others, that the *Romans* ſhould retain three or four towns of *Illyria*, which they had recovered in this war, being part of their old *Illyrian* conqueſt: places no way belonging to the *Macedonian*; and therefore perhaps inſerted into the covenants, that ſomewhat might ſeem to have been gotten. On the other ſide, the *Atintanes* were appointed to return under the obedience of *Philip:* who, if they were (as *Ortelius* probably conjectures) the people of the country about *Apollonia*, then did the *Romans* abandon part of their gettings; whereby it appears, that they did not give peace, as they would ſeem to have done, but accepted it, upon conditions ſomewhat to their loſs.

The confederates and dependants of the *Macedonian*, comprehended in this peace, were *Pruſias*, king of *Bythinia*, the *Acheans*, *Bœotians*, *Theſſalians*, *Acarnanians*, and *Epirots*. On the *Roman* ſide were named, firſt, the people of *Ilium*, as an honourable remembrance of the *Romans* deſcent from *Troy*; then, *Attalus*, king of *Pergamus*; *Pleuratus*, an *Illyrian* prince; and *Nabis*, the tyrant

rant of *Lacedemon*, together with the *Eleans*, *Meſſenians*, and *Athenians*. The *Etolians* were omitted, belike, as having agreed for themſelves before. But the *Eleans* and *Meſſenians*, followers of the *Etolians*, (and by them, as is moſt likely, compriſed in their league with *Philip*) were alſo inſerted by the *Romans*, that were never ſlow in offering their friendſhip to ſmall and feeble nations. As for the *Athenians*, they ſtood much upon their old honour; and loved to bear a part, though they did nothing in all great actions. Yet the ſetting down of their names in this treaty, ſerved the *Romans* to good purpoſe; foraſmuch as they were a buſy people, and miniſtered occaſion to renew the war, when means did better ſerve to follow it.

SECT. XIII.

How the Romans *began to recover their ſtrength by degrees. The noble affection of the* Romans, *in relieving the publick neceſſities of their commonweal.*

IT was a great fault in the *Carthaginians*, that, embracing ſo many enterprizes at once, they followed all by the halves; and waſted more men and money to no purpoſe, than would have ſerved (if good order had been taken) to finiſh the whole war in far ſhorter ſpace, and make themſelves lords of all that the *Romans* held. This error had become the leſs harmful, if their care of *Italy* had been ſuch as it ought. But they ſuffered *Hannibal* to weary himſelf with expectation of their promiſed ſupplies; which being ſtill deferred from year to year, cauſed as great opportunities to be loſt, as a conqueror could have deſired. The death of *Poſthumius*, and deſtruction of his whole army in *Gaul*; the begun rebellion of the *Sardinians*; the death of *Hiero* their friend in *Syracuſe*; with great alterations, much to their prejudice, in the whole iſle of *Sicily*; as alſo that war, of which we laſt ſpake, threatened from *Macedon*, happening all at one time, and that ſo nearly after their terrible overthrow at *Cannæ*, among ſo many revolts of their *Italian* confederates, would utterly have ſunk the *Roman* ſtate, had the *Carthaginians*, if not the firſt year, yet at the leaſt the ſecond, ſent over to *Hannibal* the forces that were decreed. It is not to be doubted, that even this diverſity of great hopes, appearing from all parts, adminiſtered matter unto *Hanno*, or ſuch as *Hanno* was, whereupon to work. For though it were in the power of *Carthage* to perform all that was decreed for *Italy*, yet could not that proportion hold, when ſo many new occurrences brought each along with them their new care, and required their ſeveral armies. This had not been a very bad excuſe, if any one of the many occaſions offered had been throughly proſecuted; though it ſtood with beſt reaſon, that the foundation of all other hopes and comforts, which was the proſperity of *Hannibal* in his *Italian* war, ſhould have been ſtrengthened, whatſoever had become of the reſt. But the ſlender troops wherewith the *Carthaginians* fed the war in *Spain*; the lingering aid which they ſent to uphold the *Sardinian* rebellion, when it was already well-near beaten down; their trifling with *Philip*; and (amongſt all theſe their attempts) their haſty catching at *Sicily*, little deſerved to be thought good reaſons of neglecting the main point, whereto all the reſt had reference. Rather every one of theſe actions, conſidered apart by it ſelf, was no otherwiſe to be allowed as diſcreetly undertaken, or ſubſtantially followed, than by making ſuppoſition, that the care of *Italy* made the *Carthaginians* more negligent in all things elſe. Yet if theſe allegations would not ſerve to content *Hannibal*, then muſt he patiently endure to know, that his own citizens were jealous of his greatneſs, and durſt not truſt him with ſo much power, as ſhould enable him to wrong the ſtate at home.

Whatſoever he heard or thought, *Hannibal* was glad to apply himſelf to neceſſity; to feed his *Italian* friends with hopes, and to trifle away the time about *Nola*, *Naples*, *Cumæ*, and other places; being loth to ſpend his army in an hard ſiege, that was to be reſerved for a work of more importance. Many offers be made upon *Nola*, but always with bad ſucceſs. Once *Marcellus* fought a battel with him there, yet under the very walls of the town, having the aſſiſtance of the citizens, that were grown better affected to the *Roman* ſide, ſince the heads that inclined them to rebellion, were cut off. About a thouſand men *Hannibal* in that fight loſt, which was no great marvel, his forces being then divided, and employed in ſundry parts of *Italy* at once. *Naples* was, even in thoſe days, a ſtrong city, and required a year's work to have taken it by force. Wherefore the earneſt deſire of *Hannibal* to get it, was always fruſtrate. Upon the town of *Cumæ* they of *Capua* had their plot, and were in hope to take it by cunning. They ſent to the chief magiſtrates of the *Cumans*, deſiring them (as being alſo *Campans*) to be preſent at a ſolemn ſacrifice of the nation, where they would conſult about their general good, promiſing to bring thither a ſufficient guard, to aſſure the whole aſſembly from any danger that might come by the *Romans*. This motion the *Cumans* made ſhew to entertain, but privily ſent word of all to *T. Sempronius Gracchus*, the *Roman* conſul.

Gracchus was a very good man of war, and happily choſen conſul in ſo dangerous a time. His colleague ſhould have been *Poſthumius Albinus*, that was lately ſlain by the *Gauls*; after whoſe death *Marcellus* was choſen, as being judged the fitteſt man to encounter with *Hannibal*. But the *Roman Augures* either found ſome religious impediment that nullified the election of *Marcellus*, or at leaſt they fained ſo to have done, becauſe this was the firſt time that ever two *Plebeian* conſuls were choſen together. *Marcellus* therefore gave over the place, and *Q. Fabius Maximus*, the late famous dictator, was ſubſtituted in his room. But *Fabius* was detained in the city about matters of religion, or ſuperſtition, wherewith *Rome* was commonly, eſpecially in times of danger, very much troubled. So *Gracchus* alone, with a conſular army, waited upon *Hannibal* among the *Campans*, not able to meet the enemy in field; yet intentive to all occaſions that ſhould be preſented. The *Volones*, or ſlaves, that lately had been armed, were no ſmall part of his followers. Theſe, and the reſt of his men, he continually trained; and had not a greater care to make his army ſkilful in the exerciſes of war, than to keep it from quarrels, that might ariſe by their upbraiding one another with their baſe conditions.

Whilſt the conſul was thus buſied at *Linternum*, the ſenators of *Cumæ* ſent him word of all that had paſſed between them and the *Capuans*. It was a good occaſion to fleſh his men, and make them confident againſt the enemy, of whom hitherto they had bad experience. *Gracchus* therefore put himſelf into *Cumæ*, whence he iſſued at ſuch time as the magiſtrates of that city were expected by the *Campans*. The ſacrifice was to be performed by night, at a place called *Hamæ*, three miles from *Cumæ*. There lay *Marius Alfius*, the chief magiſtrate of *Capua*, with fourteen thouſand men, not wholly intent either to the ſacrifice, or to any danger that might interrupt it; but rather deviſing how

to

to ſurprize others, than fearing himſelf to be aſſailed. The conſul therefore ſuffering none to go forth of *Cumæ*, that might bear word of him to the enemies, iſſued out of the town when it grew dark, his men being well refreſhed with meat and ſleep the day before, that they might hold out the better in this night's ſervice. So he came upon the *Capuans* unawares, and ſlew more than two thouſand of them, together with their commander, loſing not above an hundred of his own men. Their camp he took, but tarried not long to rifle it, for fear of *Hannibal*, who lay not far off. By this his providence, he eſcaped a greater loſs than he had brought upon the enemies. For when *Hannibal* was informed how things went at *Hamæ*, forthwith he marched thither, hoping to find thoſe young ſoldiers and ſlaves buſied in making ſpoil, and loading themſelves with the booty. But they were all gotten ſafe within *Cumæ*, which, partly for anger, partly for deſire of gaining it, and partly at the urgent entreaty of the *Capuans*, *Hannibal* aſſailed the next day. Much labour, and with ill ſucceſs, the *Carthaginians* and their fellows ſpent about this town. They raiſed a wooden tower againſt it, which they brought cloſe unto the walls, thinking thereby to force an entry. But the defendants on the inſide of the wall, raiſed againſt this an high tower, whence they made reſiſtance, and found means at length to conſume with fire the work of their enemies. While the *Carthaginians* were buſy in quenching the fire, the *Romans*, ſallying out of the town at two gates, charged them valiantly, and drove them to their trenches, with the ſlaughter of about fourteen hundred. The conſul wiſely ſounded the retreat, ere his men were too far engaged, and *Hannibal* in a readineſs to requite their ſervice. Neither would he, in the pride of this good ſucceſs, adventure forth againſt the enemy, who preſented him battel the day following, near unto the walls. *Hannibal* therefore, ſeeing no likelihood to prevail in that which he had taken in hand, broke up the ſiege, and returned to his old camp at *Tifata*. About theſe times, and ſhortly after, when *Fabius* the other conſul had taken the field, ſome ſmall towns were recovered by the *Romans*, and the people ſeverely puniſhed for their revolt.

The *Carthaginian* army was too ſmall to fill with garriſons all places that had yielded, and withal to abide (as it muſt do) ſtrong in the field. Wherefore *Hannibal*, attending the ſupply from home, that ſhould enable him to ſtrike at *Rome* it ſelf, was driven in the mean time to alter his courſe of war; and, inſtead of making (as formerly he had done) a general invaſion upon the whole country, to paſs from place to place, and wait upon occaſions, that grew daily more commodious to the enemy than to him. The country of the *Hirpines* and *Samnites* was grievouſly waſted by *Marcellus*, in the abſence of *Hannibal*; as alſo was *Campania*, by *Fabius* the conſul, when *Hannibal*, having followed *Marcellus* to *Nola*, and received there the loſs before-mentioned, was gone to winter in *Apulia*. Theſe people ſhewed not the like ſpirit in defending their lands, and fighting for the *Carthaginian* empire, as in former times they had done, when they contended with the *Romans* in their own behalf to get the ſoveraignty. They held it reaſon, that they ſhould be protected by ſuch as thought to have dominion over them, whereby at once they over-burdened their new lords, and gave unto their old the more eaſy means to take revenge of their defection.

The people of *Rome* were very intentive, as neceſſity conſtrained them, to the work that they had in hand. They continued *Fabius* in his conſulſhip, and joined with him *Marcus Claudius Marcellus*, whom they had appointed unto that honour the year before. Of theſe two, *Fabius* was called the *ſhield*, and *Marcellus*, the *Roman ſword*. In *Fabius* it was highly, and upon juſt reaſon, commended, that being himſelf conſul, and holding the election, he did not ſtand upon nice points of formality, or regard what men might think of his ambition, but cauſed himſelf to be choſen with *Marcellus*, knowing in what need the city ſtood of able commanders. The great name of theſe conſuls, and the great preparations which the *Romans* made, ſerved to put the *Campans* in fear that *Capua* it ſelf ſhould be beſieged. To prevent this, *Hannibal*, at their earneſt entreaty, came from *Arpi* (where he lay hearkening after news from *Tarentum*) and, having with his preſence comforted theſe his friends, fell on the ſudden upon *Puteoli*, a ſea-town of *Campania*, about which he ſpent three days in vain, hoping to have won it. The garriſon in *Puteoli* was ſix thouſand ſtrong, and did their duty ſo well, that the *Carthaginian*, finding no hope of good ſucceſs, could only ſhew his anger upon the fields there, and about *Naples*; which having done, and once more (with as ill ſucceſs as before) aſſayed *Nola*, he bent his courſe to *Tarentum*, wherein he had very great intelligence. Whilſt he was in his progreſs thither, *Hanno* made a journey againſt *Beneventum*; and *T. Gracchus*, the laſt year's conſul, haſting from *Nuceria*, met him there, and fought with him a battel: *Hanno* had with him about ſeventeen thouſand foot, *Brutians* and *Lucans* for the moſt part, beſides twelve hundred horſe, very few of which were *Italians*, all the reſt *Numidians* and *Moors*. He held the *Roman* work four hours, ere it could be perceived to which ſide the victory would incline. But *Gracchus*'s ſoldiers, which were all (in a manner) the late armed ſlaves, had received from their general a peremptory denuntiation, that this day, or never, they muſt purchaſe their liberty, bringing every man, for price thereof, an enemy's head. The ſweet reward of liberty was ſo greatly deſired, that none of them feared any danger in earning it; howbeit that vain labour, impoſed by their general, of cutting off the ſlain enemy's heads, troubled them exceedingly, and hindered the ſervice, by employing of ſo many hands, in a work ſo little concerning the victory. *Gracchus* therefore finding his own error, wiſely corrected it, proclaiming aloud, that they ſhould caſt away the heads, and ſpare the trouble of cutting off any more; for that all ſhould have liberty immediately after the battel, if they won the day. This encouragement made them run headlong upon the enemy, whom their deſperate fury had ſoon overthrown, if the *Roman* horſe could have made their part good againſt the *Numidian*. But though *Hanno* did what he could, and preſſed ſo hard upon the *Romans* battel, that four thouſand of the ſlaves (for fear either of him, or of the puniſhment which *Gracchus* had threatened before the battel, unto thoſe that ſhould not valiantly behave themſelves) retired unto a ground of ſtrength; yet was he glad at length to ſave himſelf by flight, when the groſs of his army was broken, being unable to remedy the loſs. Leaving the field, he was accompanied by no more than two thouſand, moſt of which were horſe, all the reſt were either ſlain or taken. The *Roman* general gave unto all his ſoldiers that reward of liberty which he had promiſed; but unto thoſe four thouſand which had recoiled unto the hill, he added this light puniſhment, that as long as they ſerved in the wars, they ſhould neither eat nor drink otherwiſe than ſtanding, unleſs ſickneſs forced them to break his order. So the victorious army returned to *Beneventum*,

tum: where the newly enfranchiſed ſoldiers were feaſted in publick by the townſmen; ſome ſitting, ſome ſtanding, and all of them having their heads covered (as was the cuſtom of ſlaves manumiſed) with caps of white wool. The picture of this feaſt (as a thing worthy of remembrance) was afterwards hung up in a table by *Gracchus*, in the temple of *Liberty*; which his father had built and dedicated. This was indeed the firſt battel, worthy of great note, which the *Carthaginians* had loſt ſince the coming of *Hannibal* into *Italy:* the victories of *Marcellus* at *Nola*, and of this *Gracchus* before at *Hamæ*, being things of ſmall importance.

Thus the *Romans* through induſtry, by little and little, repaired that great breach in their eſtate, which *Hannibal* had made at *Cannæ*. But all this while, and long after this, their treaſury was ſo poor, that no induſtry nor art could ſerve to help it. The fruits of their grounds did only (and perhaps hardly) ſerve, to feed their towns and armies, without any ſurpluſage, that might be exchanged for other needful commodities. Few they were in *Italy*, that continued to pay them tribute: which alſo they could worſe do than before; as living upon the ſame trade, and ſubject to the ſame inconveniencies, which enfeebled *Rome* it ſelf. *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, that were wont to yield great profit, hardly now maintained the *Roman* armies that lay in thoſe provinces, to hold them ſafe and in good order. As for the citizens of *Rome*, every one of them ſuffered his part of the detriment, which the commonwealth ſuſtained, and could now do leaſt for his country, when moſt need was: as alſo the number of them was much decreaſed: ſo as if money ſhould be raiſed upon them by the *Poll*, yet muſt it be far leſs than in former times. The ſenate therefore, diligently conſidering the greatneſs of the war within the bowels of *Italy*, that could not be thence expelled without the exceeding charge of many good armies; the peril, wherein *Sicily* and *Sardinia* ſtood, both of the *Carthaginians*, and of many among the naturals declining from the friendſhip or ſubjection of *Rome*; the threats of the *Macedonian*, ready to land in the eaſtern parts of *Italy*, if they were not at the coſt to find him work at home; the greater threats of *Aſdrubal*, to follow his brother over the *Alps*, as ſoon as he could rid himſelf of the *Scipio's* in *Spain*; and the poverty of the common-wealth, which had not money for any one of theſe mortal dangers, were driven almoſt even to extreme want of counſel. But being urged by the violence of ſwift neceſſity, ſignified in the letters of the two *Scipio's* from *Spain*; they reſolved upon the only courſe, without which the city could not have ſubſiſted.

They called the people to aſſembly: wherein *Q. Fulvius*, the pretor, laid open the publick wants, and plainly ſaid, that in this exigent, there muſt be no taking of money for victuals, weapons, apparel, or the like things needful to the ſoldiers: but that ſuch as had ſtuff, or were artificers, muſt truſt the commonwealth with the loan of their commodities, and labours, until the war were ended. Hereunto he ſo effectually exhorted all men, eſpecially the publicans or cuſtomers, and thoſe which in former times had lived upon their dealing in the common revenues, that the charge was undertaken by private men; and the army in *Spain* as well ſupplied, as if the treaſury had been full. Shortly after this, *M. Atilius Regulus*, and *P. Furius Philus*, the *Roman* cenſors, taking in hand the redreſs of diſorders within the city, were chiefly intentive to the correction of thoſe that had miſbehaved themſelves in this preſent war. They began with *L. Cecilius Metellus:* who, after the battel at *Cannæ*, had held diſcourſe with ſome of his companions, about flying beyond the ſeas; as if *Rome*, and all *Italy*, had been no better than loſt. After him they took in hand thoſe, that having brought to *Rome* the meſſage of their fellows made priſoners at *Cannæ*, returned not back to *Hannibal*, as they were bound by oath; but thought themſelves thereof ſufficiently diſcharged, in that they had ſtepped once back into his camp; with pretence of taking better notice of the captives names. All theſe were now pronounced infamous by the cenſors: as alſo were a great many more; even whoſoever had not ſerved in the wars, after the term which the laws appointed. Neither was the note of the cenſors at this time (as otherwiſe it uſed to be) hurtful only in reputation: but greater weight was added thereunto by this decree of the ſenate following; *That all ſuch as were noted with infamy by theſe cenſors, ſhould be tranſported into* Sicily, *there to ſerve until the end of the war, under the ſame hard conditions that were impoſed upon the remainder of the army beaten at* Cannæ. The office of the cenſors was, to take the liſt and account of the citizens; to chooſe or diſplace the ſenators; and to ſet notes of diſgrace (without further puniſhment) upon thoſe, whoſe unhoneſt or unſeemly behaviour fell not within the compaſs of the law. They took alſo an account of the *Roman* gentlemen: among whom they diſtributed the publick horſes of ſervice, unto ſuch as they thought meet; or took them away for their miſbehaviour. Generally, they had the overſight of men's lives and manners: and their cenſure was much reverenced and feared; though it extended no further, than to putting men out of rank; or making them change their tribe; or (which was the moſt that they could do) cauſing them to pay ſome duties to the treaſury, for which others were exempted. But beſides the care of this general tax, and matters of morality, they had the charge of all publick works; as mending of high-ways, bridges, water-courſes; the reparations of temples, porches, and ſuch other buildings. If any man encroached upon the ſtreets, high-ways, or other places that ought to be common; the cenſors compelled him to make amends. They had alſo the letting out of lands, cuſtoms, and other publick revenues, to farm: ſo that moſt of the citizens of *Rome* were beholden unto this office, as maintaining themſelves by ſome of the trades thereto belonging. And this was no ſmall help to conſerve the dignity of the ſenate: the commonalty being obnoxious unto the cenſors; which were always of that order, and careful to uphold the reputation thereof. But the common-weal being now impoveriſhed by war, and having ſmall ſtore of lands to let, or of cuſtoms that were worth the farming; *Regulus* and *Philus* troubled not themſelves much with peruſing the temples, or other decayed places, that needed reparations: or if they took a view of what was requiſite to be done in this kind; yet forbore they to ſet any thing in hand, becauſe they had not wherewith to pay. Herein again appeared a notable generoſity of the *Romans*. They that had been accuſtomed, in more happy times, to undertake ſuch pieces of work, offered now themſelves as willingly to the cenſors, as if there had been no ſuch want: promiſing liberally their coſt and travel, without expectation of any payment, before the end of the war. In like ſort, the maſters of thoſe ſlaves, that lately had been enfranchiſed by *Gracchus*, were very well contented to forbear the price of them, until the city were in better caſe to pay. In this general inclination of the multitude,

to relieve, as far forth as every one was able, the common neceſſity; all the goods of orphans, and of widows living under patronage, were brought into the treaſury; and there the queſtor kept a book of all that was laid out for the ſuſtenance of theſe widows and orphans: whilſt the whole ſtock was uſed by the city. This good example of thoſe which remained in the town, prevailed with the ſoldiers abroad: ſo that (the poorer ſort excepted) they refuſed to take pay; and called thoſe mercenaries, that did accept it when their country was in ſo great want.

The twelve hundred talents, wrongfully extorted from the *Carthaginians*; nor any injuries following, done by the *Romans* in the height of their pride; yielded half ſo much commodity, as might be laid in ballance againſt theſe miſeries, whereunto their eſtate was now reduced. Nevertheleſs, if we conſider things aright, the calamities of this war did rather enable *Rome* to deal with thoſe enemies, whom ſhe forthwith undertook, than abate or ſlacken the growth of that large dominion, whereto ſhe attained, ere the youngeſt of thoſe men was dead, whoſe names we have already mentioned. For by this hammering, the *Roman* metal grew the more hard and ſolid; and by paring the branches of private fortunes, the root and heart of the commonwealth was corroborated. So grew the city of *Athens*, when *Xerxes* had burnt the town to aſhes, and taken from every particular citizen all hope of other felicity, than that which reſted in the common happineſs of the univerſality. Certain it is (as Sir *Francis Bacon* hath judiciouſly obſerved) that a ſtate, whoſe dimenſion or ſtem is ſmall, may aptly ſerve to be a foundation of a great monarchy: which chiefly comes to paſs, where all regard of domeſtical proſperity is laid aſide; and every man's care addreſſed to the benefit of his country. Hereof I might ſay that our age hath ſeen a great example, in the united provinces in the *Netherlands*; whoſe preſent riches and ſtrength, grew chiefly from that ill aſſurance, which each of their towns, or almoſt of their families, perceived it ſelf to hold, whilſt the generality was oppreſſed by the duke of *Alva*; were it ſo, that the people had thereby grown as warlike, as by extreme induſtry, and ſtraining themſelves to fill their publick treaſury, they are all grown wealthy, ſtrong at ſea, and able to wage great armies for their ſervices by land. Wherefore, if we value at ſuch a rate as we ought, the patient reſolution, conformity to good order, obedience to magiſtrates, with many other virtues, and, above all other, the great love of the common-weal, which was found in *Rome* in theſe dangerous times; we may truly ſay, that the city was never in greater likelihood to proſper. Neither can it be deemed otherwiſe, than that if the ſame affection of the people had laſted, when their empire, being grown more large and beautiful, ſhould in all reaſon have been more dear unto them, if the riches and delicacies of *Aſia* had not infected them with ſenſuality, and carried their appetites mainly to thoſe pleaſures, wherein they thought their well-being to conſiſt; if all the citizens, and ſubjects of *Rome*, could have believed their own intereſt to be as great, in thoſe wars which their late emperors made for their defence, as in theſe which were managed by the conſuls: the empire, founded upon ſo great virtue, could not have been thrown down by the hands of rude *Barbarians*, were they never ſo many. But unto all dominions God hath ſet their periods: who, though he hath given unto man the knowledge of thoſe ways, by which kingdoms riſe and fall; yet hath left him ſubject unto the affections, which draw on theſe fatal changes, in their times appointed.

SECT. XIV.

The Romans *win ſome towns back from* Hannibal. Hannibal *wins* Tarentum. *The ſiege of* Capua. *Two victories of* Hannibal. *The journey of* Hannibal *to the gates of* Rome. Capua *taken by the* Romans.

AS the people of *Rome* ſtrained themſelves to the utmoſt, for maintaining the war: ſo their generals abroad omitted no part of induſtry, in ſeeking to recover what had been loſt. The town of *Caſiline Fabius* beſieged. It was well defended by the *Carthaginian* garriſon; and likely to have been relieved by thoſe of *Capua*, if *Marcellus* from *Nola* had not come to the aſſiſtance of his colleague. Nevertheleſs the place held out ſo obſtinately, that *Fabius* was purpoſed to give it over: ſaying, that the enterpriſe was not great; yet as difficult, as a thing of more importance. But *Marcellus* was of a contrary opinion. He ſaid, that many ſuch things, as were not at firſt to have been undertaken by great commanders, ought yet, when once they were taken in hand, to be proſecuted unto the beſt effect. So the ſiege held on: and the town was preſſed ſo hard, that the *Campans* dwelling therein grew fearful, and craved parley; offering to give it up, ſo as all might have leave to depart in ſafety, whither they pleaſed. Whilſt they were thus treating of conditions: or whilſt they were iſſuing forth, according to the compoſition already made (for it is diverſly reported) *Marcellus*, ſeizing upon a gate, entred with his army, and put all to the ſword that came in their way. Fifty of thoſe that were firſt gotten out, ran to *Fabius* the conſul: who ſaved them, and ſent them to *Capua* in ſafety; all the reſt were either ſlain, or made priſoners. If *Fabius* deſerved commendations, by holding his word good unto theſe fifty; I know not how the ſlaughter of the reſt, or impriſonment afterward of ſuch, as eſcaped the heat of execution, could be excuſed by *Marcellus*. It may be that he helped himſelf, after the *Roman* faſhion, with ſome equivocation, but he ſhall pay for it hereafter. In like ſort was *Mount Marſan*, in *Gaſcoigne*, taken by the marſhal *Monluc*, when I was a young man in *France*. For whilſt he entertained parley about compoſition, the beſieged ran all from their ſeveral guards, upon haſty deſire of being acquainted with the conditions propoſed. The marſhal therefore diſcovering a part of the walls ungarded, entred by *Scalado*, and put all, ſave the governor, unto the ſword. Herein that governor of *Mount Marſan* committed two groſs errors; the one, in that he gave no order for the captains and companies, to hold themſelves in their places; the other, in that he was content to parley, without pledges for aſſurance given and received. Some ſuch over-ſight the governor of *Caſiline* ſeemeth to have committed: yet neither the advantage taken by *Marcellus*, or by *Monluc*, was very honourable. When this work was ended, many ſmall towns of the *Samnites*, and ſome of the *Lucans* and *Apulians*, were recovered: wherein were taken, or ſlain, about five and twenty thouſand of the enemies; and the country grievouſly waſted by *Fabius*, *Marcellus* lying ſick at *Nola*.

Hannibal in the mean while was about *Tarentum*, waiting to hear from thoſe, that had promiſed to give up the town. But *M. Valerius*, the *Roman* propretor,

propretor, had thruſt ſo many men into it, that the traitors durſt not ſtir. Wherefore the *Carthaginian* was fain to depart, having wearied himſelf in vain with expectation. Yet he waſted not the country; but contented himſelf with hope, that they would pleaſe him better in time following. So he departed thence toward *Salapia:* which he choſe for his wintering place; and began to victual it, when ſummer was but half paſt. It is ſaid, that he was in love with a young wench in that town: in which regard if he began his winter more timely, than otherwiſe need required, he did not like the *Romans*; whom neceſſity enforced, to make their ſummer laſt as long, as they were able to travel up and down the country.

About this time began great troubles in *Sicily*, whither *Marcellus* the conſul was ſent, to take ſuch order for the province, as need ſhould require. Of the doings there, which wore out more time than his conſulſhip, we will ſpeak hereafter.

The new conſuls, choſen at *Rome*, were *Q. Fabius*, the ſon of the preſent conſul, and *T. Sempronius Gracchus* the ſecond time. The *Romans* found it needful for the publick ſervice, to imploy oftentimes their beſt able men: and therefore made it lawful, during the war, to recontinue their officers, and chooſe ſuch, as had lately held their places before; without regarding any diſtance of time, which was otherwiſe required. The old *Fabius* became lieutenant unto his ſon: which was perhaps the reſpect, that moſt commended his ſon unto the place. It is noted, that when the old man came into the camp, and his ſon rode forth to meet him: eleven of the twelve lictors, which carried each an axe, with a bundle of rods before the conſul, ſuffered him, in regard of due reverence, to paſs by them on horſeback; which was againſt the cuſtom. But the ſon perceiving this, commanded the laſt of his lictors to note it: who thereupon bade the old *Fabius* alight, and come to the conſul on his feet. The father chearfully did ſo, ſaying, *It was my mind, ſon, to make trial, whether thou didſt underſtand thy ſelf to be conſul. Caſſius Altinius*, a wealthy citizen of *Arpi*, who, after the battel at *Cannæ*, had holpen the *Carthaginian* into that town, ſeeing now the fortune of the *Romans* to amend; came privily to this conſul *Fabius*, and offered to render it back unto him, if he might be therefore well rewarded. The conſul purpoſed to follow old examples: and to make this *Altinius* a pattern to all traitors; uſing him, as *Camillus* and *Fabricius* had done thoſe, that offered their unfaithful ſervice againſt the *Faliſci*, and king *Pyrrhus*. But *Q. Fabius*, the father, was of another opinion: and ſaid, it was a matter of dangerous conſequence, that it ſhould be thought more ſafe to revolt from the *Romans*, than to turn unto them. Wherefore it was concluded, that he ſhould be ſent to the town of *Cales*, and there kept as priſoner, until they could better reſolve what to do with him, or what uſe to make of him. *Hannibal*, underſtanding that *Altinius* was gone, and among the *Romans*, took it not ſorrowfully; but thought this a good occaſion, to ſeize upon all the man's riches, which were great. Yet, that he might ſeem rather ſevere, than covetous, he ſent for the wife and children of *Altinius* into his camp: where having examined them by torment, partly concerning the departure and intention of this fugitive; partly, and more ſtrictly, about his riches, what they were, and where they lay; he condemned them, as partakers of the treaſon, to be burnt alive; and took all their goods unto himſelf. *Fabius*, the conſul, ſhortly after came to *Arpi*; which he won by *Scalado*, in a ſtormy and rainy night. Five thouſand of *Hannibal*'s ſoldiers lay in the town; and of the *Arpines* themſelves, there were about three thouſand. Theſe were thruſt foremoſt by the *Carthaginian* garriſon, when it was underſtood, that the *Romans* had gotten over the wall, and broken open the gate. For the ſoldiers held the townſmen ſuſpected; and therefore thought it no wiſdom, to truſt them at their backs. But after ſome little reſiſtance, the *Arpines* gave over fight, and entertained parley with the *Romans:* proteſting, that they had been betrayed by their princes; and were become ſubject to the *Carthaginians*, againſt their wills. In proceſs of this diſcourſe, the *Arpine* pretor went unto the *Roman* conſul: and receiving his faith for the ſecurity of the town, preſently made head againſt the garriſon. This notwithſtanding, like it is, that *Hannibal*'s men continued to make good reſiſtance. For when almoſt a thouſand of them, that were *Spaniards*, offered to leave their companions, and ſerve on the *Roman* ſide, it was yet covenanted, that the *Carthaginians* ſhould be ſuffered to paſs forth quietly, and return to *Hannibal*. This was performed: and ſo *Arpi* became *Roman* again, with little other loſs, than of him that had betrayed it. About the ſame time, *Cliternum* was taken by *Sempronius Tuditanus*, one of the pretors: and unto *Cneius Fulvius*, another of the pretors, an hundred and twelve gentlemen of *Capua* offered their ſervice; upon no other condition, than to have their goods reſtored unto them, when their city ſhould be recovered by the *Romans*. This was a thing of ſmall importance: but, conſidering the general hatred of the *Campans* toward *Rome*, it ſerved to diſcover the inclination of the *Italians* in thoſe times; and how their affections recoiled from *Hannibal*, when there was no appearance of thoſe mighty ſuccours, that had been promiſed from *Carthage*. The *Conſentines* alſo, and the *Thurines*, people of the *Brutians*, that had yielded themſelves to *Hannibal*, returned again to their old allegiance. Others would have followed their example, but that one *L. Pomponius*, who of a *Publican* had made himſelf a captain, and gotten reputation by petty exploits in foraging the country, was ſlain by *Hanno*, with a great multitude of thoſe that followed him. *Hannibal* in the mean while had all his care bent upon *Tarentum*; which if he could take, it ſeemed that it would ſtand him in good ſtead, for drawing over that help out of *Macedon*, which his *Carthaginians* failed to ſend. Long he waited, ere he could bring his deſire to paſs: and being loth to hazard his forces, where he hoped to prevail by intelligence, he contented himſelf, with taking in ſome poor towns of the *Salentines*. At length, his agents within *Tarentum* found means to accompliſh their purpoſe, and his wiſh. One *Phileas*, that was of their conſpiracy, who lay at *Rome*, as ambaſſador, practiſing with the hoſtages of the *Tarentines*, and ſuch as had the keeping of them, conveyed them by night out of the city. But he and his company were the next day ſo cloſely purſued, that all of them were taken, and brought back to *Rome*; where they ſuffered death, as traitors. By reaſon of this cruelty, or ſeverity, the people of *Tarentum* grew to hate the *Romans*, more generally and earneſtly than before. As for the conſpirators, they followed their buſineſs the more diligently; as knowing what reward they were to expect, if their intention ſhould happen to be diſcovered. Wherefore they ſent again to *Hannibal:* and acquainting him with the manner of their plot, made the ſame compoſition with him for the *Tarentines*, which they

they of *Capua* had made before. *Nico* and *Philomenes*, two the chief among them, uſed much to go forth of the town on hunting by night, as if they durſt not take their pleaſure by day, for fear of the *Carthaginians*. Seldom or never they miſſed of their game: for the *Carthaginians* prepared it ready for their hands, that they might not ſeem to have been abroad upon other occaſion. From the camp of *Hannibal*, it was about three days journey to *Tarentum*, if he ſhould have marched thither with his whole army. This cauſed his long abode in one place the leſs to be ſuſpected: as alſo, to make his enemies the more ſecure, he cauſed it to be given out, that he was ſick. But when the *Romans* within *Tarentum* were grown careleſs of ſuch his neighbourhood, and the conſpirators had ſet their buſineſs in order, he took with him ten thouſand the moſt expedite of his horſe and foot, and long before break of day, made all ſpeed thitherward. Fourſcore light horſe of the *Numidians* ran a great way before him, beating all the ways, and killing any that they met, for fear leſt he, and his troop following him, would be diſcovered. It had been often the manner of ſome few *Numidian* horſe, to do the like in former times. Wherefore the *Roman* governour, when he heard tell in the evening, that ſome *Numidians* were abroad in the fields, took it for a ſign, that *Hannibal* was not as yet diſlodged; and gave order, that ſome companies ſhould be ſent out the next morning, to ſtrip them of their booty, and ſend them gone. But when it grew dark night, *Hannibal*, guided by *Philomenes*, came cloſe to the town: where, according to the tokens agreed upon, making a light to ſhew his arrival; *Nico*, that was within the town, anſwered him with another light, in ſign that he was ready. Preſently *Nico* began to ſet upon one of the gates, and to kill the watchmen. *Philomenes* went toward another gate: and whiſtling (as was his manner) called up the porter; bidding him make haſte, for that he had killed a great boar, ſo heavy, that ſcarce two men could ſtand under it. So the porter opened the wicket; and forthwith entered two young men, loaden with the boar; which *Hannibal* had prepared large enough, to be worthy the looking on. While the porter ſtood wondring at the largeneſs of the beaſt, *Philomenes* ran him through with his boar-ſpear: and letting in ſome thirty armed men, fell upon all the watch; whom when he had ſlain, he opened the great gate. So the army of *Hannibal*, entring *Tarentum* at two gates, went directly toward the market-place; where both parts met. Thence they were diſtributed by their general, and ſent into all quarters of the city, with *Tarentines* to be their guides. They were commanded to kill all the *Romans*; not to hurt the citizens. For better performance hereof, *Hannibal* willed the conſpirators, that when any of their friends appeared in ſight, they ſhould bid him be quiet, and of good chear. All the town was in an uproar; but few could tell what the matter meant. A *Roman* trumpet was unſkilfully ſounded by a *Greek* in the theatre; which helped the ſuſpicion, both of the *Tarentines*, that the *Romans* were about to ſpoil the town; and of the *Romans*, that the citizens were in commotion. The governour fled into the port: and taking boat, got into the citadel, that ſtood in the mouth of the haven; whence he might eaſily perceive the next morning, how all had paſſed. *Hannibal*, aſſembling the *Tarentines*, gave them to undeeſtand, what good affection he bore them; inveighing bitterly againſt the *Romans*, as tyrannous oppreſſors; and ſpake what elſe he thought fit for the preſent. This done: and having gotten ſuch ſpoil as was to be had of the ſoldiers goods in the town, he addreſſed himſelf againſt the citadel; hoping, that if the garriſon would ſally out, he might give them ſuch a blow, as ſhould make them unable to defend the place. According to his expectation it partly fell out. For when he began to make his approaches, the *Romans* in a bravery ſallying forth, gave charge upon his men: who fell back of purpoſe, according to direction, till they had drawn on as many as they could, and ſo far from their ſtrength, as they durſt adventure. Then gave *Hannibal* a ſign to his *Carthaginians*, who lay prepared ready for the purpoſe: and fiercely ſetting upon the enemy, drove him back with great ſlaughter, as faſt as he could run; ſo that afterwards he durſt not iſſue forth. The citadel ſtood upon a demi-iſland, that was plain ground; and fortified only with a ditch and wall againſt the town, whereunto it was joined by a cawſey. This cawſey *Hannibal* intended to fortify in like ſort againſt the citadel; to the end, that the *Tarentines* might be able, without his help, to keep themſelves from all danger thence. His work in few days went ſo well forward, without impediment from the beſieged, that he conceived hope of winning the place it ſelf, by taking a little more pains. Wherefore he made ready all ſorts of engines, to force the place. But whilſt he was buſied in his works, there came by ſea a ſtrong ſupply from *Metapontum*: which took away all hope of prevailing; and made him return to his former counſel. Now, foraſmuch as the *Tarentine* fleet lay within the haven, and could not paſs forth, whilſt the *Romans* held the citadel: it ſeemed likely, that the town would ſuffer want, being debarred of accuſtomed trade and proviſions by ſea; whilſt the *Roman* garriſon, by help of their ſhipping might eaſily be relieved, and enabled to hold out. Againſt this inconvenience, it was rather wiſhed by the *Tarentines*, than any way hoped, that their fleet could get out of the haven, to guard the mouth of it, and cut off all ſupply from the enemy. *Hannibal* told them, that this might well be done: for that their town ſtanding in plain ground, and their ſtreets being fair and broad, it would be no hard matter to draw the gallies over land, and lanch them into the ſea without. This he undertook and effected: whereby the *Roman* garriſon was reduced into great neceſſity; though with much patience it held out, and found *Hannibal* oftentimes otherwiſe buſied, than his affairs required.

Thus with mutual loſs on both ſides, the time paſſed: and the *Roman* forces, growing daily ſtronger, *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*, with *Appius Claudius*, lately choſen conſuls, prepared to beſiege the great city of *Capua*. Three and twenty legions the *Romans* had now armed. This was a great and haſty growth from that want of men, and of all neceſſaries, whereunto the loſs at *Cannæ* had reduced them. But, to fill up theſe legions, they were fain to take up young boys, that were under ſeventeen years of age: and to ſend commiſſioners above fifty miles round, for the ſeeking out ſuch lads as might appear ſerviceable, and preſſing them to the wars; making yet a law, that their years of ſervice, whereunto they were bound by order of the city, ſhould be reckoned for their benefit, from this their beginning ſo young, as if they had been of lawful age. Before the *Roman* army drew near, the *Campans* felt great want of victuals, as if they had already been beſieged. This happened partly by ſloth of the nation, partly by the great waſte and ſpoil, which the *Romans* had in fore-

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going years made upon their grounds. They ſent therefore embaſſadors to *Hannibal*; deſiring him to ſuccour them ere they were cloſed up, as they feared to be ſhortly. He gave them comfortable words; and ſent *Hanno*, with an army, to ſupply their wants. *Hanno* appointed them a day, againſt which they ſhould be ready, with all manner of carriages, to ſtore themſelves with victuals, that he would provide. Neither did he promiſe more than he performed. For he cauſed great quantity of grain, that had been laid up in cities round about, to be brought into his camp, three miles from *Beneventum*. Thither at the time appointed came no more than forty carts or waggons, with a few pack-horſes; as if this had been enough to victual *Capua*. Such was the retchleſneſs of the *Campans*. *Hanno* was exceeding angry hereat; and told them, they were worſe than very beaſts, ſince hunger could not teach them to have greater care. Wherefore he gave them a longer day, againſt which he made proviſion to ſtore them throughly. Of all theſe doings word was ſent to the *Roman* conſuls, from the citizens of *Beneventum*. Therefore *Q. Fulvius*, the conſul, taking with him ſuch ſtrength as he thought needful for the ſervice, came into *Beneventum* by night; where with diligence he made enquiry into the behaviour of the enemy. He learned, that *Hanno*, with part of his army, was gone abroad to make proviſions; that ſome two thouſand waggons, with a great rabble of carters, and other varlets, lay among the *Carthaginians* in their camp; ſo that little good order was kept; all thought being ſet upon a great harveſt. Hereupon the conſul bade his men prepare themſelves to aſſail the enemies camp: and leaving all his impediments within *Beneventum*, he marched thitherward ſo early in the morning, that he was there with the firſt break of day. By coming ſo unexpected, he had well-near forced the camp on the ſudden. But it was very ſtrong, and very well defended: ſo that the longer the fight continued, the leſs deſire had *Fulvius* to loſe more of his men in the attempt; ſeeing many of them caſt away, and yet little hope of doing good. Therefore he ſaid, that it were better to go more leiſurely and ſubſtantially to work; to ſend for his fellow-conſul, with the reſt of their army, and to lie between *Hanno* and home; that neither the *Campans* ſhould depart thence, nor the *Carthaginians* be able to relieve them. Being thus diſcourſing, and about to ſound the retreat; he ſaw, that ſome of his men had gotten over the enemies rampart. There was great booty; or (which was all one to the ſoldiers) an opinion of much that might be gotten in that camp. Wherefore ſome enſign-bearers threw their enſigns over the rampart, willing their men to fetch them out, unleſs they would endure the ſhame and diſhonour following ſuch a loſs. Fear of ſuch ignominy, than which none could be greater, made the ſoldiers adventure ſo deſperately, that *Fulvius*, perceiving the heat of his men, changed his purpoſe, and encouraged thoſe that were ſomewhat backward, to follow the example of them that had already gotten over the trenches. Thus the camp was won: in which were ſlain above ſix thouſand; and taken, above ſeven thouſand; beſides all the ſtore of victuals, and carriages, with abundance of booty, that *Hanno* had lately gotten from the *Roman* confederates. This miſadventure, and the nearer approach of both the conſuls, made them of *Capua* ſend a pitiful embaſſage to *Hannibal:* putting him in mind of all the love that he was wont to proteſt unto their city; and how he had made ſhew to affect it no leſs than *Carthage*. But now, they ſaid, it would be loſt, as *Arpi* was lately, if he gave not ſtrong and ſpeedy ſuccour. *Hannibal* anſwered with comfortable words, and ſent away two thouſand horſe to keep their grounds from ſpoil; whilſt he himſelf was detained about *Tarentum*, partly by hope of winning the citadel, partly by the diſpoſition which he ſaw in many towns adjoining to yield unto him. Among the hoſtages of the *Tarentines* that lately had fled out of *Rome*, and, being overtaken, ſuffered death for their attempt, were ſome of the *Metapontines*, and other cities of the *Greeks*, inhabiting that eaſtern part of *Italy*, which was called of old *Magna Græcia*. Theſe people took to heart the death of their hoſtages, and thought the puniſhment greater than the offence. Wherefore the *Metapontines*, as ſoon as the *Roman* garriſon was taken from them to defend the citadel of *Tarentum*, made no more ado, but opened their gates to *Hannibal*. The *Thurines* would have done the like, upon the like reaſon, had not ſome companies lain in their town, which they feared that they ſhould not be able to maſter. Nevertheleſs, they helped themſelves by cunning; inviting to their gates *Hanno* and *Mago*, that were near at hand, againſt whom, whilſt they profeſſed their ſervice to *Atinius*, the *Roman* captain, they drew him forth to fight; and recoiling from him, cloſed up their gates. A little formality they uſed, in pretending fear leſt the enemy ſhould break in together with the *Romans*; in ſaving *Atinius* himſelf, and ſending him away by ſea; as alſo in conſulting a ſmall while (becauſe perhaps many of their chief men were unacquainted with the practice) whether they ſhould yield to the *Carthaginian*, or no. But this diſputation laſted not long, for they that had removed the chief impediment, eaſily prevailed in the reſt, and delivered up the town to *Hanno* and *Mago*. This good ſucceſs, and hope of the like, detained *Hannibal* in thoſe quarters; whilſt the conſuls, fortifying *Beneventum*, to ſecure their backs, addreſſed themſelves unto the ſiege of *Capua*.

Many diſaſters befel the *Romans* in the beginning of this great enterprize. *T. Sempronius Gracchus*, a very good man of war, that had of late been twice conſul, was ſlain, either by treachery of ſome *Lucans*, that drew him into an ambuſh, or by ſome *Carthaginian* ſtragglers, among whom he fell unawares. His body, or his head, was very honourably interred either by *Hannibal* himſelf, or (for the reports agree not) by the *Romans*, to whom *Hannibal* ſent it. He was appointed to lie in *Beneventum*, there to ſecure the back of the army that ſhould beſiege *Capua*. But his death happened in an ill time, to the great hindrance of that buſineſs. The *Volones*, or ſlaves, lately manumiſed, forſook their enſigns, and went every one whither he thought good, as if they had been diſcharged by the deceaſe of their leader; ſo that it aſked ſome labour to ſeek them out, and bring them back into their camp. Nevertheleſs, the conſuls went forward with their work; and drawing near to *Capua*, did all acts of hoſtility which they could. *Mago*, the *Carthaginian*, and the citizens of *Capua*, gave them an hard welcome; wherein above fifteen hundred *Romans* were loſt. Neither was it long, ere *Hannibal* came thither, who fought with the conſuls, and had the better, inſomuch that he cauſed them to diſlodge. They removed by night, and went ſeveral ways: *Fulvius* toward *Cannæ*; *Claudius* into *Lucania*. *Hannibal* followed after *Claudius*, who having led him a great walk, fetched a com-

paſs about, and returned to *Capua*. It ſo fell out, that one *M. Centenius Penula*, a ſtout man, and one that with good commendations had diſcharged the place of a centurion, lay with an army not far from thence, where *Hannibal* reſted, when he was very weary of hunting after *Claudius*. This *Penula* had made great vaunts to the *Roman* ſenate, of wonders which he would work, if he might be truſted with the leading of five thouſand men. The fathers were unwilling in ſuch a time, to reject the virtue of any good ſoldier, how mean ſoever his condition were. Wherefore they gave him the charge of eight thouſand; and he himſelf being a proper man, and talking bravely, gathered up ſo many voluntaries, as almoſt doubled his number. But meeting thus with *Hannibal*, he gave proof of the difference between a ſtout centurion, and one able to command in chief. He and his fellows were all (in a manner) ſlain, ſcarce a thouſand of them eſcaping. Soon after this *Hannibal* had word, that *Cn. Fulvius*, a *Roman* pretor, with eighteen thouſand men, was in *Apulia*, very careleſs, and a man inſufficient for the charge which he held. Thither therefore he haſted to viſit him, hoping to deal the better with the main ſtrength of *Rome*, which pointed at *Capua*, when he ſhould have cut off thoſe forces that lay in the provinces about, under men of ſmall ability. Coming upon *Fulvius*, he found him and his men ſo jolly, that needs they would have fought the firſt night. Wherefore it was not to be doubted what would happen the day following. So he beſtowed *Mago*, with three thouſand of his lighteſt armed, in places thereabout moſt fit for ambuſh. Then offering battel to *Fulvius*, he ſoon had him in the trap, whence he made him glad to eſcape alive, leaving all, ſave two thouſand of his followers, dead behind him.

Theſe two great blows, received one preſently after the other, much aſtoniſhed the *Romans*. Nevertheleſs, all care was taken to gather up the ſmall remains of the broken armies; and that the conſuls ſhould go ſubſtantially forwards with the ſiege of *Capua*, which was of great conſequence, both in matter of reputation, and in many other reſpects. The two conſuls ſat down before the town, and *C. Claudius Nero*, one of the pretors, came with his army from *Sueſſula* to their aſſiſtance. They made proclamation, that whoſoever would iſſue out of *Capua* before a certain day prefixed, ſhould have his pardon, and be ſuffered to enjoy all that unto him belonged; which day being paſs'd, there ſhould be no grace expected. This offer was contumeliouſly rejected, the *Capuans* relying on their own ſtrength, and the ſuccours attended from *Hannibal*. Before the city was cloſed up, they ſent meſſengers to the *Carthaginian*, which found him at *Brunduſium*. He had made a long journey, in hope of gaining the *Tarentine* citadel; of which expectation failing, he turned to *Brunduſium*, upon advertiſement that he ſhould be let in. There the *Capuans* met him; told him of their danger with earneſt words; and were with words as bravely re-comforted. He bade them conſider, how a few days ſince he had chaſed the conſuls out of their fields; and told them, that he would preſently come thither again, and ſend the *Romans* going as faſt as before. With this good anſwer the meſſengers returned, and hardly could get back into the city, which the *Romans* had almoſt intrenched round. As for *Hannibal* himſelf, he was of opinion, that *Capua*, being very well manned, and heartily devoted unto his friendſhip, would hold out a long time; and thereby give him leiſure to do what he thought requiſite among the *Tarentines*, and in thoſe eaſtern parts of *Italy*, whilſt the *Roman* army ſpent it ſelf in a tedious ſiege. Thus he lingered, and thereby gave the conſuls time both to fortify themſelves at *Capua*, and to diſpatch the election of new magiſtrates in *Rome*, whilſt he himſelf purſued hopes, that never found ſucceſs.

Claudius and *Fulvius*, when their term of office was expired, were appointed to continue the ſiege at *Capua*, retaining the ſame armies, as pro-conſuls. The townſmen often ſallied out, rather in a bravery, than likelihood to work any matter of effect, the enemy lying cloſe within his trenches, as intending, without other violence, to ſubdue them by famine. Yet againſt the *Campan* horſe (for their foot was eaſily beaten) the *Romans* uſed to thruſt out ſome troops, that ſhould hold them ſkirmiſh. In theſe exerciſes the *Campans* uſually had the better, to the great grief of their proud enemy, who ſcorned to take foil at the hands of ſuch rebels. It was therefore deviſed, that ſome active and couragious young men, ſhould learn to ride behind the *Roman* men at arms, leaping up, and again diſmounting lightly, as occaſion ſerved. Theſe were furniſhed like the *Velites*, having each of them three or four ſmall darts; which, alighting in time of conflict, they diſcharged thick upon the enemy's horſe; whom vanquiſhing in this kind of ſervice, they much diſheartened in the main. The time thus paſſing, and famine daily increaſing within the city, *Hannibal* came at length, not expected by the *Romans*; and taking a fort of theirs, called *Galatia*, fell upon their camp. At the ſame time the *Capuans* iſſued with their whole power, in as terrible manner as they could deviſe; ſetting all their multitude of unſerviceable people on the walls; which, with a loud noiſe of pans and baſons, troubled thoſe that were occupied in fight. *Appius Claudius* oppoſing himſelf to the *Campans*, eaſily defended his trenches againſt them; and ſo well repreſſed them, that he drove them at length back into their city. Nevertheleſs, in purſuing them to their gates, he received a wound, that accompanied him in ſhort ſpace after to his grave. *Q. Fulvius* was held harder to his taſk by *Hannibal*, and the *Carthaginian* army. The *Roman* camp was even at point to have been loſt; and *Hannibal's* elephants, of which he brought with him thirty-three, were either gotten within the rampart, or elſe (for the report varies) being ſome of them ſlain upon it, fell into the ditch; and filled it up in ſuch ſort, that their bodies ſerved as a bridge unto the aſſailants. It is ſaid, that *Hannibal* in this tumult cauſed ſome fugitives, that could ſpeak *Latin* well, to proclaim aloud, as it were in the conſul's name, that every one of the ſoldiers ſhould ſhift for himſelf, and fly betimes unto the next hills, foraſmuch as the camp was already loſt. But all would not ſerve. The fraud was detected, and the army, having ſitten there ſo long, had at good leiſure ſtrongly intrenched it ſelf, ſo as little hope there was to raiſe the ſiege by force.

This did extremely perplex the *Carthaginian*. The purchaſe of *Capua* had (as was thought) withheld him from taking *Rome* it ſelf: and now his deſire of winning the *Tarentine* citadel, had well near loſt *Capua*, in reſpect of which, neither the citadel, nor the city of *Tarentum*, were to have been much regarded. Falling therefore into a deſperate anger with himſelf and his hard fortune, that of ſo many great victories he had made no greater uſe; on the ſudden he entertained an haughty reſolution even to ſet upon *Rome*, and carry to the walls of that proud city the danger of war that threatened *Capua*. This he thought would be a mean to draw the *Roman* generals, or one of them at leaſt, unto the defence of their own home. If they roſe from the ſiege with their

their whole army, then had he his deſire: if they divided their forces, then was it likely that either he, or the *Campans*, ſhould well enough deal with them apart. Neither did he deſpair that the terror of his coming might ſo aſtoniſh the multitude within *Rome*, as he might enter ſome part or other of the city. His only fear was, leſt the *Campans*, being ignorant of his purpoſe, ſhould think he had forſaken them, and thereupon forthwith yield themſelves to the enemy. To prevent this danger, he ſent letters to *Capua* by a ſubtle *Numidian*; who running as a fugitive into the *Roman* camp, conveyed himſelf thence over the innermoſt trenches into the city. The journey to *Rome* was to be performed with great celerity; no ſmall hope of good ſucceſs reſting in the ſuddenneſs of his arrival there. Wherefore he cauſed his men to have in a readineſs ten days victuals; and prepared as many boats as might in one night tranſport his army over the river of *Vulturnus*. This could not be done ſo cloſely, but that the *Roman* generals, by ſome fugitives, had notice of his purpoſe. With this danger therefore they acquainted the ſenate, which was therewith affected, according to the diverſity of mens opinions in a caſe of ſuch importance. Some gave counſel to let alone *Capua*, yea, and all places elſe, rather than to put the town of *Rome* into peril of being taken by the enemy. Others were ſo far from allowing of this, as they wondered how any man could think that *Hannibal*, being unable to relieve *Capua*, ſhould judge himſelf ſtrong enough to win *Rome*; and therefore ſtoutly ſaid, that thoſe legions which were kept at home for defence of the city, would ſerve the turn well enough to keep him out, and ſend him thence, if he were ſo unwiſe as to come thither. But it was finally concluded, that letters ſhould be ſent to *Fulvius* and *Claudius*, acquainting them perfectly with the forces that at the preſent were in *Rome*; who ſince they knew beſt what the ſtrength was which *Hannibal* could bring along with him, were beſt able to judge what was needful to oppoſe him. So it was referred unto the diſcretion of theſe generals at *Capua*, to do as they thought behoveful; and, if it might conveniently be, neither to raiſe their ſiege, nor yet to put the city of *Rome* into much adventure. According to this decree of the ſenate, Q. *Fulvius* took fifteen thouſand foot and a thouſand horſe, the choice of his whole army, with which he haſted toward *Rome*, leaving *App. Claudius*, who could not travel by reaſon of his wound, to continue the ſiege at *Capua*.

Hannibal, having paſſed over *Vulturnus*, burnt up all his boats, and left nothing that might ſerve to tranſport the enemy, in caſe he ſhould offer to purſue or coaſt him. Then haſted he away toward *Rome*, ſtaying no longer in any one place than he needs muſt. Yet found he the bridges over *Liris* broken down by the people of *Fregellæ*; which, as it ſtopped him a little on his way, ſo it made him the more grievouſly to ſpoil their lands whilſt the bridges were in mending. The nearer that he drew to *Rome*, the greater waſte he made: his *Numidians* running before him, driving the country, and killing or taking multitudes of all ſorts and ages, that fled out of all parts round about. The meſſengers of theſe news came apace, one after another, into the city; ſome few bringing true advertiſements, but the moſt of them reporting the conceits of their own fear. All the ſtreets and temples in *Rome* were peſtered with women, crying, and praying, and rubbing the altars with their hair, becauſe they could do none other good. The ſenators were all in the great market, or place of aſſembly; ready to give their advice, if it were aſked, or to take directions given by the magiſtrates. All places of moſt importance were ſtuffed with ſoldiers: it being uncertain, upon which part *Hannibal* would fall. In the midſt of this trepidation, there came news, that Q. *Fulvius*, with part of the army from *Capua*, was haſting to the defence of the city. The office of a proconſul did expire, at his return home, and entry into the gates of *Rome*. Wherefore, that *Fulvius* might loſe nothing by coming into the city in time of ſuch need, an act was paſſed, that he ſhould have equal power with the conſuls, during his abode there. He and *Hannibal* arrived at *Rome*, one ſoon after another: *Fulvius* having been long held occupied in paſſing over *Vulturnus*; and *Hannibal* receiving impediment in his journey, as much as the country was able to give. The conſuls, and *Fulvius*, incamped without the gates of *Rome*; attending the *Carthaginian*. Thither they called the ſenate: and as the danger grew nearer and greater; ſo took they more careful and eſpecial order, againſt all occurrences. *Hannibal* came to the river *Anio* or *Anien*, three miles from the town: whence he advanced with two thouſand horſe, and rode along a great way under the walls; viewing the ſite thereof, and conſidering how he might beſt approach it. But he either went, or (as the *Roman* ſtory ſaith) was driven away, without doing, or receiving any hurt. Many tumults roſe in this while among the people; but were ſuppreſſed by the care and diligence of the ſenators. Above the reſt, one accident was both troubleſome, and not without peril. Of *Numidians* that had ſhifted ſide, and fallen (upon ſome diſpleaſures) from *Hannibal* to the *Romans*, there were ſome twelve hundred then in *Rome*: which were appointed by the conſuls, to paſs through the town, from the mount *Aventine*, to the gate *Collina*, where it was thought that their ſervice might be uſeful, among broken ways, and garden-walls lying in the ſuburbs. The faces of theſe men, and their furniture, wherein they differed not from the followers of *Hannibal*, bred ſuch miſtaking, as cauſed a great uproar among the people: all crying out, that *Aventine* was taken, and the enemy gotten within the walls. The noiſe was ſuch, that men could not be informed of the truth: and the ſtreets were ſo full of cattel, and huſbandmen, which were fled thither out of the villages adjoining, that the paſſage was ſtop'd up; and the poor *Numidians* pitifully beaten from the houſe-tops, with ſtones and other weapons that came next to hand, by the deſperate multitude, that would have run out of the gates, had it not been certain who lay under the walls. To remedy the like inconveniencies, it was ordained, *That all which had been dictators, conſuls, or cenſors, ſhould have authority as magiſtrates, till the enemy departed.* The day following, *Hannibal* paſſed over *Anien*, and preſented battel to the *Romans*, who did not wiſely if they undertook it. It is ſaid, that a terrible ſhower of rain, cauſed both *Romans* and *Carthaginians* to return into their ſeveral camps: and that this happened two days together, the weather breaking up, and clearing, as ſoon as they were departed aſunder. Certain it is, that *Hannibal*, who had brought along with him no more than ten days proviſion, could not endure to ſtay there, until his victuals were all ſpent. In which regard, the *Romans*, if they ſuffered him to waſte his time and proviſions, knowing that he could not abide there long, did as became well adviſed men; if they offered to fight with him, and either had the better, or were parted (as is ſaid) by ſome accident of weather; the commendations muſt be given

given to their fortune. The terror of *Hannibal*'s coming to the city, how great ſoever it was at the firſt, yet, after ſome leiſure, and better notice taken of his forces, which appeared leſs than the firſt apprehenſion had formed them, was much and ſoon abated. Hereunto it helped well, that at the ſame time the ſupply appointed for *Spain*, after the death of the two *Scipio's*, was ſent out of the town, and went forth at the gate, whilſt one *Carthaginian* lay before another. In all *Panick terrors*, as they are called, whereof there is either no cauſe known, or no cauſe anſwerable to the greatneſs of the ſudden conſternation, it is a good remedy, to do ſomewhat quite contrary to that which the danger would require; were it ſuch, as men have faſhioned it in their amazed conceits. Thus did *Alexander* cauſe his ſoldiers to diſarm themſelves, when they were all on a ſudden in a great fear of they knew not what. And thus did *Clearchus* pacify a fooliſh uproar in his army, by proclaiming a reward unto him, that could tell who had ſent the aſs into the camp. But in this preſent example of the *Romans*, appears withal a great magnanimity: whereby they ſuſtained their reputation, and augmented it no leſs, than by this bold attempt of *Hannibal* it might ſeem to have been diminiſhed. Neither could they more finely have checked the glorious conceits of their enemies, and taken away the diſgrace of that fear, which clouded their valour at his firſt coming, than by making ſuch demonſtrations, when once they had recovered ſpirit, how little they eſteemed him. To this purpoſe therefore that very piece of ground, on which the *Carthaginian* lay incamped, was ſold in *Rome*: and ſold it was nothing under the value, but at as good a rate, as if it had been in time of peace. This indignity coming to his ear, incenſed *Hannibal* ſo much, that he made port-ſale of the ſilver-ſmiths ſhops, which were near about the market or common place in *Rome*, as if his own title to the houſes within the town were no wit worſe than any *Roman* citizens could be unto that piece of ground, whereon he raiſed his tent. But this counter-practice was nothing worth. The *Romans* did ſeek to manifeſt that aſſurance which they juſtly had conceived; *Hannibal*, to make ſhew of continuing in an hope, which was already paſt. His victuals were almoſt ſpent: and of thoſe ends that he had propoſed unto himſelf, this journey had brought forth none other, than the fame of his much daring. Wherefore he broke up his camp: and doing what ſpoil he could in the *Roman* territory, without ſparing religious places, wherein wealth was to be gotten, he paſſed like a tempeſt over the country; and ran toward the eaſtern ſea ſo faſt, that he had almoſt taken the city of *Rhegium* before his arrival was feared or ſuſpected. As for *Capua*, he gave it loſt: and is likely to have curſed the whole faction of *Hanno*, which thus diſabled him to relieve that fair city, ſince he had no other way to vent his grief.

Q. Fulvius returning back to *Capua*, made proclamation a-new, that whoſo would yield, before a certain day, might ſafely do it. This, and the very return of *Fulvius*, without any more appearance of *Hannibal*, gave the *Capuans* to underſtand, that they were abandoned, and their caſe deſperate. To truſt the *Roman* pardon proclaimed, every man's conſcience of his own evil deſerts, told him, that it was a vanity: and ſome faint hope was given by *Hanno* and *Boſtar*, captains of the *Carthaginian* garriſon within the town, that *Hannibal* ſhould come again, if means could only be found how to convey ſuch letters unto him, as they would write. The carriage of the letters was undertaken by ſome *Numidians*; who running, as fugitives, out of the town, into the *Roman* camp, waited fit opportunity to make an eſcape thence with their packets. But it happened, ere they could convey themſelves away, that one of them was detected by an harlot following him out of the town; and the letters of *Boſtar* and *Hanno* were taken and opened, containing a vehement intreaty unto *Hannibal*, that he would not thus forſake the *Capuans*, and them. For (ſaid they) we came not hither to make war againſt *Rhegium* and *Tarentum*, but againſt the *Romans*: whoſe legions whereſoever they lie, there alſo ſhould the *Carthaginian* army be ready to attend them; and by taking of ſuch courſe, have we gotten thoſe victories at *Trebia*, *Thraſymene*, and *Cannæ*. In fine, they beſought him, that he would not diſhonour himſelf, and betray them to their enemies, by turning another way; as if it were his only care, that the city ſhould not be taken in his full view: promiſing to make a deſperate ſally, if he would once more adventure to ſet upon the *Roman* camp. Such were the hopes of *Boſtar* and his fellow. But *Hannibal* had already done his beſt: and now began to faint under the burden of that war, wherein (as afterwards he proteſted) he was vanquiſhed by *Hanno* and his partiſans in the *Carthaginian* ſenate, rather than by any force of *Rome*. [a] It may well be, as a thing incident in like caſes, that ſome of thoſe which were beſieged in *Capua*, had been ſent over by the *Hannonians*, to obſerve the doings of *Hannibal*, and to check his proceedings. If this were ſo, juſtly might they curſe their own malice, which had caſt them into this remedileſs neceſſity. Howſoever it were, the letters directed unto *Hannibal*, fell (as is ſhewed) into the *Roman* proconſul's hands; who cutting off the hands of all ſuch counterfeit fugitives, as carried ſuch meſſages, whip'd them back into the town. This miſerable ſpectacle broke the hearts of the *Campans*: ſo that the multitude crying out upon the ſenate, with menacing terms, cauſed them to aſſemble, and conſult about the yielding up of *Capua* unto the *Romans*. The braveſt of the ſenators, and ſuch as a few years ſince had been moſt forward in joining with *Hannibal*, underſtood well enough whereunto the matter tended. Wherefore one of them invited the reſt home to ſupper; telling them, that when they had made good chear, he would drink to them ſuch an health, as ſhould ſet them free from that cruel revenge, which the enemy ſought upon their bodies. About ſeven and twenty of the ſenators there were, that liking well of this motion, ended their lives together, by drinking poiſon. All the reſt, hoping for more mercy than they had deſerved, yielded ſimply to diſcretion. So one of the town-gates was ſet open: whereat a *Roman* legion, with ſome other companies, entring, diſarmed the citizens, apprehended the *Carthaginian* garriſon, and commanded all the ſenators of *Capua* to go forth into the *Roman* camp. At their coming thither, the proconſuls laid irons upon them all, and, commanding them to tell what ſtore of gold and ſilver they had at home, ſent them into ſafe cuſtody; ſome to *Cales*, others to *Theanum*. Touching the general multitude: they were reſerved unto the diſcretion of the ſenate; yet ſo hardly uſed by *Fulvius* in the mean while, that they had little cauſe of hope or comfort in this adverſity. *Ap. Claudius* was brought

[a] Liv. l. 30.

even

even to the point of death, by the wound which he had lately received: yet was he not inexorable to the *Campans*; as having loved them well in former times, and having given his daughter in marriage to that *Pacuvius*, of whom we ſpake before. But this facility of his colleague, made *Fulvius* the more haſty in taking vengeance: for fear, leſt upon the like reſpects, the *Roman* ſenate might prove more gentle, than he thought behoveful to the common ſafety, and honour of their ſtate. Wherefore he took the pains, to ride by night unto *Theanum*, and from thence to *Cales*: where he cauſed all the *Campan* priſoners to ſuffer death; binding them to ſtakes, and ſcourging them firſt a good while with rods; after which he ſtruck off their heads.

This terrible example of vengeance, which the *Carthaginians* could not hinder, made all towns of *Italy* the leſs apt to follow the vain hope of the *Campans*: and bred a general inclination, to return upon good conditions to the *Roman* ſide. The *Atellans*, *Calatines*, and *Sabatines*, people of the *Campans*, that in the former change had followed the fortune of *Capua*, made alſo now the like ſubmiſſion, for very fear, and want of ability to reſiſt. They were therefore uſed with the like rigor, by *Fulvius*: who dealt ſo extreamly with them all, that he brought them into deſperation. Wherefore ſome of their young gentlemen, burning with fire of revenge, got into *Rome*: where they found means by night-time, to ſet on fire ſo many houſes, that a great part of the city was like to have been conſumed. The beginning of the fire in divers places at once, argued that it was no caſualty. Wherefore liberty was proclaimed upon any ſlave, and other ſufficient reward unto any freeman, that ſhould diſcover who thoſe incendiaries were. Thus all came out: and the *Campans*, being detected by a ſlave of their own (to whom, above his liberty promiſed, was given about the ſum of an hundred marks) had the puniſhment anſwerable to their deſerts. *Fulvius* hereby being more and more incenſed againſt this wretched people, held them in a manner as priſoners within their walls: and this extreme ſeverity cauſed them at length to become ſuppliants unto the *Roman* ſenate; that ſome period might be ſet unto their miſeries. That, whereupon the ſenators reſolved in the end, was worſe than all that which they had ſuffered before. Only two poor women in *Capua* (of which one had been an harlot) were found not guilty of the late rebellion. The reſt were, ſome of them, with their wives and children, ſold for ſlaves, and their goods confiſcated; others laid in priſon, and reſerved to further deliberation: but the generality of them, commanded to depart out of *Campania* by a certain day; and confined unto ſeveral places, as beſt liked the angry victors. As for the town of *Capua*, it was ſuffered to ſtand, in regard of the beauty and commodious ſite: but no corporation, or form of polity, was allowed to be therein: only a *Roman* provoſt was every year ſent, to govern over thoſe that ſhould inhabit it, and to do juſtice. This was the greateſt act, and moſt important, hitherto done by the people of *Rome*, after many great loſſes in the preſent war. After this, the glory of *Hannibal* began to ſhine with a more dim light than before: his oil being far ſpent: and that which ſhould have revived his flame, being unfortunately ſhed; as ſhall be told in place convenient.

No. XLII.

SECT. XV.

How the Carthaginians, *making a party in* Sardinia, *and* Sicily, *held war againſt the* Romans *in thoſe iſlands; and were overcome.*

WHILST things paſſed thus in *Italy*, the commotions raiſed in *Sardinia* and *Sicily* by the *Carthaginians* and their friends, were brought to a quiet and happy end, by the induſtrious valour of the *Romans*. The *Sardinian* rebellion was great and ſudden: above thirty thouſand being up in arms, ere the *Roman* forces could arrive there to ſuppreſs it. One *Harſicoras*, with his ſon *Hioſtus*, mighty men in that iſland, were the ringleaders; being incited by *Hanno*, a *Carthaginian*, that promiſed the aſſiſtance of his country. Neither were the *Carthaginians* in this enterpriſe ſo careleſs, as in the reſt of their main undertakings, about the ſame time. Yet it had been better, if their care had been directed unto the proſecution of that main buſineſs in *Italy*; whereon this, and all other hopes depended. For it would have ſufficed, if they could have hindred the *Romans* from ſending an army into *Sardinia*. *Harſicoras*, with his followers, might well enough have ſerved to drive out *Q. Mutius*, the pretor; who lay ſick in the province; and not more weak in his own body, than in his train. But whilſt they ſought revenge of that particular injury, whereof the ſenſe was moſt grievous: they neglected the opportunity of requiting thoſe that had done them wrong, and of the ſecuring themſelves from all injuries in the future. Their fortune alſo in this enterpriſe was ſuch, as may ſeem to have diſcouraged them from being at the like charge, in caſes of more importance. For whereas they ſent over *Aſdrubal*, ſurnamed *the bald*, with a competent fleet and army; aſſiſted in this expedition by *Hanno*, the author of the rebellion, and by *Mago*, a gentleman of the *Barchine* houſe, and near kinſman to *Hannibal*: it ſo fell out, that the whole fleet, by extremity of foul weather, was caſt upon the *Baleares*; ſo beaten, and in ſuch evil plight, that the *Sardinians* had even ſpent their hearts, and were in a manner quite vanquiſhed, ere theſe their friends could arrive to ſuccour them.

Titus Manlius was ſent from *Rome* with two and twenty thouſand foot, and twelve hundred horſe, to ſettle the eſtate of that iſland, which he had taken in, and annexed unto the *Roman* dominion, long before this, in his conſulſhip. It was a laudable cuſtom of the *Romans*, to preſerve and uphold in their ſeveral provinces, the greatneſs and reputation of thoſe men, and their families, by whom each province had been firſt ſubdued unto their empire. If any injury were done unto the provincials; if any grace were to be obtained from the ſenate; or whatſoever accident required the aſſiſtance of a patron: the firſt conqueror, and his race after him, were the moſt ready and beſt approved means, to procure the benefit of the people ſubdued. Hereby the *Romans* held very ſure intelligence in every province, and had always in readineſs fit men to reclaim their ſubjects, if they fell into any ſuch diſorder, as would otherwiſe have required a greater charge and trouble. The coming of *Manlius* retained in obedience all that were not already broken too far out. Yet was *Harſicoras* ſo ſtrong in field, that *Manlius* was compelled to arm his

mariners: without whom he could not have made up that number of two and twenty thouſand, whereof we have ſpoken before: He landed at *Calaris*, or *Carallis:* where mooring his ſhips, he paſſed up into the country, and ſought out the enemy. *Hyoſtus*, the ſon of *Harſicoras*, had then the command of the *Sardinian* army left unto him by his father, who was gone abroad into the country, to draw in more friends to their ſide. This young gentleman would needs adventure to get honour, by giving battel to the *Romans* at his own diſcretion. So he raſhly adventured to fight with an old ſoldier: by whom he received a terrible overthrow; and loſt in one day above thirty thouſand of his followers. *Hyoſtus* himſelf, with the reſt of his broken troops, got into *Cornus*, the chief town of the iſland: whither *Manlius* purſued them. Very ſoon after this defeature came *Aſdrubal* with his *Carthaginians:* too late to win all *Sardinia*, in ſuch haſte as he might have done, if the tempeſt had not hindred his voyage; yet ſoon enough, and ſtrong enough to ſave the town of *Cornus*, and to put a new ſpirit into the rebels. *Manlius* hereupon withdrew himſelf back to *Calaris:* where he had not ſtayed long, ere the *Sardinians* (ſuch of them as adhered to the *Roman* party) craved his aſſiſtance; their country being waſted by the *Carthaginians*, and the rebels, with whom they had refuſed to join. This drew *Manlius* forth of *Calaris:* where if he had ſtayed a little longer, *Aſdrubal* would have ſought him out with ſome blemiſh to his reputation. But the fame of *Aſdrubal* and his company, appears to have been greater than was their ſtrength. For, after ſome trial made of them in a few ſkirmiſhes, *Manlius* adventured all to the hazard of a battel: wherein he ſlew twelve thouſand of the enemies; and took of the *Sardinians* and *Carthaginians* three thouſand. Four hours the battel laſted: and victory at length fell to the *Romans*, by the flight of the iſlanders; whoſe courage had been broken in their unproſperous fight not many days before. The death of young *Hyoſtus*, and of his father *Harſicoras*, that ſlew himſelf for grief, together with the captivity of *Aſdrubal* himſelf, with *Mago* and *Hanno*, the *Carthaginians*; made the victory the more famous. The vanquiſhed army fled into *Cornus:* whither *Manlius* followed them; and in ſhort ſpace won the the town. All other cities of the iſle that had rebelled, followed the example of *Cornus*, and yielded unto the *Roman:* who impoſing upon them ſuch increaſe of tribute, or other puniſhment, as beſt ſorted with the nature of their ſeveral offences, or their ability to pay, returned back to *Calaris* with a great booty, and from thence to *Rome*; leaving *Sardinia* in quiet.

The war in *Sicily* was of greater length, and every way more burdenſome to *Rome:* as alſo the victory brought more honour and profit; for that the *Romans* became thereby not only ſavers of their own, as in *Sardinia*, but lords of the whole country, by annexing the city and dominion of *Syracuſe*, to that which they enjoyed before. Soon after the battel of *Cannæ*, the old king of *Syracuſe* died: who had continued long a ſtedfaſt friend unto the *Romans*; and greatly relieved them in this preſent war. He left his kingdom to *Hieronymus*, his grand-child, that was about fifteen years of age; *Gelo*, his ſon, that ſhould have been his heir, being dead before. To this young king his ſucceſſor, *Hiero* appointed fifteen tutors; of which the principal were *Andronodorus*, *Zoilus*, and *Themiſtius*; who had married his daughters, or the daughters of *Gelo*. The reſt were ſuch, as he judged moſt likely to preſerve the kingdom, by the ſame art, whereby himſelf had gotten, and ſo long kept it. But within a little while, *Andronodorus*, waxing weary of ſo many coadjutors, began to commend the ſufficiency of the young prince, as extraordinary in one of his years: and ſaid, that he was able to rule the kingdom without help of any protector. Thus by giving over his own charge, he cauſed others to do the like: hoping thereby to get the king wholly into his hands; which came to paſs in a ſort as he deſired. For *Hieronymus*, laying aſide all care of government gave himſelf wholly over to his pleaſures: or if he had any regard for his royal dignity, it was only in matter of exterior ſhew, as wearing a diadem with ornaments of purple, and being attended by an armed guard. Hereby he offended the eyes of his people, that had never ſeen the like in *Hiero*, or in *Gelo*, his ſon. But much more he offended them, when by his inſolent behaviour, ſuitable to his outward pomp, he gave proof, that, in courſe of life, he would revive the memory of tyrants dead long ſince, from whom he took the pattern of his habit. He grew proud, luſtful, cruel, and dangerous to all that were about him: ſo that ſuch of his late tutors as could eſcape him by flight, were glad to live in baniſhment: the reſt, being moſt of them put to death by the tyrant; many of them dying by their own hands, to avoid the danger of his diſpleaſure, that ſeemed worſe than death it ſelf. Only *Andronodorus*, *Zoilus*, and one *Thraſo*, continued in grace with him, and were his counſellors, but not of his cabinet. Theſe, howſoever they agreed in other points, were at ſome diſſenſion about that main point, of adhering, either to the *Romans*, or to the *Carthaginians*. The two former of them, were wholly for the king's pleaſures, which was ſet on change: but *Thraſo*, having more regard for his honour and profit, was very earneſt to continue the amity with *Rome*. Whilſt as yet it remained ſomewhat doubtful, which way the king would incline; a conſpiracy againſt his perſon, was detected by a groom of his; to whom one *Theodorus* had broken the matter. *Theodorus* hereupon was apprehended, and tormented; thereby to wring out of him the whole practice, and the names of the undertakers. Long it was ere he would ſpeak any thing: but yielding (as it ſeemed) in the end, unto the extremity of the torture; he confeſſed, that he had been ſet on by *Thraſo*; whom he impeached of the treaſon, together with many more, that were near in love or place unto *Hieronymus*. All theſe therefore were put to death, being innocent of the crime wherewith they were charged. But they that were indeed the conſpirators, walked boldly in the ſtreets, and never ſhrunk for the matter: aſſuring themſelves, that the reſolution of *Theodorus* would yield to no extremity. Thus they all eſcaped, and ſoon after found means to execute their purpoſe. The king himſelf, when *Thraſo* was taken out of the way, quickly reſolved upon ſiding with the *Carthaginians*; whereto he was very inclinable before. Young men, when firſt they grow maſters of themſelves, love to ſeem wiſer than their fathers, by taking different courſes. And the liberality of *Hiero* to the *Romans*, in their great neceſſity, had of late been ſuch, as might have been termed exceſſive, were it not in regard of his providence, wherein he took order for his own eſtate, that depended upon theirs. But the young nephew, taking little heed of dangers far off, regarded only the things preſent; the weakneſs of

Rome;

Rome; the prevalent fortunes of *Carthage*; and the much money that his grandfather had laid out in vain, to ſhoulder up a falling houſe. Wherefore he dealt with *Hannibal*, who readily entered into good correſpondence with him; that was maintained by *Hippocrates* and *Epicides*, *Carthaginians* born, but grand-children of a baniſhed *Syracuſian*. Theſe grew into ſuch favour with *Hieronymus*, that they drew him whither they liſted. So that when *Appius Claudius*, the *Roman* pretor, hearing what was towards, made a motion of renewing the confederacy between the people of *Rome* and the king of *Syracuſe*, his meſſengers were diſmiſſed with an open ſcoff. For *Hieronymus* would needs have them tell him the order of the fight at *Cannæ*, that he might thereby learn how to accommodate himſelf: ſaying, that he could hardly believe the *Carthaginians*; ſo wonderful was the victory, as they reported it. Having thus diſmiſſed the *Romans*, he ſent ambaſſadors to *Carthage*, where he concluded a league: with condition, at firſt, that a great part of the iſland ſhould be annexed to his dominion; but afterwards, that he ſhould reign over all *Sicily*, and the *Carthaginians* reſt ſatisfied with what they could get in *Italy*. At theſe doings *Ap. Claudius* did not greatly ſtir; partly for the indignities that were offered; partly for that it behoved not the *Romans* to entertain more quarrels than were enforced upon them by neceſſity; and partly (as may ſeem) for that the reputation both of himſelf, and of his city, had received ſuch blemiſh by that which happened unto him in his journey, as much diſcountenanced him when he came into *Sicily*, and forbade him to look big. The money that *Hiero* had beſtowed formerly upon the *Romans*, wherewith to relieve them in their neceſſity, this *Appius* was to carry back unto him; it being refuſed by the *Roman* ſenate with greater bravery than their preſent fortune would allow. But inſtead of returning the money with thanks, as he had been directed, and as it had been noiſed abroad that he ſhould do; the war againſt *Philip*, king of *Macedon* (whereof we have ſpoken before) compelled the *Romans* to lay aſide their vain-glory, and ſend word after him, that he ſhould conſign that money over to *Marcus Valerius*; of whoſe voyage into *Greece*, the city had not otherwiſe wherewith to bear the charge. This was done accordingly, and hereby *Claudius* (which name, in the whole continuance of that family, is taxed with pride) his errand was changed, from a glorious oſtentation of the *Roman* magnanimity, into ſuch a pitiful tune of thankſgiving, as muſt needs have bred ſorrow and commiſeration, in ſo true a friend as *Hiero*; or, if it were delivered after his death, matter of paſtime and ſcorn, in *Hieronymus*, the new king.

But whilſt *Hieronymus* was more deſirous of war, than well reſolved how to begin it; his own death changed the form of things, and bred a great innovation in the ſtate of *Syracuſe*, which thereby might have proſpered more than ever, had it been wiſely governed. *Hippocrates* and *Epicides*, of whom we ſpoke before, were ſent about the country with two thouſand men, to ſollicit the towns, and perſwade them to ſhake off their obedience to the *Romans*. The king himſelf, with an army of fifteen thouſand horſe and foot, went to *Leontium*, a city of his own dominion, hoping that the fame of his preparation would make the whole iſland fall to him in all haſte, and accept him for ſoveraign. There the conſpirators took him on the ſudden, as he was paſſing through a narrow ſtreet; and, ruſhing between him and his guard, ſtruck him dead. Forthwith liberty was proclaimed, and the ſound of that word ſo joyfully anſwered by the *Leontines*, that the guard of *Hieronymus* had little courage to revenge their maſter's death. Yet for fear of the worſt, a great largeſs was promiſed unto the ſoldiers, with rewards unto their captains; which wrought ſo effectually, that when many wicked acts of the murdered king were reckoned up, the army, as in deteſtation of his bad life, ſuffered his carcaſe to lie unburied. Theſe news ran quickly to *Syracuſe*, whither ſome of the conſpirators, taking alſo of the king's horſes, poſted away, to ſignify all that had paſſed, to ſtir up the people to liberty, and to prevent *Andronodorus*, if he or his fellows would make offer to uſurp a tyranny. The *Syracuſians* hereupon preſently took arms, and made themſelves maſters of their own city. *Andronodorus*, on the other ſide, fortified the palace and the iſland; being yet uncertain what to do, between deſire of making himſelf a ſoveraign lord, and fear of ſuffering puniſhment as a tyrant, if his enterprize miſcarried. His wife *Demarata*, that was the daughter of *Hiero*, cheriſhed him in his hopes, putting him in mind of that well-known proverb which *Dionyſius* had uſed; *That a tyrant ſhould keep his place, till he were haled out of it by the heels, and not ride away from it on horſe-back.* But fear, and better counſel prevailed ſo far, that *Andronodorus*, having ſlept upon the matter, diſſembled his affections, and deferred his hope unto better opportunity. The next day he came forth, and made a ſpeech unto the people, telling them, that he was glad to ſee how prudently they behaved themſelves in ſo great a change; that he had ſtood in fear, leſt they would not havecontained themſelves within bounds of diſcretion, but rather have ſought to murder all, without difference, that any-way belonged to the tyrant; and that ſince he beheld their orderly proceeding, and their care not to raviſh their liberty perforce, but to wed it unto them for ever; he was willingly come to them forth of his ſtrength, and ſurrendered up the charge committed unto him, by one that had been an evil maſter both to him and them. Hereupon great joy was made, and pretors choſen (as in former times) to govern the city; of which *Andronodorus* was one, and the chief. But ſuch was his deſire of ſoveraignty, and ſo vehement were the inſtigations of his wife, that ſhortly he began to practiſe with *Hippocrates*, *Epicides*, and other captains of the mercenaries; hoping to make himſelf ſtrong by their help, that were leaſt pleaſed with the change. *Hippocrates* and *Epicides* had been with the *Syracuſian* pretors, and told them, that, being ſent from *Hannibal* to *Hieronymus*, they, according to inſtructions of their captain, had done him, whilſt he lived, what ſervice they could; and that now they were deſirous to return home. They requeſted therefore that they might be friendly diſmiſſed, and with a convoy, that might keep them from falling into the hands of the *Romans*, and ſet them ſafe at *Locri*. This was eaſily granted, both for that the *Syracuſian* magiſtrates were well contented to earn thanks of *Hannibal* with ſuch a little courteſy; and for that they thought it expedient to rid their town quickly of this troubleſome couple, which were good ſoldiers, and gracious with the army, but otherwiſe lewd men. It was not the deſire of theſe two *Sicilians* to be gone ſo haſtily as they made ſhew; they were more mindful of the buſineſs for which *Hannibal* had ſent them. Wherefore they inſinuated themſelves into the boſoms of ſuch as were moſt likely to fill the army with tumult, eſpecially of the *Roman* fugitives, and thoſe that had cauſe to miſtruſt what ſhould become of themſelves, when the *Romans* and *Syracuſians* were come to agreement. Such inſtruments as theſe *Andronodorus* had great need of; as alſo of many other, to help him in his dangerous attempt.

attempt. He found *Themiſtius*, that had married *Harmonia*, the ſiſter of *Hieronymus*, ready to take his part; as being carried with the like paſſions of his own, and of his wife. But in ſeeking to increaſe the number of his adherents, he revealed the matter to one, that revealed all to the reſt of the pretors. Hereupon it followed, that he and *Themiſtius* entering into the ſenate, were ſlain out of hand; and afterwards accuſed to the people of all the evil which they had done whilſt *Hieronymus* lived, as by his authority; and now ſince attempted, in ſeeking to uſurp the tyranny themſelves. It was alſo declared, that the daughters of *Hiero* and *Gelo* were acceſſary to this dangerous treaſon; and that the unquiet ſpirits of theſe women would never ceaſe to work, until they had recovered thoſe royal ornaments, and ſoveraign power, whereof their family was now diſpoſſeſſed. Theſe daughters therefore of *Hiero* and *Gelo* were alſo condemned to die, and executioners preſently ſent by the enraged people to take away their lives. *Demarata* and *Harmonia* had perhaps deſerved this heavy ſentence; but *Heraclea*, the daughter of *Hiero*, and wife of *Soſippus*, being altogether innocent, was murdered, together with her two young daughters, in the haſty execution of this raſh judgment. Her huſband *Soſippus*, was a lover of the common-wealth, and in that reſpect ſo hated by *Hieronymus*, that being ſent ambaſſador to king *Ptolemy*, &c. he durſt not return home, but ſtayed in *Egypt*, as a baniſhed man. This conſideration, when it was too late, together with ſome pitiful accidents accompanying the ſlaughter, ſo affected the multitude, that (pardoning themſelves) all cried out upon the authors of ſo foul a butchery. Being thus incenſed againſt the ſenate, and knowing not otherwiſe how to ſatisfy their anger, they called for an election of new pretors, in the room of *Andronodorus* and *Themiſtius*, that were lately ſlain; meaning to ſubſtitute ſuch in their places, as the ſenators ſhould have little cauſe to like. At the election were preſent a great rout, not only of the poorer citizens, but of ſoldiers that preſſed into the throng. One of theſe named *Epicides* pretor; another named *Hippocrates*: and the leſs that the old pretors and ſenators approved this nomination, the more eager was the multitude; and, by a general cry, forced them to be accepted. Theſe, being made pretors, did what they could to hinder the agreement that was in hand between the *Syracuſians* and the *Romans*. But having ſtriven in vain, and ſeeing that the people ſtood in fear of *Ap. Claudius*, and of *Marcellus*, that was lately come into *Sicily*, they gave way unto the time, and ſuffered the old league of *Hiero* to be re-confirmed; which afterwards they purpoſed to diſſolve by practice. The *Leontines* had ſome need of a garriſon, and to them was ſent *Hippocrates* the pretor, attended by ſuch fugitives and mercenary ſoldiers as were moſt burdenſome to *Syracuſe*. Thither when he came, he began to do many acts of hoſtility againſt the *Romans*: firſt in ſecret, afterwards more openly and boldly. *Marcellus*, rightly underſtanding the purpoſe of theſe two brethren, ſent word unto the *Syracuſians*, that they had already broken the league; and that the peace would never be kept ſincerely, until this turbulent pair of brethren were expelled the iſland. *Epicides*, fearing to bear the blame of his brother's proceedings, and more deſirous to ſet forward the war, than to excuſe any breach of peace, went himſelf unto the *Leontines*, whom he perſwaded to rebel againſt the *Syracuſians*. For he ſaid, that ſince they had all of late ſerved one maſter, there was little reaſon why the *Leontines* ſhould not be enfranchiſed by his death, as well as the *Syracuſians*; yea, or much rather, all things conſidered; ſince in their ſtreets the tyrant was ſlain, and liberty firſt proclaimed. Wherefore, ſince they of *Syracuſe* were not contented to enjoy the freedom purchaſed among the *Leontines*, but thought it good reaſon that they ſhould bear dominion over thoſe that had broken the chain, wherewith the one and the other were bound; his advice was, that ſuch their arrogancy ſhould be checked betimes, ere it could get any colour of right by preſcription. Hereunto occaſion was given by one article of the league made of late by the *Romans* and *Syracuſians*. For it was agreed, *That all which had been ſubject to* Hiero *and* Hieronymus, *ſhould henceforth be vaſſals unto the ſtate of* Syracuſe. Againſt this article, if the *Leontines* would take exception, and thereby challenge their own due; *Epicides* told them, that in this novelty of change, they had fit opportunity to recover the freedom which their fathers had loſt not many ages before. Neither was it unreaſonable which this crafty *Carthaginian* propounded, if the *Leontines* had been ſubdued by the ſame hand which took liberty from the *Syracuſians*. But ſeeing they had long ſince yielded unto *Syracuſe*, and been ſubject unto that city, by what form ſoever it was governed, this claim of liberty was rather ſeaſonable than juſt. Nevertheleſs, the motion of *Epicides* was highly approved; inſomuch that when meſſengers came ſoon after from *Syracuſe*, to rebuke the *Leontines* for that which they had done againſt the *Romans*, and to denounce unto *Hippocrates* and *Epicides*, that they ſhould get them gone either to *Locri*, or whither elſe they liſted, ſo that they ſtayed not in *Sicily*; word was returned, that they of *Leontium* had not requeſted the *Syracuſians* to make any bargains for them with the *Romans*, nor thought themſelves bound to obſerve the covenants, which others, without warrant, had made in their names. This peremptory anſwer was forthwith reported unto *Marcellus* by the *Syracuſians*, who offered him their aſſiſtance in doing juſtice upon the *Leontines*, their rebels; with condition that when the town was taken, it might be theirs again. *Marcellus* required no better ſatisfaction, but forthwith took the buſineſs in hand, which he diſpatched in one day. At the firſt aſſault, *Leontium* was taken: all, ſave the caſtle, whereinto *Hippocrates* and *Epicides* fled; and, ſtealing thence away by night, conveyed themſelves into the town of *Herbeſus*. The firſt thing that *Marcellus* did, when he had won the town, was the ſame which other *Roman* captains uſed after victory; to ſeek out the fugitive *Roman* ſlaves and renegadoes, whom he cauſed all to die: the reſt, both of the townſmen and ſoldiers, he took to mercy; forbearing alſo to ſtrip or ſpoil them. But the fame of his doings was bruited after a contrary ſort. It was ſaid, that he had ſlain man, woman and child, and put the town to ſack. Theſe news met the *Syracuſian* army upon the way, as it was going to join with *Marcellus*, who had ended his buſineſs before. About eight thouſand mercenaries there were that had been ſent out of *Syracuſe*, under *Soſis* and *Dinomenes*, two of the pretors, to ſerve againſt the *Leontines*, and other rebels. Theſe captains were honeſt men, and well affected to their country; but the ſoldiers that followed them, had thoſe diſeaſes with which all mercenaries are commonly infected. They took the matter deeply to heart, that their fellow-ſoldiers (as now they termed thoſe againſt whom they went) had been ſo cruelly butchered: and hereupon they fell to mutiny, though what to demand, or with whom to be angry, they could not tell. The pretors therefore thought it beſt to turn their unquiet thoughts another way,

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and ſet them at work in ſome place elſe; foraſmuch as at *Leontium* there was no need of their ſervice. So toward *Herbeſus* they marched, where lay *Hippocrates* and *Epicides*, the architects of all this miſchief, deviſing what further harm they might do; but now ſo weakly accompanied, that they ſeemed unable to eſcape the puniſhments belonging to their offences paſs'd. Hereof the two brethren were no leſs well aware, and therefore adventured upon a remedy little leſs deſperate than their preſent caſe. They iſſued out of *Herbeſus* unarmed, with olive-branches in their hands, in manner of ſupplicants, and ſo preſented themſelves to the army. Six hundred men of *Crete* were in the vanguard, that had been well uſed by *Hieronymus*; and ſome of them greatly bound unto *Hannibal*, who had taken them priſoners in the *Italian* war, and lovingly diſmiſſed them. Theſe *Cretans* therefore welcomed the two brethren, and bade them be of good chear; ſaying, that no man ſhould do them harm as long as they could uſe their weapons. Herewithal the army was at a ſtand, and the rumour of this accident ran ſwiftly from man to man, with general approbation. The pretors thought to help the matter by ſeverity, which would not ſerve. For when they commanded theſe two traitors to be laid in irons, the exclamation was ſo violent againſt them, that fain they were to let all alone, and return, uncertain what courſe to take, unto *Megara*, where they were lodged the night before. Thither when they came, *Hippocrates* deviſed a trick, whereby to help himſelf, and better the uncertain caſe wherein he ſtood. He cauſed letters of his own penning to be intercepted by ſome of his moſt truſty *Cretans*; directed (as they made ſhew) from the *Syracuſian* pretors to *Marcellus*. The contents hereof were, that *Marcellus* had well done in committing all to the ſword among the *Leontines*; but that it farther behoved him to make the like diſpatch of all the mercenaries belonging to *Syracuſe*, which were offenſive, all of them in general, to the liberty of the city, and the peace with *Rome*. When this counterfeit epiſtle was openly rehearſed, the uproar was ſuch, that *Soſis* and his fellow-pretor were glad to forſake the camp, and fly for their lives. All the *Syracuſians* remaining behind, had been cut in pieces by the enraged ſoldiers, if the two artificers of the ſedition had not ſaved their lives, rather to keep them as pledges, and by them, to win their friends within the town, than for any good-will. They perſwaded alſo a miſchievous knave, that had ſerved among the *Leontines*, to juſtify the bruit of *Marcellus*'s cruelty; and to carry home the news to *Syracuſe*, as an eye-witneſs. This incenſed not only the multitude, but ſome of the ſenate, and filled the whole town with cauſeleſs indignation. In good time (ſaid ſome) was the avarice and cruelty of the *Romans* detected; who, had they in like ſort gotten into *Syracuſe*, would have dealt much worſe, where their greedy appetites might have been tempted with a far greater booty. Whilſt they were thus diſcourſing and deviſing how to keep out the wicked *Romans*, *Hippocrates*, with his army, came to the gates, exhorting the citizens to let him in, unleſs for want of help, they would be betrayed to their enemies. The pretors, with the beſt and wiſeſt of the ſenate, would fain have kept him out; but the violence of the ſoldiers to force a gate, was no whit greater than the head-ſtrong fury of thoſe within the town, that laboured to break it open. So he entered, and immediately fell upon the pretors, whom (being forſaken by all men) he put to the ſword, and made ſlaughter of them and their followers until night. The next day he went openly to work; and, after the common example of tyrants, gave liberty to all ſlaves and priſoners; and being fortified with adherents of the worſt and baſeſt ſort, made himſelf and his brother pretors, in title, but in effect, lords of *Syracuſe*.

When *Marcellus* was advertiſed of this great alteration, he thought it no time for him to ſit ſtill, and attend the further iſſue. He ſent ambaſſadors to *Syracuſe*, that were not admitted into the haven, but chaſed out as enemies. Then drew he near with his army, and lodging within a mile and an half of the town, ſent before him ſome to require a parley. Theſe were entertained without the walls by the two new pretors, to whom they declared, that the *Romans* were come thither, not with purpoſe to do hurt, but in favour of the *Syracuſians*, which were oppreſſed by tyrants; and to puniſh thoſe that had murdered and baniſhed ſo many of the principal citizens. Wherefore they required, that thoſe worthy men, their confederates, which were chaſed out of the town, might be ſuffered to return, and enjoy their own; as alſo that the authors of the great ſlaughter lately committed, might be delivered up. Hereto *Epicides* briefly anſwered, that if their errand had been to him, he could have told what to ſay to them: but ſince it was directed unto others, they ſhould do well to return, when thoſe, to whom they were ſent, had the government in their hands. As for the war which they threatened, he told them, they ſhould find by experience, that to beſiege *Syracuſe*, was another manner of work than to take *Leontium*. Thus he ſent them gone, and returned back into the city. Immediately began the ſiege, which endured longer than the *Romans* had expected. The quick and eaſy winning of *Leontium*, did put *Marcellus* in hope, that ſo long a circuit of walls as compaſſed *Syracuſe*, being manned with no better kind of ſoldiers than thoſe with whom he had lately dealt, would, in ſome part or other, be taken at the firſt aſſault. Wherefore he omitted no violence or terror in the very beginning, but did his beſt both by land and ſea. Nevertheleſs, all his labour was diſappointed, and his hope of prevailing by open force taken from him, by the ill ſucceſs of two or three of the firſt aſſaults. Yet was it not the virtue of the defendants, or any ſtrength of the city, that bred ſuch deſpair of haſty victory. But there lived at that time in *Syracuſe*, *Archimedes* the noble mathematician, who, at the requeſt of *Hiero* the late king, that was his kinſman, had framed ſuch engines of war, as being in this extremity put in uſe, did more miſchief to the *Romans* than could have been wrought by the cannon, or any inſtruments of gun-powder, had they in that age been known. This *Archimedes*, diſcourſing once with *Hiero*, maintained, that it were poſſible to remove the whole earth out of the place wherein it is, if there were ſome other earth, or place of ſure footing, whereon a man might ſtand. For proof of this bold aſſertion, he performed ſome ſtrange works, which made the king intreat him to convert his ſtudy unto things of uſe, that might preſerve the city from danger of enemies. To ſuch mechanical works *Archimedes*, and the philoſophers of thoſe times, had little affection. They held it an injury done unto the liberal ſciences, to ſubmit learned propoſitions unto the workmanſhip and gain of baſe handicraftſmen. And of this opinion *Plato* was an author, who greatly blamed ſome geometricians, that ſeemed unto him to profane their ſcience, by making it vulgar. Neither muſt we raſhly taſk a man ſo wiſe as *Plato*, with the imputation of ſupercilious auſterity, or affected ſingularity in his reprehenſion. For it hath been the unhappy fate of great inven-

tions, to be vilified as idle fancies, or dreams, before they were publiſhed; and being once made known, to be under-valued, as falling within compaſs of the meaneſt wit, and things, that every one could well have performed. Hereof (to omit that memorable example of *Columbus*'s diſcovery, with the much different ſorts of neglect which he underwent before and after it) in a familiar and moſt homely example, we may ſee moſt apparent proof. He that looks upon our *Engliſh* brewers, and their ſervants, that are daily exerciſed in the trade, will think it ridiculous to hear one ſay, that the making of malt was an invention proceeding from ſome of an extraordinary knowledge in natural philoſophy. Yet is not the ſkill of the inventors any whit the leſs, for that the labour of workmanſhip grows to be the trade of ignorant men. The like may be ſaid of many handicrafts, and particularly in the printing of books, which being deviſed and bettered by great ſcholars and wiſe men, grew afterwards corrupted by thoſe to whom the practice fell; that is, by ſuch as could ſlubber things eaſily over, and feed their workmen at the cheapeſt rate. In this reſpect therefore, the alchymiſts, and all others, that have, or would ſeem to have, any ſecret ſkill, whereof the publication might do good unto mankind, are not without excuſe of their cloſe concealing. For it is a kind of injuſtice, that the long travels of an underſtanding brain, beſide the loſs of time, and other expence, ſhould be caſt away upon men of no worth, or yield leſs benefit unto the author of ſo great a work, than to meer ſtrangers; and perhaps his enemies. And ſurely, if the paſſion of envy have in it any thing allowable and natural, as having anger, fear, and other the like affections; it is in ſome ſuch caſe as this, and ſerveth againſt thoſe which would uſurp the knowledge wherewith God hath denied to endue them. Nevertheleſs, if we have regard unto common charity, and the great affection that every one ought to bear to the generality of mankind, after the example of him *that ſuffereth his ſun to ſhine upon the juſt and unjuſt*; it will appear more commendable in wiſe men to enlarge themſelves, and to publiſh unto the world thoſe good things that lie buried in their own boſoms. This ought ſpecially to be done, when a profitable knowledge hath not annexed to it ſome dangerous cunning, that may be perverted by evil men to a miſchievous uſe. For if the ſecret of any rare antidote contained in it the ſkill of giving ſome deadly and irrecoverable poiſon, much better it were that ſuch a jewel remain cloſe in the hands of a wiſe and honeſt man, than being made common, bind all men to uſe the remedy, by teaching the worſt men how to do miſchief. But the works, which *Archimedes* publiſhed, were ſuch as tended to very commendable ends. They were engines, ſerving unto the defence of *Syracuſe*; not fit for the *Syracuſians* to carry abroad, to the hurt and oppreſſion of others. Neither did he altogether publiſh the knowledge how to uſe them; but reſerved ſo much to his own direction, that after his death more of the ſame kind were not made, nor thoſe of his own making were employed by the *Romans*. It ſufficed unto this worthy man, that he had approved even unto the vulgar the dignity of his ſcience, and done eſpecial benefit unto his country: for to enrich a mechanical trade, or teach the art of murdering men, it was beſides his purpoſe.

Marcellus had cauſed certain of his *Quinquereme* gallies to be faſtened together, and towers erected on them, to beat the defendants from the wall. Againſt theſe *Archimedes* had ſundry devices, of which any one ſort might have repelled the aſſailants; but all of them together ſhewed the multiplicity of his great wit. He ſhot heavy ſtones, and long pieces of timber, like unto the yards of ſhips, which brake ſome of the gallies by their force and weight. Theſe afflicted ſuch as lay far off. They that were come nearer the walls, lay open to a continual volley of ſhot, which they could not endure. Some with an iron graple were taken by the prow, and hoiſted up, ſhaking out all the men, and afterwards falling down into the water. Some by ſtrange engines were lifted up into the air, where turning round a-while, they were broken againſt the walls, or caſt upon the rocks; and all of them were ſo beaten, that they durſt never come to any ſecond aſſault. In the like ſort was the land-army handled, ſtones and timber falling upon it like hail, did not only overwhelm the men, but broke down the *Roman* engines of battery, and forced *Marcellus* to give over the aſſault. For remedy hereof it was conceived, that if the *Romans* could early, before day, get near unto the walls, they ſhould be (as it were) under the *point-blanc*, and receive no hurt by theſe terrible inſtruments, which were wound up hard, to ſhoot a great compaſs. But this vain hope coſt many of the aſſailants lives, for the ſhot came down-right upon them; and, beating them from all parts of the wall, made a great ſlaughter of them all the way as they fled (for they were unable to ſtay by it) even till they were gotten very far off. This did ſo terrify the *Romans*, that if they perceived any piece of timber, or a rope's end, upon the walls, they ran away, crying out, that *Archimedes*'s engines were ready to diſcharge. Neither knew *Marcellus* how to overcome theſe difficulties, or to take away from his men that fear, againſt the cauſe whereof he knew no remedy. If the engines had ſtood upon the wall, ſubject to firing, or any ſuch annoyance from without, he might have holpen it by ſome device to make them unſerviceable. But all, or moſt of them, were out of ſight, being erected in the ſtreets behind the walls, where *Archimedes* gave directions how to uſe them. Wherefore the *Roman* had none other way left, than to cut off from the town all proviſion of victuals both by land and by ſea. This was a very deſperate piece of work: for the enemies having ſo goodly an haven, the ſea in a manner free, and the *Carthaginians*, that were ſtrong by ſea, willing to ſupply them, were not likely ſo ſoon to be conſumed with famine, as the beſiegers to be wearied out, by lying in leaguer before ſo ſtrong a city, having no probability to carry it. Yet, for want of better counſel to follow, this was thought the beſt and moſt honourable courſe.

In the mean while *Himilco*, admiral of a *Carthaginian* fleet, that had waited long about *Sicily*, being by *Hippocrates* advertiſed of theſe paſſages, went home to *Carthage*; and there ſo dealt with the ſenate, that twenty-five thouſand foot, three thouſand horſe, and twelve elephants, were committed unto his charge, wherewith to make war upon the *Romans* in *Sicily* by land. He took many towns, and many, that had anciently belonged unto the *Carthaginians*, did yield unto him. To remedy this miſchief, and to ſtay the inclination of men, which following the current of fortune, began to turn unto the *Carthaginians*, *Marcellus*, with a great part of his army, roſe from *Syracuſe*, and went from place to place about the iſland. He took *Pelorus* and *Herbeſus*, which yielded unto him. He took alſo *Megara* by force, and ſacked it, either to terrify others that were obſtinate, eſpecially the *Syracuſians*; or elſe becauſe *Rome* was at this time poor, and his army muſt have ſomewhat to keep it in heart. His

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eſpecial deſire was to have ſaved *Agrigentum:* whither he came too late; for *Himilco* had gotten it before. Therefore he returned back toward *Syracuſe*; carefully, and in as good order as he could, for fear of the *Carthaginian*, that was too ſtrong for him. The circumſpection that he uſed, in regard of *Himilco*, ſtood him in good ſtead, againſt a danger that he had not miſtruſted. For *Hippocrates*, leaving the charge of *Syracuſe* unto his brother, had lately iſſued out of the city, with ten thouſand foot; and five hundred horſe; intending to join his forces with *Himilco*. *Marcellus* fell upon him, ere either were aware of the other: and the *Romans*, being in good order, got an eaſy victory againſt the diſperſed, and half-unarmed *Syracuſians*. The reputation hereof helped a little to keep the *Sicilians* from rebellion. Yet it was not long, ere *Himilco*, joining with *Hippocrates*, ran over all the iſland at his pleaſure; and preſented battel to *Marcellus*, even at his trenches; but the *Roman* wiſely refuſed it. *Bomilcar* alſo, a *Carthaginian*, entred with a great fleet into the haven of *Syracuſe*, and victualled the city. After this, the diſpoſition of the iſlanders changed ſo again, that although another legion was come from *Rome*, which eſcaped from *Himilco*, and ſafely arrived at *Marcellus*'s camp: yet many places revolted unto the *Carthaginians*; and ſlew or betrayed the *Roman* garriſons.

In the midſt of theſe troubles, winter enforced both parts to take breath a while: and *Marcellus* leaving ſome of his army before *Syracuſe*, that he might not ſeem to have given over the ſiege, went unto *Leontium*; where he lay intentive to all occaſions. In the beginning of the ſpring, he ſtood in doubt, whether it were better to continue the laborious work of beſieging *Syracuſe*; or to turn all his forces to *Agrigentum*, againſt *Himilco* and *Hippocrates*. But it would greatly have impaired his reputation, if he had gone from *Syracuſe*, as unable to prevail: and he himſelf was of an eager diſpoſition, ever unwilling to give ground, or to quit, as not feaſible, an enterpriſe, that he had once taken in hand. He came therefore to *Syracuſe:* where, though he found all the difficulties remaining as before, and no likelihood to take the city by force or famine; yet was he not without hope, that continuance of time would bring forth ſomewhat, which might fulfil his deſire. Eſpecially he aſſayed to prevail by treaſon; againſt which no place can hold out. And to this end, he dealt with the *Syracuſian* gentlemen that were in his camp; exhorting them to practiſe with their friends that remained in the city. This was not eaſy for them to do; becauſe the town would hearken to no parley. At length a ſlave unto one of theſe baniſhed men, making ſhew to run away from his maſter, got into *Syracuſe*; where he talked in private with ſome few, as he had been inſtructed. Thus began *Marcellus* to have intelligence within the city: whence the conſpirators uſed to ſend him advertiſement of their proceedings, by a fiſher-boat that paſſed forth in the night. But when they were grown to the number of fourſcore, and thought themſelves able to effect ſomewhat of importance: all was diſcovered; and they, like traitors, put to death. In the mean while, one *Damaſippus*, a *Lacedemonian*, that had been ſent out of the town, as an ambaſſador to *Philip*, king of *Macedon*, was fallen into the hands of *Marcellus*. *Epicides* was very deſirous to ranſome him: and many meetings were appointed for that purpoſe, not far from the walls. There one of the *Romans* looking upon the wall, and wanting the more compendious art of geometry, fell to numbring the ſtones: and, making an eſtimate of the height, judged it leſs than it had been formerly deemed. Herewith he acquainted *Marcellus:* who cauſing better notice to be taken of the place, and finding that ladders of no extraordinary length would reach it; made all things ready, and waited a convenient time. It was the weakeſt part of the town, and therefore the moſt ſtrongly guarded: neither was there hope to prevail by force againſt *Archimedes*, if they failed to take it by ſurpriſe. But a fugitive out of the town brought word, that a great feaſt was to be held unto *Diana*, which was to laſt three days: and that, becauſe other good chear was not ſo plentiful within the city, as in former times, *Epicides*, to gratify the people, had made the more large diſtribution of wine. A better opportunity could not be wiſhed. Wherefore *Marcellus*, in the dead of the feſtival night, came unto the walls; which he took by *Scalado*. *Syracuſe* was divided into four parts (or five, if *Epipolæ* were reckoned as one) each of which was fortified as diſtinct cities. When therefore *Marcellus* had gotten ſome pieces, he had the commodity of a better and ſafe lodging, with good ſtore of booty; and better opportunity than before, to deal with the reſt. For there were now a great many, as well of thoſe in *Acradina*, and the iſland, inner parts of the town, as of thoſe that were already in the hands of *Marcellus*, that began to hearken unto compoſition; as being much terrified by the loſs of thoſe parts, which the *Romans* had taken and ſack'd. As for the weapons of *Archimedes*, little harm, or none, they did unto thoſe that were ſheltred under ſtrong houſes: although it may ſeem, that the inner walls, were not altogether unfurniſhed of his help; ſince they held out a good while, and were not taken by force. The *Roman* fugitives, and renegadoes, were more careful than ever to defend the reſt of the city; being ſure to be rewarded with a cruel death, if *Marcellus* could prevail. *Hippocrates* and *Himilco*, were daily expected; and *Bomilcar* was ſent away to *Carthage*, to bring help from thence. It was not long ere *Hippocrates* and *Himilco* came: who fell upon the old camp of the *Romans*, whilſt *Epicides* ſallied out of *Acradina* upon *Marcellus*. But the *Romans* made ſuch defence in each part, that the aſſailants were repelled. Nevertheleſs, they continued to beſet *Marcellus:* whom they held in a manner as ſtreightly beſieged, as he himſelf did beſiege the town. But the peſtilence at length conſumed, together with the two captains, a great part of the army, and cauſed the reſt to diſlodge. The *Romans* were (though ſomewhat leſs) afflicted with the ſame peſtilence, inſomuch that *Bomilcar* did put the city of *Carthage* in hope, that he might be taken where he lay, if any great forces were ſent thither. This *Bomilcar* wanted no deſire to do his country ſervice: but his courage was not anſwerable to his good will. He arrived at *Pachynus* with a ſtrong fleet: where he ſtayed; being loth to double the cape; for that the winds did better ſerve the enemy than him. Thither ſailed *Epicides* out of *Syracuſe*; to acquaint him with the neceſſities of the city, and to draw him on. With much intreaty, at length he came forwards: but meeting with the *Roman* fleet, that was ready for him, he ſtood off into the deep; and ſailed away to *Tarentum*, bidding *Sicily* farewell. Then durſt not *Epicides* return into *Syracuſe*, but went to *Agrigentum:* where he expected the iſſue, with a very faint hope of hearing any good news.

The *Sicilian* ſoldiers, that remained alive of *Hippocrates*'s army, lay as near as they could ſafely,

ſafely, unto *Marcellus*; and ſome of them, in a ſtrong town three miles off. Theſe had done what good they could to *Syracuſe*, by doing what hurt they could unto the *Romans*. But when they were informed, that the ſtate of *Sicily* was given as deſperate by the *Carthaginians*: they ſent ambaſſadors to treat of peace; and made offer to compound, both for themſelves, and for the town: hereunto *Marcellus* willingly gave ear: for he had ſtayed there long enough; and had cauſe to fear, that after a little while, the *Carthaginians* might come thither ſtrong again. He therefore agreed, both with the citizens, and with the ſoldiers that lay abroad; that they ſhould be maſters of their own, enjoying their liberty and proper laws; yet ſuffering the *Romans* to poſſeſs whatſoever had belonged unto the Kings. Hereupon they, to whom *Epicides* had left his charge, were put to death; new pretors choſen; and the gates even ready to be opened unto *Marcellus*: when ſuddenly the *Roman* fugitives diſturbed all. Theſe perceiving their own condition to be deſperate, perſwaded the other mercenary ſoldiers, that the citizens had bargained for themſelves, and betrayed the army to the *Romans*. Wherefore they preſently took arms, and fell upon the new choſen pretors; whom they ſlew, and made election of ſix captains that ſhould command over all. But ſhortly it was found out, that there was no danger at all to the ſoldiers; excepting only the fugitives. The treaty therefore was again ſet on foot, and wanted little of concluſion; which yet was delayed, either by ſome fear of the citizens, that had ſeen (as they thought) proof of the *Roman* avarice in the ſack of *Epipolæ*, *Tyche*, and *Neapolis*, the parts already taken; or by ſome deſire of *Marcellus* to get the town by force, that he might uſe the liberty of a conqueror, and make it wholly ſubject unto *Rome*. *Mericus*, a *Spaniard*, was one of the ſix captains, that had been choſen in the laſt commotion: a man of ſuch faith, as uſually is found in mercenaries; holding his own particular benefit above all other reſpects. With this captain, *Marcellus* dealt ſecretly: having a fit inſtrument, of the ſame nation, one *Belligenes*; that went in company with the *Roman* ambaſſadors, daily paſſing to and fro. This crafty agent perſwaded *Mericus*, that the *Romans* had already gotten all *Spain*: and that if ever he purpoſed to make his own fortune good, either at home in *Spain*, or any-where elſe; it was now the only time to do it; by conforming himſelf to the will of the *Roman* general. By ſuch hopes the *Spaniſh* captain was eaſily won: and ſent forth his own brother among the *Syracuſian* ambaſſadors, to ratify the covenant with *Marcellus*.

This under-hand dealing of *Marcellus* againſt the *Syracuſians*, cannot well be commended as honeſt: neither was it afterwards throughly approved at his coming to *Rome*. For the benefits of *Hiero* to the *Romans* had been ſuch, as deſerved not to be requited with the ruin of his country: much leſs, that the miſeries of his people, oppreſſed (though partly through their own folly) by an army of mercenaries, ſhould miniſter unto the people of *Rome*, advantage againſt them. The poor citizens could not make good their parts againſt the hired ſoldiers; and therefore were fain to yield unto the time, and obey thoſe miniſters of *Hannibal*, that ruled the army. But as long as they were free after the death of *Hieronymus*; and now of late, when they had gathered courage by the flight of *Epicides*: it had been their chief care to maintain amity with the people of *Rome*. They had lately ſlain many the principal of *Epicides*'s followers; and many of themſelves had alſo been ſlain, both lately and in former times, becauſe of this their deſire unto the peace. What though it were true, that the raſcality, and ſome ill adviſed perſons, joined with the ſoldiers in hatred of the *Romans*, by occaſion of the ſlaughter which they heard to be done at *Leontium*, and afterwards beheld in thoſe parts of their own city which was taken? Ought therefore the *Roman* general, in a treaty of peace held with the *Syracuſians*, to make a bargain under-hand againſt them, with a captain of the mercenaries? Theſe things were objected againſt *Marcellus*, at his return home. But the ſenators thought it a great deal better, to comfort the *Syracuſians* with gentle words, and promiſes of good uſage in time to come; than to reſtore the booty, and give over the dominion of a city, ſo great, wealthy, ſtrong, and many ways important. Nevertheleſs, if we conſider the many inconveniencies and great miſchiefs, whereunto *Syracuſe* was obnoxious, both by evil neighbours, and by that very form of polity, after which it was governed: we may truly affirm, that it received no ſmall benefit, by becoming ſubject unto *Rome*. For thereby it was not only aſſured againſt all foreign enemies, domeſtical conſpiracies, and ſuch tyrants as of old had reigned therein: but freed from the neceſſity of baniſhing, or murdering the moſt worthy citizens; as alſo from all factions, inteſtine ſeditions, and a thouſand the like miſeries, that were wont to grow out of the jealouſy, wherein they held their liberty in vain. Neither enjoyed that city, from her firſt foundation, any ſuch long time of happineſs, as that wherein it flouriſhed, when it reſted ſecure under the protection of *Rome*; and was no more moleſted by the diſeaſe of ambition; whereof by *Marcellus*'s victory it was throughly cured. But ſuch benefit, ariſing from wrongs done, ſerves not to make injuſtice the more excuſable; unleſs we ſhould approve the anſwer of that thief, who being found to have ſtolen a ſilver cup from a ſick man, ſaid, *He never leaves drinking*.

By the treaſon of *Mericus*, the *Roman* army was let into poſſeſſion of all *Syracuſe*: wherein the booty that it found, was ſaid to have been no leſs, than could have been hoped for, if they had taken *Carthage* it ſelf; that maintained war by land and ſea againſt them. All the goodly works and imageries, wherewith *Syracuſe* was marvelloufly adorned, were carried away to *Rome*; and nothing left untouched, ſave only the houſes of thoſe baniſhed men, that had eſcaped from *Hippocrates* and *Epicides*, into the *Roman* camp. Among other pitiful accidents, the death of *Archimedes*, was greatly lamented, even by *Marcellus* himſelf. He was ſo buſy about his geometry, in drawing figures, that he hearkned not to the noiſe and uproar in the city; no, nor greatly attended the rude ſoldier that was about to kill him. *Marcellus* took heavily the death of him; and cauſed his body to be honourably buried. Upon his tomb (as he had ordained in his life-time) was placed a cylinder and ſphere, with an inſcription of the proportion between them; which he firſt found out. An invention of ſo little uſe, as this may ſeem, pleaſed that great artiſt better, than the deviſing of all thoſe engines, that made him ſo famous. Such difference is between the judgment of learned men, and of the vulgar ſort. For many a one would think the money loſt, that had been ſpent upon a ſon, whoſe ſtudies in the univerſity had brought forth ſuch fruit, as the proportion between the ſphere and a cylinder.

After the taking of *Syracuſe*, all the towns in *Sicily* yielded unto the *Romans*; except *Agrigentum*, and

and a few places thereabout. At *Agrigentum* lay *Epicides*, with one *Hanno*, a *Carthaginian*, and *Mutines*, an *African*, that was lately ſent from *Hannibal*. This *Mutines*, by many good pieces of ſervice, had added ſome credit to the beaten *Carthaginian* ſide; and withal made his own name great. By his perſwaſions, *Hanno* and *Epicides* adventured to meet *Marcellus* without the town; and not behave themſelves as men expecting to be beſieged. Neither was he more valiant in counſel, than in execution. Once and again he ſet upon the *Romans*, where they lay encamped; and drove them fearfully into their trenches. This bred envy in *Epicides* and *Hanno*: eſpecially in *Hanno*, that having been lately ſent from *Carthage*, with commiſſion and authority from the ſtate, thought himſelf wronged greatly by *Hannibal*; in that he had ſent unto him this *Mutines*, to be his companion, and to take upon him, like as good a man as himſelf. The indignity ſeemed the greater, when *Mutines* being to ſtep aſide unto *Heraclea*, for the pacifying of ſome troubles there among the *Numidians*, adviſed (as directing *Hanno* and *Epicides*) not to meddle with the enemy, until his return. So much therefore the rather would *Hanno* fight: and offered battel unto *Marcellus*, before he ſought it. It is like, that a great part of the *Roman* army was left behind in *Syracuſe*, as need required: which made the *Carthaginians* the better able to deal with thoſe that came againſt them. But whatſoever diſproportion was between the two armies; far greater were the odds between the captains. For howſoever the people of *Carthage* would give authority by favour; yet could they not give worth, and ability, in matter of war. The *Numidians*, having before conceived ſome diſpleaſure againſt their captains: and being therefore ſome of them gone away to *Heraclea*; were much more offended, when they ſaw that the vain-glorious envy of *Hanno* carried him into the fight, upon a fooliſh deſire to get victory, without the help of *Mutines*, their countryman. Wherefore they ſent unto the *Roman* general, and bade him be confident: for that it was not their purpoſe to ſhew themſelves his enemies that day; but only look on, and ſee the proud *Carthaginians* well beaten, by whom they had been miſuſed. They made good their promiſe, and had their deſire. For *Marcellus* finding likelihood of truth in their meſſage, did ſo luſtily ſet upon the enemies, that he brake them at the firſt charge; and with the ſlaughter of many thouſands, drove them back into *Agrigentum*.

If *Hanno* could have been contented to follow the directions of one, that was a better man of war than himſelf, and not have hazarded a battel without need; the *Romans* would ſhortly have been reduced into terms of great difficulty in their *Sicilian* war. For *Marcellus* was ſhortly after to leave the province; and ſoon upon his departure, there landed in the iſland a ſupply of eight thouſand foot, and three thouſand *Numidian* horſe, that were ſent from *Carthage*. The fame of this new army drew many of the *Sicilians* into rebellion. The *Roman* army, conſiſting (for the moſt part) of the legions of *Cannæ*, took it very heinouſly, that no good ſervice done, could bring them into the favour of the ſenate; but that, as baniſhed men, they were ſent far from home and not ſuffered to return back to *Rome* with their general. *Mutines* had pacified his countrymen the *Numidians*; and, like an honeſt man, did the beſt that he could for thoſe whom he ſerved, without contending againſt the fooliſh pride of *Hanno*. He recovered thoſe inland towns that had rebelled: finding that there was a great alteration; and a greater might have been, if the army lately overthrown had been intire. *M. Cornelius*, the *Roman* pretor, uſed all diligence, both to pacify his own men, and to hinder the *Carthaginians*. He recovered thoſe inland towns that had rebelled: and though he could not hinder *Mutines* from overrunning all the country; yet he hindred the country from revolting unto *Mutines*. Above threeſcore towns, great and ſmall, the *Carthaginians* held in *Sicily*: of which, *Agrigentum* was the principal; and far bigger than any of the reſt. Thence iſſued *Mutines* as often as he pleaſed, in deſpight of the *Romans*: not only to the ſuccour of his own adherents, but to the great waſte of thoſe that followed the contrary part. But *Hanno*, inſtead of being pleaſed with all theſe good ſervices, was filled more and more with envy, againſt the man that performed them. He had (belike) received inſtructions from old *Hanno* at *Carthage*, not to ſuffer *Hannibal*, or any *Hannibalian*, to have ſhare in the honour of theſe *Sicilian* wars: which were therefore perhaps the more diligently ſupplied; whilſt *Italy* was neglected, that ſhould have been regarded more than all the reſt. Wherefore, to ſhew his authority, and that it was not in the power of *Hannibal*, to appoint unto him an aſſiſtant, or director: he took away from *Mutines* his charge, and gave it to his own ſon; thinking thereby to diſcountenance the man, and make him little eſteemed, as one out of office, among his *Numidians*. But it fell out quite contrary: and this ſpightful dealing occaſioned the loſs of whatſoever the *Carthaginians* held in *Sicily*. For the *Numidians* were ſo incenſed by the indignity offered unto their countryman, being ſuch a brave commander, that they offered him their ſervice to requite the wrong, and were thenceforth abſolutely at his own diſpoſition. *M. Valerius Lævinus*, the *Roman* conſul, was newly come into the province, when this fell out: and with him did *Mutines* enter into intelligence. For he could no longer brook theſe indignities: but being neither a *Carthaginian*, nor favoured by thoſe that bore all the ſway in *Carthage*; he thought it the wiſeſt way, to play the beſt of his own game, and forſake that city, which was likely to periſh by the evil counſel that governed it. He did not therefore, as his countrymen had lately done, content himſelf to ſee his adverſaries reap the bitter fruits of their own malicious over-weening: and to ſuffer that harm, in doing whereof he would not bear a part; but conſpired againſt them, to deliver up *Agrigentum*, and to help to expel them utterly out of *Sicily*. The conſul was glad of his friendſhip; and carefully followed his advertiſements. Neither was there much cunning needful, to the performance of that which *Mutines* had undertaken. For he, with his *Numidians*, did forcibly ſeize upon a gate; whereat they let in ſome *Roman* companies, that lay near in a readineſs for the purpoſe. *Hanno*, when firſt he heard the noiſe, thought it had been no worſe matter, than ſome ſuch tumult of the *Numidians*, as he had been well acquainted with of late. But when, making haſte to pacify the trouble, he ſaw and heard the *Romans* intermixed among thoſe diſcontented followers of *Mutines*, forthwith he betook himſelf to flight: and ſaving himſelf, with *Epicides*, in a ſmall bark, ſet ſail for *Afric*; leaving all his army and adherents in *Sicily*, to the mercy of the *Romans*, that henceforward continued maſters of the whole iſland.

Lævinus, the conſul, having taken *Agrigentum*, did ſharp execution of juſtice upon all the citizens. The principal of them he ſcourged with rods, and afterwards beheaded, as was the manner of the *Romans*:

mans: all the reſt of them he ſold for ſlaves, and confiſcated their goods; ſending home to *Rome* the money that was raiſed of the booty. This was indeed a time, wherein *Rome* ſtood in no leſs neceſſity of gold than of ſteel: which may have been the reaſon, why *Lævinus* dealt ſo cruelly with the *Agrigentines*. Nevertheleſs, the fame of ſuch ſeverity bred a terror among all the dependants of the *Carthaginians*; ſo that in great haſte they ſought to make their peace. About forty towns yielded themſelves quickly unto the *Romans*; twenty were delivered up by treaſon; and ſix only ſtaid to be won by force. Theſe things done, *Lævinus* returned home to *Rome*; carrying with him about four thouſand men from *Agatirna*; that were a company of out-laws, bankrupts, and baniſhed men, accuſtomed to live by ſpoil of others, in theſe troubleſome times. He beſtowed them about *Rhegium* in *Italy*, where they might exerciſe their own occupation againſt the *Brutians*, a thieviſh kind of people, that were enemies unto thoſe of *Rhegium*, and to the *Romans*. As for *Mutines*, he was well rewarded, and made citizen of *Rome*: where he lived in good account; accompanying the two *Scipio's* in their journey againſt *Antiochus*, and therein doing (as it is ſaid) very eſpecial ſervice. So by this enterpriſe of *Sicily*, the *Carthaginians* waſted much of their forces, that with greater profit might have been employed in *Italy*: leaving yet unto the *Romans*, in the end of this war, the entire poſſeſſion of this iſland; which they wanted when it began.

SECT. XVI.

How the war paſſed between the Romans *and* Hannibal *in* Italy, *from the taking of* Capua *to the great victory at* Metaurus.

SHORTLY after the winning of *Capua*, *Marcellus* came to *Rome*: where, for his good ſervices done in the iſland of *Sicily*, he had granted unto him the honour of the leſſer triumph, which was called *Ovation*. The greater triumph was denied him: becauſe he had not finiſhed the war, but was fain to leave his army behind him in the province. He ſtayed not long in *Rome*, before he was again choſen conſul, together with *M. Valerius Lævinus*, who ſucceeded him in the government of *Sicily*, and was, at the time of his election, making war againſt king *Philip* in *Greece*. Great complaint was made againſt the conſul *Marcellus*, by the *Syracuſians*, for that which he had done unto them: they alledging their great friendſhip to the people of *Rome*, in the time of their late king *Hiero*; and affirming, that their city did never willingly brake the alliance, excepting when it was oppreſſed by ſuch tyrants, as were not greater enemies to *Rome*, than to all good men that lived in *Syracuſe*. The conſul, on the other ſide, reckoned up the labours and dangers whereunto they had put him: willing them to bemoan themſelves to the *Carthaginians* that had holpen them in their neceſſity; and not unto the *Romans*, whom they had kept out. Thus each part having ſome good matter to alledge, the ſenate made ſuch an end of the controverſy, as beſt agreed with the benefit of their own commonwealth: blaming the too much rigor of *Marcellus*, yet not reſtoring the booty that he had taken, nor making the *Syracuſians* free from their ſubjection; but comforting them, with gentle words, and hopeful promiſes, as hath been ſhewed before. The two new conſuls, *Marcellus* and *Lævinus*, were appointed to make war, as their lots ſhould fall out; the one in *Italy*, the other in *Sicily*. The iſle of *Sicily* fell unto *Marcellus*, which province he willingly changed with his colleague, to the end that the *Syracuſians* (whoſe cauſe had not as yet been heard in the ſenate) might not ſeem hindred by fear, from uttering their grievances freely. Afterwards, when his buſineſs with them was diſpatch'd, he gently undertook the patronage of them: which remained long in his family; to the great benefit of the country in times following. So *Valerius*, the other conſul, was ſent into *Sicily*, whoſe doings there have been already rehearſed: but *Marcellus* was employed againſt *Hannibal*.

Before the conſuls departed out of *Rome*, they were much troubled with preſſing of ſoldiers to the war; and moſt of all, with getting mariners for their navy. They were all of the poorer ſort, that uſed to be employed in ſea-ſervice; eſpecially in rowing. Theſe could not live without preſent wages: neither was there money enough in the treaſury to give them pay. Wherefore it was ordained, that they ſhould be ſet out at the expence of private men; who in this neceſſity of the ſtate, were driven to ſuſtain all publick charges. Hereat the people murmured; and were ready to fall into ſedition, had not the conſuls deferred the matter unto further conſideration. The ſenate could ill tell, what to determine or do, in a caſe of ſuch extremity. For manifeſt it was, that the multitude had already endured ſo much as well it could undergo; and ſomewhat more than could with honeſty have been impoſed upon it. Nevertheleſs, it was impoſſible to maintain the war againſt the *Carthaginians*, or to keep the *Macedonian* out of *Italy*, without a ſtrong fleet. Wherefore ſome were of opinion, that, ſince the common treaſury was ſo empty, the people muſt be forced, by right or wrong, to take the burthen upon them. At laſt the conſuls began to ſay, That no perſwaſions would be ſo effectual with the people, as good examples: and that if the ſenators would follow the conſuls, like it was, that the people alſo would follow the ſenate. Wherefore they propounded, and it was immediately concluded, that every one of them ſhould bring forth, and put into the treaſury, all the money that he had; and that no ſenator ſhould keep any veſſel of gold, or plate whatſoever, excepting one ſalt-ſeller, and a bowl, wherewith to make their offerings unto the gods: as alſo a ring for himſelf, with ſuch other tokens of ingenuity for his wife and children, as every one did uſe, and thoſe of as ſmall value as might be. This advice of the conſuls was not more thankfully accepted by the ſenate, than the ready performance thereof by the ſenate was highly applauded, and haſtily followed by the gentlemen of *Rome*. Neither did the commonalty refuſe to do that, which their betters had openly done before them. For ſince the publick neceſſity could no otherwiſe be holpen, every one was contented that his private eſtate ſhould run the ſame fortune with the commonwealth, which if it ſuffered wrack, in vain could any particular man hope to enjoy the benefit of his proper ſubſtance. This magnanimity deſerved well that greatneſs of empire, whereof it was the foundation.

Convenient order being thus taken for an army and fleet: *Marcellus* went forth of the city againſt *Hannibal*; and *Lævinus* towards *Sicily*. The army of *Hannibal* was greatly diminiſhed, by long and hard ſervice: neither did his *Carthaginians* ſeem to remember him, and think upon ſending the promiſed ſupply, or any ſuch proportion as he needed. His credit alſo among his *Italian* friends, was much weakned, by the loſs of *Capua*: which gave them cauſe to look unto themſelves; as if in his

his help there were little truſt to be repoſed, when they ſhould ſtand in need. This he well perceived; yet could not tell how to remedy. Either he muſt thruſt garriſons into all towns that he ſuſpected, and thereby ſo diminiſh his army, that he ſhould not be able to keep the field; or elſe he muſt leave them to their own fidelity; which now began to waver. At length his jealouſy grew ſo outragious, that he ſacked, and waſted thoſe places that he was unable to defend: thinking that the beſt way to enrich himſelf; and make unprofitable, to his enemies, the purchaſe from which he could not hinder them. But by this example, many were quite alienated from him; and ſome of thoſe, whom before he had leaſt cauſe to doubt. The town of *Salapia* yielded unto *Marcellus:* and betrayed unto him a gallant regiment of *Numidian* horſe, the beſt of all that ſerved under *Hannibal*; which was a greater loſs than the town it ſelf. *Blaſius*, the author of this rebellion, could not bring his deſire to effect, without getting the conſent of one *Daſius*, that was his bitter enemy. Wherefore he brake the matter to this *Daſius* in private; and was by him accuſed unto *Hannibal.* But when he was convened, and charged of treaſon, he ſo ſtoutly denied it, and by way of recrimination, ſo vehemently preſſed his accuſer with the ſame fault; that *Hannibal* thought it a matter deviſed out of mere malice; knowing well what enemies they were; and ſeeing, that neither of them could bring any proof of what he affirmed. This notwithſtanding, *Blaſius* did not ceaſe to preſs his adverſary a-new, and urge him from time to time, with ſuch lively reaſons, that he who could not be believed by *Hannibal*, was contented at length to win the favour of *Marcellus.* Preſently after this, the conſul took by force, *Maronea* and *Meles*, towns of the *Samnites:* wherein he ſlew about three thouſand of *Hannibal*'s men.

Hannibal could not look to all at once: but was fain to catch advantages where he might get them; the *Romans* now being grown ſtronger in the field than he. The beſt was, that his *Carthaginians*, having wearied themſelves with ill ſpeed in many petty enterpriſes, and laid aſide all this while the care of *Italy*, to follow buſineſs of far leſs importance; had now at length reſolved to ſend preſently the great ſupply, that had been ſo long promiſed and expected. This if they had done in better ſeaſon, *Rome* it ſelf might have been ſtrucken down, the next year after that great blow received at *Cannæ*. But ſince that which is paſt cannot be amended; *Hannibal* muſt force himſelf to make a good countenance; and tell his followers, that this mighty ſuccour would come time enough. For *Maſaniſſa* was at *Carthage* with five thouſand *Numidians*, ready to ſet ſail for *Spain*: whither when he came, it was appointed, that *Aſdrubal* ſhould forthwith take his journey into *Italy*, of which there had been ſo long talk. Theſe news did not more comfort *Hannibal* and his followers, than terrify the *Romans.* Wherefore each did their beſt: the *Romans*, to prevent the threatning miſchief, and win as much as they could upon *Hannibal*, before the coming of his brother: *Hannibal*, on the contrary, to hold his own, and weaken the *Romans* as much as he was able. He had intelligence, that *Cn. Fulvius*, a *Roman* pretor, lay near unto *Herdonea*, to get the town by practice. It was not long, ſince, near unto the ſame place, another *Cn. Fulvius* had loſt his army. Therefore *Hannibal* had made great marches thitherward; and came to *Herdonea* ere *Fulvius* had news of his approach. As ſoon as he came, he offered battel to the *Roman* pretor: who accepted it with more haſte than good ſpeed. The *Roman* legions made good reſiſtance a-while, till they were compaſſed round with the *Carthaginian* horſe. Then fell they to rout, and great ſlaughter was made of them. *Fulvius* himſelf, with twelve *tribunes* or *colonels*, were loſt: of the common ſoldiers that were ſlain, the number is uncertain; ſome reporting ſeven, others thirteen thouſand. The town of *Herdonea*, becauſe it was at point to have yielded unto *Fulvius*, *Hannibal* did ſet on fire; and, putting thoſe to death that had practiſed with the enemy, carried away the multitude, whom he beſtowed among the *Thurians* and *Metapontines.* The conſul *Marcellus* hearing of this, wrote unto the ſenate, and exhorted them to be of a good chear; for that he would ſhortly abate the enemy's pride. He followed the *Carthaginian* apace, and overtaking him at *Numiſtro*, in the country of the *Lucans*, fought with him a battel; which beginning at nine of the clock in the morning, laſted until night; and ended, by reaſon of the darkneſs, with uncertain victory. Afterwards *Hannibal* departed thence into *Apulia*, whither *Marcellus* followed him. At *Venuſia* they met, and had many ſkirmiſhes, but none of importance. *Hannibal* removed often, and ſought to bring the enemy within danger of ſome ambuſh. But *Marcellus*, though he was very eager of battel, would yet adventure nothing, but by open day-light, and upon fair ground.

Thus paſſed the time away, until *Q. Fabius Maximus*, and *Q. Fulvius*, he that lately had taken *Capua*, were choſen conſuls. *Fabius*, conſidering how much the *Roman* affairs were bettered by the taking of *Capua*, purpoſed that year to beſiege *Tarentum*; which if he could win, like it was, that ſcarce one good city would afterwards remain true to *Hannibal.* Wherefore he vehemently exhorted his colleague, and *Marcellus* (to whom was continued the command of thoſe legions that ſerved under him the year before) to preſs the *Carthaginian* ſo hard, as he might have no leiſure to help *Tarentum.* *Marcellus* was very glad of this charge, for he thought no *Roman* fitter than himſelf, to deal with *Hannibal* in open field. He followed him therefore to *Cannuſium*, and thence from place to place, deſiring ever to come to battel, but upon equal terms. The *Carthaginian* had not mind to hazard much in fight, but thought it enough to entertain his enemy with ſkirmiſh, as being deſirous to keep his army ſtrong until the coming of *Aſdrubal.* Yet could he not avoid the importunity of *Marcellus*, nor brook the indignity of being daily braved. He therefore bade his men to be luſty, and to beat ſoundly this hot-ſpirited *Roman* captain, that would never ſuffer them to be at quiet, until they once had cooled well his courage, by letting him blood. Hereupon followed a battel, wherein *Hannibal* had the victory, took ſix enſigns, and ſlew of the *Romans* almoſt three thouſand; among which were ſome of mark. *Marcellus* was ſo impatient of this diſhonour, that he rated his men as peaſants, and baſe cowards; telling them, that they were the firſt of the *Roman* legions which had been beaten by *Hannibal*, by plain force and manhood, without being circumvented by any ſtratagem. With theſe, and many other the like words, which they were aſhamed to hear, he did ſo vex them, that thinking themſelves better able to endure any violence of the enemy, than ſuch diſpleaſure of their general, they beſought him to pardon them, and lead them forth once again to fight. He did ſo, and placing thoſe companies foremoſt, that had loſt their enſigns the day before, bade them be careful

ful to win a victory, whereof the news might be at *Rome*, before the report of their ſhameful overthrow. *Hannibal* was angry, to ſee that nothing could make this enemy quiet, and therefore was ready to fight again, ſince all other motives continued the ſame, and his men had been heartened by the late victory. But the *Romans* were ſtirred up with deſire of revenge, and of repairing their honour loſt, which affections gave a ſharp edge unto their valour; whereas the *Carthaginians* were grown dull, and weary, by ſeeing themſelves diſappointed of their hope; and the enemy, notwithſtanding their late victory, as ready to moleſt them as before. In this ſecond battel *Marcellus* got the victory, which he purchaſed at ſo dear a rate, that neither he nor *Hannibal* had great cauſe to vaunt the ſecond night. For if eight thouſand of the *Carthaginians* were ſlain, and three thouſand of the *Roman* ſide, in this next battel, the difference was no greater, than even to recompenſe the late received overthrow; eſpecially ſince the number of the *Romans* that were wounded was ſo great, as diſabled *Marcellus* from purſuing *Hannibal*, who diſlodged by night. Nevertheleſs it ſufficed, that *Fabius* the conſul hereby got leiſure to follow his buſineſs at *Tarentum*, without any diſturbance. *Q. Fulvius* the other conſul, about the ſame time, took in many of the *Hirpines*, *Lucans*, and *Volſcentes*, that willingly yielded themſelves, and betrayed the garriſons of *Hannibal* that lay in their towns, whom *Fulvius* entertained in loving ſort; gently rebuking them for their errors paſt, without puniſhing thoſe that had been authors, or buſy doers in the rebellion. That rabble of *Sicilian* thieves, which *Lævinus* had lately brought from *Agaterna*, was then alſo ſet on work to beſiege *Caulonia*, a town of the *Brutians*; and nothing was omitted, that might ſerve to divert *Hannibal* from the ſuccour of *Tarentum*.

Q. Fabius the conſul having taken *Manduria*, a town of the *Salentines*, ſat down before *Tarentum*; making all preparation that ſeemed needful to carry it either by aſſault, or long ſiege. Of the garriſons in the town, a good part were *Brutians*, placed there by *Hannibal*, under a captain of their own nation. This captain fell in love with a *Tarentine* wench, whoſe brother ſerved under *Fabius*. Hereof ſhe gave notice by letters to her brother, as thinking, belike, to draw him from the *Roman* ſide; by telling him how rich, and of what great account her lover was. But her brother made the conſul acquainted with theſe news, and ſaid, that if the *Brutian* were far in love, he might perhaps be won by intreaty of his miſtreſs, to do what ſhe would have him. The conſul hearing this, and finding likelihood in the matter, willed his ſoldier to convey himſelf into the town as a fugitive, and try what good might be done. It fell out according to his deſire. The ſoldier grew acquainted with this *Brutian* captain, and partly by his own perſwaſions, partly by the flattering entreaty of his ſiſter, won him to betray the town to the *Romans*. When they had agreed upon the buſineſs, and reſolved how to order it, the ſame ſoldier got out of the town by night, and acquainted the conſul with his proceedings; telling him in which part that *Brutian* kept watch, and what might conveniently be done. So in the night-time *Fabius* gave an alarm to the city, eſpecially about thoſe parts of the wall which were fartheſt from the place where he meant to enter. The captains in the town prepared to make reſiſtance in thoſe places, where the noiſe did threaten them with greateſt likelihood of danger. But *Fabius* himſelf, with the choiceſt of his men, came in great ſilence to the quarter of the *Brutians*; who being wrought by their captain, helped the *Romans* to get up, and break open the next gate, whereat the army was let in. The *Tarentines* and *Carthaginian* ſoldiers made head againſt *Fabius* in the market-place; but (as it happeneth in like caſes, where the main confidence is already taken away) not very obſtinately. *Nico*, *Democrates*, and *Philomenes*, with thoſe that before had let in *Hannibal*, uſed now the laſt of their courage, in dying againſt the *Romans*. *Carthalo*, who commanded the garriſon within the town, offered himſelf priſoner, hoping to be well uſed, becauſe of hoſpitality that had paſſed between his father and the conſul. But he was ſlain by the way, ere he could come at *Fabius*. The *Romans* did put all indifferently to the ſword; in ſuch ſort, that they ſpared few of the *Brutians*. This ſlaughter of the *Brutians* was thought to have been made by appointment of the conſul, to the end that he might ſeem to have won the town by force, and not by treaſon, though he thereby failed of his purpoſe; and neither had the glory which he expected, nor preſerved his reputation of faithful dealing, and keeping his word. The booty found in *Tarentum* was very great, whereof the *Roman* treaſury, whither it was carried, had great need. As for the imageries, and other curioſities that were in the city, *Fabius* was contented to let them alone; and being told of ſome idols, that ſeemed worthy to be carried away, being very goodly pieces, in ſuch habit and poſture as if they were fighting, he ſaid, let us leave unto the *Tarentines* their angry gods.

Hannibal, being gotten clear from *Marcellus*, fell upon thoſe that beſieged *Caulonia*. They fled at his coming, but he was ſo near, that they were fain to betake them to a hill, which ſerved to no other purpoſe, than to bear off the firſt brunt. There they defended themſelves a little while, and then they yielded. When this buſineſs was done, he haſted away to relieve *Tarentum*; but when he came within five miles of the city, he had news that it was loſt. This grieved him; yet he ſaid no more than this; *The* Romans *have alſo their* Hannibal; we have loſt *Tarentum* in ſuch ſort as we got it. That he might not ſeem to turn back amazed, or in any fear of the victorious conſul, he encamped a few days together ſo near as he was unto *Tarentum*; and thence departing to *Metapontum*, bethought himſelf how to take *Fabius* in a trap. He cauſed the chief of the *Metapontines* to write unto *Fabius*, and offer to betray into his hands the *Carthaginian* garriſon, with condition, that he ſhould in that reſpect forgive them all offences paſs'd. Theſe letters were ſent by two young men of the ſame city, who did their errand ſo well, that the conſul wrote back by them unto the *Metapontines*, and appointed the day when they ſhould expect him. Hereof *Hannibal* was exceeding glad, and at good leiſure, made ready his ambuſhes for the wary *Fabius*. But whether ſome ſecret notice of the plot were given, or whether indeed (as it is related) ſome tokens in ſacrificing, terrified the ſuperſtitious *Roman*, the journey to *Metapontum* was deferred. Hereupon the ſame two meſſengers were employed again; but being apprehended, and threatened with torture, they diſcovered all.

This year was happy to the *Romans*, in all their wars; for they got every-where, ſave only at *Caulonia*, where they loſt a company of ſuch lewd fellows, that it may ſeem good fortune to have ſo been rid of them. But their common poverty, and diſability to maintain their charge, continued, and grew greater than it was before. Thirty *Roman* colonies were then in *Italy*, of which, twelve refuſed to contribute

contribute any longer to the wars: for it was conſidered, that the legions of *Cannæ*, and thoſe unhappy companies that had been beaten under the one and the other *Cn. Fulvius*, were tranſported into *Sicily*, where they lived, in a ſort, as baniſhed men. This grieved their friends at home, and made them reckon up the more diligently thoſe other miſeries which they daily felt. Ten years together they had been exhauſted with levies of men, and impoſitions of money, in every of which years they had received ſome notable overthrow. In this caſe, the leaſt that they could fear, or rather, the beſt which they could hope, was, to fall into the hands of the enemy to be made priſoners. For *Hannibal* did gently ſend home their people that was taken by him; whereas the *Romans* did baniſh from their homes thoſe that had eſcaped. It was therefore likely to come to paſs within a-while, that they ſhould be all conſumed, ſince new ſoldiers were daily preſſed out of their towns, and the old ones never did return. Such talk was frequent among thoſe of the colonies, eſpecially where they that were tranſported into *Sicily*, had moſt compaſſionate friends. Wherefore it was concluded by the people of *Ardea*, *Sutrium*, *Alba*, and other good towns, to the number of twelve, that they ſhould boldly deny unto the *Romans* their farther help. This was thought the likelieſt way to obtain peace, whereof otherwiſe they ſaw little hope, ſo long as *Hannibal* lived. When the conſuls heard the ambaſſadors of theſe towns make ſuch declaration, and proteſt their diſability of giving any farther help, they were much amazed. They willed the ambaſſadors to return home, and bring a better anſwer; foraſmuch as this was none other than treaſon: they bade them conſider, that their people were not *Campani*, or *Tarentines*, but the offspring of the *Romans*; and no leſs partakers of the empire, than they that inhabited the mother-city. But all would not ſerve, the ambaſſadors continuing to proteſt that they had already done what they could, and that they had remaining neither men nor money. It was well for the *Romans*, that the other eighteen colonies did not imitate theſe twelve, but ſhewed themſelves willing to undergo whatſoever ſhould be laid upon them, without ſhrinking under the burden. This their offer was ſo highly pleaſing to the conſuls, that the ambaſſadors of thoſe faithful colonies, were brought unto the ſenate, and produced into the aſſembly of the people, where, with commemoration of all their former good ſervices, this their preſent love unto the ſtate was magnified, and thanks accordingly beſtowed upon them; with promiſe, that it ſhould not be forgotten. As for the ambaſſadors of thoſe twelve colonies that refuſed to contribute, it was thought beſt neither to retain them in the city, nor yet to diſmiſs them, nor to take any notice of them at all, but leave them to their own conſideration of their ill-deſerving.

It may greatly be doubted, what the example of theſe twelve people would have wrought in thoſe that were ſo willing to help the ſtate, if *Aſdrubal* had been then coming into *Italy*: for then muſt the *Romans* have betaken themſelves wholly to their own defence; whereas now, to the great comfort of their ſubjects, they employed their forces in the conqueſt of *Italy*, with hopeful and fortunate ſucceſs. Nevertheleſs, they were fain to open their moſt privy treaſury, and thence take out the gold that had been laid up to ſerve them in caſes of greateſt extremity. Of the money thus extracted, one quarter was delivered to *Fabius* the conſul, to ſet him well out againſt the *Tarentines*: all the reſt was ſent into *Spain* to *Scipio*, for the maintenance of his army, and to provide that *Aſdrubal* might not paſs from thence into *Italy*. It is likely that *Fabius* did not ſpend all his money; finding ſuch eaſy ſucceſs at *Tarentum*, as was ſhewed before. But to ſtop the journey of *Aſdrubal*, neither the money ſent into *Spain*, nor any victories won by *Scipio*, could ſuffice. Nevertheleſs, it fell out happily for the people of *Rome*, that this year and the next were ſpent before his coming; and they better prepared, than at leſs warning they could have been, to entertain him. Here it were not amiſs to note, that ſince the *Romans*, being in ſo great neceſſity of money, were driven to furniſh the army in *Spain* with the greateſt part of all their ſtock that was left; it muſt needs be, that either the booty taken in *New Carthage*, was far leſs than fame had reported it; or elſe that *Scipio* had not as yet won it: howſoever *Livy* rather inclines to thoſe, who ſay that he got it ſoon after his arrival.

M. Claudius Marcellus, and *T. Quintius Criſpinus*, were choſen conſuls after *Fabius* and *Fulvius*. In this year it was, that *Aſdrubal* took his journey out of *Spain*, though he came not into *Italy* till the year following. After the great battel at *Cannæ*, *Hannibal* had loſt much time about *Cumæ* and *Naples*, in ſeeking to make himſelf maſter of a good haven, for the landing of thoſe ſuccours that were promiſed from *Carthage*. The hope that he repoſed in *Philip*, cauſed him to turn his principal care to the eaſtern parts of *Italy*, where he made ready a fair entrance for the *Macedonian*, if he had been ready to come. But ſince his hope was vaniſhed, and the long promiſed ſuccour of *Aſdrubal* was (though far later than had been expedient) ready to arrive, he began to deal with the people of *Hetruria*, through whoſe countries his brother was to paſs, that therein he might make a party againſt the *Romans*. The loſs of *Capua*, *Tarentum*, and many other towns, might have terrified all other of the *Italian* towns from hearkening to any ſollicitation of the *Carthaginians*; yet the poverty of the *Romans*, and the wearineſs of their adherents, together with the fame of a greater army coming, than that which *Hannibal* brought into *Italy*, did embolden many of the *Hetrurians*, eſpecially the *Aretines*, to take ſuch counſel as they thought moſt expedient for themſelves, without regard of their fidelity to *Rome*. The *Roman* ſenate, hearing the rumour of their conſpiracy, ſent *Marcellus* the new choſen conſul into *Hetruria*, whoſe coming did ſo terrify them, that they reſted quiet for a-while. All the year following they were deviſing how to break out; as contrariwiſe, the *Roman* pretors, partly by terror of ſevere judgments and inquiſitions, and partly by the force of two or three legions, with which they viſited all ſuſpected places, kept them honeſt againſt their wills, and took many hoſtages for better aſſurance. The two conſuls had an earneſt deſire to make ſtrong war upon *Hannibal*, without more temporizing; perſwading themſelves, that in battel they ſhould be too ſtrong for him. *Criſpinus* had further his particular deſire to make his conſulſhip notable, by the winning of ſome good town: as *Fulvius* and *Fabius* had gotten honour by *Capua* and *Tarentum*. Therefore he went about the ſiege of *Locri*, one of the beſt cities which the *Carthaginian* then held in *Italy*; and brought thither all ſorts of engines, ſending for a fleet out of *Sicily* to help him. But *Hannibal* was not ſlow to relieve the city, the fame of whoſe approach, made *Criſpinus* deſiſt from his enterprize, and retire unto his colleague, that lay at *Venuſia*. Thither followed *Hannibal*, to whom the conſuls daily offered battel. This great man of war had no need

to ſtand upon his reputation, which was already ſo confirmed, that his refuſing to fight, was not likely to be aſcribed unto fear, but rather deemed as a part of his wiſdom. He entertained the conſuls with many light ſkirmiſhes, and ſought to take them at ſome advantage; reſerving his own numbers as full as he could unto a time of greater employment. In this lingring manner of war *Marcellus* took no pleaſure, but ſought to compel the enemy to battel whether he would or no. The admiral of the *Roman* fleet about *Sicily*, *L. Cincius*, was commanded again to aſſail the town of *Locri*, which might well enough be forced, if *Hannibal* continued, as he began, to trifle away the time at *Venuſia*. To the ſame purpoſe a part of the garriſon that lay in *Tarentum*, was appointed to go by land to the aſſiſtance of *Cincius*; but *Hannibal* had an eye behind him. He laid an ambuſh in the way, between *Tarentum* and *Locri*, whereinto the *Romans* fell; and having loſt above three thouſand of their company, were well glad, the reſt of them, to quit their enterprize, and ſave their own lives within *Tarentum*. As for the conſuls, it was the deſire of *Hannibal* to waſte their army by little and little; which to do, he neglected no advantage. There lay between him and them an hillock, over-grown with wood, that ſeemed fit to cover a number of men; who lying there undiſcerned, might fall upon ſuch as ſhould ſtraggle from the *Roman* camp, and cut them off. Therefore he ſent thither by night ſome companies of *Numidians*, whom he willed to keep themſelves cloſe, and attend their beſt advantage. To this piece of ground the conſuls thought it fit to remove their camp; *Marcellus* thinking that he never lay near enough unto *Hannibal*. Thither therefore both of them rode to view the place, accompanied with the ſon of *Marcellus*, a few colonels, and other principal men, and not many more than two hundred horſe, moſt of them *Hetrurians*. The *Numidian* centinel gave warning of their approach to his fellows, who diſcovered not themſelves until they had ſurrounded the conſuls and their train. The conſuls, as neceſſity compelled them, defended themſelves, hoping to be quickly relieved from their camp, that was near at hand. But the *Hetrurians* ran away from them at the firſt, and left them in that great danger to the weak aſſiſtance of no more than forty horſe-men, that were of the colony of *Fregellæ*. Theſe *Fregellans* abode by the conſuls, and did what they could to have brought them ſafe off. But when *Marcellus* was ſtricken through with a lance, and fell down dead, then began every one to ſhift for himſelf, and eſcape as they might. *Criſpinus*, the other conſul, had his death's wound, being ſtricken with two darts; and young *Marcellus* was likewiſe wounded; yet theſe two recovered their camp. The reſt of the colonels and officers, together with the lictors that carried the bundles of rods and axes before the conſuls, were all ſlain or taken. To the dead body of the conſul *Marcellus*, *Hannibal* gave honourable funeral, according to the cuſtom of thoſe times; and beſtowing his aſhes in a ſilver pot, covered it with a crown of gold, and ſo ſent them to young *Marcellus*, to be by him interr'd where he thought good.

Preſently after this, *Criſpinus* bethought himſelf how that the ſignet-ring of *Marcellus* was fallen into the cuſtody of *Hannibal*, who might uſe it to his own purpoſes, ere that which had happened were well known abroad. Wherefore he ſent word unto all the towns about, that his colleague was ſlain, and that *Hannibal* had gotten his ring; wiſhing them in that regard to give no credit to any letters therewithal ſigned. This providence of *Criſpinus*, was not more than requiſite: for his meſſenger was but a little before come to *Salapia*, when another meſſenger arrived there, ſent from *Hannibal*, bringing letters in the name of *Marcellus*, and ſealed with the captive ring, whereof the contents were, that it was his purpoſe to come the ſame night unto *Salapia*; where he willed, that the ſoldiers of the garriſon ſhould be in a readineſs, for ſuch employment as he ſhould think needful. The device was plain: and no leſs plain was the revengeful mind, which he bare againſt that city; becauſe of his brave *Numidian* companies, that had therein been betrayed. The *Salapians* hereupon bethought themſelves, how to take their enemy in his own ſnare. They ſent back the meſſenger, which was a *Roman* fugitive, without letting him perceive any ſign of diſtruſt in them. This done, they prepared all things in a readineſs, for the entertainment of ſuch a friend. Late in the night he came thither, with a troop of *Roman* fugitives, armed *Roman*-like, leading the way. Theſe all talking *Latin* together, called unto the watch, and bade open the gate; for the conſul was there. The gate was opened, fair and leiſurely, and the port-cullis drawn up no higher than needs it muſt be, to let them enter. But when ſix hundred of them were gotten in, down fell the port-cullis again: and they that thought to have taken others, were taken themſelves; being laid at on all hands by the *Salapians*, that quickly made an end with them.

Hannibal being thus over-reached with this ſtratagem, haſted away to *Locri*; whereunto *Cincius*, the admiral of the *Roman* fleet about *Sicily*, did lay hard ſiege. The firſt appearance of the *Numidians*, *Hannibal*'s vant-currors, made the *Romans* in all confuſed haſte run to their ſhips; leaving all their engines, and whatſoever was in their camp, to the enemies diſpoſition.

The *Roman* ſenate, hearing of theſe accidents, ſent unto *Criſpinus*, the ſurviving conſul, and requeſted him to name a dictator: that might take charge of the commonwealth, and diſpatch the election of new magiſtrates, with other buſineſs; whereunto himſelf was diſabled by his hurts. He did ſo: and ſoon after died. Then it was thought needful, that new conſuls ſhould be choſen out of hand: foraſmuch as two *Roman* armies lay ſo near unto the enemy, without any general. Eſpecially it was deſired, that election ſhould be made of ſuch men, as were not only valiant, but well adviſed: ſince the beſt, and moſt fortunate of their great darers, *M. Marcellus*, by loſing himſelf ſo ſtrangely, had given them a fair warning, not to commit their army unto raſh heads. Among thoſe that ſtood for the conſulſhip, *C. Claudius Nero* was the moſt eminent. He was of great nobility, a good ſoldier, and one, whoſe many ſervices in this preſent war, did forcibly commend unto the place. Yet he ſeemed a little too violent; and one, whoſe temper needed the allay of a more ſtaid wit. The *Fathers* therefore endeavoured to join unto him in the conſulſhip *M. Livius*: one that had borne the ſame office, long before. This *M. Livius* had been conſul with *L. Æmilius Paulus*, in the year foregoing the beginning of this war. After their conſulſhip, wherein they did good ſervice, they had both of them been called unto judgment by the people: and this *Livius* condemned, *Æmilius* hardly eſcaping. Though it hath been once already noted, yet I cannot forbear to remember it again; how it pleaſed God to upbraid the unthankful *Romans*, with the malicious judgment, given by their multitude upon honourable men. For in the battel of *Cannæ* it was apparent, what lamentable effects

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the memory of their injuſtice wrought: when *L. Æmilius* rather choſe to yield to the forward ignorance of his colleague; and afterwards to die in the greateſt overthrow that ever fell upon the ſtate of *Rome*; than by reſiſting the pernicious courſes of *Terentius Varro*, to caſt himſelf a-new upon the danger of the popular fury. As for *M. Livius*, he is even now ready, and will ſo continue, to tell the people of their faults in a diverſe manner. Eight years together after his condemnation had he been abſent out of the city, and lived in his country grange; ſtill vexing himſelf with the indignity of his condemnation. *Marcellus* and *Levinus*, being conſuls two or three years ago, had brought him into *Rome:* where he lived private, in diſcontented ſort, as might appear, both by his careleſneſs in apparel, and by the wearing of his long hair and beard; which in that age were the badges of men afflicted. Very lately he was compelled by the cenſors to pull his hair, and come into the ſenate: where he uſed to ſit ſilent, and ſignify his aſſent or diſlike to what was propoſed; either in ſhort formal words, or in paſſing from ſide to ſide, when the houſe was divided. At length it happened, that in ſome buſineſs weightily concerning one that was his kinſman, he ſtood up, and made a ſet ſpeech: whereby he drew all the *Fathers* to attention; and bade them enquire of him, and take better notice what he was, and what he had been. The ſenate was much altered ſince he had left it; many brave men were loſt; new ones were choſen; ſuch as rather ſerved to fill up the number, than to anſwer to the dignity of the place: and they that were left of ancient ſtanding, had ever ſpent their virtues to no great effect. Wherefore, all began to ſay, that it was a great pity, ſo worthy and able a man, as this *Livius*, had been all this while forgotten; one, of whom the commonwealth ſtood in great need, yet had not uſed in this dangerous war. Now ſeeing that the conſuls ought, one of them, to be choſen a *Patrician*; the other, of neceſſity a *Plebeian:* and ſince, neither *Fabius*, nor *Valerius Levinus*, being both of them *Patricians*, could be joined with *Claudius Nero:* every one was of opinion, that there could not be choſen and coupled together, two fitter men than *C. Claudius*, and this *Marcus Livius*. But *Livy* would not endure to hear of this. He ſaid, it was unreaſonable, that one condemned as a diſhoneſt man, ſhould afterwards be choſen ruler of the city. If they had done ill to truſt him with one conſulſhip, what meant they then to offer him another? With theſe and the like phraſes, he reſiſted their deſires: till by perſwaſions, and examples rehearſed, of ſuch as had patiently digeſted injuries done by the people, and repayed good for evil; he was contented to accept the honour.

Here we may behold a true figure of that emblem, with which *Themiſtocles* checked the ingratitude of the *Athenians:* reſembling himſelf to a plane-tree, the branches and boughs whereof men brake in fair weather; but run under it for ſhelter in a ſtorm. Such unthankfulneſs, to well-deſerving men, is not rarely found in the outragious multitude. Neither was the late example hereto much unlike, of *Philip* the ſecond, king of *Spain*, his dealing with the duke of *Alva*. For although he had committed the duke to priſon, upon ſome ſmall offence conceived, without all regard of his former deſerts: yet, when his intended conqueſt of *Portugal*, required the ſervice of a man, more than ordinarily ſufficient; he ſtood no longer upon the ſcanning of late diſpleaſures; but employed the ſame duke, whom he had newly diſgraced. This is wiſdom often taught by neceſſity.

It was a dangerous year toward, when *C. Claudius Nero*, and *M. Livius* were choſen conſuls. *Aſdrubal* was already come into *France*, and waited only to have the ways of the *Alps* thawed by warm weather, for his paſſage into *Italy*. The *Romans* uſed at this time the ſervice of three and twenty legions: and wanted not employment, for many more, if they had known how to levy and maintain them. Of theſe which they had, four ſerved in *Spain*, two in *Sicily*, and two in *Sardinia*; the reſt were ſo diſpoſed, in ſeveral parts of *Italy*, where need ſeemed to require, that only two legions were left to each of the conſuls. But the conſuls were men of execution, and would not be tied to the punctual obſervance of what the ſenate thought fit. *M. Livius* would not ſtir out of *Rome*, againſt ſo mighty a power as followed *Aſdrubal*; until he had firſt obtained, that he might carry with him as many as could well be ſpared from other employments; and thoſe, or the moſt of them, choſen companies. It was true, that two legions, appointed to ſerve under *Lucius Porcius*, a pretor of that year, among the *Ciſalpine Gauls*, might be reckoned as an additament to the forces of *Livius*; to whom the war againſt *Aſdrubal* was allotted. So might alſo two other legions, that were among the *Salentines*, near unto *Tarentum*, under another of the pretors, be accounted a part of *Claudius*'s army, that was ſent againſt *Hannibal*. Nevertheleſs the conſuls, by the ſpecial inſtance of *Livy*, did obtain, that all might be left to their own diſcretion. For news came, that *Aſdrubal* was already paſſing the *Alps*; the *Ligurians*, who dwelt in the country about *Genua*, with their neighbour people, were in readineſs to join with him; and *L. Porcius* ſent word, that he would adventure no further, than he ſafely might. When all was ordered, as themſelves thought beſt, the two conſuls went forth of the city, each his ſeveral way. The people of *Rome* were now quite otherwiſe affected, than they had been, when *L. Æmilius Paulus*, and *C. Terentius Varro*, were ſent againſt *Hannibal*. They did no longer take upon them, to direct their generals, or bid them diſpatch, and win the victory betimes; but rather they ſtood in fear, leſt all diligence, wiſdom, and valour, ſhould prove too little. For ſince few years had paſſed, wherein ſome one of their generals had not been ſlain; and ſince it was manifeſt, that if either of theſe preſent conſuls were defeated, or put to the worſt, the two *Carthaginians* would forthwith join, and make ſhort work with the other: it ſeemed a greater happineſs than could be expected, that each of them ſhould return home victor; and come off with honour, from ſuch mighty oppoſition, as he was like to find. With extreme difficulty had *Rome* held up her head ever ſince the battel of *Cannæ:* though it were ſo, that *Hannibal* alone, with little help from *Carthage*, had continued the war in *Italy*. But there was now arrived another ſon of *Amilcar*; and one, that in his preſent expedition, had ſeemed a man of more ſufficiency than *Hannibal* himſelf. For, whereas in that long and dangerous march, through barbarous nations, over great rivers and mountains, that were thought unpaſſable, *Hannibal* had loſt a great part of his army: this *Aſdrubal*, in the ſame places, had multiplied his numbers; and, gathering the people that he found in the way, deſcended from the *Alps* like a rowling ſnow-ball, far greater than he came over the *Pyrenees*, at his firſt ſetting out of *Spain*.

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Theſe conſiderations, and the like, of which, fear preſented many unto them; cauſed the people of *Rome*, to wait upon their conſuls out of the town; like a penſive train of mourners: thinking upon *Marcellus* and *Criſpinus*, upon whom in the like ſort they had given attendance the laſt year, but ſaw neither of them return alive, from a leſs dangerous war. Particularly, old *Q. Fabius* gave his accuſtomed advice to *M. Livius*, that he ſhould abſtain from giving, or taking battel, until he well underſtood the enemies condition. But the conſul made him a froward anſwer, and ſaid, That he would fight the firſt day: for that he thought it long, till he ſhould either recover his honour by victory; or, by ſeeing the overthrow of his own unjuſt citizens, ſatisfy himſelf with the joy of a great, though not an honeſt, revenge. But his meaning was better than his words.

Of the overthrow that *Aſdrubal* received in *Spain*, from *Scipio*, a little before he took his journey into *Italy*; ſuch mention hath already been made, as agreed with the report of that noble hiſtorian *Livy*. Yet I think it not amiſs to add in this place, what may be gathered out of the remaining fragments of [a] *Polybius*'s hiſtory, concerning the accident. *Aſdrubal* had wreſtled with many difficulties in *Spain*, by reaſon of thoſe captains that were ſent from the city of *Carthage*, to join with him in the adminiſtration of that province: they being, as it may ſeem, of the *Hannonian* faction; which is to ſay, thus far forth traitors, that they preferred the advantage of their own ſide, before the good of their commonwealth. In what particulars they wronged this worthy ſon of *Amilcar*, and how they hindered his courſes undertaken, it cannot be known: ſince of theſe books, wherein *Polybius* hath exactly handled theſe matters, there are to us remaining, only a few broken pieces. But by the ſpightful dealing of *Hanno*, in *Sicily*, with *Mutines*, a better man of war than himſelf, whom *Hannibal* had ſent into the iſland; we may conceive, that againſt the brother of *Hannibal*, it was thought needful, by theſe miſchievous partiſans of *Hanno*, to uſe the violent oppoſition of more earneſt malice. Nevertheleſs *Aſdrubal* was a good patriot: and therefore endured patiently ſuch indignities as *Mutines* could not long digeſt. His journey into *Italy* being reſolved upon; he lay with part of the army at *Betula*, not far from the mines of ſilver; whence he was to furniſh his expedition. Thither came *Scipio*; and drove him out of his camp, though he were ſtrongly lodged, before the other *Carthaginian* captains could, or would, come to his aſſiſtance. The overthrow ſeems not to have been ſo great, as it muſt have been ſuppoſed, if no way lay open to thoſe that fled. Rather it appears, that *Aſdrubal* dealt like a provident man: and ſeeing that his camp was likely to be forced, ſent away all his money, with his elephants before him: but ſtaid behind himſelf to ſuſtain the *Romans* a while, until his carriages might be out of danger. Herein he had his deſire. Afterwards, he gathered his broken troops together; and retired in ſuch ſort, that *Scipio* thought it not good to purſue him; and ſo paſſed over *Tagus*. Then taking unto him the forces aſſigned for his expedition, he marched away towards the *Pyrenees:* leaving the care of *Spain* unto his brother *Mago*, and to *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Geſco*, that thought himſelf the fitteſt man for the adminiſtration thereof. Fain would *Scipio* have ſtopped him in his journey, by ſending to defend againſt him the ordinary way of the mountains. But whether *Aſdrubal* took another way, or whether he forced the guards that *Scipio* had ſet to keep the *Pyrenees* (as the defence of hard paſſages commonly ſorts to no good effect) he was not letted in his voyage by any ſuch impediment. Coming into *Gaul*, and following the ſteps of his brother *Hannibal:* he found the nations that lay in his way, ſo well affected, either to him or his money, that no paſſages were defended againſt him, nor any ſort of reſiſtance made; but he, and his army well entertained, and their numbers much increaſed, by acceſs of ſuch as were deſirous to take his pay. Of theſe he had the better choice: for that he was driven to winter in their country, whilſt that the paſſages of the *Alps* were cloſed up with ice and ſnow. The mountains likewiſe, that had ſo greatly moleſted *Hannibal* in his journey over the *Alps*, were eaſily won to take part with *Aſdrubal*, when he travelled through their country. For theſe poor men, at the firſt coming of *Hannibal*, were verily perſwaded, that it was his purpoſe to rob them of their cattel, and to make ſpoil of that little wealth, which they had painfully ſcraped together out of the deſolate rocks. But now in proceſs of time they were better informed. Therefore underſtanding, that there were two mighty cities, far disjoining aſunder, which made war upon each other, by land and ſea: and that the *Alps* did only lie in their way; they gladly condeſcended, to take their part in the fortune of the invaders. The like affection, upon greater cauſe, was afterwards found in the *Ciſalpine Gauls*. The *Ligurians* alſo joined with *Aſdrubal:* and ſo would the *Hetrurians* have done, if he had arrived in their country. There was no other *Roman* army near, than *L. Porcius*, with his two legions; of whom there was no great fear. Therefore did *Aſdrubal* ſet upon *Placentia*, a *Roman* colony: in hope to make his coming the more terrible, by the deſtruction of that town. But there he loſt a dreat deal of time, and finally was driven to quit the enterpriſe: by undertaking which, he gave the *Roman* conſuls leiſure to make ready for him; and cauſed his brother *Hannibal* (who upon the firſt bruit of *Aſdrubal*'s ſo timely, and eaſily paſſing the *Alps*, was about to leave his wintering camp, and go forth to meet with him) to ſit ſtill a while, as well aware, that *Placentia* would not be taken in haſte.

C. Claudius Nero, the *Roman* conſul, made what ſpeed he could to meet with *Hannibal*, and ſtop him from joining with his brother. He had about forty thouſand foot, and five hundred horſe: with which he daily offered battel to the *Carthaginian*; and had of him the better in many ſkirmiſhes. *Hannibal* was once driven to make a tedious march from the borders of the *Salentines* and *Apulians*, into the country of the *Brutians*, there to increaſe his forces; which were otherwiſe too weak for the journey intended. Afterwards coming to *Grumentum*, a town of the *Lucans*; he there fought unproſperouſly with *Nero* the conſul. Nevertheleſs he got off, and marched away to *Venuſia*. But *Nero* followed him; and had there again the better of him. Wherefore he was driven to return to *Metapontum:* where joining with *Hanno*, that had made ready a good army, he aſſayed again to make way by force to his brother. So he paſſed onward, and came again to *Venuſia*, having *Nero* ſtill at his heels. Thence went he over the river *Aufidus*, to *Canuſium*; where he ſat down, not far from the place in which he had obtained his moſt memorable victory. There alſo

[a] Excerpt. E. Polyb. hiſt. l. 10. & 11.

did

did *Nero* ſit down by him: and both of them reſted, without making offer to fight. It ſeemed perhaps unto *Hannibal*, who knew the country very well, that his brother might, with little impediment, overcome the way to *Canuſium*: where if he could once again deal with both the conſuls, and all the *Roman* forces together, he had reaſon to hope for ſuch another victory, as once he had gotten in the ſame open country. If this had ſo fallen out, *Rome* would have been undone for ever. But the *Carthaginians* ſhould not have needed to wiſh any ſecond victory, in the naked champans about *Cannæ*; if ſuch an army, as this which *Aſdrubal* now brings, had come to ſecond *Hannibal*, when he was in his full ſtrength, and the *Romans* not able to keep the field. Wherefore this worthy general had good reaſon afterwards to ſay, that *Hanno* was the man, who, by delaying the ſupply, did beat him out of *Italy*; which elſe no power of the *Romans* could have done.

Whilſt *Nero* waited upon the *Carthaginians*, and thought it enough to hinder them from meeting with the army that was coming to their ſuccour: he was advertiſed of *Aſdrubal*'s approach; by letters and meſſengers intercepted, as they were going to *Hannibal*. Theſe gave notice, that *Aſdrubal* had left the ſiege of *Placentia*, and drew onwards apace: being already come within two hundred miles of his brother; notwithſtanding all oppoſition that could be made by *Livy* the conſul. Of theſe news *Claudius Nero* was nothing joyful. For if *Hannibal* could once be joined as head, unto that great body of an army, which *Aſdrubal* brought with him: it was moſt apparent, that howſoever the fortune of *Rome* ſhould avoid, for the preſent, any great calamity; yet the very continuance of ſo ſtrong a war at home, would enforce the *Latins*, and other faithful aſſociates, to faint under the burden; as twelve of the thirty *Roman* colonies had already done. Wherefore he reſolved, that it were better to make any deſperate adventure, than to ſuffer the conjunction of two ſuch malevolent planets: whoſe peſtilent influence, if not on the ſudden, yet within few years, was like to work moſt lamentable effects. It ſeemed apparent, that his colleague was unable to ſtay the progreſs of *Aſdrubal*: neither were there any good legions in a readineſs, that could do ſervice in ſuch a needful caſe; excepting thoſe that were already employed under the two conſuls. Hereupon he concluded, that it was not expedient for him to tie himſelf to his own charge, which was the war againſt *Hannibal*: but rather that it behoved him to help where more neceſſity required; and to carry part of his forces unto his colleague. This could not be without much danger. Yet ſince the meeting of the two *Carthaginian* brethren, was far more dangerous to the *Roman* commonwealth; it ſeemed the beſt way to put fortune in truſt with that which was of the leſs importance. Six thouſand foot, and a thouſand horſe he therefore took, that were the very choice of his army: and making ſhew, as if he would only ſtep aſide, to do ſome ſmall piece of ſervice near at hand; away he poſted as faſt as he could, to aſſiſt his fellow-conſul. His meſſengers ran before him, to give warning to all towns by which he was to paſs, that they ſhould be ready to meet him, with victuals, and all other neceſſaries for his army. *Livius*, the other conſul, at that time, lay encamped near unto *Sena Gallica*; and *Aſdrubal* within half a mile of him. In ſix days *Nero* had finiſhed his journey thither; and when he drew near, ſent meſſengers before him, to give notice of his coming. *Livy* thought it fitteſt that he ſhould ſtay in ſome place of covert until dark night, and then enter ſecretly into the camp: leſt the enemy, perceiving this acceſs of ſtrength, ſhould accordingly frame his counſels. This was done: and a token given, that the colonels, captains, and all ſoldiers, as well horſe as foot, that *Nero* had brought with him, ſhould be lodged and entertained by men of their own ſort. Their company was ſomewhat encreaſed by voluntiers that joined with them on the way. Nevertheleſs, it was not needful, that the quarter which received them, ſhould be enlarged, ſince they had brought with them nothing but their arms. The next day they held a counſel of war: wherein ſome were of opinion, that it was beſt for theſe new-arrived companies, to refreſh themſelves a few days after their weary journey, before they ſhould be drawn forth to battel. But againſt this, *Nero* was very earneſt: and beſought his colleague, to make uſe of him out of hand; that he might betimes return to his own camp, ere *Hannibal* ſhould have notice of his abſence. The ſoldiers alſo of *Nero* were full of ſpirit; perceiving that the honour of the victory was like to be theirs: foraſmuch as the battel would not have been undertaken, without this their coming to help. Finally, it was agreed when the counſel brake up, that the ſign of battel ſhould be hung out; which was commonly a purple coat over the general's pavillion.

Aſdrubal was no leſs willing than the *Romans* to come to battel; having long deſired it, and hitherto not found occaſion before. But when he had put his men in order, and was riding before the head of his army, to behold the enemies countenance; it ſeemed to him, that they were more than they had been; and ſome of their arms and horſes, looked as though they had wanted dreſſing, after a long journey. Hereupon he began to withdraw his army back into the camp: and gave order, that if no priſoners could be taken, by whom he might be certified of the truth; yet ſhould there good obſervation be made, whether the enemies camp were enlarged, or no; or what other alteration could be noted, that might ſhew their forces to be increaſed. The camp, as hath been ſaid, was not extended: but the trumpet, that ſounded only once in the quarter of *L. Porcius* the pretor, did now, contrary to former cuſtom, ſound twice in the quarter of *Livius* the conſul. Hereat *Aſdrubal* greatly muſed: and being well acquainted with the *Roman* orders; held this for a ſure token, that the other conſul was there arrived. How this might be, if *Hannibal* were alive, and in good caſe, he was not able to conjecture: but thought it the beſt way, to go leiſurely to work, till he might be better informed. Upon confidence in his own forces, he had not cared hitherto, how near he lay to the *Romans*; nor troubled himſelf perhaps with over-ſtrongly fortifying his own camp. Yet when he now perceived, that ſomewhat was fallen out beſide his expectation, he changed his reſolution; and held it no diſhonour to remove a little further off. So he diſlodged ſecretly by night: intending to get over the river *Metaurus*; whereby to keep himſelf as long as he could, from neceſſity of battel. But whether it were ſo, that his guides did ſteal away from him in the dark, ſo that he could not find the way to the fords; or whether his carriages were too heavy, and hindred his ſpeed: far he had not gone, ere the conſul *Nero* was at his heels with all the *Roman* horſe, and ſtayed him from paſſing any further. Soon after came *L. Porcius* with the light armature: whom the other conſul followed anon with all his legions, in good order, and ready for battel. *Aſdrubal*, ſeeing himſelf

ſelf overtaken with neceſſity to fight, omitted no care and circumſpection. His *Gauls*, in whom he repoſed leaſt confidence, he placed in his left wing, upon a hill, which the enemy ſhould not, without much difficulty, be able to climb: in the right wing he ſtood himſelf, with his *Africans* and *Spaniards*; his *Ligurians* he placed in the midſt; and his elephants be beſtowed in the front of his battels. On the *Roman* ſide, *Nero* had the leading of the right wing, *Livius* of the left, and *Porcius* of the battel. Both *Romans* and *Carthaginians* well underſtood how much depended upon the fortune of this day, and how little hope of ſafety there was unto the vanquiſhed. Only the *Romans* herein ſeemed to have had the better in conceit and opinion; that they were to fight with men deſirous to have fled from them. And according to this preſumption, came *Livius* the conſul with a proud bravery, to give charge on the *Africans*; by whom he was ſo ſharply entertained, that the victory ſeemed very doubtful. The *Africans* and *Spaniards* were ſtout ſoldiers, and well acquainted with the manner of the *Roman* fight. The *Ligurians* alſo were a hardy nation, and not accuſtomed to give ground, which they needed the leſs, or were able now to do, being placed in the midſt. *Livius* therefore, and *Porcius*, found ſtrong oppoſition; and, with great ſlaughter on both ſides, prevailed little or nothing. Beſides other difficulties, they were exceedingly troubled by the elephants, that broke their firſt ranks; and put them in ſuch diſorder, as the *Roman* enſigns were driven to fall back. All this while *Claudius Nero*, labouring much in vain againſt a ſteep hill, was unable to come to blows with the *Gauls*, that ſtood oppoſite unto him, but out of danger. This made *Aſdrubal* the more confident, who, ſeeing his own left wing ſafe, did the more boldly and fiercely make impreſſion on the other ſide, upon the left wing of the *Romans*. But *Nero*, perceiving that the place wherein he ſtood, was ſuch as would compel him to remain idle till the fight were ended, took a part of his forces, and led them round behind the forces of *Porcius* and *Livius*; which having compaſſed, he fell upon *Aſdrubal*, and charged him in the flank. Here began the victory to be manifeſt on the *Roman* ſide: for *Nero*, finding none to reſiſt him in front, ran all along the depth of *Aſdrubal*'s battel; and, falling upon the ſkirts thereof, diſordered the enemies, and put all to rout. Of the *Spaniards* therefore and *Africans*, that were laid at on every ſide, the greateſt part was ſlain. The *Ligurians* and *Gauls* eſcaped as they could, and ſaved themſelves by timely flight. Of the elephants, four were taken alive, the reſt were ſlain; ſome by the enemy's weapons, others by their own guides that rode them. For when any of them, being ſore wounded, began to wax unruly, and ruſh back upon their own battels following them, the guide had in readineſs a mallet and a chizzel, wherewith he gave them a ſtroke between the ears, in the joint of the neck, next unto the head, wherewith he killed the beaſt upon the ſudden. This ſpeedy way of preventing ſuch harm as the elephants, being hurt, were wont to do to the ſquadrons following them, is ſaid to have been the device of *Aſdrubal* himſelf, who died in this battel.

Great commendations are given to *Aſdrubal*, both by *Polybius*, and by *Livy*. He is ſaid, at all times, to have ſhewed himſelf worthy of *Amilcar* his father, and *Hannibal* his brother; to have ſtriven with great patience againſt many difficulties, whereinto he fell by the means of thoſe captains that were ſent from *Carthage* into *Spain*; to have performed in this laſt battel all duties of a worthy general; and finally, when he ſaw the loſs irreparable, to have ridden manfully into the thickeſt of his enemies; where, fighting bravely, he was ſlain. Of the number that died with him in this battel, the report of *Livy*, and of *Polybius*, do very much diſagree: for *Livy* ſaith, that the *Carthaginians* had no leſs an overthrow, than was that which they gave to the *Romans* at *Cannæ*; that fifty-ſix thouſand of them were ſlain, five thouſand four hundred taken priſoners, and above four thouſand *Roman* citizens, whom they had captives with them, delivered, and ſet at liberty. He ſaith alſo, that of the *Romans* and their aſſociates there were ſlain eight thouſand; and of the booty, that it was exceeding great; not only in other kinds, but in gold and ſilver. Concerning the booty, *Polybius* hath no mention of it. Likely it is to have been as rich as *Livy* reporteth it; for *Aſdrubal* came well ſtored with money. But *Polybius* (who had no deſire to make this battel of *Metaurus* a parallel unto that of *Cannæ*) reports no more than about ten thouſand on the *Carthaginian* ſide, and two thouſand of the *Roman* to have been ſlain. The number of the priſoners he doth not mention; but only ſaith, that ſome of the *Carthaginian* princes were taken alive, and that all the reſt died in the battel: whereby it may ſeem that they were all *Barchines*, foraſmuch as they preferred the honour of themſelves, and of their country, above their lives.

The joy of this victory was no leſs in *Rome*, than had been the fear of the event: for ever ſince it was known in what ſort *Nero* had left his army, the whole city was troubled, as much as lately at *Hannibal*'s coming thither. Men thought it ſtrange, that the conſul ſhould make ſuch a great adventure, as thus to put the one half of all the *Roman* forces unto hazard of the dice. For what if *Hannibal* ſhould chance to have notice of this his departure, and either purſue him, or ſet upon the army that ſtayed behind, much weakened, and without a general? Thus did they talk; yet reſerving their cenſure unto the ſucceſs, with liberty to approve or condemn, according to the iſſue. In the mean while the people filled the market-place; the women ran to the temple with vows and prayers, and the ſenators were daily in council, waiting ſtill ready at hand upon the magiſtrates; as if ſome great matter were likely to fall out, that would require every one's help. In brief, they were all ſo full of melancholy, that when the firſt news of the victory came, there were not many that would believe it. Afterwards, when meſſengers arrived from the conſuls, with letters containing all that had paſſed, there was not only a great and joyful concourſe of all ſorts of men unto the temples, but the very face of the city was altered; and men from thenceforth began to follow their private buſineſs, making contracts one with another (which they had long forborn to do) and attending their own affairs in ſuch wiſe, as if *Hannibal* were already driven out of *Italy*.

Nero, returning to his camp, threw forth openly the head of *Aſdrubal* before the *Carthaginians*; and producing his *African* priſoners bound, ſent two of them looſe to give *Hannibal* notice of what had happened. Theſe two priſoners might have ſerved well enough to certify *Hannibal* of the miſadventure, without doing wrong to the dead body of *Aſdrubal*; eſpecially ſince *Hannibal* in honourable, and far different manner, had given burial to *Gracchus* and *Marcellus*; yea, to all the *Roman* generals, whoſe carcaſes fell into his hands. But it may ſeem, that howſoever the people of *Carthage* wanted much of the generous diſpoſition which was found among

among the *Romans*, in their love unto the common-weal; yet in dealing with enemies, they were far more civil, and leſs prone to the inſolency of revenge. The beſt excuſe of this outrage done by *Nero*, is, that he hoped much more by the ſudden terror of ſuch a ſpectacle, than by the ſimple relation of that which had paſſed, to make a deep impreſſion of fear into the *Carthaginians*. It may alſo be ſaid, that he forgot himſelf, being over-joyed with the greatneſs of his proſperity: for it was the battel of *Metaurus* that weighed down the balance, and turned the tide of the *Roman* fortune; which being then at the loweſt ebb, ceaſed not afterwards to flow, till it could not be contained within any banks. *Hannibal*, having loſt in this unhappy fight (beſides that worthy gentleman his brother) all the hope that ſo long ſuſtained him in *Italy*, withdrew himſelf into the country of the *Brutians*; and thither he cauſed all the *Lucans*, that were of his party, to remove; as likewiſe all that dwelt in *Metapontum*. For he wanted men, to defend ſo many places as he held at the preſent, becauſe they lay too far aſunder. Wherefore he drew them all into a leſſer compaſs, in the utmoſt corner of *Italy*, it being a country of much faſtneſs, and the people exceedingly devoted to his ſervice. In this buſineſs, *Nero* gave him no memorable impediment, either becauſe *Hannibal* was too ſtrong for him, having all his forces united, or becauſe it is likely that this remove of the *Lucans* and *Metapontines* was not before the end of ſummer, when their harveſt was gathered in; at which time the ſenate called him home to *Rome*. *M. Livius*, the other conſul, tarried among the *Ciſalpine Gauls* until the end of ſummer; there to ſet things in ſuch order as he thought requiſite: which done, he wrote unto the ſenate, that there was no more need of him and his army in that province; but that *L. Porcius*, with the two legions that were there before, might very well diſcharge the place. For this cauſe he deſired leave to return home, and that he might bring his army with him. The ſenate well underſtood his meaning, which was to have the honour of triumph, as he well deſerved. But foraſmuch as it was well known what intereſt *Nero* had in the late victory, order was given, that not only *Livy*, with his army, ſhould come home, but likewiſe *Nero*; though leaving his army behind him, to confront *Hannibal*. So the honour of triumph was granted to them both; in the pomp whereof *Livy* made the greater ſhew, as riding in a chariot, and followed by his ſoldiers; becauſe in his province, and upon his day of command, the victory was gotten; his army alſo being preſent at the triumph. But *Nero*, that rode on horſeback, and without ſuch attendance, was the more extolled both by the people and ſoldiers, by whom the victory was in a manner wholly aſcribed unto his great worth. Neither wanted *L. Veturius Philo*, and *Q. Cæcilius Metellus*, lieutenants to the generals, the due acknowledgment of their good ſervice. For they were commended unto the people, as men worthy to be choſen conſuls; and conſuls they were choſen for the year following: but nothing was done by them worthy of memory in their conſulſhip. Neither indeed from this year, which was the thirteenth of the preſent war, until the eighteenth year, wherein it ended, was there any matter of importance wrought in *Italy*; ſave only the taking of *Locri* from the *Carthaginians* by ſurprize: for *Hannibal* wanted ſtrength wherewith to make any great offer; and the *Romans* had little mind to provoke him, but thought it well that he was quiet. Such opinion had they conceived of him, that though all about him went to ruin, yet in him alone they thought there was force enough to hold himſelf upright. And ſurely very notable are the commendations given unto him by *Polybius*, whom *Livy* therein follows: that making war upon a people, of all other the moſt warlike, he obtained ſo many victories by his own good conduct; and that leading an army, compounded of ſo many ſundry nations, *Africans*, *Spaniards*, *Gauls*, *Carthaginians*, *Italians*, and *Greeks*, which were neither in language, laws, conditions, or any other thing, one like to another, he held them all in ſuch good order, that they never fell to ſedition among themſelves, or againſt their general. But that which *Livy* adds hereto, is yet perhaps of greater admiration: that he ſuſtained his army, without help from other places, from this time forward, upon the hungry ſoil of the *Brutians*; which, when it was beſt manur'd in time of peace, could hardly ſuffice to nouriſh the inhabitants. It is therefore apparent, that by his proper worth and virtue, he kept his army in ſuch order and obedience, rather than by any greatneſs of reward and booty; ſince after the death of *Aſdrubal*, he made no invaſion upon the wealthier parts of *Italy*, but held himſelf ſtill among the poor *Brutians*. Where we muſt leave him until he be drawn into *Afric* by *Scipio*, whoſe doings will henceforth entertain, and lead us unto the end of this war.

SECT. XVII.

How P. Cornelius Scipio, *the* Roman, *made entire conqueſt of* Spain.

†. I.

How the Carthaginians *were driven by* Scipio *from the continent into the iſle of* Gades.

MAGO, and *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Geſco*, took upon them the charge of *Spain*, when *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Amilcar*, departed thence into *Italy*. Theſe agreed together, that *Mago* ſhould make a voyage to the *Baleares*, there to levy a ſupply of men; and *Aſdrubal* withdraw himſelf into *Luſitania* (which is now *Portugal*) whither the *Romans* had ill means to follow, being altogether unacquainted in thoſe parts. *Mago* had ſoon ended his buſineſs, and returned into *Spain*, where he met with one *Hanno* (the ſame perhaps that had lately been employed in *Sicily*) who brought new forces out of *Afric*, and came to ſucceed in place of *Aſdrubal* the *Barchine*. It is not unlikely that *Spain* was now the better, and more readily furniſhed with men, and all things needful, from *Carthage*, when that ſon of *Amilcar*, whoſe authority had been greateſt, was thence departed. For hereby might the factious diligence of old *Hanno* approve it ſelf, againſt that noble race of warriors, when it ſhould appear, that things did proſper much the better, by being left unto the handling of other men. Whether it were upon deſire to make good ſome ſuch opinion raiſed of him at home, or whether upon confidence in the forces that he brought over, *Hanno* took the field, and led *Mago* with him, as purpoſing afreſh to ſet upon the *Romans*. So he entered into the country of the *Celtiberians*, not very far from *New Carthage*, where, by money, and other perſwaſions, he levied above nine thouſand men.

P. Scipio, in the mean while, contained himſelf in the eaſtern parts of *Spain*, attentive, as it may ſeem, to the proceedings of *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Amilcar*; againſt whom, he is reported, by ſome writers, to have ſent part of his forces into *Italy*, to the aſſiſtance of *C. Claudius Nero*, and *M. Livius*, the

the conſuls. But hearing of the levy made by *Hanno* and *Mago*, among the *Celtiberians*, he ſent *M. Syllanus*, the propretor, with ten thouſand foot and five hundred horſe. *Syllanus* got intelligence by ſome fugitive *Celtiberians*, who became his guides, that their countrymen encamped a-part from the *Carthaginians* in great diſorder, as men fearing no danger, becauſe they were at home. Wherefore, as cloſely as he was able, he drew near to theſe *Celtiberians*; and, falling upon them on the ſudden, gave them ſuch an overthrow, that *Hanno* and *Mago*, coming to their ſuccour, inſtead of heartning and reinforcing them, became partakers of the loſs. *Mago* ſaved himſelf, with all the horſe and old companies of foot, which were about two thouſand, and in ten days journey brought them ſafe to *Aſdrubal*. The reſt of the *Africans* were either ſlain or taken, among whom, *Hanno* had the ill luck to be taken priſoner; though he kept himſelf out of the fight until all was loſt. As for the *Celtiberians*, they knew better how to make ſhift, and ſaved moſt of themſelves by running into the woods.

It could no otherwiſe be, but that *Scipio* was much troubled with the danger wherein *Italy* ſtood, by the coming thither of *Aſdrubal*. Ten thouſand foot and eighteen hundred horſe he did therefore ſend out of *Spain* (as it is reported by ſome authors) to the defence of his own country, or was perhaps about to ſend them; and thereupon remained at *New Carthage*, intentive to the neceſſity and ſucceſs of his countrymen at home. But when he had word of the great victory at *Metaurus*, which fell out long before the end of this ſummer, then might he well adventure to take in hand the entire conqueſt of *Spain*; which muſt needs be much alienated from the *Carthaginians*, by the report of ſuch an overthrow. The *Spaniſh* ſoldiers that ſerved under *Hannibal*, and thoſe that had been ſent over into *Afric*, were as pledges heretofore, by whom their country was held obnoxious to the *Carthaginians*. But when it was noiſed abroad, that all which had followed *Aſdrubal* into *Italy*, were fallen into the hands of the *Romans*; and that *Hannibal*, with his army, was cloſed up in a ſtreight, whence he could not get out; then did it greatly behove the *Spaniards* to conform themſelves unto the will of the victors. That it was the ſucceſs of things in *Italy*, which gave ſuch confidence unto *Scipio*, it is the more probable, becauſe he took not this great enterprize in hand till the ſummer was almoſt ſpent. *Aſdrubal* therefore uſed the benefit of the ſeaſon; and by diſpoſing his army into many garriſons, hindered the enemy from doing any great exploit before winter. So the very length of way, and the time of the year, cauſed *Scipio* to return back, without any other matter performed, than that his brother, *L. Scipio*, took by aſſault the town of *Oringis*.

Againſt the next year's danger, *Aſdrubal* prepared a great army, and ſpared not coſt nor travel in ſtrengthning himſelf for the trial of his laſt fortune in *Spain*. With ſeventy thouſand foot, four thouſand horſe, and thirty-two elephants, he took the field; which number, I believe, that he could hardly have raiſed, without boldly denying the truth of thoſe reports that came from *Italy*. *Scipio* thought his *Roman* legions too weak to encounter with ſuch a multitude; wherefore he judged it needful to uſe the help of his *Spaniſh* friends. But the death of his father and uncle, that were caſt away by the treaſon of ſuch falſe auxiliaries, made him, on the other ſide, very doubtful of relying upon thoſe that might perhaps betray him in his greateſt need. Yet ſince one *Colchas*, that was lord of twenty-eight towns, had promiſed him the laſt winter, to raiſe three thouſand foot, and five hundred horſe for his ſervice: he reſolved to make uſe of thoſe, and ſome few others, that might help to make a ſhew, and yet not be able to do great harm, if they would revolt. So with five and forty thouſand foot, and three thouſand horſe he ſought the enemy; near to whom he incamped. At his firſt coming, *Mago* and *Maſaniſſa* fell upon him; with hope to take him unprepared, whilſt he was making his lodgings. But he laid certain troops of horſe in covert: which breaking upon them unexpected, cauſed them to fall off. They made at firſt an orderly retreat: but being more hardly preſſed, they ſhortly betook themſelves to plain flight. After this encounter, which added ſome courage to the *Romans*, and abated the preſumption of the *Carthaginians*: there were daily ſkirmiſhes between the horſe, and light armature, on both ſides; wherein was nothing done of importance. *Aſdrubal* drew forth his army, and arranged it before his trenches: the like did *Scipio*; each of them to ſhew that he durſt fight; yet not proceeding any further. Thus they continued many days: *Aſdrubal* being ſtill the firſt that iſſued forth in the morning; and the firſt that, in the evening, withdrew himſelf into his trenches. The *Spaniſh* auxiliaries were placed on both ſides in the wings: the *Carthaginians* were in the midſt, with their elephants before them; and oppoſite to theſe on the other ſide were the *Roman* legions. When they had in this order confronted one another, though at far diſtance, many days together: it grew to be the common opinion, that they ſhould ſhortly meet in the ſame form, and be matched on each part, with the enemies, long before deſigned. But *Scipio*, when he purpoſed indeed to fight, altered the form of his army; and withal, came forth earlier than he had been wont. He cauſed his men, and horſes, to be well fed betimes in the morning, before day: and then ſent forth his horſe and light armature, to train out the *Carthaginians*, with their bellies empty: uſing herein the ſame trick, whereby he might remember that *Hannibal* had beaten his father in the battel of *Trebia*. His *Roman* legions he beſtowed in the wings; his *Spaniards* in the battel. *Aſdrubal* ſent forth his horſe in all haſte, to entertain the *Romans*; whilſt he himſelf arranged his men, in their wonted order, at the hill foot, upon which he incamped. In the ſkirmiſhes of the horſe it could not be diſcerned which part had the better: ſince being over-preſſed on either ſide, they had a ſafe retreat unto their foot; and one troop ſeconding another by courſe, returned to charge. This fight was protracted by *Scipio* to a great length: becauſe his men, having well fed themſelves, were like to hold out better than the enemy. But about noon he cauſed his wings to advance a good pace; leaving their battel of *Spaniards* far behind them, that came on leiſurely, according to direction. The *Spaniſh* mercenaries, that ſtood in *Aſdrubal*'s wings, were no way comparable, ſave only in number, to the *Latin* and *Roman* ſoldiers, that came againſt them; for they were freſh ſoldiers, levied in haſte; and fighting only in reſpect of their pay. Being therefore charged in front by the legions, and in flank, at the ſame time, by the *Roman Velites*, and by ſome cohorts, that were appointed to wheel about for the ſame purpoſe: they were ſorely preſſed; and with much difficulty made reſiſtance. The *Carthaginians* would fain have ſuccoured them; but that they durſt not ſtir out of their places, becauſe of the *Spaniſh* battel which was coming againſt

againſt them; though it were as yet far off. Thus the beſt part of *Aſdrubal*'s army ſtood idle, until the wings were broken. For, had he adventured to meet with the *Spaniards*, he muſt have caſt himſelf into the open ſpace that lay before him, between the *Roman* wings: to the depth whereof when he had arrived, he ſhould have found himſelf incloſed in ſuch a ſort, as was the conſul *Paulus* at the battel of *Cannæ*. Wherefore he did not only employ his elephants; which did, according to their manner, no greater harm to his enemies, than to his friends. When they were chafed with wounds, they could no longer be ruled by their guides: but ran, as chance led them, and troubled both parts; or thoſe perhaps the more, that were the more unwilling to kill them. In proceſs of the fight, the *Romans*, who had well refreſhed their bodies in the morning, endured luſty; when the others began to faint with travel, and heat of the day. Wherefore perceiving their advantage, they followed it the more hotly: and gave not over, till they had forc'd the enemy to change his pace, and run from him. *Aſdrubal* did his beſt to have made an orderly retreat; and afterwards again, to have cauſed his men to turn head, at the hill foot. But the *Romans* would not ſuffer the victory to be ſo extorted from them: neither was it eaſy to put freſh courage into the vanquiſhed; led by the obſtinate paſſion of fear, which hearkens to no perſwaſion. The camp of *Aſdrubal* had that day been taken, if a ſtorm of rain, which fell violently on the ſudden, and bred ſome ſuperſtition in the *Romans*, had not cauſed them to give over.

The ſame night, *Aſdrubal* gave no reſt to his men: but cauſed them, hungry, and over-laboured as they were, to take pains in fortifying the camp; wherein he feared to be aſſaulted. But little aſſurance could he have in the ſtrength of his trenches, when he had loſt the hearts of his *Spaniſh* ſoldiers. One *Attanes*, that was lord of the *Turdetani*, fled from him to the *Romans*, with a great band of his ſubjects: many followed this example; and ſoon after, two ſtrong towns were yielded up to *Scipio*, and the garriſons betrayed. It ſeems, that the perverſe fortune of this late battel, whereupon *Aſdrubal* had ſet his reſt; bred in the *Spaniards* a diſpoſition, to believe the more eaſily thoſe reports which they heard from *Italy*: for henceforward, they never did good office to the *Carthaginians*. *Aſdrubal*, perceiving this, withdrew himſelf, and marched away, faſter than an ordinary pace, towards the ocean ſea. *Scipio* followed the next morning: and overtaking the *Carthaginians* with his horſe, cauſed them ſo often to make ſtand, that they were at length attacked by the *Roman* legions. Here began a cruel ſlaughter: for there was no reſiſtance made, but all fell to rout, ſave only ſeven thouſand, that with *Aſdrubal* himſelf recovered a very ſtrong piece of ground, which they fortified in haſte. This place he made ſhift a while to defend: but wanting there neceſſaries to ſuſtain himſelf long, he was forſaken by ſome of thoſe few, that continued hitherto partakers of his fortune. Wherefore he reſolved to make ſhift for one: and ſtealing from his company by night away to the ſea-ſide, that was not far thence; he took ſhipping, and ſet ſail for *Gades*. When *Scipio* underſtood that *Aſdrubal* was thus gone: he left *Syllanus* with ten thouſand foot, and a thouſand horſe, to beſiege their camp (which was not taken in haſte; for *Mago* and *Maſaniſſa* ſtayed in it) whilſt he with the reſt of the army, did what was needful in the country abroad. It was not long ere *Mago* and *Maſaniſſa* followed *Aſdrubal* to *Gades*: and their army diſperſed it ſelf; ſome flying over to the *Romans*; others taking what way they liked. So upon all the continent of *Spain*, there were only three towns left, *Illiturgi*, *Caſtulo*, and *Aſtapa*, that made continuance of war againſt the *Romans*: of which only *Caſtulo* had in it a *Carthaginian* garriſon; conſiſting of ſuch as had ſaved themſelves by flight, in the late overthrows. Hereby it ſeems, that the report of thoſe hiſtorians was ill grounded, who ſaid, that *Caſtulo* yielded long ſince unto the *Romans*; though *Hannibal* took a wife in that city. For this was one of the laſt three towns that held out, on the *Carthaginian* ſide. *Illiturgi* had ſometimes been inclinable to the *Romans*; if not altogether at their devotion. Yet after the death of the two elder *Scipio's*, following too earneſtly the *Carthaginian* fortune; it not only rebelled; but with great cruelty betrayed, and ſlew the poor men that eſcaped thither from the overthrows. *Aſtapa* was a town that ſtill adhered to the *Carthaginians*; and, which was worſe, had thriven by the ſpoil of the *Romans* and their confederates. Wherefore (though not until the next year) *Scipio* went againſt theſe, and took himſelf *Illiturgi* and *Caſtulo*: *Illiturgi* by aſſault, and with a general ſlaughter of the inhabitants; *Caſtulo*, by treaſon of one *Cerdubellus*. *Aſtapa* was taken by *Lucius Marcius*; or rather deſtroyed by the inhabitants. For a great pile of wood was raiſed in the market-place; whereinto was thrown all the gold and ſilver, with whatſoever elſe was precious; the women and children ſtanding by it under a ſure guard, that ſhould kill and burn them if the *Romans* got into the town. This proviſion being made; all the inhabitants that could bear arms, ruſhed forth deſperately, and fell upon the *Roman* camp; where ſtriving beyond their power, they were every one ſlain. Then was the town forthwith ſet on fire, by thoſe that had taken charge to do it: and many of the *Romans* conſumed with the flame; whilſt they ruſhed overhaſtily to catch the gold and ſilver, which they ſaw lying on the pile ready to melt.

Aſdrubal, being beaten into the iſland of *Gades*, found no cauſe of long ſtay there: but returned home to *Carthage*, with ſeven gallies: leaving *Mago* behind him, to wait upon occaſion, if any ſhould be offered. He viſited in his way home, *Syphax*, king of the *Maſæſili*, a people of the *Numidians*, hoping to win him to the friendſhip of the *Carthaginians*. But he met with *Scipio*, as it were with his evil *Angel*, in the king's port: who, landing at the ſame time, carried *Syphax* quite another way. For *Scipio*, having driven the *Carthaginians* out of *Spain*, did forthwith bethink himſelf, how to finiſh the war, by putting them to the like diſtreſs in *Afric*. Hereunto it ſeemed, that the help of *Syphax* would be much available: a king that had many times fallen out with the *Carthaginians*, and ſuſtained much hurt by their procurement; of which in all likelihood he might eaſily be moved to ſeek revenge. He had alſo been beholden to *P.* and *Cn. Scipio*, that ſent him over a captain into *Afric*; who inſtructed him ſo well in marſhalling his forces, as he thereby often became victorious. Upon theſe reaſons the *Numidian* king ſent ambaſſadors to *Rome*, and made league with the city, in a time of great extremity. So that hereby *P. Scipio* conceived hope of laying a foundation to the war, which he intended in *Afric*, upon the friendſhip of this ill neighbour to the *Carthaginians*. For which cauſe he ſent over *C. Lælius* his ambaſſador, to deal with *Syphax*: who declaring, that the *Carthaginians* did very ill in *Italy*, and had nothing now at all to do in *Spain*; eaſily perſwaded the king to take part with thoſe that had the better, and were

without queſtion his better friends. Only *Syphax* requeſted, that the *Roman* general ſhould viſit him in perſon, to conclude the league; by which he was to enter into conditions of more importance, than in any former treaty. Hereto *Scipio* condeſcended; thinking the friendſhip of ſo great a king, that was neighbour to *Carthage*, and not far diſtant from *Spain*, well worthy of the adventure. So with two *Quinquereme* gallies he took ſea: and arrived in the king's port, at the ſame time with *Aſdrubal*. This would have been very dangerous to him, had he been deſcried by his enemies further at ſea: but in the haven, they forbare to make offer one upon the other. *Syphax* might well be proud; ſeeing at one time, two ſuch captains of the two moſt powerful cities, came to deſire his friendſhip. He would have brought them to treat of peace: but the *Roman* excuſed himſelf, by want of ſuch commiſſion from the ſenate. He feaſted them together: and ſhortly diſmiſſed *Scipio*, with whom he readily entred into covenant; which in time of performance, he as readily brake.

†. II.

Funeral games held by Scipio. *A duel between two* Spaniſh *princes. A digreſſion, concerning duels.*

SCIPIO returning into *Spain*, and reſting that winter, took vengeance the next year upon thoſe of *Illiturgi*, *Caſtulo*, and *Aſtapa*, as hath been ſaid before. The conqueſt of the country being then in a manner at an end: he performed at *New Carthage*, with great ſolemnity, ſome Vows that he had made; and honoured the memory of his father and uncle, with funeral games, eſpecially of thoſe that fought at ſharp, according to the manner of the times. Neither was it needful, that he ſhould trouble himſelf with preparing ſlaves for that ſpectacle, to hazard their lives, as was uſed in the city of *Rome*: for there were enough, that either offered themſelves as voluntiers, or were ſent from their princes, to give proof in ſingle combat, of the valour that was in their ſeveral countries. Some alſo there were, that being in contention, which they could not, or would not otherwiſe end, agreed to refer the deciſion of their controverſy, to trial of the ſword, in ſingle fight. Among theſe, the moſt eminent, were *Corbis* and *Orſua*, couſin-germans, that contended for the principality of a town called *Ibes*. *Corbis* was the elder, and the elder brother's ſon: wherefore he claimed the lordſhip, as eldeſt of the houſe, after the manner of our *Iriſh Taniſtry*. But the father of *Orſua* ſtood lately ſeized of the principality: which though himſelf received by the death of his elder brother, yet this his ſon would not let it go back; but claimed to hold it as heir unto his father, and old enough to rule. Fain would *Scipio* have compounded the matter. But they anſwered peremptorily, That all their friends, and kindred had already laboured in vain, to take up that quarrel; and that neither God, nor man, but only *Mars*, their god of battel, ſhould be umpire between them. So they had their wills: and the elder, who was alſo the ſtronger, and more ſkilful at his weapon, eaſily vanquiſhed the fool-hardineſs of the younger.

Such combats have been very ancient; and perhaps more ancient, than any other kind of fight. We read of many performed before the war of *Troy*, by *Theſeus*, *Hercules*, *Pollux*, and others: as alſo of two more at the war of *Troy*; the one between *Paris* and *Menelaus*; the other between *Hector* and *Ajax*. Neither want their examples of them among the *Hebrews*: whereof that between *David* and *Goliah*; and others performed by ſome of *David*'s worthies, againſt thoſe that challenged them; are greatly celebrated. Unto the ſame kind appertains the fight, between twelve of the tribe of *Juda* and as many of the *Benjamites*. The *Romans* had many of them: whereof that was principal, in which they ventured their dominion upon the heads of three brethren the *Horatii*, againſt the three brethren *Curatii*, that were *Albans*. The combat of *Manlius Torquatus*, and ſhortly after, of *Valerius Corvinus*, with two champions of the *Gauls*, which challenged any *Roman*; were of leſs importance, as having only reference to bravery. In *England* there was a great combat fought, between *Edmond Ironſide* and *Canutus* the *Dane*, for no leſs matter than the kingdom. The uſe of them was very frequent in the *Saxon* times; almoſt upon every occaſion, great or ſmall. In the reign of *Edward* the third, who ſuſtained the party of *Mountfort* againſt the earl of *Blois*, contending for the dutchy of *Bretagne*; there was a fight, for honour of the nations, between thirty of the *Bretanes*, and thirty *Engliſh*: two of which *Engliſh*, were *Calverly*, a brave captain, and that Sir *Robert Knolles*, who afterwards became a renowned commander in the *French* wars, and did highly honour his blood, whereof the lord *Knolles* is deſcended. It were infinite to reckon the examples of the like, found in *Engliſh*, *French*, and *Italian* hiſtories. Moſt of them have been combats of bravery, and of *gayeté de cœur*, as the *French* term it; for honour of ſeveral nations; for love of miſtreſſes; or whatſoever elſe gave occaſion unto men, deſirous to ſet out themſelves. But beſides thoſe of this ſort, there are two other natures of combats; which are, either upon accuſation for life; or upon trial of title and inheritance, as in *writ of right*. And of this latter kind was that, of which we ſpake even now, between *Corbis* and *Orſua*. Unto theſe (methinks) may be added, as of different condition from the reſt, the combat upon wager; ſuch as were that between *David* and *Goliah*; or that between the *Horatii* and *Curatii*: in which, without regard of title, the dominion of nations, one over the other, is adventured upon the head of champions. [a] Upon an accuſation for life, there was a combat appointed between the lord *Henry* of *Boulinbrook*, duke of *Hereford*, and *Moubray*, duke of *Norfolk*. [b] There was a combat performed by Sir *John Anſley*, and one *Cattrington*: whom *Anſley* charged with treaſon; and proved it upon him, by being victorious. The like was fought between *Robert* of *Mountfort*, and *Henry* of *Eſſex*. [c] The like alſo between a *Navarrois*, and one *Welch* of *Grimsby*, whom the *Navarrois* accuſed of treaſon: but, being beaten in fight, confeſſed that he had belied him; and was therefore drawn and hanged. Whether our trial by battel do determine, that the falſe accuſer, if he be vanquiſhed, ſhall ſuffer the puniſhment which had been due to the offender, if the accuſation had been proved, I cannot affirm. But we every-where find, that if he which is accuſed of treaſon, or, according to the cuſtoms of *Normandy*, of murder, rape, or burning of places (offences puniſhed by death) be overcome, he ſhall ſuffer the pains appointed for thoſe crimes. In combats for trial of right, it is not ſo: neither is the appellant or defendant bound to fight in perſon, but he may try it by his champion; as did *Paramor* and *Lowe*, or offered to do, in the reign of queen *Elizabeth*. And in this caſe, he that is beaten, or yieldeth, loſeth only his cauſe,

[a] Anno 21. Ric. 2. [b] Anno 3. Ric. 2. [c] Anno 9. Hen. 2.

not

not his life. Neither are the combats, upon accuſation, or trial of right, fought in open field, as are thoſe of bravery, but in *campe cloſe*; that is, within rails. Now this trial by combat was ſo ordinary in *France*, before the time of St. *Lewis*, and *Philip the fair*, his grand-child, as every lord of fee, eccleſiaſtical or temporal, had power to grant it within his own juriſdiction. And it ſeemeth, that the *French* kings, and other lords, made their profit hereby. For in the [a] *Memorials of the chamber of accompts*, is found an article to this effect: That if a combat were once accepted, and after, by conſent of the the lord, were taken up, each of the parties ſhould pay two ſhillings and ſix-pence; but if it were performed, then ſhould the party vanquiſhed forfeit an hundred and twelve ſhillings. And upon this cuſtom grew the *French* proverb, which they uſe when any man hath had an hard or unjuſt judgment, ſaying, that *he was tried by the law of* Loray, *or* Berne; *ou le battu paye l'amende*, where he that is beaten gives the recompence. Of theſe frequent trials by battel, that great learned man *Yuo*, biſhop of *Chartres*, did often complain, and eſpecially againſt the *French* church-men: as appears by [b] his letters to the biſhop of *Orleans*, to the arch-deacon of *Paris*, to *Rembert* archbiſhop of *Sens*, and to others; wherein he rebukes the judgment of their churches, that had ratified ſuch challenges of combat. But this liberty, and kind of trial, was retrenched by St. *Lewis*, and *Philip the fair*; ſo that no man ſhould decree or grant it, ſave the king himſelf. It hath ſince been granted, though more ſparingly, by the *French* kings; as to the lord of *Carouges* againſt *Jaques les gris*; and to *Julian Romero* the *Spaniard*, againſt *Moro* his country-man: wherein Sir *Henry Kneuet*, father of the lord *Kneuet*, now living, was patron to *Romero*, that had the victory; and laſtly, to the lord of *Chaſt*. Now in thoſe challenges, upon accuſation of treaſon, murder, or other offence deſerving death (and in thoſe only) the rule held; That *le defendeur eſtoit tenu de propoſer ces deffenſes par une dementir*; The defendant was bound to plead not guilty, by giving the accuſer the lie: otherwiſe it was concluded, that the defendant did *taiſiblement confeſſer le crime*; ſilently confeſs the crime. But after ſuch time as *Francis* the *French* king, upon ſome diſpute about breach of faith, had ſent the *lie* unto the emperor *Charles* the fifth, thereby to draw him to a perſonal combat: every petty companion in *France*, in imitation of their maſter, made the giving of the *lie* mortality it ſelf; holding it a matter of no ſmall glory, to have it ſaid, that the meaneſt gentleman in *France*, would not put up, what the great emperor *Charles* the fifth had patiently endured.

From this beginning is derived a challenge of combat, grounded upon none of thoſe occaſions that were known to the antient. For, the honour of nations, the trial of right, the wager upon champions, or the objection and refutation of capital offences, are none of them, nor all of them together, the argument of half ſo many duels, as are founded upon mere private anger; yea, or upon matter ſeeming worthy of anger in the opinion of the duelliſts. So that in theſe days, wherein every man takes unto himſelf a kingly liberty, to offer, accept, and appoint perſonal combats; the giving of the *lie*, which ought to be the negation only in accuſations for life, is become the moſt fruitful root of deadly quarrels. This is held a word ſo terrible, and a wrong ſo unpardonable, as will admit no other recompence, than the blood of him that gives it. Thus the faſhion, taken up in haſte by the *French* gentlemen, after the pattern of their king, is grown to be a cuſtom: whence we have derived a kind of art and philoſophy of quarrel, with certain grounds and rules, from whence the points of honour, and the dependencies thereof, are deduced. Yea, there are (among many other no leſs ridiculous) ſome ſo myſtical curioſities herein, as that it is held a far greater diſhonour to receive from an enemy a ſlight touch with a cane, than a ſound blow with a ſword; the one having relation to a ſlave; the other to a ſoldier. I confeſs, that the difference is pretty; though, for mine own part, if I had had any ſuch *Italianated* enemy in former times, I ſhould willingly have made with him ſuch an exchange, and have given him the point of honour to boot.

But let us examine indifferently the offence of this terrible word, the *lie*, with their conditions, who are commonly, of all other, the moſt tender in receiving it. I ſay, that the moſt of theſe, who preſent death on the points of their ſwords to all that give it them, uſe nothing ſo much in their converſation and courſe of life, as to ſpeak and ſwear falſly. Yea, it is thereby that they ſhift and ſhuffle in the world, and abuſe it. For how few are there among them, which having aſſumed and ſworn to pay the monies, and other things they borrow, do not break their word and promiſe as often as they engage it? Nay, how few are there among them, that are not *liars by record*, by being ſued in ſome court or other of juſtice, upon breach of word, or bond? For he which hath promiſed that he will pay money by a day, or promiſed any thing elſe, wherein he faileth, hath directly lied to him to whom the promiſe hath been made. Nay, what is the profeſſion of love that men make now-a-days? What is the vowing of their ſervice, and of all they have uſed in their ordinary compliments, and (in effect) to every man whom they bid but good-morrow, or ſalute, other than a courteous and court-like kind of lying? It is, ſaith a wiſe *Frenchman* (deriding therein the apiſh cuſtom of his country) *une marché & complot fait enſemble ſe mocquer, mentir, & piper les uns les autres*; A kind of merchandiſe, and complot made among them, to mock, belie, and deride each other: and ſo far now-a-days in faſhion, and in uſe; as he that uſeth it not, is accounted either dull, or cynical. True it is notwithſtanding (omitting the old diſtinction) that there is great difference between theſe mannerly and complimental lies, with thoſe which are ſometime perſwaded by neceſſity upon breach of promiſe; and thoſe which men uſe out of cowardiſe and fear: the latter confeſſing themſelves to be in greater awe of men, than of God; a vice, of all other, ſtiled the moſt villainous. But now for the *lie* it ſelf, as it is made the ſubject of all our deadly quarrels in effect: to it I ſay, that whoſo gives another man the *lie*, when it is manifeſt that he hath lied, doth him no wrong at all; neither ought it to be more heinouſly taken, than to tell him, that he hath broken any promiſe which he hath otherwiſe made. For he that promiſeth any thing, tells him to whom he hath promiſed, that he will perform it; and, in not performing it, he hath made himſelf a liar. On the other ſide, he that gives any man the *lie*, when he himſelf knows that he to whom it is given, hath not lied,

[a] Si homines de Loraico vadia duelli temerè dederint, &c. [b] Clerici veſtri nuper ad nos revertentes, qui cauſæ comitis Theobaldi Aurelianis interfuerunt, retulerunt nobis, quod quidam miles Domini Rodulphi quendam militem comitis ad Monomachiam provocaverit, & hanc provocationem Eccleſiæ veſtræ judicio confirmaverit, &c.

doth

doth therein give the lie directly to himself. And what cause have I, if I say that the sun shines, when it doth shine, and that another fellow tells me I lie, for it's mid-night, to prosecute such an one to death, for making himself a foolish ruffian, and a liar in his own knowledge? For he that gives the lie in any other dispute, than in defence of his loyalty or life, gives it impertinently, and ruffian-like. I will not deny, but it is an extreme rudeness to tax any man in publick with an untruth (if it be not pernicious, and to his prejudice against whom the untruth is uttered) but all that is rude, ought not to be civilized with death. That were more to admire and imitate a *French* custom, and a wicked one, than to admire and to follow the counsel of God: but you will say, that these discourses savour of cowardise. It is true, if you call it cowardise to fear God or hell; whereas he that is truly wise, and truly valiant, knows that there is nothing else to be feared. For against an enemy's sword we shall find ten thousand seven-penny men (waged at that price in the wars) that fear it as little, or perchance less, than any profess'd swordsman in the world. *Diligentissima in tutela sui fortitudo*; Fortitude is a diligent preserver of it self. It is (saith *Aristotle*) a mediocrity between doubting and daring. *Sicut non martyrem pœna; sic nec fortem pugna, sed causa:* As it is not the punishment that makes the martyr; so it is not fighting that declares a valiant man, but fighting in a good cause. In which whosoever shall resolvedly end his life, resolvedly in respect of the cause, to wit, in defence of his prince, religion, or country; as he may justly be numbered among the martyrs of God; so may those that die with malicious hearts, in private combats, be called the martyrs of the devil. Neither do we indeed take our own revenge, or punish the injuries offered us, by the death of the injurious. For the true conquest of revenge is, to give him, of whom we would be revenged, cause to repent him; and not to lay the repentance of another man's death on our own consciences; *animasq; in vulnere ponere*; And to drown our souls in the wounds and blood of our enemies. Hereupon you will again ask me, if I condemn in generous and noble spirits the defence of their honours, being pressed with injuries? I say, that I do not, if the injuries be violent. For the law of nature, which is a branch of the eternal law; and the laws of all christian kings and states, do favour him that is assailed, in the slaughter of the assailant. You will secondly ask me, whether a nobleman, or a gentleman, being challenged by *cartel*, by one of like quality, be not bound, in point of honour, to satisfy the challenger in private combat? I answer, that he is not; because (omitting the greatest, which is the point of religion) the point of the law is directly contrary and opposite to that, which they call the point of honour; the law which hath dominion over it, which can judge it, which can destroy it; except you will stile those acts honourable, where the hangman gives the garland. For, seeing the laws of this land have appointed the hangman to second the conqueror; and the laws of *God* appointed the *Devil* to second the conquered dying in malice: I say, that he is both base, and a fool, that accepts of any *cartel* so accompanied. To this perchance it will be answered, that the kings of *England*, and other christian kings, have seldom taken any such advantage over men of quality; who upon even terms have slain their private enemies. It is true, that as in times of trouble and combustion they have not often done it; so did our noblemen and gentlemen in former ages, in all important injuries, sue unto the king, to approve themselves by battel and publick combat. For as they dared not to brave the law: so did they disdain to submit themselves to the shameful revenge thereof; the same revenge (because it deterreth murder) that it hath declared against a common cut-purse, or other thieves. Nay, let it be granted, that a pardon be procured for such offenders; yet is not the man-slayer freed by his pardon. For these two remedies hath the party grieved notwithstanding; that is, to require justice by grand-assize, or by battel, upon his appeal, which (saith [a] Sir *Thomas Smith*) is not denied; and he further saith (for I use his own words) that if the defendant (to wit, the man-slayer) be convinced either by great assize, or by battel, upon that appeal; the man-slayer shall die, notwithstanding the prince's pardon. So favourable (saith the same learned gentleman) are our princes, and the law of our realm, to justice, and to the punishment of blood violently shed. It may further be demanded, how our noblemen and gentlemen shall be repaired in honour, where an enemy, taking the start either in words or blows, shall lay on them an infamy unsufferable? I say, that a marshal's court will easily give satisfaction in both. And if we hold it no disgrace to submit our selves, for the recovery of our debts, goods, and lands, and for all things else, by which the lives of our selves, our wives, and children, are sustained, to the judges of the law; because it may be felony, to take by violence even that which is our own: why should we not submit our selves to the judges of honour in cases of honour; because to recover our reputation by strong hand, may be murder? But yet again it may be objected, that the loss of honour ought to be much more fearful unto us, than either the loss of our goods, of our lands, or of our lives; and I say so too. But what is this honour, I mean honour indeed, and that which ought to be so dear unto us, other than a kind of history, or fame following actions of virtue, actions accompanied with difficulty or danger, and undertaken for the publick good? In these, he that is imployed and trusted, if he fail in the performance, either through cowardise, or any other base affection; it is true that he loseth his honour. But the acting of a private combat, for a private respect, and most commonly a frivolous one, is not an action of virtue; because it is contrary to the law of God, and of all christian kings: neither is it difficult; because even and equal in persons and arms: neither for a publick good, but tending to the contrary; because the loss or mutilation of an able man, is also a loss to the commonweal.

Now that a marshal of *England* hath power to save every man's fame and reputation, as far as reputation may sustain injury by words, I think no man doubteth. For to repent us of any evil words that we have given, and to confess that we have done him wrong to whom we have given them, is a sufficient satisfaction; and, as it may fall out, more than sufficient. For he, that gives ill words in choler, and suddenly denies them, or repents himself of them upon advisement, hath the disadvantage in point of reputation. Concerning blows, which are indeed not to be given but to those that are servile, whether sufficient recompence will be made for them, it shall appear by a notable example of a most worthy gentleman, *Monsieur de Plessis*, that was stricken in *France* not long since,

[a] *Sir* Thomas Smith, *in his commonwealth of* England.

by a baron of the ſame nation. The ſatisfaction which was given him by a judgment of the conſtable, and marſhals of *France*, was this: In the open court, wherein the conſtable gave judgment, *M. de Pleſſis* was ſet in a chair under the degrees where the conſtable and marſhals ſat: the baron, who had given him the blow, did kneel before him on both knees, holding in his right hand a ſword, with the point towards himſelf, and in his left hand the like cudgel, or baſtinado, wherewith he had ſtricken *M. de Pleſſis*; both which weapons he delivered into *Pleſſis*'s hands, ſubmitting himſelf to ſuch revenge, as it ſhould pleaſe him to take with either of thoſe weapons; the conſtable and marſhals having formally left it to the will of *Pleſſis* to uſe his own diſcretion in the revenge of his own wrongs. Now whether the baron had reaſon to pleaſe himſelf, as one before-hand in point of honour, who ſtruck *M. de Pleſſis*, like a ruffian, coming behind him, and (having advantage of company, and his horſes ready) ſhifted himſelf away on the ſudden, but being afterwards taken, was taught to repent himſelf in this ſhameful manner; or whether *M. de Pleſſis* (of whoſe valour no man doubted) had not far juſter cauſe to reſt ſatisfied, ſince he might at his pleaſure have beaten or wounded his enemy, but forgave him; let any wiſe man judge. To this if it be ſaid, that the baron was conſtrained to make his ſubmiſſion, that his repentance was enforced, and not voluntary; and therefore no diſgrace unto him: I anſwer, that one may ſay as well, that it is no diſgrace to a thief, when he is brought to the gallows, to repent him of the robberies by him committed, becauſe his repentance alſo is conſtrained. And it is true, that enforced repentance is no diſgrace, in reſpect of the force, but in reſpect of the fact: which (but for our ſins to God) makes all appearance ſhameful; becauſe all forced repentance is inflicted upon us for ſomewhat unworthy of a gentleman and of an honeſt man. Nay, voluntary repentance it ſelf, as it hath relation to men, ariſeth either out of the fear of the ill that may befall us, or out of the acknowledgment of our own weakneſs. Certainly, as wiſe men, and valiant men, do rather deride petty injuries, or ſudden injuries, that are not offered from malice fore-thought, than revenge them: ſo men, apt to quarrel, do commonly ſuſpect their own valour; and rather deſire, that thereby the world ſhould believe them to be of great daring, than know any ſuch reſolution in themſelves. For he that knows himſelf indeed to be a valiant man, ſcorns to hunt after opinion.

Now the ſame power, which the conſtable and marſhals of *France* have, hath alſo a marſhal of *England*, or his Deputies; by whoſe judgment, in all diſputes of honour, every man's reputation may be preſerved; we may therefore as well ſubmit our ſelves to the judges of honour, in all diſputes of honour, as we do ſubmit our ſelves in all controverſies of livelihood and life, to the judges of the law. And, out of doubt, the inſtitution of this court of chivalry in *England*, in *France*, and elſewhere, was no leſs charitable than politick. For the blood of man, violently ſpilt, doth not bring forth honey-bees, as that of bulls doth, which ſting but the fingers, or the face: but it produceth that moſt monſtrous beaſt, *Revenge*; which hath ſtung to death, and eaten up of ſeveral nations, ſo many noble patronages, as there is nothing more lamentable, nor more threatning the wrath of God upon ſupreme governors, than the permiſſion.

His majeſty therefore (which *Henry* the fourth of *France* alſo endeavoured) hath done a moſt kingly and chriſtian-like deed in *Scotland*, which the moſt renowned of all his predeceſſors could never do: in beating down, and extinguiſhing, that hereditary proſecution of malice, called *the deadly feud*; a conqueſt, which will give him the honour of prudence and kingly power for evermore. And we have cauſe to hope, that his royal care ſhall be no leſs happy in preventing the like miſchief, which threatens *England*, by the audacious, common, and brave, yet outragious vanity of duelliſts.

Unto this that I have ſpoken of lying, and of man-ſlaughter, it muſt be added, that each of theſe are of great latitude, and worthy of reproof and vengeance proportionably, more or leſs, in their ſeveral degrees. There is much difference between lies of neceſſity, upon breach of promiſe, of complimental lies; and ſuch pernicious lies, as proceed from fear and cowardiſe, or are uttered by falſe witneſſes: the former ſort, being excuſable by weakneſs or levity; the latter, being altogether deteſtable. No leſs, if not more, difference there is, between killing of a man in open field, with even weapons; and that killing, which the ſcriptures call *killing by guile*, *dolo* or *per inſidias*; though our laws do not much diſtinguiſh them in puniſhment. For in the latter, God, forſaking his own privilege, commandeth, that the *guileful* murderer be drawn by force, from the protection of his altar. [a] Neither is every guileful murder performed by the ſword, nor by *overt* violence: but there is a guileful murder alſo, by poyſoning; and by the pen, or by practice. For ſuch diſtinction is found, between coming *preſumptuouſly* upon a man, [b] *to ſlay him with guile*, and *lying in wait for blood*, *privily*, *for the innocent without a cauſe*, upon hope of ſpoil, after ſuch manner as [c] *the net is ſpread before the eyes of the birds*. *Francis* the firſt, queen *Mary* of *England*, and the king's majeſty now reigning, have given notable teſtimony of their juſtice, upon three noblemen, who committed *guileful* murder. Of the firſt kind, king *Francis* upon the lord of *Talard*: who being (ſaith the *French* hiſtorian) *de haute & ancienne lignée, & ſupporté de pleuſieurs grandes alliances*; who being of high and ancient lineage, and ſupported by divers great alliances, of which the cardinal of *Bellay* (in ſpecial favour with the king) was one, was notwithſtanding delivered over into the hands of a hangman. Queen *Mary*, upon a nobleman of her own religion, and in many other reſpects very dear unto her. His majeſty, upon a baron of *Scotland*; whoſe houſe was no leſs ancient and faithful, than himſelf valiant, and greatly friended both at home and abroad. Of killing guilefully by poyſon, and of puniſhment following ſuch wicked artiſans, every age hath had too many examples. Of killing guilefully by the *pen* (that I may not ſpeak of any *Engliſh* judge) the author of the *French Recherches* gives us two notable inſtances: the one of *des Eſſars*, who [d] (ſaith *Paſquire*) *fit mourir* Montaigu *grand maiſtre de* France, *pour contenter l'opinion de celuy dont il eſtoit lors idolaſtre; & Dieu permit que depuis il fut pendu & eſtranglé*; who cauſed *Montaigu*, great maſter of *France* to die, to content his mind (to wit, the duke of *Burgoyn*) whom at that time *Eſſars* worſhipped as his idol; but God permitted, that he himſelf was ſoon after hanged and ſtrangled. The other was of the great *Francis* the firſt, upon his chancellor *Poyet*;

[a] Exod. 21. [b] Exod. 21. 14. [c] Prov. 1. 11. [d] Lib. 5. cap. 12. & cap. 13.

who, to ſatisfy the king's paſſion, practiſed the deſtruction of admiral *Chabot*, a man moſt nobly deſcended, and of great ſervice. For as in other men, ſo in kings, the paſſion of love grows old, and wears out by time. So the king's affection being changed towards the admiral, he charged him with ſome offences which he had formerly committed. The admiral, preſuming upon the great good ſervice which he had done the king in *Piedmont*, and in the defence of *Marſeilles* againſt the emperor, gave the king other language than became him; and deſired nothing ſo much as a publick trial. Hereupon the king (it being eaſy to provoke an ill diſpoſition) gave commiſſion to the chancellor, as preſident, and other judges, upon an information of the king's advocate, to queſtion the admiral's life. The chancellor, an ambitious man, and of a large conſcience (which is not rare in men towards the law) hoping highly to content the king; wrought with ſome of the judges with ſo great cunning; with others, with ſo ſharp threats; and with the reſt, with ſo fair promiſes; as, albeit nothing could be proved againſt the admiral, worthy of the king's diſpleaſure; yet the chancellor ſubſcribed, and got others to ſubſcribe, to the forfeiture of his eſtate, offices, and liberty; though not able to prevail againſt his life. But what was the chancellor's reward (the king hating falſhood in ſo great a magiſtrate) other than his own degradation, arraignment, and condemnation? *Belle leçon certès* (ſaith *Paſquire*) *à tout juge pour demeurer touſiours en ſoy, & de laiſſer fluctuer ſa conſcience dedans les vagues d' une imaginaire faveur, qui pour fin de jeu le ſubmerge*; a fair leſſon to all judges, to dwell always in themſelves, and not to ſuffer their conſciences to float upon the waves of imaginary favour, which in the end overwhelm them. And as for the admiral: though it might have been anſwered unto his friends, if any bewailed his calamity, as undeſerved, that he was tried, according to his own deſire, by the laws of his country, and by the judges of parliament; yet the king's juſtice, ſurmounting all other his paſſions, gave back unto him his honour, his offices, his liberty, and his eſtate.

† III.

The laſt acts of Scipio *in* Spain. *His return to* Rome, *where he is choſen conſul.*

THE laſt buſineſs that troubled *Scipio* in *Spain*, grew by the rebellion of the people, and mutiny of his ſoldiers. He fell dangerouſly ſick, in ſuch ſort, that the rumour of his death ran current throughout *Spain*. This encouraged *Mandonius* and *Indibilis*, petty kings, that had forſaken the *Carthaginians*, and followed *Scipio* awhile before, to take arms againſt the *Romans*. They were vainly perſwaded, that after the *Carthaginians* were driven out, they themſelves ſhould become the mightieſt in all *Spain*. But ſeeing now, that things were no way anſwerable to the greatneſs of their hopes, they thought it beſt, to take the preſent advantage, and hammer out their own fortunes. So they raſhly fell upon the *Sueſſetani* and *Sedetani*, confederates of the *Romans*, and waſted their country. Part of the *Roman* army lying at *Sucro*, inſtead of making head againſt theſe rebels, grew to be affected with the like diſtemper. They had not reaped ſuch profit of their *Roman* conqueſts, as might ſatisfy their deſires; or as they thought eaſy to be gotten, if they might be their own carvers. Wherefore, when the death of *Scipio* was reported, they thought, that the time ſerved very well, to enrich themſelves with the ſpoil of the country. Many outrages they commited: and, which was greateſt of all, driving away their colonels, that ſhould have bridled their fury; they choſe out of their own number, two baſe fellows, *Albius Calenus*, and *Atrius Umber*, to be their commanders. Theſe took upon them all the enſigns of proconſuls, or propretors; as if this their election had been like to that, wherein *Lucius Martius* was choſen by the ſoldiers, after the death of the two *Scipio's*. But whilſt they were deviſing, what exploits they might do, for the enriching of themſelves, in a time of ſuch combuſtion, as was expected; there arrived more certain news, that *Scipio* was both alive, and in good health. There came alſo new colonels, ſent unto them from their general: who mildly rebuking their want of conſideration, and ſeeming to be glad, that they had no further over-ſhot themſelves, led them to *Carthagena*, there to receive their pay. Before their coming, *Scipio* had reſolved to do exemplary juſtice on the principal offenders; and to put the whole multitude of them in fear of what they had deſerved. Therefore he cauſed *Syllanus* to make ready the companies which lay before in the town, as it were to make an expedition againſt *Mandonius*, and *Indibilis*; he cauſed *Albius* and *Atrius*, with ſome thirty other of their complices, to be ſecretly apprehended in their lodgings; he called the mutineers to aſſembly; and having them unarmed as they were, encircled round by *Syllanus*, and his companies, prepared for the purpoſe; he bitterly inveighed againſt them all, as traitors. This done, *Albius*, and *Atrius*, with the other priſoners, were haled to the ſtake; where they were whipt, and beheaded, as was the *Roman* cuſtom towards ſuch offenders. The reſt of the ſoldiers, to the number of eight thouſand, were cauſed to take their oath of obedience a-new; and received every man his pay when he was ſworn.

Mandonius and *Indibilis* continued in arms, notwithſtanding that they had certain word of *Scipio*'s life and health. Well they could have been contented to be quiet: but, by the ſeverity uſed to the *Roman* ſoldiers, they ſtood in fear, as being *Spaniards*, and greater offenders, of harder meaſure. *Scipio* went againſt them; and found them in a valley, that was ſcarce large enough to hold all their army. In the entrance thereof he fought with them: and ſending *Lælius*, with all his horſe, to fetch a compaſs about the hills, and charge them in rear; he overthrew them. *Indibilis* and *Mandonius* had after this no hope remaining, to preſerve themſelves and their eſtates, otherwiſe than by making ſubmiſſion. *Mandonius* therefore came to *Scipio*: and, humbly craving pardon, both for himſelf, and for his brother *Indibilis*, obtained his requeſt; yet ſo, that they were taught to acknowledge themſelves leſs free princes than formerly they had been.

Afterwards *Scipio* went towards *Gades*: and was met on the way by *Maſaniſſa*; who ſecretly promiſed to do him all ſervice, if the people of *Rome* would ſend him to make war in *Afric*. Unto *Mago*, that lay in *Gades*, came directions from *Carthage*; that letting all care of *Spain* alone, he ſhould thence depart with his fleet into *Italy*; and there wage an army of *Gauls* and *Ligurians*, to join with *Hannibal*. For this purpoſe, was money ſent unto him from *Carthage*: and he himſelf laid hold upon all that he could find in the town of *Gades*: without ſparing either private men, the common treaſury, or the temples. In his voyage thence, he landed at *Carthagena*: hoping

ping to have taken it by ſurpriſe. But he failed in the attempt; and was ſo beaten to his ſhips, that he returned back to repoſe himſelf a-while at *Gades*. The *Gaditanes*, offended with the robberies and ſpoil that he had made at his taking leave of them, would not ſuffer him again to enter into their city. By this he foreſaw, that it would not be long ere they became *Roman*. Wherefore ſending meſſages into the town, to complain of this uncourteous dealing, he allured their magiſtrates forth unto him; whom, notwithſtanding all the excuſe they could make, he whipped and crucified. This done, he followed his former intended voyage, bidding *Spain* farewel for ever.

The iſle and city of *Gades* was yielded to the *Romans* preſently after the departure of *Mago*. Then did *Scipio* deliver up the province to thoſe that were ſent from *Rome* to ſucceed him therein, and himſelf, with ten ſhips, returned home. At his coming to *Rome*, he made ſuit for the honour of a triumph: but it was denied him, for that it had as yet been granted unto no proconſul, excepting to ſuch as received that dignity after a conſulſhip, as it were by prorogation. But to make amends for this repulſe, the election of new conſuls being then in hand, by general voice of the city, *P. Cornelius Scipio* was choſen conſul; and *P. Licinius Craſſus* joined with him. This *Craſſus*, being high-prieſt, or biſhop of the *Romans*, might not, by the cuſtom of thoſe times, go far from the city, as being to intend the matters of their ſuperſtition: though *Ceſar*, and others, who in ages following held the ſame office, were ſtayed by no ſuch religious impediment from being far, and long abſent. Hereby it came to paſs, that *Scipio* deſiring to have the war transferred into *Afric*, was in no danger to loſe that honourable charge by any miſchance of lot in the diviſion of provinces; for that his colleague was not capable of employment ſo far off.

SECT. XVIII.

Scipio *obtains leave to make war in* Afric. *His preparations. Of* Maſaniſſa, *who joined with* Scipio. *The victories againſt* Aſdrubal *and* Syphax.

PUB. *Cornelius Scipio*, and *P. Licinius Craſſus*, entering into their conſulſhip, held a meeting of the ſenate in the capitol; wherein it was decreed, that *Scipio* ſhould be allowed to beſtow part of the money which he had brought out of *Spain* into the treaſury, upon the ſetting forth of ſolemn plays that he had vowed to make whilſt he was buſied in his *Spaniſh* wars. This helped well to revive the memory of his victories already gotten, and to give hope unto the people of greater victories in the war which he intended to make in *Afric*. To the ſame purpoſe did the *Spaniſh* embaſſages avail much in the ſenate, eſpecially that of the *Saguntines*, who magnified his actions highly and deſervedly; ſaying, that they were the moſt happy of all their countrymen, ſince they being preſent, had ſeen him choſen conſul, and ſhould carry home ſuch joyful news. The *Saguntine* ambaſſadors were lovingly entertained by the ſenate, as their faith to *Rome* (though coſtly it were, both to them and to the *Romans*) had well deſerved. Nevertheleſs, when *Scipio* propoſed that *Afric* might be decreed unto him for his province, there wanted not many, even of the principal men, that vehemently gainſay'd him. Of theſe was *Q. Fabius Maximus* the chief, who ſeems to have been troubled with that diſeaſe, which too often cauſeth men renowned for long approved virtue, to look aſquint upon the actions of thoſe that follow them in the ſame kind. He alledged many reaſons againſt the purpoſe of the conſul, whereof the chief were, that the treaſury was unable to ſuſtain the charges of a war in *Afric*; and that it was extremely perilous to hazard ſo great forces, where they could not at pleaſure be recalled unto the defence of *Rome* it ſelf, if need required. Hereunto he added many words concerning the danger wherein *Italy* ſtood, not only of *Hannibal*, but of *Mago* his brother, that was arming the *Ligurians*: as alſo concerning the honour of the conſul, which would (he ſaid) be greater in ſetting *Italy* free from enemies, than it could be in doing any harm to *Afric*. Neither did he forget both to elevate the *Spaniſh* wars, as of leſs moment than the intended voyage againſt *Carthage*; nor withal, to lay great blame upon *Scipio*, for having ſuffered *Aſdrubal* to paſs into *Italy*: ſhewing, that it was greatly to be feared leſt the like might happen again; and that a new army, notwithſtanding the good ſucceſs of *Scipio* (if it had happened to be good) might be ſent from *Carthage*, to the utter endangering of *Rome*, whilſt the *Roman* forces were employed abroad. But the main point which he urged, was, that neither the ſenate had ordained, nor the people commanded, *Afric* to be that year a province; which the conſul nevertheleſs propounded in ſuch wiſe, as if it were a matter already concluded, and no longer to be argued. *Scipio*, on the other ſide, inſiſted upon this one point, that it was better to make an offenſive, than a defenſive war, eſpecially againſt ſuch as the *Carthaginians*; who being ill-provided of able men at home, did furniſh themſelves by help of money, with levies made abroad. As for the care of *Italy*, he doubted not but *P. Licinius* his colleague, would be as well able to diſcharge it now, as others had done in times of greater danger. So promiſing to draw *Hannibal* into *Afric*, for defence of his own home; and taxing as civilly as he could the envy of *Fabius*, which withſtood ſuch a gallant enterpriſe, he propoſed the matter again unto the ſenate. Much alteration there was about the manner of his proceeding, foraſmuch as it was noiſed abroad, that if he could not bring the ſenate to his mind, he would carry it by the people. This offended many of the antients, who reſented in this honourable man a little ſpice of that arrogancy, which in following ages grew to be much hotter in thoſe that had commanded long abroad. But in concluſion, *Scipio* referred himſelf wholly unto the ſenate's good-will and pleaſure; whereby he obtained thus much, that the iſle of *Sicily* might be appointed unto him for his province, with leave to paſs over into *Afric*, if he found it expedient.

Want of money, and no great liking to his voyage, made the *Roman* ſenate have little care to furniſh out *Scipio* to the war, by him intended upon *Afric*. Herewithal it fell out, that *Mago*, coming on the ſudden from the *Baleares* to *Genoa*, and winning the town, bred a fear of no leſs terrible invaſion upon *Italy*, than that which *Aſdrubal* had lately made. He could not indeed raiſe any great army of the *Ligurians*, for that he found them diſtracted with civil wars. Therefore he was driven to make choice of his party, and to help thoſe whom he thought fitteſt for his turn, againſt the others. This troubleſom buſineſs, though it occupied more of his time than he could willingly have ſpared; yet it got him reputation by his victories, and made the unſteady *Gauls* ready to enter into his pay. Hereupon the diſperſed legions of the *Romans*, that, under proconſuls and pretors, lay ready to be employed where need ſhould require, were directed unto the borders of *Lombardy*, and *Liguria*, there to make head againſt *Mago*. But all his menaces paſſed away

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in vapour: for a fleet, either coming to his aid from *Carthage*, or by him ſent thither (the report is uncertain) loaden with the booty that he had taken, fell into the hands of the *Roman* pretor that governed in *Sardinia*. This did much diſable him; and though after a while there came letters from *Carthage*, together with ſtore of money, heartning him in his proceedings; yet ſome impediments which he found, and that fatal voyage of *Scipio* into *Afric*, diſturbed all, and made him be recalled home.

Againſt *Hannibal* was nothing done this year. Neither was any thing done by him, of which the *Roman* hiſtorians have been pleaſed to take notice; only it is ſaid, that he ſpent the ſummer by the temple of *Juno Lucina*, where he raiſed an altar, with a huge title of all that he had performed, graven in *Punic* and *Greek* letters. Such account of winnings paſs'd, is commonly in gameſters that are at the height of their fortune, a cauſe of remiſſion and careleſneſs; in thoſe that are upon the loſing hand, a cauſe both of the ſame for the preſent, and ſhortly after of dejection, when they find a notable change. A great peſtilence, infeſting both the *Carthaginian* and the *Roman* camp, is ſaid to have been the occaſion of this year's idleneſs; which fell out not much amiſs for the city of *Rome*, that was marvelouſly impoveriſhed by this war; and had already tried the utmoſt way to defray the charges, which grew inſupportable. To relieve the preſent neceſſity, it was well thought upon, that a great part of *Campania* (not many years ſince confiſcated) ſhould be ſold, or let out; in which bargain, that the city might receive no loſs, the tenth part of the fine was ordained as a reward unto the detectors of lands concealed.

Of this, or other money, none was given to *Scipio*; neither was he allowed to make preſs of ſoldiers for his *African* voyage; neither did he over-much labour to obtain it. That which the ſenate refuſed, the people did for him; or rather, they did it for themſelves, that were therein wiſer than the ſenate. It is uſually found in counſels of ſtate, that the buſy, or obſtinate heads of a few, do carry all the reſt: And many times men make a ſurrender of their own judgments, to the wiſdom that hath gotten it ſelf a name, by giving happy direction in troubles fore-paſs'd. Therefore he, that repoſeth himſelf upon the advice of many, ſhall often find himſelf deceived; the counſel of thoſe many, being wholly directed by the temper of a few, that over-ſway the reſt. *Q. Fabius* was accounted the oracle of his time, for his wary nature ſorted well with the buſineſs that fell out in the chief of his employment. Unto him therefore *Q. Fulvius* adhered, with other of the ſenators, that were grown old in following one courſe, from whence they could not ſhift, as the change of times required. But the people (who, though they could not well adviſe and deliberate, yet could well apprehend) embraced the needful reſolution of *Scipio*; in ſuch ſort, that beſides his *Roman* forces, he had from divers parts of *Italy* about ſeven thouſand voluntiers. He had alſo proviſion from the ſeveral towns; corn, iron, canvas for ſails, axes, beed-hooks, hand-mills, and the like implements; fir for building of ſhips, many thouſands of targets, helmets, and ſpears of all kinds; every place furniſhing him with that commodity which it beſt could afford. Unto this willingneſs of the people, the diligence of *Scipio* was correſpondent. In the compaſs of forty-five days, he had both fell'd his timber, built and launched twenty *Trireme*, and ten *Quinquereme* gallies, wherewith he tranſported his army into *Sicily*. In *Sicily* he found, beſides other forces, two legions that had ſerved at *Cannæ*, which were old ſoldiers; and (as he himſelf well knew) not guilty of the overthrow, for which they had long undergone a heavy cenſure. They had ſerved under *Marcellus*, and *Lævinus*, at the taking of many cities and ſtrong places; in which regard, they were like to be of good uſe to him in *Afric*, where would be ſtore of ſuch employment. For, increaſing the number of his horſe, he preſſed three hundred *Sicilians*, all wealthy young men, and ſuch as loved well their eaſe. Theſe he afterwards diſcharged from the war, highly to their contentment; but with condition, that they ſhould deliver their horſe and arms to as many *Roman* gentlemen, which he brought over with him for the purpoſe. Whilſt he was providing to have things in a readineſs for *Afric*, the baniſhed *Locrians* that followed the *Roman* ſide, made him acquainted with an intelligence, whereby they hoped to recover their city. Some handicraftſmen, that wrought for the *Carthaginians* in one of the citadels of *Locri* (for there were two in the town) being taken priſoners by the *Romans*, promiſed to betray the place, if they might be ranſomed, and rewarded. *Scipio*, being advertiſed of this, gave order to have the attempt made by night, which happily ſucceeded, and that citadel was ſurprized. The other citadel was ſtrongly defended by the *Carthaginian* garriſon, which ſent to *Hannibal* for aid. The *Romans*, in like ſort, fearing leſt their own paucity ſhould make them too weak for *Hannibal*, craved help of the conſul *Scipio*. The townſmen were doubtfully affected; but the beſt, and moſt of them, inclining to the *Romans*, kept *Hannibal* out, whom the coming of *Scipio* cauſed thence to depart; and cauſed likewiſe the *Carthaginian* garriſon to abandon the other citadel. Many outrages were committed by the *Roman* ſoldiers, that were left by *Scipio* in cuſtody of the town. Wherefore a vehement complaint was made by the *Locrians* unto the *Roman* ſenate, not only againſt thoſe of the garriſon, but much more againſt *Pleminius* the captain, who gave bad example, and was worſe than all the reſt. Beſides many murders, robberies, rapes, and other villanies, the temple of *Proſerpina*, that had a great fame of ſanctity, was ſpoiled by theſe barbarous thieves. The *Locrians* therefore adviſed the ſenate to make preſent amends to the goddeſs for this ſacrilege; ſaying, that the like had never been committed, without notorious vengeance by her taken upon the authors. The ſenate gave good ear to this complaint, comforted the *Locrians*, and redreſſed the injuries done unto them; ſent for *Pleminius*, with the other principal offenders, whom they caſt into priſon, and uſed according to their deſerts: as alſo they reſtored unto *Proſerpina* her money twice told. But old *Q. Fabius* was not herewithal contented. He laid much of the blame upon *Scipio*, that had placed ſuch a man in *Locri*; and had not carefully hearkned to the complaints made againſt him, but ſuffered him to run on in theſe his wicked courſes. By the ſharp invective that *Fabius* made, others took courage to ſpeak what they pleaſed, as well againſt the demeanor of *Scipio*, as againſt the diſſoluteneſs of his army, which lay, as they ſaid, idle in *Sicily*; neither mindful of any ſervice toward, nor fit for it, if need ſhould require. Finally, things were ſo far urged, that ten legates were ſent over into *Sicily*, together with the pretor appointed for that iſland, two of the *Tribunes*, and one of the *Ædiles*, who ſhould examine theſe matters; and either cauſe the general to return into *Italy*, or continue him in his charge, as they thought fit. The end of all was, they found him ſo well prepared againſt *Carthage*, as that they haſtened him on his

his journey, and gave him high commendations at their return.

Scipio had already employed *Lælius* in *Afric*, rather to make diſcovery, than to work any other great effect of war. He took a great booty, and ſtruck no little terror into the *Carthaginians*, who ſaw their affairs to be upon terms of change. But the greateſt fruit of his journey was, that, ſpeaking with *Maſaniſſa*, he well inform'd himſelf of the ſtate of *Afric*; and knew what was to be expected of thoſe two kings, that had promiſed to join with the *Romans* at their landing.

Concerning *Maſaniſſa*'s revolt from the *Carthaginians*, and his compact made underhand with the *Romans*: [a] *Livy* doth profeſs, that there was no ſuch evident cauſe thereof at the preſent; but that the long continuance of his faith and conſtancy, in following times, muſt help to prove, that this his change was not without ſome good cauſe. But *Appianus* (an hiſtorian, far inferior to *Livy*, both in worth and time) gives one reaſon ſo probable of this, and many accidents thereto belonging, as that it carries with it a great appearance of neceſſary truth. Only the doubt is, how it could any way come to paſs, that the knowledge of ſuch a matter ſhould have eſcaped the diligence of *Livy*, if it had been true; unleſs we ſhould believe, that he wilfully forbore to rehearſe a tragedy, the ſorrow whereof would cauſe men to think amiſs of *Scipio*. Howſoever it was, thus [a] *Appian* tells it, and many circumſtances of things done, confirm it. *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Giſco*, had a fair daughter, whom both king *Syphax* and *Maſaniſſa* loved. *Maſaniſſa*, being brought up at *Carthage*; and being withal a goodly gentleman of perſon, and excellent in qualities, was choſen by *Aſdrubal* to be his ſon-in-law. When the virgin was betrothed unto him, he went into *Spain*, and there did great ſervice. But afterwards, the *Carthaginian* ſenate thought the marriage of *Aſdrubal*'s daughter to be a matter of ſtate, and beſtowed her upon *Syphax*, without ſtanding to acquaint her father or *Maſaniſſa* therewith. This they did, for that *Syphax* was the more mighty prince; and for that the indignity of the repulſe had made him become their enemy. Hereof *Maſaniſſa* was advertiſed, and forthwith entered into intelligence with *Scipio*, ſecretly, as he thought; yet not ſo ſecretly, but that ſome notice was taken of it, which would have coſt him his life, had he not, with great circumſpection, conveyed himſelf home into his father's kingdom. Thus far forth we may believe *Appianus*, all the narration well cohering with things paſs'd and following: only it ſeems, that howſoever *Sophonisba*, the daughter of *Aſdrubal*, was promiſed by the *Carthaginians* unto *Syphax*; yet ſince this their courteſy proceeded from fear, he thought it wiſdom to continue and increaſe the ſame their fear, by making fair promiſes to the *Romans*, until *Aſdrubal* had ſent for his daughter from *Carthage*, and the marriage was conſummated.[c] In other matters concerning the war it ſelf, wherein *Appian* differs much from *Livy*, and from *Polybius*, whom (as appears by the broken pieces of his works remaining) *Livy* did follow; it will be no offence, to take little heed unto his reports.

Maſaniſſa was the ſon of *Gala*, a king of the *Numidians*, whoſe father dying, the crown deſcended, by order of the country, unto *Deſalces* the brother, not unto *Maſaniſſa* the ſon. But this uncle of *Maſaniſſa* ſhortly died, and his elder ſon, who took poſſeſſion of the kingdom, was vanquiſhed, and ſlain in battel by a rebel, that made himſelf protector over the younger, which was a child. The traitor fortified himſelf againſt *Maſaniſſa*, whoſe return he feared, by alliances with the *Carthaginians* and *Syphax*. But all would not ſerve: he and his pupil were diſpoſſeſſed of their eſtates by *Maſaniſſa*, that was a ſkilful warrior, and well-beloved for the memory of his father *Gala*. The *Carthaginians* in reaſon ſhould have been glad that *Maſaniſſa*, who had done them notable ſervice, was thus confirmed in his eſtate, had they not been guilty of the injury by them done unto him, whilſt his uncle or couſin reigned, and he ſeemed unlikely to ſtand them in any ſtead. But *Syphax*, by their procurement, and perhaps by his own malice towards his corrival, warred upon him; and, over-charging him with numbers, drove him out of his kingdom. Nevertheleſs *Maſaniſſa* ſtill retained the hearts of his people, and thereby remained ſtrong enough to infeſt both *Syphax* and the *Carthaginians*; though he was often put in diſtreſs by great forces that were ſent againſt him. He therefore keeping much about the leſſer *Syrtis*, between the borders of the *Carthaginians* and the nation of the *Garamants*, expected the coming of the *Romans*; yet ſo, as he made long roads over all the country, even as far as to *Hippo*; and, when *Lælius* arrived thereabouts, exhorted and encouraged him to haſten on *Scipio* to the invaſion of *Afric*.

But *Syphax*, in whoſe great aid and ſuccour was repoſed more hope of good ſucceſs, than could be expected from the good-will of poor *Maſaniſſa*, ſent an embaſſy into *Sicily* about the ſame time, which was little pleaſing unto *Scipio*. He excuſed himſelf of his promiſe lately made, and ſignified his alliance with the *Carthaginians*; adding, that he could not chuſe but fight for the defence of *Afric*, wherein he was born and reigned; and for the defence of his beloved wife's country, if it were invaded. Nevertheleſs he promiſed to remain a neuter, ſo long as the *Romans* and *Carthaginians* held war abroad far enough from *Afric*, as hitherto they had done. This meſſage haſtned *Scipio* in his expedition, much more than any perſwaſion could have done. For the promiſed aſſiſtance of *Syphax* had not a little advanced his enterpriſe, in procuring both the aſſent of the ſenate, and the forwardneſs of many adventurers. Leſt therefore the failing of this hope ſhould work too great a change in common opinion, he thought it the beſt way, to prevent all diſcourſe, and ſet the war undertaken immediately on foot. The ambaſſadors he diſmiſſed in all haſte, with letters to their king, wherein he willed him to conſider, that what he had promiſed, he had alſo ſworn; and therefore ſhould do well to make it good. Having ſent them away, he called his ſoldiers together, and bade them make ready for the voyage, which he intended no longer to defer. For, ſaid he, *Maſaniſſa* hath been with *Lælius*, and *Syphax* hath newly ſent to me, greatly wondering upon what I ſhould thus ſtay; and ſaying, that they will provide for themſelves, if I fail their expectation, by tarrying any longer. This fine tale prevented all further inquiſition, that might elſe have been made concerning the meſſage of theſe ambaſſadors, whoſe followers had been ſeen walking up and down *Syracuſe*. And, leſt any thing ſhould afterwards break out, that might hinder the buſineſs, *Scipio* immediately ſent about his fleet unto *Lilybæum*; and requeſting by letters *M. Pomponius*, that was pretor in *Sicily*, to meet him there, haſted thither with his army. At *Lilybæum* he agreed with the pretor about the diviſion of the legions

[a] Liv. l. 28. Appian. Alex. de Bell. Punic. [c] Liv. l. 29.

between them; which to leave behind for defence of the iſland; and which to carry with him into *Afric*. What numbers he tranſported, it is not certain; ſome hiſtorians reckoning only ten thouſand foot and twenty-two hundred horſe; others increaſing them to thirty-five thouſand horſe and foot. Concerning his directions for embarking, and other matters belonging to their courſe, I hold it needleſs to ſet them down; ſince they were points of ordinary care; and which, it is like, that neither he, when he took his voyage into *Spain*, nor others, upon like occaſions, have omitted; they being alſo word for word, ſet down by an hiſtorian, who borrowed them from *Livy*, and fitted them to a prince of later age.

This *Roman* army landed in *Afric*, near unto a foreland, then called the *Fair Promontory*; which, how far it was from *Carthage*, or toward what point of the compaſs, I cannot preciſely affirm; becauſe it is uncertain whether it were that cape or head-land, which bore the name of *Mercury*, and lay to the north-eaſt of *Carthage*; or whether that of *Apollo*, which lay northerly from *Carthage*, and by weſt. The coming of *Maſaniſſa* unto *Scipio*, at his firſt arrival, helps to confirm the opinion of *Xylander*, who thinks the *Fair Promontory* to have been the ſame that was alſo called *Mercury's Cape*; ſince, with little difficulty, *Maſaniſſa* might come thither from the leſſer *Syrtis*, whereabout was his common abiding. But foraſmuch as without any memorable impediment, ſoon after his arrival, *Scipio* encamped before *Utica*, that ſtood weſtward from *Carthage*, beyond the river *Bagradas*; it may rather ſeem that he landed within the promontory of *Apollo*, whence the way to *Utica* was not long. This is alſo ſtrongly proved, for that out of *Carthage* were ſent the next day five hundred horſe, to trouble him in his diſembarking. Neither was it ſo hard for *Maſaniſſa*, that roved about the country with a troop of horſe, to find out the *Romans*, though they landed far from the place to the which he uſually reſorted; like as before he had met with *Lælius* at *Hippo*, that was farther off, as it would have been for *Scipio*, with his army and carriages, to over-come the trouble of a long journey, and fetch a great compaſs to *Utica* by land, when he might have diſembarked nearer unto it. Nevertheleſs it may paſs as a conjecture, that *Scipio* came firſt of all from *Emporia*, a plentiful region about the leſſer *Syrtis*; ſince he gave charge to the maſters of his ſhips, at the ſetting forth from *Lilybæum*, to ſhape their courſe for that coaſt. The country thereabout was very rich, and fit for ſuſtenance of an army; neither were the inhabitants warlike, or well provided to make reſiſtance. Thus much perhaps *Maſſaniſſa* had ſignified unto *Lælius*, when he ſpake with him at *Hippo*; thinking that the *Romans*, howſoever they made brave promiſes, would not come ſtrong enough to fight at head. But when he ſaw their fleet and army to be ſuch, as not only ſerved to invade the lands of *Carthage*, but threatened a conqueſt of the city, and whole eſtate; then might he better adviſe them to ſet ſail for *Utica*, and make war upon the enemies at their own doors.

The *Carthaginians* had at that time neither any captain of great worth at home, nor better army than of raw ſoldiers, that were levied, or to be levied in haſte. *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Giſco*, the ſame that had lately been chaſed out of *Spain* by *Scipio*, was their beſt man of war. And good enough perhaps he was thought by *Hanno*, and his fellows, of whoſe faction he was; or if ought were wanting in him, yet his riches and nobility, together with the affinity of king *Syphax*, made him paſſable. He was at that preſent with the king his ſon-in-law, working him (no doubt) againſt the *Romans*; when letters were brought from *Carthage*, both to *Syphax* and to him, informing them of the invaſion; entreating the one of them to give aſſiſtance, and commanding the other to make his repair unto the city, where he was choſen general. But ere theſe could be ready, *Scipio* had beaten the troop of *Carthaginian* horſe, that were ſent out of the city to diſturb his landing, and ſlain *Hanno*, a young gentleman that was their leader. He had alſo taken and ſacked a town of the *Carthaginians*, wherein, beſides other booty, he took eight thouſand priſoners; all which he conveyed aboard his hulks, or ſhips of burden, and ſent them back loaded into *Sicily*. He took likewiſe a town called *Salera*, which he held and fortified. In *Salera* lay another *Hanno*, with four thouſand *Numidian* horſe, whoſe ſervice being fitter for the field, than for defence of walled places, made *Scipio* to perceive the unſkilfulneſs of their leader, that had thus houſed them. Wherefore he ſent *Maſaniſſa* before him, who rode up to the gates, and, by making a bravado, trained out the improvident *Hanno* ſo far, that he drew him unto a place where the *Romans* lay in wait for him. The victory was eaſily gotten, and *Hanno* either taken or ſlain. With thoſe that fled, the *Romans* entered pell-mell into the town, which preſently they made their own. Thence went *Scipio* to *Utica*, a city of great importance, [a] of which mention hath been formerly made, and ſat down before it. Forty days he ſpent about it, aſſailing it both by land and ſea, and uſing all his engines of battery, whereof he had plenty; yet was in no likelihood of prevailing. And now the ſummer was quite ſpent, ſo that it was time for him to chuſe a place, and fortify his winter-camp, which muſt be well ſtored the year following. Whilſt thus neceſſity urged him to leave *Utica*, and ſhame of taking the repulſe in his firſt great enterprize, rather than any hope of better ſucceſs, cauſed him to ſtay there: *Aſdrubal* and *Syphax* gave him the honour of a fair pretence to leave the ſiege. *Aſdrubal* had made a levy of thirty thouſand foot and three thouſand horſe, yet adventured not with this ill-trained army to draw near unto the *Romans*, before the coming of *Syphax*. *Syphax* brought with him unto *Carthage* fifteen thouſand foot and ten thouſand horſe; which joining unto the forces of *Aſdrubal*, they marched bravely towards *Scipio*, who thereby took occaſion to diſlodge. He choſe for his winter-camp the banks of an in-let, that had good harbour for his navy. His foot-men he lodged on a promontory, joining to the continent by an arm of land: his horſe-men he beſtowed upon lower ground, on the other ſhore: in the bottom of the creek he moored his ſhips, and there he quartered the mariners, with all that belonged unto the fleet. The whole camp he ſtrongly fortified, and ſo attended the ſeaſon of the year, when it ſhould ſerve him again to fight. Of cattle, and other booty, *Maſaniſſa* had brought in great ſtore, by driving the country, before the coming of *Aſdrubal* and *Syphax*. Corn alſo he had gotten ſome; and great ſtore was ſent him from *Sicily* and *Sardinia*. Likewiſe apparel for his ſoldiers, was ſent from home, or from *Sardinia*; though ſcarce enough to ſerve turn, for that it was a matter of more coſt. The ſhips that brought theſe things,

[a] Lib. 5. cap. 2. § 3.

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he freighted homewards with ſuch part of his booty, as he could beſt ſpare; eſpecially with captives, to be ſold for ſlaves. *Aſdrubal* and *Syphax* encamped near unto *Scipio*: not ſo ſtrongly fortifying themſelves, as did the *Romans*; either for that they wanted the ſevere inſtitution, which the *Romans* uſed in diſcipline of war; or for that they preſumed upon their multitude, againſt which they found in *Scipio* no diſpoſition to iſſue forth of his ſtrength, and fight. So the winter paſſed without action.

When ſpring drew near; *Scipio* thought it good to aſſay his old friend the *Numidian* king, if perhaps he might be won by perſwaſions to forſake the *Carthaginians*. It was conſidered, that thoſe *Barbarians* were naturally unconſtant; and particularly, that *Syphax* had given proof before this of his much levity. It might therefore be hoped, that having wearied himſelf, by lodging a whole winter in the camp: and being peradventure no leſs weary with ſatiety of his wife, who had cauſed him to enter into this war: he might be moved with a little entreaty, to withdraw himſelf home into his kingdom, and reſt a *Neuter*. But it is not unlikely, that ſuch a friend as this king had been highly entertained and honoured in the city of *Carthage*, which was near at hand, as often as during this winter it had pleaſed him, or as he had been invited, to make a ſtep thither and repoſe himſelf a while: his wife queen *Sophonisba* lying alſo there at the ſame time, to cheriſh him in his reſolution. Howſoever it were, *Syphax* did only make an overture of peace: propounding it as reaſonable, That *Hannibal* ſhould be recalled out of *Italy* by the *Carthaginians*: and that the *Romans* in like ſort ſhould quietly depart out of *Afric*; and ſo make an end of the war, wherewith now both *Afric* and *Europe* were diſquieted. Unto this would not *Scipio* at the firſt give ear: yet being preſſed earneſtly by many meſſages from *Syphax*, and deſiring to continue the intercourſe of ambaſſadors: he began to make a ſhew, as if he would conſider of the motion. He was given to underſtand by thoſe whom he had ſent unto the king, that their enemies had their camps without any great defence of earth, full of wooden cabbins, and covered with boughs: and that the *Numidians*, ſuch of them as came firſt with *Syphax*, uſed coverings of mats and reeds; others that came later, had thatched their lodgings with dry boughs and leaves: under which they lay carefully without their trenches. Upon this advertiſement he bethought himſelf, that it would not be hard for him to ſet their camps on fire; and thereby give them a notable overthrow. Without help of ſome ſuch ſtratagem, he foreſaw that it would be a work of great difficulty for him, to proceed in his wars when time ſhould ſerve. It was a plain open country wherein he lay: and the enemies had great advantage of him in number, eſpecially in horſe; which upon ſuch ground, could not be reſiſted by the *Roman* legions. The longer therefore that he thought upon the matter, the more needful he found it for himſelf, to make ſome ſudden attempt upon their camp. To this end he ſent many ambaſſadors, under pretence of treating about the peace; but indeed of purpoſe to diſcover all that concerned the intended ſurpriſe. With theſe ambaſſadors he ſent, as attendants, many old ſoldiers diguiſed like ſlaves; that wandring (as it were) idly up and down the camp, might obſerve the ways and entrances, with whatſoever was needful. When he had learned as much as he deſired: upon the ſudden he ſent word to *Syphax*, that it was vain to hold any longer treaty; foraſmuch as he could not get the conſent of his council of war; without whoſe approbation, all that himſelf could do was no more than the good will of one man. This he did, to the end, that without any breach of faith, he might put his deſign in execution. The truce being thus cut off: *Aſdrubal* and *Syphax* were very penſive; as having lately perſwaded themſelves, that their trouble was almoſt at an end. But ſince it could be no better, they began to deviſe, by what art they might draw *Scipio* out of his camp; and provoke him to battel in thoſe plains. This if they could do, they hoped to make his council of war repent as greatly the refuſal of peace, as did *M. Atilius* after the like preſumption. But if he ſhould refuſe to come forth of his trenches, what elſe remained than to beſiege him? which they themſelves were well able to do by land; and the *Carthaginian* fleet ſhould do by ſea, that was making ready for the purpoſe. By ſuch diſcourſes theſe two comforted themſelves; recompenſing in conceit the loſs of their hopes paſt, with that of victory to come. But herein they were extremely and worthily diſappointed: for that, conſulting about the future, they provided not againſt preſent danger; but continued in the ſame negligence, which was grown upon them by the long diſcourſe of peace. As for *Scipio*, he was not idle but made preparation out of hand; as it were to do ſomewhat againſt *Utica*. Two thouſand ſoldiers he had made ready; and appointed to take the ſame piece of ground, whereon he lay againſt *Utica* before. This he did; partly to keep ſecret that which he had in hand, leſt being ſuſpected by his own ſoldiers, the enemy might happen to have notice of it; partly to hinder thoſe of *Utica* from ſetting upon the few, that he purpoſed to leave behind him in his camp. He cauſed his men that night to ſup well and betimes; that they might be ready for the journey. After ſupper, he appointed ſuch companies as he thought fit, unto the defence of his camp; all the reſt of the army he led forth, about nine of the clock at night. The *Carthaginians* lay from him ſeven miles and an half: whom he purpoſed to undertake himſelf with the one half of his army: the other half he committed unto *Lælius* and *Maſaniſſa*, whom he ſent before him to ſet upon the camp of *Syphax*, that was farther off. It was his meaning that the camp of *Syphax* ſhould be on a light fire, ere he would meddle with the *Carthaginians*. For the fire might ſeem to have taken hold by caſualty upon the *Numidians*, that lay farther off: whereas, if it firſt appeared in the camp of *Aſdrubal*, it would be ſuſpected as the doing of enemies; and give *Syphax* warning to look unto himſelf. To this end therefore *Scipio* marched fair and ſoftly: that *Lælius* and *Maſaniſſa*, who had a longer journey, and were to fetch a compaſs about for fear of being diſcovered, might have time to get before him, and do their feat. It was about two or three of the clock in the morning, when the camp of *Syphax* began to blaze: which not only the *Numidians*, but their king himſelf, imputed unto caſualty; as thinking themſelves ſafe enough from enemies, for that the *Carthaginian* lay interpoſed between them and the danger. Wherefore, as if there were no more to do, ſome, ſtarting half aſleep; and others, that had ſitten up late a drinking; ran out of their cabbins to quench the fire. But ſo great was the tumult, that they neither could rightly underſtand in what caſe they were; nor give any remedy to the miſchance, as it was ſuppoſed. Many were ſmothered, and burnt in the flame, which grew greater and

greater:

greater: many, leaping into the trenches for fear of the ſudden miſchief, were trampled to death by the multitude, that followed them. They that eſcaped the fire fell upon the enemies ſword, which was ready to receive them. Eſpecially *Maſaniſſa*, that beſt knew the country, did great execution upon them; having laid all the ways, by which he foreſaw that they would ſeek to eſcape. The *Carthaginians* perceiving this fire, thought none other than that it was a pitiful miſchance: ſo that ſome ran out to help the poor *Numidians*; carrying only what would ſerve to quench the fire. Others ran up to the rampart: where, fearleſs of any danger towards themſelves, they ſtood beholding the greatneſs of the flame, and lamenting the misfortune. This fell out right as *Scipio* would have it. He therefore loſt no time: but ſetting upon thoſe that were running towards the *Numidians*, he killed ſome, and purſued the reſt back into their camp; which in a little while he made to burn as bright, as did that of *Syphax*. *Aſdrubal* ſeeing this, and knowing that the *Romans* were there, did not ſtand to make reſiſtance, but ſhifted only for himſelf, and eſcaped with a few of his horſe about him. If *Hannibal*, or any of the *Barchine* faction, had been taken in ſuch a manner: it is more than probable, that old *Hanno* would have judged him worthy to be crucified. It would then have been ſaid, that with leſs than one half of thirty-thouſand men, he might at leaſt have given ſome bad recompence, to them that were taking pains in kindling theſe fires, had he not been only careful how to ſave his own fearful head. Nevertheleſs [a] *Polybius* acknowledgeth, and it is moſt likely to have been true, That if *Aſdrubal*, or any of thoſe about him, would have ſtriven to ſhew valour, when the camp was once on fire: he ſhould not thereby have done any manner of good; becauſe of the tumult and conſternation. I ſhall not need to tell what a fearful thing it was, to hear the cries of ſo many thouſands that periſhed by fire and ſword, or to behold the cruel flame that conſumed them; which (as *Polybius* affirms) none *that hath being* is able to deſcribe. It is enough to ſay, that of thoſe many thouſands very few did eſcape, which accompanied *Aſdrubal* and *Syphax* in their ſeveral ways to flight. Beſides theſe, alſo there were ſome ſcatterers, eſpecially of the *Numidians*, that ſaved themſelves in the dark: but they were not many; as after ſhall appear. Surely it muſt needs have been very hard to tell, how many were burnt or otherwiſe made away; and what numbers eſcaped in the dark of night. Wherefore *Livy*, who, in the reſt of this relation, as often elſewhere, doth follow *Polybius*, may ſeem to have followed ſome leſs worthy author, and him no good arithmetician, in caſting up the ſum. For he reckons only two thouſand foot, and five hundred horſe, to have eſcaped; forty thouſand to have periſhed by ſword or fire; and above ſix thouſand to have been taken priſoners: the whole number of all which together, is far ſhort of ninety three thouſand, which were in theſe two camps.

Aſdrubal, putting himſelf into the next town that was very ſtrongly fortified; thought there to find the *Romans* work; until the *Carthaginians* at good leiſure might repair their army. He had with him no more than two thouſand foot, and five hundred horſe; which he thought ſufficient to defend the town, if the townſmen would not be wanting to themſelves. But he found the inhabitants of the place very earneſt in contention, whether it were better to fight or to yield. Unto this diſputation, he well foreſaw that the arrival of *Scipio* would ſoon give an end. Wherefore, leſt they ſhould lay hold upon him, and ſeek the victor's favour by delivering him up; he ſhrunk away betimes, and made all haſte to *Carthage*. As for the town, which he left, it opened the gates to *Scipio*, at his firſt coming: and thereby preſerved it felt from all manner of loſs. The two next towns, adjoining would needs be valiant, and make countenance of war: but their ſtrength not being anſwerable, they were ſoon taken by *Scipio*; who abandoned them to the pleaſure of his ſoldiers. This being done, he returned to the ſiege of *Utica*.

The *Carthaginians* were ſore troubled, as they had good reaſon; when, inſtead of either peace or victory, which they lately hoped for, they heard news of ſuch a lamentable overthrow. Neceſſity enforced them to make haſty proviſion for the future: but how to do it, few of them ſaw any means. Some gave advice to crave peace of *Scipio*; others to ſend for *Hannibal* out of *Italy*: but the moſt, and they which finally prevailed, were of opinion, that notwithſtanding the loſs of this army, they might well defend themſelves againſt the *Romans*, by raiſing new forces; eſpecially, if *Syphax* would not leave them. It was therefore concluded, that they ſhould bend all their care this way: levying in all haſte another army; and ſending ambaſſadors to deal with *Syphax*, who lay then at a town called *Abba*, not paſſing eight miles from *Carthage*. Immediately the ſame their unfortunate commander, *Aſdrubal* the ſon of *Geſco*, was imployed to make new levies of men: and queen *Sophonisba* went forth with ambaſſadors to her huſband *Syphax*; who having gathered together as many as he could of his ſubjects that had eſcaped from the late ſlaughter, was thinking to return into his own kingdom. *Sophonisba* laboured ſo with her huſband, that at length ſhe won him to her own deſire. And it fell out at the ſame time that four thouſand *Spaniards*, waged by the *Carthaginians*, were brought over to ſerve in *Afric*. Of theſe were made ſuch brave reports; as if their courage, and the arms which they uſed, were not to be reſiſted. Even the multitude within *Carthage* believed theſe tales, and were more glad than they had cauſe to be; which is great wonder, ſince in one age, the whole country of *Spain* had been twice conquered; firſt by the *Carthaginians* themſelves, and after by the *Romans*. But with *Syphax* theſe tales prevailed much: which the *Carthaginian* ambaſſadors helped with a lie; ſaying, that there were come ten thouſand of theſe terrible *Spaniards*. Upon this confidence the people of *Carthage* and their friends gathered ſuch ſpirit, that in thirty days they made up an army conſiſting well near of thirty thouſand men; reckoning the *Spaniards*, and *Syphax* with his *Numidians*, in the number. So they encamped in a region called *the great Fields*, about five days journey from *Utica*. *Scipio* hearing of this, came from *Utica* thither, to viſit them: leaving behind him his impediments, with ſome part of his army, to make a ſhew of continuing the ſiege. Two or three days, after the meeting of both armies, paſſed away in ſkirmiſhes, without any great thing done. It had now been time for *Aſdrubal* to follow the example of the *Roman*, *Fabius*; and ſeek to weary out the enemy by delays. But either (which is likely) he was a far worſe commander, or elſe it was not in his power to give ſuch directions as beſt pleaſed himſelf. The fourth

[a] Excerpt. è Pol. lib. 14.

day

day the armies met in battel: wherein the *Romans* were marſhalled by *Scipio* after their wonted manner; having their *Italian* horſe in their right wing; and *Maſaniſſa* with his *Numidians* in the left. On the contrary ſide, *Aſdrubal* and his *Carthaginians* had the right wing; *Syphax* the left, and the *Spaniards* the battel. The victory was gotten without many blows: for the untrained followers of *Syphax* and *Aſdrubal*, could not ſuſtain the firſt charge of the *Italians*, or of *Maſaniſſa*. Only the *Spaniards* fought a long time, even till they were all in a manner ſlain: rather as men deſperate, and not hoping for mercy, ſince they were thus come over to fight againſt *Scipio*, who had otherwiſe deſerved of them; than upon any likelihood or conceit of victory. This their obſtinacy was beneficial unto thoſe that fled; for that it hindered the *Romans* from making any great purſuit. Hereby *Aſdrubal* and *Syphax* eſcaped: *Aſdrubal*, to *Carthage*; and *Syphax* home, to his own kingdom: whither his wife was either gone before, or immediately followed him.

Scipio, having thus gotten the maſtery of the field, took counſel about the proſecution of the war. It was reſolved upon, as the beſt courſe, that he himſelf, with part of the army, ſhould attempt the cities round about him: and that *Maſaniſſa*, with his *Numidians*, and *Lælius*, with ſome of the *Roman* legions, ſhould follow after *Syphax*, not permitting him to take reſt within his own kingdom, where eaſily elſe he might repair his forces, and put them to new trouble. This advice it ſeems that *Maſaniſſa* gave: who knew beſt the quality of the *Numidians*; and what good might be done among them, by the reputation of a victory. The leaſt that could be expected, was his reſtitution into his own kingdom, uſurped by *Syphax*: which to accompliſh, it no leſs concerned the *Romans* at the preſent, than it did himſelf. According to this order concluded, *Lælius* was ſent away with *Maſaniſſa*: and *Scipio* ſtayed behind; carrying the war from town to town. Many places yielded for fear: many were taken by force: and all the ſubjects of *Carthage* wavered in their fidelity; as if the time was now come, wherein they might take notice of thoſe unreaſonable burdens, which their proud maſters had laid upon them, for maintenance of the war in *Spain* and *Italy*. What to do in this caſe, the *Carthaginians* could hardly reſolve. Fortune was their enemy: they had loſt their armies, and many of their towns: neither durſt they make bold to trouble their own ſubjects with any violent exaction of men or money; who nevertheleſs of their own free will were likely to give little help. Very much it grieved them, to ſend for *Hannibal* out of *Italy*: yet ſince there was no other hope remaining, than in him and his good army; it was decreed, that ambaſſadors ſhould be forthwith ſent to call him home. Some there were that gave advice, to ſet out a fleet againſt that of *Scipio*; that rode before *Utica*, weakly manned, and eaſy to be taken, whilſt *Scipio* himſelf was buſied in the inland countries. Some were of opinion, that it ſhould be their principal care, to fortify by all means the city of *Carthage*: upon the ſafety whereof, they ſaid, all depended; adding, that whilſt they were true, and at unity amongſt themſelves, they might well enough ſubſiſt, and expect thoſe opportunities, with which fortune (doubtleſs) would preſent them. Theſe counſels were not rejected: but order was forthwith taken, both for all things concerning the defence of the city, and for the attempt upon the *Roman* fleet at *Utica*. Nevertheleſs it was conſidered, that hereby they ſhould only protract the war: without any way advancing their own affairs towards likelihood of victory; no, though it ſhould fall out, that all the ſhips at *Utica* might be taken or deſtroyed. Wherefore the determination held concerning *Hannibal*, that he ſhould immediately come over into *Afric*, as the laſt refuge of *Carthage*. The council was no ſooner broken up, than all the ſenators betook themſelves to the execution of that which was decreed: ſome to the fortification of the town: ſome to make ready the fleet: and ſome, appointed thereunto, forthwith to embark themſelves for *Italy*. In this their trepidation, *Scipio* comes to *Tunis*, a city in thoſe days very ſtrong; and ſtanding in proſpect almoſt of every part of *Carthage*. This place, or rather ſome defenſible piece adjoining, he eaſily took; the garriſon forſaking it, and running away, as ſoon as he drew near. But whilſt he was about there to encamp, and fortify himſelf againſt the city; he might perceive the *Carthaginian* fleet ſetting forth, and making towards *Utica*. What this meant, he readily conceived: and ſtood in great fear, leſt his own ſhips, that were very ill prepared for ſea-fight (as being heavily loaden with engines of battery, and wholly diſpoſed in ſuch order, as was moſt convenient for aſſaulting the town) ſhould make bad reſiſtance, againſt a fleet appointed for that ſpecial ſervice. Wherefore he haſted away towards *Utica*, to aſſiſt with his preſence in this needful caſe. It fell out well, that he had ſent his carriages, and all the great booty which he drew along with him, thither before, at his going to *Tunis*. For had not he now made great expedition, he ſhould have come too late. Neither could he indeed have been there in due time; if the *Carthaginians* had uſed ſuch diligence as was convenient. But they reſted one night in harbour by the way: and at their coming to *Utica*, they tarried a while to make a bravado: preſenting themſelves in order of battel, as if the *Romans* would have put forth to ſea againſt them. But *Scipio* had no ſuch intent: he thought it would be ſufficient, if he could preſerve his gallies. As for the pleaſure of their bravery at ſea; it ſhould little avail the *Carthaginians*; if they got nothing by it, and loſt their whole eſtate by land. Wherefore he took his ſhips of burden, and, faſtning them together with cables, in four ranks, one behind another, made a fourfold bridge over the channel of the haven: whereon he placed a thouſand of his choice men, with ſtore of darts, and other caſting weapons, to make defence. Some open ſpaces he left; whereat his frigats, and other ſmall veſſels might run out, and back again, upon any advantage or need: but theſe he covered with planks; uſing the maſts and yards of his ſhips inſtead of rafters, to join all together, that his men might help one another, and the bridge it ſelf not be torn aſunder. Scarce was this work finiſhed, when the *Carthaginians*, ſeeing none iſſue forth againſt them, came into the haven. The fight between them and the *Romans*, that were in the hulks, was rather like to the aſſaulting of a wall, than to any ſea-fight. For they that ſtood upon the bridge, had ſure footing, and threw their weapons downwards with their whole ſtrength and violence; which the *Carthaginians* out of their gallies, that were lower and unſteady, could not do. But the *Roman* frigats and long-boats, adventuring forth from behind the bridge, were greatly over-borne by the force of the gallies; and were one occaſion of that ſmall loſs which followed. They that ſtood upon the bridge, were neither able to relieve them: nor yet could freely beſtow their weapons among the *Carthaginians*,

ans, as before, for fear of hurting theſe their friends, that were entangled and mixed among the enemies. The *Carthaginians* had brought with them grapling-hooks, hanging at iron-chains. Theſe they threw upon the maſts and yards, which ſerved as arches to join the bridge together: then rowing backwards, they tore all aſunder, in ſuch ſort, that one ſhip followed another, and all the firſt rank was broken, or defaced. The defendants had no other way, than to ſave themſelves as haſtily as they could, by ſhifting into the next rank of ſhips, that lay behind them untouched. Neither did the *Carthaginians* trouble themſelves any further in this laborious work; but having haled away ſix ſhips of burden, and towed them out of the haven, returned home to *Carthage*. Their welcome was greater than their victory: becauſe among ſo many grievous loſſes, only this exploit had ſucceeded well; though it were of ſmall importance.

Whilſt things thus paſſed about *Carthage*, *Lælius* and *Maſaniſſa*, in their journey againſt *Syphax*, found as good ſucceſs as could be deſired. The fame of the victories already gotten, reſtored *Maſaniſſa* to his kingdom, without further contention: the *Maſæſyli* his ſubjects, joyfully receiving him; and forſaking the uſurper. But here they ſtayed not: neither indeed would *Syphax* permit them to be quiet. He had ſuch abundance of men and horſes, that he felt not greatly the loſſes paſt: and therefore being ſollicited by *Aſdrubal* and *Sophoniſba*, he prepared again for war. But beſide the inſtigation of his beloved wife; the loſs of the *Maſæſyli* would let him take no reſt: neither was it the purpoſe of *Lælius* and *Maſaniſſa*, to give him any breathing time. It is common in men, to depart no leſs unwillingly from from that which they have gotten by extortion, than from their proper inheritance: but to think all alike their own, whereof they are in poſſeſſion; be the title unto ſome part never ſo unjuſt. Hereunto alludes the fable of the young kite: which thought that ſhe had vomited up her own guts; when it was only the garbage of ſome other fowl, that ſhe had haſtily ſwallowed, and was not able to digeſt. But whether or no *Syphax*, like the young kite, believed the kingdom of the *Maſæſyli* to be part of his entrails: *Lælius* and *Maſaniſſa* will ſhortly give him ſomewhat, that ſhall make him caſt his gorge. For to this purpoſe chiefly are they come ſo far. It concerned the *Romans* to diſpoſſeſs (if it might be) that king; whoſe falſe and hollow friendſhip towards them, had been converted into ſtrong enmity: as alſo to ſet in his place another, who might do them ſuch good offices, as *Syphax* had lately done unto the *Carthaginians*. How eaſily this might be affected, *Maſaniſſa* knew beſt: as being well acquainted with the nature of thoſe countries; wherein, even to this day, though there be many ſtrong towns, yet the fortune of a battel is enough to tranſlate the kingdom from one competitor to another. So they met with *Syphax*: who came againſt them with no leſs an army than his former, and marſhalled in the *Roman* order; according to the ſkill which he had learned of the *Roman* centurion, long ago ſent unto him out of *Spain*, from *Cn. Scipio*. But though he could teach his men, how to march in order; yet could he not teach them to fight couragiouſly. They were a rabble of all ſorts, gathered up in haſte: and few of them had ſeen war before. Encamping near unto the *Romans*, it fell out, as commonly, that ſome troops of horſe on both ſides, encountered one another in the mid-way: and they that had the worſt, were ſeconded by other of their fellows. By continuance of the ſkirmiſh, more and more were drawn out from either camp: ſo that at length *Syphax*, unwilling to diſhearten his men, by taking any foil at their firſt meeting with the enemy, came up with all his horſe, which were the beſt part of his forces, and therewith over-charged *Maſaniſſa*, whoſe numbers were far leſs. But whilſt he was proſecuting his hope of victory: ſome *Roman* ſquadrons of foot came againſt him through their own troops of horſe; which fell to the ſides, and made a lane for them. So their battel ſtanding now more firm than a little before; *Syphax* was unable, though he laboured much in vain, to make them give ground. *Maſaniſſa* likewiſe, and his troops, grew confident upon this aſſiſtance: and charging afreſh the enemy, that could not make way forward, cauſed him to give back. Herewithal the legions came in ſight: which ſo terrified the *Numidian* horſe, that they began preſently to diſband. Fain would *Syphax* have ſtayed them from flight: and to that end, made head in perſon againſt the *Romans*; with hope, that his men would be aſhamed to leave him. But it fell out unhappily, that he was caſt from his horſe, which received a wound; and ſo taken priſoner. Of others that were ſlain or taken, the multitude was not great. It ſufficed, that they forſook the place, and fled: and that their king, upon whom all depended, was in the *Roman*'s hand. *Maſaniſſa* told *Lælius*, that this victory ſhould make an end of the *Numidian* war, if preſently they haſted away to *Cirta*, the chief city of the kingdom; whither he himſelf deſired to be ſent before with the horſe, carrying *Syphax* along with him. Hereunto *Lælius* agreed. *Maſaniſſa* coming to *Cirta*, before any news of the king's miſchance was there arrived, called out the chief of the city to parley: wherein by many fair promiſes and threats, but eſpecially by ſhewing unto them *Syphax* bound, he prevailed ſo far, that the gates were forthwith opened unto him; and every one ſtrove to get his favour, that was like to be their king hereafter. Among the reſt, queen *Sophoniſba* yielded her ſelf into his hands; and vehemently beſought him, that ſhe might not be delivered up unto the *Romans*. Her youth, and excellent beauty, ſo commended her ſuit, that *Maſaniſſa* forthwith granted it: and to make good his promiſe, married her himſelf that very day: thereby to prevent *Lælius* and *Scipio* from determining otherwiſe of her, ſince ſhe was his wife. But *Lælius*, when he came thither, took the matter heinouſly; ſo that at firſt he would have haled her away, together with *Syphax* and other priſoners, and have ſent her unto *Scipio*. But being over-entreated by *Maſaniſſa*, he ſuffered the matter to reſt a while as he found it, and referred all to *Scipio*'s diſcretion: to whom he ſent away *Syphax*, and other captives immediately; following ſhortly after himſelf, with *Maſaniſſa*, when they had done what was needful in the kingdom.

At the coming of *Syphax* there was great joy in the *Roman* camp: the mighty armies which he had lately brought into the field; and his entertainment of *Scipio* and *Aſdrubal*, both at one time, when *Rome* and *Carthage* together ſought his friendſhip, with ſuch other commemoration of his paſt and preſent fortune; miniſtring to every one a large argument of diſcourſe. *Scipio* demanded of him, what had moved him, not only to forſake the *Roman* friendſhip, but to make war upon them unprovoked. He briefly anſwered, that his wife had moved him ſo to do; calling her a fury, and a peſtilent creature: and ſaying, that *Maſaniſſa* was no wiſer than himſelf; ſince he had now taken

ken the ſame woman to his wife, who would ſhortly draw him to the ſame courſes. Hereat *Scipio* was greatly troubled: and ſtood in great doubt, leſt this perilous woman ſhould deprive him of *Maſaniſſa*, as ſhe had done of *Syphax*. It was not long, ere *Maſaniſſa* and *Lælius* came unto him: both of whom together he lovingly welcomed; and highly commended in publick, for their notable ſervice in this expedition. Then taking *Maſaniſſa* apart, he brake with him, as touching *Sophonisba*: letting him underſtand, that the *Romans* had title to her head; and that ſhe was a miſchievous enemy of theirs. Wherefore he entreated him to moderate his affection: and not to deface the memory of his great ſervices already done, (for which he ſhould be highly rewarded, to his own contentment) by committing a great offence upon little reaſon. *Maſaniſſa* bluſh'd, and wept: and finally promiſed to be governed by *Scipio*; whom he nevertheleſs entreated, to think upon his faith given to *Sophonisba*, that ſhe ſhould not be delivered into the *Roman* power. So he departed to his own tent, where, after ſome time ſpent in agony, he called unto him a ſervant of his, that had the cuſtody of his poiſon (which princes uſed then to have in readineſs, againſt all miſchances that might make them unwilling to live:) and tempering a potion for *Sophonisba*, ſent it unto her with this meſſage; that gladly he would have had her to live with him as his wife: but ſince they, who had power to hinder him of his deſire, would not yield thereto, he ſent her a cup, that ſhould preſerve her from falling alive into the hands of the *Romans*; willing her to remember her birth and eſtate, and accordingly to take order for her ſelf.

At the receipt of this meſſage and preſent, ſhe only ſaid, That if her huſband had no better token to ſend unto his new wife, ſhe muſt accept of this; adding, that ſhe might have died more honourably, if ſhe had not wedded ſo lately before her funeral. And herewithal ſhe boldly drank off the poiſon. Thus *Livy* reporteth. But *Appian* varies from this: and ſets it down agreeably to that which hath been ſpoken before, concerning the pre-contract between *Maſaniſſa* and *Sophonisba*. He ſaith, that after the taking of *Syphax*, ambaſſadors from *Cirta* met with *Lælius* and *Maſaniſſa* upon their way thither, yielding up their city, and the king's palace: and that *Sophonisba*, for her own private, ſent meſſengers to excuſe her marriage with *Syphax*; as made againſt her will, by compulſion of thoſe in whoſe power ſhe was. *Maſaniſſa* readily admitted of this excuſe; and accepted her to wife. But when *Scipio* had received information from *Syphax*, how cunning in perſwaſion *Sophonisba* was; and that all her thoughts laboured for the good of *Carthage*: he fell out about her with *Maſaniſſa* at his return; and challenged her, as a part of the booty belonging to the *Romans*. *Maſaniſſa* ſaid, ſhe was his own wife, and unto him betrothed many years before. But *Scipio* would not hear of this: or if it were true, yet he ſaid, it was no reaſon, that *Maſaniſſa* ſhould keep her in poſſeſſion, as long as it was diſputable, unto whom ſhe might appertain. Wherefore he willed him firſt of all to produce her, and then afterwards to make his claim unto her; wherein he ſhould have no wrong. Herewithal he ſent to fetch her away: and *Maſaniſſa* accompanied the meſſengers, as it were to deliver her; but making her acquainted with the neceſſity, gave unto her a cup of poiſon, wherewith ſhe ended her life, before they came that ſhould have apprehended her. So he ſhewed unto the *Romans* her dead body, which he royally interred. The ſudden violence of *Maſaniſſa*'s love, and the ready conſent of *Sophonisba* to marry with him, add not ſo much credit unto this relation of *Appian*, as doth the want of all other evident cauſe (which [a] *Livy* notes) of the ſudden falling out between him and the *Carthaginians*, under whom he had been trained up, and done them great ſervice. Howſoever it were, *Scipio*, hearing of this tragical accident, ſent for *Maſaniſſa*, and comforted him as well as he could, leſt his melancholy ſhould lead him to ſome inconvenience. Having therefore gently rebuked him for his raſhneſs, he brought him forth in preſence of the army; where, extolling his noble acts, and ſhewing how highly he had deſerved of the city of *Rome*, he proclaimed him king; and gave unto him a crown of gold, with other royal ornaments. This was indeed the ready way to divert his thoughts from the ſad remembrance of that which was paſs'd, unto the more chearful contemplation of good fortune, that began to ſmile upon him.

This was the firſt time that the *Romans* took upon them to create or proclaim a king. Which honour, though *Maſaniſſa* well deſerved, yet would not the title have redounded unto his great benefit; neither ſhould he have been much beholden to them for it, if he had not, by their means, recovered poſſeſſion of his country, together with the greateſt part of *Syphax*'s dominions. It ſeems not unlikely, that had he remained a neuter in theſe wars, and ſuſtained himſelf, with his troop of horſe, in ſuch ſort as he did before the coming of the *Romans*, he might nevertheleſs have recovered his proper inheritance, by the love of his own ſubjects, without other help, when *Syphax* had once or twice been vanquiſhed. As for the enlargement of his kingdom, it was not more than he deſerved; neither were the *Romans* then in caſe to make a conqueſt of *Numidia* for themſelves, neither could they have wiſhed a fitter opportunity, than of ſuch a man, upon whom to beſtow it, that was their aſſured friend, and paſſable withal among the *Numidians*, as being (for the *Maſæſyli* were a *Numidian* tribe) a great prince of the ſame nation. Yet this liberality of the *Romans* was noiſed abroad as very glorious; and the *Romans* themſelves, in a politick ſort of gravity, took highly upon them; as if even their ſaluting him by the name of *king*, had been a matter of great conſequence. He thrived indeed well after it, and by their maintenance, waxed mighty in times followings, encroaching upon his neighbours on all ſides; but moſt of all upon the ſtate of *Carthage*, whereat they were little diſpleaſed. Hence it grew, that *Vermina*, the ſon of *Syphax* (of whom we ſhall ſhortly ſpeak more) which held ſome piece of his father's kingdom, deſiring friendſhip of the *Romans*, and promiſing by all means to deſerve their love, requeſted therewithal, that they would call him *king*. But though it were ſo, that never any before him had made this a matter of ſuit; yet the *Roman* ſenate was *punctilious* herein; and anſwered very gravely, [b] that it was not their cuſtom to give the honour of that appellation, ſave only unto ſuch kings as had greatly deſerved of their city. Thus they made it a matter of ſtate, and in proceſs of time grew ſo proud of this their imaginary prerogative, that they imputed as a ſingular benefit unto

[a] Lib. 28. [b] Liv. l. 31.

kings,

kings, that no way depended upon them, the ſalutation by [a] *that name*, though it were not accompanied with any other favour or profit thence redounding.

SECT. XIX.

The Carthaginians *deſire truce, and break it.*

THE *Carthaginians* were extremely diſmayed, when they heard of the great calamity that was befallen their good friend *Syphax*, and underſtood that *Maſaniſſa*, their mortal enemy, had got poſſeſſion of his kingdom. To increaſe their fear, *Scipio* returned again to *Tunis*, in view of their city, where he made an end of that fortification which he had begun at his laſt being there. The *Carthaginians* had neither forces, nor courage to withſtand him; but their hearts ſo failed them, that they ſent forth unto him thirty ambaſſadors, princes of the city, which were their privy-council, to make ſuit for peace. Theſe being admitted into the preſence of *Scipio*, did not only proſtrate themſelves on the ground, but kiſſed the [a] feet of him, and of thoſe that ſat in council with him.

Anſwerable to this baſe adoration, was their ſpeech that followed. They confeſſed themſelves to have unjuſtly broken the peace between them and *Rome*, and to have deſerved whatſoever puniſhment it ſhould pleaſe the *Romans* to inflict upon them. Yet they humbly beſought *Scipio*, and the reſt, that, in common regard of thoſe misfortunes whereto all men are ſubject, they would ſhew mercy unto the city of *Carthage*, and let it remain as a monument of their clemency; which, by the folly of her citizens, had now twice deſerved to be overthrown. Herewithal they did not forget to lay the blame upon *Hannibal*, who, without their appointment, had begun the war; and was maintained in his doings by a faction, without the good-liking of the whole city. By this it appears, that theſe ambaſſadors were no *Barchines*, but rather, that they were *Hanno*, and the choice of his company, who had now their long deſired work in hand, of ſuing unto the *Romans* for peace. Whatſoever they were, it muſt needs be that they were moſt inſolent men over thoſe that were ſubject unto their power; for they would not have made ſuch adoration to the *Romans*, in their own neceſſity, unleſs they themſelves had expected the like, where they had the advantage.

It was not unknown to *Scipio*, or to his aſſiſtants, in what poor caſe the city of *Rome* then was, and how unable to defray the charges of continuing the war. Neither were the *Carthaginians*, notwithſtanding the loſs of ſo many armies, in ſuch ill caſe, as the *Romans* themſelves had very lately been. For they had money enough wherewith to wage more men: they had a city far ſtronger than *Rome*, and they had the ſea free. But they wanted the *Roman* reſolution, and therefore diſtruſted the walls of *Carthage*, though *Utica*, a weaker city, had all this while held out againſt *Scipio*, and could not yet be forced by him and his army, though ſo often victorious in the field. *Scipio* therefore accepted their ſubmiſſion, and told them, that though he came into *Africk* to make a conqueſt, and not a peace; yet having the conqueſt, as it were, in his hand, he would not deny to grant them the peace which they deſired; for thereby ſhould all nations underſtand, that the people of *Rome* did follow the rule of juſtice, both in making war, and in concluding it. The conditions which he impoſed upon them, were theſe: that they ſhould render up unto him all the priſoners that they had taken, together with all the renagadoes and fugitive ſlaves: that they ſhould withdraw their armies out of *Italy* and *Gaul*; that they ſhould not meddle in *Spain*, nor yet in any iſland between *Italy* and *Africk*: that they ſhould deliver up all their ſhips of war, ſave twenty; and that they ſhould pay a great ſum of money, with certain hundred thouſand buſhels of wheat and barley. To conſider of theſe articles, he gave them three days; and when they had approved them, he granted a truce, that they might ſend ambaſſadors unto the *Roman* ſenate.

This done, *Maſaniſſa* was diſmiſſed, and went home into his kingdom, as if the war had been already at an end. *Syphax* was a little before ſent with *Lælius* unto *Rome*, where the fame of theſe victories filled men with joy, and gave hope that the long endured miſeries would be ſhortly at an end. Wherefore all the temples were ſet open, and an holy-day appointed for thankſgiving and ſupplication to their gods. *Lælius* was accompanied with ambaſſadors from king *Maſaniſſa*, who, gratulating the happy ſucceſs of the *Romans* in their *African* war, and giving thanks unto the ſenate for the benefits done by *Scipio* unto their maſter, made requeſt for the *Numidians*, ſuch as were now his ſubjects, and priſoners in *Rome*, that they might be beſtowed upon him; who, by rendering them to liberty, ſhould do an act very plauſible, that would make him gracious among his people in the beginning of his reign. The *Roman* ſenate were not behind with *Maſaniſſa* in compliment; but ſhewing themſelves to be highly pleaſed with all that *Scipio* had done, and ſhould do for him; they called him *king* again; releaſed his *Numidians* that were captives; and ſent him two purple caſſocks, that had each of them one gold button; with ſuch other preſents, as in time of their poverty, might ſerve to teſtify their good-will. Scarcely were theſe and *Lælius* gone from *Rome*, when the news came that ambaſſadors from *Carthage* were arrived to deſire peace. Theſe ambaſſadors were not admitted into the city, but were lodged without; until *Lælius*, being ſent for, came back from *Oſtia*, to be preſent when their demands were to be heard. Then was audience given them in the temple of *Bellona*, that ſtood in the ſuburbs. The errand of theſe ambaſſadors was peace; but the meaning of them, and of their city, was only to win time, and get reſpite from war, until *Hannibal* and *Mago* ſhould come out of *Italy*, either to chaſe the *Romans* out of *Africk*, or to obtain peace for *Carthage*, by terror of their great names and armies, upon more eaſy conditions. Wherefore they made an idle diſcourſe of the league that was concluded between them and *Luctatius Catulus*, at the end of the former war. This league, they ſaid, all things well conſidered, did ſtill remain in force; neither had there ſince been any war at all between the people of *Rome* and the *Carthaginians*. For it was only *Hannibal*, that, without any leave from *Carthage*, had of his own head beſieged and ras'd the town of *Saguntum*: and after that, adventured in like ſort, without commiſſion, to paſs the *Alps*, and trouble (as he had done) the quiet of *Italy*. This being ſo, their meſſage was none other, than to deſire that the league, before ſpoken of, made in the time of *Catulus*, might hereafter ſtand in force, as indeed it hitherto did, and ought to do. The ſenators had cauſe to wonder at this tale, hearing theſe ambaſſadors make (as it were) a jeſt of a war, that had been ſo

[a] Ceſar's Com. Lib. 1. [b] Excerpt. è Polyb. lib. 15. Liv. lib. 30.

terrible

terrible. Wherefore they aſked them a great many queſtions concerning that peace made by *Lutatius*, and other paſſages following, between the two cities. But they excuſed themſelves by their age (for they were all young men) and ſaid, that thoſe things were beyond their knowledge and remembrance. Forthwith it appeared, that all was but colluſion, and that they ſought no other than to gain time, until they might repair the war. Wherefore they were ſent home in company of *Lælius*, without any concluſion at all of peace; and, in effect, without anſwer. This notwithſtanding, we find in [a] *Polybius*, that the ſenate receiving advertiſement from *Scipio*, of that which had paſſed between him and the *Carthaginians* in this treaty of peace, approved the conditions by him propounded; and gave him licence thereupon to proceed unto concluſion. This may, with good reaſon, be believed; ſince it was not unknown, that if the war continued, all theſe goodly hopes muſt reſt upon the uncertain hope of one battel between *Hannibal* and *Scipio*; wherein, if fortune ſhould be averſe to them, their forces in *Afric* were no better than quite loſt.

Matters thus hanging in ſuſpenſe, before the *Carthaginian* ambaſſadors came back from *Rome*, a fleet out of *Sicily*, wherein were two hundred ſhips of burden, and thirty gallies, being bound for *Afric*, to victual the *Roman* camp, was overtaken by foul weather at ſea; and, hardly eſcaping wreck, was diſperſed, and driven a-ground in divers parts of the bay of *Carthage*, even in view, and under command of the city. There was at that time, as we find in [b] *Appian*, and may gather out of *Polybius*, a great dearth of victuals in *Carthage*; which cauſed the people to cry out upon their magiſtrates, that they ſhould not let ſuch a booty eſcape them; ſaying, that the danger of famine was greater and worſe than of breaking truce. Whether it were ſo that hunger urged them, or that they yielded to their own greedy deſires, the multitude in *Carthage* underſtood (as it ſeems) that all this diſcourſe of peace in hand, was no better than mere mockery; and therefore cared not for obſervation of particular points, when they meant deceit in the whole. [c] It was the manner in *Carthage*, as likewiſe in *Alexandria*, for all the raſcality, together with women and boys, to be medling in uproars; the clamours of the boys being in ſuch tumults no leſs violent than of the men. Wherefore it is no marvel, if little regard were had of reaſon, or of honour, in any ſuch commotion. A fleet was ſent out under *Aſdrubal*, to gather up the diſperſed *Roman* ſhips of burden (for the gallies, by force of oars, recovered the ſtation whereto their camp adjoined) and bring them into *Carthage*, which was done. *Scipio* was hereat much offended, not only for the loſs, and for that the town was thereby relieved; but for that by this breach of truce, he foreſaw the intention of the *Carthaginians* to renew the war, and put him to more trouble. Wherefore he ſent ambaſſadors unto them, both to require ſatisfaction for the injury done, and to deter them from entertaining any other hope, than in the peace which they had ſo much deſired. Theſe gave the *Carthaginians* to underſtand, that letters were come from *Rome* unto *Scipio*, with allowance to conclude the peace upon thoſe conditions which he had propounded. But (ſaid they) *we hold it ſtrange, that ye, who ſo lately have caſt your ſelves to the ground before us, and kiſſed our feet, after an unuſual manner of humility, confeſſing your ſelves to have perfidiouſly broken the league that was between us, and thereby to have deſerved ſuch puniſhment as is due unto rebels, ſhould ſo ſoon forget what ye then uttered, and run headlong again into the ſame crimes, for which ye acknowledged your ſelves worthy to be deſtroyed, having only recourſe unto our mercy. We are not ignorant, that it is the confidence which ye repoſe in* Hannibal, *that thus emboldens you. Yet were it not amiſs, that ye ſhould conſider, how long he hath been pent up in a corner of* Italy, *among the* Brutians, *where he is in a manner beſieged, and unable to ſtir; ſo that ye are like to find his help wanting in your greateſt need. Or let it be ſuppoſed, that he were now in* Afric, *and ready to give us battel; yet ſhould it well agree with your wiſdom, to doubt what might befal; remembering that he is a man, and not invincible. Now if it ſhould happen that he were overcome, what refuge have ye left unto your ſelves againſt hereafter? What gods will ye either ſwear by, to be believed, or call upon in your miſery? What words, and lamentable geſture will ye henceforth uſe to move compaſſion; Surely ye have already waſted all your forces of perſwaſion, and ſhall not again deceive us, if ye refuſe the grace, whereof at this preſent ye are capable.* It is no marvel though the *Carthaginians* were angry, when they heard themſelves upbraided with the baſe demeanor of their ambaſſadors. For it was not the general opinion of the city, that the truce was broken by themſelves, though it had pleaſed *Hanno*, or ſuch as were of his faction, to gratify the *Romans* with all manner of ſubmiſſion; and to renounce not only their hope of the future, but all juſtification of matters paſs'd. And indeed it ſeems that the *Roman* ambaſſadors were very much delighted in the rehearſal of that point, which was yielded unto them, as knowing that thereon depended the juſtice of the quarrel. But the *Carthaginians* took this in ſo ill part, that hardly could they refrain from doing violence unto the men who had uſed unto them ſuch inſolent ſpeeches. Yet the fury of the multitude was in ſome ſort appeaſed, either by *Hanno*, whom *Appian* (I know not why) calls *Hanno the great*; or by the very reverence due unto the place of thoſe that had uttered ſuch liberal words. So they were diſmiſſed in friendly ſort, though it were without anſwer to their propoſition. There were alſo two gallies appointed for their ſafe convoy home, though with little intent of good unto their perſons. *Aſdrubal* was then in the mid-way, as men ſailed from *Carthage* towards *Utica*. He, whether only deſirous to pleaſe the multitude, of whoſe diſpoſition he was informed; or whether directed by publick order, to cut off theſe ambaſſadors in their way homeward, lay waiting for them behind a cape that was a little beyond the mouth of the river *Bagradas*. Their convoy having brought them on the way as far as to the mouth of *Bagradas*, wiſhed them a good voyage, and ſo took leave of them, as if they had been then in ſafety, ſince the *Roman* camp was even in ſight. The ambaſſadors took this in ill part, not as fearing any danger toward; but thinking themſelves too much neglected, foraſmuch as their attendants did ſo abruptly leave them. But no ſooner had they doubled the cape, than *Aſdrubal* fell upon them in ſuch manner, as they might well diſcern his purpoſe, which was to have ſtemmed them. They rowed hard therefore, and being in a quinquereme, that had more banks of oars than had any galley of *Aſdrubal*, they ſlipped away, and made him over-ſhoot himſelf. Yet he gave them chace, and had well near ſurpriſed them; but they diſcovered ſome *Roman* companies on the ſhore over-

a Excerpt. è Polyb. l. 15. b App. de bello Punico. c Excerpt. è Polyb. l. 15.

againſt them, and therefore adventured to run their veſſel a-ground; whereby they ſaved their own lives, though a great part of their company were ſlain, or hurt. This practice of the *Carthaginians* was inexcuſable; and for the ſame cauſe perhaps were the citizens heartned in ſuch a diſhonourable attempt, by thoſe that were deſirous to continue the war, that thereby they might be driven to ſtudy nothing elſe than how to get the victory, as having none other hope remaining. Yet likely it is, that the ſame fear which had cauſed them to make ſuch earneſt ſuit for peace, would alſo have cauſed them to be better adviſed, than thus to abandon all hope of treaty, had they not been given to underſtand that *Hannibal* was already landed in *Afric*, in whom they repoſed no ſmall confidence; but verily perſwaded themſelves that he would change their fortune, and teach the *Romans* to hold themſelves contented with more eaſy conditions than were thoſe that *Scipio*, in the pride of his fortune, had of late propounded.

SECT. XX.

In what ſort Hannibal *ſpent the time after the battel of* Metaurus. *The doings of* Mago *in* Italy. Hannibal *and* Mago *called out of* Italy. *How the* Romans *were diverſly affected by* Hannibal's *departure.*

EVER ſince the loſs of that battel at *Metaurus*, *Hannibal* remained in the country of the *Brutians*, waiting for another ſupply from *Carthage*. The *Roman* conſuls, that ſucceeded unto *Claudius* and *Livius*, by whom *Aſdrubal* was overcome and ſlain, were contented to be quiet all their year. Neither did *Licinius*, the colleague of *Scipio*, ought worthy of remembrance againſt *Hannibal*, being hindered by the peſtilence that was in his army. *Sempronius* the conſul, who followed *Licinius*, and *Cn. Servilius Sæpo*, who followed *Sempronius*, were earneſtly bent to have done ſomewhat; but their diligence was in a manner fruitleſs. In ſome ſkirmiſhes with *Hannibal* they had the better; in ſome the worſe; and a few poor towns they got from him, as it were, by ſtealth; his care being more to preſerve his army, than to keep thoſe places that were weak.

The *Romans* had at this time ſo many great pieces of work in hand, that their chief enemy was become not the chief part of their care. Their thoughts were mainly bent upon *Afric*, wherein they were at no ſmall charges to maintain the army, which (as was hoped) ſhould bring the war to a ſhort and happy concluſion. They ſtood nevertheleſs in much fear of *Mago*, the brother of *Hannibal*, who took exceeding pains among the *Ligurians* and *Gauls* to raiſe an army, wherewith to kindle anew the war in *Italy*, that began to wax cold. *Mago* ſollicited alſo the *Hetrurians*, and found them ſo ready to ſtir in his behalf, that if he could have entered their country ſtrong, it might have proved no leſs needful for *Scipio* to return home out of *Afric*, than ſhortly it was for *Hannibal* to make ſpeed unto the defence of *Carthage*. Theſe dangers cauſed the *Romans* to employ one of their conſuls, or proconſuls, with an army, among the *Hetrurians*; another among the *Gauls*; and a third among the *Ligurians*; foraſmuch as it was uncertain upon which ſide *Mago* would break out. Being thus buſied, it is no wonder though they forbore to over-charge *Hannibal* with any great power.

As for *Mago*, when things were in ſome readineſs for his ſetting forwards, he met in the country of the *Inſubrians*, which is about *Milan*, with *M. Cornelius* the *Roman* proconſul, and *P. Quintilius Varus*, one of the pretors. With theſe he fought a battel, wherein though his virtue ſhewed it ſelf worthy of his father and brethren, yet his fortune was *Carthaginian*. The fight continued a long while doubtful, in ſuch ſort, that the *Roman* commanders began to diſtruſt the iſſue. Wherefore *Quintilius* the pretor, taking unto him all the *Roman* horſe, thought to have ſhaken the enemies to pieces. The legions at the ſame time gave a loud ſhout, and ſtrained themſelves hard, as if at that brunt the victory ſhould have been carried before them. But *Mago* oppoſed his elephants to the horſe, the ſervice of thoſe beaſts being fitter for ſuch uſe, than againſt the ſquadrons of foot. The figure, ſcent, and braying of theſe elephants, did ſo affright the horſe, that they ſtarted aſide, and were ſcattered over the field, their riders being unable to manage them. Hereby the *Numidians* got advantage upon them, whoſe manner of fight was more available againſt thoſe that were looſe, than againſt the troops that were cloſe and thick. Then fell the elephants upon the legions, which entertained them after the accuſtomed manner, with a ſhower of darts, and killed four of them, cauſing all the reſt to give back. This notwithſtanding, the ſame legions were ſo vehemently preſſed by the enemy, that, more for ſhame of running away, than by any great force to make reſiſtance, they held their ground. The proconſul therefore brought up thoſe forces, which he had kept unto the laſt, to ſuccour where need ſhould moſt require. Againſt theſe *Mago* employed ſome of his *Gauls*, whom he had in readineſs for the like occaſion. But theſe *Gauls* diſcharged their parts very ill; they were ſoon beaten off, and recoiled ſo haſtily, that they brought fear upon all the reſt. When *Mago* ſaw that his men began to ſhrink, he put himſelf in the head of his army, and held them ſo well to it, that, keeping their order, they made a fair retreat, with their faces towards the enemy. But at length he received a grievous wound in his thigh, whereof ſhortly after he died. He was taken up, and carried out of danger by ſome of his own men: the reſt of them, after little further reſiſtance, provided every one for himſelf. So the *Romans* obtained victory, not without great coſt, as purchaſing the death of about five thouſand enemies, with the loſs of twenty-three hundred of the pretor's army, beſides thoſe that died of the proconſul's legions; alſo beſides divers colonels, captains, and gentlemen of mark, that fell in this hot piece of ſervice. Neither were there any priſoners taken; whereby it may ſeem that the enemies did not fall to rout, before they had recovered ſome ground that might aſſure them from purſuit. However it were, this victory would have much more imported for the aſſurance of *Italy*, if the ſtate of *Carthage* could longer have permitted theſe valiant ſons of of *Amilcar* to abide therein. But *Mago*, withdrawing himſelf (by eaſy journies, becauſe of his wound) into *Liguria*, found there ſome hoſtages from *Carthage* attending him, who gave him to underſtand the pleaſure of their city, which was, that both he and *Hannibal* ſhould preſently repair home with all their forces, not ſtaying any longer to think upon the conqueſt of *Italy*, ſince *Carthage* it ſelf was ready to be loſt. He obeyed this commandment, and embarked ſhortly his army; but died of his wound about *Sardinia*, in the way homewards.

About the ſame time *Hannibal* received the like command from *Carthage* to return into *Afric*. He heard it with great impatience, gnaſhing his teeth, and groaning, and hardly keeping in the tears, that were ready to burſt out, whilſt the ambaſſadors were

were delivering their errand. When their meſſage was done, he told them, that *this was yet plain dealing. For*, ſaid he, *They that now directly bid me come home, have long ago done their beſt to hale me out of* Italy; *though more cloſely and crookedly they went to work, by ſtopping the ſupply that ſhould have enabled me to manage the war here.* Scipio *therefore ſhall not need to brag, that he hath drawn me home by the heels; it is* Hanno *that hath wrought this noble feat, and overwhelmed the houſe of the* Barchines, *for lack of other means to do it, with the ruin of* Carthage. He had before prepared a fleet in readineſs, doubting that, which after came to paſs; wherein he embarked, beſides his own men, as many of the *Italians* as were content to be partakers of his fortune. Many there were that ſhrunk back from him, and refuſed to do ſervice in this expedition: of whom ſuch as he could take he ſlew, not ſparing thoſe that fled into the temple of *Juno Lucina*, which had been held an inviolable ſanctuary unto that day. He was indeed then wholly tranſported with rage, and departed out of *Italy* no leſs paſſionate, than men are wont to be when they leave their own countries to go into exile. He looked back unto the ſhore; accuſing both gods and men, and curſing his own dulneſs, in that he had not led his army from *Cannæ*, hot and bloodied as it was, directly unto the walls of *Rome*. With ſuch vexation of ſpirit he quitted the poſſeſſion of *Italy*, wherein he had lived almoſt half his time.

If it could have been foretold unto the *Romans*, in the firſt beginning of this war, with what exceeding joy in times following they ſhould entertain the news of *Hannibal*'s departure out of *Italy:* they would (I think) leſs earneſtly have preſſed the *Carthaginians* to ſend him over thither. When ſure advertiſement was brought into the city, that *Hannibal* was gone with all his army, an holy-day was appointed for thankſgiving unto their gods, and extraordinary great ſacrifices publickly made for joy of ſuch happy tidings. Yet old *Q. Fabius* was of opinion, that the danger did ſtill remain the ſame, though the place were changed; for that *Hannibal*, at his coming into *Afric*, would find *P. Scipio* other manner of work, than he had been troubled with at any time before; and would do greater matters in his own country, than ever he was able to perform abroad in a land of ſtrangers. The remove of the war from their own doors, and the conceit of that victory for which they hoped, was enough to make them preſume further than at other times they would have done. When therefore the *Saguntine* ambaſſadors brought unto them a great maſs of gold and ſilver, together with ſome agents of the *Carthaginians*, taken by them in *Spain:* only the *Carthaginian* priſoners were accepted; the treaſure was rendered back unto the *Saguntines*, that had ſurpriſed it. Upon like confidence of the future, a little before this, order was taken for the repayment of thoſe monies that had been borrowed in time of more neceſſity from private men. Hence alſo proceeded the ſevere chaſtiſement laid upon thoſe twelve colonies, that, for want either of means, or of goodwill, had refuſed to give aid to the *Romans*. They were commanded, and enforced to give double the number of foot to that which they had been wont to ſet out for the wars, with a proportion of horſe anſwerable to the very moſt of their ability. So confident were the *Romans* grown (though their wealth were not as yet ſuitable to the greatneſs of their ſpirit) upon the good ſucceſs of the battel of *Metaurus*, and the hopes which they repoſed in *Scipio*. All this notwithſtanding, when they conſidered more nearly of that which might happen; and were informed, that the terrible army, whereof *Italy* had been few days ſince diſcharged, was landed ſafe in *Afric*, they began to revolve a thouſand fearful matters in their heads, and to ſtand in doubt leſt *Q. Fabius* (who died about the ſame time) would be found a true prophet. For, bethinking themſelves of that which might comfort them in their hopes, they found in the victories againſt *Syphax* and *Aſdrubal* no ſpecialty of ſuch great worth, as might promiſe the like ſucceſs againſt another manner of general, followed by other manner of men than were either of thoſe two. The *Numidian* king had been wont to bring into the field a raſcally multitude of half-ſcullions, that were good for nothing, being himſelf a fit captain for ſuch ſoldiers. Likewiſe *Aſdrubal*, the ſon of *Giſco*, was well thought of by the *Carthaginian* ſenate; but otherwiſe, one that in the field was only good at ſaving himſelf by a ſwift retreat. But now there came an army of men, hardned from their childhood with incredible patience, fleſhed many hundred times in *Roman* blood, and wearing the ſpoils not only of good ſoldiers, but brave captains, by them ſlain. Such talk uſed the people of *Rome*, ſaying, that *Scipio* was like to meet in battel with many, that had ſlain *Roman* prætors, yea, and conſuls, with their own hands; with many, that had been firſt in getting over the trenches of ſeveral *Roman* camps, or in winning the tops of walls at the ſiege of towns; briefly, that he ſhould now be oppoſed by an army as good as had ever ſerved in war, and following the dreadful name of *Hannibal*.

SECT. XXI.

Hannibal *in* Afric *prepares to fight with* Scipio; *treats with him about peace in vain; loſeth a battel at* Nadagara, *and perſwades the* Carthaginians *to ſue for peace. Of the peace granted from* Rome *to* Carthage.

HANNIBAL diſembarked his army at *Leptis*, almoſt an hundred miles from *Carthage*, eaſtward from the headland of *Mercury*, and ſomewhat more than one degree to the ſouth. He was ill-provided of horſe, which it was not eaſy for him to tranſport out of *Italy*. Therefore it behoved him to land, as he did, ſomewhat far from the enemy, that he might furniſh himſelf with this and the like needful helps againſt the day of battel. From *Leptis* he paſſed on to *Adrumetum*, and ſo along through the inland country, gathering friends unto him by the way. *Tychæus*, a *Numidian* prince, and a familiar friend of *Syphax*, was ſaid to have in thoſe days the beſt horſes of ſervice that were to be found in *Afric*. Him therefore did *Hannibal* allure unto his party, making him underſtand, that if the *Romans* got the victory, it ſhould be eaſy for *Maſaniſſa*, by their countenance and help, to oppreſs both him, and as many other of the neighbour princes as hindered his proſpect. This argument, and the fame of him that uſed it, prevailed with *Tychæus*, who ſhortly after brought unto the *Carthaginian* two thouſand horſe. *Appian* further adds, that *Mezetullus* (the ſame who had made himſelf protector over *Maſaniſſa*'s couſins, and was head of a family, and adverſe to the *Numidian* kings of that race) brought unto *Hannibal* another thouſand horſe; as likewiſe that *Vermina*, the ſon of *Syphax*, holding a great part of his father's kingdom, began at the ſame time to aſſail the places that yielded obedience to *Maſaniſſa*. This *Vermina*, as we find in *Livy*, came with more than ſixteen thouſand men (for he loſt more than ſo many) to ſuccour *Hannibal*, when it was too late.

The

The *Carthaginians* were at this time in ſuch hard eſtate, or (at leaſt) ſo impatient of the ſtate wherein they were; that they could not attend the leiſure of thoſe preparations, which would have made the victory aſſured. When they conſidered the worth of *Hannibal*, and the greatneſs of his acts: it offended them to think, that they had been ſo baſe, as to make humble ſuit unto the *Romans* for peace; whilſt they had ſuch a brave champion alive, to maintain their cauſe by war. But when they bethought themſelves of their own ſufferings, which, for want of *Roman* magnanimity to endure them, appeared greater than indeed they were: then cried they out earneſtly, that it was no time to linger, but preſently to fight; that ſo they might ſee an end of theſe troubles, either good or bad. And to this purpoſe, they ſent their mandates to *Hannibal:* requiring him, without any further protraction, to do what he could do out of hand. *Hannibal* made anſwer, that they were his good lords, and had power to diſpoſe of him and his army: but ſince he was general of their forces, he thought it reaſonable, that they ſhould ſuffer him to do as a general ought to do; and to chooſe his own times. Nevertheleſs, to give them ſatisfaction, he made great marches to *Zama*; and there encamped.

The breach of truce, made by the *Carthaginians:* the violence done to his ambaſſadors: and the news of *Hannibal*'s being landed in *Afric*; made *Scipio* to underſtand the reſolution of the *Carthaginians*, which was, not to yield unto any conditions unprofitable for themſelves, as long as they were able to make reſiſtance. Wherefore he ſent unto *Maſaniſſa:* and informed him of all that was fallen out; praying him to come away with ſpeed, and lay all other buſineſs a-part. Ten *Roman* companies, of horſe and foot together, *Maſaniſſa* had with him; that were lent unto him by *Scipio*, to do him ſervice in the eſtabliſhing and enlarging of his kingdom. But he well underſtood, that thoſe, and many more beſides all his own forces, would little avail him; if *Hannibal* ſhould drive the *Romans* out of *Afric*. Wherefore taking ſuch order as he could upon the ſudden, for the ſafety of his own kingdom; with four thouſond horſe, and ſix thouſand foot, he made all haſte unto *Scipio*.

Soon after the beginning of theſe new troubles, the *Carthaginian* ambaſſadors that had been at *Rome*, returned back under the conduct of *Lælius* and *Fulvius:* who brought them ſafe into the *Roman* camp. There when they arrived, and underſtood what had lately paſſed, eſpecially how their citizens had behaved themſelves towards the *Roman* ambaſſadors: they made little doubt, how their own heads ſhould anſwer for ſuch notorious outrage. To confirm them in this opinion, *M. Bæbius*, one of the late ambaſſadors that had been in *Carthage*, being left by *Scipio* to take charge of the camp, laid hands upon them, and detained them; ſending word unto his general, who was gone abroad to make war in the country, that he had them in his power, and that now the *Carthaginians* might be repaid in their own coin, for the injury by them lately done. *Scipio* was very glad to hear of this; and commanded *Bæbius* to uſe them with all poſſible courteſy, and ſend them ſafe home. By this doing he brake the hearts of his enemies; and cauſed them to acknowledge themſelves (which was a great victory) far leſs honourable than the *Romans*. This notwithſtanding, he made more cruel war upon them than before: taking their towns by force; and putting them to ſack, without hearkning to any compoſition. It was the manner of the *Romans*, as often as they took a town by aſſault, to put all that came in their way to the ſword, whatſoever they were, without regard. This they did, to make themſelves terrible: and the better to work ſuch impreſſion in the minds of thoſe, with whom they had to do, they uſed oftentimes to kill the very dogs and other beaſts, that ran athwart them in the ſtreets; hewing their bodies aſunder, as men delighted in ſhedding of blood. [a] This being their practice at other times: it is likely, that now they omitted no piece of cruelty; when they meant to give proof of their vehement indignation, and revengeful minds, for the injuries received. Hence it partly grew, that the *Carthaginians* were ſo earneſt in preſſing *Hannibal* to fight.

Hannibal being encamped at *Zama*, ſent forth his ſcouts and ſpies to diſcover where the *Romans* lay; what they were doing; and as much as might be of their demeanour. Some of theſe were taken, and brought unto *Scipio:* who, inſtead of truſſing them up, gave them free leave to view his camp at pleaſure; appointing one to conduct them up and down, and ſhew them whatſoever they deſired. This done, he gave them liberty to depart; and ſent them away ſafe unto their general. *Hannibal* underſtanding this, admired the bravery and courage of his enemy: with whom on the ſudden he grew deſirous to have an interview, and perſonal conference; and ſignified ſo much unto him, by a meſſenger ſent of purpoſe. Of this motion the *Roman* liked well: and returned anſwer, that he would meet him ſhortly in place convenient. The next day *Maſaniſſa* came with his army: whom *Scipio* taking with him removed unto a town called *Nodagara*; near unto which he ſat down, in a place otherwiſe commodious, and cloſe by a water that might opportunely ſerve his camp. Thence he ſent word unto the *Carthaginian*, that the time and place did fitly ſerve, if he had ought to ſay to him. *Hannibal* thereupon removed from *Zama*, and came within four miles of the enemy: where he encamped well to his own good liking in all things elſe; excepting that his men were driven to take much pains, in fetching their water ſomewhat far off. Then was order taken for their meeting: and the two generals, each of them with a troop of horſe, rode forth of their camps, till they came unto a piece of ground, which was before well ſearched, for fear of ambuſh. There they will their followers to ſtand off: and themſelves, with each of them one interpreter, encountered each other in the mid-way between their companies. They remained a while ſilent, viewing one the other with mutual admiration. Then began the *Carthaginian*, ſaluting the *Roman*, to deliver his mind to this effect: That it had been better both for *Carthage* and *Rome*, if they could have limited and contained their ambition within the ſhores of *Afric* and of *Italy*; for that the countries of *Sicily* and of *Spain*, about which their fathers and themſelves had ſtriven, were no ſufficient recompence for ſo many fleets as had been loſt, and for ſo much blood as had been ſhed, in making thoſe coſtly purchaſes. But ſince things paſs'd could not be recalled: He ſaid, that it was meet for them to conſider, unto what extreme dangers their own cities had been expoſed, by the greedy deſire of extending their empires abroad; and that it was even time for them now at length, to make an end of their

[a] Excerpt. è Polyb. lib. 10.

obſtinate

obſtinate contention, and pray the gods to endow them with greater wiſdom hereafter. And to ſuch peaceable diſpoſition, he affirmed that his own years, and long trial of fortune both good and evil, had made him inclinable. But much he feared, that *Scipio*, by want of the like experience might rather fix his mind upon uncertain hopes, than upon the contemplation of that mutability, whereunto all human affairs are ſubject. *Yet* (ſaid he) *mine own example may peradventure ſuffice to teach thee moderation. For I am that ſame* Hannibal, *who after my victory at* Cannæ *won the greateſt part of* Italy: *and deviſed with my ſelf, what I ſhould do with your city of* Rome; *which I hoped verily to have taken. Once I brought mine army to your walls, as thou haſt ſince brought thine to ours of* Carthage: *but now, ſee the change! I ſtand here entreating thee to grant us peace. This may ſerve as a document of fortune's inſtability. I have fought with thy father* Scipio: *he was the firſt of the* Roman *generals, that ever met me in the field. I did then little think; that the time would come, that I ſhould have ſuch buſineſs, as now at the preſent, with his ſon. But this is even one of fortune's pageants, whereof ſhe hath many. And thou mayeſt have experience of the like in thy ſelf, who knows how ſoon? Think upon* M. Atilius. *If he would have harkned unto ſuch perſwaſions, as I now uſe to thee; he might have returned home to* Rome *an happy man. And ſo mayeſt thou do now, if any reaſonable offer will give thee ſatisfaction. How ſayeſt thou? Canſt thou be contented, that all* Spain, Sicily, Sardinia, *and whatever iſlands elſe are ſituate between* Italy *and* Afric, *be abandoned by the* Carthaginians *for ever; and left unto the* Romans *to bear dominion therein? Thou ſhalt have glory enough by effecting thus much, and the* Romans *may well be glad of ſuch a bargain. As for us: our own quiet ſhall henceforth give us contentment. And the ſame contentment of ours, ſhall make us faithfully obſerve the peace with you. But if thou thinkeſt all too little; I muſt deſire thee to ponder well how great an hazard thou muſt undergo, for the obtaining of a very little more, than that which thou mayeſt have without contention. It is now in thine own power, to lay hold of good fortune, if it pleaſe thee: ſtay but till to-morrow night, and thou mayeſt take ſuch fortune, as it ſhall pleaſe the gods. The iſſue of battel is uncertain, and many times beguileth expectation. Men and ſteel we ſhall each of us bring into the field: but of the victory, neither of us hath the aſſurance. Let us therefore without more ado make peace: And do not tell me, that ſome falſe hearted citizens of ours dealt fraudulently of late in the like treaty: It is I* Hannibal *that now deſires peace with thee; which I would never do, if I thought it not expedient for my country. And thinking it expedient I will always maintain it: like as I have maintained unto my power, as long as the gods did not envy me, the war by me begun.* Hereunto *Scipio* made anſwer, That it was no ambitious deſire of ruling in *Sicily* and in *Spain*, which had moved the *Romans* to enter into this or the former war: but that the defence of the *Mamertines*, and afterwards of the *Saguntines*, their confederates, had cauſed them to put on thoſe arms; which the gods by the final iſſue of the wars had approved, and would approve to be moſt juſt. As for the mutability of fortune: he ſaid, that he was not thereof ignorant; and that without any note of inſolence, or over-weening, he might well refuſe the conditions offered. *For was it not plain, that all theſe countries, with which the* Carthaginians *now ſo willingly departed were already won from them by the* Romans? *If*, ſaid he, *theſe conditions had been propounded whilſt as yet ye detained ſome part of* Italy, *they might peradventure not have been rejected. But as the caſe now ſtands, I ſee no reaſon why I ſhould remit unto you any one piece of thoſe my former demands; to which the* Carthaginians *have yielded already, and thought me to deal graciouſly in being ſo moderate. Rather I ſay, that the injuries which they have done me ſince, have made them unworthy of obtaining peace upon ſo friendly terms. But I cannot blame thee,* Hannibal, *though thou wouldſt be glad to make thy citizens underſtand, from how much of their burden they are by thy means eaſed. Only thou muſt think, that in like ſort it concerns me in honour, not to let them be gainers or ſavers by the wrongs which they have done of late. Thou knoweſt well, that, beſides thoſe offers which thou here haſt made, they were well contented to reſtore unto us ranſom-free all priſoners that they have of ours; to pay us five thouſand talents; to deliver up their gallies; and to deliver hoſtages for aſſurance of fair dealing. And muſt they now be diſcharged of all this, by their breach of truce; their ſpoiling of our fleet; and their violating our ambaſſadors? Not ſo. But if they can be contented, beſides all this, to make ſuch amends as I ſhall require, for theſe injuries newly done; then will I take advice with my council what anſwer to give you; otherwiſe, you may even prepare for war, and blame your own ſelves, for that I have denied you peace.*

Hereupon they brake off; and returned each to his own camp, with no other news than war; bidding their ſoldiers prepare for a battel, wherein ſhould be decided the quarrel between *Rome* and *Carthage*. The next morning at break of day they iſſued into the field: a notable match, and ſuch as hath very ſeldom been found; whether we regard the generals; their armies; the two cities that contended, or the great importance of the battel at hand. *Scipio* ordered his men after the *Roman* manner: placing firſt the *Haſtati*, divided into their maniples, or ſmall batalions, with reaſonable diſtance between them: Not far behind theſe followed the *Principes*, likewiſe divided; and ſo after them the *Triarii*. But herein *Scipio* altered a little the ordinary cuſtom of the *Romans*: he placed not the maniples of his *Principes* oppoſite unto the void ſpaces between the *Haſtati*, that ſo the *Haſtati*, as was uſual, might fall back between the *Principes*; but he placed them directly one behind another, as it were in file. This he did becauſe of the elephants; whereof *Hannibal* had many. For of thoſe beaſts the danger was leſs, whilſt there was open way to let them through. Therefore he took ſuch order, that when they had paſſed through the ſpaces between the firſt battalions, they ſhould not come upon the *Principes* in front. Unto his *Velites*, or thoſe of the light armature, that were to begin the fight, he gave direction, that when they found themſelves to be overcharged, either by the enemies, or (which was moſt to be feared) by the elephants, they ſhould run back through thoſe lanes that were between the maniples, and that thoſe which were ſwifteſt, or otherwiſe beſt able, ſhould continue on their flight, until they were got behind all their own army; thereby leaving room enough unto thoſe that were wounded, or caſt behind, to ſave themſelves on the void ground, that was betwixt the firſt and ſecond, or the ſecond and third battalions, without cloying up the way between the maniples which he deſired to keep open. His *Italian* horſe he placed in the left wing under *C. Lælius*. In the right wing was *Maſaniſſa* with his *Numidians*. He himſelf riding up and down, exhorting his men to do valiantly;

uſing words not many, but very forcible. He bade them remember what they had atchieved, ſince their coming into *Afric*. He told them, that if this day were theirs, the war was at an end: and that their victory in this war, ſhould make them lords of all the world; for that afterwards, none would be found able to reſiſt them. On the contrary; if they were beaten, he aſked them whither they would fly. They were far from home, yea, and far from their own ſtanding camp: neither was there any place in *Afric*, that would give them ſhelter; if they fell into the *Carthaginians* hands, they knew what to expect. And therefore there was none other way, but death or victory; unleſs they would live like wretched ſlaves under moſt mercileſs enemies. In ſuch neceſſity, he ſaid, that they which conſider themſelves to be, and take reſolution anſwerable thereunto, have never been known to fail of getting victory.

Hannibal on the other ſide placed his elephants, that were more than fourſcore, in front of his battel. Next behind theſe, he made his vantguard all of mercenaries, *Ligurians*, *Gauls*, *Baleares*, and *Moors*. Then followed his battel; which was of *Carthaginians* and *Africans*, more intereſted in the quarrel than were thoſe mercenaries, though not ſo good ſoldiers; but to help (if it might be) their want of courage, they had with them four thouſand *Macedonians*, lately ſent from king *Philip*. More than the ſpace of a furlong behind theſe came his rearward conſiſting of thoſe brave ſoldiers which had ſerved him in his *Italian* wars; and were the only men, in whom he repoſed any confidence. Oppoſite to *Lælius*, in his own right wing he beſtowed the *Carthaginian* horſe. *Tychæus* and the *Numidians* he placed in his left wing againſt *Maſaniſſa*. He was indeed far too weak for the enemy in horſe, both in number and in goodneſs. For *Tychæus* and *Mezetullus* had no more than three thouſand; and thoſe not ſo well exerciſed, as were the four thouſand of *Maſaniſſa*. The *Carthaginians* alſo were no more, nor none other than ſuch as could be levied in the haſte of a few days; and the remainder of thoſe that had of late been often vanquiſhed, and accuſtomed to fly. But it was no time for *Hannibal*, neither had he perhaps authority, to make theſe his companions alight and ſerve on foot, ſetting better men in their ſaddles. All that he could have done, was to ſtay a little longer, and expect more help. Had *Vermina* the ſon of *Syphax* come thither, as he did in few days after, with ſixteen thouſand and upwards, the moſt of them horſe; the advantage of number might have ſerved well to ſupply all other defect. Yet ſince the lords of *Carthage* would brook no delay: *Hannibal* muſt be fain to comfort himſelf, with the hope that he repoſed in his old *Italian* ſoldiers; whoſe virtue had wrought greater wonders, when it was more ſtrongly oppoſed. He encouraged therefore his men, with words agreeable to their ſeveral conditions: promiſing unto the mercenaries bountiful rewards, threatning the *Carthaginians* with inevitable ſervitude, if they loſt that day; but eſpecially animating his old fellow-ſoldiers, by the many victories which they had obtained againſt far greater numbers. He bade them to look upon the enemies; and make an eſtimate, whether they were any thing like ſo many, as that large army which they had ſlaughtered at *Cannæ*. He willed them to remember, that it was one *P. Scipio*, even the father of this man, whom they had firſt of all compelled to run away. He told them that theſe legions which they yonder beheld, were, for the moſt part of them, the very worſt of the *Roman* ſoldiers; even ſuch, as for their daſtardly flight out of ſundry battels could no longer be truſted to bear arms in their own country. As for the reſt, they were young men, the ſons of cowards, and bred up in the continual fear of thoſe weapons, by which their fathers were daily ſlain or chaſed. Wherefore he entreated theſe his old companions, upon whoſe virtue he meant wholly to repoſe himſelf, that they would this day ſtrive to make good their honour; and to purchaſe the fame of *Men invincible*.

Such exhortations uſed the two generals before the fight. When they drew near together, the *Numidian* horſemen on both ſides began to ſkirmiſh. The trumpets, and other inſtruments of war, ſounded to battel: and *Hannibal* commanded his elephants to break upon the *Romans*. Of theſe elephants (as they were always an uncertain kind of help) thoſe that ſtood near unto the point of the left wing, turned back for fear, and ran upon their own *Numidian* horſe; which they affrighted and diſordered. *Maſaniſſa* eſpying this, gave charge upon the ſame *Numidians*; and not ſuffering them to rally themſelves, drove them quite out of the field. The reſt of thoſe beaſts made a great ſpoil of the *Roman Velites*, whom they followed into the ſpaces between the maniples: but without any harm to the battalions themſelves; which gave them open way, according as *Scipio* had well provided. Divers of them receiving many wounds, and growing therewith furious could no longer be governed: but ran back upon the right point of their own battel, and beyond that into the open field. Herewithal they diſordered the *Carthaginian* horſe which were in that wing: againſt whom they gave to *Lælius* the ſame advantage, that *Maſaniſſa* had againſt the *Numidians*; which he uſed in like ſort. In the mean while the battels of foot advanced, and drew near together with a ſlow and ſtately pace, till they were almoſt within a weapon's caſt: at what time they gave a ſhout and ran one at the other. The mercenaries for a time ſeemed both in audacity, and in quickneſs, to have the better of the *Romans*; wounding many, and doing more harm, than they took. But the *Roman* diſcipline, after a while, prevailed againſt the boiſterous violence of theſe untrained *Barbarians*. Whereunto it helped not a little, that the battel of the *Principes*, following ſomewhat near after the *Haſtati*, encouraged their fellows; and ſhewed themſelves ready, if need were, to relieve them. Contrariwiſe, the mercenaries received no manner of help or comfort, from thoſe that ſhould have ſeconded them. For the new levied *Carthaginians* and *Africans*, when they ſaw their hired ſoldiers give back, did alſo themſelves retire. This cauſed the *Ligurians*, *Gauls*, and the reſt, to think themſelves betrayed: whereupon they inclined unto flight. The *Carthaginian* battel was herewith more terrified than before, ſo as it refuſed to give way unto the mercenaries for their ſafe retreat: and yet withal forbore to make head againſt the enemies, that purſued them. It was no time to aſk them what they meant by this; fear and indignation cauſed thoſe that were at once chaſed by the *Romans*, and betrayed, as they thought, by their own fellows, to turn their arms with an heedleſs fury againſt both the one and the other. Thus were many of the *Carthaginians* beaten down and ſlain, through their own indiſcretion, by their own mercenaries. The *Roman Haſtati* in like ſort, fighting with deſperate men in a throng, had their hands ſo full of work, that the *Principes* were fain to come up unto them, and help to over-bear this great medley

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of enemies, that were together by the ears among themſelves. In this place was made a great ſlaughter, both of the mercenaries and of the *Carthaginians*; which hindering one another, could neither fight, nor eaſily fly. Such of them as eſcaped, ran towards *Hannibal*, who kept his ground, and would not ſtir one foot to help or ſave theſe run-aways. He cauſed his men to bend their pikes at thoſe of his own ſide, that would have ruſhed upon him, whom he thereby compelled to turn aſide beyond his battel, and ſave themſelves in the open field. The ground, over which the *Romans* were now to march, ere they could meet with *Hannibal*, was covered with ſuch thick heaps of dead bodies and weapons, and ſo ſlippery with blood; that *Scipio* began to ſtand in great doubt leſt the order of his battalions ſhould be diſſolved in paſſing that way. In ſuch caſe, if he ſhould fight with that warlike army which he ſaw before him, remaining yet entire, and without fear expecting him, he might be well aſſured to receive a notable overthrow. He cauſed therefore the *Haſtati* to make a ſtand there where they were, oppoſite unto the main battel of the *Hannibalians*. Then drawing up his *Principes* and *Triarii*, he placed them, when they had overcome the bad way, all in one front with the *Haſtati*, and made of them his two cornets. This done, he advanced towards *Hannibal*, who entertained him after another manner than ever he had been received in his life before. All the day's work, till now, ſeemed to have been only a matter of paſtime, in regard of the ſharp conflict that was maintained between theſe notable ſoldiers. The *Romans* were encouraged, by their having prevailed all the day before: they were alſo far the more in number. But theſe old ſoldiers of *Hannibal* were freſh, and (perhaps) the better men. They fought with ſuch obſtinate reſolution, that no man gave back one foot, but rather choſe to die upon the ground whereon he ſtood. So that after a long time, it was uncertain which part had the worſe, unleſs it may ſeem that the *Romans* were beginning to ſhrink; foraſmuch as the return of [a] *Maſaniſſa* and *Lælius*, from purſuit of the enemy's horſe, is ſaid to have been *moſt happy*, and in a *needful time*. Theſe upon the ſudden charged the *Hannibalians* in rear, and over-bearing them by mere violence, compelled them to fall to rout.

In this battel there died of the *Romans* fifteen hundred and upwards; on the *Carthaginian* ſide above twenty thouſand, beſides as many that were taken; of whom *Sopater*, captain of the *Macedonians*, was one. The ſingular ſkill that *Hannibal* ſhewed in this his laſt fight, is highly commended by *Polybius*; and was acknowledged, as *Livy* reports, by *Scipio* himſelf. But the enemies were too ſtrong for him in horſe; and being enjoined, as he was, by the ſtate of *Carthage*, to take battel with ſuch diſadvantage, he could work no marvels. He ſaved himſelf, with a few horſe, and ſtaid not in his journey, till he came to *Adrumetum*. Thence was he ſent for to *Carthage*, from which he had been about thirty-ſix years. At his coming into the ſenate, he ſaid plainly, that there was none other way left, than to take ſuch peace as could be gotten. Wherefore the *Carthaginians*, not knowing what other courſe to take, reſolved to ſend ambaſſadors again, and try the favour of *Scipio*, whoſe arms they could not now reſiſt.

Scipio having ſpoiled the enemy's camp, returned back to *Utica*, where he found *P. Lentulus* newly arrived, with fifty gallies, and an hundred ſhips of burden. With this fleet, and that which he had before, he thought it beſt to make towards *Carthage*, rather of purpoſe to terrify the city, than with any hope to take it. His legions he committed unto *Cn. Octavius*, whom he willed to meet him there by land. Then ſending *Lælius* away to *Rome*, with news of the victory, he ſet ſail from *Utica* towards *Carthage*. He was encountered on the way by ten ambaſſadors from the city, who bearing up with the admiral galley, began to uſe the pitiful geſture of ſuppliants. But they received none other anſwer, than that they ſhould meet him at *Tunis*, where he would give them audience. So rowing along before the city, and viewing it more in bravery, than with meaning to attempt it; he returned back to *Utica*, and called back *Octavius* thither, with whom, in perſon, he ſet forwards to *Tunis*. As they were in their journey thither, they heard the news that *Vermina*, the ſon of *Syphax*, was coming with an army of more horſe than foot, to the ſuccour of thoſe that were already vanquiſhed. This *Vermina* ſeems to have been both careleſs of getting intelligence how things paſſed, and very defective in all other duties requiſite in the commander of an army. Part of the *Roman* foot, with all their power of horſe, was ſent againſt him; which did not only beat him, but ſo compaſs him in, that he hardly eſcaped himſelf with a few; leaving fifteen thouſand of his followers dead behind him, and twelve hundred taken priſoners. If this good company had been with *Hannibal* at *Nadagara*, they ſhould have been far better conducted, and might well have changed the fortune of the day, which the *Carthaginian* loſt by default of horſe. But God had otherwiſe determined. It is not to be doubted that this victory, though it were no great acceſs unto the former, yet ſerved well to daunt the *Carthaginians*, and imprint in them the greater fear of *Scipio*. When he came to *Tunis*, there met him thirty ambaſſadors from *Carthage*, whoſe behaviour, though it was more pitiful than it had been before, yet procured it leſs commiſeration, by reaſon of their late falſe dealing, after they had in like ſort humbled themſelves. Nevertheleſs it was conſidered, what a long and laborious work it would prove, to beſiege the mighty city of *Carthage*. And particularly *Scipio* ſtood in great doubt leſt the honour of this war, if it were protracted, ſhould be taken out of his hands, and given to one of the conſuls. *Cn. Servilius Sæpio*, that conſul who had charge of the war againſt *Hannibal*, at ſuch time as he departed out of *Italy*, was bold to paſs over into the iſle of *Sicily* (as it were in chaſe of *Hannibal*, by him terrified and driven away) with a purpoſe thence to have proceeded into *Afric*, and taken from *Scipio* the command of the army there. But a dictator was choſen of purpoſe to reſtrain the ambition of this conſul *Servilius*. After him followed *Tiberius Claudius*, who made ſuit for the ſame province of *Afric*, and was therein ſo earneſt, that though neither the ſenate nor people would grant him his deſire; yet he needs would be going, procuring only leave of the ſenate, that he, being conſul, might join with *Scipio*, were it with no more than equal authority. But ere he could have his fleet, and all things in a readineſs for the journey, wherein no man cared to further him, winter came on, and he was only toſs'd at ſea with foul weather; firſt upon the coaſt of *Hetruria*, and afterwards by *Sardinia*, where his conſulſhip expired; and ſo he returned home a private man. Then came the joyful news to *Rome* of the victory obtained againſt *Hannibal*, and that the war was now even at an end. Yet was *Lentulus*,

[a] Excerpt. è Polyb. l. 15.

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the new conſul, ſo paſſionate in deſiring *Afric* for his province, that he ſaid he would ſuffer nothing to paſs in the ſenate, until he had firſt his will. Much ado there was about this, and after many contentions, both in the ſenate and before the people, at laſt it was ordered, that if peace were granted, it ſhould be granted by *Scipio*; if the war continued, *Scipio* ſhould have command therein by land, and the conſul at ſea. The ambition of theſe men, cauſed *Scipio* to give the more favourable anſwer unto the *Carthaginian* ambaſſadors. He willed them to conſider what they had deſerved, and in regard thereof, to think themſelves well dealt withal, in that he was contented to leave unto them their liberty, and their own laws, without appointing any governor over them, or garriſon to hold them in ſubjection; leaving alſo unto them their poſſeſſions in *Afric*, ſuch as they were at the beginning of this war. As touching the reſt, he was at a point, that, before he either granted them peace or truce, they ſhould make ſatisfaction for wrongs which they had done whilſt the late treaty was in dependance. Hereunto, if they would yield, then required he, *That immediately they ſhould deliver up unto the* Romans *all priſoners, fugitives, and renegadoes, that they had of theirs; likewiſe all their gallies, excepting ten, and all their elephants: That they ſhould make no war at all thenceforth out of* Afric, *neither yet within* Afric, *without licence of the* Romans: *that the countries, towns, goods whatſoever, belonging anywiſe unto* Maſaniſſa, *or to any of his anceſtors, which were in their poſſeſſion, ſhould be all by them reſtored unto him: that they ſhould find corn for the* Roman *army, and wages for their auxiliaries, during the time of truce, until the peace were fully concluded: that they ſhould pay ten thouſand talents of ſilver, in the term of fifty years, by two hundred talents a-year: and that for obſervance of conditions, they ſhould give an hundred hoſtages, ſuch as* Scipio *would chuſe, being none of them under fourteen years of age, nor above thirty.*

With theſe conditions the ambaſſadors returned home, and reported them unto the city. They were very unpleaſing, and therefore one *Giſco* ſtood up to ſpeak againſt them, and exhorted the people, who gave good attention, that they ſhould not condeſcend unto ſuch intolerable demands. But *Hannibal*, perceiving this, and noting withal what favourable audience was given to this vain orator by the unquiet, yet unwarlike multitude, was bold to pull him down from his ſtanding by plain force. Hereat all the people murmured, as if their common liberty were too much wronged by ſuch inſolence of this preſumptuous captain. Which *Hannibal* perceiving, roſe up, and ſpake unto them, ſaying, that they ought to pardon him, if he had done otherwiſe than the cuſtoms of the city would allow; foraſmuch as he had been thence abſent ever ſince he was a boy of nine years old, until he was now a man of forty-five. Having thus excuſed himſelf of the diſorder, he diſcourſed unto them concerning the peace, and perſwaded them to accept it, as wanting ability to defend themſelves, had the demands of the enemy been yet more rigorous. Finally, upon good advice, they reſolved to yield unto the conditions propounded by *Scipio*, to whom they payed out of hand twenty-five thouſand weight of ſilver, in recompence of dangers and injuries by them done to his fleet and ambaſſadors. *Scipio* granted them truce for three months, in which time they might negotiate with the ſtate of *Rome* about confirmation of the league. But herewithal he gave injunction, that they ſhould neither in the mean while ſend ambaſſadors any-where elſe, nor yet diſmiſs any ambaſſadors to them ſent, without firſt making him acquainted what they were, and what their errand was.

At this time *Hanno*, and they of his faction, were become wiſe and honourable men, by the miſeries whereinto *Carthage* was fallen, through their malicious counſels. *Aſdrubal*, ſurnamed *the Kid*, a venerable man, and a great friend of *Hanno*, was chief of the embaſſies which they ſent to *Rome* for obtaining peace. They went thither in company of *Scipio*'s ambaſſadors, who related unto the ſenate and people theſe joyful news. About the ſame time arrived at *Rome* ambaſſadors from *Philip* king of *Macedon*, who, together with the *Carthaginians*, were fain to wait a-while for audience, till the election of new conſuls, then in hand, was finiſhed, and order taken for the provinces of them, and the new pretors. Then were the *Macedonian* ambaſſadors called into the ſenate, who firſt anſwering unto ſome points, wherein the *Romans* had lately ſignified unto their king, that they found themſelves grieved, returned the blame upon thoſe *Greeks* themſelves that had made their complaint at *Rome*. Then accuſed they *M. Aurelius*, who being one of the three ambaſſadors that had lately been ſent from *Rome* unto king *Philip*, tarried in *Greece* behind his fellows; and there levying men, made war upon the king, without any regard at all of the league that was between him and the *Romans*. Further, they deſired of the ſenate, that one *Sopater*, a *Macedonian* gentleman, with other of their countrymen, that had lately ſerved *Hannibal* for pay; and being taken priſoners in *Afric*, were kept in bonds by *Scipio*, might be releaſed, and delivered unto them. Unto all this *M. Furius*, whom *Aurelius* had ſent to *Rome* for that purpoſe, made a ſharp anſwer. He ſaid, that the *Greeks*, which were confederate with *Rome*, endured ſo many injuries at the hands of *Philip*, that *M. Aurelius* was fain to ſtay behind, to help them as he might; which elſe were like to be brought under the king's ſubjection. As for *Sopater*, he affirmed him to be one of the king's council, and very inward with him; one that ſerved not for money, but carried money with him, and four thouſand men, ſent from the king to the aid of *Hannibal*. About theſe points, when the *Macedonian* ambaſſadors could make unto the ſenate no good anſwer, they were willed to return, and tell their maſter, that war he ſought, and war he ſhould find, if he proceeded as he had begun. For in two main points, he had broken the league that was between him and the *Romans*: firſt, in that he had wronged their confederates; and ſecondly, in that he had aided their enemies againſt them with men and money.

Theſe quarrels with *Philip*, that promiſed to open a way into *Greece*, and the eaſtern countries, helped well the *Carthaginian* ambaſſadors in their ſollicitation of peace. They appeared a very reverend company when they entered into the ſenate; and *Aſdrubal*, above the reſt, was much reſpected, as one, whoſe good offices had kept the *Romans* from neceſſity of ſending ambaſſadors to *Carthage* upon the like errand. He liberally granted, that the juſtice of the quarrel had been wholly on the *Roman* ſide, ſaying, that it was the fault of ſome violent men, through which the peace was broken. Yet could he not altogether excuſe the city, that had been too vehement in the proſecution of bad counſel. But if *Hanno* and himſelf might have had their wills, the *Carthaginians*, even at the beſt of their fortune, ſhould have granted the peace which they now deſired. Herewithal he commended the moderation of the *Romans*, as no ſmall argument

argument of their valour, by which always they had been victorious. To the ſame effect ſpake the reſt of the ambaſſadors, all of them entreating to have the peace ratified; though ſome with more lamentable words than others, according to the diverſity of their ſtyle. They had patience enough to endure ſuch reproof of perjury, as they themſelves might have laid upon the *Romans*, if their diligence and fortune had been ſuch as the *Romans* was. Among the reſt, when one of the ſenators demanded by what gods they would ſwear to keep the peace hereafter; *Aſdrubal* made anſwer, *Even by the ſame gods that are ſo ſevere unto thoſe that violate their leagues.*

Lentulus the conſul, interpoſing the authority of his office, would have hindered the ſenate from proceeding unto concluſion of peace; for that hereby he was like to loſe the honour which he purpoſed to get by making war in *Afric*. But the matter was propounded unto the people, in whom reſted the ſoveraign command of *Rome*, and by them referred wholly unto the pleaſure of the ſenate. So it was decreed that *Scipio*, with ten delegates ſent unto him from *Rome* of purpoſe, ſhould make a league with the *Carthaginians*, upon ſuch conditions as ſeemed beſt, which were none other than the ſame which he had already propounded. For this favour, the *Carthaginian* ambaſſadors humbly thanked the ſenate, and craved licence that they might viſit their countrymen which were priſoners in *Rome*; afterwards, that they might ranſom, and carry home with them ſome that were their eſpecial friends, of whom they gave in writing almoſt two hundred names. Whereupon the ſenate ordained that two hundred of thoſe priſoners, which the ambaſſadors would chuſe, ſhould be ſent over into *Afric*, and be freely reſtored to liberty by *Scipio* when the peace was fully concluded. So they took leave, and returned home, in company of the ten delegates that were appointed by the ſenate to join with *Scipio* in commiſſion.

At their coming into *Afric*, the peace was given, and accepted, without any controverſy or diſputation. The priſoners, fugitives, and renegadoes, were delivered up to *Scipio*; likewiſe the gallies and the elephants. *Scipio* took more vengeance upon the renegadoes than upon the fugitives; and upon thoſe of the *Romans* than upon the *Latins*, or other *Italians*. The *Latins* he beheaded, the *Romans* he crucified. About the firſt payment of their money, the *Carthaginians* were ſomewhat troubled: for though perhaps their common treaſury could have ſpared two hundred talents for the preſent, yet ſince the penſion was annual, and to continue fifty years, it was thought meet to lay the burden upon the citizens. At the collection of the ſum there was piteous lamentation, as if now the *Roman* yoke had begun to pinch them; ſo as many, even of the ſenators, could not forbear weeping. Contrariwiſe, *Hannibal* could not refrain from laughter: for which, when he was check'd by *Aſdrubal Hædus*, and told, that it worſt of all beſeemed him to laugh, ſince he had been the cauſe why all others did weep; he anſwered, *That laughter did not always proceed from joy; but ſometimes from extremity of indignation. Yet*, ſaid he, *my laughter is more ſeaſonable, and leſs abſurd, than your tears. For ye ſhould have wept when ye gave up your ſhips and elephants, and when ye bound your own hands from the uſe of arms, without the good leave of the* Romans *firſt obtained. This miſerable condition keeps us under, and holds us in aſſured ſervitude: but of theſe matters ye had no feeling. Now, when a little money is wrung out of your private purſes, ye have thereof ſome ſenſe. God grant that the time come not hereafter, wherein ye ſhall acknowledge, that it was the very leaſt part of your miſery for which ye have ſhed theſe tears.* Thus diſcourſed *Hannibal* to thoſe, who, taſting the bitter fruits of their own malicious counſel, repented when it was too late; and, inſtead of curſing their own diſorders, which had bred this grievous diſeaſe, accuſed that phyſician, whoſe noble endeavours had been employed in procuring the remedy.

Scipio, being to take leave of *Afric*, produced *Maſaniſſa*, and magnified him in preſence of the army with high commendations, not undeſervedly. To him alſo he conſigned over thoſe towns of king *Syphax*, which the *Romans* at that preſent held; wherein, to ſay truth, he gave him but his due, and that which otherwiſe he knew not well how to beſtow. But the love of the *Romans* and friendſhip of *Scipio*, was fully anſwerable now, and hereafter, to all the deſervings of this *Numidian* king. About *Carthage* there reſted no more to be done. Wherefore the *Romans* embarked themſelves for *Sicily*, where, when they arrived at *Lilybæum*, *Scipio*, with ſome part of his army, took his way home to *Rome* by land, and ſent the reſt before him thither by ſea. His journey through *Italy* was no leſs glorious than any triumph, all the people thronging out of the towns and villages to do him honour as he paſſed along. He entered the city in triumph: neither was there ever before or after any triumph celebrated with ſo great joy of the people, as was this of *Scipio*; though, in bravery of the pomp, there were others in time ſhortly following that exceeded this. Whether *Syphax* were carried through the city in this triumph, and died ſoon after in priſon; or whether he were dead a-while before, it cannot be affirmed. Thus much may be avowed, that it was a barbarous cuſtom of the *Romans* to inſult over the calamities of mighty princes, by leading them contumeliouſly in triumph, yea, though they were ſuch as had always made fair and courteous war. But hereof we ſhall have better example, ere the ſame age paſs. It was neither the perſon of *Syphax*, nor any other glory of the ſpectacle, that ſo much beautified the triumph of *Scipio*, as did the contemplation of that grievous war paſs'd, whereof the *Romans* had been in a manner *without hope that ever they ſhould ſet* Italy *free*[a]. This made them look chearfully upon the author of ſo great a converſion, and filled them with more joy than they well could moderate. Wherefore they gave to *Scipio* the title of the *African*, ſtyling him by the name of that province, which he had ſubdued. This honourable kind of ſurname, taken from a conquered province, grew afterwards more common, and was uſurped by men of leſs deſert, eſpecially by many of the *Ceſars*, who ſometimes arrogated unto themſelves the title of countries, wherein they had performed little or nothing; as if ſuch glorious attributes could have made them like in virtue unto *Scipio the African.*

[a] Excerpt. è Polyb. l. 16.

CHAP. IV.

Of Philip *the father of* Perſeus, *king of* Macedon; *his firſt acts, and war with the* Romans, *by whom he was ſubdued.*

SECT. I.

How the Romans *grew acquainted in the* Eaſt *countries, and deſirous of war there. The beginning of many princes, with great wars, at one time. The* Etolians *over-run* Peloponneſus. Philip, *and his Aſſociates, make war againſt the* Etolians. *Alteration of the ſtate in* Sparta. *The* Etolians *invade* Greece *and* Macedon, *and are invaded at home by* Philip.

OF the great ſimilitude found in worldly events, the limitation of [a] *matter* hath been aſſigned as a probable cauſe. For ſince nature is confined unto a ſubject that is not unbounded; the works of nature muſt needs be finite, and many of them reſemble one the other. Now in thoſe actions, that ſeem to have their whole dependance upon the will of man, we are leſs to wonder, if we find leſs variety: ſince it is no great portion of things which is obnoxious unto human power; and ſince they are the ſame affections, by which the wills of ſundry men are over-ruled, in managing the affairs of our daily life. It may be obſerved in the change of empires, before thoſe times whereof we now write, how the *Aſſyrians* or *Chaldeans* invaded the kingdom of the *Medes*, with two hundred thouſand foot, and threeſcore thouſand horſe: but failing in their intended conqueſt, they became ſubject within a while themſelves unto the *Medes* and *Perſians*. In like manner *Darius*, and after him *Xerxes*, fell upon the *Greeks*, with ſuch numbers of men, as might have ſeemed reſiſtleſs. But after that the *Perſians* were beaten home, their empire was never ſecure of the *Greeks:* who at all times of leiſure from inteſtine war deviſed upon that conqueſt thereof, which finally they made under the great *Alexander*. If *Nabuchadonoſor*, with his rough old ſoldiers, had undertaken the *Medes:* or *Cyrus*, with his well-trained army, had made the attempt upon *Greece*; the iſſue might, in human reaſon, have been far different. Yet would it then have been expedient for them, to employ the travel and virtue of their men, rather than the greatneſs of their names, againſt thoſe people; that were no leſs valiant, though leſs renowned, than their own. For the menacing words uſed by *Cyrus*, and ſome ſmall diſpleaſures done to the *Greeks* (in which kind it may be, that *Nabuchodonoſor* likewiſe offended the *Medes* and *Perſians*) were not ſo available to victory, as to draw on revenge in the future. Great kingdoms, when they decay in ſtrength, ſuffer, as did the old lion, for the oppreſſion done in his youth; being pinched by the wolf, gored by the bull; yea, and kick'd by the aſs. But princes are often carried away from reaſon, by miſunderſtanding the language of fame: and deſpiſing the virtue, that makes little noiſe, adventure to provoke it againſt themſelves; as if it were not poſſible that their own glory ſhould be foil'd by any of leſs noted excellence. Againſt the ſame ſtone, whereat *Xerxes*, and before him (as I take it) *Evil-merodach*, had ſtumbled; *Pyrrhus*, the *Epirot*, had daſh'd his foot. He was not indeed the king of all *Greece*; though moſt of mark, and a better ſoldier than any other *Greekiſh* king, when he entred into war againſt the *Romans*. This war he undertook, as it were, for his mind's ſake: having received no injury; but hoping by the glory of his name, and of the *Greeks* that ſerved under him, to prevail ſo eaſily againſt the barbarous *Romans*, that they ſhould only ſerve as a ſtep to his further intended conqueſts, of *Sicily* and *Afric*. But when the *Romans*, by their victory againſt *Pyrrhus*, had found their own virtue to be of richer metal, than was the more ſhining valour of the *Greeks:* then did all the bravery of the *Epirot* (his elephants, and whatſoever elſe had ſerved to make him terrible) ſerve only to make the *Romans*, in time following, to think more highly of themſelves. [b] For ſince they had overcome the beſt warrior in *Greece*; even him, that, being thus beaten by them, could in a year after make himſelf lord of *Greece* and *Macedon:* what ſhould hinder them from the conqueſt of all thoſe unwarlike provinces, which in compaſs of twelve years a *Macedonian* king of late memory had won? Certainly there was hereunto requiſite no more, than to bring to their own devotion, by ſome good means, the whole country of *Greece:* all the reſt, this done, would follow of it ſelf. How to deal with the *Greeks*, *Philip* and *Alexander* had ſhewed a way: which, or perhaps a better, they might learn, by getting more acquaintance with the nation.

When therefore the firſt *Punic* war was ended, which followed ſoon after the wars of *Pyrrhus*, and of the *Tarentines:* then were the *Romans* at good leiſure to hearken after news in *Greece*; and to entertain any good occaſion, that ſhould be on that ſide preſented. They had alſo then a ſtrong fleet: and were become, though not otherwiſe very ſkilful mariners, yet good fighters at ſea. So it fell out as happily as could be wiſhed, that the *Illyrian* queen *Teuta* made at the ſame time cruel war upon the *Greeks:* waſting their country, and ſacking their towns, only becauſe they were unable to reſiſt, though they had done her none offence. Into this quarrel, if the *Romans* were deſirous to enter, the queen was not ſlow to give them [c] cauſe. And their happy accompliſhing of that war which they made with *her*, was, in their own opinion, a matter not unworthy to make their patronage to be deſired by the *Greeks*. But no ſuch thing happened: though they ſent ambaſſadors, as it were, to offer themſelves; by ſignifying, that for the love of *Greece* they had undertaken this *Illyrian* war. Thus began the firſt acquaintance betwixt the *Greeks* and *Romans:* which afterwards increaſed very haſtily, through the indiſcretion of king *Philip* the *Macedonian*; whoſe buſineſs with

a Plut. in vita Sertorii.

b *The king of* Spain's *pretended invincible navy, being beaten out of the* Britiſh *ſeas, invited us to thoſe of* Spain: *and having broken the greateſt fleet that ever the* Spaniards *gathered together, we never made account of any of his preparations after that time.*

c Lib. 5. ch. 2. §. 7.

them

them being now the ſubject of our ſtory, it is meet that we ſhould relate (though ſomewhat briefly) the beginning of his reign, and his firſt actions.

It was like to prove a buſy time in the world, when, within the ſpace of four years, new kings began to reign in moſt of all the countries known; and three of them young boys, in three of the greateſt kingdoms. This happened from the third year of the hundred thirty ninth *Olympiad*, unto the third of the *Olympiad* following. For in this time died *Seleucus Ceraunus* king of *Aſia* and *Syria*, in whoſe room ſucceeded his brother *Antiochus*, afterwards call *the Great*. *Ptolemy Philopator* ſucceeded in the kingdom of *Egypt* unto his father *Euergetes*. And *Philip*, the ſon of *Demetrius*, being ſixteen or ſeventeen years old, received the kingdom of *Macedon*, together with the patronage of the *Acheans* and moſt of the *Greeks*; by the deceaſe of his uncle *Antigonus Doſon*, that was called the *Tutor* or *Protector*. About the ſame time alſo was the like change in *Cappadocia*, *Lacedemon*, and the countries about mount *Taurus*. For *Ariarathes* then began his reign in *Cappadocia*. *Lycurgus* found means to make himſelf king over the *Lacedemonians*, whoſe common-weal, ſince the flight of *Cleomenes*, had continued in a manner headleſs; and *Achæus*, a kinſman of *Antiochus*, but a rebel unto him, occupied the regions near unto mount *Taurus*, and kept a while the ſtate of a mighty king. Laſtly, in the ſecond and third years of the hundred and fortieth *Olympiad* it was, that open war brake out between *Rome* and *Carthage*; and that *Hannibal* began his great invaſion upon *Italy*. Thoſe troubles of the weſtern world, which were indeed the greateſt, we have already followed unto an end: of *Antiochus*, *Ptolemy*, and the reſt, we ſhall ſpeak hereafter, when the *Romans* find them out.

Philip, ſoon after the beginning of his reign, came into *Peloponneſus*; greatly deſired of the *Acheans*, and many others his dependants. That country, having freed it ſelf by the help of *Antigonus* from the danger (accounted great) of an eaſy ſubjection unto *Cleomenes*; was now become no leſs obnoxious to the *Macedonian*, than it ſhould have been to the *Spartan*; and therewithal it lay open unto the violence of the *Etolians*, who deſpiſed even the *Macedonian* kings, that were patrons thereof. The *Etolians* were no men to be idle; nor were much addicted to any other art, than war. Therefore wanting employment, they fell upon the *Meſſenians* that were their own clients, and (excepting the *Eleans*, that were anciently of their conſanguinity) the only good friends which they had at the preſent in *Peloponneſus*. Their invaſion was no leſs unexpected, than it was unjuſt: whereby with greater eaſe they made ſpoil of the country; finding none prepared to make reſiſtance. The *Acheans* were called by the *Meſſenians* to help: which they did the more willingly; becauſe the *Etolians*, paſſing without leave through their territory, had (as was their manner) done what harm they liſted. Old *Aratus* could ill abide theſe *Etolians*; as both knowing well their nature, and remembring the injuries, wherewith moſt ungratefully they had requited no ſmall benefits done to them by the *Acheans*. He was therefore ſo haſty to fall upon this their army, that he could hardly endure to ſtay a few days until the time of his own office came; being choſen pretor of the *Acheans* for the year following. [a] But his anger was greater than his courage: and he ſhewed himſelf a man fitter (as hath been already noted of him) for any other ſervice, than leading of an army. He ſuffered them to paſs quietly along with their booty, through a part of the country, wherein he might eaſily have diſtreſſed them; and afterwards preſſed them ſo near, when they had recovered ground of advantage, that they eaſily defeated all his army. So they departed home rich, and well animated to return again. As for the *Acheans*; they got hereby only the friendſhip of the *Meſſenians*: with whom, by licence of king *Philip*, they made confederacy. Shortly after, the *Etolians* invaded *Peloponneſus* again; having no more to do, than to paſs over the narrow ſtreights of the *Corinthian* bay, called now the gulph of *Lepanto*, where they might land in the country of the *Eleans*. There joined with them in this their ſecond invaſion a great number of the *Illyrians*: who neglecting that condition impoſed upon them by the *Romans*, of ſetting out no ſhips of war unto the coaſt of *Greece*; made bold to ſeek adventures again, and did great miſchief. [b] *Demetrius Pharius*, a creature of the *Romans*, commanded a part of theſe *Illyrians*: who ſhortly repented him of this his voyage; which cauſed him to loſe his kingdom, as is ſhewed before. But this *Demetrius* went another way, and fell upon the iſlands of the *Cyclades* in the *Egean* ſea: whence returning, he did ſome good offices for king *Philip* or his friends. The reſt of the *Illyrians* under *Scerdilaidas*, or *Scerdiletus*, having gotten what they could elſewhere by roving at ſea, accompanied the *Etolians* into *Peloponneſus*: who made greater havock in the country now, than in their former expedition; and returned home without finding any reſiſtance.

Of theſe things great complaint was made unto *Philip*, when he came to *Corinth*. And becauſe men were deſirous to ſatisfy themſelves with ſome ſpeedy revenge: there were that urged to have ſome grievous puniſhment laid upon the *Lacedemonians*: who were thought under-hand to have favoured the *Etolians*, in meer deſpight of the *Acheans* and *Macedonians*, by whom themſelves had lately been ſubdued. It is true, that the *Lacedemonians* had been ſo affected: and (which was worſe) at the arrival of *Philip*, they ſlew ſuch friends of his, as having checked their inclination, ſeemed likely to impeach them of the intended rebellion. Neither durſt they well commit themſelves to judgment: but entreated the king, that he would abſtain from coming to them with an army: ſince their town was lately much diſquieted with civil diſcord, which they hoped ſoon to appeaſe, and meant always to remain at his devotion. *Philip* was eaſily ſatisfied with this: not for that he (or rather old *Aratus*, who then wholly governed him) did miſunderſtand the *Lacedemonians*: but for that a greater work was in hand, which ought not to be interrupted. There met at *Corinth*, in preſence of the king, the ambaſſadors of the *Acheans*, *Beotians*, *Epirots*, and *Acarnanians*: all complaining upon the *Etolians*: and deſiring to have war decreed againſt them, by common aſſent. *Philip* ſent his letters unto the *Etolians*: requiring them to make ready their anſwer in ſome convenient time; if they could alledge any thing in excuſe of that which they had done. They returned word, that a diet ſhould be holden at *Rhium* for that purpoſe: whither if it pleaſed him to come or ſend, he ſhould be well informed of them and their whole meaning. The king prepared to have been there at the day. But when the *Etolians* under-

[a] Lib. 5. ch. 2. §. 6. ibid.

[b] Chap. 3. §. 1.

ſtood

ſtood this for certainty, they adjourned the council unto a further time: ſaying, That ſuch weighty matters ought not to be handled, ſave in the great parliament of all *Ætolia*. This trick of law notwithſtanding, open war was proclaimed againſt them. And they, as it were, to ſhew how well they had deſerved it, made election of *Scopas* to be their pretor, that was author of theſe invaſions made on *Peloponneſus*; and the only man, in a ſort, upon whom they muſt have lay'd the blame of theſe actions, if they would have ſhifted it from the publick.

After this, *Philip* went into *Macedon*; where he prepared buſily for the war againſt the year following. He alſo aſſayed the *Illyrian*, *Scerdilaidas*, with fair words and promiſes: whom he eaſily won from the *Etolian* ſide, foraſmuch as the *Etolians* had couzened him of his ſhare, when he was partner with them in their late robberies. In like ſort the *Acheans*, who had firſt of all others proclaimed the war in their own country, ſent unto the *Acarnanians*, *Epirots*, *Meſſenians*, and *Lacedemonians*: requeſting them forthwith to declare themſelves, and to denounce war unto the *Etolians*; without ſtaying (as it were) to await the event. Hereunto they received divers anſwers, according to the qualities of thoſe with whom they dealt. The *Acarnanians*, a free-hearted and valiant, though a ſmall nation, and bordering upon the *Etolians*, of whom they ſtood in continual danger; ſaid, That they could not honeſtly refuſe to ſhew their faithful meaning in that war, which was concluded by general aſſent. The *Epirots*, that were more mighty, were nevertheleſs more cunning and reſerved: ſo that they ſtood upon a needleſs point; and deſired to be held excuſed, until *Philip* (of whoſe meaning they needed not to have made any doubt) ſhould firſt proclaim the war. The *Meſſenians*, for whoſe cauſe the war was undertaken, excuſed themſelves, by reaſon of a town which the *Etolians* held upon their borders; and ſaid, that they durſt not be over-bold, until that bridle were taken out of their mouths. As for the *Lacedemonians*; the chief of them ſtudied only how to manage the treaſon, for which their city had been ſo ſo lately pardoned: and therefore diſmiſſed the ambaſſadors of the confederates without any anſwer at all. They had three years together continued ſubject againſt their wills to the *Macedonians*, expecting ſtill when *Cleomenes* ſhould return out of *Egypt* to reign over them again; and maintain, as he was wont, the honour of their city. In this regard they choſe not any kings; but were contented with the rule of *Ephori*. Of theſe there were ſome, that thought the publick ſafety to conſiſt, in holding their faith with the *Macedonian* that had preſerved them: And hereto they referred all their councils; being perhaps a little moved with reſpect of the benefit, which might redound unto themſelves, by adhering firmly to thoſe which at the preſent bore rule over them. Others, and thoſe the greater part, were ſtill deviſing, how to make all ready for *Cleomenes* againſt his return; and therefore ſought to join with the *Etolians*, which were the moſt likely to give him ſtrong aſſiſtance. The *Macedonian* faction had the more authority, and durſt more freely ſpeak their minds: but the contrary ſide was the more paſſionate; and ſpared not by murders, or any other violent courſes, to ſet forward their deſire. Neither did it ſuffice, that about theſe times there came certain report of *Cleomenes*'s death. For it was the liberty and honour of *Sparta*, which theſe intended: fancying unto themſelves the glory of their anceſtors in ſuch ages paſt, as were not like to come again. *Cleomenes* was, they knew, the moſt able man to reſtore them unto their greatneſs and luſtre; which once he had in a manner performed: But ſince he was dead, and that, without injury to his well deſerving virtue, they might proceed to the election of new kings: kings they would have, and thoſe of the race of *Hercules*, as in former times; for that without ſuch helps, they muſt continue little better than ſubjects unto the *Macedonian*, and far leſs by him reſpected, than were the *Acheans*. Thus were they tranſported, by contemplation of their own nobility and fame. Some of the moſt working ſpirits among them, procured the *Etolians* to ſend an ambaſſy to *Sparta*: which propounded the matter openly unto the people; whereof no one of the citizens durſt have made himſelf the author. Much diſputation and hot there was, between thoſe of the *Macedonian* party and theſe their oppoſites: in ſuch wiſe, that nothing could be concluded; until by maſſacre or baniſhment of all, or the chief, that ſpake againſt the *Etolians*, the diverſity of opinion was taken quite away. Then forthwith a league was concluded between the *Lacedemonians* and the *Etolians*: without all regard of the *Macedonians* or *Acheans*; who had ſpared the city, when they might have deſtroyed it. Then alſo they went in hand with the election of new kings: wherein their diligence was ſo nice, and ſo regardful of their ancient laws, as touching the chooſing of the one king; that we may juſtly wonder, how they grew ſo careleſs in making choice of the other. In the one of their royal families they found *Ageſipolis* the ſon of *Ageſipolis* the ſon of king *Cleombrotus*: and him they admitted to reign over them, as heir apparent to his grandfather. This *Ageſipolis* was a young boy, ſtanding in need of a guardian, and had an uncle, his father's brother, that was fit for the government. Yet becauſe the law required, that the ſon, how young ſoever, ſhould have his father's whole right and title: the *Lacedemonians*, though ſtanding in need of a man, were ſo punctual in obſervation of the law; that they made this child their King, and appointed his uncle *Cleomenes* to be his protector. But in the other branch of the royal family, though there was no want of heirs: yet would not the people trouble themſelves about any of them, to examine the goodneſs of his claim; but made election of one *Lycurgus*, who having no manner of title to the kingdom, beſtowed upon each of the *Ephori* a talent, and thereby made himſelf be ſaluted king of *Sparta*, and a gentleman of the race of *Hercules*. This *Lycurgus*, to gratify his partiſans, and to approve his worth by action, invaded the country of the *Argives*: which lay open and unguarded, as in a time of peace. There he did great ſpoil, and won divers towns; whereof two he retained, and annexed unto the ſtate of *Lacedemon*. After ſuch open hoſtility, the *Lacedemonians* declared themſelves on the *Etolian* ſide; and proclaimed war againſt the *Acheans*.

Thus the beginnings of the war fell out much otherwiſe, than the *Acheans* and their confederates had expected, when they firſt made preparation. *Philip* was not ready: the *Epirots* gave uncertain anſwer: the *Meſſenians* would not ſtir: all the burden muſt lie upon themſelves and the poor *Acarnanians*, whom the *Etolians*, by favour of the *Eleans*, could invade at pleaſure, as they were like to do; and by help of the *Lacedemonians*, could aſſail on all parts at once. It was not long ere the *Etolians*, paſſing over the bay of *Corinth*, ſurpriſed the town of *Ægira*: which if they could

could have held, they ſhould thereby grievouſly have moleſted the *Acheans*; for that it ſtood in the mid-way between *Ægium* and *Sicyon* two of their principal cities, and gave open way into the heart of all their country. But as *Ægira* was taken by ſurpriſe: ſo was it preſently loſt again, through greedineſs of ſpoil; whilſt they that ſhould have made it their firſt care to aſſure the place unto themſelves, by occupying the citadel and other pieces of ſtrength, fell heedleſly to ranſack private houſes, and thereby gave the citizens leave to make head, by whom they were driven with great ſlaughter back unto their fleet. About the ſame time, another *Etolian* army landing among the *Eleans*, fell upon the weſtern coaſt of *Achaia*; waſting all the territory of the *Dymeans* and other people, that were firſt beginners of the *Achean* confederacy. The *Dymeans* and their neighbours made head againſt theſe invaders; but were ſo well beaten, that the enemy grew bolder with them than before. They ſent for help unto their pretor, and to all the towns of their ſociety. In vain. For the *Acheans*, having lately been much weakened by *Cleomenes*, were now able to do little of themſelves: neither could they get any ſtrength of mercenaries; foraſmuch as at the end of *Cleomenes*'s war, they had covetouſly withheld part of their due from thoſe that ſerved them therein. So through this diſability of the *Acheans*, and inſufficiency of their pretor; the *Dymeans*, with others, were driven to with-hold their contribution heretofore made for the publick ſervice, and to convert the money to their own defence. *Lycurgus* alſo with his *Lacedemonians*, began to win upon the *Arcadians*; that were confederate with *Philip* and the *Acheans*.

Philip came to the borders of the *Etolians*, whilſt their army was thus employed afar off in *Peloponneſus*. The *Epirots* joined all their forces with him: and, by ſuch their willing readineſs, drew him to the ſiege of a frontier piece; which they deſired to get into their own hands; for that, by commodity thereof, they hoped ſhortly to make themſelves maſters of *Ambracia*. There he ſpent forty days, ere he could end the buſineſs; which tended only to the benefit of the *Epirots*. Had he entred into the heart of *Etolia* at his firſt coming; it was thought that he might have had an end of the war. But it happens oft, that the violence of great armies is broken upon ſmall towns and forts: and not ſeldom, that the importunity of aſſociates, to have their own deſires fulfilled, converts the preparations of great kings to thoſe uſes for which they never were intended; thereby hindering the proſecution of their main deſigns. Thus was our king *Henry* the eighth led aſide, and quite out of his way, by *Maximilian* the emperor, to the ſiege of *Tournay*: at ſuch time as the *French* King *Lewis* the twelfth, hearing that the ſtrong city of *Terwin* were loſt, and that of his cavalry, wherein reſted his chief confidence, two thouſand were beaten by the earl of *Eſſex* with ſeven hundred *Engliſh*; was thinking to withdraw himſelf into *Britain*, in fear that *Henry* would have come to *Paris*.

The ſtay that *Philip* made at *Ambracus*, did wondrouſly embolden the *Etolians*: in ſuch ſort, as their pretor *Scopas* adventured to lead all their forces out of the country; and therewith not only to over-run *Theſſaly*, but to make impreſſion into *Macedon*. He ran as far as to *Dium*, a city of *Macedon* upon the *Egean* ſea: which, being forſaken by the inhabitants at his coming, he took, and razed to the ground. He ſpared neither temple, nor any other of the goodly buildings therein, but overturned all: and among the reſt, he threw down the ſtatues that were there erected, of the *Macedonian* kings. For this he was highly honoured by his countrymen at his return; foraſmuch as thereby they thought their nation to be grown terrible, not only (as before) unto *Peloponneſus*, but even to *Macedon* it ſelf. But this their pride was ſoon abated; and they rewarded ſhortly at home in their own country, for their pains taken at *Dium*. *Philip*, having diſpatched his work at *Ambracus*, made a ſtrong invaſion upon *Etolia*. He took *Phoetiæ*, *Metropolis*, *Oeniade*, *Pæanium*, *Elæus*, and divers other towns and caſtles of theirs: of which he burnt ſome, and fortified others. He alſo beat the *Etolians* in ſundry ſkirmiſhes; and waſted all the country over, without receiving any harm. This done, while he was about to make a cut over the ſtreights into *Peloponneſus*, and to do the like ſpoil in the country of the *Eleans*, whereto he was vehemently ſollicited by the *Achean* ambaſſadors: news came out of *Macedon*, that the *Dardanians* were ready with a great army to fall upon the country. Theſe *Dardanians* were a barbarous people, divided by mount *Hæmus* from the northern part of *Macedon*; and were accuſtomed to ſeek booty in that wealthy kingdom, when they found their own times. Having therefore intelligence, that *Philip* was about to make a journey into *Peloponneſus*; they propoſed in his abſence, which they thought would be long, to get what they could for themſelves in his country; as had been their manner upon the like advantages. This made the king to diſmiſs the *Achean* ambaſſadors (whom he ſhould have accompanied home with his army) and to bid them have patience until another year. So he took his way home: and, as he was paſſing out of *Acarnania* into *Epirus*, there came to him *Demetrius Pharius* with no more than one ſhip, that was newly chaſed out of his kingdom by the *Romans*. This *Demetrius* had lately ſhewed himſelf a friend to *Antigonus Doſon*, in the wars of *Cleomenes*: and returning in his laſt voyage from the *Cyclades*, was ready, at their firſt requeſt, to take part with *Philip*'s captains. Theſe, or the like conſiderations, made him welcome unto the *Macedonian* king: whoſe counſellor he was ever after. The *Dardanians* hearing of the king's return, brake up their army; and gave over for the preſent their invaſion of *Macedon*, towards which they were already on their way.

All that ſummer following the king reſted at *Lariſſa* in *Theſſaly*, whilſt his people gathered in their harveſt. But the *Etolians* reſted not. They avenged themſelves upon the *Epirots*: whom for the harms by them and *Philip* done in *Etolia*, they requited with all extremities of war; among which, the moſt notable was the ruin of the moſt famous temple of *Dodona*. When winter grew on, and all thought of war until another year was laid aſide: *Philip* ſtole a journey into *Peloponneſus*, with five thouſand foot, and about four hundred horſe. As ſoon as he was within *Corinth*, he commanded the gates to be ſhut, that no word might be carried forth of his arrival. He ſent privily for old *Aratus* to come thither unto him: with whom he took order, when, and in what places, he would have the *Achean* ſoldiers ready ro meet him. The enemies were then abroad in the country, with ſomewhat more than two thouſand foot and an hundred horſe; little thinking to meet with ſuch oppoſition. Indeed they had little cauſe to fear: ſince the *Acheans* themſelves were not aware that the king was in their land with his *Macedonians*; until they heard, that theſe two thouſand *Eleans*, *Etolians*,

Etolians, and their fellows, were by him ſurpriſed, and all made priſoners, or ſlain. By this exploit which he did at his firſt coming, *Philip* got very much reputation: and likewiſe he purchaſed both reputation and love, by divers actions immediately following. He won *Pſophis*, an exceeding ſtrong town, in the borders of *Arcadia*; which the *Eleans* and *Etolians* then held. He won it by aſſault at his firſt coming: wherein it much availed him, that the enemy, not believing that he would undertake ſuch a piece of work at ſuch an unſeaſonable time of the year, was careleſs of providing even ſuch ſtore of weapons, as might have ſerved to defend it. The town was preſerved by the king from ſack; and given to the *Acheans* of his own mere motion, before they requeſted it. Thence went he to *Laſion*, which yielded for very fear; hearing how eaſily he had taken *Pſophis*. This town alſo he gave to the *Acheans*. The like liberality he uſed towards others; that had ancient title unto places by him recovered. Then fell he upon the country of *Elis*, where was much wealth to be gotten: for that the people were addicted to huſbandry, and lived abroad in villages; even ſuch as were of the wealthier ſort among them. So he came to the city of *Olympia*: where having done ſacrifice to *Jupiter*, feaſted his captains, and refreſhed his army three days; he proceeded on the ſpoil of thoſe that had taken pleaſure to ſhare with the *Etolians*, in the ſpoils of their otherwiſe deſerving neighbours. Great abundance of cattel he took, with great numbers of ſlaves, and much wealth of all ſorts: ſuch as could be found in rich villages. Then fell he in hand with the towns whereinto a great multitude of the country people were fled. Some of theſe were taken at the firſt aſſault. Some yielded for fear. Some prevented the labour of his journey, by ſending ambaſſadors to yield before he came. And ſome that were held with garriſons againſt their wills, took courage to ſet themſelves at liberty, by ſeeing the king ſo near; to whoſe patronage thenceforth they betook themſelves. And many places were ſpoiled by the *Etolian* captains; becauſe they diſtruſted their ability to hold them. So the king won more towns in the country, than the ſharpneſs of winter would ſuffer him to ſtay there days. Fain he would have fought with the *Etolians*: but they made ſuch haſte from him, that he could not overtake them, until they had covered themſelves within the town of *Samicum*; where they thought to have been ſafe. But *Philip* aſſaulted them therein ſo forcibly, that he made them glad to yield the place; obtaining licence to depart, with their lives and arms. Having performed ſo much in this expedition, the king repoſed himſelf a while in *Megalopolis*; and then removed to *Argos*, where he ſpent all the reſt of the winter.

Before the king's arrival in *Peloponneſus*, the *Lacedemonians* with *Lycurgus* their new king, had gotten ſomewhat in *Arcadia*; and threatned to do great matters. But when they were admoniſhed, by the calamity that fell upon the *Eleans*, of the danger hanging over their own heads; they quitted their winnings, and withdrew themſelves home. This *Lycurgus*, as he had no other right to the kingdom of *Sparta*, than that which he could buy with money: ſo was he neither free from danger of conſpiracies made againſt him; nor from thoſe jealouſies, with which uſurpers are commonly perplexed. There was one *Chilon*, of the royal blood, that thinking himſelf to have beſt right unto the kingdom, purpoſed to make way thereunto, by maſſacre of his oppoſites: and afterwards to confirm himſelf, by propounding unto the multitude ſuch reformation of the ſtate as was moſt popular: namely, by making an equal diſtribution of all the lands among the whole number of the citizens, according to the ancient inſtitution of that commonwealth. He won to his party ſome two hundred men; with whom he fell upon the *Ephori* as they were together at ſupper, and ſlew them all. Then went he to *Lycurgus*'s houſe: who perceiving the danger, ſtole away and fled. It remained that he ſhould give account of theſe doings to the people, and procure them to take part with him. But their minds being not hereto prediſpoſed; they ſo little regarded his goodly offers, as even whilſt he was uſing his beſt perſwaſions, they were conſulting how to apprehend him. *Chilon* perceived whereabout they went, and ſhifted preſently away. So he lived afterwards among the *Acheans* a baniſhed man, and hated of his own people. As for *Lycurgus*, he returned home: and ſuſpecting thenceforth all thoſe of *Hercules*'s race, found means to drive out his fellow-king young *Ageſipolis*; whereby he made himſelf lord alone. His doings grew to be ſuſpected, in ſuch ſort as once he ſhould have been apprehended by the *Ephori*: But though his actions hitherto might have been defended; yet rather than to adventure himſelf into judgment, he choſe to fly for a time, and ſojourn among his friends the *Etolians*. His well known vehemency in oppoſition to the *Macedonians*, had procured unto him ſuch good liking among the people, that in his abſence they began to conſider the weakneſs of their own ſurmiſes againſt him; and pronouncing him innocent, recalled him home to his eſtate. But in time following, he took better heed unto himſelf: not by amending his condition (for he grew a tyrant, and was ſo acknowledged) but by taking order, that it ſhould not be in the power of the citizens to expel him when they liſted. By what actions he got the name of a tyrant: or at what time it was, that he chaced *Ageſipolis* out of the city; I do not certainly find. Like enough it is, that his being the firſt of three uſurpers, which followed in order one after another, made him to be placed in the rank of tyrants; which the laſt of the three very juſtly deſerved. Whatſoever he was towards ſome private citizens: in the war againſt *Philip*, he behaved himſelf as a provident man, and careful of his country's good.

SECT. II.

How Philip *was miſadviſed by ill counſellors: who afterwards wrought treaſon againſt him, and were juſtly puniſhed. He invadeth the* Etolians *a ſecond time: and forceth them to ſue for peace: which is granted unto them.*

WHILST the king lay at *Argos*, deviſing upon his buſineſs for the year following; ſome ambitious men that were about him ſtudied ſo diligently for their own greatneſs, as they were like to have ſpoiled all that he took in hand. *Antigonus Doſon* had left unto *Philip* ſuch counſellors, as to him did ſeem the fitteſt men for governing of his youth. The chief of theſe was *Apelles*; that had the charge of his perſon, and alſo the ordering of his treaſures. This man ſeeming to himſelf a great politician, thought that he ſhould do a notable piece of ſervice to his prince; if he could reduce the *Acheans* unto the ſame degree of ſubjection, wherein the *Macedonians* lived. To bring this to paſs; during the late expedition he had cauſed ſome of the *Macedonians* to thruſt the *Acheans* out of their lodgings,

lodgings, and to ſtrip them of the booty that they had gotten. Proceeding further, as occaſion fell out, he was bold to chaſtiſe ſome of that nation, cauſing his miniſters to take and whip them. If any of them offered (as there were ſome of them that could not refrain) to help their fellows; them he laid by the heels, and puniſhed as mutineers. Hereby he thought to bring it to paſs by little and little, that they ſhould be qualified with an habit of blind obedience, and think nothing unjuſt that pleaſed the king. But theſe *Acheans* were tenderly ſenſible in matter of liberty, whereof if they could have been contented to ſuffer any little diminution, they needed not have troubled the *Macedonians* to help them in the war againſt *Cleomenes:* they bemoaned themſelves unto old *Aratus*, and beſought him to think upon ſome good order, that they might not be oppreſſed by degrees. *Aratus* forthwith dealt earneſtly with the king, as in a matter more weighty than at firſt it might ſeem. The king beſtowed gracious words upon thoſe that had been wronged, and forbade *Apelles* to follow the courſe begun. Hereat *Apelles* was inwardly vexed, though he diſſembled his choler for a time. He thought ſo well of his own project, that he could not endure to lay it aſide; being perhaps unable to do the king any valuable ſervice in buſineſs of other nature. He purpoſed therefore hereafter to begin at the head, ſince, in biting at the tail, the fiſh had ſhot away from his mouth. It could not otherwiſe be, than that among the *Acheans* there were ſome who bore no hearty affection to *Aratus*. Theſe he enquired out, and, ſending for them, entertained them with words of court; promiſing to become their eſpecial friend, and commend them unto the king. Then brake he his purpoſe with the king himſelf, letting him know, that as long as he continued to make much of *Aratus*, he muſt be fain to deal preciſely with the *Acheans*, and, as it were, by indenture, according to the letter of the contract; whereas if he would be pleaſed to give countenance unto thoſe others whom he himſelf commended, then ſhould the *Acheans*, and all other *Peloponneſians*, be quickly brought to conform themſelves unto the duty of obedient ſubjects. By ſuch perſwaſions, he drew the king to be preſent at *Ægium*, where the *Acheans* were to hold election of a new pretor. There, with much more labour than would have been needful in a buſineſs of more importance, the king, by fair words and threatnings together, obtained ſo much, that *Eperatus*, a very inſufficient man, but one of *Apelles*'s new favourites, was choſen pretor, inſtead of one more worthy, for whom *Aratus* had laboured. This was thought a good introduction unto greater matters that ſhould follow. The king from thence paſſed along by *Patras* and *Dyma*, to a very ſtrong caſtle held by the *Eleans*, which was called *Tichos*. The garriſon yielded it up for fear at his firſt coming, whereof he was glad; for that he had an earneſt deſire to beſtow it upon the *Dymeans*, as he preſently did.

The king thought it ſtrange, that all this while he heard of no meſſengers from the *Eleans* to ſue for peace: for at his departure out of their country the laſt winter, he had let looſe one *Amphidamus*, a captain of theirs, that was his priſoner; becauſe he found him an intelligent man, and one that undertook to make them forſake their alliance with the *Etolians*, and join with him upon reaſonable terms. This, if they could be contented to do, he willed *Amphidamus* to let them underſtand, that he would render unto them freely all priſoners which he had of theirs; that he would defend them from all foreign invaſion; and that they ſhould hold their liberty entire, living after their own laws, without paying any manner of tribute, or being kept under by any garriſon. Theſe conditions were not to be deſpiſed, if they had found credit as they might have done. But when *Philip* came to the caſtle of *Tichos*, and made a new invaſion of their country, then began the *Eleans* (that were not before over-haſty to believe ſuch fair promiſes) to ſuſpect *Amphidamus* as a traitor, and one that was ſet on work for no other end, than to breed a mutual diffidence between them and the *Etolians*. Wherefore they purpoſed to lay hands upon him, and ſend him priſoner into *Ætolia:* but he perceived their intent, and got away to *Dyma*; in good time for himſelf; in better for *Aratus*. For the king (as was ſaid) marvelling what ſhould be the cauſe that he heard no news from the *Eleans*, concerning the offers which he had made unto them by *Amphidamus*; *Apelles*, his counſellor, thereby took occaſion to ſupplant *Aratus*. He ſaid, that old *Aratus*, and his ſon together, had ſuch devices in their heads as tended little to the king's good; and long of them he ſaid it was, that the *Eleans* did thus hold out; for when *Amphidamus* was diſmiſſed home, the two *Arati* (the father and the ſon) had taken him aſide, and given him to underſtand, that it would be very prejudicial to all *Peloponneſus*, if the *Eleans* once became at the devotion of the *Macedonian*; and this was the true cauſe, why neither *Amphidamus* was very careful in doing this meſſage, nor the *Eleans* in hearkning to the king's offers. All this was a falſe lie, deviſed by *Apelles* himſelf, upon no other ground than his own malice. *Philip* had no ſooner heard his tale, but in a great rage he ſent for the two *Arati*, and bade *Apelles* rehearſe it over again to their faces. *Apelles* did ſo, and with a bold countenance, talking to them as to men already convicted. And when he had ſaid all the reſt, ere either *Philip* or they ſpake any word, he added this clauſe, as it were, in the king's name: Since the king hath found you ſuch ungrateful wretches, it is in his meaning to hold a parliament of the *Acheans*; and therein having made it known what ye are, to depart into *Macedon*, and leave you to your ſelves. Old *Aratus* gravely admoniſhed the king, that whenſoever he heard any accuſation, eſpecially againſt a friend of his own, or a man of worth, he ſhould forbear a-while to give credit, until he had diligently examined the buſineſs. For ſuch deliberation was kingly, and he ſhould never thereof repent him. At the preſent, he ſaid, there needed no more than to call in thoſe that had heard his talk with *Amphidamus*; and eſpecially him that had brought this goodly tale to *Apelles*. For it would be a very abſurd thing, that the king ſhould make himſelf author of a report in the open parliament of *Achaia*, whereof there was none other evidence than one man's *yea*, and another's *no*. Hereof the king liked well, and ſaid, that he would make ſufficient enquiry. So paſſed a few days, wherein, whilſt *Appelles* delayed to bring in the proof, which he wanted, *Amphidamus* came from *Elis*, and told what had befallen him there. The king was not forgetful to examine him about the conſpiracy of the *Arati*; which, when he found no better than a meer device againſt his honourable friends, he entertained them in loving manner, as before. As for his love to *Apelles*, though it was hereby ſomewhat cooled, yet by means of long acquaintance and daily employment, no remiſſion therein could be diſcerned.

The unreſtful temper of *Apelles*, having, with much vehemency, brought nothing to paſs, began (as commonly ambition uſeth) to ſwell and grow venomous for want of his free motion. He betakes himſelf

himſelf to his cunning again, and, as before, being checked in his doings with thoſe of the vulgar, he had prepared a ſnare for the *Arati*; ſo failing of them, he thinks it wiſdom to lay for the king himſelf, and for all at once which were about him. In ſuch manner ſometime the ſpider thought to have taken the ſwallow, which drove away flies out of the chimney; but was carried (net and all) into the air by the bird that was too ſtrong to be caught and held by the ſubtil workmanſhip of a cobweb. Of the four that, next unto *Appelles*, were left by *Antigonus* in chief place about *Philip*, *Taurion*, his lieutenant in *Peloponneſus*, and *Alexander*, captain of the guard, were faithful men, and ſuch as would not be corrupted. The other two, *Leontius*, captain of the targuetiers, and *Megaleas*, chief of the ſecretaries, were eaſily won to be at *Apelles*'s diſpoſition. This politician therefore ſtudied how to remove the other two from their places, and put ſome creatures of his own into their rooms. Againſt *Alexander* he went to work the ordinary way, by calumniation and privy detraction. But for the ſupplanting of *Taurion* he uſed more fineneſs, loading him with daily commendations, as a notable man of war, and one, whom, for his many virtues, the king might ill ſpare from being always in his preſence. By ſuch art he thought to have removed him, as we ſay, *out of God's bleſſing into a warm ſun*. In the mean ſeaſon, *Aratus* retired himſelf, and ſought to avoid the dangerous friendſhip of the king, by forbearing to meddle in affairs of ſtate. As for the new pretor of *Achaia*, lately choſen by ſuch vehement inſtance of the king, he was a man of no diſpatch, and one that had no grace with the people. Wherefore a great deal of time was loſt, whilſt *Philip* wanted both the money and the corn wherewith he ſhould have been furniſhed by the *Acheans*. This made the king underſtand his own error, which he wiſely ſought to reform betimes. He perſwaded the *Acheans* to rejourn their parliament from *Ægium* to *Sicyon*, the town of *Aratus*. There he dealt with the old man and his ſon, perſwading them to forget what was paſs'd, and laying all the blame upon *Apelles*, on whom thenceforth he intended to keep a more diligent eye. So by the travel of theſe worthy men, he eaſily obtained what he would of the *Acheans*. Fifteen talents they gave him out of hand, with great ſtore of corn; and further decreed, that ſo long as he himſelf in perſon followed the wars in *Peloponneſus*, he ſhould receive ten talents a month. Being thus enabled, he began to provide ſhipping, that ſo he might invade the *Etolians*, *Eleans*, and *Lacedemonians*, that were maritime people, at his pleaſure, and hinder their excurſions by ſea.

It vexed *Apelles* beyond meaſure to ſee things go forward ſo well without his help, even by the miniſtry of thoſe whom he moſt hated. Wherefore he entered into conſpiracy with *Leontius* and *Megaleas*, binding himſelf and them by oath, to croſs and bring to nought, as well as they were able, all that the king ſhould take in hand. By ſo doing, they thought to bring it to paſs, that very want of ability to do any thing without them, ſhould make him ſpeak them fair, and be glad to ſubmit himſelf to their directions. The king, it is like, had ſtood in ſome awe of them whilſt he was a child; and therefore theſe wiſe men perſwaded themſelves, that, by looking big upon him, and imputing unto him all that fell out ill, through their own miſgovernment of his affairs, they might rule him as a child ſtill. *Apelles* would needs go to *Chalcis*, there to take order for the proviſions which were to come that way out of *Macedon*: the other two ſtaid behind with the king, to play their parts; all more mindful of their wicked oath, than of their duty.

His fleet and army being in a readineſs, *Philip* made countenance as if he would have bent all his forces againſt the *Eleans*; to whoſe aid therefore the *Etolians* ſent men, little fearing that the miſchief would have fallen, as ſoon after it did, upon themſelves. But againſt the *Eleans*, and thoſe that came to help them, *Philip* thought it enough to leave the *Acheans*, with ſome part of his and their mercenaries. He himſelf, with the body of his army, putting to ſea, landed in the iſle of *Cephallenia*, whence the *Etolians*, dwelling over-againſt it, uſed to furniſh themſelves of ſhipping, when they went to rove abroad. There he beſieged the town of *Palæa*, that had been very ſerviceable to the enemy againſt him and his confederates; and might be very uſeful to him, if he could get it. Whilſt he lay before this town, there came unto him fifteen ſhips of war from *Scerdilaidas*, and many good ſoldiers from the *Epirots*, *Acarnanians*, and *Meſſenians*. But the town was obſtinate, and would not be terrified with numbers. It was naturally fenced on all parts, ſave one, on which ſide *Philip* carried a mine to the wall, wherewith he overthrew two hundred foot thereof. *Leontius*, captain of the targuetiers, was appointed by the king to make the aſſault. But he, remembering his covenant with *Apelles*, did both wilfully forbear to do his beſt, and cauſed others to do the like. So the *Macedonians* were put to foil, and many ſlain; not of the worſt ſoldiers, but ſuch as had gotten over the breach, and would have carried the town, if the treaſon of their captain, and ſome by him corrupted, had not hindered the victory. The king was angry with this, but there was no remedy; and therefore he thought upon breaking up the ſiege. For it was eaſier to the townſmen to make up the gap in their wall, than for him to make it wider. Whilſt he ſtood thus perplexed, and uncertain what courſe to take, the *Meſſenians* and *Acarnanians* lay hard upon him, each of them deſirous to draw him into their own country. The *Meſſenians* alledged, that *Lycurgus* was buſy in waſting their country, upon whom the king might come unawares in one day; the *Eteſian* winds, which then blew, ſerving fitly for his navigation. Hereto alſo *Leontius* perſwaded, who conſidered that thoſe winds, as they would eaſily carry him thither, ſo would they detain him there perforce (blowing all the dog-days) and make him ſpend the ſummer to ſmall or no purpoſe. But *Aratus* gave better counſel, and prevailed. He ſhewed how unfitting it were to let the *Etolians* overrun all *Theſſaly* again, and ſome part of *Macedon*, whilſt the king withdrew his army far off to ſeek ſmall adventures. Rather, he ſaid, that the time now ſerved well to carry the war into *Etolia*, ſince the pretor was gone thence abroad on roving, with the one half of their ſtrength. As for *Lycurgus*, he was not ſtrong enough to do much harm in *Peloponneſus*; and it might ſuffice, if the *Acheans* were appointed to make head againſt him. According to this advice, the king ſets ſail for *Ætolia*, and enters the bay of *Ambracia*, which divided the *Etolians* from *Acarnania*. The *Acarnanians* were glad to ſee him on their borders, and joined with him as many of them as could bear arms, to help in taking vengeance upon their bad neighbours. He marched up into the in-land country, and, taking ſome places by the way, which he filled with garriſons to aſſure his retreat, he paſſed on to *Thermum*, which was the receptacle of the *Etolians*, and ſureſt place of defence in all extremities. The country round about was a great faſtneſs, environed with rocky mountains of very narrow, ſteep, and

and difficult aſcent. There did the *Etolians* uſe to hold all their chief meetings, their fairs, their election of magiſtrates, and their ſolemn games. There alſo they uſed to beſtow the moſt precious of their goods, as in a place of greateſt ſecurity. This opinion of the natural ſtrength, had made them careleſs in looking unto it. When *Philip* therefore had overcome the bad way, there was nothing elſe to do than to take ſpoil, whereof he found ſuch plenty, that he thought the pains of his journey well recompenſed. So he loaded his army, and, conſuming all that could not be carried away, forgot not to raze a goodly temple, the chief of all belonging unto the *Etolians*, in remembrance of the like their courteſy ſhewed upon the temples of *Dium* and *Dodona*. This burning of the temple might (queſtionleſs) more for the king's honour, have been forborn. But perhaps he thought, as Monſieur *du Gourges*, the *French* captain, told the *Spaniards* in *Florida*, That *they which had no faith, needed no church*. At his return from *Thermum*, the *Etolians* laid for him, which that they would do, he believed before; and therefore was not taken unawares. Three thouſand of them there were, that, lying in ambuſh, fell upon his ſkirts: but he had laid a counter-ambuſh for them of his *Illyrians*, who, ſtaying behind the reſt, did ſet upon the backs of the *Etolians*, whilſt they were buſily charging in the rear the army that went before. So, with ſlaughter of the enemy, he returned the ſame way that he came; and, burning down thoſe places that he had taken before, as alſo waſting the country round-about him, he ſafely carried all that he had gotten aboard his fleet. Once the *Etolians* made countenance of fight, iſſuing out of *Stratus* in great bravery. But they were beaten home faſter than they came, and followed to their very gates.

The joy of this victorious expedition being every way compleat, and not deformed (as commonly happens) by any ſiniſter accident, it pleaſed the king to make a great feaſt unto all his friends and captains. Thither were invited among the reſt *Leontius*, with his fellow *Megaleas*. They came, becauſe they could not chuſe; but their heavy looks argued what little pleaſure they took in the king's proſperity. It grieved them to think, that they ſhould be able to give no better account unto *Apelles*, of their hindering the king's buſineſs, ſince *Apelles* himſelf, as will be ſhewed anon, had played his own part with a moſt miſchievous dexterity. The ſorrow and indignation, which they could ill diſſemble in their faces, broke out after ſupper, when they had warmed themſelves with drink, into open riot. Finding *Aratus* on the way home to his tent, they fell to reviling him, throwing ſtones at him, ſo that they cauſed a great uproar; many running in (as happens in ſuch caſes) to take part with the one or the other. The king, ſending to enquire of the matter, was truly informed of all that had paſſed: which made him ſend for *Leontius* and his fellows. But *Leontius* was gotten out of the way; *Magaleas*, and another with him, came. The king began to rate them for their diſorder; and they to give him froward anſwers; inſomuch as they ſaid at length, that they would never give over till they had rewarded *Aratus* with a miſchief as he deſerved. Hereupon the king committed them to ward. *Leontius*, hearing of this, comes boldly to the king, with his targettiers at his heels, and with a proud grace demanded, who it was that had dared to lay hands upon *Megaleas*, yea, and to caſt him into priſon? Why, ſaid the king, it was even I. This reſolute anſwer, which *Leontius* had not expected, made him depart both ſad and angry; ſeeing himſelf outfrowned, and not knowing how to remedy the matter. Shortly after *Megaleas* was called forth to his anſwer, and was charged by *Aratus* with many great crimes. Among which were, the hinderance of the king's victory at *Palæa*, and the compact made with *Apelles*; matters no leſs touching *Leontius*, that ſtood by as a looker on, than *Megaleas* that was accuſed. In concluſion, the preſumptions againſt him were ſo ſtrong, and his anſwers thereto ſo weak, that he, and *Crinon*, one of his fellows, were condemned in twenty talents: *Crinon* being remanded back to priſon, and *Leontius* becoming bail for *Megaleas*. This was done upon the way homeward, as the king was returning to *Corinth*.

Philip diſpatched well a great deal of buſineſs this year: for as ſoon as he was at *Corinth*, he took in hand an expedition againſt the *Lacedemonians*. Theſe, and the *Eleans*, had done what harm they could in *Peloponneſus* whilſt the king was abſent. The *Acheans* had oppoſed them as well as they could, with ill ſucceſs; yet ſo, as they hindered them from doing ſuch harm as elſe they would have done. But when *Philip* came, he over-run the country about *Lacedemon*, and was in a manner at the gates of *Sparta*, ere men could well believe that he was returned out of *Ætolia*. He took not in this expedition any cities, but made great waſte in the fields; and having beaten the enemy in ſome ſkirmiſhes, carried back with him to *Corinth* a rich booty of cattel, ſlaves, and other country-ſpoil. At *Corinth* he found attending him ambaſſadors from the *Rhodians* and *Chians*, that requeſted him to ſet *Greece* at quiet, by granting peace unto the *Etolians*. They had gracious audience, and he willed them to deal firſt with the *Etolians*, who, if they would make the ſame requeſt, ſhould not find him unreaſonable. The *Etolians* had ſped ill that year; neither ſaw they any likely hopes for the years following. The army, that they had ſent forth to waſte *Theſſaly* and *Macedon*, found ſuch oppoſition on the way, that, not daring to proceed, it returned home without bringing any thing to effect. In the mean ſeaſon, they had been grievouſly afflicted, as before is ſhewed, by *Philip*, in the center of their own country. All *Greece* and *Macedon* was up in arms againſt them, and their weak allies the *Eleans* and *Lacedemonians*. Neither was it certain how long the one or other of theſe their *Peloponneſian* friends ſhould be able to hold out; ſince they were not ſtrong enough to keep the field, but had already ſuffered thoſe miſeries of war, which, by a little continuance, would make them glad each to ſeek their own peace, without regard of their confederates. Wherefore the *Etolians* readily entertained this negotiation of peace; and, taking truce for thirty days with the king, dealt with him by interceſſion of the ſame ambaſſadors, to entreat his preſence at a diet of their nation, that ſhould be held at *Rhium*; whither, if he would vouchſafe to come, they promiſed that he ſhould find them conformable to any good reaſon.

Whilſt theſe things were in hand, *Leontius* and *Megaleas* thought to have terrified the king, by raiſing ſedition againſt him in the army. But this device ſorted to no good effect. The ſoldiers were eaſily and quickly incenſed againſt many of the king's friends, who were ſaid to be the cauſe why they were not rewarded with ſo much of the booty, as they thought to belong of right unto them. But their anger ſpent it ſelf in a noiſe, and breaking open of doors, without further harm done. This was enough to inform the king (who eaſily pacified his men with gentle words) that ſome about him were very falſe. Yea, the ſoldiers themſelves, repenting of their inſolence,

deſired to have the authors of the tumult ſought out, and puniſhed according to their deſerts. The king made ſhew, as if he had not cared to make ſuch inquiſition. But *Leontius* and *Magaleas* were afraid, leſt the matter would ſoon come out of it ſelf, to their extreme danger. Wherefore they ſent unto *Apelles*, the head and architect of their treaſon; requeſting him ſpeedily to repair to *Corinth*, where he might ſtand between them and the king's diſpleaſure. *Apelles* had not all this while been wanting to the buſineſs, undertaken by him and his treacherous companions. He had taken upon him, as a man that had the king's heart in his own hand: and thereby was he grown into ſuch credit, that all the king's officers in *Macedon* and *Theſſaly* addreſſed themſelves unto him; and received from him their diſpatch in every buſineſs. Likewiſe the *Greeks*, in all their flattering decrees, took occaſion to magnify the virtue of *Apelles*; making ſlight mention (only for faſhion ſake) of the king: who ſeemed no better than the miniſter and executioner of *Apelles*'s will and pleaſure. Such was the arrogancy of this great man, in ſetting himſelf out unto the people: but in managing the king's affairs, he made it his eſpecial care, that money, and all things needful for the publick ſervice, ſhould be wanting. Yea, he enforced the king, for very need, to ſell his own plate, and houſhold veſſels: thinking to reſolve theſe, and all other difficulties, by only ſaying, *Sir, be ruled wholly by me, and all ſhall be as you would wiſh.* Hereto if the king would give aſſent, then had this politician obtained his heart's deſire. Now taking his journey from *Chalcis* in the iſle of *Eubœa*, to the city of *Corinth*, where *Philip* then lay: he was fetch'd in with great pomp and royalty, by a great number of the captains and ſoldiers; which *Leontius* and *Megaleas* drew forth to meet him on the way. So entering the city with a goodly train, he went directly to the court, and towards the king's chamber. But *Philip* was well aware of his pride, and had vehement ſuſpicion of his falſhood. Wherefore one was ſent to tell him, that he ſhould wait a while, or come another time; for the king was not now at leiſure to be ſpoken with. It was a pretty thing, that ſuch a check as this made all his attendants forſake him, as a man in diſgrace; in ſuch ſort, that going thence to his lodging, he had none to follow him, ſave his own pages. After this, the king vouchſafed him now and then ſome ſlender graces: but in conſultations, or other matters of privacy, he uſed him not at all. This taught *Megaleas* to look unto himſelf, and run away betimes. Hereupon the king ſent forth *Taurion*, his lieutenant of *Peloponneſus*, with all the targettiers, as it were to do ſome piece of ſervice; but indeed of purpoſe to apprehend *Leontius* in the abſence of his followers. *Leontius*, being taken, diſpatched away a meſſenger preſently to his targettiers, to ſignify what was befallen him: and they forthwith ſent unto the king in his behalf. They made requeſt, That if any other thing were objected againſt him, he might not be called forth to trial before their return: as for the debt of *Megaleas*, if that were all the matter, they ſaid, that they were ready to make a purſe for his diſcharge. This affection of the ſoldiers made *Philip* more haſty than elſe he would have been, to take away the traitor's life. Neither was it long, ere letters of *Megaleas* were intercepted, which he wrote unto the *Etolians*; vilifying the king with opprobrious words; and bidding them not to hearken after peace, but to hold out a while, for that *Philip* was even ready to ſink under the burden of his own poverty. By this the king underſtood more perfectly the falſhood, not only of *Megaleas*, but of *Apelles*; whoſe cunning head had laboured all this while to keep him ſo poor. Wherefore he ſent one to purſue *Megaleas*, that was fled to *Thebes*. As for *Apelles*, he committed both him, his ſon, and another that was inward with him, to priſon; wherein all of them ſhortly ended their lives. *Megaleas* alſo, neither daring to ſtand to trial, nor knowing whither to fly, was weary of his own life, and ſlew himſelf about the ſame time.

The *Etolians*, as they had begun this war upon hope of accompliſhing what they lifted in the nonage of *Philip*: ſo finding that the vigour of this young prince, tempered with the cold advice of *Aratus*, wrought very effectually towards their overthrow; they grew very deſirous to make an end of it. Nevertheleſs, being a turbulent nation, and ready to lay hold upon all advantages: when they heard what was happened in the court, the death of *Apelles*, *Leontius*, and *Megaleas*, together with ſome indignation thereupon conceived by ſome of the king's targettiers; they began to hope a-new, that theſe troubles would be long laſting, and thereupon brake the day appointed for the meeting at *Rhium*. Of this was *Philip* nothing ſorry. For being in good hope throughly to tame this unquiet nation: he thought it much to concern his own honour, that all the blame of the beginning, and continuing the war, ſhould reſt upon themſelves. Wherefore he willed his confederates, to lay aſide all thought of peace, and to prepare for war againſt the year following; wherein he hoped to bring it to an end. Then gratified he his *Macedonian* ſoldiers, by yielding to let them winter in their own country. In his returning homeward, he called into judgment one *Ptolemy*, a companion with *Apelles* and *Leontius* in their treaſons: who was therefore condemned by the *Macedonians*, and ſuffered death. Theſe were the ſame *Macedonians*, that lately could not endure to hear of *Leontius*'s impriſonment: yet now they think the man worthy to die, that was but his adherent. So vain is the confidence, on which rebels uſe to build, in their favour with the multitude.

During his abode in *Macedon*, *Philip* won ſome bordering towns; from which the *Dardanians*, *Etolians*, and other his ill neighbours, were accuſtomed to make roads into his kingdom. When he had thus provided for ſafety of his own; the *Etolians* might well know what they were to expect. But there came again ambaſſadors from the *Rhodians* and *Chians*, with others from *Ptolemy* king of *Egypt*, and from the city of *Byzantium*, re-continuing the former ſollicitation about the peace. This faſhion had been taken up in matters of *Greece*, ever ſince the kings that reigned after *Alexander* had taken upon them to ſet the whole country at liberty: no ſooner was any province or city in danger to be oppreſſed, and ſubdued by force of war, but preſently there were found interceſſors, who pitying the effuſion of *Greekiſh* blood, would importune the ſtronger to relinquiſh his advantage. By doing ſuch friendly offices in time of need, the princes and ſtates abroad ſought to bind unto them thoſe people, that were, howſoever weak in numbers, yet very good ſoldiers. But hereby it came to paſs, that the more froward ſort, eſpecially the *Etolians*, whoſe whole nation was addicted to falſhood and robbery, durſt enter boldly into quarrels with all their neighbours: being well aſſured, that if they had the worſt, *the love of Greece* would be ſufficient to redeem their quiet. They had, ſince the late treaty of peace, done what

what harm they could in *Peloponneſus:* but being beaten by the *Acheans*, and ſtanding in fear to be more ſoundly beaten at home, they deſired now, more earneſtly than before, to make an end of the war as ſoon as they might. *Philip* made ſuch anſwer to the ambaſſadors as he had done the former year; that he gave not occaſion to the beginning of this war, nor was at the preſent either afraid to continue it, or unwilling to end it: but that the *Etolians*, if they had a deſire to live in reſt, muſt firſt be dealt withal, to ſignify plainly their determination, whereto himſelf would return ſuch anſwer as he ſhould think fit.

Philip had at this time no great liking unto the peace, being a young prince, and in hope to increaſe the honour which he daily got by the war. But it happened in the midſt of this negotiation, that he was advertiſed by letters out of *Macedon*, what a notable victory *Hannibal* had obtained againſt the *Romans* in the battel of *Thraſymene*. Theſe letters he communicated unto *Demetrius Pharius:* who greatly encouraged him to take part with *Hannibal*; and not to ſit ſtill, as an idle beholder of the *Italian* war. Hereby he grew more inclinable than before unto peace with the *Etolians:* which was concluded ſhortly in a meeting at *Naupactus*. There did *Agelaus*, an *Etolian*, make a great oration: telling how happy it was for the *Greeks*, that they might at their own pleaſure diſpute about finiſhing war between themſelves, without being moleſted by the *Barbarians*. For when once either the *Romans*, or *Carthaginians*, had ſubdued one the other; it was not to be doubted, that they would forthwith look eaſtward, and ſeek by all means to ſet footing in *Greece*. For this cauſe he ſaid it was good, that their country ſhould be at peace within it ſelf: and that *Philip*, if he were deſirous of war, ſhould lay hold on the opportunity, now fitly ſerving, to enlarge his dominion, by winning ſomewhat in *Italy*. Such advice could the *Etolians* then give, when they ſtood in fear of danger threatning them at hand: but being ſoon after weary of reſt, as being accuſtomed to enrich themſelves by pillage, they were ſo far from obſerving and following their own good counſel, that they invited the *Romans* into *Greece*; whereby they brought themſelves and the whole country (but themſelves before any other part of the country) under ſervitude of ſtrangers. The condition of this peace was ſimple, that every one ſhould keep what they held at the preſent, without making reſtitution, or any amends for damages paſt.

SECT. III.

Philip, *at the perſwaſion of* Demetrius Pharius, *enters into league with* Hannibal, *againſt the* Romans. *The tenor of the league between* Hannibal *and* Philip.

THIS being agreed upon: the *Greeks* betook themſelves to quiet courſes of life; and *Philip*, to prepare for the buſineſs of *Italy*, about which he conſulted with *Demetrius Pharius*. And thus paſſed the time away, till the great battel of *Cannæ:* after which he joined in league with *Hannibal*, as hath been ſhewn before. *Demetrius Pharius* bore great malice unto the *Romans*; and knew no other way to be avenged upon them, or to recover his own loſt kingdom, than by procuring the *Macedonian*, that was in a manner wholly guided by his counſel, to take part with their enemies. It had otherwiſe been far more expedient for *Philip*, to have ſupported the weaker of theſe two great cities againſt the more mighty. For by ſo doing, he ſhould perhaps have brought them to peace upon ſome equal terms; and thereby, as did *Hiero*, a far weaker prince, have both ſecured his own eſtate, and cauſed each of them to be deſirous of chief place in his friendſhip. The iſſue of the counſel which he followed, will appear ſoon after this. His firſt quarrel with the *Romans*; the trouble which they and the *Etolians* did put him to in *Greece*; and the peace which they made with him for a time, upon conditions that might eaſily be broken: have been related in another place, as belonging unto the ſecond *Punic* war. Wherefore I will only here ſet down the tenor of the league between him and *Carthage:* which may ſeem not unworthy to be read, if only in regard of the form it ſelf then uſed; though it had been over-long to have been inſerted into a more buſy piece.

The OATH and COVENANTS,

Between *HANNIBAL*, General of the *Carthaginians*, and *XENOPHANES*, Ambaſſador of *PHILIP*, king of *Macedon*.

THIS is the league ratified by oath, which HANNIBAL, *the general, and with him* MAGO, MYRCAL, *and* BARMOCAL, *as alſo the ſenators of* Carthage *that are preſent, and all the* Carthaginians *that are in his army, have made with* XENOPHANES, *the ſon of* CLEOMACHUS, Athenian, *whom king* PHILIP, *the ſon of* DEMETRIUS, *hath ſent unto us, for himſelf, and the* Macedonians, *and his aſſociates: before* Jupiter *and* Juno, *and* Apollo: *before* [a] the god of the Carthaginians, Hercules, *and* Iolaus: *before* Mars, Triton, Neptune: *before* the gods *accompanying arms, the* ſun, *the* moon, *and the* earth; *before* rivers, *and* meadows, *and* waters; *before all the* gods *that have power over* Carthage; *before all the* gods *that rule over* Macedon, *and the reſt of* Greece; *before all the* gods *that are preſidents of war, and preſent at the making of this league.* HANNIBAL the general *hath ſaid, and all the ſenators that are with him, and all the* Carthaginians *in his army:* Be *it agreed between you and us. That this oath ſtand for friendſhip and loving affection, That we become friends, familiar, and brethren, upon covenant,* That *the ſafety of the lords, the* Carthaginians, *and of* HANNIBAL, the general, *and thoſe that are with him, and of the rulers and provinces of the* Carthaginians, *uſing the ſame laws, and of the* Uticans, *and as many cities and nations as obey the* Carthaginians, *and of the ſoldiers and aſſociates, and of all towns and nations*

[a] Dæmon.

with

with which we hold friendſhip in Italy, Gaul, *and* Liguria, *and with whom we ſhall hold friendſhip, or make alliance hereafter in this region, be preſerved by king* PHILIP, *and the* Macedonians, *and ſuch of the* Greeks *as are their aſſociates. In like manner ſhall king* PHILIP, *and the* Macedonians, *and other the* Greeks *his aſſociates, be ſaved and preſerved by the* Carthaginian *armies, and by the* Uticans, *and by all cities and nations that obey the* Carthaginians, *and by their aſſociates and ſoldiers, and by all cities in* Italy, Gaul, *and* Liguria *that are of our alliance, or ſhall hereafter join with us in* Italy. *We ſhall not take counſel one againſt the other, nor deal fraudulently one with the other. With all readineſs and good-will, without deceit or ſubtilty, we ſhall be enemies unto the enemies of the* Carthaginians, *excepting thoſe kings, towns, and havens, with which we have already league and friendſhip. We alſo ſhall be enemies to the enemies of king* PHILIP, *excepting thoſe kings, cities, and nations, with which we have already league and friendſhip. The war that we have with the* Romans, *have ye alſo with them, until the gods ſhall give us a new and happy end. Ye ſhall aid us with thoſe things whereof we have need, and ſhall do according to the covenants between us. But if the gods ſhall not give unto you and us their help in this war againſt the* Romans *and their aſſociates; then if the* Romans *offer friendſhip, we ſhall make friendſhip in ſuch wiſe, that* ye *ſhall be partakers of the ſame friendſhip, with condition,* that *they ſhall not have power to make war upon you: neither ſhall the* Romans *be lords over the* Corcyreans, *nor over thoſe of* Apollonia, *nor* Dyrrachium, *nor over* Pharus, *nor* Dimalle, *nor the* Parthini, nor Atintania. *They ſhall alſo render unto* DEMETRIUS PHARIUS *all thoſe that belong unto him, as many as are within the* Romans *dominions. But if the* Romans *(after ſuch peace made) ſhall make war upon ye or us; we will ſuccour one another in that war, as either ſhall have need. The ſame ſhall be obſerved in war made by any other, excepting thoſe kings, cities, and ſtates, with whom we hold already league and friendſhip.* To this league *if we or ye ſhall think fit to add or detract, ſuch addition or detraction ſhall be made by our common conſent.*

SECT. IV.

How Philip *yielded to his natural vices, being therein ſoothed by* Demetrius Pharius. *His deſire to tyrannize upon the free ſtates his aſſociates: With the troubles into which he thereby fell, whilſt he bore a part in the ſecond* Punic *War. He poiſoneth* Aratus; *and grows hateful to the* Acheans.

HItherto *Philip* had carried himſelf as a virtuous prince. And though with more commendation of his wiſdom, he might have offered his friendſhip to the *Romans*, that were like to be oppreſſed, than to the *Carthaginians*, who had the better hand; yet this his medling in the *Punic* war, proceeded from a royal greatneſs of mind, with a deſire to ſecure and increaſe his own eſtate; adding therewithal reputation to his country. But in this buſineſs he was guided (as hath been ſaid) by *Demetrius Pharius*; who, looking throughly into his nature, did accommodate himſelf to his deſires, and thereby ſhortly governed him, as he liſted. For the virtues of *Philip* were not indeed ſuch as they ſeemed. He was luſtful, bloody, and tyrannical; deſirous of power to do what he liſted, and not otherwiſe liſting to do what he ought, than ſo far forth, as by making a fair ſhew, he might breed in men ſuch a good opinion of him, as ſhould help to ſerve his turn in all that he took in hand. Before he ſhould buſy himſelf in *Italy*, he thought it requiſite in good policy, to bring the *Greeks*, that were his aſſociates, under a more abſolute form of ſubjection. Hereunto *Apelles* had adviſed him before, and he had liked reaſonably well of the courſe. But *Apelles* was a boiſterous counſellor, and one, that, referring all to his own glory, thought himſelf deeply wronged, if he might not wholly have his own way, but were driven to await the king's opportunity at better times. *Demetrius Pharius* could well be contented to obſerve the king's humours; and guided, like a coachman, with the reins in his hand, thoſe affections which himſelf did only ſeem to follow. Therefore he grew daily more and more in credit; ſo as, without any manner of contention, he ſupplanted *Aratus*, which the violence of *Apelles* could never do.

There aroſe about theſe times a very hot faction among the *Meſſenians*, between the nobility and commons; their vehement thoughts being rather diverted (as happens often after a foreign war) unto domeſtick objects, than allayed and reduced unto a more quiet temper. In proceſs of no long time, the contention among them grew ſo violent, that *Philip* was entreated to compound the differences. He was glad of this, reſolving ſo to end the matter, that they ſhould not henceforth ſtrive any more about their government; for that he would aſſume it wholly to himſelf. At his coming thither, he found *Aratus* buſy among them to make all friends, after a better manner than agreed with his own ſecret purpoſe. Wherefore he conſulted not with this reverend old man, but talked in private with ſuch of the *Meſſenians* as repaired unto him. He aſked the governors what they meant to ſtand thus diſputing, and whether they had not laws to bridle the inſolence of the unruly rabble. Contrariwiſe, in talking with the heads of the popular faction, he ſaid it was ſtrange that they, being ſo many, would ſuffer themſelves to be oppreſſed by a few; as if they had not hands to defend themſelves from tyrants. Thus, whilſt each of them preſumed on the king's aſſiſtance, they thought it beſt to go roundly to work, ere he were gone that ſhould countenance their doings. The governors therefore would have apprehended ſome ſeditious orators, that were, they ſaid, the ſtirrers up of the multitude unto ſedition. Upon this occaſion the people took arms; and, running upon the nobility and magiſtrates, killed of them in a rage almoſt two hundred. *Philip* thought, it ſeems, that it would be eaſy to worry the ſheep, when the dogs, their guardians, were ſlain. But his falſhood and double dealing was immediately found out. Neither did the younger *Aratus* forbear to tell him of it in publick, with very bitter and diſgraceful words. The king was angry at this; but having already done more than was commendable, or excuſable; and yet further intending to take other things in hand, wherein he ſhould need the help and countenance of his beſt friends, he was content to ſmother his diſpleaſure, and make as fair weather as he could. He led old *Aratus* aſide by the hand, and went up into the caſtle of *Ithome*, that was over *Meſſene*. There he pretend to do ſacrifice, and ſacrifice he did. But it was his purpoſe to keep the place to his own uſe; for that it was of notable ſtrength, and would ſerve to command the further parts of *Peloponneſus*, as the citadel of *Corinth*, which he had already, commanded the entrance into that country. Whilſt he was therefore ſacrificing, and had the entrails of the beaſt delivered into his hand, as was the manner, he ſhewed them to *Aratus*, and gently aſked him, whether the tokens that he ſaw therein did ſignify, that being now in poſſeſſion of this

this place, he ſhould quietly go out of it, or rather keep it to himſelf. He thought, perhaps, that the old man would have ſoothed him a little, were it only for deſire to make amends for the angry words newly ſpoken by his ſon. But as *Aratus* ſtood doubtful what to anſwer, *Demetrius Pharius* gave this verdict: *If thou be a ſoothſayer, thou may'ſt go thy ways, and let ſlip this good advantage; if thou be a king, thou muſt not neglect the opportunity, but hold the ox by both his horns.* Thus he ſpake, reſembling *Ithome* and *Acrocorinthus*, unto the two horns of *Peloponneſus*. Yet would *Philip* needs hear the opinion of *Aratus*, who told him plainly, that it were well done to keep the place, if it might be kept without breach of his faith with the *Meſſenians*: but if, by ſeizing upon *Ithome*, he muſt loſe all the other caſtles that he held, and eſpecially the ſtrongeſt caſtle of all, which was left unto him by *Antigonus*, which was his credit, then were it far better to depart with his ſoldiers, and keep men in duty, as he had done hitherto, by their own goodwills, than by fortifying any ſtrong places againſt them, to make them of his friends become his enemies.

To this good advice *Philip* yielded at the preſent; but not without ſome diſlike, thenceforth growing between him and the *Arati*, whom he thought more froward than beſeemed them, in contradicting his will. Neither was the old man deſirous at all, to deal any longer in the king's affairs, or be inward with him: for as he plainly diſcovered his tyrannous purpoſes; ſo likewiſe he perceived, that in reſorting to his houſe, he had been diſhoneſt with his ſon's wife. He therefore ſtaid at home, where, at good leiſure, he might repent, that in deſpight of *Cleomenes*, his own countryman, and a temperate prince, he had brought the *Macedonians* into *Peloponneſus*.

Philip made a voyage out of *Peloponneſus* into *Epirus*, wherein *Aratus* refuſed to bear him company. In this journey he found by experience what *Aratus* had lately told him, that diſhoneſt counſels are not ſo profitable in deed, as in appearance. The *Epirots* were his followers and dependants, and ſo they purpoſed to continue: but he would needs have them ſo to remain, whether they purpoſed it or not. Wherefore, to make them the more obnoxious unto his will, he ſeized upon their town of *Oricum*, and laid ſiege to *Apollonia*, having no good colour of theſe doings, but thinking himſelf ſtrong enough to do what he liſted, and not ſeeing whence they ſhould procure friends to help them. Thus, inſtead of ſettling the country, as his intended voyage into *Italy* required, he kindled a fire in it which he could never quench, until it had laid hold on his own palace. Whilſt he was thus labouring to bind the hands that ſhould have fought for him in *Italy*, *M. Valerius*, the *Roman*, came into thoſe parts; who not only maintained the *Epirots* againſt him, but procured the [a] *Etolians* to break the peace which they had lately made with him.

Thus began that war, the occurrents whereof we have related before, in place whereto it belonged. In managing whereof, though *Philip* did the offices of a good captain; yet, when leiſure ſerved, he made it apparent that he was a vicious king. He had not quite left his former deſire, of oppreſſing the liberty of the *Meſſenians*, but made another journey into their country, with hope to deceive them, as before. They underſtood him better now than before, and therefore were not haſty to truſt him too far. When he ſaw that his cunning would not ſerve, he went by force; and calling them his enemies, invaded them with open war. But in that war he could do little good; perhaps, becauſe none of his confederates were deſirous to help him in ſuch an enterpriſe. In this attempt upon *Meſſene*, he loſt *Demetrius Pharius*, that was his counſellor and flatterer, not his perverter; as appears by his growing daily more nought in following times. The worſe that he ſped, the more angry he vexed againſt thoſe that ſeemed not to favour his injurious doings. Wherefore, by the miniſtry of *Taurion*, his lieutenant, he poiſoned old *Aratus*; and ſhortly after that, he poiſoned alſo the younger *Aratus*; hoping that theſe things would never have been known, becauſe they were done ſecretly, and the poiſons themſelves were more ſure, than manifeſt in operation. The *Sicyonians*, and all the people of *Achaia*, decreed unto *Aratus* more than human honours; as ſacrifices, hymns, and proceſſions, to be celebrated every year twice, with a prieſt ordained unto him for that purpoſe; as was accuſtom'd unto the heroes, or men, whom they thought to be tranſlated into the number of the gods. Hereunto they are ſaid to have been encouraged by an oracle of *Apollo*; which is like enough to have been true, ſince the help of the devil is never failing to the increaſe of idolatry.

The loving memory of *Aratus*, their patron and ſingular benefactor, could not but work in the *Acheans* marvellous diſlike of that wicked king, which had made him thus away. He ſhall therefore hear of this hereafter, when they better dare to take counſel for themſelves. At the preſent, the murder was not generally known or believed; neither were they in caſe to ſubſiſt, without his help that had committed it. The *Etolians* were a moſt outragious people, great darers, and ſhameleſs robbers. With theſe the *Romans* had made a league, whereof the conditions were ſoon divulged, eſpecially that main point, concerning the diviſion of the purchaſe which they ſhould make; namely, that the *Etolians* ſhould have the country and towns, but the *Romans* the ſpoil, and carry away the people to ſell for ſlaves. The *Acheans*, who, in times of greater quiet, could not endure to make ſtreight alliance with the *Etolians*, as knowing their uncivil diſpoſition, were much more averſe from them, when they perceived how they had called in the *Barbarians* (for ſuch did the *Greeks* account all other nations, except their own) to make havock of the country. The ſame conſideration moved alſo the *Lacedemonians* to ſtand off a-while, before they would declare themſelves for the *Etolians*, whoſe friendſhip they had embraced in the late war. The induſtry therefore of *Philip*, and the great care which he ſeemed to take of the *Acheans*, his confederates, ſufficed to retain them; eſpecially at ſuch time as their own neceſſity was thereto concurrent. More particularly, he obliged unto himſelf the *Dymeans*, by an ineſtimable benefit, recovering their own after it had been taken by the *Romans* and *Etolians*; and redeeming their people whereſoever they might be found, that had been carried away captive, and ſold abroad for ſlaves. Thus might he have blotted out the memory of offences paſs'd, if the malignity of his condition had not otherwhiles broken out, and given men to underſtand that it was the time, and not his virtue, which cauſed him to make ſuch a ſhew of goodneſs. Among other foul acts, whereof he was not aſhamed, he took *Polycratia*, the wife of the younger *Aratus*, and carried her into *Macedon*; little regarding how this might ſerve to confirm in

[a] Ch. 3. §. 12.

the people their opinion, that he was guilty of the old man's death. But of ſuch faults he ſhall be told, when the *Romans* make war upon him the ſecond time: for of that which happened in this their firſt invaſion, I hold it ſuperfluous to make repetition.

SECT. V.

Of Philopœmen, *general of the* Acheans, *and* Machanidas, *tyrant of* Lacedemon. *A battel between them, wherein* Machanidas *is ſlain.*

IT happens often, that the deceaſe of one eminent man diſcovers the virtue of another. In the place of *Aratus* there ſtood up *Philopœmen*, whoſe notable valour, and great ſkill in arms, made the nation of the *Acheans* redoubtable among all the *Greeks*, and careleſs of ſuch protection, as in former times they had needed againſt the violence of their neighbours. This is that *Philopœmen*, who, being then a young man, and having no command, did eſpecial ſervice to *Antigonus* at the battel of *Sellaſia*, againſt *Cleomenes*. Thenceforward until now, he had ſpent the moſt part of his time in the iſle of *Crete*; the inhabitants whereof being a valiant people, and ſeldom or never at peace between themſelves, he bettered among them his knowledge and practice in the art of war. At his return home, he had charge of the horſe, wherein he carried himſelf ſo ſtrictly, travailing with all the cities of the confederacy, to have his followers well mounted and armed at all pieces; as alſo he ſo diligently trained them up in all exerciſe of ſervice, that he made the *Acheans* very ſtrong in that part of their forces. Being afterwards choſen pretor, or general of the nation, he had no leſs care to reform their military diſcipline throughout, whereby his country might be ſtrong enough to defend it ſelf, and not any longer (as in former times) need to depend upon the help of others. He perſwaded the *Acheans* to cut off their vain expence of bravery, in apparel, houſehold-ſtuff, and curious fare, and to beſtow that coſt upon their arms; wherein by how much they were the more gallant, by ſo much were they like to prove the better ſoldiers; and ſuitable in behaviour unto the pride of their furniture. They had ſerved hitherto with little light bucklers, and ſlender darts, to caſt aſar off, that were uſeful in ſkirmiſhing at ſome diſtance, or for ſurpriſes, or ſudden and haſty expeditions; whereto *Aratus* had been moſt accuſtomed. But when they came to handy-ſtrokes, they were good for nothing; ſo as they were wholly driven to rely upon the courage of their mercenaries. *Philopœmen* altered this, cauſing them to arm themſelves more weightily; to uſe a larger kind of ſhield, with good ſwords, and ſtrong pikes, fit for ſervice at hand. He taught them alſo to fight in cloſe order, and altered the form of their embatteling; not making the files ſo deep as had been accuſtomed, but extending the front, that he might uſe the ſervice of many hands.

Eight months were ſpent of that year in which he firſt was pretor of the *Acheans*, when *Machanidas*, the tyrant of *Lacedemon*, cauſed him to make trial how his ſoldiers had profited by his diſcipline. This *Machanidas* was the ſucceſſor unto *Lycurgus*, a man more violent than his fore-goer. He kept in pay a ſtrong army of mercenaries; and he kept them not only to fight for *Sparta*, but to hold the city in obedience to himſelf perforce. Wherefore it behoved him not to take part with the *Acheans*, that were favourers of liberty; but to ſtrengthen himſelf by friendſhip of the *Etolians*; who, in making alliances, took no further notice of vice or virtue, than as it had reference to their own profit. The people alſo of *Lacedemon*, through their inveterate hatred unto the *Argives*, *Acheans*, and *Macedonians*, were in like ſort (all, or moſt of them) inclinable to the *Etolian* faction. Very unwiſely: for in ſeeking to take revenge upon thoſe that had lately hindered them from getting the lordſhip of *Peloponneſus*, they hindered themſelves thereby from recovering the maſtery of their own city. This affection of the *Spartans*, together with the regard of his own ſecurity, and no ſmall hope of good that would follow, ſuffered not *Machanidas* to be idle; but always made him ready to fall upon his neighbours backs, and take of theirs what he could, whilſt they were enforced, by greater neceſſity, to turn face another way. Thus had he often done, eſpecially in the abſence of *Philip*, whoſe ſudden coming into thoſe parts, or ſome other oppoſition made againſt him, had uſually made him fail of his attempts. At the preſent he was ſtronger in men than were the *Acheans*, and thought his own men better ſoldiers than were theirs.

Whilſt *Philip* therefore was buſied elſewhere, he entered the country of the *Mantineans*, being not without hope to do as *Cleomenes* had done before him; yea, and perhaps to get the [a] lordſhip of *Peloponneſus*, as having ſtronger friends, and weaker oppoſition, than *Cleomenes* had found. But *Philopœmen* was ready to entertain him at *Mantinæa*, where was fought between them a great battel. The tyrant had brought into the field upon carts a great many of engines, wherewith to beat upon the ſquadrons of his enemies, and put them into diſorder. To prevent this danger, *Philopœmen* ſent forth his light armature a good way before him; ſo as *Machanidas* was fain to do the like. To ſecond theſe, from the one and the other ſide came in continual ſupply, till at length all the mercenaries both of the *Acheans* and of *Machanidas* were drawn up to the fight, being ſo far advanced each before their own *Phalanx*, that it could no otherwiſe be diſcerned which preſſed forward, or which recoiled, than by the riſing of the duſt. Thus were *Machanidas*'s engines made unſerviceable, by the interpoſition of his own men; in ſuch manner, as the cannon is hindered from doing execution in moſt of the battels fought in theſe our times. The mercenaries of the tyrant prevailed at length, not only by their advantage of number, but (as [b] *Polybius* well obſerveth) by ſurmounting their oppoſites in degree of courage, wherein uſually the hired ſoldiers of tyrants exceed thoſe that are waged by free ſtates. For as it is true, that a free people are much more valiant than they which live oppreſſed by tyranny; ſince the one, by doing their beſt in fight, have hope to acquire ſomewhat beneficial to themſelves; whereas the other do fight (as it were) to aſſure their own ſervitude: ſo the mercenaries of a tyrant, being made partakers with him in the fruits of his proſperity, have good cauſe to maintain his quarrel as their own; whereas they that ſerve under a free ſtate, have no other motive to do manfully, than their bare ſtipend. Further than this, when a free ſtate hath gotten the victory, many companies (if not all) of foreign auxiliaries are preſently caſt; and therefore ſuch good fellows will not take much pains to bring the war to an end. But the victory of a tyrant, makes him ſtand in need of more helpers: becauſe that after it he doth wrong to more, as having more ſubjects; and therefore ſtands in fear of more, that ſhould

[a] Excerpt. è Polyb. l. 11. Plut. in vita Philopœm. [b] Polyb. ibid.

ſeek

ſeek to take revenge upon him. The ſtipendaries therefore of the *Acheans*, being forced to give ground, were urged ſo violently in their retreat by thoſe of *Machanidas*, that ſhortly they betook themſelves to flight; and could not be ſtay'd by any perſwaſions of *Philopœmen*, but ran away quite beyond the battel of the *Acheans*. This diſaſter had been ſufficient to take from *Philopœmen* the honour of the day; had he not wiſely obſerved the demeanor of *Machanidas*, and found in him that error which might reſtore the victory. The tyrant, with his mercenaries, gave chace unto thoſe that fled: leaving behind him in good order of battel his *Lacedemonians*; whom he thought ſufficient to deal with the *Acheans*, that were already diſheartned by the flight of their companions. But when this his raſhneſs had carried him out of ſight, *Philopœmen* advanced towards the *Lacedemonians* that ſtood before him. There lay between them athwart the country a long ditch, without water at that time; and therefore paſſable (as it ſeemed) without much difficulty, eſpecially for foot. The *Lacedemonians* adventured over it, as thinking themſelves better ſoldiers than the *Acheans*; who had in a manner already loſt the day. But hereby they greatly diſordered their own battel; and no ſooner had the foremoſt of them recovered the further bank, than they were ſtoutly charged by the *Acheans*, who drove them headlong into the ditch again. The firſt ranks being broken, all the reſt began to ſhrink: ſo as *Philopœmen* getting over the ditch, eaſily chaſed them out of the field. *Philopœmen* knew better how to uſe his advantage, than *Machanidas* had done. He ſuffered not all his army to diſband and follow the chace: but retained with him a ſufficient ſtrength, for the cuſtody of a bridge that was over the ditch, by which he knew that the tyrant muſt come back. The tyrant with his mercenaries returning from the chace, looked very heavily when he ſaw what was fallen out. Yet, with a luſty troop of horſe ubout him, he made towards the bridge: hoping to find the *Acheans* in diſorder, and to ſet upon their backs, as they were careleſly purſuing their victory. But when he and his company ſaw *Philopœmen* ready to make good the bridge againſt them; then began every one to look, which way he might ſhift for himſelf. The tyrant, with no more than two in his company, rode along the ditch-ſide; and ſearched for an eaſy paſſage over. He was eaſily diſcovered by his purple caſſock, and the coſtly trappings of his horſe. *Philopœmen* therefore leaving the charge of the bridge unto another, coaſted him all the way that he rode; and falling upon him at length in the ditch it ſelf, as he was getting over it, ſlew him there with his own hand. There died in this battel on the *Lacedemonians* ſide about four thouſand: and more than four thouſand were taken priſoners. Of the *Achean* mercenaries, probable it is that the loſs was not greatly cared for; ſince that war was at an end, and for their money they might hire more when they ſhould have need.

SECT. VI.

Philip *leaving peace with* Rome, *and with all* Greece, *prepares againſt* Aſia. *Of the kings of* Pergamus, Cappadocia, Pontus, Paphlagonia, Bithynia, *and their lineages. Of the* Galatians.

BY this victory the *Acheans* learned to think well of themſelves. Neither needed they indeed after a while (ſuch was their diſcipline, and continual exerciſe) to account themſelves in manner of war inferiour to any, that ſhould have brought againſt them no great odds of number. As for the *Macedonian*, he made no great uſe of them: But when he had once concluded peace with the *Romans* and *Etolians*. He ſtudied how to enlarge his dominions eaſtward; ſince the fortune of his friends, the *Carthaginians*, declined in the weſt. He took in hand many matters together, or very nearly together, and ſome of them not honeſt: wherein if the *Acheans* would have done him ſervice; they muſt, by helping him to oppreſs others that never had wronged him, have taught him the way how to deal with themſelves. He greatly hated *Attalus* king of *Pergamus*, who had joined with the *Romans* and *Etolians* againſt him.

This *Attalus*, though a king, was ſcarce yet a nobleman, otherwiſe than as he was ennobled by his own, and by his father's virtue. His fortune began in *Philetærus* his uncle: who being gelded, by reaſon of a miſhap which he had when he was a child, grew afterwards thereby to be more eſteemed: as great men in thoſe times repoſed much confidence in eunuchs, whoſe affections could not be obliged unto wives or children. He was entertained into the family of *Docimus*, a captain following *Antigonus the firſt*; and after the death of *Antigonus*, he accompanied his maſter, that betook himſelf to *Lyſimachus* king of *Thrace*. *Lyſimachus* had good opinion of him; and put him in truſt with his money and accompts. But when at length he ſtood in fear of this king, that grew a bloody tyrant: he fled into *Aſia*, where he ſeized upon the town of *Pergamus*, and nine thouſand talents belonging to *Lyſimachus*. The town and money, together with his own ſervice, he offered unto *Seleucus the firſt*, that then was ready to give *Lyſimachus* battel. His offer was kindly accepted, but never performed; for that *Seleucus* having ſlain *Lyſimachus*, died ſhortly after himſelf, before he made uſe of *Philetærus* or his money. So this eunuch ſtill retained *Pergamus* with the country about it; and reigned therein twenty years as an abſolute king. He had two brethren: of which the elder is ſaid to have been a poor carter; and the younger perhaps was not much better; before ſuch time as they were raiſed by the fortune of this eunuch. *Philetærus* left the kingdom to the elder of theſe, or to the ſon of the elder called *Eumenes*. This *Eumenes* enlarged his kingdom; making his advantage of the diſſenſion, between *Seleucus Callinicus* and *Antiochus Hierax*, the ſons of *the ſecond Antiochus*. He fought a battel with *Hierax*, near unto *Sardes*; and won the victory. At which time, to animate his men againſt the *Gauls* that ſerved under his enemy, he uſed a pretty device. He wrote the word [a] *Victory* upon the hand of his ſoothſayer, in ſuch colours as would eaſily come off: and when the hot liver of the beaſt that was ſacrificed, had cleanly taken the print of the letters, he publiſhed this unto his army as a miracle, plainly fore-ſhewing that the gods would be aſſiſtant in that battel.

After this victory, he grew a dreadful enemy to *Seleucus*: who never durſt attempt to recover from him, by war, the territory that he had gotten and held. Finally, when he had reigned two and twenty years, he died by a ſurfeit of over-much drink; and left his kingdom to *Attalus*, of whom we now intreat, that was ſon unto *Attalus* the

[a] Jul. Front. Strat. L. 1. C. 11.

youngeſt

youngeſt brother of *Philetærus*. *Attalus* was an undertaking prince, very bountiful, and no leſs valiant. By his own proper forces he reſtored his friend *Ariarathes* the *Cappadocian* into his kingdom, whence he had been expelled. He was grievouſly moleſted by *Acheus*: who ſetting up himſelf, as king, againſt *Antiochus the great*, reigned in the leſſer *Aſia*. He was beſieged in his own city of *Pergamus*: but by the help of the *Tectoſagæ*, a nation of the *Gauls*, whom he called over out of *Thrace*, he recovered all that he had loſt. When theſe *Gauls* had once gotten footing in *Aſia*, they never wanted employment: but were either entertained by ſome of the princes reigning in thoſe quarters; or interpoſed themſelves, without invitation, and found themſelves work in quarrels of their own making. They cauſed *Pruſias* king of *Bithynia* to ceaſe from his war againſt *Byzantium*. Whereunto when he had condeſcended; they nevertheleſs within a while after invaded his kingdom. He obtained againſt them a great victory; and uſed it with great cruelty, ſparing neither age nor ſex. But the ſwarm of them increaſing, they occupied the region about *Helleſpont*: where, in ſeating themſelves, they were much beholden unto *Attalus*. Nevertheleſs, preſuming afterwards upon their ſtrength; they forced their neighbour princes and cities to pay them tribute. In the ſharp exaction whereof, they had no more reſpect unto *Attalus* than to any that had worſe deſerved of them. By this they compelled him to fight againſt them; and he being victorious, compelled them to contain themſelves within the bounds of that province, which took name from them in time following, and was called *Galatia*. Yet continued they ſtill to oppreſs the weakeſt of their neighbours; and to fill up the armies of thoſe that could beſt hire them.

The kings reigning in thoſe parts, were the poſterity of ſuch as had ſaved themſelves and their provinces, in the ſlothful reign of the *Perſians*; or in the buſy times of *Alexander*, and his *Macedonian* followers. The *Cappadocians* were very ancient. For the firſt of their line had married with *Atoſſa*, ſiſter unto the great king *Cyrus*. Their country was taken from them by *Perdiccas*, as is ſhewed before. But the ſon of that king, whom *Perdiccas* crucified, eſpying his time while the *Macedonians* were at civil wars among themſelves; recovered his dominion, and paſſed it over to his off-ſpring. The kings of *Pontus* had alſo their beginning from the *Perſian* empire; and are ſaid to have iſſued from the royal houſe of *Achæmenes*. The *Paphlagonians* derived themſelves from *Pylæmenes*, a king that aſſiſted *Priamus* at the war of *Troy*. Theſe, applying themſelves unto the times, were always conformable unto the ſtrongeſt. The anceſtors of *Pruſias* had begun to reign in *Bithynia*, ſome few generations before that of *the Great Alexander*. They lay ſomewhat out of the *Macedonians* way: by whom therefore, having other employment, they were the leſs moleſted. *Calantus*, one of *Alexander*'s captains, made an expedition into their country; where he was vanquiſhed. They had afterwards to do with a lieutenant of *Antigonus*, that made them ſomewhat more humble. And thus they ſhuffled, as did the reſt, until the reign of *Pruſias*, whom we have already ſometimes mentioned.

SECT. VII.

The town of Cios *taken by* Philip, *at the inſtance of* Pruſias *king of* Bithynia, *and cruelly deſtroyed. By this and like actions* Philip *grows hateful to many of the* Greeks; *and is warred upon by* Attalus *king of* Pergamus, *and by the* Rhodians.

PRUSIAS, as a neighbour king, had many quarrels with *Attalus*, whoſe greatneſs he ſuſpected. He therefore ſtrengthned himſelf, by taking to wife the daughter of *Philip*; as *Attalus*, on the contrary ſide, entered into a ſtrict confederacy with the *Etolians*, *Rhodians*, and other of the *Greeks*. But when *Philip* had ended his *Etolian* war, and was deviſing with *Antiochus* about ſharing between them two the kingdom of *Egypt*, wherein *Ptolemy Philopater*, a friend unto them both, was newly dead, and had left his ſon *Ptolemy Epiphanes*, a young child, his heir; the *Bithynian* entreated this his father-in-law to come over into *Aſia*, there to win the town of the *Ciani*, and beſtow it upon him. *Pruſias* had no right unto the town, nor juſt matter of quarrel againſt it; but it was fitly ſeated for him, and therewithal rich. *Philip* came, as one that could not well deny to help his ſon-in-law: but hereby he mightily offended no ſmall part of *Greece*. Ambaſſadors came to him, whilſt he lay at the ſiege, from the *Rhodians*, and divers other ſtates; entreating him to forſake the enterprize. He gave dilatory, but otherwiſe gentle anſwers, making ſhew as if he would condeſcend to their requeſt; when he intended nothing leſs. At length he got the town, where, even in preſence of the ambaſſadors, of whoſe ſollicitation he had ſeemed ſo regardful, he omitted no part of cruelty. Hereby he rendered himſelf odious to his neighbours, as a perfidious and cruel prince. Eſpecially his fact was deteſted of the *Rhodians*, who had made vehement interceſſion for the poor *Ciani*; and were advertiſed by ambaſſadors of purpoſe ſent unto them from *Philip*, that, howſoever it were in his power to win the town as ſoon as he liſted; yet, in regard of his love to the *Rhodians*, he was contented to give it over. And by this his clemency, the ambaſſadors ſaid, that he would manifeſt unto the world what ſlanderous tongues they were, which noiſed abroad ſuch reports as went, of his falſhood and oppreſſions. Whilſt the ambaſſadors were declaiming at *Rhodes*, in the theatre, to this effect, there came ſome that made a true relation of what had happened; ſhewing that *Philip* had ſacked and deſtroyed the town of *Cios*, and, after a cruel ſlaughter of the inhabitants, had made ſlaves of all that eſcaped the ſword. If the *Rhodians* took this in great deſpite, no leſs were the *Etolians* inflamed againſt him, ſince they had ſent a captain to take charge of the town; being warned before by his doings at *Lyſimachia* and *Chalcedon* (which he had withdrawn from their confederacy to his own) what little truſt was to be repoſed in the faith of this king. But moſt of all others was *Attalus* moved with conſideration of the *Macedonians* violent ambition, and of his own eſtate. He had much to loſe, and was not without hope of getting much, if he could make a ſtrong party in *Greece*. He had already, as a new king, followed the example of *Alexander*'s captains, in purchaſing with much liberality the love of the *Athenians*, which were notable trumpeters of other mens virtue, having loſt their own. On the friendſhip of the *Etolians* he had cauſe to preſume, having bound them unto him by good offices, many and great, in their late war with *Philip*. The *Rhodians*, that were mighty at ſea, and held very good intelligence with the *Egyptians*, *Syrians*, and many other princes and ſtates, he eaſily drew into a ſtreight alliance with him, by their hatred newly conceived againſt *Philip*.

Upon

Upon confidence in theſe his friends, but moſt of all in the ready aſſiſtance of the *Rhodians*, *Attalus* prepared to deal with the *Macedonian* by open war. It had been unſeaſonable to procraſtinate, and expect whereto the doings of the enemy tended, ſince his deſire to faſten upon *Aſia* was manifeſt, and his falſhood no leſs manifeſt, than was ſuch his deſire. They met with him ſhortly not far from *Chios*, and fought with him a battel at ſea, wherein, though *Attalus* was driven to run his own ſhip on ground, hardly eſcaping to land; though the admiral of the *Rhodians* took his death's wound; and though *Philip*, after the battel, took harbour under a promontory, by which they had fought; ſo that he had the gathering of the wrecks upon the ſhore: yet foraſmuch as he had ſuffered far greater loſs of ſhips and men, than had the enemy, and ſince he durſt not in few days after put forth to ſea, when *Attalus* and the *Rhodians* came to brave him in his port, the honour of the victory was adjudged to his enemies. This notwithſtanding, *Philip* afterwards beſieged, and won ſome towns in *Caria*; whether only in a bravery, and to deſpite his oppoſites, or whether upon any hopeful deſire of conqueſt, it is uncertain. The ſtratagem, by which he won *Prinaſſus*, is worthy of noting. He attempted it by a mine, and finding the earth ſo ſtony, that it reſiſted his work, he nevertheleſs commanded the pioneers to make a noiſe under-ground; and ſecretly in the night-time he raiſed a great mount about the entrance of the mine, to breed an opinion in the beſieged, that the work went marvellouſly forward. At length he ſent word to the townſmen, that by his undermining, two acres of their wall ſtood only upon wooden props; to which, if he gave fire, and entered by a breach, they ſhould expect no mercy. The *Prinaſſians* little thought that he had fetched all his earth and rubbiſh by night a great way off, to raiſe up thoſe heaps which they ſaw, but rather that all had been extracted out of the mine. Wherefore they ſuffered themſelves to be out-faced, and gave up the town as loſt, which the enemy had no hope to win by force. But *Philip* could not ſtay to ſettle himſelf in thoſe parts. *Attalus* and the *Rhodians* were too ſtrong for him at ſea, and compelled him to make haſte back into *Macedon*, whither they followed him all the way in manner of purſuit.

SECT. VIII.

The Romans, *after their* Carthaginian *war, ſeek matter of quarrel againſt* Philip. *The* Athenians *upon ſlight cauſe proclaim war againſt* Philip, *moved thereto by* Attalus, *whom they flatter.* Philip *wins divers towns, and makes peremptory anſwer to the* Roman *ambaſſador. The furious reſolution of the* Abydeni.

THESE *Aſiatic* matters, which no way concerned the *Romans*, yet ſerved well to make a noiſe in *Rome*, and fill the people's heads, if not with a deſire of making war in *Macedon*, at leaſt with a conceit that it were expedient ſo to do. The *Roman* ſenate was perfectly informed of the ſtate of thoſe eaſtern countries, and knew that there was none other nation than the *Greeks*, which lay between them and the lordſhip of *Aſia*. Theſe *Greeks* were factious, and ſeldom or never at peace. As for the *Macedonian*, though length of time, and continual dealings in *Greece* ever ſince the reigns of *Philip* and *Alexander*, had left no difference between him and the naturals; yet moſt of them abhorred his dominion, becauſe he was originally, forſooth, a *Barbarian*: many of them hated him upon ancient quarrels; and they that had been moſt beholden unto him, were nevertheleſs weary of him, by reaſon of his perſonal faults. All this gave hope, that the affairs of *Greece* would not long detain the *Roman* armies; eſpecially ſince the diviſions of the country were ſuch, that every petty eſtate was apt to take counſel apart for it ſelf, without much regarding the generality. But the poor commonalty of *Rome* had no great affection to ſuch a chargeable enterpriſe. They were already quite exhauſted by that grievous war with *Hannibal*, wherein they had given by loan to the republick all their money; neither had they as yet received, neither did they receive until fifteen or ſixteen years after this, their whole ſum back again. That part of payment alſo which was already made, being not in preſent money, but much of it in land, it behoved them to reſt a-while, and beſtow the more diligence in tilling their grounds, by how much they were the leſs able to beſtow coſt. Wherefore they took no pleaſure to hear, that *Attalus* and the *Rhodians* had ſent ambaſſadors to ſollicit them againſt *Philip*, with report of his bold attempts in *Aſia*: or that *M. Aurelius*, their *Agent* in *Greece*, had ſent letters of the ſame tenor to the ſenate; and magnified his intelligence, by ſetting out the preparations of this dangerous enemy, that ſollicited not only the towns upon the continent, but all the iſlands in thoſe ſeas; viſiting them in perſon, or ſending ambaſſadors, as one that meant ſhortly to hold war with the *Romans* upon their own ground. *Philip* had indeed no ſuch intent; neither was he much too ſtrong, either of himſelf, or by his alliance in *Greece*, to be reſiſted by *Attalus* and the *Rhodians*, eſpecially with the help of the *Etolians*, their good friends; and (in a manner) his own profeſſed enemies. But ſuch things muſt be publiſhed abroad, if only to prediſpoſe men unto the war, and give it the more honeſt colour.

Philip was a man of ill condition, and therefore could not thrive by intermeddling in the affairs of thoſe that were more mighty than himſelf. He was too unſkilful, or otherwiſe too unapt, to retain his old friends; yet would he needs be ſeeking new enemies. And he found them ſuch as he deſerved to have them; for he offered his help to their deſtruction, when they were in miſery, and had done him no harm. It behoved him therefore either to have ſtrained his forces to the uttermoſt, in making war upon them; or, in deſiſting from that injurious courſe, to have made amends for the wrongs paſs'd, by doing friendly offices of his own accord. But he, having broken that league of peace, which is of all other the moſt natural, binding all men to offer no violence willingly, unleſs they think themſelves juſtly provoked, was afterwards too fondly perſwaded, that he might well be ſecure of the *Romans*, becauſe of the *written* covenants of peace between him and them. There is not any form of oath, whereby ſuch articles of peace can be held inviolable, ſave only [a] *by the water of Styx*, that is, by *neceſſity*; which whilſt it binds one party, or both, unto performance, making it apparent, that he ſhall be a loſer, who ſtarts from the conditions; it may ſo long (and ſo long only) be preſumed that there ſhall be no breach. Till *Hannibal* was vanquiſhed, the *Romans* never hearkned after *Philip*; for neceſſity made them let him alone. But when once they had peace with *Carthage*, then was this river of *Styx* dried up; and then could they ſwear, as [b] *Mercury* did in the comedy, by

[a] *Sir* Fra. Bacon de Sap. veterum. [b] Plaut. Amphitr.

their own ſelves, even by their good ſwords, that they had good reaſon to make war upon him. The voyage of *Sopater* into *Afric*, and the preſent war againſt *Attalus*, were matter of quarrel as much as needed; or, if this were not enough, the *Athenians* helped to furniſh them with more.

The *Athenians*, being at this time lords of no more than their own barren territory, took ſtate upon them nevertheleſs, as in their ancient fortune. Two young gentlemen of *Acarnania*, entering into the temple of *Ceres*, in the days of *initiation* (wherein were delivered the myſteries of religion, or rather, of idolatrous ſuperſtition, vainly ſaid to have been available unto felicity after this life) diſcovered themſelves, by ſome impertinent queſtions, to be none of thoſe that were initiated. Hereupon they were brought before the officers; and though it was apparent, that they came into the place by mere error, not thinking to have therein done amiſs; yet, as it had been for ſome heinous crime, they were put to death. All their countrymen at home took this in ill part, and ſought to revenge it as a publick injury, by war upon the *Athenians*. Procuring therefore of *Philip* ſome *Macedonians* to help them, they entered into *Attica*, who waſted it with fire and ſword, and carried thence away with them a great booty. This indignity ſtirred up the high-minded *Athenians*, and made them think upon doing more than they had ability to perform. All which at the preſent they could do, was to ſend ambaſſadors to king *Attalus*, gratulating his happy ſucceſs againſt *Philip*, and intreating him to viſit their city. *Attalus* was hereto the more willing, becauſe he underſtood that the *Roman* ambaſſadors, hovering about *Greece* for matter of *intelligence*, had a purpoſe to be there at the ſame time. So he went thither, accompanied, beſides his own followers, with ſome of the *Rhodians*. Landing in the *Piræus*, he found the *Romans* there, with whom he had much friendly conference, they rejoicing that he continued enemy to *Philip*; and he being no leſs glad when he heard of their purpoſe to renew the war. The *Athenians* came forth of their city, all the magiſtrates, prieſts, and citizens, with their wives and children, in as ſolemn a pomp as they could deviſe, to meet and honour the king. They entertained the *Romans* that were with him in very loving manner; but towards *Attalus* himſelf, they omitted no point of obſervance, which their flattery could ſuggeſt. At his firſt coming into the city, they called the people to aſſembly; where they deſired him to honour them with his preſence, and let them hear him ſpeak. But he excuſed himſelf, ſaying, that with an evil grace he ſhould recount unto them thoſe many benefits, by which he ſtudied to make them know what love he bore them. Wherefore it was thought fit that he ſhould deliver in writing, what he would have to be propounded. He did ſo. The points of his declaration were; firſt, what he had willingly done for their ſake; then, what had lately paſſed between him and *Philip*; laſtly, an exhortation unto them, to declare themſelves againſt the *Macedonian*, whilſt he, with the *Rhodians* and the *Romans*, were willing and ready to take their part; which if they now refuſed to do, he proteſted that afterwards it would be vain to crave his help. There needed little intreaty, for they were as willing to proclaim the war, as he to deſire it. As for other matters, they loaded him with immoderate honours, and ordained, that unto the ten tribes, whereof the body of their citizens conſiſted, ſhould be added another, and called after his name; as if he were in part one of their founders. To the *Rhodians* they alſo decreed a crown of gold, in reward of their virtue, and made all the *Rhodians* free citizens of *Athens*.

Thus began a great noiſe of war, wherein little was left unto the *Romans* for their part; *Attalus*, and the *Rhodians*, taking all upon them. But while theſe were vainly miſpending the time, in ſeeking to draw the *Etolians* to their party, that contrary to their old manner were glad to be at quiet, *Philip* won the towns of *Maronea* and *Ænus*, with many other ſtrong places about the *Helleſpont*. Likewiſe paſſing over the *Helleſpont*, he laid ſiege unto *Abydus*; and won it, though he was fain to ſtay there long. The town held out, rather upon an obſtinate reſolution, and hope of ſuccour from *Attalus* and the *Rhodians*, than any great ability to defend it ſelf againſt ſo mighty an enemy. But the *Rhodians* ſent thither only one quadrireme gally, and *Attalus* no more than three hundred men; far too weak an aid to make good the place. The *Roman* embaſſadors wondred much at this great negligence of them that had taken ſo much upon them.

Theſe embaſſadors, *C. Claudius*, *M. Æmilius*, and *P. Sempronius*, were ſent unto *Ptolemy Epiphanes*, king of *Egypt*, to acquaint him with their victory againſt *Hannibal* and the *Carthaginians*; as alſo to thank him for his favour unto them ſhewed in that war; and to deſire the continuance thereof, if they ſhould need it againſt *Philip*. This *Egyptian* king was now in the third or fourth year of his reign, which (as his father *Philopator* had done before him) he began a very young boy. The courteſie for which the *Romans* were to thank him, was, that out of *Egypt* they had lately been ſupplied with corn, in a time of extreme dearth; when the miſeries of war had made all their own provinces unable to relieve them. This meſſage could not but be welcome to the *Egyptian*: ſince it was well known, how *Philip* and *Antiochus*, had combined themſelves againſt him; conſpiring to take away his kingdom. And therefore it might in reaſon be hoped, that he, or his council for him, ſhould offer to ſupply the *Romans* with corn: ſince this their *Macedonian* expedition, concerned his eſtate no leſs than theirs.

But as the errand was for the moſt part complemental: ſo had the embaſſadors both leiſure and direction from the ſenate, to look unto the things of *Greece* by the way. Wherefore they agreed, that *M. Æmilius*, the youngeſt of them, ſhould ſtep aſide, and viſit *Philip*, to try if he could make him leave the ſiege of *Abydus*; which elſe he was like to carry. *Æmilius*, coming to *Philip*, tells him, that his doings are contrary to the league that he had made with the *Romans*. For *Attalus* and the *Rhodians*, upon whom he made war, were confederate with *Rome*: and the town of *Abydus*, which he was now beſieging, had a kind of dependency upon *Attalus*. Hereto *Philip* anſwered, that *Attalus* and the *Rhodians* had made war upon him: and that he did only requite them with the like. *Do you alſo* (ſaid *Æmilius*) *requite theſe poor* Abydeni *with ſuch terrible war, for any the like invaſion by them firſt made upon you?* The king was angry to hear himſelf thus taken ſhort: and therefore he roundly made anſwer to *Æmilius*; *It is your youth, Sir, and your beauty; and (above all) your being a* Roman, *that makes you thus preſumptuous. But I would wiſh ye to remember the league that ye have made with me, and to keep it: if ye do otherwiſe, I will make ye underſtand, that the kingdom and name of* Macedon *is in matter of war, no leſs noble than the* Roman. So he diſmiſſed

miſſed the embaſſador; and had the town immediately yielded to his diſcretion. The people had entertained a reſolution, to have died every one of them, and ſet their town on fire; binding themſelves hereto by a fearful oath, when *Philip* denied to accept them upon reaſonable conditions. But having in deſperate fight, once repelling him from the breach, loſt the greateſt number of their youth: it was thought meet by the governors and ancients of the city, to change this reſolution, and take ſuch peace as could be gotten. So they carried out their gold and ſilver to *Philip:* about which whilſt they were buſy, the memory of their oath wrought ſo effectually in the younger ſort; that, by exhortation of their prieſts, they fell to murdering their women, children, and themſelves. Hereof the king had ſo little compaſſion, that he ſaid, he would grant the *Abydeni* three days leiſure to die: and to that end forbad his men to enter the town; or hazard themſelves in interrupting the violence of thoſe mad fools.

SECT. IX.

The Romans *decree war againſt* Philip, *and ſend one of their conſuls into* Greece, *as it were in defence of the* Athenians *their confederates. How poor the* Athenians *were at this time, both in quality and eſtate.*

THis calamity of the *Abydeni*, was likened by the *Romans* unto that of the *Saguntines:* which indeed it nearly reſembled; though *Rome* was not alike intereſſed in the quarrel. But to help themſelves with pretence for the war, they had found out another *Saguntum*, even the city of *Athens:* which if the *Macedonian* ſhould win, then reſted there no more to do, than that he ſhould preſently embark himſelf for *Italy*, whither he would come, not as *Hannibal* from *Saguntum*, in five months, but in the ſhort ſpace of five days ſailing. Thus *P. Sulpicius*, the conſul, told the multitude, when he exhorted them to make war upon *Philip*; which at his firſt propounding they had denied. The example of *Pyrrhus* was by him alledged, to ſhew, what *Philip*, with the power of a greater kingdom, might dare to undertake: as alſo the fortunate voyage of *Scipio* into *Afric*; to ſhew the difference of making war abroad, and admitting it into the bowels of their own country. By ſuch arguments was the commonalty of *Rome* induced to believe, that this war with the *Macedonian* was both juſt and neceſſary. So it was decreed: and immediately the ſame conſul haſted away towards *Macedon*, having that province allotted unto him before, and all things in a readineſs, by order from the ſenate; who followed other motives, than the people muſt be acquainted with. Great thanks were given to the *Athenian* embaſſadors, for their conſtancy (as was ſaid) in not changing their faith at ſuch time as they ſtood in danger of being beſieged. And indeed great thanks were due to them; though not upon the ſame occaſion. For the people of *Rome* had no cauſe to think it a benefit unto themſelves, that any *Greek* town, refuſing to ſue unto the *Macedonian* for peace, requeſted their help againſt him. But the ſenate intending to take in hand the conqueſt of the *eaſtern* parts, had reaſon to give thanks unto thoſe that miniſtred the occaſion. Since therefore it was an untrue ſuggeſtion, that *Philip* was making ready for *Italy:* and ſince neither *Attalus*, the *Rhodians*, nor any other ſtate in thoſe quarters, deſired the *Romans* to give them protection: theſe buſy-headed *Athenians*, who falling out with the *Arcarnanians*, and conſequently with *Philip*, about a matter of *Maygame* (as was ſhewed before) ſent embaſſadors into all parts of the world, even to *Ptolemy* of *Egypt*, and to the *Romans*, as well as to *Attalus*, and other their neighbours; muſt be accepted as cauſe of the war, and authors of the benefit thence redounding.

Nevertheleſs, as it loves to fall out where the meaning differs from the pretence: the doings of *P. Sulpicius*, the conſul, were ſuch, as might have argued *Athens* to be the leaſt part of his care. He failed not about *Peloponneſus*, but took the ready way to *Macedon*; and landing about the river of *Apſus*, between *Dyrrachium* and *Apollonia*, there began the war. Soon upon his coming, the *Athenian* ambaſſadors were with him, and craved his help; whereof they could make no benefit whilſt he was ſo far from them. They bemoaned themſelves as men beſieged, and entreated him to deliver them. For which cauſe he ſent unto them *C. Claudius*, with twenty gallies, and a competent number of men: but the main of his forces he retained with him, for the proſecution of a greater deſign. The *Athenians* were not indeed beſieged: only ſome rovers of *Chalcis*, in the iſle of *Eubœa*; and ſome bands of adventurers out of *Corinth*; uſed to take their ſhips, and ſpoil their fields, becauſe they had declared themſelves againſt king *Philip*, that was lord of theſe two towns. The robberies done by theſe pirates, and free-booters, were by the more eloquent than warlike *Athenians*, *in the declining age of their* fortune and virtue, called a ſiege. From ſuch detriment the arrival of *Claudius*, and ſhortly after of three *Rhodian* gallies, eaſily preſerved them. As for the *Athenians* themſelves; they that had been wont, in ancient times, to undertake the conqueſts of *Egypt*, *Cyprus*, and *Sicily*; to make war upon the great *Perſian* king; and to hold ſo much of *Greece* in ſubjection, as made them redoubtable unto all the reſt: had now no more than three ſhips, and thoſe open ones, not much better than long boats. Yet thought they not themſelves a whit the worſe men; but ſtood as highly upon the glory and virtue of their anceſtors, as if it had been ſtill their own.

SECT. X.

The town of Chalcis, *in* Eubœa, *taken and ſack'd by the* Romans, *and their aſſociates, that lay in garriſon at* Athens. Philip *attempteth to take* Athens *by ſurpriſe: waſteth the country about: and makes a journey into* Peloponneſus. *Of* Nabis, *the tyrant of* Lacedemon, *and his wife.* Philip *offers to make war againſt* Nabis *for the* Acheans. *He returneth home through* Attica, *which he ſpoileth again: and provides againſt the enemies. Some exploits of the* Romans. *Divers princes join with them. Great labouring to draw the* Etolians *into the war.*

PHILIP, returning home from *Abydus*, heard news of the *Roman* conſul's being about *Apollonia*. But ere he ſtirred forth to give him entertainment; or perhaps before he had well reſolved, whether it were beſt a while to ſit ſtill, and try what might be done for obtaining of peace, or whether to make oppoſition, and reſiſt theſe invaders with all his forces: he received advertiſement from *Chalcis* of a grievous miſhap there befallen him, by procurement of the *Athenians*. For *C. Claudius*, with his *Romans*, finding no ſuch work at *Athens* as they had expected, or as was anſwerable

to

to the fame that went abroad; purpoſed to do ſomewhat that might quicken the war, and make his own employment better. He grew ſoon weary of ſitting as a ſcare-crow, to ſave the *Athenians* grounds from ſpoil; and therefore gladly took in hand a buſineſs of more importance. The town of *Chalcis* was negligently guarded by the *Macedonian* ſoldiers therein, for that there was no enemy at hand; and more negligently by the townſmen, who repoſed themſelves upon their garriſon. Hereof *Claudius* having advertiſement, ſailed thither by night, for fear of being deſcried; and arriving there a little before break of day, took it by ſcalado. He uſed no mercy, but ſlew all that came in his way: and wanting men to keep it (unleſs he ſhould have left the heartleſs *Athenians* to their own defence) he ſet it on fire; conſuming the king's magazines of corn, and all proviſions for war, which were plenteouſly filled. Neither were he and his aſſociates contented with the great abundance of ſpoil which they carried aboard their ſhips; and with enlarging all thoſe, whom *Philip*, as in a place of moſt ſecurity, kept there impriſoned: but, to ſhew their deſpight and hatred unto the king, they overthrew, and brake in pieces the ſtatues unto him there erected. This done, they haſted away towards *Athens:* where the news of their exploit were like to be joyfully welcomed. The king lay then at *Demetrias*, about ſome twenty miles thence: whither when theſe tidings, or part of them, were brought him, though he ſaw that it was too late to remedy the matter; yet he made all haſte to take revenge. He thought to have taken the *Athenians*, with their truſty friends, buſy at work in ranſacking the town, and loading themſelves with ſpoil: but they were gone before his coming. Five thouſand light-armed foot he had with him, and three hundred horſe: whereof leaving at *Chalcis* only a few to bury the dead, he marched thence away ſpeedily towards *Athens:* thinking it not impoſſible to take his enemies, in the joy of their victory, as full of negligence, as they had taken *Chalcis*. Neither had he much failed of his expectation, if a foot-poſt, that ſtood ſcout for the city upon the borders, had not deſcried him afar off, and ſwiftly carried word of his approach to *Athens*. It was mid-night when this poſt came thither: who found all the town aſleep, as fearleſs of any danger. But the magiſtrates, hearing his report, cauſed a trumpet out of their citadel to ſound the alarm, and with all ſpeed made ready for defence. Within a few hours *Philip* was there: who ſeeing the many lights, and other ſigns of buſy preparation uſual in ſuch a caſe, underſtood that they had news of his coming; and therefore willed his men, to repoſe themſelves till it were day. It is like, that the paucity of his followers did help well to animate the citizens, which beheld them from the walls. Wherefore though *Claudius* were not yet returned (who was to fetch a compaſs about by ſea, and had no cauſe of haſte) yet having in the town ſome mercenary ſoldiers, which they kept, of their own, beſides the great multitude of citizens; they adventured to iſſue forth at a gate, whereto they ſaw *Philip* make approach. The king was glad of this; reckoning all thoſe his own, that were thus hardy. He therefore only willed his men to follow his example; and preſently gave charge upon them. In that fight he gave ſingular proof of his valour: and beating down many of the enemies with his own hands, drove them with great ſlaughter back into the city. The heat of his courage tranſported him further, than diſcretion would have allowed, even to the very gate. But he retired without harm taken; for that they, which were upon the towers over the gate, could not uſe their caſting weapons againſt him, without endangering their own people, that were thronging before him into the city. There was a temple of *Hercules*, a place of exerciſe, with a grove, and many goodly monuments beſides, near adjoining unto *Athens:* of which he ſpared none, but ſuffered the rage of his anger to extend, even unto the ſepulchres of the dead. The next day came the *Romans*, and ſome companies of *Attalus*'s men from *Ægina*; too late, in regard of what was already paſt; but in good time, to prevent him of ſatisfying his anger to the full, which as yet he had not done. So he departed thence to *Corinth:* and hearing that the *Acheans* held a parliament at *Argos*, he came thither to them unexpected.

The *Acheans* were deviſing upon war, which they intended to make againſt *Nabis*, the tyrant of *Lacedemon:* who being ſtarted up in the room of *Machanidas*, did greater miſchief than any that went before him. This tyrant relied wholly upon his mercenaries; and of his ſubjects had no regard. He was a cruel oppreſſor; a greedy extortioner upon thoſe that lived under him; and one, that in his natural condition ſmelt rankly of the hangman. In theſe qualities, his wife *Apega*, was very fitly matched with him: ſince his dexterity was no greater in ſpoiling the men, than hers in fleecing their wives; whom ſhe would never ſuffer to be at quiet, till they had preſented her with all their [a] *jewels* and *apparel*. Her huſband was ſo delighted with her property, that he cauſed an image to be made lively repreſenting her, and apparelled it with ſuch coſtly garments as ſhe uſed to wear. But it was indeed an [b] *engine*, ſerving to torment men. Hereof he made uſe, when he meant to try the virtue of his rhetorick. For calling unto him ſome rich man, of whoſe money he was deſirous, he would bring him into the room where this counterfeit *Apega* ſtood, and there uſe all his art of perſwaſion to get what he deſired, as it were by good-will. If he could not ſo ſpeed, but was anſwered with excuſes, then took he the refractory denier by the hand, and told him, that perhaps his wife *Apega* (who ſat by in a chair) could perſwade more effectually. So he led him to the image, that roſe up, and opened the arms, as it were for embracement. Thoſe arms were full of ſharp iron nails, the like whereof were alſo ſticking in the breaſts, though hidden with her cloaths: and herewith ſhe griped the poor wretch, to the pleaſure of the tyrant, that laughed at his cruel death. Such, and worſe (for it were long to tell all here that is ſpoken of him) was *Nabis* in his government. In his dealings abroad, he combined with the *Etolians*, as *Machanidas* and *Lycurgus* had done before him. By theſe he grew into acquaintance with the *Romans*; and was comprehended in the league which they made with *Philip*, at the end of their former war. Of *Philopœmen*'s virtue he ſtood in fear; and therefore durſt not provoke the *Acheans*, as long as they had ſuch an able commander. But when *Cycliades*, a far worſe captain, was their pretor; and all, or the greateſt part of their mercenaries were diſcharged; *Philopœmen* being alſo gone into *Crete*, to follow his beloved occupation of war: then did *Nabis* fall upon their territory; and waſting all the fields,

[a] Liv. lib. 32. Excerpt. è Polyb. l. 13.

made

made them diſtruſt their own ſafety in the towns.

Againſt this tyrant, the *Acheans* were preparing for war, when *Philip* came among them; and had ſet down what proportion of ſoldiers every city of their corporation ſhould furniſh out. But *Philip* willed them, not to trouble themſelves with the care of this buſineſs; foraſmuch as he alone would eaſe them of this war, and take the burden upon himſelf. With exceeding joy and thanks they accepted of this kind offer. But then he told them, that whilſt he made war upon *Lacedemon*, he ought not to leave his own towns unguarded. In which reſpect, he thought they would be pleaſed to ſend a few men to *Corinth*, and ſome companies into the iſle of *Eubœa*, that ſo he might ſecurely purſue the war againſt *Nabis*. Immediately they found out his device, which was none other, than to engage their nation in his war againſt the *Romans*. Wherefore their pretor *Cycliades* made him anſwer, that their laws forbade them to conclude any other matters in their parliament, than thoſe for which it was aſſembled. So paſſing the decree, upon which they had agreed before, for preparing war againſt *Nabis*, he broke up the aſſembly, with every man's good-liking; whereas in former times, he had been thought no better than one of the king's paraſites.

It grieved the king to have thus failed in his purpoſe with the *Acheans*. Nevertheleſs he gathered up among them a few volunteers, and ſo returned by *Corinth* back into *Attica*. There he met with *Philocles*, one of his captains, that, with two thouſand men, had been doing what harm he might unto the country. With this addition of ſtrength, he attempted the caſtle of *Eleuſine*, the haven of *Pyræus*, and even the city of *Athens*. But the *Romans* made ſuch haſte after him by ſea, thruſting themſelves into every of theſe places, that he could no more than wreak his anger upon thoſe goodly temples, with which the land of *Attica* was at that time ſingularly beautified. So he deſtroyed all the works of their notable artificers, wrought in excellent marble, which they had in plenty of their own; or, having long ago been maſters of the ſea, had brought from other places, where beſt choice was found. Neither did he only pull all down, but cauſed his men to break the very ſtones, that they might be unſerviceable to the reparation. His loſs at *Chalcis* being thus revenged upon *Athens*, he went home into *Macedon*, and there made proviſion both againſt the *Roman* conſul that lay about *Apollonia*, and againſt the *Dardanians*, with other his bad neighbours, which were likely to infeſt him. Among his other cares, he forgot not the *Etolians*, to whoſe parliament, ſhortly to be held at *Naupactus*, he ſent an embaſſy, requeſting them to continue in his friendſhip. Thus was *Philip* occupied.

Sulpicius, the *Roman* conſul, encamped upon the river of *Apſus*. Thence he ſent forth *Apuſtius*, his lieutenant, with part of the army, to waſte the borders of *Macedon*. *Apuſtius* took ſundry caſtles and towns, uſing ſuch extremity of ſword and fire at *Antipatria*, the firſt good town, which he won by force, that none durſt afterwards make reſiſtance, unleſs they knew themſelves able to hold out. Returning towards the conſul with his ſpoil, he was charged in rear, upon the paſſage of a brook, by *Athenagoras*, a *Macedonian* captain: but the *Romans* had the better, and killing many of theſe enemies, took priſoners many more, to the increaſe of their booty, with which they arrived in ſafety at their camp. The ſucceſs of this expedition, though it were not great, yet ſerved to draw into the *Roman* friendſhip, thoſe that had formerly no good inclination to the *Macedonian*. Theſe were *Pleuratus*, the ſon of *Scerdilaidas* the *Illyrian*; *Aminander*, king of the *Athamanians*; and *Bato*, the ſon of *Longarus*, a prince of the *Dardanians*. They offered their aſſiſtance unto the conſul, who thanked them, and ſaid, that he would ſhortly make uſe of *Pleuratus* and *Bato*, when he entered into *Macedon*; but that the friendſhip of *Aminander*, whoſe country lay between the *Etolians* and *Theſſaly*, might be perhaps available with the *Etolians*, to ſtir them up againſt *Philip*.

So the preſent care was wholly ſet upon the *Etolian* parliament at hand. Thither came ambaſſadors from the *Macedonians*, *Romans*, and *Athenians*. Of which, the *Macedonian* ſpake firſt, and ſaid, that as there was nothing fallen out which ſhould occaſion the breach of peace between his maſter and the *Etolians*; ſo was it to be hoped that they would not ſuffer themſelves, without good cauſe, to be carried away after other men's fancies. He prayed them to conſider, how the *Romans* heretofore had made ſhew as if their war in *Greece* tended only to the defence of the *Etolians*; and yet notwithſtanding had been angry, that the *Etolians*, by making peace with *Philip*, had no longer need of ſuch their patronage. What might it be that made them ſo buſy in intruding their protection upon thoſe that needed it not? Surely it was even the general hatred which theſe *Barbarians* bore unto the *Greeks*. For even after the ſame ſort had they lent their help to the *Mamertines*, and afterwards delivered *Syracuſe*, when it was oppreſſed by *Carthaginian* tyrants; but now both *Syracuſe* and *Meſſina* were ſubject unto the rods and axes of the *Romans*. To the ſame effect he alledged many examples; adding, that in like ſort it would happen to the *Etolians*, who, if they drew ſuch maſters into *Greece*, muſt not look hereafter to hold, as now, free parliaments of their own, wherein to conſult about war and peace: the *Romans* would eaſe them of this care, and ſend them ſuch a moderator as went every year from *Rome* to *Syracuſe*. Wherefore he concluded, that it was beſt for them, whilſt as yet they might, and whilſt one of them as yet could help the other, to continue in their league with *Philip*, with whom, if at any time upon light occaſion they happened to fall out, they might as lightly be reconciled; and with whom they had three years ago made the peace, which ſtill continued, although the ſame *Romans* were then againſt it, who ſought to break it now.

It would have troubled the *Romans*, to frame a good anſwer to theſe objections. For the *Macedonian* had ſpoken the very truth, in ſhewing whereto this their patronage, which they offered with ſuch importunity, did tend. Wherefore the *Athenians* were ſet on by them to ſpeak next, who had ſtore of eloquence, and matter of recrimination enough, to make *Philip* odious. Theſe affirmed, that it was a great impudence in the *Macedonian* ambaſſador to call the *Romans* by the name of *Barbarians*, knowing in what barbarous manner his own king had, in few days paſs'd, made war upon the gods themſelves, by deſtroying all their temples in *Attica*. Herewithal they made a pitiful rehearſal of their own calamities; and ſaid, that if *Philip* might have his will, *Etolia*, and all the reſt of *Greece*, ſhould feel the ſame that *Attica* had felt; yea, that *Athens* itſelf, together with *Minerva*, *Jupiter*, *Ceres*, and other of the gods, were like to have felt, if the walls and the *Roman* arms had not defended them.

Then ſpake the *Romans*, who excuſing, as well as they could, their own oppreſſion of all thoſe in whoſe defence they had heretofore taken arms, went roundly to the point in hand. They ſaid, that they had

had of late made war in the *Etolians* behalf, and that the *Etolians* had, without their conſent, made peace: whereof ſince the *Etolians* muſt excuſe themſelves, by alledging that the *Romans*, being buſied with *Carthage*, wanted leiſure to give them aid convenient; ſo this excuſe being now taken away, and the *Romans* wholly bent againſt their common enemy, it concerned the *Etolians* to take part with them in their war and victory, unleſs they had rather periſh with *Philip*.

It might eaſily be perceived, that they which were ſo vehement, in offering their help ere it was deſired, were themſelves carried into the war by more earneſt motives than a ſimple deſire to help thoſe friends, with whom they had no great acquaintance. This may have been the cauſe why *Dorymachus*, the *Etolian* pretor, ſhifted them off a-while with a dilatory anſwer; though he told his countrymen, that, by reſerving themſelves till the matter were inclined one way or other, they might afterwards take part with thoſe that had the better fortune. His anſwer was, firſt, in general terms; that over-much haſte was an enemy to good counſel, for which cauſe they muſt further deliberate ere they concluded. But coming nearer to the matter in hand, he paſſed a decree, *That the pretor might at any time call an aſſembly of the ſtates, and therein conclude upon this buſineſs; any law to the contrary notwithſtanding:* whereas otherwiſe it was unlawful to treat of ſuch affairs, except in two of their great parliaments that were held at ſet times.

SECT. XI.

The meeting of Philip *with the* Romans, *and skirmiſhing with them on his borders. The* Etolians *invade his dominions, and are beaten home. Some doings of* Attalus *and the* Roman *fleet.*

PHILIP was glad to hear, that the *Romans* had ſped no better in their ſollicitation of the *Etolians*. He thought them hereby diſappointed, in the very beginning, of one great help; and meant himſelf to diſappoint them of another. His ſon *Perſeus*, a very boy, was ſent to keep the ſtreights of *Pelagonia* againſt the *Dardanians*, having with him ſome of the king's council, to govern both him and his army. It was judged, as may ſeem, that the preſence of the king's ſon, how young ſoever, would both encourage his followers, and terrify the enemies; by making them at leaſt believe, that he was not weakly attended. And this may have been the reaſon why the ſame *Perſeus*, a few years before this, was in like manner left upon the borders of *Etolia* by his father, whom earneſt buſineſs called thence another way. No danger of enemies being left on either hand, it was thought that the *Macedonian* fleet under *Heraclides* would ſerve to keep *Attalus*, with the *Rhodians* and *Romans*, from doing harm by ſea, when the king's back was turned, who took his journey weſtward againſt *Sulpicius* the conſul.

The armies met in the country of the *Daſſaretii*, a people in the utmoſt borders of *Macedon*, towards *Illyria*, about the mountains of *Candavia*, that, running along from *Hæmus* in the north, until they join in the ſouth with *Pindus*, incloſe the weſtern parts of *Macedon*. Two or three days they lay in ſight the one of the other, without making offer of battel. The conſul was the firſt that iſſued forth of his camp into the open field. But *Philip* was not confident in the ſtrength which he had then about him, and therefore thought it better to ſend forth ſome of his light-armed mercenaries, and ſome part of his horſe, to entertain them with ſkirmiſh. Theſe were eaſily vanquiſhed by the *Romans*, and driven back into their camp. Now although it was ſo that the king was unwilling to hazard all at firſt upon a caſt, and therefore ſent for *Perſeus*, with his companies, to increaſe his own forces; yet being no leſs unwilling to loſe too much in reputation, he made ſhew a day after as if he would have fought. He had found the advantage of a place fit for ambuſh, wherein he beſtowed as many as he thought meet of his targetteers, and ſo gave charge to *Athenagoras*, one of his captains, to provoke out the *Romans* to fight; inſtructing both him and the targetteers how to behave themſelves reſpectively, as opportunity ſhould fall out. The *Romans* had no miſtruſt of any ambuſh, having fought upon the ſame ground a day before; wherefore perhaps they might have ſuſtained ſome notable detriment, if the king's directions had been well followed. For when *Athenagoras* began to fall back, they charged him ſo hotly, that they drove him to an haſty flight, and purſued him as hard as they were able. But the captains of the targetteers, not ſtaying to let them run into the danger, diſcovered themſelves before it was time; and thereby made fruſtrate the work to which they were appointed. The conſul hereby gathered, that the king had ſome deſire to try the fortune of a battel, which he therefore preſented the ſecond time, leading forth his army, and ſetting it in order, with elephants in the front; a kind of help which the *Romans* had never uſed before, but had taken theſe of late from the *Carthaginians*. Such are the alterations wrought by time. It was ſcarce above eighty years ere this, that *Pyrrhus* carried elephants out of *Greece* into *Italy*, to affright the *Romans*, who had never ſeen any of thoſe beaſts before. But now the ſame *Romans* (whilſt poſſibly ſome were yet alive which had known that expedition of *Pyrrhus*) come into *Macedon*, bringing elephants with them; whereof the *Macedonians* and *Greeks* have none. *Philip* had patience to let the conſul brave him at his trenches, wherein he did wiſely; for the *Roman* had greater need to fight than he. *Sulpicius* was unwilling to loſe time; neither could he without great danger, lying ſo near the enemy, that was ſtrong in horſe, ſend his men to fetch in corn out of the fields. Wherefore he removed eight miles off, preſuming that *Philip* would not adventure to meet him on even ground, and ſo the more boldly he ſuffered his foragers to over-run the country. The king was nothing ſorry of this; but permitted the *Romans* to take their good pleaſure, even till their preſumption, and his own ſuppoſed fear, ſhould make them careleſs. When this was come to paſs, he took all his horſe and light-armed foot, with which he occupied a place in the mid-way, between the foragers and their camp. There he ſtayed in covert with part of his forces, to keep the paſſages that none ſhould eſcape. The reſt he ſent abroad the country, to fall upon the ſtragglers, willing them to put all to the ſword, and let none run home with news to the camp. The ſlaughter was great, and thoſe which eſcaped the hands of them that were ſent abroad to ſcour the fields, lighted all, or moſt of them, upon the king and his companies in their flight; ſo as they were cut off by the way. Long it was ere the camp had news of this. But in the end there eſcaped ſome: who, though they could not make any perfect relation how the matter went; yet by telling what had happened to themſelves, raiſed a great tumult. *Sulpicius* hereupon ſends forth all his horſe, and bids them help their fellows where they ſaw it needful: he himſelf with the legions followed. The companies of horſe divided themſelves, accordingly

cordingly as they met with advertiſements upon the way, into many parts: not knowing where was moſt of the danger. Such of them as lighted upon *Philip*'s troops, that were canvaſing the field, took their taſk where they found it. But the main bulk of them fell upon the king himſelf. They had the diſadvantage: as coming fewer, and unprepared, to one that was ready for them. So they were beaten away: as their fellows alſo might have been, if the king had well bethought himſelf, and given over in time. But while, not contented with ſuch an harveſt, he was too greedy about a poor gleaning, the *Roman* legions appeared in ſight; which emboldened their horſe to make a recharge. Then the danger apparent enforced the *Macedonians* to look to their own ſafety. They ran which way they could: and (as men that lie in wait for others, are ſeldom heedful of that which may befall themſelves) to eſcape the enemy, they declined the faireſt way; ſo as they were plunged in marſhes and bogs, wherein many of them were loſt. The king's horſe was ſlain under him: and there had he been caſt away, if a loving ſubject of his had not alighted, mounted him upon his own horſe, and delivered him out of peril, at the expence of his own life, that running on foot was overtaken and killed.

In the common opinion *Philip* was charged with improvident raſhneſs, and the conſul with as much dulneſs, for this day's ſervice. A little longer ſtay would have delivered the king from theſe enemies without any blow: ſince, when all the fields about them were waſted, they muſt needs have retired back to the ſea. On the other ſide it was not thought unlikely, That if the *Romans* following the king, had ſet upon his camp, at ſuch time as he fled thither half amazed with fear of being either ſlain or taken; they might have won it. But that noble hiſtorian *Livy* (as is commonly his manner) hath judiciouſly obſerved, That neither the one, nor the other, were much to blame in this day's work. For the main body of the king's army lay ſafe in his camp; and could not be ſo aſtoniſhed with the loſs of two or three hundred horſe, that it ſhould therefore have abandoned the defence of the trenches. And as for the king himſelf; he was advertiſed, that *Pleuratus* the *Illyrian*, and the *Dardanians*, were fallen upon his country; when they found the paſſage therein open, after *Perſeus* was called away from cuſtody of the ſtreights. This was it which made him adventure to do ſomewhat betimes; that he might ſet the *Romans* going the ſooner, and afterwards look unto his troubleſome neighbours. In conſideration of this, *Philip* was deſirous to clear himſelf of the *Romans*, as ſoon as he might. And to that purpoſe he ſent unto the conſul; requeſting a day of truce for burial of the dead. But, inſtead of ſo doing, he marched away by night; and left fires in his camp to beguile the enemy, as if he had not ſtirred out of the place. *Sulpicius*, when he heard of the king's departure, was not ſlow to follow him. He overtook the *Macedonians* in a place of ſtrength, which they had fenced (for it was a woody ground) by cutting down trees, and laying them athwart the way where it was moſt open. In making of ſuch places good, the *Macedonian Phalanx* was of little uſe; being a ſquare battel of pikes, not fit for every ground. The archers of *Crete* were judged, and were indeed, more ſerviceable in that caſe. But they were few; and their arrows were of ſmall force againſt the *Roman* ſhields. The *Macedonians* therefore helped them; by flinging of ſtones. But to no purpoſe. For the *Romans* got within them; and forced them to quit the place. This victory (ſuch as it was) laid open unto the conſul ſome poor towns thereabout; which partly were taken by ſtrong hand; partly yielded for fear. But the ſpoil of theſe, and of the fields adjoining, was not ſufficient to maintain his army; and therefore he returned back to *Apollonia*.

The *Dardanians*, hearing that *Philip* was come back, withdrew themſelves apace out of the country. The king ſent *Athenagoras* to wait upon them home; whilſt he himſelf went againſt the *Etolians*. For *Damocritus* the pretor of the *Etolians*, who had reſerved himſelf and his nation unto the event of things, hearing report, that *Philip* was beaten once again; as alſo that *Pleuratus* and the *Dardanians* were fallen upon *Macedon*; grew no leſs buſy on the ſudden, than before he had been wiſe. He perſwaded his nation to take their time: and ſo, not ſtaying to proclaim war, joined his forces with *Aminander* the *Athamanian*; and made invaſion upon *Theſſaly*. They took and cruelly ſacked a few towns: whereby they grew confident; as if, without any danger, they might do what they liſted. But *Philip* came upon them ere they looked for him: and, killing them as they lay diſperſed, was like to have taken their camp; if *Alexander*, more wary than the *Etolians*, had not helped at need, and made the retreat through his own mountainous country.

About the ſame time, the *Roman* fleet, aſſiſted by *Attalus* and the *Rhodians*, had taken ſome ſmall iſlands in the *Egean* ſea. They took likewiſe the town of *Oreum* in the iſle of *Eubœa*; and ſome other places thereabout. The towns were given to *Attalus*, after the ſame compact that had formerly been made with the *Etolians*: the goods therein found were given to the *Romans*; and the people for ſlaves. Other attempts on that ſide were hindred: either by foul weather at ſea; or by want of daring, and of means.

SECT. XII.

Villius *the* Roman *conſul waſtes a year to no effect. War of the* Gauls *in* Italy. *An embaſſy of the* Romans *to* Carthage, Maſaniſſa, *and* Vermina. *The* Macedonian *prepares for defence of his kingdom: and* T. Quintius Flaminius *is ſent againſt him.*

THUS the time ran away: and *P. Villius*, a new conſul, took charge of the war in *Macedon*. He was troubled with a mutiny of his oldeſt ſoldiers: whereof two thouſand, having ſerved long in *Sicily* and *Afric*, thought themſelves much wronged, in that they could not be ſuffered to look unto their own eſtates at home. They were (belike) of the legions that had ſerved at *Cannæ*: as may ſeem by their complaint, of having been long abſent from *Italy*; whither fain they would have returned, when by their colonels they were ſhipped for *Macedon*. How *Villius* dealt with them, it is uncertain. For the hiſtory of his year is loſt: whereof the miſs is not great; ſince he did nothing memorable. *Valerius Antias*, as we find in *Livy*, hath adorned this *Villius* with a great exploit againſt *Philip*. [a] Yet ſince *Livy* himſelf, an hiſtorian to whom few of the beſt are matchable, could find no ſuch thing recorded in any good author; we may reaſonably believe, that *Villius*'s year was idle.

[a] Liv. l. 32.

In

In the beginning of this *Macedonian* war, the *Romans* found more trouble than could have been expected with the *Gauls*. Their colony of *Placentia*, a goodly and ſtrong town, which neither *Hannibal*, nor after him *Aſdrubal*, had been able to force, was taken by theſe *Barbarians*, and burnt in a manner to the ground. In like ſort *Cremona* was attempted, but ſaved her ſelf, taking warning by her neighbours's calamity. *Amilcar*, a *Carthaginian*, that had ſtayed behind *Aſdrubal*, or *Mago*, in thoſe parts, was now become captain of the *Gauls*, in theſe their enterpriſes. This when the *Romans* heard, they ſent ambaſſadors to the *Carthaginians*, giving them to underſtand, that, if they were not weary of the peace, it behoved them to call home and deliver up this their citizen *Amilcar*, who made war in *Italy*. Hereunto it was added (perhaps leſt the meſſage might ſeem otherwiſe to have ſavoured a little of ſome fear) that of the fugitive ſlaves belonging unto the *Romans*, there were ſome reported to walk up and down in *Carthage*; which if it were ſo, then ought they to be reſtored back to their maſters, as was conditioned in the late peace. The ambaſſadors that were ſent on this errand, had further charge to treat with *Maſaniſſa*, as alſo with *Vermina* the ſon of *Syphax*. Unto *Maſaniſſa*, beſides matter of compliment, they were to ſignify what pleaſure he might do them, by lending them ſome of his *Numidian* horſe to ſerve in their war againſt the *Macedonian*. *Vermina* had intreated the ſenate to vouchſafe unto him the name of king, and promiſed thereafter to deſerve it, by his readineſs in doing them all good offices. But they were ſomewhat ſcrupulous in the matter, and ſaid, that having been, and being ſtill (as they took it) their enemy, he ought firſt of all to deſire peace; for that the name of king, was an honour which they uſed not to confer upon any, ſave only upon ſuch as had royally deſerved it at their hands. The authority to make peace with him, was wholly committed unto theſe ambaſſadors upon ſuch terms as they ſhould think fit, without further relation to the ſenate and people: for they were then buſied with greater cares. The *Carthaginians* made a gentle anſwer, that they wholly diſclaimed *Amilcar*, baniſhing him, and confiſcating his goods. As for the fugitives, they had reſtored as many as they could find; and would, in that point, as far as was requiſite, give ſatisfaction to the ſenate. Herewithal they ſent a great proportion of corn to *Rome*, and the like unto the army that was in *Macedon*. King *Maſaniſſa* would have lent unto the *Romans* two thouſand of his *Numidian* horſe; but they were contented with half the number, and would accept no more. *Vermina* met with the ambaſſadors, to give them entertainment, on the borders of his kingdom; and, without any diſputation, agreed with them upon terms of peace.

Thus were the *Romans* buſied in taking order for their *Macedonian* war, that they might purſue it ſtrongly, and without interruption. As for *Amilcar* and his *Gauls*, they laid ſiege unto *Cremona*, where *L. Furius*, a *Roman* pretor, came upon them, fought a battel with them, and overcame them. *Amilcar* the *Carthaginian* died in this battel, and the fruit of the victory was ſuch, as both made amends for loſſes paſs'd, and left the work eaſy to thoſe that afterwards ſhould have the managing of war among thoſe *Gauls*. So was there good leiſure to think upon the buſineſs of *Macedon*, where *Philip* was carefully providing to give contentment unto his ſubjects, by puniſhing a bad counſellor whom they hated; as alſo to aſſure unto himſelf the *Achæans*, by rendering unto them ſome towns that he held of theirs; and finally, to ſtrengthen his kingdom, not only by exerciſing and training his people, but by fortifying the paſſages that led thereinto out of *Epirus*. This was in doing, when *Villius*, having unprofitably laboured to find way into *Macedon*, taking a journey (as *Sulpicius* had done before him) wherein he could not be ſupplied with victuals, determined at length to try a new courſe. But then came advertiſement, that *T. Quintius Flaminius* was choſen conſul, and had *Macedon* allotted him for his province, whoſe coming was expected; and he very ſhortly arrived at the army.

SECT. XIII.

The Romans *began to make war by negotiation.* T. Quintius *wins a paſſage againſt* Philip. Theſſaly *waſted by* Philip, *the* Romans, *and* Etolians. *The* Acheans *forſaking the* Macedonian, *take part with the* Romans. *A treaty of peace that was vain.* Philip *delivers* Argos *to* Nabis *the tyrant, who preſently enters into league with the* Romans.

THE *Romans* had not been wont in former times to make war after ſuch a trifling manner. It was their uſe to give battel to the enemy as ſoon as they met with him. If he refuſed it, they beſieged his towns, and ſo forced him to try the fortune of a day, with his diſadvantage in reputation, when he had long forborn it (as it would be interpreted) upon knowledge of his own weakneſs. But in this their war with *Philip*, they began to learn of the ſubtle *Greeks* the art of negotiation; wherein hitherto they were not grown ſo fine, as within a little while they proved. Their treaſury was poor, and ſtood indebted, [a] many years after this, unto private men, for part of thoſe monies that had been borrowed in the ſecond *Punic* war. This had made the commonalty averſe from the *Macedonian* war, and had thereby driven the ſenators, greedy of the enterpriſe, to make uſe of their cunning. Yet being weary of the ſlow pace wherewith their buſineſs went forward, they determined to increaſe their army, that they might have the leſs need to rely upon their confederates. So they levied eight thouſand foot and eight hundred horſe (the greater part of them of the *Latins*) which they ſent with *T. Quintius Flaminius*, the new conſul, into *Macedon*. Their navy, and other means, could well have ſerved for the ſetting forth and tranſportation of a greater army; but by ſtraining themſelves to the moſt of their abilities, they ſhould (beſides other difficulties incident unto the ſuſtenance of thoſe that are too many, and too far from home) have bred ſome jealouſy in their friends of *Greece*, and thereby have loſt ſome friends, yea, perhaps, have increaſed the number of their enemies more than of their own ſoldiers. This preſent augmentation of the forces was very requiſite, for that *Attalus*, about the ſame time, excuſed himſelf unto them by his ambaſſadors; requeſting that either they would undertake the defence of his kingdom againſt *Antiochus*, who invaded it; or elſe that they would not take it uncourteouſly, that he quitted the war with *Philip*, and returned home, to look unto that which more concerned him. Their anſwer was remarkable: they ſaid, that it was not their manner to uſe the aid of their friends longer than their friends had good opportunity, and could alſo be well contented to afford it; that they could not honeſtly take part with *Attalus*, though he were their good friend, againſt *Antiochus*, whom

[a] Liv. l. 34.

they

they held in the like account; but that they would deal with *Antiochus* by ambaſſadors, and (as common friends unto both of the kings) do their beſt to perſwade an attonement between them. In ſuch loving faſhion did they now carry themſelves towards their good friend the king *Antiochus*, who reciprocally, at their intreaty, withdrew his army from the kingdom of *Attalus*. But how little they regarded theſe terms of friendſhip, after that once they had made an end with *Philip*, it will very ſoon appear.

T. Quintius haſting away from *Rome*, came betimes into his province, with the ſupply decreed unto him, which conſiſted for the moſt part of old ſoldiers, that had ſerved in *Spain* and *Afric*. He found *Villius* the old conſul (whom at his coming he preſently diſcharged) and king *Philip* of *Macedon*, encamped one againſt the other in the ſtreights of *Epirus*, by the river of *Apſus* or *Aous*. It was manifeſt, that either the *Romans* muſt fetch a compaſs about, and ſeek their way into *Macedon* through the poor country of the *Daſſeretians*, or elſe win by force that paſſage which the king defended. In taking the former way, they had already two years together miſpent their time, and been forced to return back without profit, for want of victuals; whereof they could neither carry with them ſtore ſufficient, nor find it on the way. But if they could once get over theſe mountains, which divided the ſouth of *Epirus* from *Theſſaly*, then ſhould they enter into a plentiful country; and which, by long dependance upon the *Macedonian*, was become (in a manner) part of his kingdom, whereof it made the ſouth border. Nevertheleſs the deſire of winning this paſſage, was greater than the likelihood; for the river of *Apſus* running through that valley which alone was open between the mountains, made it all a deep marſh, and unpaſſable bog; a very narrow way excepted, and a path cut out of the main rock by man's hand. Wherefore *Quintius* aſſayed to climb in the mountains; but finding himſelf diſappointed of this hope, through the diligence of his enemy, who neglected not the guard of them that was very eaſy, he was compelled to ſit ſtill, without doing any thing for the ſpace of forty days.

This long time of reſt gave hope unto *Philip*, that the war might be ended by compoſition, upon ſome reaſonable terms. He therefore ſo dealt with ſome of the *Epirots* (among whom he had many friends) that he and the conſul had a meeting together: but nothing was effected. The conſul would have him to ſet all the towns of *Greece* at liberty; and to make amends for the injuries which he had done to many people in his late wars. *Philip* was contented to give liberty to thoſe whom he had ſubdued of late; but unto ſuch as had been long ſubject unto him and his anceſtors, he thought it againſt all reaſon, that he ſhould relinquiſh his claim and dominion over them. He alſo ſaid, that as far forth as it ſhould appear that he had done wrong unto any town or people whatſoever, he could well be pleaſed to make ſuch amends, as might ſeem convenient, in the judgment of ſome free ſtate, that had not been intereſted in thoſe quarrels. But herewithal *Quintius* was not ſatisfied. There needed (he ſaid) no judgment or compromiſe; foraſmuch as it was apparent, that *Philip* had always been the invader, and had not made war, as one provoked, in his own defence. After this alteration, when they ſhould come to particulars, and when the conſul was required to name thoſe towns that he would have to be ſet at liberty, the firſt that he named were the *Theſſalians*. Theſe had been ſubjects (though conditional) unto the *Macedonian* kings ever ſince the days of *Alexander* the great, and of *Philip* his father. Wherefore as ſoon as *Flaminius* had named the *Theſſalians*, the king, in a rage, demanded what ſharper condition he would have laid upon him, had he been but vanquiſhed. And herewithal abruptly he flung away, refuſing to hear any more of ſuch diſcourſe.

After this, the conſul ſtrove in vain for two or three days together, to have prevailed againſt the difficulties of that paſſage which *Philip* kept. When he had well wearied himſelf, and could not reſolve what courſe to take, there came to him an herdſman, ſent from *Charopus*, a prince of the *Epirots*, that favoured the *Romans*, who, having long kept beaſts in thoſe mountains, was throughly acquainted with all by-paths; and therefore undertook to guide the *Romans*, without any danger, to a place where they ſhould have advantage of the enemy. This guide, for fear of treacherous dealing, was faſt bound; and, being promiſed a great reward in caſe he made good his word, had ſuch companies as was thought fit appointed to follow his directions. They travelled by night (it being then about the full of the moon) and reſted in the day-time, for fear of being diſcovered. When they had recovered the hill-tops, and were above the *Macedonians* (though undiſcovered by them, becauſe at their backs) they raiſed a great ſmoke, whereby they gave notice of their ſucceſs unto the conſul. Some ſkirmiſhes, whilſt theſe were on their journey, *T. Quintius* had held with the *Macedonian*, thereby to avert him from the thought of that which was intended. But when on the third morning he ſaw the ſmoke ariſe more and more plainly, and thereby knew that his men had attained unto the place whither they were ſent: he preſſed as near as he could unto the enemy's camp, and aſſailed them in their ſtrength. He prevailed as little as in former times, until the ſhoutings of thoſe that ran down the hill, and charged *Philip* on the back, aſtoniſhed ſo the *Macedonians*, that they betook themſelves to flight. The king, upon the firſt apprehenſion of the danger, made all ſpeed away to ſave himſelf. Yet anon, conſidering that the difficulty of the paſſage muſt needs hinder the *Romans* from purſuing him, he made a ſtand at the end of five miles, and gathered there together his broken troops, of whom he ſaw wanting no more than two thouſand men. The greateſt loſs was of his camp and proviſions, if not rather perhaps of his reputation; for that now the *Macedonians* began to ſtand in fear, leſt being driven from a place of ſuch advantage, they ſhould hardly make good their party againſt the enemy upon equal ground: neither was *Philip* himſelf much better perſwaded. Wherefore he cauſed the *Theſſalians*, as many of them as in his haſty retreat he could viſit, to forſake their towns and country, carrying away with them as much as they were able, and ſpoiling all the reſt. But all of them could not be perſwaded thus to abandon (for the pleaſure of their king) their antient habitations, and all the ſubſtance which they had gotten. Some there were that forcibly reſiſted him; which they might the better do, for that he could not ſtay to uſe any great compulſion. He alſo himſelf took it very grievouſly, that he was driven to make ſuch waſte of a moſt pleaſant and fruitful country, which had ever been well affected unto him; ſo that a little hinderance did ſerve to make him break off his purpoſe, and withdraw himſelf home into his kingdom of *Macedon*.

The *Etolians* and *Athamanians*, when this fell out, were even in a readineſs to invade *Theſſaly*, whereinto the ways lay more open, out of their ſeveral countries. When therefore they heard for certain,

certain, that *Philip* was beaten by the *Romans*, they foreſlowed not the occaſion, but made all ſpeed, each of them to lay hold upon what they might. *T. Quintius* followed them within a little while: but they had gotten ſo much before his coming, that he, in gleaning after their harveſt, could not find enough to maintain his army. Thus were the poor *Theſſalians*, of whoſe liberty the *Romans* a few days ſince had made ſhew to be very deſirous, waſted by the ſame *Romans* and their confederates; not knowing which way to turn themſelves, or whom to avoid. *T. Quintius* won *Phaleria* by aſſault; *Metropolis* and *Piera* yielded unto him. *Rhage* he beſieged, and having made a fair breach, yet was unable to force it; ſo ſtoutly it was defended both by the inhabitants, and by a *Macedonian* garriſon therein. *Philip* alſo, at the ſame time, having ſomewhat recollected his ſpirits, hovered about *Tempe* with his army, thruſting men into all places that were like to be diſtreſſed. So the conſul, having well near ſpent his victuals, and ſeeing no hope to prevail at *Rhage*, brake up his ſiege, and departed out of *Theſſaly*. He had appointed his ſhips of burden to meet him at *Anticyra*, an haven town of *Phocis*, on the gulf of *Corinth*; which country being friend to the *Macedonian*, he preſently invaded; not ſo much for hatred unto the people, as becauſe it lay conveniently ſeated between *Theſſaly* and other regions, wherein he had buſineſs, or was ſhortly like to have. Many towns in *Phocis* he won by aſſault; many were yielded up unto him for fear; and within ſhort ſpace he had (in effect) maſtered it all.

In the mean time *L. Quintius* the conſul's brother, being then admiral for the *Romans* in this war, joined with king *Attalus* and the *Rhodian* fleet. They won two cities in *Eubœa*, and afterwards laid ſiege unto *Cenchree*, an haven and arſenal of the *Corinthians* on their eaſtern ſea. This enterpriſe did ſomewhat help forward the *Acheans* in their deſire to leave the part of *Philip*: ſince it might come to paſs, that *Corinth* it ſelf, ere long time were ſpent, and that *Cenchree*, with other places appertaining to *Corinth*, now very ſhortly, ſhould be rendered unto their nation, by favour of the *Romans*.

But there were other motives inducing the *Acheans* to prefer the friendſhip of the *Romans*, before the patronage of *Philip*, whereto they had been long accuſtomed. For this king had ſo many ways offended them in time of peace, that they thought it the beſt courſe to rid their hands of him; whilſt being entangled in a dangerous war, he wanted means to hinder the execution of ſuch counſel, as they ſhould hold the ſafeſt. His tyrannous practices to make himſelf their abſolute lord; his poiſoning of *Aratus* their old governour; his falſe dealing with the *Meſſenians*, *Epirots*, and other people their confederates, and his own dependants; together with many particular outrages by him committed, had cauſed them long ſince to hold him as *a neceſſary evil*, even whilſt they were unable to be without his aſſiſtance. But ſince, by the virtue of *Philopœmen*, they were grown ſomewhat confident in their own ſtrength, ſo as without the *Macedonians* help, they could as well ſubſiſt, as having him to friend: then did they only think how *evil* he was; and thereupon rejoice the more, in that he was become no longer *neceſſary*. It angred him to perceive how they ſtood affected; and therefore he ſent murderers to take away the life of *Philopœmen*. But failing in this enterpriſe, and being detected, he did thereby only ſet fire to the wood, which was throughly dry before, and prepared to burn. *Philopœmen* wrought ſo with the *Acheans*, that no diſcourſe was more familiar with them, than what great cauſe they had to withdraw themſelves from the *Macedonians*. *Cycliadas*, a principal man among them, and lately their pretor, was expelled by them, for ſhewing himſelf paſſionate in the cauſe of *Philip*, and *Ariſtænus* choſen pretor, who laboured to join them in Society with the *Romans*.

Theſe News were very welcome to *T. Quintius*. Ambaſſadors were ſent from the *Romans* and their confederates, king *Attalus*, the *Rhodians*, and *Athenians*, to treat with the *Acheans*; making promiſe, that they ſhould have *Corinth* reſtored unto them, if they would forſake the *Macedonian*. A parliament of the *Acheans* was held at *Sicyon*, to deliberate and reſolve in this weighty caſe. Therein the *Romans* and their adherents deſired the *Acheans* to join with them in making war upon *Philip*. Contrariwiſe, the ambaſſadors of *Philip*, whom he had alſo ſent for this buſineſs, admoniſhing the *Athenians* of their alliance with the king, and of their faith due unto him; requeſted them, that they would be contented to remain as neuters. This moderate requeſt of *Philip*'s ambaſſador, did no way advance his maſter's cauſe: rather it gave the *Acheans* to underſtand, That he, who could be ſatisfied with ſo little at their hands, knew himſelf unable to gratify them in any reciprocal demand. Yet were there many in that great council, who remembring the benefits of *Philip* and *Antigonus*, laboured earneſtly for the preſervation of the ancient league. But in fine, the ſenſe of late injuries, and expectation of like or worſe from him in the future, prevailed againſt the memory of thoſe old good turns, which he (and *Antigonus* before him) had partly ſold unto them, and partly had uſed as baits, whereby to allure them into abſolute ſubjection. Neither was it perhaps of the leaſt importance, that the *Romans* were ſtrong, and likely to prevail in the end. So after much alteration the decree paſſed, That they ſhould thenceforward renounce the *Macedonian*, and take part with his enemies in this war. With *Attalus* and the *Rhodians* they forthwith entred into ſociety: with the *Romans* (becauſe no league would be of force, until the ſenate and people had approved it) they forbore to decree any ſociety at the preſent, until the return of thoſe ambaſſadors from *Rome*, which they determined to ſend thither of purpoſe. The *Megalopolitans*, *Dimeans*, and *Argives*, having done their beſt for the *Macedonian*, as by many reſpects they were bound; roſe up out of the council, and departed before the paſſing the decree, which they could not reſiſt, nor yet with honeſty thereto give aſſent. For this their good will, and greater, which they ſhortly manifeſted, the *Argives* had ſo little thanks, that all the reſt of the *Acheans* may be the better excuſed, for eſcaping how they might, out of the hands of ſo fell a prince.

Soon after this, upon a ſolemn day at *Argos*, the affection of the citizens diſcovered it ſelf ſo plainly, in the behalf of *Philip*, that they, which were his partiſans within the town, made no doubt of putting the city into his hands, if they might have any ſmall aſſiſtance. *Philocles*, a lieutenant of the king's, lay then in *Corinth*; which he had manfully defended againſt the *Romans* and *Attalus*: him the conſpirators drew to *Argos*; whither

a Plut. in vita Philopœm. Juſtin. l. 29.

coming

coming on a ſudden, and finding the multitude ready to join with him, he eaſily compelled the *Achean* garriſon to quit the place.

This getting of *Argos*, together with the good defence of *Corinth* and ſome other towns, as it helped *Philip* a little in his reputation, ſo they gave him hope to obtain ſome good end by treaty, whilſt as yet with his honour he might ſeek it; and when (the winter being now come on) a new conſul would ſhortly be choſen, who ſhould take the work out of *Titus*'s hands, if it were not concluded the ſooner. *Titus* had the like reſpect unto himſelf; and therefore thought it beſt, ſince more could not be done, to prediſpoſe things unto a concluſion, for his own reputation. The meeting was appointed to be held on the ſea-ſhore, in the bay then called *the Malian*, or *Lamian Bay*, now (as is ſuppoſed) the *gulf of Ziton*, in the *Egean* ſea, or *Archipelago*. Thither came *Titus*, with *Aminander* the *Athamanian*, an ambaſſador of *Attalus*; the admiral of *Rhodes*; and ſome agents for the *Etolians* and *Acheans*. *Philip* had with him ſome few of his own captains, and *Cycliadas*, lately baniſhed for his ſake out of *Achaia*. He refuſed to come on ſhore, though fearing (as he ſaid) none but *the immortal Gods*; yet miſdoubting ſome treachery in the *Etolians*. The demands of *Titus* in behalf of the *Romans* were, That he ſhould ſet all cities of *Greece* at liberty; deliver up to the *Romans* and their confederates, all priſoners, which he had of theirs, and renagado's; likewiſe whatſoever he held of theirs in *Illyria*; and whatſoever about *Greece* or *Aſia* he had gotten from *Ptolemy* then king of *Egypt*, after his father's death. *Attalus* demanded reſtitution to be made entire, of ſhips, towns, and temples, by him taken and ſpoiled in the late war between them. The *Rhodians* would have again the country of *Paræa*, lying over-againſt their iſland; as alſo that he ſhould withdraw his garriſons out of divers towns about the *Helleſpont*, and other havens of their friends. The *Acheans* deſired reſtitution of *Argos* and *Corinth*; about the one of which they might not unjuſtly quarrel with him; the other had been long his own by their conſent. The *Etolians* took upon them angerly, as patrons of *Greece*; willing him to depart out of it, even out of the whole country, leaving it free; and withal to deliver up unto them whatſoever he held that had at any time been theirs. Neither were they herewithal content, but inſolently declaimed againſt him, for that which he had lately done in *Theſſaly*, corrupting (as they ſaid) the rewards of the victors, by deſtroying, when he was vanquiſhed, thoſe towns, which elſe they might have gotten. To anſwer theſe malapert *Etolians*, *Philip* commanded his galley to row near the ſhore. But they began to ply him afreſh, telling him, That he muſt obey his betters, unleſs he were able to defend himſelf by force of arms. He anſwered them (as he was much given to gybing) with ſundry ſcoffs, and eſpecially with one, which made the *Roman* conſul underſtand what manner of companions theſe *Etolians* were. For he ſaid, That he had often dealt with them, as likewiſe the beſt of the *Greeks*; deſiring them to abrogate a wicked law, which permitted them *to take ſpoil from ſpoil*; yet could he get no better an anſwer, than [a] *that they would ſooner take* Etolia *out of* Etolia. *Titus* wondered what might be the meaning of this ſtrange law. So the king told him, That they held it a laudable cuſtom, as often as war happened between their friends, to hold up the quarrel, by ſending voluntiers to ſerve on both ſides, that ſhould ſpoil both the one and the other. As for the liberty of *Greece*, he ſaid it was ſtrange that the *Etolians* ſhould be ſo careful thereof, ſince divers tribes of their own, which he there named, were indeed no *Grecians*; wherefore he would fain know, whether the *Romans* would give him leave to make ſlaves of thoſe *Etolians*, which were no *Greeks*. *Titus* hereat ſmiled; and was no whit offended to hear the *Etolians* well ratled up; touching whom, he began to underſtand, how odious they were in all the country. As for that general demand of ſetting all *Greece* at liberty, *Philip* acknowledged, that it might well beſeem the greatneſs of the *Romans*; though he would alſo conſider what might beſeem his own dignity. But that the *Etolians*, *Rhodians*, and other petty eſtates, ſhould thus preſume under countenance of the *Romans*, to take upon them, as if by their great might, he ſhould be hereunto compelled; it was, he ſaid, a ſtrange and ridiculous inſolence. The *Acheans* he charged with much ingratitude, reciting againſt them ſome decrees of their own; wherein they had loaden both *Antigonus* and him, with more than human honours. Nevertheleſs he ſaid, that he would render *Argos* unto them: but as touching *Corinth*, that he would further deliberate with *Titus* himſelf. Thus he addreſſed himſelf wholly to the *Roman* general; unto whom, if he could give ſatisfaction, he cared little for all the reſt. With *Attalus* and the *Rhodians*, his late war (he ſaid) was only defenſive, they having been the offerers; or if he gave them any occaſion, it was only in helping *Pruſias*, his ſon-in-law; neither did he ſee why they ſhould rather ſeek amends at his hands, than he at theirs. For whereas they complained, That ſpoiling a temple of *Venus*, he had cut down the grove and pleaſant walks thereabouts: what could he do more than ſend gardeners thither with young plants, if one king of another would ſtand to aſk ſuch recompence. Thus he jeſted the matter out; but offered, nevertheleſs, in honour of the *Romans*, to give back the region of *Peræa* to the *Rhodians*; as likewiſe to *Attalus* the ſhips and priſoners of his, whereof he had then poſſeſſion. Thus ended that day's conference, becauſe it was late; *Philip* requiring a night's leiſure to think upon the articles, which were many; and he ill provided of counſel wherewith to adviſe about them. *For your being ſo ill provided of counſel*, ſaid Titus, *you may even thank your ſelf; as having murdered all your friends, that were wont to adviſe you faithfully.* The dext day *Philip* came not, until it was late at night, excuſing his long ſtay by the weightineſs of the things propounded, whereon he could not ſuddenly tell how to reſolve. But it was believed, that he thereby ſought to abridge the *Etolians* of leiſure to rail at him. And this was the more likely, for that he deſired conference in private with the *Roman* general. The ſum of his diſcourſe, as *Titus* afterwards related it, was, That he would give to the *Acheans* both *Argos* and *Corinth*; as alſo that he would render unto *Attalus* and the *Rhodians* what he had promiſed the day before; likewiſe to the *Etolians*, that he would grant ſome part of their demands; and to the *Romans* whatſoever they did challenge. This when *Titus*'s aſſociates heard, they exclaimed againſt it, ſaying, That if the king were ſuffered to retain any thing in *Greece*, he would ſhortly get poſſeſſion of all

[a] Excerp. è Polyb. l. 17.

which

which he now rendred up. The noiſe that they made came to *Philip*'s ear; who thereupon deſired a third day of meeting, and proteſted, that if he could not perſwade them, he would ſuffer himſelf to be perſwaded by them. So the third day they met early in the morning; at what time the king entreated them all, that they would with ſincere affection hearken unto good offers of peace, and immediately conclude it, if they could like well of thoſe conditions, which he had already tendered; or otherwiſe that they would make truce with him for the preſent, and let him ſend ambaſſadors to *Rome*, where he would refer himſelf to the courteſy of the ſenate.

This was even as *Quintius* would have it, who ſtood in doubt, leſt a new conſul might happen to defraud him of the honour, which he expected by ending of the war. So he eaſily prevailed with the reſt to aſſent thereunto; foraſmuch as it was winter, a time unfit for ſervice in the war; and ſince, without authority of the ſenate, he ſhould be unable to proceed reſolvedly either in war or peace. Further, he willed them to ſend their ſeveral ambaſſadors to *Rome*, which intimating unto the ſenate what each of them required, ſhould eaſily hinder *Philip* from obtaining any thing to their prejudice. Among the reſt, he perſwaded king *Aminander* to make a journey to *Rome*, in perſon, knowing well, that the name of a king, together with the confluence of ſo many ambaſſadors, would ſerve to make his own actions more glorious in the city. All this tended to procure, that his own command of the army in *Greece*, might be prorogued. And to the ſame end had he dealt with ſome of the tribunes of the people at *Rome*, who had already (though as yet he knew not ſo much) obtained it from him, partly by their authority, partly by good reaſons which they alledged unto the ſenate.

The ambaſſadors of the *Greeks*, when they had audience at *Rome*, ſpake bitterly againſt the king, with good liking of the ſenate, which was more deſirous of victory than ſatisfaction. They magnified the honourable purpoſe of the *Romans*, in undertaking to ſet *Greece* at liberty. But this (they ſaid) could never be effected, unleſs eſpecial care were taken, that the king ſhould be diſpoſſeſſed of *Corinth*, *Chalcis*, and *Demetrias*. In this point they were ſo vehement, producing a map of the country, and making demonſtration how thoſe places held all the reſt in ſervility, that the ſenate agreed to have it even ſo as they had deſired. When therefore the ambaſſadors of *Philip* were brought in, and began to have made a long oration, they were briefly cut off in the midſt of their preface, with this one demand; *Whether their maſter would yield up* Corinth, Chalcis, *and* Demetrias? Hereto they made anſwer, That concerning thoſe places, the king had given them no direction or commiſſion what to ſay or do. This was enough. The ſenate would no longer hearken to *Philip*'s deſire of peace, wherein they ſaid he did no better than trifle. Yet might his ambaſſadors have truly ſaid, That neither the *Etolians*, *Acheans*, nor any of their fellows, had in the late treaty required by name, that *Chalcis* and *Demetrias* ſhould be yielded up. For which of them indeed could make any claim to either of theſe towns? As for *Corinth*, whereto the *Acheans* had ſome right, (though their right were no better, than that having ſtolen it from one *Macedonian* king in a night, they had, after mature deliberation, made it away by bargain unto another) *Philip* had already condeſcended to give it back unto them. And this perhaps would have been alledged, even againſt the *Greeks*, in excuſe of the king, by ſome of *T. Quintius*'s friends, that ſo he might have had the honour to conclude the war, if a ſucceſſor had been decreed unto him. But ſince he was appointed to continue general, neither his friends at *Rome*, nor he himſelf, after the return of the ambaſſadors into *Greece*, cared to give ear to any talk of peace.

Philip, ſeeing that the *Acheans* had forſaken him, and joined with their common enemies, thought even to deal with them in the like manner, by reconciling himſelf unto *Nabis*, whom they hated moſt. There were not many years paſs'd, ſince the *Lacedemonians* under *Cleomenes*, with little other help than their own ſtrength, had been almoſt ſtrong enough both for the *Macedonians* and *Acheans* together: but now the condition of things was altered. *Nabis*'s force conſiſted in a manner wholly in his mercenaries, for he was a tyrant, though ſtyling himſelf king. Yet he ſorely vexed the *Acheans*, and therefore ſeemed unto *Philip* one likely to ſtand him in great ſtead, if he could be won. To this purpoſe, it was thought meet that the town of *Argos*, which could not otherwiſe be eaſily defended, ſhould be conſigned over into his hands; in hope, that ſuch a benefit would ſerve to tie him faſt unto the *Macedonian*. *Philocles*, the king's lieutenant, who was appointed to deal with *Nabis*, added further, that it was his maſter's purpoſe to make a ſtreight alliance with the *Lacedemonian*, by giving ſome daughters of his own in marriage unto *Nabis*'s ſons. This could not but be well taken. Yet *Nabis* made ſome ſcruple in accepting the town of *Argos*, unleſs by decree of the citizens themſelves he might be called into it. Hereabout *Philocles* dealt with the *Argives*; but found them ſo averſe, that, in open aſſembly of the people, they deteſted the very name of the tyrant, with many railing words. *Nabis*, hearing of this, thought he had thereby a good occaſion to rob and fleece them. So he willed *Philocles*, without more ado, to make over the town, which he was ready to receive. *Philocles* accordingly did let him, with his army, into it by night, and gave him poſſeſſion of the ſtrongeſt places therein. Thus dealt *Philip* with the *Argives*; who, for very love, had forſaken the *Acheans*, to take his part. Early in the morning, the tyrant made himſelf maſter of all the gates. A few of the principal men underſtanding how things went, fled out of the city at the firſt tumult: wherefore they were all baniſhed, and their goods confiſcated. The reſt of the chief citizens that ſtayed behind, were commanded to bring forth out of hand, all their gold and ſilver. Alſo a great impoſition of money was laid upon all thoſe that were thought able to pay it. Such as made their contribution readily, were diſmiſſed without more ado; but if any ſtood long upon the matter, or played the thieves, in purloining their own goods, they were put to the whip, and, beſides loſs of their wealth, had their torments to boot. This done, the tyrant began to make popular laws; namely, ſuch as might ſerve to make him gracious with the raſcally multitude; abrogating all debts, and dividing the lands of the rich among the poor. By ſuch art of oppreſſing the great ones, it had been an old cuſtom of tyrants to aſſure themſelves of the vulgar for a time.

As ſoon as *Nabis* had gotten *Argos*, he ſent the news to *T. Quintius*, and offered to join with him againſt *Philip*. *Titus* was glad of it, ſo as he took the pains to croſs over the *Streights* into *Peloponneſus*, there to meet with *Nabis*. They had ſoon agreed (though king *Attalus*, who was preſent with

with the conſul, made ſome cavil touching *Argos*) and the tyrant lent unto the *Romans* ſix hundred of his mercenaries of *Crete*; as alſo he agreed with the *Acheans* upon a truce for four months, reſerving the final concluſion of peace between them until the war of *Philip* ſhould be ended; which, after this, continued not long.

SECT. XIV.

The battel at Cynoſcephalæ, *wherein* Philip *was vanquiſhed by* T. Quintius.

TITUS *Quintius*, as ſoon as he underſtood that he was appointed to have command of the army, without any other limitation of time, than during the pleaſure of the ſenate, made all things ready for diligent purſuit of the war. The like did *Philip*, who, having failed in his negotiation of peace, and no leſs failed in his hopes of getting *Nabis* to friend in that war, meant afterwards wholly to rely upon himſelf.

[a] *Titus* had in his army about twenty-ſix thouſand, and *Philip* a proportionable number: but neither of them knew the other's ſtrength, or what his enemy intended to do. Only *Titus* heard that *Philip* was in *Theſſaly*, and thereupon addreſſed himſelf to ſeek him out. They had like to have met unawares near unto the city of *Pheræ*, where the vant-couriers on both ſides diſcovered each other, and ſent word thereof unto their ſeveral captains: but neither of them were over-haſty to commit all to hazard upon ſo ſhort warning. The day following, each of them ſent out three hundred horſe, with as many light-armed foot, to make a better diſcovery. Theſe met, and fought a long while, returning finally back into their ſeveral camps, with little advantage unto either ſide. The country about *Pheræ* was thick ſet with trees, and otherwiſe full of gardens and mud-walls; which made it improper for ſervice of the *Macedonian Phalanx*: wherefore the king diſlodged, intending to remove back unto *Scotuſa*, in the frontier of *Macedon*, where he might be plentifully ſerved with all neceſſaries. *Titus* conceived aright his meaning, and therefore purpoſed alſo to march thitherwards, were it only to waſte the country. There lay between them a great ledge of hills, which hindered the one from knowing what courſe the other took. Nevertheleſs they encamped not far aſunder both the firſt and the ſecond night; though neither of them underſtood what was become of the other. The third day was very tempeſtuous, and forced each of them to take up his lodging, where he found it by chance. Then ſent they forth diſcoverers again, in greater number than before. Theſe meeting together, held a long fight, wherein at firſt the *Macedonians* had the worſe. But *Philip* anon ſent in ſuch a ſtrong ſupply, that if the reſiſtance of the *Etolians* had not been deſperate, the *Romans*, their fellows, had been driven back into their camp. Yet, all reſiſtance notwithſtanding, the *Macedonians* prevailed; ſo that *Titus* himſelf was fain to bring forth his legions, that were not a little diſcouraged, by the defeat of all their horſe, to animate thoſe which were in flight.

It was altogether beſides the king's purpoſe, to put the fortune of a battel in truſt that day, with ſo much of his eſtate as might thereon depend. But the news came to him thick and tumultuouſly, how the enemies fled, and how the day was his own; if he could uſe an occaſion, the like whereof he ſhould not often find. This cauſed him to alter his purpoſe, inſomuch that he embattel'd his men, and climbed up thoſe hills; which, for that the knops thereon had ſome reſemblance unto dogs heads, were called by a word ſignifying as much, *Cynoſcephalæ*. As ſoon as he was on the hill-top, it did him good to ſee that they of his own light-armature were buſy in fight, almoſt at the very camp of the enemies, whom they had repelled ſo far. He had alſo liberty to chuſe his ground, as might ſerve beſt his advantage; foraſmuch as the *Romans* were quite driven from all parts of the hill. But of this commodity he could make no great uſe, the roughneſs of the place among thoſe *dogs heads*, as they were called, ſerving nothing aptly for his *Phalanx*. Nevertheleſs he found convenient room wherein to marſhal the one part of his army, and gave order unto his captains to follow with the reſt, embatteling them as they might. Whilſt he was doing this, he perceived that his horſemen and light-armature began to ſhrink, as being fallen upon the *Roman* legion, by force whereof they were driven to recoil. He ſets forward to help them, and they no leſs haſtily draw unto him for ſuccour, having the *Romans* not far behind them.

As the legions began to climb the hill, *Philip* commanded thoſe of his *Phalanx* to charge their pikes, and entertain them. Here *Titus* found an extreme difficult piece of work; for this *Phalanx* being a great ſquare battel of armed pikes, like in all points to thoſe which are now uſed in our modern wars; and being in like manner uſed as are ours, was not to be reſiſted by the *Roman* targetteers as long as the *Phalanx* it ſelf held together undiſſolved. The *Macedonians* were embattel'd in very cloſe order, ſo that two of them ſtood oppoſite to one of the *Romans*; as alſo the pikes of the firſt rank had their points advanced two or three foot before their foreman. Wherefore it is no marvel if the *Romans* gave back, every one of them being troubled (as it were) with ten enemies at once, and not able to come nearer unto the next of them than a dozen foot, or thereabouts. *Titus* finding this, and not knowing how to remedy it, was greatly troubled; for that ſtill the *Phalanx* bore down all which came in the way. But in the mean while he obſerved, that they which were appointed by *Philip* to make his left wing, were not able, through the much unevenneſs of the ground, to put themſelves in order; ſo as either they kept their places on the hill-tops, or elſe (which was worſe) upon deſire either of beholding the paſtime, or of ſeeming to be partakers in the work, run fooliſhly along by the ſide of their fellows which were occupied in fight.

Of this their diſorder he made great and preſent uſe. He cauſed the right wing of his battel to march up the hill againſt theſe ill-ordered troops, his elephants leading the way to increaſe the terror. The *Macedonians* were readier to diſpute what ſhould be done in ſuch a caſe, than well adviſed what to do; as having no one man appointed to command that part in chief. Indeed, if they ſhould have done their beſt, it could not have ſerved, ſince the ground whereon they ſtood, made their weapons uſeleſs. For, let it be ſuppoſed that *Philip*, having twenty-ſix thouſand in his army (as he is ſaid to have been equal to the enemy in number) had four thouſand horſe, four thouſand targetteers, and four thouſand light-armed; ſo ſhall there remain fourteen thouſand pikes, whereof he himſelf had embattel'd the one half in a *Phalanx*; the other half in the left wing, are they whom *Quintius* is ready now to charge. The *Phalanx*, having uſually ſixteen in file, muſt, when it conſiſted of ſeven thouſand, have well near

[a] Plut. in vita T. Q. Flam.

four hundred and forty in rank; but four hundred would ſerve to make a front long enough; the other forty, or thirty-ſeven files might be cut off, and reckoned in the number of the targetteers, or light-armed. Allowing therefore, as [a] *Polybius* doth, to every man of them three foot of ground, this front muſt have occupied twelve hundred foot, or two hundred and forty paces; that is, very near a quarter of a mile in length. Such a ſpace of open champain, free from incumbrance of trees, ditches, hillocks, or the like impediments, that muſt of neceſſity dis-join this cloſe battel of the *Phalanx*, was not every-where to be found. Here at *Cynoſcephalæ*, *Philip* had ſo much room, as would only ſuffice for the one half of his men; the reſt were fain to ſtand ſtill, and look about them, being hindered from putting themſelves in order, by the roughneſs of the *dogs heads*. But the *Romans*, to whom all grounds were much alike, were not hindered from coming up unto them; nor found any difficulty in maſtering thoſe enemies, whoſe feet were in a manner bound by the diſcommodity of the place. The very firſt impreſſion of the elephants cauſed them to give back; and the coming on of the legions, to betake themſelves unto flight. A *Roman* tribune, or colonel, ſeeing the victory on that part aſſured, left the proſecution of it unto others; and being followed by twenty enſigns, or maniples; that is, (as they might fall out) by ſome two thouſand men, took in hand a notable piece of work, and mainly helpful to making of the victory compleat. He conſidered that *Philip*, in purſuing the right wing of the *Romans*, was run on ſo far, as that himſelf, with his fellows, in mounting the hill to charge the left wing of the *Macedonians*, was already gotten above the king's head. Wherefore he turned to the left hand, and, making down the hill after the king's *Phalanx*, fell upon it in the rear. The hindmoſt ranks of the *Phalanx*, all of them indeed, ſave the firſt five, were accuſtomed, when the battels came to joining, to carry their pikes upright, and with the whole weight of their bodies to thruſt on their foremen; and ſo were they doing at the preſent. This was another great inconvenience in the *Macedonian Phalanx*, that it ſerved neither for offence nor defence, except only in front. For though it were ſo, that *Alexander*, when he was to fight with *Darius* in *Meſopotamia*, arranged his *Phalanx* in ſuch order, that all the four ſides of it were as ſo many fronts, looking ſundry ways, becauſe he expected that he ſhould be encompaſſed round; yet it is to be underſtood, that herein he altered the uſual form; as alſo at the ſame time he embattelled his men in looſe order, that ſo with eaſe they might turn their weapons which way need ſhould require. Likewiſe it is to be conſidered, that *Alexander's* men being thus diſpoſed, were fit only to keep their own ground; not being able to follow upon the enemy, unleſs their hindmoſt ranks could have marched backwards. But in this preſent caſe of *Philip*, there was no ſuch proviſion for reſiſtance. Therefore his men, being otherwiſe unable to help themſelves, threw down their weapons, and fled. The king himſelf had thought, until now, that the fortune of the battel was every-where alike, and the day his own. But hearing a noiſe behind him, and turning a little aſide, with a troop of horſe, to ſee how all went, when he beheld his men caſting down their weapons, and the *Romans* at his back on the higher ground, he preſently betook himſelf to flight. Neither ſtaid he afterwards in any place (except only a ſmall while about *Tempe*, there to collect ſuch as were diſperſed in this overthrow) until he was gotten into his own kingdom of *Macedon*.

There died of the *Roman* army in this battel, about ſeven hundred: of the *Macedonians*, about eight thouſand were ſlain, and five thouſand taken priſoners.

SECT. XV.

T. Quintius *falleth out with the* Etolians; *and grants truce unto* Philip, *with conditions, upon which the peace is ratified. Liberty proclaimed unto the* Greeks. *The* Romans *quarrel with* Antiochus.

THE *Etolians* wonderfully vaunted themſelves; and deſired to have it noiſed through all *Greece*, That the victory at *Cynoſcephalæ* was gotten (in a manner) wholly by their valour. They had gotten indeed the moſt of the booty, by ſacking the *Macedonian* camp, whilſt the *Romans* were buſied in the chace. *Titus* therefore being offended both at their vain-glory, and at their ravenous condition; purpoſed to teach them better manners, by regarding them as ſlightly, as they thought highly of themſelves. He alſo well perceived, that by uſing them with any extraordinary favour, he ſhould greatly offend the reſt of his confederates in *Greece*; who deteſted the *Etolians* much more vehemently, than ever they had done the *Macedonians*. But this diſpleaſure brake not forth yet a while.

After the battel, *Titus* made haſte unto *Lariſſa*, a city of *Theſſaly*; which he preſently took. Before his coming, *Philip* had ſent thither one of his courtiers, to burn all his letters, and paſſages whatſoever in writing, betwixt him and others, of which many were there kept. It was well done of the king, that among the cares of ſo much adverſity, he forgot not to provide for the ſafety of his friends. Yet by his thus doing, they of *Lariſſa* might well perceive, that he gave them as already loſt. Wherefore we find not that they, or any of their neighbours, did make delay of opening their gates to *Titus*. At the ſame time, the town of *Leucas* bordering upon *Acarnania*, was taken by the *Roman* fleet: and very ſoon after, all the *Acarnanians*, a warlike nation, and in hatred of the *Etolians*, ever true to *Philip*; gave up themſelves unto the *Romans*, hearing of the victory at *Cynoſcephalæ*. The *Rhodians* alſo were then in hand with the conqueſt of *Peræa*, a region of the continent over-againſt their iſland; whereof they had demanded reſtitution, in the late treaty of peace with *Philip*. They did herein more manly, than any other of the *Greeks*: foraſmuch as they awaited not the good leiſure of the *Romans*; but with an army of their own, and ſome help which they borrowed of the *Acheans*, and other their friends, gave battel to *Dimocrates*, the king's lieutenant, wherein they had the victory, and conſequently recovered the whole province. It angered *Philip* worſe than all this, that the *Dardanians* gathered courage out of his affliction, to invade his kingdom; waſting and ſpoiling, as if all had been abandoned to their diſcretion. This made him gather an army in all haſte, of ſix thouſand foot, and five hundred horſe: wherewith coming upon them, he drove them, with little or no loſs of his own, and great ſlaughter of theirs, haſtily out of the kingdom. Which done, he returned to *Theſſalonia*.

In this one enterpriſe, he had ſucceſs anſwerable to his deſire: but ſeeing what bad fortune ac-

[a] Excerpt. è Polyb. l. 17.

companied

companied his affairs, in all other parts at the ſame time, he thought it wiſdom to yield unto neceſſity; and therefore ſent in all haſte *Limnæus* and *Demoſthenes*, with *Cycliadas*, the baniſhed *Achean*, in whom he repoſed much confidence, ambaſſadors unto *Titus*. Theſe had conference a long while in private, with *Titus*, and ſome of his *Roman* colonels: by whom they were gently entertained, and in very friendly wiſe diſmiſſed. It ſeems that they had commiſſion to refer all unto *Titus*'s own diſcretion; as *Philip* himſelf in few days after did. There was granted unto them a truce for fifteen days: in which time, the king himſelf might come and ſpeak with the *Roman* general. In the mean ſeaſon many ſuſpicious rumors went of *Titus*; as if he had been corrupted with great rewards from the king, to betray the *Greeks* his confederates. Of theſe bruits the *Etolians* were chief authors: who being wont to regard neither friendſhip nor honeſty, where profit led them a wrong way, judged alike of all men elſe. But againſt the day appointed for the meeting betwixt him and *Philip*, *Titus* had ſent letters unto his aſſociates; willing them to have their agents ready by a time appointed, at the entrance of *Tempe*, where the treaty ſhould be held. There, when they were all aſſembled, they entred into conſultation before the king's arrival, what ſhould be moſt expedient for the common benefit of them all, and for every eſtate in particular. The poor king *Aminander*, beſought them all, and eſpecially the *Romans*, that they would think upon him; and conſidering his weakneſs, which he confeſſed, make ſuch proviſion, that after the *Romans* had turned their backs, and were gone home, *Philip* might not wreak his anger upon him, who was not able to reſiſt. Then ſpake *Alexander*, one of the *Etolians*: who commending *Titus* for ſo much as he had thus aſſembled the confederates, to adviſe upon their own good, and had willed them to deliver their minds freely: added, That in the main of the purpoſe which he had in hand, he was utterly deceived: for that by making peace with *Philip*, he could neither aſſure the *Romans* of their quiet, nor the *Greeks* of their liberty. There was, he ſaid, none other end to be made of the war, which could agree either with the purpoſe of the ſenate and people of *Rome*, or with the fair promiſes made by *Titus* himſelf unto the *Greeks*, than the chaſing of *Philip* quite out of his kingdom. And to this effect he made a long diſcourſe. But *Titus* anſwered, That this *Etolian* was ill acquainted, either with the good pleaſure of the ſenate and people of *Rome*, or with the laudable cuſtoms which they generally held: for that it was not the manner of the *Romans*, to ſeek the utter deſtruction of any king or nation, at ſuch time as they firſt made war with them; until by ſome rebellion they found it a matter of neceſſity, to take ſuch a rigorous courſe. And hereof he alledged the *Carthaginians* as a notable example: adding, That victory, to generous minds, was only an inducement unto moderation. As concerning the publick benefit of *Greece*: it was (he ſaid) expedient, that the kingdom of *Macedon* ſhould be greatly weakned and brought low; not that it ſhould be utterly deſtroyed: foraſmuch as it ſerved as a bar, to the *Thracians*, *Gauls*, and a multitude of other ſavage nations, which would ſoon overflow the whole continent of *Greece*, if this kingdom were not interpoſed. Wherefore he concluded, that if *Philip* would yield unto thoſe demands, wherewith he had preſſed him in the former treaty; then was there no reaſon to deny him peace. As for the *Etolians*: if they thought otherwiſe, it ſhould be at their own pleaſure, to take counſel apart for themſelves, as they thought good. Then began *Phaneas*, another of the *Etolians*, to ſay, That all was come to nothing; for that ere long *Philip* would trouble all the *Greeks*, no leſs than he had done in time before. But *Titus* interrupted him, and bad him leave his babling; ſaying, That himſelf would take ſuch order, as that *Philip*, were he never ſo deſirous, ſhould thenceforth not have it in his power to moleſt the *Greeks*.

The next day king *Philip* came thither: whom *Titus* uſed friendly: and ſuffering him to repoſe himſelf that night, held a council the day following: wherein the king yielded unto all that had been required at his hands; offering yet further, to ſtand to the good pleaſure of the ſenate, if they would have more added to the conditions. *Phaneas*, the *Etolian*, inſulting over him, ſaid it was to be hoped, that he would then at length give up to the *Etolians* a many of the towns (which he there named) bidding him ſpeak, whether he would, or not. His anſwer was, That they might take them all. But *Titus* interpoſing himſelf, ſaid, it ſhould be otherwiſe. Theſe were *Theſſalonian* towns, and ſhould all be free: one of them only excepted, which not long ago had refuſed to commit it ſelf to the faith of the *Romans*, and therefore ſhould now be given to the *Etolians*. Hereat *Phaneas* cried out, that it was too great an injury, thus to defraud them of the towns that had ſome time belonged unto their common-weal. Rather he willed *Titus* to conſider, that by an ancient covenant between them and the *Romans*, all the towns taken ought to be their own, and the *Romans* to have nothing, ſave the pillage and captives. It is true, that there had been ſuch a condition in the former war: but it ceaſed to be of any validity, as ſoon as the *Etolians* made peace with *Philip*. And thus much *Titus* gave them to underſtand; aſking them, whether they thought it reaſonable, that all the towns in *Greece*, which had let in the *Romans* by compoſition, ſhould be delivered into ſubjection of the *Etolians*. The reſt of the confederates were very much delighted, with theſe angry paſſages between the *Roman* and the *Etolians*: neither had they great reaſon, to fear any hard meaſure; ſince *Titus* was ſo earneſt in behalf of thoſe *Theſſalians*, to give them liberty, though they had ſtood out againſt him, even till very fear made them open their gates. Wherefore they oppoſed not themſelves; but gave their conſent willingly unto a truce for four months.

The chief cauſe that moved *Titus* to grant peace ſo readily to the *Macedonian*, beſides that laudable cuſtom by him before alledged; was, the fame of *Antiochus*'s coming with an army from *Syria*, and drawing near towards *Europe*. He had alſo perhaps yet a greater motive; even the conſideration, that his ſucceſſor might happen to defraud him of the honour, if the war ſhould happen to be protracted. And he was in the right. For when his letters, together with ambaſſadors from the *Macedonian*, and ſundry ſtates of *Greece*, came unto *Rome*, new conſuls were choſen: who (eſpecially the one of them) ſtood very earneſtly againſt the peace; alledging frivolous matter of their own ſuſpicion, in hope to get the honour of concluding the war. The ſenate began to be doubtfully affected, between the ambaſſadors of *Philip* offering to ſtand to whatſoever was demanded, and the letters of *Titus* preſſing them to accept this offer, on the one ſide; and the importunity of the conſul on the other; who ſaid, that all

all theſe goodly ſhews were fraudulent, and that the king would rebel, as ſoon as the army was called out of *Greece*. But the matter was taken out of the ſenators hands by two of the tribunes, that referred it to an aſſembly of the people; by whoſe ſoveraign authority it was concluded, That peace ſhould be granted unto the king. So ten ambaſſadors were ſent from *Rome* over into *Greece*: in which number were they, that had been conſuls before *Titus*: and it was ordained by their advice, That *Titus* ſhould go through with the buſineſs of peace. Theſe would very fain have retained thoſe three important cities of *Corinth*, *Chalcis*, and *Demetrias*, until the ſtate of *Greece* were ſomewhat better ſettled. But finally *Titus* prevailed ſo, that *Corinth* was (though not immediately) rendred unto the *Acheans*; and all the other *Greek* towns which *Philip* held, as well in *Aſia* as in *Greece*, reſtored unto liberty.

The conditions of the peace granted unto *Philip*, were, That before the celebration of the next [a] *Iſthmian Games*, he ſhould withdraw his garriſons out of all the *Greek* towns which he held, and conſign them over to the *Romans*: That he ſhould deliver up unto them all captives that he had of theirs, and all renagado's: likewiſe all his ſhips of war, reſerving to himſelf only five of the leſſer ſort, and one of extraordinary greatneſs, wherein ſixteen men laboured at every oar: further, that he ſhould pay a thouſand talents, the one half in hand, the other in ten years next following, by even portions. Hereto [b] *Livy* adds, That he was forbidden to make war out of *Macedon*, without permiſſion of the ſenate. But I find not that he obſerved this article, or was at any time charged with the breach of it. Four hundred talents he had already delivered unto *Titus*, together with his younger ſon *Demetrius*, to remain as hoſtage for his true dealing in this matter of peace, at ſuch time as he lately ſent his ambaſſadors to *Rome*: when it was promiſed, that the money, and his ſon, ſhould be reſtored back unto him, if the ſenate were not pleaſed with the agreement. Whether this money were reckoned as part of the thouſand talents, I cannot find: and it ſeemeth otherwiſe, foraſmuch as young *Demetrius*, who together with thoſe four hundred talents, was given for hoſtage, remained ſtill in cuſtody of the *Romans*, as a part of the bargain which *Titus* formerly had made. Letters alſo were then ſent by *Titus*, unto *Pruſias*, king of *Bithynia*: giving him to underſtand, what agreement was made with *Philip*, in behalf of the *Greeks*; and how the ſenate held it reaſonable, that the *Ciani*, moſt miſerably ſpoiled and oppreſſed by *Philip*, to gratify this *Bithynian*, his ſon-in-law, ſhould be reſtored to liberty, and permitted to enjoy the ſame benefit of the *Romans*, which other of their nation did. What effect theſe letters wrought, it was not greatly material; ſince the *Romans* were ſhortly buſied with *Antiochus*, in ſuch wiſe, that they had not leiſure to examine the conformity of *Pruſias* to their will.

All *Greece* rejoiced at the good bargain, which *Titus* had made with *Philip*. Only the *Etolians* found themſelves aggrieved, that they were utterly neglected; which was to the reſt no ſmall part of their contentment. The *Beotians* continued to favour the *Macedonian*; and thereby occaſioned much trouble unto themſelves. There were ſome among them well-affected to the *Romans*: who ſeeing how things were like to go, made their complaint unto *Titus*; ſaying, that they were no better than loſt, for the good-will which they had borne unto him; unleſs at this time, when he lay cloſe by them with his army, their pretor, which was head of the oppoſite faction, might be made away. *Titus* refuſed to have an hand in the execution; yet nevertheleſs did animate them in their purpoſe. So they committed the fact, and hoped to have kept themſelves undiſcovered. But when the murder came out, and ſomewhat was confeſſed by thoſe that were put to torture, the hatred of the people broke out violently againſt the *Romans*; in ſuch wiſe, that howſoever they durſt not take arms againſt them, yet ſuch of them as they found ſtraggling from their camp, they murdered in all parts of the country. This was detected within a while, and many of the dead bodies found. Hereupon *Titus* requires of the *Bœotians* to have the murderers delivered into his hands; and for five hundred ſoldiers, which he had loſt by them, to have paid unto him five hundred talents. Inſtead of making any ſuch amends, they paid him with excuſes, which he would not take as good ſatisfaction. He ſends ambaſſadors to the *Acheans* and *Athenians*, informing them what had happened, and requeſted them not to take it amiſs, though he dealt with theſe their friends as they had deſerved. Herewithal he falls to waſting their country, and beſiegeth two ſuch towns of theirs, as did ſeem to be moſt culpable of the murders lately done. But the ambaſſadors of the *Acheans* and *Athenians* (eſpecially of the *Acheans*, who offered, if he needed them, to help him in this war; yet beſought him rather to grant peace unto the *Beotians*) prevailed ſo far with him, that he was pacified with thirty talents, and the puniſhment of ſuch as were known offenders.

In like ſort, though not ſo violently, were many ſtates of *Greece* diſtracted; ſome among them rejoicing that they were free from the *Macedonian*; others grealy doubting that the *Roman* would prove a worſe neighbour. The *Etolians* would have been glad of any commotion, and therefore publiſhed rumours abroad, that it was the purpoſe of the *Romans* to keep in their own hands all thoſe places, wherein *Philip* lately had his garriſons. Little did they, or the reſt of the *Greeks*, conceive, that this *Macedonian* war ſerved as an introduction to the war to be made in *Aſia* againſt *Antiochus*; where grew the fruit, that was to be reaped of this and many other victories. Wherefore to ſtay the progreſs of bad rumours, when the *Iſthmian Games* were held, which in time of peace were never without great ſolemnity and concourſe: *Titus*, in that great aſſembly of all *Greece*, cauſed proclamation to be made by ſound of trumpet to this effect, That the ſenate and people of *Rome*, and *Titus Quintius Flaminius*, the general, having vanquiſhed king *Philip* and the *Macedonians*, did will to be at liberty, free from impoſitions, free from garriſons, and living at their own laws, the *Corinthians*, *Phocians*, *Locrians*, *Eubeans*, *Acheans* of *Phthiotis*, *Magnetians*, *Theſſalians*, and *Perrhebians*. The ſuddenneſs of this proclamation aſtoniſhed men: ſo as tho' they applauded it with a great ſhout; yet preſently they cried out to hear it again, as if they durſt ſcarce credit their own ears. The *Greeks* were crafts-maſters in the art of giving thanks; which they rendered now to *T. Quintius* with ſo great affection, as that they had well-near ſmothered him, by thronging officiouſly about him.

[a] è Polyb. excerpt. Legat. 9. [b] Liv. l. 33.

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This good-will of the *Greeks*, was like to be much more available to the *Romans* in their war againſt *Antiochus*, than could have been the poſſeſſion of a few towns; yea, or of all thoſe provinces which were named in the proclamation. Upon confidence hereof, no ſooner were theſe *Iſthmian* games at an end, than *Titus*, with the *Romans* that were of his council, gave audience to *Hageſianax*, and *Lyſias*, king *Antiochus*'s ambaſſadors, whom they willed to ſignify unto their lord, that he ſhould do well to abſtain from the free cities in *Aſia*, and not vex them with war; as alſo to reſtore whatſoever he had occupied belonging to the kings *Ptolemy* or *Philip*. Moreover, they willed him by theſe his ambaſſadors, that he ſhould not paſs over his army into *Europe*; adding, that ſome of them would viſit him in perſon ere it were long, to talk with him further concerning theſe points. This done, they fell to accompliſhing their promiſes unto the *Greeks*; to the reſt they gave what they had promiſed. But the *Phocians* and *Locrians* they gave unto the *Etolians*, whom they thought it no wiſdom to offend over-much, being ſhortly to take a greater work in hand. The *Acheans* of *Phthiotis* they annexed unto the *Theſſalians*, all ſave the town of *Thebes* in *Phthiotis*, the ſame which had been abandoned by *T. Quintius* to the *Etolians* in the laſt treaty with *Philip*. The *Etolians* contended very earneſtly about *Pharſalus* and *Leucas*. But they were put off with a dilatory anſwer, and rejected unto the ſenate: for howſoever ſomewhat the council might favour them; yet it was not meet that they ſhould have their will, as it were in deſpite of *Titus*. To the *Acheans* were reſtored *Corinth*, *Triphylia*, and *Herea*. So the *Corinthians* were made free indeed (tho' the *Romans* yet a while kept the *Acrocorinthus*) for that all which were partakers of the *Achean* common-wealth, enjoyed their liberty in as abſolute manner, as they could deſire. To *Pleuratus*, the *Illyrian*, were given one or two places, taken by the *Romans* from *Philip*: and upon *Aminander* were beſtowed thoſe caſtles, which he had gotten from *Philip* during this war; to reign in them and the grounds which they commanded, as he did among his *Athamanians*. The *Rhodians* had been their own carvers. *Attalus* was dead a little before the victory; and therefore loſt his ſhare. Yet many that were with *Titus* in council, would have given the towns of *Oreum* and *Eretria*, in the iſle of *Eubœa*, to his ſon and ſucceſſor king *Eumenes*. But finally it was concluded, that theſe, as well as the reſt of the *Eubeans*, ſhould be ſuffered to enjoy their liberty. *Oreſtis*, a little province of the kingdom of *Macedon*, bordering on *Epirus*, and lying towards the *Ionian* ſea, had yielded unto the *Romans* long ere this, and ſince continued true to them: for which cauſe it was alſo ſet at liberty, and made a free eſtate by it ſelf.

Theſe buſineſſes being diſpatch'd, it remained, that all care ſhould be uſed, not how to avoid the war with king *Antiochus*, but how to accompliſh it with moſt eaſe and proſperity. Wherefore embaſſadors were ſent both to *Antiochus* himſelf, to pick matter of quarrel; and about unto others, to pre-diſpoſe them unto the aſſiſting of the *Romans* therein. What ground and matter of war againſt this king the *Romans* now had, or ſhortly after found; as alſo how their embaſſadors and agents dealt and ſped abroad; I refer unto another place.

CHAP. V.

The wars of the Romans *with* Antiochus *the Great, and his adherents.*

SECT. I.

What kings, of the races of Seleucus *and* Ptolemy, *reigned in* Aſia *and* Egypt, *before* Antiochus *the Great.*

SEleucus [a] *Nicator*, the firſt of his race, king of *Aſia* and *Syria*, died in the end of the hundred twenty and fourth *Olympiad*. He was treacherouſly ſlain by *Ptolemy Ceraunus*, at an altar called *Argos*; having (as is ſaid) been warned before by an oracle, to beware of *Argos*, as the fatal place of his death. But I never have read, that any man's life hath been preſerved, or any miſchance avoided, by the predictions of ſuch deviliſh oracles. Rather I believe, that many ſuch predictions of the heathen gods, have been antedated by their prieſts or by others, which deviſed them after the event.

Antiochus Sotus, the ſon and heir of this *Seleucus*, was dearly beloved of his father: who ſurrendered up unto him his own wife *Stratonica*, when he underſtood how much the young prince was enamoured on her. Wherefore *Ptolemy Ceraunus* had great cauſe to fear, that the death of *Seleucus*, would not be revenged by this his ſucceſſor. But *Antiochus* was contented to be pacified, either with gifts, or perhaps only with fair words; containing himſelf within *Aſia*, and letting *Ceraunus* enjoy that quietly, which he had purchaſed in *Europe* with the blood of *Seleucus*. It is ſaid of this *Antiochus*, that altho' he married with the queen *Stratonica* in his father's life; yet out of modeſty he forbore to embrace her, till his father was dead. So that perhaps his inceſtuous love was partly, if not chiefly, the cauſe of his not proſecuting that revenge, whereunto nature ſhould have urged him. Afterwards he had wars with *Antigonus Gonatas*, and with *Nicomedes* king of *Bithynia*. Alſo *Lutarius* and *Leonorius*, kings or captains of the *Gauls*, were ſet upon him by the ſaid *Nicomedes*. With theſe he fought a great battel: wherein, tho' otherwiſe, the enemy had all advantage againſt him; yet by the terror of his elephants, which affrighted both their horſes and them, he won the victory. He took in hand an enterpriſe againſt *Ptolemy Philadelphus*: but finding ill ſucceſs in the beginning, he ſoon gave it over. To this king *Antiochus Sotor* it was, that *Beroſus* the *Chaldean* dedicated his [b] hiſtory of the kings of *Aſſyria*; the fame, which

[a] Polyb. lib. 2. [b] Genebrard. lib. 2. Juſt. Mart. in Paræn.

hath ſince been excellently falſified by the friar *Annius*. He left behind him one ſon, called *Antiochus Theos*; and one daughter, called *Apame*, that was married unto the king of *Cyrene*. So he died about the end of the hundred twenty and ninth *Olympiad*, or the beginning of the *Olympiad* following, in the fiftieth or one and fiftieth year of *the kingdom of the Greeks*; when he had reigned nineteen years.

Antiochus, ſurnamed *Theos* or *the God*, had this vain and impious title given unto him, by flattery of the *Mileſians*; whom he delivered from *Timarchus*, a tyrant that oppreſſed them. He held long and difficult, but fruitleſs, war with *Ptolemy Philadelphus* king of *Egypt*; which finally he compounded, by taking to wife *Berenice* the daughter of *Ptolemy*.

Of theſe two kings, and of this lady *Berenice*, St. *Jerome*, and other interpreters have underſtood that prophecy of *Daniel*: [a] *The king's daughter of the ſouth, ſhall come to the king of the north, to make an agreement*; and that which followeth.

Ptolemy Philadelphus was a great lover of peace and learning; and (ſetting apart his inceſtuous marriage with his own ſiſter *Arſinoe*) a very excellent prince: howſoever, the worthieſt of all that race. It was he, that built and furniſhed with books, that famous library in *Alexandria*: which to adorn, and to honour the more, he ſent unto *Eleazar*, then high prieſt of the *Jews*, for the books of *Moſes* and other ſcriptures. The benefits of this king unto the *Jews*, had formerly been very great: for he had ſet at liberty as many of them, as his father held in ſlavery throughout all *Egypt*; and he had ſent unto the [b] temple of God in *Jeruſalem* very rich preſents. Wherefore *Eleazar* yielding to the king's deſire, preſented him with an *Hebrew* copy: which *Ptolemy* cauſed to be tranſlated into *Greek*, by ſeventy-two of the moſt grave and learned perſons, that could be found among all the tribes. In this number of the ſeventy two interpreters, or (as they are commonly called) the *Seventy*; *Jeſus*, the ſon of *Sirach*, is thought by *Genebrard* to have been one: who that he lived in this age, it ſeems to me very ſufficiently proved by *Janeſinus*, in his preface unto *Eccleſiaſticus*. The whole paſſage of this buſineſs between *Philadelphus* and the high prieſt, was written (as [c] *Joſephus* affirms) by *Ariſtæus* that was employed therein. Forty years *Ptolemy Philadelphus* was king: reckoning the time wherein he jointly reigned with his father. He was exceedingly beloved of his people; and highly magnified by poets, and other writers. Towards his end he grew more voluptuous, than he had been in his former years: in which time he boaſted, that he alone had found out the way how to live for ever. If this had been referred unto his honourable deeds, it might have ſtood with reaſon: otherwiſe, the gout, with which he was often troubled, was enough to teach him his own error. He was the firſt of the kings, derived from *Alexander*'s ſucceſſors, that entered into league with the *Romans*: as alſo his off-ſpring was the laſt among the royal families, which by them was rooted up.

Antiochus Theos had another wife, called *Laodice*, at ſuch time as he married with *Berenice* the daughter of this *Ptolemy*. After his ſecond marriage, he uſed his firſt wife with no better regard, than if ſhe had been his concubine. *Laodice* hated him for this: yet adventured not to ſeek revenge; until her own ſon *Seleucus Callinicus*, was of ability to be king. This was two or three years after the death of *Ptolemy Philadelphus*: at what time ſhe poiſoned her husband *Theos*; and by permiſſion of *Seleucus* her ſon, murdered *Berenice*, together with a ſon ſhe had born to *Antiochus*. [d] *Juſtin* reports, that *Berenice* ſaved herſelf, together with the young prince her child, awhile in the ſanctuary at *Daphne*: and that not only ſome cities of *Aſia* prepared to ſuccour her, but her brother *Ptolemy Euergetes*, king of *Egypt*, came to reſcue her with an army; tho' too late, for ſhe was ſlain before.

With ſuch cruelties *Seleucus Callinicus*, ſucceeding unto his father that had fifteen years been king, began his reign. His ſubjects were highly offended at his wicked nature, which they diſcovered at his firſt entrance. Wherefore it was like, that his eſtate would have been much endangered, if *Ptolemy Euergetes*, who came againſt him, had not been drawn back into his own country, by ſome commotions there in hand. For there were none that would bear arms againſt *Ptolemy*, in defence of their own king: but rather they ſided with the *Egyptian*; who took *Laodice* the king's mother, and rewarded her with death, as ſhe had well deſerved. Wherefore *Seleucus*, being freed from this invaſion, by occaſion of thoſe domeſtical troubles, which recalled *Euergetes* home into *Egypt*, went about a dangerous piece of work, even to make war upon his own ſubjects, becauſe of their bad affection towards him; when as it had been much better, by well deſerving, to have changed their hatred into love. A great fleet he prepared: in furniſhing and manning whereof, he was at ſuch charges, that he ſcarce left himſelf any other hope, if that ſhould miſcarry. Herein he embarked himſelf; and putting to ſea, met with ſuch a tempeſt, as devoured all ſave himſelf, and a very few of his friends, that hardly eſcaped. This calamity, having left him nothing elſe in a manner than his naked body, turned nevertheleſs to his great good; as anon after it ſeemed. For when his ſubjects underſtood, in what ſort the gods (as they conceived it) had puniſhed him for his offences: they had commiſeration of his eſtate; and, preſuming, that he would thenceforth become a new man, offered him their ſervice with great alacrity. This revived him, and filled him with ſuch ſpirit; as thinking himſelf well enough able to deal with the *Egyptian*, he made ready a mighty army for that purpoſe. But his fortune was no better at land, than it had been at ſea. He was vanquiſhed by *Ptolemy* in a great battel: whence he eſcaped hardly; no better attended, than after his late ſhipwrack. Haſting therefore back to *Antioch*, and fearing that the enemy would ſoon be at his heels; he wrote unto his brother *Antiochus Hierax*, who lay then in *Aſia*, praying him to bring ſuccour with all ſpeed; and promiſing, in recompence of his faith and diligence, the dominion of a great part of *Aſia*. *Antiochus* was then but fourteen years old, yet extreamly ambitious; and therefore glad of ſuch an occaſion to make himſelf great. He levied a mighty army of the *Gauls*; wherewith he ſet forwards to help his brother; or rather to get what he could for himſelf. Hereof *Ptolemy* being

[a] Dan. c. 11. v. 6. [b] Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 18. c. 42. [c] Joſ. Ann. l. 12. c. 2. *Concerning that book, which now goes under the name of* Ariſtæus; *many learned men, and among the reſt* Lodovicus Vives, *hold ſuſpicion, that it is counterfeit, and the invention of ſome late author. Surely if it were to be ſuſpected in the time of* Vives; *it may be now much more juſtly ſuſpected, ſince a new edition of it is come forth,* purged from faults *(as the papiſts term thoſe books, wherein they have changed what they pleaſe) and ſet forth by* Middendorpius *at* Colen. An. Dom. 1578. [d] Juſt. l. 27.

advertiſed

advertiſed, and having no deſire to put himſelf in danger more than needed, took truce with *Seleucus* for ten years. No ſooner was *Seleucus* freed from this care of the *Egyptian* war, but his brother *Antiochus* came upon him, and needs would fight with him, as knowing himſelf to have the better army. So *Seleucus* was vanquiſhed again, and ſaved himſelf, with ſo few about him, that he was verily ſuppoſed to have periſhed in the battel. Thus did God's juſtice take revenge of thoſe murders, by which the crown was purchaſed; and ſettled (as might have been thought) on the head of this bloody king. *Antiochus* was very glad to hear of his brother's death; as if thereby he had purchaſed his heart's deſire: but the *Gauls*, his mercenaries, were gladder than he. For when he led them againſt *Eumenes*, king of *Pergamus*, being in hopes to get honour by making a conqueſt in the beginning of his reign, theſe perfidious *Barbarians* took counſel againſt him, and deviſed how to ſtrip him of all that he had. They thought it very likely, that if there were none of the royal houſe to make head againſt them, it would be in their power to do what ſhould beſt be pleaſing unto themſelves in the lower *Aſia*. Wherefore they laid hands on *Antiochus*, and enforced him to ranſom himſelf with money, as if he had been their lawful priſoner. Neither were they ſo contented, but made him enter into ſuch compoſition with them, as tended but little to his honour. In the mean while *Seleucus* had gathered a new army, and prepared once more to try his fortune againſt his brother. *Eumenes* hearing of this, thought the ſeaſon fit for himſelf, to make his profit of their diſcord. *Antiochus* fought with him, and was beaten; which is no great marvel, ſince he had great reaſon to ſtand in no leſs fear of the *Gauls*, his own ſoldiers, than of the enemy with whom he had to deal. After this, *Eumenes* won much in *Aſia*, whilſt *Antiochus* went againſt his brother. In the ſecond battel fought between the brethren, *Seleucus* had the upper hand; and *Antiochus Hierax*, or the *Hawk* (which ſurname was given him, becauſe he ſought his prey upon every one, without care whether he were provoked or not) ſoared away as far as he could both from his brother, and his own *Gauls*. Having fetched a great compaſs through *Meſopotamia* and *Armenia*, he fell at length into *Cappadocia*, where his father-in-law, king *Artamenes*, took him up. He was entertained very lovingly in outward ſhew, but with a meaning to betray him. This he ſoon perceived, and therefore betook him to his wings again, though he knew not well which way to bend his flight. At length he reſolved to beſtow himſelf upon *Ptolemy*; his own conſcience telling him, what evil he had meant unto *Seleucus*, his brother; and therefore what little good he was reciprocally to expect at his hands. Infidelity can find no ſure harbour. *Ptolemy* well underſtood the perfidious and turbulent nature of this *Hierax*. Wherefore he laid him up in cloſe priſon; whence, though by means of an harlot, he got out; yet flying from his keepers, he fell into the hands of thieves, by whom he was murdered. Near about the ſame time died *Seleucus*. The *Parthians* and *Bactrians* had rebelled againſt him, during his wars with his brother. He therefore made a journey againſt *Arſaces*, founder of the *Parthian* kingdom; wherein his evil fortune, or rather God's vengeance, adhered ſo cloſely to him, that he was taken priſoner. *Arſaces* dealt friendly with him, and diſmiſſed him, having every way given him royal entertainment; but in returning home, he broke his neck by a fall from his horſe, and ſo ended his unhappy reign of twenty years. He had to wife *Laodice*, the ſiſter of *Andromachus*, one of his moſt truſty captains; which was father unto that *Achæus*, who, making his advantage of this affinity, became ſhortly after (as he ſtyled himſelf) a king; though rather indeed a greater troubler of the world in thoſe parts. By *Laodice* he had two ſons, *Seleucus* the third, ſurnamed *Ceraunus*; and *Antiochus* the third, called afterwards *the Great*.

Seleucus Ceraunus reigned only three years; in which time he made war upon *Attalus* the firſt, that was king of *Pergamus*. Being weak of body, through ſickneſs, and in want of money, he could not keep his men of war in good order: and finally, he was ſlain by the treaſon of *Nicanor*, and *Apaturius*, a *Gaul*. His death was revenged by *Achæus*, who ſlew the traitors, and took charge of the army, which he ruled very wiſely and faithfully awhile; *Antiochus*, the brother of *Seleucus*, being then a child.

SECT. II.

The beginning of the great Antiochus's *reign. Of* Ptolemy Euergetes, *and* Philopator, *kings of Egypt. War between* Antiochus *and* Philopator. *The rebellion of* Molo; *and expedition of* Antiochus *againſt him. The re-continuance of* Antiochus's Egyptian *war; with the paſſages between the two kings: the victory of* Ptolemy; *and peace concluded. Of* Achæus, *and his rebellion; his greatneſs, and his fall.* Antiochus's *expedition againſt the* Parthians, Bactrians, *and* Indians. *Somewhat of the king's reigning in* India, *after the death of the Great* Alexander.

ANTIOCHUS was ſcarcely fifteen years old, when he began his reign, which laſted thirty-ſix years. In his minority, he was wholly governed by one *Hermias*, an ambitious man, and one which maligned all virtue that he found in any of the king's faithful ſervants. This vile quality in a counſellor of ſuch great place, how harmful it was unto his lord, and finally, unto himſelf, the ſucceſs of things will ſhortly diſcover.

Soon after the beginning of *Antiochus*'s reign, *Ptolemy Euergetes*, king of *Egypt*, died; and left his heir *Ptolemy Philopator*, a young boy likewiſe, as hath elſewhere been remembred. This was that *Euergetes*, who relieved *Aratus* and the *Acheans*; who afterwards took part with *Cleomenes*, and lovingly entertained him when he was chaſed out of *Greece* by *Antigonus Gonatas*. He annexed unto his dominion the kingdom of *Cyrene*, by taking to wife *Berenice*, the daughter of king *Magas*. He was the third of the *Ptolemies*, and the laſt good king of the race. The name of *Euergetes*, or *the doer of good*, was given to him by the *Egyptians*; not ſo much for the great ſpoils which he brought home, after his victories in *Syria*, as for that he recovered ſome of thoſe images or idols, which *Cambyſes*, when he conquered *Egypt*, had carried into *Perſia*. He was ready to have made war upon the *Jews*, for that *Onias*, their high-prieſt, out of mere covetouſneſs of money, refuſed to pay unto him his yearly tribute of twenty talents: but he was pacified by the wiſdom of *Joſephus*, a *Jew*; to whom afterwards he let in farm the tributes and cuſtoms, that belonged unto him, in thoſe parts of *Syria* which he held. For *Cœleſyria*, with *Paleſtina* and all thoſe parts of the country that lay neareſt unto *Egypt*, were held by the *Egyptian*; either as having fallen to the ſhare of *Ptolemy* the firſt, at ſuch time as the great *Antigonus* was vanquiſhed and

and ſlain in the battel at *Ipſus*; or as being won by this *Euergetes*, in the troubleſome and unhappy reign of *Seleucus Callinicus*. The victories of this *Euergetes* in *Syria*, with the contentions that laſted for many ſucceeding ages between the *Ptolemies* and the *Seleucidæ*; were all foretold by *Daniel* in the prophecy before cited, which is expounded by St. *Jerome*. This *Ptolemy Euergetes* reigned ſix and twenty years; and died towards the end of the hundred thirty and ninth *Olympiad*. It may ſeem by that, which we find in the prologue unto *Jeſus* the ſon of *Sirach*'s book, that he ſhould have reigned a much longer time. For *Siracides* there ſaith, that he came into *Egypt* in the eight and thirtieth year, when *Euergetes* was king. It may therefore be, That either this king reigned long together with his father: or that thoſe eight and thirty years, were the years of *Jeſus*'s own age; if not perhaps reckoned (as the *Jews* did other whiles reckon) from ſome notable accident that had befallen them.

Not long after the death of *Euergetes*: *Hermias* the counſellor, and in a manner the protector of king *Antiochus*, incited his lord unto war againſt the *Egyptian*; for the recovery of *Cœleſyria* and the countries adjoining. This council was very unſeaſonably given; when *Molo*, the king's lieutenant in *Media*, was broken out into rebellion, and ſought to make himſelf abſolute lord of that rich country. Nevertheleſs *Hermias*, being more froward than wiſe, maintained ſtifly, that it was moſt expedient, and agreeable with the king's honour, to ſend forth againſt a rebellious captain other captains that were faithful; whilſt he in perſon made war upon one, that was like himſelf, a king. No man durſt gainſay the reſolution of *Hermias*; who therefore ſent *Xenœtas* an *Achean*, with ſuch forces as he thought expedient, againſt the rebel; whilſt in the mean ſeaſon an army was preparing for the king's expedition into *Cœleſyria*. The king having marched from *Apamea* to *Laodicea*, and ſo over the deſarts into the valley of *Marſyas*, between the mountains of *Libanus* and *Antilibanus*; found his way there ſtopped by *Theodotus* an *Etolian*, that ſerved under *Ptolemy*. So he conſumed the time there awhile to none effect: and then came news, that *Xenœtas*, his captain, was deſtroyed with his whole army; and *Molo* thereby become lord of all the country, as far as unto *Babylon*.

Xenœtas, whilſt he was yet on his journey, and drew near to the river of *Tigris*; received many advertiſements, by ſuch as fled over unto him from the enemy, That the followers of *Molo* were, for the moſt part, againſt their wills, drawn by their commander to bear arms againſt their king. This report was not altogether falſe; but *Molo* himſelf ſtood in ſome doubt leſt his followers would leave him in time of neceſſity. *Xenœtas* therefore making ſhew, as if he had prepared to paſs the river by boats in face of his enemy: left in the night time ſuch as he thought meet to defend his camp; and with all the flour of his army went over *Tigris*, in a place ten miles lower than *Molo*'s camp. *Molo* heard of this, and ſent forth his horſe to give impediment: but hearing that *Xenœtas* could not ſo be ſtopped, he himſelf diſlodged, and took his journey towards *Media*; leaving all his baggage behind him in his camp. Whether he did this, as diſtruſting the faith of his own ſoldiers; or whether thereby to deceive his enemy; the great folly of *Xenœtas* made his ſtratagem proſperous. For *Xenœtas*, having borne himſelf proudly before, upon the countenance of *Hermias*, by whom he was advanced unto this charge; did now preſume, that all ſhould give way to his authority, without putting him to much trouble of uſing the ſword. Wherefore he ſuffered his men to feaſt, with the proviſions which they found ready in the forſaken camp: or rather he commanded them ſo to do, by making proclamation, That they ſhould cheriſh up themſelves againſt the journey, which he intended to take next day, in purſuit of the rebels that fled. And to the ſame purpoſe he buſied himſelf, in tranſporting the remainder of his army, which he had left on the other ſide of *Tigris*. But *Molo* went no further that day, than he could eaſily return the ſame night. Wherefore underſtanding what good rule the king's men kept: he made ſuch haſte back unto them, that he came upon them early in the morning; whilſt they were yet heavy with the wine and other good chear, that they had ſpent at ſupper. So *Xenœtas*, and a very few with him, died fighting in defence of the camp: the reſt were ſlaughtered, without making reſiſtance; and many of them, ere they were perfectly awake. Likewiſe the camp on the other ſide of *Tigris* was eaſily taken by *Molo*: the captains flying thence, to ſave their own lives. In the heat of this victory, the rebel marched unto *Seleucia*, which he preſently took: and, maſtering within a little while the province of *Babylonia*, and all the country down to the *Red* ſea, or *Bay of Perſia*, he haſted unto *Suſa*: where at his firſt coming he won the city: but, failing to take the caſtle that was exceeding ſtrong, returned back to *Seleucia*, there to give order concerning this buſineſs.

The report of theſe things coming to *Antiochus*, whilſt he lay (as is ſaid before) in the vale of *Marſyas*: filled him with great ſorrow, and his camp with trouble. He took counſel what to do in this needful caſe; and was well adviſed by *Epigenes*, the beſt man of war he had about him, to let alone this enterpriſe of *Cœleſyria*; and bend his forces thither, where more need required them. This counſel was put in execution with all convenient haſte. Yet was *Epigenes* diſmiſſed by the way, and ſoon after ſlain, by the practice of *Hermias*: who could not endure to hear good counſel given, contrary to his own good liking and allowance. In the journey againſt *Molo*, the name and preſence of the king was more available, than any odds which he had of the rebel in ſtrength. *Molo* diſtruſted his own followers: and thought, that neither his late good ſucceſs, or any other conſideration, would ſerve to hold them from returning to the king's obedience; if once they beheld his perſon. Wherefore he thought it ſafeſt for him, to aſſail the king's camp in the night time. But going in hand with this; he was diſcovered by ſome that fled over from him to the king. This cauſed him to return back to his camp: which, by ſome error, took alarm at his return; and was hardly quieted, when *Antiochus* appeared in ſight. The king was thus forward in giving battel to *Molo*, upon confidence which he had that many would revolt unto him. Neither was he deceived in this his belief. For not a few men, or enſigns: but all the left wing of the enemy, which was oppoſite unto the king, changed ſide forthwith as ſoon as ever they had ſight of the king's perſon; and were ready to do him ſervice againſt *Molo*. This was enough to have won the victory: but *Molo* ſhortned the work, by killing himſelf; as did alſo divers of his friends, who for fear of torments prevented the hangman with their own ſwords.

After

After this victory came joyful news, that the queen *Laodice*, daughter of *Mithridates* king of *Pontus*, which was married unto *Antiochus* a while before, had brought forth a ſon. Fortune ſeemed bountiful unto the king: and therefore he purpoſed to make what uſe he could, of her friendly diſpoſition while it laſted. Being now in the eaſtern parts of his kingdom, he judged it convenient to viſit his frontiers; were it only to terrify the *Barbarians*, that bordered upon him. Hereunto his counſellor *Hermias* gave aſſent: not ſo much reſpecting the king's honour; as conſidering what good might thereby happen to himſelf. For if it ſhould come to paſs, that the king were taken out of the world by any caſualty: then made he no doubt of becoming protector to the young prince; and thereby of lengthening his own government. *Antiochus* therefore went againſt *Artabazanes*, who reigned among the *Atropatians*; having the greateſt part of his kingdom, ſituate between the *Caſpian* and *Euxine* ſea. This barbarous king was very old and fearful; and therefore yielded unto whatſoever conditions it pleaſed *Antiochus* to lay upon him. So in this journey *Antiochus* got honour, ſuch as well contented him; and then returned homewards. Upon the way, a phyſician of his brake with him as concerning *Hermias*; informing him truly, how odious he was unto the people; and how dangerous he would be ſhortly unto the king's own life. *Antiochus* believed this, having long ſuſpected the ſame *Hermias*; but not daring, for fear of him, to utter his ſuſpicions. It was therefore agreed, that he ſhould be made away on the ſudden: which was done; he being trained forth by a ſleight a good way out of the camp, and there killed without warning or diſputation. The king needed not to have uſed ſo much art, in ridding his hands of a man ſo much deteſted. For howſoever he ſeemed gracious whilſt he was alive; yet they that for fear had been moſt obſequious to him, whilſt he was in caſe to do them hurt, were as ready as the foremoſt, to ſpeak of him as he had deſerved, when once they were ſecure of him. Yea, his wife and children, lying then at *Apamea*, were ſtoned to death by the wives and children of the citizens; whoſe indignation brake forth the more outragiouſly, the longer that it had been concealed.

About theſe times, *Achæus* (of whom we ſpake before) thinking that *Antiochus* might happen to periſh in ſome of theſe expeditions which he took in hand; was bold to ſet a diadem upon his own head, and take upon him as a king. His purpoſe was to have invaded *Syria*: but the fame of *Antiochus*'s returning thitherwards, made him quit the enterpriſe; and ſtudy to ſet ſome handſome colour on his former preſumption. It is very ſtrange, that *Antiochus* neither went againſt *Achæus*; nor yet diſſembled the notice which he had taken, of theſe his traiterous purpoſes: but wrote unto him, ſignifying that he knew all; and upbraiding him with ſuch infidelity, as any offender might know to be unpardonable. By theſe means he emboldened the traitor: who being already detected, might better hope to maintain his former actions by ſtrong hand, than to excuſe them, or get pardon by ſubmiſſion. *Antiochus* had at that time a vehement deſire to recover *Cœleſyria* or what elſe he could, of the dominions of *Ptolemy Philopator* in thoſe parts. He began with *Seleucia*, a very ſtrong city near unto the mouth of the river *Orontes*, which ere long he won, partly by force, partly by corrupting with bribes the captains that lay therein. This was that *Seleucia*, whereto *Antigonus the great*, who founded it, gave the name of *Antigonia*; but *Seleucus* getting it ſhortly after, called it *Seleucia*; and *Ptolemy Euergetes* having lately won it, might, if it had ſo pleaſed him, have changed the name into *Ptolemais*. Such is the vanity of men that hope to purchaſe an endleſs memorial unto their names, by works proceeding rather from their greatneſs, than from their virtue; which therefore no longer are their own, than the ſame greatneſs hath continuance. *Theodotus* the *Etolian*, he that before had oppoſed himſelf to *Antiochus*, and defended *Cœleſyria* in the behalf of *Ptolemy*, was now grown ſorry that he had uſed ſo much faith and diligence in ſervice of an unthankful and luxurious prince. Wherefore, as a mercenary, he began to have regard unto his own profit; which thinking to find greater, by applying himſelf unto him that was (queſtionleſs) the more worthy of theſe two kings; he offered to deliver up to *Antiochus*, the cities of *Tyrus* and *Ptolemais*. Whilſt he was deviſing about this treaſon, and had already ſent meſſengers to king *Antiochus*, his practice was detected, and he beſieged in *Ptolemais* by one of *Ptolemy*'s captains that was more faithful than himſelf. But *Antiochus* haſting to his reſcue, vanquiſhed this captain who met him on the way, and afterwards got poſſeſſion, not only of *Tyrus* and *Ptolemais*, with a good fleet of the *Egyptian* kings that was in thoſe havens; but of ſo many other towns in that country, as emboldened him to think upon making a journey into *Egypt* it ſelf. *Agathocles* and *Soſibius* bore all the ſway in *Egypt* at that time; *Ptolemy* himſelf being loth to have his pleaſures interrupted with buſineſs of ſo ſmall importance, as the ſafety of his kingdom. Wherefore theſe two agreed together to make proviſion as haſtily, and yet as ſecretly as might be, for the war; and nevertheleſs, at the ſame time to preſs *Antiochus* with daily ambaſſadors to ſome good agreement. There came in the heat of this buſineſs, ambaſſadors from *Rhodes*, *Bizantium*, and *Cyzicus*, as likewiſe from the *Etolians*, according to the uſual courteſy of the *Greeks*, deſiring to take up the quarrel. Theſe were all entertained in *Memphis*, by *Agathocles* and *Soſibius*; who entreated them to deal effectually with *Antiochus*. But whilſt this treaty laſted, great preparations were made at *Alexandria* for the war, wherein theſe two counſellors perſwaded themſelves reaſonably, that the victory would be their own, if they could get for money a ſufficient number of the *Greeks* to take their parts. *Antiochus* heard only what was done at *Memphis*, and how deſirous the governours of *Egypt* were to be at quiet; whereunto he gave the readier belief, not only for that he knew the diſpoſition of *Ptolemy*; but becauſe the *Rhodians*, and other ambaſſadors, coming from *Memphis*, diſcourſed unto him all after one manner; as being all deceived by the cunning of *Agathocles* and his fellow. *Antiochus* therefore, having wearied himſelf at the long ſiege of a town called *Dura*, which he could not win; and being deſirous to refreſh himſelf and his army in *Seleucia*, during the winter which then came on, granted unto the *Egyptian* a truce for four months, with promiſe that he would be ready to hearken unto equal conditions, when they ſhould be offered. It was not his meaning to be ſo courteous, as he would fain have ſeemed, but only to lull his enemies aſleep; whilſt he took time to refreſh himſelf, and to bring *Achæus* to ſome good order, whoſe treaſon daily grew more open and violent. The ſame negligence which he thought the *Egyptian* would have uſed, he uſed himſelf; as preſuming, that when time of the year better ſerved, little force would be needful;

needful; for that the towns would voluntarily yield unto him, ſince *Ptolemy* provided not for their defence. Nevertheleſs he gave audience to the ambaſſadors, and had often conference with thoſe that were ſent out of *Egypt*, pleaſing himſelf well to diſpute about the juſtice of his quarrel; which he purpoſed ſhortly to make good by the ſword, whether it were juſt or no. He ſaid, that it was agreed between *Seleucus* his anceſtor, and *Ptolemy* the ſon of *Lagi*, That all *Syria*, if they could win it from *Antigonus*, ſhould be given in poſſeſſion to *Seleucus*; and that this bargain was afterwards ratified by general conſent of all the confederates after the battel at *Ipſus*. But *Ptolemy*'s men would acknowledge no ſuch bargain. They ſaid, that *Ptolemy*, the ſon of *Lagi*, had won *Cæloſyria* and the provinces adjoining, for himſelf; as alſo that he had ſufficiently gratified *Seleucus*, by lending him forces to recover his province of *Babylon*, and the countries about the river of *Euphrates*. Thus, whilſt neither of them greatly cared for peace, they were in the end of their diſputation as far from concluding as at the beginning. *Ptolemy* demanded reſtitution; *Antiochus* thought that he had not as yet gotten all that was his own: alſo *Ptolemy* would needs have *Achæus* comprehended in the league between them, as one of their confederates; but *Antiochus* would not endure to hear of this, exclaiming againſt it as a ſhameful thing, that one king ſhould offer to deal ſo with another, as to take his rebel into protection, and ſeek to join him in confederacy with his own ſoveraign lord. When the truce was expired, and *Antiochus* prepared to take the field again, contrary to his expectation he was informed, That *Ptolemy* with a very puiſſant army, was coming up againſt him out of *Egypt*. Setting forward therefore to meet with the enemy, he was encountred on the way by thoſe captains of *Ptolemy*, that had reſiſted him the year before. They held againſt him the paſſages of *Libanus*, whence nevertheleſs he drove them; and proceeding onward in his journey, won ſo many places, that he greatly increaſed his reputation, and thereby drew the *Arabians*, with divers of the bordering people, to become his followers. As the two kings drew near together, many captains of *Ptolemy* forſook his pay, and fled over to *Antiochus*. This notwithſtanding, the *Egyptian* had the courage to meet his enemy in the field. The battel was fought at *Raphia*, where it was not to be decided, whether the *Egyptians* or *Aſiatics* were the better ſoldiers (for that the ſtrength of both armies conſiſted in mercenaries, chiefly of the *Greeks*, *Thracians*, and *Gauls*) but whether of the kings was the more fortunate. *Ptolemy*, with *Arſinoe* his ſiſter and wife, rode up and down encouraging his men; the like did *Antiochus* on the other ſide, each of them rehearſing the brave deeds of their anceſtors, as not having of their own, whereby to value themſelves. *Antiochus* had the more elephants; as alſo his being of *Aſia*, had they been fewer, would have beaten thoſe of *Afric*. Wherefore, by the advantage of theſe beaſts, he drove the enemies before him, in that part of the battel wherein he fought himſelf. But *Ptolemy* had the better men, by whoſe valour he brake the groſs of his enemy's battel, and won the victory, whilſt *Antiochus* was heedleſly following upon thoſe, whom he had compelled to retire. *Antiochus* had brought into the field above ſeventy thouſand foot, and ſix thouſand horſe, whereof though he loſt ſcarce ten thouſand foot, and not four hundred horſe, yet the fame of his overthrow took from him all thoſe places which he had lately won. When therefore he was returned home to *Antioch*, he began to ſtand in fear, leſt *Ptolemy* and *Achæus*, ſetting upon him both at once, ſhould put him in danger of his whole eſtate. This cauſed him to ſend ambaſſadors to the *Egyptian* to treat of peace, which was readily granted; it being much againſt the nature of *Ptolemy* to vex himſelf thus with the tedious buſineſs of war. So *Ptolemy*, having ſtaid three months in *Syria*, returned home into *Egypt*, clad with the reputation of a conqueror, to the great admiration of his ſubjects, and of all thoſe that were acquainted with his voluptuous and ſlothful condition.

Achæus was not compriſed in the league between theſe two kings; or, if he had been included therein, yet would not the *Egyptian* have taken the pains of making a ſecond expedition for his ſake. The beſt was, that he thought himſelf ſtrong enough, if fortune were not too much againſt him, to deal with *Antiochus*. Neither was he confident without great reaſon. For beſides his many victories, whereby he had gotten all that belonged unto *Antiochus* on this ſide of *Taurus*, he had alſo good ſucceſs againſt *Attalus* king of *Pergamus*, that was an able man of war, and commanded a ſtrong army. Neither was he, as *Molo* the rebel had been, one of mean regard otherwiſe, and carried beyond himſelf by apprehending the vantage of ſome opportunity; but couſin-german to the king, as hath been ſhewed before, and now lately the king's brother-in-law, by taking to wife a younger daughter of the ſame *Mithridates* king of *Pontus*, which was alſo called *Laodice*, as was her ſiſter the queen, *Antiochus*'s wife. Theſe things had added majeſty unto him, and had made his followers greatly to reſpect him, even as one to whom a kingdom was belonging. Neither made it a little for him, that king *Ptolemy* of *Egypt* held him in the nature of a friend; and that king *Antiochus* was now lately vanquiſhed in the battel of *Raphia*, and had thereby loſt all his gettings in *Syria*. But all theſe hopes and likelihoods came to nothing. For the king of *Pontus*, if he would meddle in that quarrel between his ſon-in-law, had no reaſon to take part againſt the more honourable. As for the *Egyptian*, he was not only ſlothful, but hindered by a rebellion of his own ſubjects, from helping his friends abroad. For the people of *Egypt*, of whom *Ptolemy*, contrary to the manner of his progenitors, had armed a great number to ſerve in the late expedition, began to entertain a good opinion of their own valour, thinking it not inferiour to the *Macedonian*. Hereupon they refuſed to ſuffer as much as formerly they had done; ſince they leſs eſteemed, than they had done, the force of the king's mercenary *Greeks*, which had hitherto kept them in ſtreight ſubjection. Thus brake out a war between the king and his ſubjects: wherein though the ill-guided force of the multitude was finally broken; yet king *Ptolemy* thereby waſted much of his ſtrength, and much of his time, that might have been ſpent, as he thought, much better in revelling; or, as others thought, in ſuccouring *Achæus*. As for *Antiochus*, he had no ſooner made his peace with the *Egyptian*, than he turned all his care to the preparation of war againſt *Achæus*. To this purpoſe he entered into league with *Attalus*, that ſo he might diſtract the forces of his rebel, and find him work on all ſides. Finally, his diligence and fortune were ſuch, that within a while he had pent up *Achæus* into the city of *Sardes*, where he held him about two years beſieged. The city was very ſtrong, and well victualled, ſo as there appeared not, when the ſecond year came, any greater likelihood of taking

taking it, than in the firſt year's ſiege. In the end, one *Lagoran*, a *Cretan*, found means how to enter the town. The caſtle it ſelf was upon a very high rock, and in a manner impregnable; as alſo the town-wall adjoining to the caſtle, in that part which was called *the Saw*, was in like manner ſituated upon ſteep rocks, and hardly acceſſible, that hung over a deep bottom, whereinto the dead carcaſes of horſes, and other beaſts, yea, and ſometimes of men, uſed to be thrown. Now it was obſerved by *Lagoras*, that the ravens, and other birds of prey, which haunted that place by reaſon of their food, which was there never wanting, uſed to fly up unto the top of the rocks, and to pitch upon the walls, where they reſted without any diſturbance. Obſerving this often, he reaſoned with himſelf, and concluded, that thoſe parts of the wall were left unguarded, as being thought unapproachable. Hereof he informed the king, who approved his judgment, and gave unto him the leading of ſuch men as he deſired for the accompliſhing of the enterpriſe. The ſucceſs was agreeable to that which *Lagoras* had before conceived; and, though with much labour, yet without reſiſtance, he ſcaled thoſe rocks, and (whilſt a general aſſault was made) entered the town in that part, which was at other times unguarded, then unthought upon. In the ſame place had the *Perſians* under *Cyrus*, gotten into *Sardes*, when *Cræſus* thought himſelf ſecure on that ſide. But the citizens took not warning by the example of a loſs many ages paſs'd, and therefore out of memory. *Achæus* held ſtill the caſtle, which not only ſeemed by nature impregnable, but was very well ſtored with all neceſſaries, and manned with a ſufficient number of ſuch as were to him well aſſured. *Antiochus* therefore was conſtrained to waſte much time about it, having none other hopes to prevail, than by famiſhing the incloſed. Beſides the uſual tedioufneſs of expectation, his buſineſs called him thence away into the higher *Aſia*, where the *Bactrians* and *Parthians*, with the *Hyrcanians*, had erected kingdoms taken out of his dominions, upon which they ſtill encroached. But he thought it not ſafe to let *Achæus* break looſe again. On the other ſide, there were ſome agents of *Ptolemy* the *Egyptian*, and good friends unto *Achæus*, that made it their whole ſtudy how to deliver this beſieged prince. If they could reſcue his perſon, they cared for no more; but preſumed, that when he ſhould appear in the countries under *Taurus*, he would ſoon have an army at command, and be ſtrong enough to hold *Antiochus* as hardly to work, as at any time before. Wherefore they dealt with one *Bolis*, a *Cretan*, that was acquainted well with all the ways in the country, and particularly with the by-paths and exceeding difficult paſſages among thoſe rocks whereon the caſtle of *Sardes* ſtood. Him they tempted with great rewards, which he ſhould receive at the hands of *Ptolemy*, as well as of *Achæus*, to do his beſt for the performance of their deſire. He undertook the buſineſs, and gave ſuch likely reaſons of bringing all to effect, that they wrote unto *Achæus* by one *Arianus*, a truſty meſſenger, whom *Bolis* found means to convey into the caſtle. The faith of theſe negotiators *Achæus* held moſt aſſured. They alſo wrote unto him in privy characters, or cyphers, wherewith none ſave he and they were acquainted; whereby he knew, that it was no feigned device of his enemies, in the name of his friends. As for the meſſenger, he was a truſty fellow, and one whom *Achæus* found, by examination, heartily affected unto their ſide. But the contents of the epiſtle, which were, that he ſhould be confident in the faith of *Bolis*, and of one *Cambylus*, whom *Bolis* had won unto the buſineſs, did ſomewhat trouble him. They were men to him unknown; and *Cambylus* was a follower of *Antiochus*, under whom he had the command of thoſe *Cretans*, which held one of the forts that blocked up the caſtle of *Sardes*. Nevertheleſs, other way to eſcape he ſaw none, than by putting himſelf to ſome adventure. When the meſſenger had therefore paſſed to and fro, it was at length concluded, that *Bolis* himſelf ſhould come to ſpeak with *Achæus*, and conduct him forth. There was none other than good faith meant by any of the reſt, ſave only by *Bolis* and *Cambylus*, which were *Cretans*, and (as all their countrymen, [a] ſome few excepted, have been, and ſtill are) falſe knaves. Theſe two held a conſultation together, that was, as [b] *Polybius* obſerves it, rightly *critical*, neither concerning the ſafety of him whoſe deliverance they undertook, nor touching the diſcharge of their own faith; but only how to get moſt, with leaſt ado and danger to themſelves. Briefly, they concluded, that firſt of all they would equally ſhare between them ten talents, which they had already received in hand; and then that they would reveal the matter to *Antiochus*, offering to deliver *Achæus* unto him, if they might be well rewarded both with preſent money, and with promiſe of conſideration anſwerable to the greatneſs of ſuch a ſervice, when it ſhould be diſpatched. *Antiochus*, hearing this promiſe of *Cambylus*, was no leſs glad, than were the friends of *Achæus* well pleaſed with the comfortable promiſes of *Bolis*. At length, when all things were in readineſs on both ſides, and that *Bolis*, with *Arianus*, was to get up into the caſtle, and convey *Achæus* thence, he firſt went with *Cambylus* to ſpeak with the king, who gave him very private audience, and confirmed unto him by word of mouth, the aſſurance of his liberal promiſes. And after that, putting on the countenance of an honeſt man, and of one that was faithful unto *Ptolemy*, whom he had long ſerved, he accompanied *Arianus* up into the caſtle. At his coming thither, he was lovingly entertained; yet queſtioned at large by *Achæus*, touching all the weight of the buſineſs in hand. But he diſcourſed ſo well, and with ſuch gravity, that there appeared no reaſon of diſtruſting either his faith or judgment. He was an old ſoldier, had long been a captain under *Ptolemy*, and did not thruſt himſelf into this buſineſs, but was invited by honourable and faithful men. He had alſo taken a ſafe courſe in winning (as it ſeemed) that other countryman of his, who kept a fort that ſtood in their way; and thereby had already ſundry times given ſafe paſſage and repaſſage unto *Arianus*. But againſt all theſe comfortable hopes, the importance of ſo great an adventure ſtirred up ſome diffidence. *Achæus* therefore dealt wiſely, and ſaid, that he would yet ſtay in the caſtle a little longer; but that he meant to ſend away with *Bolis* three or four of his friends, from whom, when he received better advertiſement concerning the likelihood of the enterpriſe, then

[a] *Among theſe few, I do not except one, calling himſelf* Eudæmon John Andrew, *a* Cretan; *who in one of his late ſhameleſs libels, wherein he traduceth our king, religion, and country, with all the good and worthy men, of whom he could learn the names, hath, by inſerting my name, twice belied me, in calling me a puritan, and one that have been dangerous to my ſoveraign. It is an honour to be ill ſpoken of by ſo diligent a ſupporter of treaſons, and architect of lies; in regard whereof I may not deny him the commendation of criticiſm, no leſs voluminous, than he in multiplicity of name is beyond any the* Cretans *in elder times, that were always liars, evil beaſts, and ſlow-bellies.* [b] Polyb. hiſt. l. 8.

would

would he iſſue forth himſelf. Hereby he took order not to commit himſelf wholly unto the faith of a man unknown. But, as *Polybius* well notes, he did not conſider that he played the *Cretan* with a man of *Crete*; which is to ſay, that he had to do with one, whoſe knavery could not be avoided by circumſpection. *Bolis* and *Cambylus* had layed their plot thus; that if *Achæus* came forth alone, then ſhould he eaſily be taken by the ambuſh prepared for him; if he were accompanied with many of his friends, then ſhould *Arianus* be appointed to lead the way, as one that of late had trodden it oft; and *Bolis* following behind, ſhould have an eye upon *Achæus*, to prevent him not only from eſcaping in the tumult, but from breaking his own neck, or otherwiſe killing himſelf; to the end that, being taken alive, he might be to *Antiochus* the more welcome preſent. And in ſuch order came they now forth. *Arianus* going before as guide, the reſt following as the way ſerved, and *Bolis* in the rear. *Achæus* made none acquainted with his purpoſe, till the very inſtant of his departure. Then ſignified he the matter to his wife *Laodice*; and, comforting her with hope as well as he could, appointed four of his eſpecial friends to bear him company. They were all diſguiſed, and one of them alone took upon him to have knowledge of the *Greek* tongue, ſpeaking and anſwering as need ſhould require, for all, as if the reſt had been *Barbarians*. *Bolis* followed them, craftily deviſing upon his buſineſs, and much perplexed. For (ſaith *Polybius*) *though he were of* Crete, *and prone to ſurmiſe any thing to the miſchief of another*, yet could he not ſee in the dark, nor know which of them was *Achæus*, or whether *Achæus* himſelf were there. The way was very uneaſy, and in ſome places dangerous; eſpecially to thoſe that knew it not. Wherefore they were fain to ſtay in divers places, and help one another up or down. But upon every occaſion, they were all of them very officious towards *Achæus*, lending him their hands, and taking ſuch care of him, as eaſily gave *Bolis* to underſtand that he was the man; and ſo by their unſeaſonable duty they undid their lord. When they came to the place, where *Cambylus* lay in wait, *Bolis* whiſtled, and preſently claſped *Achæus* about the middle, holding him faſt that he ſhould not ſtir. So they were all taken by the ambuſh, and carried forthwith to *Antiochus*, who ſat up watching in his pavilion, expecting the event. The ſight of *Achæus* brought in bound unto him, did ſo aſtoniſh the king, that he was unable to ſpeak a word, and anon brake out into weeping. Yet was he before informed of the plot, which might have kept him from admiration; as alſo the next morning betimes aſſembling his friends together, he condemned *Achæus* to a cruel death; which argues, that he was not moved with pity towards this unhappy man. Wherefore it was the general regard of calamities, incident unto great fortunes, that wrung from him theſe tears; as alſo the rarity of the accident, that made both him and his friends to wonder; though it be ſo, that ſuch a courſe as this of his, in employing two miſchievous knaves againſt one traitor, doth not rarely ſucceed well, according to that *Spaniſh* proverb, *A un Traydor dos allevoſos*. The death of *Achæus* brought ſuch aſtoniſhment upon thoſe which held the caſtle, that after a while they gave up the place and themſelves unto the king, whereby he got entire poſſeſſion of all to him belonging in the leſſer *Aſia*.

Some years paſſed after this, ere *Antiochus* was ready for his expedition againſt the *Parthians*, and *Hyrcanians*. The *Parthians* were a little nation of obſcure beginnings, and commonly ſubject unto thoſe that ruled in *Media*. In the great ſhuffling for provinces after the death of *Alexander*, the government over them was committed by *Antipater* to one *Philip*, a man of ſmall regard; ſhortly they fell to *Eumenes*, then to *Antigonus*, and from him, together with the *Medes*, to *Seleucus*, under whoſe poſterity they continued until the reign of *Seleucus Callinicus*, being ruled by lieutenants of the *Syrian* kings. The luſtful inſolency of one of theſe lieutenants, together with the misfortune of *Callinicus*, that was vanquiſhed, and thought to be ſlain by the *Gauls*, did ſtir up *Arſaces*, a nobleman of the country, to ſeek revenge of injuries done, and animate them to rebel. So he ſlew the king's lieutenant, made himſelf king of the *Parthians*, and lord of *Hyrcania*; fought proſperouſly with thoſe that diſturbed him in his beginnings, and took *Seleucus Callinicus* priſoner in battel, whom he royally entertained, and diſmiſſed. Hereby he won the reputation as a lawful king, and, by good government of his country, procured unto himſelf ſuch love of his ſubjects, that his name was continued to his ſucceſſors, like as that of the *Ptolemies* in *Egypt*, and that of the *Ceſars* afterwards in *Rome*. Much about the ſame time the *Bactrians* rebelled, though theſe at length, and all belonging to the *Seleucidæ* beyond *Euphrates*, increaſed the *Parthians* dominion. Now *Antiochus* went againſt them with ſo ſtrong an army, that they durſt not meet him in the plain field; but kept themſelves in woods, or places of ſtrength, and defended the ſtreights and paſſages of mountains. The reſiſtances they made availed them not; for *Antiochus* had with him ſo great a multitude, and ſo well ſorted, as he needed not to turn out of the way from thoſe that lay fortified againſt him in woods and ſtreights between their mountains; it being eaſy to ſpare, out of ſo great a number, as many, as fetching a compaſs about, might either get above the enemy's heads, or come behind, and charge them on the back. Thus did he often employ againſt them his light armature, wherewith he cauſed them to diſlodge, and give way unto his *Phalanx*, upon which they durſt not adventure themſelves in open ground. *Arſaces*, the ſecond of the name (for his father was dead before this) was then king of *Parthia*; who, though he was confident in the fidelity of his own ſubjects, yet feared to encounter with ſo mighty an invader. His hope was, that the bad ways, and defarts, would have cauſed *Antiochus*, when he was at *Ecbatane* in *Media*, to give over the journey without proceeding much further. This not ſo falling out, he cauſed the wells and ſprings in the wilderneſs, through which his enemy muſt paſs, to be dammed up and ſpoiled. By which means, and the reſiſtance before ſpoken of, when he could not prevail, he withdrew himſelf out of the way; ſuffering the enemy to take his pleaſure for a time, in waſting the country; wherein, without ſome victory obtained, he could make no long abode. *Antiochus* hereby found, that *Arſaces* was nothing ſtrongly provided for the war. Wherefore he marched through the heart of *Parthia*, and then forward into *Hyrcania*, where he won *Tambrace*, the chief city of that province. This indignity, and many other loſſes, cauſed *Arſaces* at length, when he had gathered an army that ſeemed ſtrong enough, to adventure a battel. The iſſue thereof was ſuch, as gave to neither of the kings hopes of accompliſhing his deſires, without exceeding difficulty. Wherefore *Arſaces* craved peace, and at length obtained it, *Antiochus* thinking it not amiſs to make him a friend, whom he could not make a ſubject.

The

The next expedition of *Antiochus*, was againſt *Euthydemus*, king of the *Bactrians*; one that indeed had not rebelled againſt him, or his anceſtors; but, having gotten the kingdom from thoſe that had rebelled, kept it to himſelf. With *Euthydemus* he fought a battel by the river *Arius*, where he had the victory. But the victory was not ſo greatly to his honour, as was the teſtimony which he gave of his own private valour in obtaining it. He was thought that day to have demeaned himſelf more couragiouſly, than did any one man in all his army. His horſe was ſlain under him, and he himſelf received a wound in his mouth, whereby he loſt ſome of his teeth. As for *Euthydemus*, he withdrew himſelf back into the furthermoſt parts of his kingdom, and afterwards protracted the war, ſeeking how to end it by compoſition. So ambaſſadors paſſed between the kings; *Antiochus* complaining, that a country of his was unjuſtly uſurped from him; *Euthydemus* anſwering, that he had won it from the children of the uſurpers: and further, that the *Bactrians*, a wild nation, could hardly be retained in order, ſave by a king of their own; for that they bordered upon the *Scythians*, with whom if they ſhould join, it would be greatly to the danger of all the provinces that lay behind them. Theſe allegations, together with his own wearineſs, pacified *Antiochus*, and made him willing to grant peace upon reaſonable conditions. *Demetrius*, the ſon of *Euthydemus*, being a goodly gentleman, and employed by his father as ambaſſador in this treaty of peace, was not a little available unto a good concluſion. For *Antiochus* liked him ſo well, that he promiſed to give him in marriage one of his own daughters, and therewithal permitted *Euthydemus* to retain the kingdom; cauſing him nevertheleſs to deliver up all his elephants; as alſo to bind himſelf by oath to ſuch covenants as he thought requiſite.

So *Antiochus*, leaving the *Bactrian* in quiet, made a journey over *Caucaſus*, and came to the borders of *India*, where he renewed with *Sophagaſenus*, king of the *Indians*, the ſociety that had been between their anceſtors. The *Indians* had remained ſubject unto the *Macedonians*, for a little while after *Alexander*'s death. *Eumenes*, in his war againſt *Antigonus*, raiſed part of his forces out of their country. But when *Antigonus*, after his victory, turned weſtward, and was over-buſied in a great civil war; then did one *Sandrocottus*, an *Indian*, ſtir up his countrymen to rebellion; making himſelf their captain, and taking upon him as protector of their liberty. This office and title he ſoon changed, though not without ſome contention, into the name and majeſty of a king. Finally, he got unto himſelf (having an army of ſix hundred thouſand men) if not all *India*, yet as much of it as had been *Alexander*'s. In this eſtate he had well confirmed himſelf, ere *Seleucus Nicator* could find leiſure to call him to account. Neither did he faint, or humble himſelf, at the coming of *Seleucus*, but met him in field, as ready to defend his own; ſo ſtrongly and well appointed, that the *Macedonian* was contented, to make both peace and affinity with him, taking only a reward of fifty elephants. This league, made by the founders of the *Indian* and *Syrian* kingdoms, was continued by ſome offices of love between their children, and now renewed by *Antiochus*, whoſe number of elephants were increaſed thereupon by the *Indian* king to an hundred and fifty; as alſo he was promiſed to have ſome treaſure ſent after him, which he left one to receive. Thus parted theſe two great kings. Neither had the *Indians*, from this time forwards, in many generations, any buſineſs worthy of remembrance with the *Weſtern* countries. The poſterity of *Sandrocottus*, is thought to have retained that kingdom unto the days of *Auguſtus Ceſar*: to whom *Porus*, when reigning in *India*, ſent ambaſſadors with preſents, and an epiſtle written in *Greek*: wherein, among other things, he ſaid, That he had command over ſix hundred kings. There is alſo found, ſcattered in ſundry authors, the mention of ſome which held that kingdom, in divers ages, even unto the time of *Conſtantine the Great*: being all peradventure of the ſame race. But *Antiochus*, who in this treaty with *Sophagaſenus*, carried himſelf as the worthier perſon, receiving preſents; and after marched home through *Drangiana* and *Carmania*, with ſuch reputation, that all the potentates, not only in the higher *Aſia*, but on the hither ſide of *Taurus*, humbled themſelves unto him, and called him *The Great*; ſaw an end of his own greatneſs within a few years enſuing, by preſuming to ſtand upon points with the *Romans*; whoſe greatneſs was the ſame indeed, that his was only in ſeeming.

SECT. III.

The lewd reign of Ptolemy Philopater *in* Egypt: *with the tragical end of his favourites, when he was dead.* Antiochus *prepares to war on the young child* Ptolemy Epiphanes, *the ſon of* Philopater. *His irreſolution in preparing for divers wars at once. His voyage toward the* Helleſpont. *He ſeeks to hold amity with the* Romans, *who make a friendly ſhew to him; intending nevertheleſs to have war with him. His doings againſt the* Helleſpont; *which the* Romans *made the firſt ground of their quarrel to him.*

THIS expedition being finiſhed; *Antiochus* had leiſure to repoſe himſelf a-while, and ſtudy which way to convert the terror of his puiſſance, for the enlargement of his empire. Within two or three years *Ptolemy Philopater* died: leaving his ſon *Ptolemy Epiphanes*, a young boy, his ſucceſſor in the kingdom; unlikely by him to be well defended, againſt a neighbour ſo mighty and ambitious. This *Ptolemy*, ſurnamed *Philopater*, that is to ſay, *a lover of his father*, is thought to have had that ſurname given him in meer deriſion; as having made away both his father and mother. [a] His young years, being newly paſt his childhood, when he began to reign, may ſeem to diſcharge him of ſo horrible a crime, as his father's death: yet the beaſtlineſs of all his following life, makes him not unlike to have done any miſchief, whereof he could be accuſed. Having won the battel at *Raphia*, he gave himſelf over to ſenſuality, and was wholly governed by a ſtrumpet, called *Agathoclea*. At her inſtigation he murdered his own wife and ſiſter; which had adventured herſelf with him, in that only dangerous action by him undertaken, and performed with honour. The lieutenantſhips of his provinces, with all commands in his army, and offices whatſoever, were wholly referred unto the diſpoſition of this *Agathoclea*, and her brother *Agathocles*, and of *Oenanthe*, a filthy bawd, that was mother unto them both. So theſe governed the realm at their pleaſure, to the great grief of all the country, till *Philopater* died: who having reigned ſeventeen years, left none other ſon than *Ptolemy*

[a] Juſtin. l. 30.

Epiphanes, a child of five years old, begotten on *Arſinoe*, that was his ſiſter and wife. After the king's death, *Agathocles* began to take upon him, as protector of young *Epiphanes*, and governor of the land. He aſſembled the *Macedons* (which were the king's ordinary forces in pay, not all born in *Macedonia*, but the race of thoſe that abode in *Egypt* with *Ptolemy the firſt*, and would not be accounted *Egyptians*; as neither would the kings themſelves) and bringing forth unto them his ſiſter *Agathoclea*, with the young king in her arms, began a ſolemn oration. He told them, That the deceaſed father of this their king, had committed the child into the arms of his ſiſter, but unto the faith of them: on whoſe valiant right hands, the whole ſtate of the kingdom did now rely. He beſought them therefore, that they would be faithful, and, as great need was, defend their king againſt the treaſon of one *Tlepolemus*, an ambitious man, who traiterouſly went about to ſet the diadem upon his own head, being a meer ſtranger to the royal blood. Herewithal he produced before them a witneſs, that ſhould juſtify his accuſation againſt *Tlepolemus*. Now, tho' it were ſo, that he delivered all this with a feigned paſſion of ſorrow, and counterfeiting of tears: yet the *Macedons* that heard him, regarded not any word that he ſpake; but ſtood laughing, and talking one to another, what a ſhameleſs diſſembler he was, to take ſo much upon him, as if he knew not how greatly he was hated. And ſo brake up the aſſembly: he that had called it, being ſcarce aware how. *Agathocles* therefore, whom the old king's favour had made mighty, but neither wiſe nor well qualified; thought to go to work, as had formerly been his manner, by uſing his authority, to the ſuppreſſion of thoſe that he diſtruſted. He haled out of a temple the mother-in-law of *Tlepolemus*; and caſt her into priſon. This filled *Alexandria* with rumors, and made the people (tho' accuſtomed to ſuffer greater things, whilſt they were committed in the old king's name) to meet in knots together, and utter one to another their minds; wherein they had conceived extreme hate, againſt theſe three pernicious miſgovernours of the old king. Beſides their conſideration of the preſent injury done to *Tlepolemus*, they were ſomewhat alſo moved with fear of harm; which, in way of requital, *Tlepolemus* was likely to do unto the city. For he was, tho' a man moſt unapt for government, as afterwards he proved; yet no bad ſoldier, and well beloved of the army. It was alſo then in his power, to ſtop the proviſion of victuals, which was to come into *Alexandria*. As theſe motives wrought with the people: ſo by the remedy which *Agathocles* uſed, were the *Macedons* more haſtily, and more violently ſtirred unto uproar. He ſecretly apprehended one of their number, whom he ſuſpected of conſpiracy againſt him; and delivered him unto a follower of his own, to be examined by torture. This poor ſoldier was carried into an inner-room of the palace, and there ſtripped out of all his apparel, to be tormented. But whilſt the whips were brought forth, and all things even in a readineſs for that purpoſe; there was brought unto the miniſter of *Agathocles*, a ſad report of *Tlepolemus*'s being at hand. Hereupon the examiner, and his torturers, one after another, went out of the room; leaving *Mœragenes*, the ſoldier, alone by himſelf, and the doors open. He perceiving this, naked as he was, conveyed himſelf out of the palace, and got unto the *Macedonians*; of whom he found ſome in a temple thereby at dinner. The *Macedonians* were as fierce in maintenance of their privileges, as are the *Turks Janizaries*. Being aſſured therefore, that one of their fellows had thus been uſed; they fell to arms in a great rage, and began to force the palace; crying out, That they would ſee the king, and not leave him in poſſeſſion of ſuch a dangerous man. The whole multitude in the city, with loud clamours, made no leſs a-do than the ſoldiers, tho' to leſs effect. So the old bawd, *Oenanthe*, fled into a temple: her ſon and daughter ſtaid in the court, until the king was taken from them; and they, by his permiſſion, which he eaſily gave, and by appointment of thoſe that now had him in their hands, delivered up to the fury of the people. *Agathocles* himſelf was ſtabbed to death, by ſome which therein did the office of friends; tho' in manner of enemies. His ſiſter was dragged naked up and down the ſtreets, as was alſo his mother, with all to them belonging: the enraged multitude committed upon them a barbarous execution of juſtice, biting them, pulling out their eyes, and tearing them in pieces.

Theſe troubles in *Egypt*, ſerved well to ſtir up king *Antiochus*; who had very good leiſure, tho' he wanted all pretence, to make war on young *Ptolemy*. *Philip* of *Macedon* had the ſame deſire, to get what part he could of the child's eſtate. But it happened well, that *Ptolemy Philopater*, in the *Punic* war, which was now newly ended, had done many good offices unto the *Romans*. Unto them therefore the *Egyptians* addreſſed themſelves, and craved help againſt theſe two kings: who tho' they ſecretly maligned one the other, yet had entred into covenant, to divide between them, all that belonged unto this orphan, whoſe father had been confederate with them both. So [a] *M. Lepidus*, was ſent from *Rome*, to protect from all violence the king of *Egypt*; eſpecially againſt *Antiochus*. As for the *Macedonian*, he was very ſoon found buſied, with war at his own doors. Alſo *Scopas*, the *Etolian*, being a penſioner to the *Egyptian*, was ſent into *Greece*, to raiſe an army of mercenaries. What *Lepidus* did in *Egypt*, I do not find: and therefore think it not improbable, that he was ſent thither only one of the three embaſſadors, [b] in the beginning of the war with *Philip*, as hath been ſhewed before. As for *Scopas*, he ſhortly after went up into *Syria* with his army: where winning many places, amongſt the reſt of his acts, he ſubdued the *Jews*; who ſeem to have yielded themſelves a little before unto *Antiochus*, at ſuch time as they ſaw him prepare for his war, and deſpaired of receiving help from *Egypt*. [c] But it was was not long, ere all theſe victories of *Scopas* came to nothing. For the very next year following, which was (according to *Euſebius*) the ſame year that *Philip* was beaten at *Cynoſcephalæ*; *Antiochus* vanquiſhed *Scopas* in battel, and recovered all that had been loſt. Among the reſt, the *Jews* with great willingneſs returned under his obedience; and were therefore by him very gently entreated.

The land of *Egypt* this great king did forbear to invade; and gave it out, that he meant to beſtow a daughter of his own in marriage upon *Ptolemy*: either hoping, as may ſeem, that the country would willingly ſubmit it ſelf unto him, if this young child ſhould happen to miſcarry; or elſe that greater purchaſe might be made in the *Weſtern* parts of *Aſia*, whilſt *Philip* was held over-laboured by the *Romans*. It appears, that he was

[a] Juſtin. l. 30. [b] Liv. l. 31. [c] Vide Joſeph. Ant. Jud. l. 12. c. 3.

very

very much diſtracted; hunting (as we ſay) two hares at once with one hound. The quarrels between *Attalus*, *Philip*, and the *Greeks*, promiſed to afford him great advantage, if he ſhould bring his army to the *Helleſpont*. On the other ſide, the ſtate of *Egypt*, being ſuch as hath been declared, ſeemed eaſy to be ſwallowed up at once. One while therefore he took what he could get in *Syria*; where all were willing (and the *Jews* among the reſt, tho' hitherto they had kept faith with the *Egyptian*) to yield him obedience. Another while, letting *Egypt* alone, he was about to make invaſion upon *Attalus*'s kingdom; yet ſuffered himſelf eaſily to be perſwaded by the *Roman* ambaſſadors, and deſiſted from that enterpriſe. Having thus far gratified the *Romans*; he ſends ambaſſadors to the ſenate, to conclude a perfect amity between him and them. It is not lightly to be over-paſſed, that theſe his ambaſſadors were lovingly entertained at *Rome*; and diſmiſſed, with a decree and anſwer of the ſenate, altogether to the honour of king *Antiochus*. But this anſwer of the *Romans* was not ſincere; being rather framed according to regard of the king's good liking, than of their own intent. They had not as yet made an end with *Philip:* neither would they gladly be troubled with two great wars at once. Wherefore, not ſtanding much upon the nice examination of what belonged unto their honour; they were content to give good words for the preſent. In the mean time, *Antiochus* fights with *Scopas* in *Syria:* and ſhortly prepares to win ſome towns elſewhere, belonging unto *Ptolemy*; yet withal he ſends an army *Weſtward*, intending to make what profit he can of the diſtractions in *Greece*. Likewiſe it is conſiderable, as an argument of his much irreſolution, how notwithſtanding his attempts upon both of their kingdoms, he offered one of his daughters to *Ptolemy*, and another to *Eumenes*, the ſon of *Attalus*, newly king of *Pergamus*; ſeeking each of their friendſhips, at one and the ſame time, when he ſought to make each of them a ſpoil. Thus was he acting and deliberating at once: being carried with an inexpreſſible deſire of repugnancies; which is a diſeaſe of great, and over-ſwelling fortunes. Howſoever it was, he ſent an army to *Sardes* by land, under two of his own ſons: willing them there to ſtay for him; whilſt he himſelf, with a fleet of an hundred gallies, and two hundred other veſſels, intended to paſs along by the coaſts of *Cilicia* and *Caria*, taking in ſuch places as held for the *Egyptian*. It was a notable act of the *Rhodians*, that, whilſt the war of *Philip* lay yet upon their hands, they adventured upon this great *Antiochus*. They ſent unto him a proud embaſſage; whereby they gave him to underſtand, that if he paſſed forward beyond a certain promontory in *Cicilia*, they would meet him, and fight with him; not for any quarrel of theirs unto him; but becauſe he ſhould not join with *Philip* their enemy, and help him againſt the *Romans*. It was inſolently done of them, neither ſeemed it otherwiſe, to preſcribe ſuch limits unto the king; yet he tempered himſelf, and without any ſhew of indignation, gave a gentle anſwer; partly himſelf to their ambaſſadors; partly unto their whole city, by ambaſſadors which he thither ſent. He ſhewed his deſire, to renew the ancient confederacies between his anceſtors and them: and willed them not to be afraid, leſt his coming ſhould tend unto any hurt, either of them, or of their confederates. As touching the *Romans*, whom they thought that he would moleſt: they were (he ſaid) his very good friends; whereof, he thought, there needed no better proof, than the entertainment and anſwer by them newly given to his ambaſſadors.

The *Rhodians* appear to have been a cunning people, and ſuch as could foreſee what weather was like to happen. This anſwer of the king, and the relation of what had paſſed between his ambaſſadors and the ſenate, moved them not a whit; when they were informed ſhortly after, that the *Macedonian* war was ended at the battel of *Cynoſcephalæ*. They knew that *Antiochus*'s turn would be next; and prepared to be forward on the ſtronger ſide. Wherefore they would not be contented to ſit ſtill; unleſs the towns on the *South* coaſt of *Aſia*, belonging to *Ptolemy*, their friend and confederate, were ſuffered to be at quiet. Herein alſo they did well: for that they had ever been greatly beholden to all the race of the *Ptolemies*. They therefore, in this time of neceſſity, gave what aid they could unto all the ſubjects of the *Egyptian* in thoſe parts. In like manner did king *Eumenes*, the ſon of *Attalus*, prognoſticate as concerning the war that followed, between *Antiochus* and the *Romans*. For when king *Antiochus* made a friendly offer, to beſtow one of his daughters upon him in marriage; he excuſed himſelf, and would not have her. *Attalus* and *Philetærus* his brethren, wondered at this. But he told them, that the *Romans* would ſurely make war upon *Antiochus*; and therein finally prevail. Wherefore he ſaid, That by abſtaining from this affinity, it ſhould be in his power to join with the *Romans*, and ſtrengthen himſelf greatly with their friendſhip. Contrariwiſe, if he leaned to *Antiochus:* as he muſt be partaker in his overthrow; ſo was he ſure to be oppreſſed by him, as by an over-mighty neighbour, if he happened to win the victory.

Antiochus himſelf wintered about *Epheſus:* where he took ſuch order as he thought convenient, for the reducing of *Smyrna* and *Lampſacus* to obedience; that had uſurped their liberty, and obſtinately ſtrove to maintain it, in hope that the *Romans* would protect them. In the beginning of the ſpring he ſailed unto the *Helleſpont:* where having won ſome towns that *Philip* had gotten not long before this, he paſſed over unto *Europe* ſide; and in ſhort ſpace maſtered the *Cherſoneſus*. Thence went he to *Lyſimachia*; which the *Thracians* had gotten and deſtroyed, when *Philip* withdrew his garriſon thence, to employ it in the *Roman* war. The *Etolians* objected as a crime unto *Philip*, in the conference before *T. Quintius*, that he had oppreſſed *Lyſimachia*, by thruſting thereinto a garriſon. Hereupon *Philip* made anſwer, that his garriſon did not oppreſs the town, but ſave it from the *Barbarians:* who took and ſack'd it, as ſoon as the *Macedonians* were gone. That this anſwer was good and ſubſtantial, though it were not accepted as ſuch; might appear by the miſerable caſe, in which *Antiochus* found *Lyſimachia* at his coming thither. For the town was utterly razed by the *Barbarians*; and the people carried away into ſlavery. Wherefore the king took order to have it re-edified: as alſo to redeem thoſe that were in bondage; and to recollect as many of the citizens, as were diſperſed in the country thereabout. Likewiſe he was careful to allure thither, by hopeful promiſes, new inhabitants; and to repleniſh the city with the wonted frequency. Now, to the end that men ſhould not be terrified from coming thither to dwell, by any fear of the neighbour *Thracians*; he took a journey in hand againſt thoſe barbarous people, with the one half of his army; leaving the other half, to repair the city. Theſe pains he took, partly in regard of the convenient

venient ſituation, and former glory of *Lyſimachia*; partly for that he thought it highly redounding unto his own honour, to recover and eſtabliſh the dominion in thoſe parts, which his fore-father *Seleucus Nicator* had won from *Lyſimachus*, and thereby made his kingdom of greater extent, than it occupied in any following time. But for this ambition he ſhall dearly pay: and as after that victory againſt *Lyſimachus*, the death of king *Seleucus* followed ſhortly; ſo ſhall a deadly wound of the kingdom founded by *Seleucus* enſue very ſpeedily, after the re-conqueſt of the ſame country, which was the laſt of *Seleucus*'s purchaſes.

SECT. IV.

The Romans *hold friendly correſpondence with* Antiochus, *during their war with* Philip: *after which they quarrel with him. The doings of* Hannibal *at* Carthage: *whence he is chaced by his enemies, and by the* Romans: *his flight unto the king* Antiochus. *The* Etolians *murmur againſt the* Romans *in* Greece. *The war of the* Romans *and* Acheans, *with* Nabis, *the tyrant of* Lacedemon. *The departure of the* Romans *out of* Greece. T. Quintius's *triumph. Peace denied to* Antiochus *by the* Romans.

FOR the *Romans*, though they were unable to ſmother their deſire of war with *Antiochus*, whereof notice was already taken both by their friends and by their enemies: yet was it much againſt their will to keep the rumour on foot, which they meant ſhortly to make good, of this intended war, ſo long as they wanted matter of quarrel; whereof they were furniſhed, by this enterpriſe of the king's about *Lyſimachia*. It was not long, ſince king *Attalus*, a friend and helper of the *Romans* in their war with *Philip*, could obtain of them none other help againſt *Antiochus*, than ambaſſadors to ſpeak for him; *becauſe* the one of theſe kings was held no leſs a friend than the other. Neither did there afterwards paſs between them any other offices, than very friendly. *Antiochus*, at the requeſt of their ambaſſadors, withdrew his invaſion from the kingdom of *Pergamus*: alſo very ſhortly after he ſent ambaſſadors to them, to make a perfect league of amity between them. This was whilſt as yet they were buſied with *Philip*; and therefore had reaſon to anſwer his good will with good acceptation; as they did in outward ſhew. But when the *Macedonian* war was at an end, and all, or moſt of all the ſtates in *Greece*, were become little better than clients unto the *Romans*: then was all this good correſpondence changed, into terms of worſe, but more plain meaning. For *T. Quintius*, with his ten counſellors ſent from *Rome*, required (as hath been [a] ſhewed before) with a commination of war, this king's gratulation of their victory; as alſo his long profeſſed amity, and deſire to continue in the ſame.

Theſe ten counſellors were able to inform *T. Quintius*, and acquaint him with the purpoſe of the ſenate: whereof yet it ſeems that he was not ignorant before; ſince, in regard of *Antiochus*, he was the more inclinable unto peace with *Philip*. It was therefore agreed, when they divided themſelves to make progreſs through divers quarters of *Greece*, for the execution of their late decree, That two of them ſhould viſit king *Antiochus*; and the reſt, where occaſion ſerved, uſe diligence to make a party ſtrong againſt him. Neither was the ſenate at *Rome* unmindful of the buſineſs: wherein, leſt *T. Quintius*, with his ten aſſiſtants, ſhould happen to forget any thing to their parts belonging; *L. Cornelius* was ſent from *Rome* of purpoſe, to deal with the king about thoſe controverſies, that were between him and *Ptolemy*. What other private inſtructions *Cornelius* had, we may conjecture by the managing of this his ambaſſage. For coming to *Selymbria*: and there underſtanding that *P. Villius* and *L. Terentius*, having been ſent by *Titus*, were at *Lyſimachia*, he haſtned thither; whither alſo came *P. Lentulus* (another of the ten counſellors) from *Bargillæ*, to be preſent at the conference. *Hegeſinax* and *Lyſias* were alſo there; the ſame, who had lately brought from *Titus* thoſe peremptory conditions, which the ambaſſadors preſent ſhall expound unto their maſters. After a few days *Antiochus* returned from his *Thracian* expedition. The meeing and entertainment between him and theſe *Romans*, was in appearance full of love. But when they came to treat of the buſineſs in hand; this good mood was quite altered. *L. Cornelius*, in two or three words, briefly delivered his errand from *Rome*: which was, That *Antiochus* had reaſon to deliver back unto *Ptolemy* thoſe towns of his, whereof he had lately gotten poſſeſſion. Hereunto he added, and that very earneſtly, That he muſt alſo give up the towns of late belonging unto *Philip*; and by him newly occupied. For what could be more abſurd, than ſuch folly in the *Romans*, as to let *Antiochus* enjoy the profit of that war, wherein they had laboured ſo much, and he done nothing? Further he warned the king, that he ſhould not moleſt thoſe cities that were free: and finally, he demanded of him, upon what reaſon he was come over with ſo great an army into *Europe*; for that other cauſe of his journey there was none probable, than a purpoſe to make war upon the *Romans*. To this the king made anſwer, That he wondered why the *Romans* ſhould ſo trouble themſelves, with thinking upon the matters of *Aſia*: wherewith he prayed them to let him alone; even as he, without ſuch curioſity, ſuffered them to do in *Italy* what they thought good. As for his coming over into *Europe*: they ſaw well enough what buſineſs had drawn him thither; namely, the war againſt the barbarous *Thracians*: the rebuilding of *Lyſimachia*, and the recovery of towns to him belonging, in *Thrace* and *Cherſoneſus*. Now concerning his title unto that country, he derived it from *Seleucus*: who made conqueſt thereof, by his victory againſt *Lyſimachus*. Neither was it ſo, that any of the places in controverſy between him and the other kings, had been ſtill of old belonging to the *Macedonians* or *Egyptians*; but had been ſeized on by them, or by others from whom they received them, at ſuch time as his anceſtors, being lords of thoſe countries, were hindered by multiplicity of buſineſs, from looking unto all that was their own. Finally, he willed them, neither to ſtand in fear of him, as if he intended ought againſt them from *Lyſimachia*; ſince it was his purpoſe to beſtow this city upon one of his ſons, that ſhould reign therein: nor yet to be grieved with his proceedings in *Aſia*; either againſt the free cities, or againſt the king of *Egypt*; ſince it was his meaning to make the free cities beholden unto himſelf, and to join ere long with *Ptolemy*, not only in friendſhip, but in a bond of near affinity. *Cornelius* having heard this, and being perhaps unable to refute it; would needs hear further, what the ambaſſadors of *Smyrna*

[a] Ch. 4, §. ult.

and

and of *Lampſacus*, whom he had there with him, could ſay for themſelves. The ambaſſadors of *Lampſacus* being called in, began a tale; wherein they ſeemed to accuſe the king before the *Romans*, as it were before competent judges. *Antiochus* therefore interrupted them, and bade them hold their peace; foraſmuch as he had not choſen the *Romans*, but would rather take the citizens of *Rhodes*, to be arbitrators between him and them.

Thus the treaty held ſome few days, without any likelihood of effect. The *Romans*, having not laid their complaints in ſuch ſort, as they might be a convenient foundation of the war by them intended: nor yet having purpoſe to depart well ſatisfied, and thereby to corroborate the preſent peace; were doubtful how to order the matter, in ſuch wiſe as they might neither too rudely, like boiſterous *Gallo-Greeks*, pretend only the goodneſs of their ſwords; nor yet over-modeſtly, to retain among the *Greeks* an opinion of their juſtice, forbear the occaſion of making themſelves great. The king on the other ſide was weary of theſe tedious gueſts; that would take no anſwer, and yet ſcarce knew what to ſay. At length came news, without any certain author, That *Ptolemy* was dead. Hereof neither the king, nor the *Romans*, would take notice, though each of them were deſirous to haſten into *Egypt*: *Antiochus*, to take poſſeſſion of the kingdom; and *L. Cornelius*, to prevent him thereof, and ſet the country in good order. *Cornelius* was ſent from *Rome* ambaſſador, both to *Antiochus* and to *Ptolemy*: which gave him occaſion to take leave, and prepare for his *Egyptian* voyage. Both he, and his fellow ambaſſadors, had good leave to depart all together: and the king forthwith made ready, to be in *Egypt* with the firſt. To his ſon *Seleucus* he committed his army; and left him to overſee the building of *Lyſimachia*: but all his ſea-forces he took along with him, and ſailed unto *Epheſus*. Thence he ſent ambaſſadors to *Quintius*: whom he requeſted to deal with him in this matter of peace, after ſuch ſort, as might ſtand with honeſty and good faith. But, as he was further proceeding on his voyage; he was perfectly informed that *Ptolemy* was alive. This made him bear another way from *Egypt*: and afterwards a tempeſt, with a grievous ſhipwrack, made him, without any further attempt on the way, glad to have ſafely recovered his port of *Seleucia*. Thence went he to *Antiochia*, where he wintered ſecure, as might appear, of the *Roman* war.

But the *Romans* had not ſo done with him. During the treaty at *Lyſimachia* (at leaſtwiſe not long before or after it) one of their ambaſſadors that had been ſent unto the *Macedonian*, gave him counſel, as in a point highly tending to his good; not to reſt contented with the peace which was granted unto him by the *Romans*, but to deſire ſociety with them, whereby they ſhould be bound to have the ſame friends and enemies. And this he adviſed him to do quickly before the war brake out with *Antiochus*; leſt otherwiſe he might ſeem to have awaited ſome fit occaſion of taking arms again. They, who dealt thus plainly, did not mean to be ſatisfied with weak excuſes. In like manner ſome of the *Greeks* were ſollicited; and particularly the *Etolians*, that conſtantly and faithfully they ſhould abide in the friendſhip of the people of *Rome*. It was needleſs to ſay plainly whereto this entreaty tended: the froward anſwer made by the *Etolians*, declares them to have well underſtood the purpoſe. They complained, that they were not alike honoured by the *Romans* after the victory, as they had been during the war. They that ſo complained were the moſt moderate of them. Others cried out, that they had been wronged, and defrauded of what was promiſed unto them: upbraiding withal the *Romans*, as men to them beholden; not only for their victory over *Philip*; but even for helping them to ſet foot in *Greece*, which elſe they never could have done. Hereto the *Roman* gave gentle anſwers: telling them, that there was no more to do, than to ſend ambaſſadors to the ſenate, and utter their griefs; and then ſhould all be well.

Such care took the *Romans* in *Greece*, for their war intended againſt *Antiochus*. The fame hereof arriving at *Carthage*, gave matter unto the enemies of *Hannibal*, wherewith both to pick a thank of the *Roman* ſenate; and to chace out of their city this honourable man, whom they ſo greatly hated. He had of late exerciſed his virtue againſt them in the civil adminiſtration; and given them an overthrow, or two, in the long robe. The judges at that time bore all the ſway in *Carthage*: holding their places during life; and having ſubject unto them, the lives, goods, and fame of all the reſt. Neither did they uſe this their power with moderation: but conſpired in ſuch wiſe together, that whoſo offended any one of them, ſhould have them all to be his enemies; which being once known, he was ſure to be ſoon accuſed and condemned. In this their impotent rule of the city, *Hannibal* was choſen pretor. By virtue of which office, though he was ſuperiour unto them during that year; yet had it not been their manner to bear much regard unto ſuch an annual magiſtrate, as at the year's end muſt be accountable to them, if ought were laid unto his charge. *Hannibal* therefore ſending for one of the queſtors, or officers of the treaſury, to come and ſpeak with him: the proud queſtor ſet lightly thereby, and would not come. For he was the adverſe faction to *Hannibal*; and men of his place, were to be choſen into the order of judges: in contemplation whereof, he was filled already with the ſpirit of future greatneſs. But he had not to do with ſuch a tame pretor, as were they that had occupied the place before. *Hannibal* ſent for him by a purſivant; and having thus apprehended him, brought him into judgment before a publick aſſembly of the people. There he was not only ſhewed, what the undutiful ſtubbornneſs of this queſtor had been; but how unſufferable the inſolency of all the judges at the preſent was: whoſe unbridled power, made them to regard neither laws nor magiſtrates. To this oration when he perceived that all the citizens were attentive and favourable; he forthwith propounded a law, which paſſed with the general good liking; That the judges ſhould be choſen from year to year, and no one man be continued in that office two years together. If this law had been paſſed, before he paſſed over *Iberus*; it would not perhaps have been in the power of *Hanno*, to have brought him unto neceſſity of reforming another grievance, concerning the *Roman* tribute. This tribute the *Carthaginians* were fain to levy by taxation laid upon the whole commonalty, as wanting money in their publick treaſury, wherewith to defray either that, or divers other needful charges. *Hannibal* conſidering this, began to examine the publick revenues; and to take a perfect note, both how much came into the treaſury, by ways and means whatſoever; and in what ſort it was thence laid out. So he found, That the ordinary charges of the commonwealth did not exhauſt the treaſury; but that wicked ma-

giſtrates, and corrupt officers, turning the greateſt part of the monies to their own uſe, were thereby fain to load the people with needleſs burdens. Hereof he made ſuch plain demonſtration, that theſe robbers of the common treaſure were compelled to reſtore with ſhame, what they had gotten by knavery: and ſo the *Carthaginians* were freed from the neceſſity of making ſuch poor ſhifts; as formerly they had uſed, when they knew not the value of their own eſtate. But, as the virtue of *Hannibal* was highly commended by all that were good citizens: ſo they of the *Roman* faction, which had, ſince the making of the peace until now, little regarded him, began to rage extreamly; as being by him ſtripp'd of their ill-gotten goods, and ill-employed authority, both at once; even when they thought themſelves to have been in full poſſeſſion of the vanquiſhed *Carthage*. Wherefore they ſent letters to their friends at *Rome*: wherein they complained, as if the *Barchine* faction grew ſtrong again, and *Hannibal* would ſhortly be in arms. Queſtionleſs, if oppreſſing the city by injuſtice, and robbing the treaſury, were the only way to hold *Carthage* in peace with *Rome*: theſe enemies to the *Barchines* might well cry out, That having done their beſt already to keep all in quiet, they ſaw none other likelihood than of war. But having none other matter to alledge, than their own inventions: they ſaid, That *Hannibal* was like unto a wild beaſt, which would never be tamed: that ſecret meſſages paſs'd between him, and king *Antiochus*: and that he was wont to complain of idleneſs, as if it were harmful to *Carthage*; with what elſe to like effect they could imagine. Theſe accuſations they directed not unto the ſenate: but addreſſing their letters craftily, every one to the beſt of his own friends at *Rome*, and ſuch as were ſenators; they wrought ſo well, that neither publick notice of their conſpiracy, was taken at *Carthage*; nor the authority of the *Roman* ſenate, wanting to the furtherance of their malicious purpoſe. Only *P. Scipio* is ſaid to have admoniſhed the *Fathers*, that they ſhould not thus diſhonourably ſubſcribe, and become ſeconds to the accuſers of *Hannibal*: as if they would oppreſs, by ſuborning or countenancing falſe witneſſes againſt him, the Man, againſt whom in war they had not of long time prevailed, nor uſed their victory in ſuch baſe manner, when they obtained it. But the *Romans* were not all ſo great-minded as *Scipio*: they wiſhed for ſome ſuch advantage againſt *Hannibal*; and were glad to have found it. Three ambaſſadors they ſent over to *Carthage*, *C. Servilius*, *Q. Terentius*, and *Claudius Marcellus*; whoſe very names import ſufficient cauſe of bad affection to *Hannibal*. Theſe having paſt the ſea, were entertained by thoſe that had procured their coming; and, being by them inſtructed how to carry themſelves, gave out, That they were ſent to end ſome controverſies, between the *Carthaginians* and *Maſaniſſa*. But *Hannibal* had kept ſuch good eſpial upon the *Romans*, that he knew their meaning well enough: againſt which he was never unprepared. It were enough to ſay, That he eſcaped them by flight: but in the actions of ſo famous a man, I hold it not impertinent to rehearſe the particulars. Having openly ſhewed himſelf, as was his manner, in the place of aſſembly, he went forth of the town when it began to wax dark, accompanied with two which were ignorant of his determination; though ſuch as he might well truſt. He had appointed horſes to be in a readineſs at a certain place: whence riding all night, he came to a tower of his own by the ſea-ſide. There had he a ſhip furniſhed with all things needful; as having long expected the neceſſity of ſome ſuch journey. So he bade *Africa* farewel; lamenting the misfortune of his country, more than his own. Paſſing over to the iſle of *Cercina*; he found there in the haven ſome merchants ſhips of *Carthage*. They ſaluted him reſpectively: and the chief among them began to enquire, whither he was bound. He ſaid, he went ambaſſador to *Tyre*: and that he intended there in the iſland to make a ſacrifice; whereunto he invited all the merchants, and maſters of the ſhips. It was hot weather: and therefore he would needs hold his feaſt upon the ſhore; where, becauſe there wanted covert, he made them bring thither all their ſails and yards to be uſed inſtead of tents. They did ſo; and feaſted with him till it was late at night: at which time he left them there aſleep; and putting to ſea, held on his courſe to *Tyre*. All that night, and the day following, he was ſure not to be purſued. For the merchants did neither make haſte to ſend any news of him to *Carthage*, as thinking him to be gone ambaſſador: neither could they, without ſome loſs of time, ſuch of them as made moſt ſpeed homeward, get away from *Cercina*; being buſied awhile in fitting their tackle. At *Carthage*, the miſs of ſo great a perſon was diverſly conſtrued. Some gueſſed aright, that he was fled. But the more common opinion was, That the *Romans* had made him away. At length came news where he had been ſeen: and then the *Roman* ambaſſadors, having none other errand thither, accuſed him (with an evil grace) as a troubler of the peace; whereby they only diſcovered the miſchief by them intended againſt him, and the malice of their ſenate; miſſing the while their purpoſe, and cauſing men to underſtand, that he fled not thus without great reaſon.

Hannibal, coming to *Tyre* the mother-city of *Carthage*, was there entertained royally: as one, in whoſe great worth and honour the *Tyrians*, by reaſon of affinity between their cities, thought themſelves to have intereſt. Thence went he to *Antioch*; and, finding the king departed, viſited his ſon in *Daphne*: who friendly welcomed him, and ſent him unto his father at *Epheſus*, that exceedingly rejoiced at his coming.

As *Antiochus* had cauſe to be glad, in that he had gotten *Hannibal*: ſo had the *Romans* no great cauſe to be therefore ſorry; otherwiſe than as they had much diſgraced themſelves, by diſcovering of their impotent malice, in chacing him thus out of his country. For it would not prove alike eaſy unto this great commander, to make ſtout ſoldiers of baſe *Aſiatics*; as it had been by his training and diſcipline, to make very ſerviceable and ſkilful men of war of the *Spaniards*, *Africans*, *Gauls*, and other nations, that were hardy though unexperienced. Or were it ſuppoſed, that one man's worth, eſpecially being ſo extraordinary, could alter the nature of a cowardly people: yet was it therewithal conſiderable, that the vanities of *Antiochus*, the pride of his court, the baſeneſs of his flatterers, and a thouſand other ſuch vexations, would be far more powerful in making unprofitable the virtue of *Hannibal*, now a deſolate and baniſhed man; than had been the villany of *Hanno* and his complices, hindering him in thoſe actions wherein he had the high command, and was ſeconded by his warlike brethren. Wherefore the name of this great *Carthaginian*, would only help to ennoble the *Roman* victory: or if it further ſerved to hearten *Antiochus*, and make him leſs careful to avoid the war; then ſhould it further ſerve, to juſtify the *Romans* in their quarrel. And it

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ſeems indeed, that it was no little part of their care to get a fair pretence of making war. For *Antiochus*, as is ſaid before, having newly ſent ambaſſadors to *T. Quintius*, requiring that the peace might faithfully be kept, it was not probable, that he had any meaning to take arms, unleſs by mere violence he were thereto enforced. Only the *Etolians* were greatly ſuſpected, as a turbulent people, deſirous of innovation, and therefore practiſing with this great king, whom they wiſhed to ſee among them in *Greece*. In this regard, and to appeaſe them, they had of late been anſwered with gentle words by one of the ten counſellors, that the ſenate would grant them whatſoever with reaſon they ſhould aſk: but this promiſe was too large, and unadviſed. For when their ambaſſadors came to *Rome*, the ſenate would grant them nothing; but wholly referred them to *T. Quintius*, who favoured them leaſt. Hereat they murmured, but knew not how to right themſelves, otherwiſe than by ſpeaking ſuch words as might haſten the *Romans* out of *Greece* for very ſhame, who had no deſire to be thence gone.

The daily talk at *Rome* was of war with *Antiochus*; but in *Greece*, when the *Romans* would leave the country. For the *Etolians* were wont to upbraid the reſt of the *Greeks* with the vain liberty which the *Romans* had proclaimed; ſaying, that theſe their deliverers had laid heavier fetters upon them than formerly they did wear; but yet brighter and fairer than thoſe of the *Macedonian*: likewiſe, that it was a gracious act of *Titus*, to take from the legs of the *Greeks* their chain, and tie it about their necks. There was indeed no cauſe of tarrying longer in *Greece*, if the *Romans* had no other meaning than what they pretended. For *Philip* made no delay in accompliſhment of that which was laid upon him: all the towns of *Greece* were at liberty, and the whole country at peace, both with the *Romans*, and within it ſelf. As for *Antiochus*, he made it his daily ſuit, that the peace between him and *Rome*, ſuch as it was, might be confirmed, and ſtrengthned by a league of more aſſurance. Nevertheleſs, *T. Quintius* would needs fear that *Antiochus* meant forthwith to ſeize upon *Greece*, as ſoon as he and his army were thence departed. And in this regard, he retained ſtill in his own hands *Chalcis*, *Demetrias*, and the *Acrocorinthus*; by the benefit of which towns, he might the better withſtand the dangerous invaſion like to be made by *Antiochus*. Suitable unto the doings of *Quintius* were the reports of the ten ambaſſadors that had been ſent over to aſſiſt him, when they returned back into the city. *Antiochus*, they ſaid, would queſtionleſs fall upon *Greece*; wherein he ſhould find not only the *Etolians*, but *Nabis*, the tyrant of *Lacedemon*, ready to give him entertainment. Wherefore there was none other way, than to do ſomewhat againſt theſe their ſuſpected enemies, eſpecially againſt *Nabis*, who could worſt make reſiſtance; whilſt *Antiochus* was far away in *Syria*, and not intentive to his buſineſs. Theſe reports went not only current through the city, among the vulgar; but found ſuch credit with the chief of the ſenate, that in the following year, againſt which time it was expected that *Antiochus* ſhould be ready to take his great enterpriſe in hand, *P. Cornelius Scipio*, the *African*, deſired and obtained a ſecond conſulſhip, with intention to be general in the war againſt the king and his *Hannibal*. For the preſent, the buſineſs with *Nabis* was referred unto *Titus*, to deal with him as he thought good. This would be a fair colour of his longer tarriance in *Greece*. Therefore he was glad of the employment, whereof alſo he knew that many of the *Greeks* would not be ſorry; though, for his own part, he wanted all good pretence of taking it in hand. For *Nabis* had entered into friendſhip with him two or three years before this, as is already ſhewed, whilſt he had war with *Philip*: and had further been contented for the *Romans* ſake to be at peace with the *Acheans*; neither ſince that time had he done any thing, whereby he ſhould draw upon himſelf this war. He was indeed a deteſtable tyrant, and hated of the *Acheans*; as one that, beſides his own wicked conditions, had formerly done to them great miſchief. *Titus* therefore had a plauſible theme whereon to diſcourſe before the embaſſies of all the confederate cities, which he cauſed to meet for that purpoſe at *Corinth*. He told them, that in the war with *Philip*, not only the *Greeks*, but the *Romans* themſelves, had each their motives apart (which he there briefly rehearſed) that ſhould ſtir them up, and cauſe them to be earneſt. But in this, which he now propounded to them concerning *Nabis*, the *Romans* had none other intereſt, than only the making perfect of their honour, in ſetting all *Greece* at liberty: which noble action was in ſome ſort maimed, or incompleat, whilſt the noble city of *Argos* was left in ſubjection to a tyrant, that had lately occupied it. It therefore belonged unto them, the *Greeks*, duly to conſider, whether they thought the deliverance of *Argos* a matter worthy to be undertaken; or whether otherwiſe, to avoid all further trouble, they could be well contented to leave it as it was. This concerned them, and not the *Romans*, who, in taking this work in hand, or letting it alone, would wholly be ruled by the *Greeks* themſelves. The *Athenian* ambaſſador made anſwer hereunto very eloquently, and as pleaſing as he could deviſe. He gave thanks to the *Romans* for what was paſs'd, extolled their virtues at large, and magnified them highly in regard of this their propoſition; wherein, unrequeſted, they freely made offer to continue that bounty; which, at the vehement requeſt of their poor aſſociates, they had already of late extended unto the *Greeks*. To this he added, that great pity it was to hear ſuch notable virtue and high deſerts ill ſpoken of by ſome, which took upon them, out of their own imagination, to foretel what harm theſe their benefactors meant to do hereafter: when as thankfulneſs rather would have required an acknowledgment of the benefits and pleaſures already received. Every one found the meaning of this laſt clauſe, which was directly againſt the *Etolians*. Wherefore *Alexander* the *Etolian* roſe up, and told the *Athenians* their own, putting them in mind of their ancient glory, in thoſe times when their city had been the leader of all *Greece*, for defence and recovery of the liberty general; from which honour they were now ſo far fallen, that they became paraſites unto thoſe whom they thought moſt mighty; and by their baſe aſſentation, would lead all the reſt into ſervitude. Then ſpake he againſt the *Acheans*, clients that had been a long time unto the *Macedonian*, and ſoldiers of *Philip*, until they ran away from his adverſity. Theſe he ſaid had gotten *Corinth*, and muſt now have war be made for their ſakes, to the end that they might alſo be lords of *Argos*: whereas the *Etolians*, that had firſt made war with *Philip*, and always been friends unto the *Romans*, were now defrauded of ſome places, anciently to them belonging. Neither did he thus contain himſelf, but objected unto the *Romans* fraudulent dealing; foraſmuch as they kept their garriſons in *Demetrias*, *Chalcis*, and the *Acrocorinth*; having been always wont to profeſs, that *Greece* could never be at liberty whilſt thoſe places were not free. Alſo

now

now at laſt, what elſe did they ſeek by this diſcourſe of war with *Nabis*, than buſineſs wherewith to find themſelves occupied, that ſo they might have ſome ſeeming cauſe of abiding longer in the country? But they ſhould do well, if they meant as they ſpake, to carry their legions home out of *Greece*, which could not indeed be free till their departure. As for *Nabis*, the *Etolians* themſelves did promiſe, and would undertake, that they would either cauſe him to yield to reaſon, and relinquiſh *Argos* freely, withdrawing thence his garriſon; or elſe compel him by force of arms to ſubmit himſelf to the good pleaſure of all *Greece*, that was now at unity. Theſe words had been reaſonable, if they had proceeded from better men. But it was apparent, that no regard of the common liberty wrought ſo much with theſe *Etolians*, as did their own ravenous deſire of oppreſſing others, and getting unto themſelves, that worſe would uſe it, the whole dominion in *Greece* which *Philip* had loſt. Neither could they well diſſemble this, making it no ſmall part of their grievance, that the old league was forgotten; wherein it had been covenanted, that the *Romans* ſhould enjoy the ſpoil of all, but leave the towns and lands in poſſeſſion of the *Etolians*. This, and the remembrance of a thouſand miſchiefs by them done in former times, made the whole aſſembly, eſpecially the *Acheans*, cry out upon them; intreating the *Romans* to take ſuch order before they went, that not only *Nabis* might be compelled to do right, but the *Etolian* thieves be enforced to keep home, and leave their neighbours in quiet. All this was highly to the pleaſure of *Titus*, who ſaw, that by diſcountenancing the *Etolians*, he was become the more gracious with all the reſt. But whether it pleaſed him ſo well, that *Antiochus*'s ambaſſadors did preſently after lie hard upon him to draw the peace to ſome good concluſion, it may be greatly doubted. He caſt them off with a ſlight anſwer, telling them, that the ten ambaſſadors or counſellors which had been ſent unto him from *Rome*, to be his aſſiſtants in theſe matters of weight, were now returned home; and that without them it was not in his power to conclude upon any thing.

Now concerning the *Lacedemonian* war, it was very ſoon ended: for *Titus* uſed the help of all his confederates, and made as great preparation againſt *Nabis*, both by land and ſea, as if he ſhould have had to do with *Philip*. Beſides the *Roman* forces, king *Eumenes*, with a navy, and the *Rhodian* fleet, were invited to the ſervice; as alſo *Philip* of *Macedon* ſent aid by land, doing therein poorly, whether it were to get favour of the *Romans*, or whether to make one among the number, in ſeeking revenge upon *Nabis*, that had done him injury. But the moſt forward in this expedition were the *Acheans*, who ſet out ten thouſand foot, and a thouſand horſe. As for the *Etolians*, rather to hold good faſhion, and found their diſpoſitions, than in hopes to ſpeed, their help was required, whereof they excuſed themſelves as well as they thought beſt. Thus are the *Acheans* now become the prime friends of the *Romans* in *Greece*, having removed the *Etolians* from that degree of favour, like as they themſelves hereafter (though not in all haſte) ſhall be ſupplanted by the ſame *Lacedemonians* againſt whom they are now marching.

Some of the *Argives*, more bold than wiſe, began a conſpiracy againſt the *Lacedemonians* that held their town; meaning to open their gates unto the *Roman*. But ere *Titus* drew near, they were all detected and ſlain, excepting a very few, that eſcaped out of the town. The fame of this commotion cauſed the army to march apace towards *Argos*, with hope to be there before things were at quiet. But there was no ſtir within the walls, the execution done upon the firſt movers having terrified all the reſt of the citizens. *Titus* then thought it better to aſſail *Nabis* in the head of his ſtrength at *Lacedemon*, than to conſume time about other places; eſpecially at *Argos*, for the freedom whereof, ſince the war was made, pity it were that the calamities of the war ſhould thereon fall moſt heavily.

Nabis had in readineſs an army of fifteen thouſand, wherewith to defend himſelf againſt theſe invaders. Five thouſand of them were mercenaries, the reſt of his own country, but ſuch as were of all others the worſt; as, manumiſed ſlaves, malefactors, and baſe peaſants, unto whom his tyranny was beneficial. Of the good and worthy citizens he ſtood in doubt, and ſince he could not hope to win their love, his meaning was to hold them quiet by fear. He called them all to an aſſembly, and incompaſſing them round with his army, told them of the danger that was towards him and them. If they could agree within themſelves, they might, he ſaid, hope the better to withſtand the common enemy. But foraſmuch as turbulent heads were invited by light occaſions to raiſe tumults, and work dangerous treaſon, it ſeemed unto him the ſafeſt, and (withal) the mildeſt courſe to arreſt before-hand, and put in ward, all thoſe whom he found moſt reaſon to ſuſpect. So ſhould he keep them innocent perforce, and thereby preſerve not only the city and his own perſon from danger, but them alſo from the puiſhment, which elſe they might have incurred. Hereupon he cites and apprehends about eighty of them, whom he leads away to priſon, and the next night puts them all to death. Thus was he ſure that they neither ſhould offend, nor yet break looſe. As for the death of them, if it ſhould happen to be noiſed abroad, what could it elſe do, than terrify the people, who muſt thereby underſtand, that it was a mortal crime to be ſuſpected? And to the ſame purpoſe his cruelty extended it ſelf unto ſome poor wretches, whom he accuſed of a meaning to fly to the enemy. Theſe were openly whipped through all the ſtreets, and ſlain. Having thus affrighted the citizens, he turned the more freely all his thoughts towards the enemy, that came on apace. He welcomed them with a ſally, wherein, as commonly happens, the ſoldiers of the town had the better at firſt; but were at length repelled with loſs. *Titus* abode not many days before *Sparta*, but overran the country; hoping, belike, to provoke the tyrant forth to battel. The *Roman* fleet at the ſame time, with king *Eumenes* and the *Rhodians*, laid ſiege unto *Gyttheum*, the only or principal haven-town that *Nabis* had. Likely they were to have taken it by force, when there appeared hope of getting it by treaſon. There were two governors within the town, equal in authority; whereof the one, either for fear, or deſire of reward, had a purpoſe to let in the *Romans*; but the other, finding what was in hand, and being ſomewhat more faithful, ſlew the traitor, after whoſe death, he himſelf alone made the better defence. Yet when *T. Quintius*, with part of his army, came thither to *Gyttheum*, this captain of the town had not the heart to abide the uttermoſt, and await what either time or his maſter might do for him, but was contented to give up the place; yet upon condition, to depart in ſafety to *Sparta* with his garriſon. *Pythagoras*, the ſon-in-law of *Nabis*, and brother unto his wife, was come from *Argos*, whereof he had the government, with a thouſand ſoldiers mercenaries, and two thouſand *Argives*; it being (as may ſeem) the tyrant's purpoſe to relieve *Gyttheum*, which he thought would have

have held longer out. But when they heard that it was loſt, then began they upon finiſhing the war, by ſome reaſonable compoſition. *Pythagoras* therefore was ſent ambaſſador to *Titus*, requeſting only, that he would appoint a time and place for *Nabis* to meet and ſpeak with him. This was granted. In that parley the tyrant ſpake very reaſonably for himſelf, proving, that he ſuffered wrong, and had done none; and that by many good arguments, whereof the ſum was, that whatſoever they now did, or could object unto him, was of elder date than the league which they had made with him. Whereupon he inferred, that neither for his keeping the town of *Argos*, nor for any other cauſe by them alledged, they ought to make war upon him; ſince *Argos* and all other their allegations whatſoever, had not hindered them, in time of their more need of him, from entering into that league with him; which was never broken on his part, nor ought to be on theirs. But *Quintius* was not herewith ſatisfied. He charged him with tyranny, and gave inſtance, as eaſily he might, of divers barbarous cruelties by him committed. In all which points, foraſmuch as they knew this *Nabis* to be guilty, before they made peace and confederacy with him, it was expedient that ſome other cauſe of this invaſion ſhould be alledged. Wherefore he ſaid further, that this tyrant had occupied *Meſſina*, a town confederate with the *Romans*; that he had bargained to join with *Philip*, when he was their enemy, not only in league, but alſo in affinity; and that his fleet had robbed many of their ſhips about the cape of *Malea*. Now touching this piracy, ſince in the articles by *Titus* propounded unto *Nabis*, there was reſtitution mentioned, other than of ſhips by him taken from the *Greeks*, his neighbours, with whom he had long held war, it may ſeem to have been objected only by way of compliment, and to enlarge the volume of thoſe complaints, that were otherwiſe very frivolous. As for *Meſſina*, and the bargain of alliance made with *Philip*, they were matters foregoing the league that was made between the *Romans* and this tyrant, and therefore not to have been mentioned. All this it ſeems that *Ariſtænus*, the pretor of the *Acheans*, very well perceived; who therefore doubting leſt the *Romans* (that were wont to talk ſo much of their own juſtice, honour, and faithful dealing) ſhould now relent, and forbear to moleſt him; who, though a wicked man, was yet their confederate, and had never done them wrong, framed his diſcourſe to another end. He intreated *Nabis* to conſider well of his own eſtate, and to ſettle his fortunes, whilſt he might do it without hazard, alledging the examples of many tyrants that had ruled in the neighbour-cities, and therein committed great outrages; yet were afterwards contented to ſurrender their eſtates, and lived in great ſecurity, honour, and happineſs, as private men. Thus they diſcourſed until night. The next day *Nabis* was contented to relinquiſh *Argos*, and requeſted them to deliver unto him in writing their other demands, that he might take counſel with his friends. The iſſue of all was, that, in regard of the charges, whereat the confederates muſt be for maintenance of an army to lie in leagure all that winter (as there was no hope of making ſhort work) before the city of *Sparta*, they were contented to make peace with the tyrant, upon ſuch conditions as *Titus* ſhould think meet. Beſides the reſtitution of *Argos*, and all the places thereon depending, *Titus* propounded many other conditions to *Nabis*, and ſome of them very grievous. He would not ſuffer the *Lacedemonian* to have ought to do in the iſle of *Crete*; no, nor to make any confederacies, nor war, either in that iſland or elſewhere; not to build any town or caſtle upon his own lands; not to keep any other ſhipping than two ſmall barks; beſides many other troubleſome injunctions, with the impoſition of an hundred talents in ſilver, to be paid out of hand, and fifty talents yearly, for eight years next enſuing. For obſervance of theſe covenants, he demanded five hoſtages, ſuch as he himſelf ſhould name; and one of them to be the tyrant's own ſon. If it had been the meaning of *Titus* to withdraw the war from *Nabis*, becauſe it was not to be grounded upon juſtice; then had it been enough, if not more than enough, to take *Argos* from him; which he himſelf did offer, though it were for fear, to deliver up. But if it were thought reaſonable to diſpenſe a little with the *Roman* faith, in regard of the great benefit which thereby might redound unto the ſtate of their beſt friends in *Greece*, by the extirpation of this tyranny; then ſhould this enterpriſe, when once it was taken in hand, have been proſecuted unto the very utmoſt. As for this middle courſe which the *Romans* held, as it was not honourable to them to enrich themſelves by the ſpoil of one that had not offended them, nor pleaſing to the *Acheans*, who judged it ever after a great blemiſh to the noble acts of *Titus*; ſo did it miniſter unto the *Etolians*, and to ſuch as curiouſly pried into the faults of thoſe which took upon them to be patrons of *Greece*, no barren ſubject of malicious diſcourſe. For ſince *Philip*, a king, and deſcended of many famous kings, might not be ſuffered by theſe maſterly *Romans* to hold any one of thoſe countries or towns in *Greece*, that had belonged unto his anceſtors, it was thought very ſtrange that *Lacedemon*, once the moſt famous city among all the *Greeks*, was by the ſame *Romans* left in poſſeſſion of a tyrant, that had uſurped it but yeſterday; and he therein rooted by their authority, as their friend and confederate. *Nabis*, on the other ſide, thought himſelf unmercifully dealt withal by the ſelf-ſame *Romans*, whoſe amity he had preferred in time of a doubtful war, before the love and affinity of the *Macedonian* king, that had committed the city of *Argos* into his hands. But falſly had he dealt with the *Macedonian*, and falſly was he dealt with by thoſe to whom he did betake himſelf. Among theſe articles propounded, there was nothing that pleaſed him, ſave only that for the baniſhed *Lacedemonians* (of whom a great number were in the *Roman* camp, having among them *Ageſipolis*, the natural king of *Sparta*, that, being a young child, was driven out by *Lycurgus*, the firſt of the tyrants) there was made no proviſion to have them reſtored unto their city and eſtates; but only leave required for as many of their wives, as would be ſo contented to live abroad with them in baniſhment. Wherefore he forbore to give conſent unto theſe demands, and ſuſtained an aſſault or two; hoping, belike, that the enemies would ſoon be weary. But his fearful nature ſhortly overcame the reſolution, which the ſenſe of theſe injuries had put into him. So yielding unto all that had been propounded, he delivered the hoſtages, and thereupon obtained peace, that was confirmed afterwards at *Rome* by the ſenate and people. From this time forward, he thought the *Romans* far more wicked than himſelf; and was ready, upon the firſt advantage, to do them all the miſchief that he could.

The *Argives* had heard news that *Lacedemon* was even at the point of being taken. This erected them, and gave them heart to think upon their own good. So they adventured to ſet upon the garriſon, which was much weakened by the remove of the three thouſand carried thence by *Pythagoras*, to help the tyrant at *Sparta*. There needed unto their

their liberty no more, than that all of them jointly ſhould ſet their hands to the getting of it; which no ſooner they did, than they obtained it. Preſently after this, came *T. Quintius* to *Argos*, where he was joyfully welcomed. He was deſervedly acknowledged as author of that benefit, whereon the citizens had laid hold, without ſtaying for him; and that he might the better entitle himſelf thereto, he cauſed the liberty of the *Argives* to be proclaimed at the *Nemean games*, as ratifying it by his authority. The city was annexed again to the council of *Achaia*, whereby the *Acheans* were not more ſtrengthned, than the *Argives* themſelves were ſecured from the danger of a relapſe into the ſame extremities out of which they had newly eſcaped.

After this, *Titus* found little buſineſs, or none, wherewith to ſet on work his army in *Greece*. *Antiochus* was about to ſend another embaſſy to *Rome*, deſiring peace and friendſhip of the ſenate. Things being therefore in appearance wholly diſpoſed unto quiet, *Scipio* the *African*, that was choſen conſul at *Rome*, could not have his deſire of being ſent commander into *Greece*. The unſincere meaning of *Antiochus*, and the tumultuous diſpoſition of the *Etolians*, were held as conſiderations worthy of regard; yet not ſufficient cauſes of making war. Neither appeared there any more honeſt way of confuting the *Etolians*, and of throughly perſwading all the *Greeks* (which was not to be neglected by thoſe that meant to aſſure unto themſelves the patronage of *Greece*) that the good of the country was their ſole intent, than by withdrawing thence their legions, and leaving the nation unto it ſelf, till occaſion ſhould be ripe, and call them over again. Wherefore, after *Titus* had ſpent a winter there, without any matter of employment either found, or at any near diſtance appearing, he called an aſſembly of delegates from all parts of *Greece* to *Corinth*, where he meant to bid them farewel. There he recounted unto them all that had paſſed ſince his coming into thoſe parts, and willed them to value the *Roman* friendſhip, according to the difference of eſtate wherein the *Romans* found and left them. Hereto he added ſome wholſome counſel, touching the moderate uſe of their liberty, and the care which they ought to have of living peacably, and without faction. Laſtly, he gave up *Acrocorinthus* to the *Acheans*, withdrawing thence the *Roman* garriſon, and promiſing to do the like (which very ſoon he did) at *Chalcis* and *Demetrias*; that ſo it might be known what liars the *Etolians* were, who had accuſed the *Romans* of a purpoſe to retain thoſe places. With joyful acclamations did the *Greeks* teſtify their goodliking of that which *Titus* had ſaid and done: as alſo (at his requeſt) they agreed to ranſom and enlarge all *Romans* that had been ſold into their country by *Hannibal*.

Thus *Titus* crowned his actions in *Greece* with an happy end; and, by leaving the country before his departure was urged, left therein behind him the memory of his virtue and benefits, untainted by jealouſy and ſuſpicion of any evil meaning. At his coming to the city, he had the honour of a triumph, which was the goodlieſt of all that *Rome* had until that day beheld. Three days together the ſhew of his pomp continued, as being ſet out with the ſpoils of a country, more abundant in things worthy of ſuch a ſpectacle, than any wherein the *Romans* had before made war. All ſorts of arms, with ſtatues, and curious pieces of braſs or marble, taken from the enemy, were carried in the firſt day's pageant. The ſecond day was brought in all the treaſure of gold and ſilver; ſome in the rude maſs unwrought; ſome in divers ſorts of coin; and ſome in veſſels of ſundry kinds, that were the more highly prized by the workmanſhip. Among theſe were ten ſhields, all of ſilver, and one of pure gold. The third day *Titus* himſelf entered the city in his triumphant chariot. Before him were carried an hundred and fourteen crowns of gold, beſtowed upon him by divers cities. There were alſo led the beaſts for ſacrifice, the priſoners, and the hoſtages; among which, *Demetrius*, the ſon of king *Philip*, and *Armenes*, the ſon of *Nabis*, were principal. After him followed his army, and (which added much grace and good-liking to the ſhew) the *Roman* captives, by his procurement, redeemed from ſlavery in *Greece*.

Not long after this triumph, he procured audience of the ſenate for many embaſſies that were come out of *Greece* and *Aſia*. They had all very favourable anſwers, excepting thoſe of king *Antiochus*, whom the ſenate would not hear, but referred over to *T. Quintius*, and the ten that had been his counſellors; becauſe their buſineſs was ſaid to be ſomewhat intricate. Hereat the king's ambaſſadors wondered. They ſaid unto *Titus*, and his aſſociates, that they could not diſcern wherein conſiſted any perplexity of their meſſage. For all treaties of peace and friendſhip, were either between the victor and the vanquiſhed; between thoſe, that, having warred together, were upon equal terms of advantage; or between thoſe that had lived always in good agreement, without any quarrel. Unto the victor, they ſaid, that the vanquiſhed muſt yield, and patiently endure the impoſition of ſome covenants, that elſe might ſeem unreaſonable. Where war had been made, and no advantage gotten, there was it uſual to demand and make reſtitution of things and places claimed, gotten, or loſt, accordingly as both parts could agree. But between thoſe which had never fallen out, there ought no conditions of eſtabliſhing friendſhip to be propoſed; ſince it was reaſonable that each part ſhould hold their own, and neither carry it ſelf as ſuperior unto the other, in preſcribing ought that might be troubleſome. Now of this laſt kind, was the league and friendſhip that had been ſo long in concluſion betwixt *Antiochus* and the *Romans*. Which being ſo, they held it ſtrange that the *Romans* ſhould thus inſiſt on points no way concerning them, and take upon them to preſcribe unto the king, what cities of *Aſia* he ſhould ſet at liberty; from what cities they would give him leave to exact his wonted tributes; either putting, or not putting, his garriſons into them, as the ſenate ſhould think fit. Hereto *Quintius* anſwered, that ſince they went ſo diſtinctly to work, he would alſo do the like. Wherefore he propounded unto them two conditions, and gave them their choice whether to accept: either that it ſhould be lawful for the *Romans* to take part in *Aſia* with any that would ſeek their friendſhip; or, if king *Antiochus* miſliked this, and would have them forbear to meddle in *Aſia*, that then he ſhould abandon whatſoever he had gotten in *Europe*. This was plain dealing, but no reaſonable nor pertinent anſwer to that which the king's ambaſſadors had propounded. For, if the *Romans* might be hired to abſtain from *Aſia*, by the gift of all that *Antiochus* had lately won in *Europe*, then did not the affairs of *Smyrna*, *Lampſacus*, or any other *Aſiatics*, whom they were pleaſed to reckon as their confederates, bind them in honour to make war with a king that ſought their love, and had never done them injury. But they knew very well, that *Antiochus* could not without great ſhame be ſo baſe, as to deliver up unto them the city of *Lyſimachia*, whereon of late he had been at ſo much coſt; in building

ing it up even from the foundations, and repeopling it with inhabitants, that had been diſperſed, or captive to the *Barbarians*. And ſo much the ambaſſadors with great indignation alledged: ſaying, that *Antiochus* deſired friendſhip of the *Romans*; but ſo, as it might ſtand with his honour. Now in point of honour, the *Romans* took upon them, as if their cauſe were far the ſuperior. For it was, they ſaid, their purpoſe to ſet at liberty thoſe towns, which the king would oppreſs, and hold in ſubjection: eſpecially, ſince thoſe towns were of *Greekiſh* blood and language; and fell in that regard under the patronage, which *Rome* had afforded unto all *Greece* beſides. By this colour they might ſoon have left *Antiochus* king of not many ſubjects on the hither ſide of *Euphrates*. Neither did they forbear to ſay, That unleſs he would quit what he held in *Europe*, it was their meaning, not only to protect thoſe which relied upon them in *Aſia*, but therein to make new alliances: namely (as might be underſtood) with ſuch as were his ſubjects. Wherefore they urged his ambaſſadors to come to a point, and tell them plainly which of theſe two conditions their king would accept. For lack of a pleaſing anſwer, which the ambaſſadors could not hereto make, little wanted of giving preſently defiance to the king. But they ſuffered themſelves to be entreated, and were contented once again to ſend over *P. Villius*, and others that had been already with the king at *Lyſimachia*; by whom they might receive a final anſwer, whether theſe demands made by *Quintius*, and his aſſociates, would be accepted, yea, or no. By this reſpite of time, and the fruitleſs treaties enſuing, *Antiochus* got the leiſure of two years, or thereabouts, to prepare for war, finding in the *Romans*, all that while, no diſpoſition to let him live in peace.

SECT. V.

Of long wars which the Romans *had with the* Gauls, Ligurians, *and* Spaniards. *Of* M. Porcius Cato. *Injuries done by* Maſaniſſa *to the* Carthaginians: *that ſue to the* Romans *for juſtice in vain.*

THE *Inſubrians*, *Boijans*, and other of the *Ciſalpine Gauls*, together with the *Liguri-ans*; made often, and (in a manner) continual war upon the *Romans* in *Italy*, even from ſuch time as *Hannibal* and his brother *Mago* departed thence, until ſuch time as they themſelves were utterly ſubdued; which was not before the *Romans* were almoſt at the very height of their empire. Theſe nations having ſerved under *Mago* for wages, and afterwards having gotten *Amilcar*, a *Carthaginian*, to be leader unto them all, as hath been already ſhewed, by this their fellowſhip in arms, grew to be ſuch willing partakers of each others fortune, that ſeldom afterwards either the *Gauls* or *Ligurians* did ſtir alone, but that their companions, hearing it, were ready to ſecond them. How the *Romans* firſt prevailed, and got the large poſſeſſions in [a] *Gallia Ciſalpina*, now called *Lombardy*; it had been long ſince rehearſed, between the firſt and ſecond *Punic* wars. As alſo it hath ſince appeared, how they loſt the greateſt part of their hold in that country, by means of *Hannibal*'s paſſage thereby. Neither is it likely, that the re-conqueſt would have been more difficult or tedious unto the *Romans*, than was the firſt purchaſe: if, beſides the greater employments which they had of their armies abroad, their forces appointed unto this war had not been diſtracted by the *Ligurians*; that always made them to proceed warily, having an eye to the danger at their backs. The *Ligurians* were a ſtout nation, light and ſwift of body; well practiſed in laying ambuſhes; and not diſcouraged with any overthrow, but forthwith ready to fight again. Their country was mountainous, rough, woody, and full of ſtreight and dangerous paſſages. Few good towns they had; but many caſtles, exceedingly well fortified by nature: ſo as without much labour, they could neither be taken nor beſieged. They were alſo very poor; and had little or nothing that might give contentment, unto a victorious army that ſhould ſpoil their land. In theſe reſpects they ſerved excellently well, to train up the *Roman* ſoldiers to hardneſs, and military patience: teaching them (beſides other exerciſes of war) to endure much, and live contented with a little. Their quarrel to *Rome*, grew partly from their love unto the *Gauls*, their neighbours and companions; partly from their delight in robbing and ſpoiling the territory of their borders, that were ſubject unto *Rome*. But their obſtinate continuance in the war which they had begun, ſeems to have been grounded upon the condition of all ſalvages; to be friends or foes, by cuſtom, rather than by judgment: and to acknowledge no ſuch virtue in leagues, or formal concluſions of peace, as ought to hinder them from uſing their advantage, or taking revenge of injuries when they return to mind. This quality is found in all, or moſt of the *Weſt-Indians*: who, if they be demanded a reaſon of the wars between them and any of their neighbours, uſe commonly this anſwer, *It hath ſtill been the cuſtom for us and them, to fight one againſt the other.*

Divers overthrows, though none that were great, theſe *Ligurians* gave unto the *Romans*: but many more, and greater, they received. Often they ſought peace, when they found themſelves in diſtreſs; and brake it again as often, when they thought it profitable ſo to do. The beſt was, that as their country was a good place of exerciſe unto the *Romans*; ſo out of their own country they did little harm: not ſending any great armies far from home; perhaps, becauſe they knew not how to make war, ſave on their own ground.

The country of *Spain*, as it was the firſt part of the continent out of *Italy* that became ſubject unto the *Romans*: ſo was it the laſt of all their provinces, which was wholly and throughly by them ſubdued. It is likened in figure by ſome geographers, unto an ox-hide: and the *Romans* found in it the property of that ox-hide, which *Calanus*, the *Indian*, ſhewed unto the great *Alexander*, as an emblem of his large dominions. For, treading upon any ſide of it, the further parts would riſe from the ground. And thus was it with *Spain*. Seldom did it happen, that thoſe parts, from which the *Roman* armies lay furtheſt, were not up in rebellion. The *Spaniards* were a very hardy nation, and eaſily ſtirred up to arms; but had not much knowledge in the art of war, nor any good captains. They wanted alſo (which was their principal hinderance) good intelligence among themſelves: and being divided into many ſmall ſignories, that had little other communion than of language, they ſeldom or never provided in general for the common good of their country; but made it their chief care, each of them to look unto their

[a] Ch. 2. §. 8. *of this Book.*

own

own territory. Such private reſpects made them often to fall aſunder; when many had united themſelves together, for chacing out of the *Romans*. And theſe were the cauſes of their often overthrows; as deſire of liberty, rather than complaint of any wrong done to them, was the cauſe of their often taking arms.

The *Carthaginians* had been accuſtomed, to make evacuation of this cholerick *Spaniſh* humour; by employing, as mercenaries in their wars abroad, thoſe that were moſt likely to be unquiet at home. They had alſo taken ſoldiers from one part of the country, and uſed them in another: finding means to pay them all, out of the profits which they raiſed upon the whole country; as being far better huſbands, and of more dexterity than were the *Romans*, in that kind. But contrariwiſe the *Romans*, uſing the ſervice of their own legions, and of their ſure friends the *Latins*, had little buſineſs for the *Spaniards*; and therefore were fain to have much buſineſs with them. *Spain* was too far diſtant, and withal too great, for them to ſend over colonies thither, whereby to hold it in good order, according to the courſe that they took in *Italy*. Wherefore it remained, that they ſhould always maintain ſuch armies in the country, as might ſerve to hold in obedience *per* force; and ſuch heedful captains, as might be ſtill ready to oppoſe the *Barbarians* in their firſt commotion. This they did: and thereby held the country, though ſeldom in peace.

Very ſoon after the departure of *Scipio*, there was raiſed a war in *Spain* againſt the *Romans*, even upon the ſame general ground, that was the foundation of all the *Spaniſh* wars following. It was thought unreaſonable, that the *Spaniards* ſhould one while help the *Carthaginians* againſt the *Romans*, and another while the *Romans* againſt the *Carthaginians*; baſely forgetting to help themſelves againſt thoſe that were ſtrangers, yet uſurped the dominion over them. But the forces, which *Scipio* had left behind him in that country, being well acquainted with the manner of war in thoſe parts, ſuppreſſed this rebellion by many victories: and, together with ſubjection, brought peace upon the country; which laſted five years. This victory of the *Romans*, though it happily ended the war; yet left it ſtill remaining the cauſe of the war; which, after five years, brake out again. The *Spaniards* fought a battel with the *Roman* proconſul, whom they ſlew; and had a great victory, that filled them with greater hopes. Yet the happy ſucceſs of their wars in *Greece*, made the *Romans* think it enough to ſend thither two pretors, and with each of them ſome two legions. Theſe did ſomewhat; yet not ſo much, but that *M. Porcius Cato*, who was conſul the year following, and ſent into that province, found at his coming little leſs to do, than the reconquering of all *Spain*. But it fell out happily, that all the *Spaniards* were not of one mind: ſome were faithful to *Rome*; and ſome were idle beholders of the pains that others took. Yet, when *Cato* had won a great victory upon the chiefeſt of them; they roſe againſt him in many parts of the country, and put him to much new trouble. Whilſt he was about to make a journey againſt thoſe that were as yet unſubdued, ſome of the lately vanquiſhed were even ready to rebel. He therefore diſarmed them: which they took ſo heavily, that many of them ſlew themſelves for very grief. Hearing of this, and well underſtanding, that ſuch deſperation might work dangerous effects; he called unto him the principal among them; and commending unto them peace and quietneſs, which they never had diſturbed but unto their own great loſs, he prayed them to deviſe what courſe might be taken, for holding them aſſured unto *Rome*, without further trouble. None of them could, or would give counſel in a matter of this nature. Having therefore talked with them once or twice, and finding their invention barren in this kind of ſubject, he gave expreſs charge, that upon a day appointed they ſhould throw down the walls of all their towns. Afterwards he carried the war about from place to place; and with ſingular induſtry finiſhed it in ſhort time. Neither thought he it any diſgrace to him, or to *Rome*, in this time of danger, to imitate the *Carthaginians*, and hire an army of the *Celtiberians*, againſt other of their countrymen: excuſing the indignity, ſuch as it ſeemed, with a jeſt, That if he were vanquiſhed and ſlain, then ſhould he need to pay them nothing; whereas if he had the victory, he could pay them with the enemy's money. Finally he brought the war to ſo good an end, that in long time after, though *Spain* were often troubleſome, yet was in no danger of being loſt. He increaſed alſo the publick revenues in that province, by cauſing ſome mines of iron and ſilver to be wrought, that had before lain unregarded. Herein he did benefit the commonwealth, by a virtue much agreeable to his own peculiar diſpoſition.

For this *M. Cato* was not only very notable in the art of war, which might well be then termed, The occupation of the *Romans*; but ſo well furniſhed with all other uſeful qualities, that very little was wanting in him, which might ſeem requiſite to the accompliſhment of a perfect man. He was very ſkilful in the *Roman* laws, a man of great eloquence, and not unprofitable in any buſineſs either private or publick. Many books he wrote: whereof the principal were, of the *Roman* antiquities, and of huſbandry. In matter of huſbandry he was notable, and thereby moſt increaſed his ſubſtance; being of mean birth, and the firſt of his houſe. Strong of body he was, and exceeding temperate: ſo as he lived in perfect health to very old age. But that which moſt commended him unto the better ſort of the *Romans*, was his great ſincerity of life, abſtinence from bribes, and faſhioning himſelf to the ancient laudable cuſtoms of the city. Herein he had merited ſingular commendations, if the vehemency of his nature had not cauſed him to malign the virtue of that noble *Scipio* the *African*, and ſome other worthy men; that were no leſs honeſt than himſelf, though far leſs rigid, and more gallant in behaviour. Otherwiſe he was a very good citizen, and one of ſuch temper, that he could faſhion himſelf to all occaſions, as if he never were out of his element. He loved buſineſs ſo well, or rather hated vice ſo earneſtly; that, even unto the end of his life, he was exerciſed in defending himſelf, or accuſing others. For at the age of fourſcore and ſix years, he pleaded in his own defence; and four years after, he accuſed *Sergius Galba* unto the people. So began the nobility of *Cato*'s family; which ended in his great-grandchild *M. Cato* the *Utican*: one, that being of like virtue and fervency, had all his good purpoſes daſh'd, and was finally wearied out of his life, by men of ſuch nobility and greatneſs as this his anceſtor had continually vexed.

The *Spaniſh* wars, after *Cato*'s departure out of the country, though they were not very dangerous, yet were they many; and the country ſeldom free from inſurrection, in one part or other. The *Roman* pretors therefore, of which two every year were ſent over commanders into *Spain* (that was divided

divided into two governments) did rarely fail of ſuch work, as might afford the honour of triumph. One ſlew thirteen thouſand *Spaniards* in a battel: another took fifty towns; and a third enforced many ſtates of the country to ſue for peace. Thus every one of them, or moſt of them, did ſome laudable ſervice; and yet ſo, that commonly there were of men, towns and people, new that rebelled, inſtead of the old that were ſlain, taken or reclaimed. At the cauſes hereof I have already pointed: and therefore think it enough to ſay, That the buſineſs in *Spain* required not the employment of a *Roman* conſul, from ſuch time as *Cato* thence departed, until the *Numantian* war broke out; which was very long after.

In all other countries to the weſt of the *Ionian* ſeas, the *Romans* had peace: but ſo had not the *Carthaginians*. For when *Hannibal* was gone from them, and that the enemies of the *Barchine* houſe promiſed all felicity which *Rome* could grant, unto themſelves and their obedient city: *Maſaniſſa* fell to diſputing with the ſword, about the title to the beſt part of their lands. He began with *Emporia*, a fruitful region about the leſſer *Syrtis*: wherein among other cities was that of *Leptis*, which daily paid a talent unto *Carthage* for tribute. This country the *Numidian* challenged; and by winning ſome part of it, ſeemed to better his claim unto the whole. He had a great advantage: for that the *Carthaginians* might not make any war, without leave obtained from their maſters the *Romans*. They had none other way of redreſs, than by ſending to *Rome* their complaint of his doings. And ſurely they wanted not good matter to alledge, if the judges had been impartial. For beſides that *Scipio*, in limiting out unto them their bounds, had left them the poſſeſſion of this country: *Maſaniſſa* himſelf, now very lately, purſuing a rebel that fled out of his kingdom, deſired leave of the *Carthaginians*, for himſelf to paſs through it in his way to *Cyrene*: thereby acknowledging (had it otherwiſe been queſtionable) that the country was theirs. This notwithſtanding, *Maſaniſſa* had wherewith to juſtify his proceedings, eſpecially unto the *Roman* ſenate. He gave the *Fathers* to underſtand by his ambaſſadors, what faithleſs people the *Carthaginians* were, and how ill-affected to the ſtate of *Rome*. There had lately been ſent unto them from *Hannibal* one, that ſhould perſwade them to take part with *Antiochus*. This man they had examined, upon ſome ſuſpicion of his errand; yet neither arreſting him nor his ſhip, had thereby afforded him means to eſcape. Hence the *Numidian* concluded, That certainly it was their purpoſe to rebel; and therefore good policy to keep them down. As for the country of *Emporia*: it had always, he ſaid, been theirs, that were able to hold it by ſtrong hand: and ſo belonged ſometimes unto the *Numidian* kings; though now of late it was in poſſeſſion of the *Carthaginians*. But if truth were known: the citizens of *Carthage* had not any very warrantable title, unto any more ground, than that whereon their city ſtood; or ſcarcely to ſo much. For they were no better than ſtrangers in *Afric*, that had gotten leave there to build upon ſo much ground as they could encompaſs with an ox-hide cut into ſmall thongs. Whatſoever they held without ſuch a compaſs, was purchaſed by fraud, and wrongful encroachments. This conſidered, *Maſaniſſa* requeſted of the ſenate, That they would not adjudge unto ſuch uſurpers, the country ſometimes appertaining to the anceſtors of him their aſſured friend. The *Romans* having heard theſe allegations on both ſides, found the matter ſo doubtful, that they could not on the ſudden tell what to determine. Wherefore becauſe they would do nothing raſhly; they ſent over three ambaſſadors, of whom *P. Scipio* the *African* was one and the chief, to deſide the controverſy: yet ſecretly giving them inſtructions, to leave all as they found it, without making any end one way or other. The ambaſſadors followed their directions, and left all doubtful. So was it likely that *Maſaniſſa* with a ſtrong army ſhould quickly prevail, againſt thoſe that could no more than talk of their right, and exclaim againſt the wrong. By ſuch arts were the Carthaginians held not only from ſtirring in favour of king *Antiochus*, if they had thereto any diſpoſition; but were prepared by little and little unto their final deſtruction: that came upon them, when the *Romans* had leiſure to expreſs the utmoſt of their hatred.

SECT. VI.

The Etolians *labour to provoke* Antiochus, Philip, *and* Nabis, *to war upon the* Romans; *by whom they hold themſelves wronged and diſgraced.* Nabis *beſiegeth* Gyttheum, *and waſteth ſome part of* Achæa. *The exact skill of* Philopœmen, *in advantage of ground: whereby he utterly vanquiſheth* Nabis. Antiochus *being denied peace by the* Romans, *joins with the* Etolians. *The* Etolians *ſurprize* Demetrias; *and by killing* Nabis *their confederate, ſeize upon* Sparta. *But they are driven out by the citizens: who, at* Philopœmen's *perſwaſions, annex themſelves to the* Acheans.

ALL *Greece* being at peace, and the *Roman* armies thence departed: it grieved much the *Etolians* to think, that they, who had promiſed unto themſelves the whole ſpoil of *Philip*, and the higheſt reputation among the *Greeks*; were not only diſappointed of their covetous hopes, but quite forſaken by their ancient dependants; and of all other the moſt unregarded. Yet was there made a great acceſs to their eſtate; by adding much unto them, of that which had been taken from the *Macedonian*. This might have well ſufficed them, if their deſires had not been immoderate; and their indignation more vehement, than their deſire. But they were not ſo pleaſed with that which they had, ſince they thought it no more than part of their due; as they were vexed with the denial of that which they claimed, and with finding themſelves to be wholly diſ-eſteemed, wherein they thought that they had unſufferable wrong. Wherefore they deviſed in a parliament, which they ſhortly held, by what means they might beſt right themſelves; and give the *Romans* a ſorrowful knowledge of the difference, between their enmity and friendſhip. To this purpoſe they ſoon agreed, as concurring all in one affection, That they would not only perſwade *Antiochus* to make war upon the *Romans*, as one to whom the *Romans* had long refuſed peace; but that they would deal with the king of *Macedon* their ancient enemy, and with *Nabis* the tyrant of *Lacedemon*, to join all together in a new confederacy: whoſe joint forces could not in all likelihood but far ſurmount thoſe of the *Romans*, *Acheans*, *Rhodians*, and king *Eumenes*, with all that were of their faction. This was a great enterpriſe, which the *Etolians* took in hand: and well beſeeming them, for they were great darers. They ſent ambaſſadors to all theſe kings, with perſwaſions as they thought moſt forcible. But *Philip* was irreſolute; and *Antiochus* willing to try firſt all other courſes. *Nabis* the *Lacedemonian*, who

who neither (as *Philip*) had loſt much nor (as *Antiochus*) was in fear of any war; yet ſhewed himſelf of all other the moſt forward: and not ſtaying ſo much as to ſeek any good pretence, began immediately to lay ſiege to *Gytheum*, that had been lately taken from him by the *Romans*. The *Acheans*, to whoſe care chiefly *Titus* at his departure had commended the affairs of *Peloponneſus*, were not ſlow to admoniſh *Nabis* of his duty: neither would they have ſtayed long from repreſſing his violence by open war; had not ſome of them thought it wiſdom to aſk counſel of the *Romans*, and particularly of *T. Quintius*, before they engaged themſelves in a buſineſs of ſuch importance. Whilſt thus they ſpent time in ſending ambaſſadors, and were adviſed by *Quintius* to let all alone, and to wait for the coming of the *Roman* forces that would ſhortly be amongſt them: *Nabis* was bold to give them juſter cauſe of complaint, by waſting their own territory.

Philopœmen was then pretor of the *Acheans*, who had long been abſent in *Crete*; making war there for his mind's ſake and recreation. Unto him the *Acheans* referred themſelves, giving him leave to order the war at his pleaſure; either ſtaying until the *Romans* came; or doing otherwiſe, as he ſhould think beſt. He made all haſte to relieve *Gytheum* by ſea; fearing leſt the town, and the *Achean* garriſon within it, ſhould be loſt, if he uſed any delay. But *Philopœmen* was ſo bad a ſeaman, that he knew not a ſtrong ſhip from a rotten. He made a quadrireme galley his admiral, that had fourſcore years ago been counted a gallant veſſel, in the navy of *Antigonus Gonatas*. Neither was the reſt of his fleet ſo good, as might encounter with that of the *Lacedemonian*. Only it fell out well, that he committed himſelf to a light pinnace, or brigantine, that fought better with her wings, than with her talons. For his admiral galley was ſtemmed at the firſt; and being rotten with age, ſprang ſo many leaks, and took in water ſo faſt, that ſhe was fain to yield without further reſiſtance. When the reſt of the fleet ſaw what was become of their admiral; all were preſently diſcouraged, and ſaved themſelves with what ſpeed they could. But *Philopœmen* was not herewith daunted. If he had failed in ſea-ſervice, which was none of his occupation; he ſaid, that he would make amends by land. The tyrant withdrew part of his army from the ſiege of *Gyttheum*, to ſtop the *Acheans* if they ſhould invade his country. But upon theſe which were placed in guard of *Laconia*, *Philopœmen* came unexpected; fired their camp; and put all, ſave a very few of them, to the ſword. Then marched he with all his army towards *Lacedemon:* within ten miles whereof he was, when the tyrant met him; that had already taken *Gyttheum*. It was not expected, that *Nabis* would have been ready for them ſo ſoon. Or if he ſhould come from *Gyttheum* with any part of his forces: yet was it thought that he muſt overtake them, and charge them in rear. They marched therefore almoſt ſecurely, in a long troop reaching ſome five miles: having their horſe, and the greateſt part of their auxiliaries at their backs to bear off any ſudden impreſſion. But *Nabis*, who formerly underſtood, or at leaſt ſuſpected, what courſe they would take: appeared in the front of them with all his army; encamped there where they meant to have lodged. It was the cuſtom of *Philopœmen*, when he walked or travelled abroad with his friends, to mark the ſituation of the country about him; and to diſcourſe, what might befal an army marching the ſame. He would ſuppoſe, That having with him there ſuch a number of ſoldiers, ordered and ſorted in ſuch manner, and marching towards ſuch a place; he were upon that ground encountred by a greater army, or better prepared to fight. Then would he put the queſtion, whether it were fit for him to hold on his way, retire, or make a ſtand? what piece of ground it were meet for him to ſeize upon; and in what manner he might beſt do it? In what ſort he ſhould order his men? Where beſtow his carriages; and under what guard? In what ſort encamp himſelf? And which way march the day following? By ſuch continual meditation, he was grown ſo perfect, that he never met with any difficulty, whence he could not extricate himſelf and his followers. At this time he made a ſtand: and having drawn up his rear, he encamped near unto the place where he was; within half a mile of the enemy. His baggage, with all thereto belonging, he beſtowed on a rock; encompaſſing them round with his ſoldiers. The ground was rough, the ways bad, and the day almoſt quite ſpent; ſo as *Nabis* could not at the preſent greatly moleſt him. Both armies were to water at one brook; whereto the *Acheans* lay the nearer. This watering therefore was like to miniſter the firſt occaſion of ſkirmiſh. *Philopœmen* underſtood this; and laid an ambuſh in place convenient; whereinto the mercenaries of *Nabis* fell, and were ſlaughtered in great numbers. Preſently after this, he cauſed one of his own auxiliaries to go to the tyrant, as a fugitive, and tell him, That the *Acheans* had a purpoſe to get between him and *Lacedemon*; whereby they would both debar his return into the city, and withal, encourage the people, to take arms for the recovery of their freedom. The tyrant hearing this, marched haſtily away; and left his camp, which hardly otherwiſe would have been forced. Some companies he made to ſtay behind, and ſhew themſelves upon the rampart, thereby to conceal his departure. But *Philopœmen* was not ſo to be beguiled. He eaſily won the camp; and gave chace to *Nabis:* whoſe followers being overtaken, had no courage to turn about and make head. The enemies being thus diſperſed, and fled into woods, where they lay in covert all that day; *Philopœmen* conceived aright, that their fear and neceſſity would teach them to creep homewards, and ſave themſelves, when it grew dark. Wherefore in the evening, when he had gathered together all thoſe of his light-armature, which had followed the chace whilſt it was day; he led forth the reſt that had well refreſhed themſelves, and occupied the two moſt ordinary paſſages unto *Lacedemon*. So *Nabis*'s men, when it was dark night, perceiving in *Philopœmen*'s camp great ſtore of lights, thought that all had been at reſt: and therefore adventured to make an eſcape home. But they were ſo way-laid, that hardly one quarter of them got into *Sparta*. Thirty days together after this, did *Philopœmen* waſte the country round about, whilſt *Nabis* durſt not iſſue forth of his town; and then returned home, leaving the tyrant in a manner without forces.

The *Roman* ambaſſadors were then in *Greece*, and *T. Quintius* among them; labouring to make their party ſtrong againſt *Antiochus* and *Nabis*, whom they knew to be ſollicited by the *Etolians*. Very fair countenance they alſo made unto *Philip*; and with comfortable promiſes drew him to make ſhew, whatſoever he thought, of good correſpondence. They promiſed to reſtore unto him his ſon: and were contented to let him hope, that he ſhould

ſhould receive other favours at their hands; and regain poſſeſſions of many places by them taken from him. Thus did the *Romans* prepare for war againſt *Antiochus* in *Greece*, whilſt their ambaſſadors that were with him in *Aſia*, denied otherwiſe to grant him peace, than if he would yield unto one of the conditions, by them ſo often propounded. The long abſence of this king in *Syria*, where he had accompliſhed the marriage between *Ptolemy* and his daughter; together with the death of young *Antiochus* the king's ſon, which happened during the treaty, and hindered, or ſeemed to hinder, the king from giving audience in perſon to the ambaſſadors, cauſed them to return home to *Rome*, as uncertain of their anſwer as at their ſetting forth. One thing that might have been, and partly was beneficial unto them, they brought to paſs during their abode at *Epheſus*; either by cunning, or (as *Livy* rather thinks) by chance. Finding *Hannibal* there, they diſcourſed often with him, and blamed him for having thus fled unto *Antiochus*, upon a cauſeleſs ſuſpicion wherein he held the *Romans*, that honoured his virtue, and intended him no harm. Many have affirmed that *P. Scipio* was one of theſe ambaſſadors; and that he, among other diſcourſes with *Hannibal*, demanded once, *Which of all the famous captains that had lived*, Hannibal *judged the moſt worthy?* So *Hannibal* gave to *Alexander* of *Macedon* the firſt place; to *Pyrrhus* the ſecond; and the third he challenged unto himſelf. But *Scipio*, who thought his own title better, than that it ought to be ſo forgotten, aſked yet further, what wouldſt thou have ſaid then, *Hannibal*, if thou had'ſt vanquiſhed me? To whom the *Carthaginian* replied, then would not I have given the firſt place to *Alexander*, but have claimed it as due unto my ſelf. Now whether this were ſo, or otherwiſe, the often and friendly conference of *Hannibal* with the *Roman* ambaſſadors, made him ſuſpected of *Antiochus*, who therefore did forbear a while to uſe his counſel. Yet afterwards, when *Hannibal* perceived this change in the king, and plainly deſiring him to tell the cauſe thereof, heard what it was, he eaſily recovered his former grace and credit. For he told how his father had cauſed him to ſwear at the altars, when he was a little boy, that he never ſhould be a friend unto the *Romans*. Wherefore he willed the king not to regard any vain ſurmiſes; but to know thus much, that as long as he thought upon war with *Rome*, ſo long would *Hannibal* do him all good ſervice; whereas, contrariwiſe, if he pretended to make peace, then ſhould it behove him to uſe the counſel of ſome other man.

The *Etolians*, and their friends, were no leſs buſy all this while in making their party ſtrong againſt the *Romans*, than were the *Romans* in muſtering up their friends in *Greece*. They had ſo often dealt with *Antiochus*, vaunting much of their own forces, and arrogating to themſelves the honour of the victory againſt *Philip*; that, finally, they prevailed with him; eſpecially when the *Roman* ambaſſadors had left him without hope of peace, unleſs he would buy it at too dear a rate. They dealt in like ſort with the *Macedonian*, but in vain. He underſtood the *Romans*, and himſelf too well. Wherefore it concerned them to improve their own forces to the utmoſt, as knowing that all the burden muſt lie upon *Antiochus* and themſelves, without help from any, ſave only from ſome few that were diſcontented in *Greece*. Whilſt they were about this, and had with them an ambaſſador of the king *Antiochus*, that animated them to reſolution, the *Athenian* ambaſſadors, whom *Titus* had requeſted to be at their meeting, ſtayed their vehemency a little; by exhorting them not to conclude raſhly, without firſt hearing the *Romans*, that lay near at hand. For want of a ready anſwer hereto, they were contented to approve the motion. *Titus*, hearing this, thought the buſineſs worthy of his preſence. For ſince *Antiochus* had now declared himſelf againſt the *Romans*, it would be no ſmall piece of ſervice, to withdraw from his friendſhip thoſe by whoſe encouragement he had made the adventure. Wherefore he came to their *Panætolium*, or great aſſembly of the nation, where he forgot nothing that might ſerve to appeaſe them. He willed them to conſider the weight of the enterpriſe which they took in hand, whereby *Greece* was like to become a champain-field, on which, to the ruin of the country, the *Romans*, and king *Antiochus*, that commanded no ſmall part of the world, ſhould fight for the maſtery; the *Etolians*, as maſters in that kind of fence, ſetting them on, and becoming [a] *the ſticklers*. As for thoſe grievances which did thus exaſperate them, and urge them to ſuch violent courſes, he will'd, them to conſider how ſlight they were, and how much better they might do to ſend ambaſſadors to *Rome*, that ſhould either plead their right in the ſenate, or (if their right unto the places which they claimed were not good) make requeſt to have what they deſired, than thus to ſet the world in an uproar, and be afterwards the firſt that ſhould repent it. But what he ſaid, or could ſay, it ſkilled not much. They had already done ill to make the ambaſſador of the king, whoſe help they had ſought, wait ſo long for an anſwer, and ſtay doubting what good end they ſhould make with the *Romans*. Neither was it news unto them to hear thoſe comfortable words, that, by ſending to *Rome*, they might happen to obtain what they deſired; either as their right, or elſe by way of favour. For with ſuch terms had they been feaſted once already, and were by the ſenate rejected unto *Titus*; who, having it in his own power, gave them no ſatisfaction; yet would now again refer them to the ſenate. This were only loſs of time, and might abate their credit with *Antiochus*. Wherefore without more ado they made a decree, that king *Antiochus the Great* ſhould be intreated to come over into *Greece*, as well to ſet the country at liberty, as alſo to decide the controverſies depending between the *Romans* and *Etolians*. Such a decree they would not have made, had they not underſtood the king's mind before. Having made it, they forgot no point of bravery, whereby to vaunt themſelves to the king's ambaſſadors, and againſt the *Romans*. *Titus* deſired of their pretor to let him ſee a copy of this new decree. The pretor anſwered, that then he had other things to do; but that this decree, and their further anſwer, they would ſhortly let him know, if he came to their camp in *Italy* upon the river of *Tibris*. Gentler words would have done better, as the *Etolians* are like to underſtand hereafter. But having thus begun, they meant henceforth to go roundly to work. The care of the war they referred unto the more private council of their nation; that no occaſion might ſlip in waiting for the authority of a general aſſembly. The *Apocleti* (ſo were the privy-council of *Ætolia* called) went as hotly to work as any of the youngeſt heads could have done. They laid a plot, how to get into their hands at one time the towns of *Chalcis*, *Demetrias*, and *Sparta*;

[a] Liv. 35. admiſtis Ætolis fortè, *laniſtis*.

to

to each of which they ſent men for the purpoſe. *Demetrias* they took upon the ſudden; entering, ſome of them, as friends to conduct home a principal man of the city; who, for ſpeaking words againſt *T. Quintius*, had been driven to fly thence; but was, by interceſſion of thoſe that loved him, again recalled. His *Etolian* companions, that were not many, ſeized upon a gate, whereat they let in a troop, which they had not left far behind them; and ſo fell to murdering the chief of the *Roman* faction. At *Chalcis* they ſped not ſo well. Thither alſo they had a baniſhed man to bring home; but they came ſo ſtrong, that their purpoſe was diſcovered, and the town prepared to defend it ſelf againſt them. Being therefore demanded the cauſe of this hoſtility, they gave a gentle anſwer, ſaying, that they came not thither as enemies, but only to deliver the town from the *Romans*, who more inſolently domineered over it than ever the *Macedonians* had done. By which rhetorick they prevailed no more than they could do by plain force. For the townſmen replied, that they neither found any arbidgment of their liberty, nor needed any garriſon to keep them from the *Romans*; from whom they neither feared any danger, nor received injury. So this buſineſs was daſh'd. The attempt upon *Sparta* was more ſtrange and deſperate. *Nabis*, their good friend, was lord of the town, ſtyling himſelf king; but more truly by all men called tyrant. He had well-near loſt all, by means of the overthrow which *Philopœmen* had lately given him; ſince he durſt not ſtir abroad, and daily expected the miſchief that on all ſides threatned him. Wherefore he ſent meſſengers, one after another, to the *Etolians*, requeſting them, that as he had not been ſlow to ſtir in their behalf, but adventured himſelf upon the utmoſt of danger, when all others were backward; ſo they would be pleaſed to ſend him what help they might, ſince his bad fortune had cauſed him at preſent to need it. It hath been often ſaid, that the ravenous *Etolians* were only true to themſelves, and regarded neither faith nor friendſhip, otherwiſe than as it might conduce to their own ends. And ſo dealt they now. For ſince *Nabis*'s mercenary forces, which upheld his tyranny, were in a manner conſumed, they thought it expedient, for their eſtate, to put him out of the way; and, by ſo doing, to aſſure *Lacedemon* unto themſelves. To this purpoſe, they ſent thither *Alexamenus*, one whom they thought a man fit for ſuch a work. To him they gave a thouſand foot, and thirty horſe, choſen for the purpoſe. Theſe thirty were, by *Democritus* the pretor, brought into the council of the *Apocleti*, where they were commanded to be no wiſer than they ſhould be, nor to think that they were ſent to make war with the *Acheans*, or to do ought elſe, ſave only what *Alexamenus* ſhould command them; which, were it never ſo deſperate, and, in ſeeming, againſt all reaſon, yet muſt they underſtand, that unleſs they performed it, they ſhould have no good welcome home. So *Alexamenus* came to the tyrant, whom he encouraged with brave words; telling him, that *Antiochus* was already in *Europe*, and would be anon in *Greece*, meaning to cover all the land and ſea with his mighty armies; and that the *Romans* were like to find other manner of work, than of late with *Philip*; ſince the elephants of this great king, without other help, would ſuffice to tread them down. As for the *Etolians*, he ſaid, that if need ſhould ſo require, they would preſently ſend away to *Lacedemon* all the forces that they could raiſe: but that they were very deſirous at the preſent to make as goodly a muſter as they could before the great king, which cauſed them to ſend him thither afore with no greater company. Hereupon he willed *Nabis* to take heart; bring forth his men, that had been long pent up in the city, and train them without the walls; as if ſhortly he ſhould employ them in work of conqueſt, rather than defence. *Nabis* was glad of this, and daily exerciſed his men in the field; riding up and down with his *Alexamenus*, and no more than three or four horſe about him, from one point to another, to order and behold them. During this time of exerciſe, *Alexamenus* made it his faſhion to ſtep aſide alone to his *Etolians*, and ſay ſomewhat as he thought fit; which done, he ſtill returned again to *Nabis*. But when he ſaw time for the great work that he had in hand, he then went aſide to his thirty horſe-men, and bade them remember the taſk enjoined them at their ſetting forth; telling them, that they were all in caſe of baniſhed men, unleſs they would anon come up to him, and help him to finiſh that which they ſhould ſee him take in hand. Herewithal the tyrant began to draw near them; and, *Alexamenus* making towards him, charged him on the ſudden, and ſtruck him down. The thirty *Etolians* never ſtood to deliberate upon the matter, but all flew in; and, before any ſuccour could arrive, had made an end of this wretched *Nabis*. Preſently, upon the fact committed, the tyrant's mercenaries ran unto the dead body; where, inſtead of ſeeking revenge, they ſtood fooliſhly gazing as beholders. *Alexamenus*, with his *Etolians*, haſted into the city, and ſeized on the palace, where he fell to ranſacking the treaſure; and troubled himſelf with none other care, as though all were already done. Such of his followers as were diſperſed in the town, did alſo the like; with the greater indignation of the citizens, who, ſeeing themſelves free by the death of the tyrant, could not endure to ſee thoſe that had ſlain him begin to tyrannize anew. Wherefore all the town was ſhortly in arms; and, for lack of another captain, they took a little boy of the royal ſtock, that had been brought up with *Nabis*'s children, whom they mounted upon a good horſe, and made him their chief. So they fell upon the *Etolians* that were idly ſtragling about, and put them all to the ſword. *Alexamenus*, with not many of his company, were ſlain keeping the citadel; and thoſe few that eſcaped thence into *Arcadia*, were taken by the magiſtrates, who ſold them all as bond-ſlaves. In this doubtful eſtate of things at *Lacedemon*, *Philopœmen* came thither, who, calling out the chief of the city, and ſpeaking ſuch words unto them, as *Alexamenus* ſhould have done after he had ſlain the tyrant, eaſily perſwaded them, for their own good and ſafety, to incorporate themſelves with the *Acheans*. Thus by the enterpriſe, no leſs diſhonourable than difficult, of the *Etolians*, and the ſmall, but effectual travel of *Philopœmen*, the *Acheans* made a notable purchaſe; and *Lacedemon*, that had hitherto been governed either by kings, or by tyrants that called themſelves kings, became the member of a common-wealth, whereof the name had ſcarce any reputation when *Sparta* ruled over all *Greece*.

SECT.

SECT. VII.

Antiochus, *perſwaded by* Thoas *the* Etolian, *comes over into* Greece, *ill attended. Sundry paſſages between him, the* Etolians, Chalcidians, *and others. He wins* Chalcis, *and thereby the whole iſle of* Eubœa. *The vanity of the king's ambaſſadors and the* Etolians, *with the civil anſwer of* Titus *to their diſcourſe, before the* Acheans. *That it concerned the* Greeks *to have deſired peace between the* Romans *and* Antiochus, *as the beſt aſſurance of their own liberty. Of many petty eſtates that fell to the king. Of* Aminander; *and an idle vanity, by which king* Philip *was loſt.* Hannibal *gives good counſel in vain. Some towns won in* Theſſaly. *The king retires to* Chalcis, *where he marrieth a young wife, and revels away the reſt of winter. Upon the coming of the* Roman *conſul, all forſake* Antiochus. *He, with two thouſand* Etolians, *keeps the ſtreights of* Thermopylæ. *He is beaten, and flies into* Aſia, *leaving all in* Greece *unto the victors.*

ANTIOCHUS was troubled much in *Aſia* with *Smyrna* and *Lampſacus*, that would not hearken to any compoſition. He thought it neither ſafe nor honourable to leave them enemies behind him; and to win them by force, was more than hitherto he was able. Yet was he deſirous, with all ſpeed convenient, to ſhew himſelf in *Greece*; where, he had been told, that his preſence would effect wonders. It was ſaid, that in all the country there was a very ſmall number which bore hearty affection unto the *Romans*: that *Nabis* was already up in arms; that *Philip* was like a bandog in a chain, deſiring nothing more than to break looſe; and that the *Etolians*, without whom the *Romans* had done nothing, nor nothing could have done, were ready to confer upon him the greatneſs, which they had unworthily beſtowed upon inſolent *Barbarians*. Of all this, the leaſt part was true; yet that which was true, made ſuch a noiſe, as added credit unto all the reſt. Whilſt therefore the king was thinking to ſend *Hannibal* into *Afric*, there to moleſt the *Romans*, and ſo give him the better leiſure of uſing his own opportunities in *Greece*: *Thoas*, the *Etolian*, came over to him, and bade him lay all other care aſide; for that his countrymen had already taken *Demetrias*, a town of main importance, that ſhould give him entertainmrnt; whence he might proceed as became the greatneſs of his virtue and fortune. This did ſerve to cut off all deliberation. As for *Hannibal*, *Thoas* was bold to tell the king; firſt, that it was not expedient for him to divide his forces at ſuch a time, when the very reputation of his numbers brought into *Greece* might ſerve to lay open unto him all places, without need of uſing violence; and, ſecondly, that in any ſuch great enterpriſe, there could not be choſen a more unfit man to be employed in the king's ſervice, than was that famous *Hannibal*, the *Carthaginian*. For he ſaid, that the king ſhould as greatly feel the loſs of a fleet or army, periſhing under ſuch a notable commander, if his fortune were bad, as if the ſame had miſcarried under one of meaner quality; whereas, nevertheleſs, if *Hannibal* prevailed, *Hannibal* alone ſhould have all the honour, and not *Antiochus*. In this regard he was of opinion, that ſuch a renowned warriour ſhould be always near unto the king's perſon, to give advice; which being followed as often as it was found commodious, the good ſucceſs would wholly redound unto the honour of him that had the ſoveraign command, even of the king himſelf. *Antiochus* gladly hearkened unto this admonition; being jealous of the virtue that ſhined brighter than the majeſty of his own fortune. And thereupon he laid aſide the determination, which tended more to the advancement of his deſires, than did any thing elſe by him then or after thought upon.

Preſently after this, he made ready for *Greece*. Before his ſetting forth, in a frivolous pomp of ceremony, he went up from the ſea-ſide to *Ilium*, there to do ſacrifice to *Minerva* of *Troy*. Thence paſſing over the *Egean* ſea, he came to *Demetrias*. *Eurylochus*, the *Magnetian*, the ſame whom the *Etolians* had lately waited on home, when by that pretext they won *Demetrias*, was now the chief man and ruler of his nation. He therefore, with his countrymen, in great frequency, came to do their duties to the king *Antiochus*, and bid him welcome. The king was glad of this, and took it as a ſign of good luck, to be ſo entertained at the beginning. But it may be ſuſpected, that the *Magnetians* found not the like cauſe of joy; for whereas they had expected a fleet and army ſomewhat like to that of *Xerxes*; they ſaw three hundred ſhips, of which no more than forty were ſerviceable for the wars, with an army of ten thouſand foot, five hundred horſe, and ſix elephants. The *Etolians* no ſooner heard of his coming, than they called a parliament, and made decree, whereby they invited him into their country. He knew before that they would ſo do, and was therefore well onward on his way towards them, when they met him that brought the decree. At his coming to *Lania*, the *Etolians* gave him as joyful entertainment as they could deviſe. Being brought into their council, he made an oration, wherein he deſired them to hold him excuſed, that he came not followed with a greater army. This was, he ſaid, in true eſtimation, a ſign of his goodwill; in that he ſtaid not to make all things ready, but haſted unto their aid, even whilſt the ſeaſon was unfit for navigation. Yet it ſhould not be long, ere the hope of all thoſe which had expected him, would be ſatisfied unto the full. For it was his meaning to fill all *Greece* with armies, and all the ſea-coaſts with his fleets. Neither would he ſpare for any charge, travel, or danger, to follow the buſineſs which he had undertaken, even to drive the *Romans* and their authority out of *Greece*; leaving the country free indeed, and the *Etolians* therein the chief. Now as the armies that were following him, ſhould be very great; ſo was it his meaning, that all proviſions to them belonging ſhould be correſpondent, becauſe he would not be any way burdenſome unto his confederates. But at the preſent he muſt needs intreat them, having thus haſtily come over unto their aid, unprovided of many neceſſaries, that they would help him with corn and other victuals, whereof he ſtood in need. So he left them to their conſultation, the concluſion whereof was, after a little diſpute (for a vain motion was made by ſome, that the differences between the *Romans* and them ſhould be put by compromiſe to the deciſion of *Antiochus*) that they would yield unto the king's deſire, and aſſiſt him with all their forces. Here we may obſerve, how vain a thing it is for an abſolute prince to engage himſelf, as did *Antiochus*, in a buſineſs of dangerous importance, upon the promiſed aſſurance of a ſtate that is merely popular. For if the vehemency of *Thoas*, and ſome other of that faction, had not prevailed in this council, the *Etolians*, for gain of two or three towns, yea, for hope of ſuch gain that might have deceived them, were like to have abandoned this king, their friend, unto the diſcretion of the *Romans*. And what remedy had there been, if this had ſo fallen out? He could have bemoaned himſelf to *Thoas*, and complained of the

wrong; but he muſt have been contented with this anſwer, that the fault was in thoſe of the oppoſite ſide, whom *Thoas* would therefore have pronounced to be very wicked men. It happened much better for the preſent; though in the future it proved much worſe, both for him, and for the *Etolians*. He was choſen general of all their forces: and thirty commiſſioners were appointed to be about him, as a council of war for the nation. Theſe armed ſuch as readily they could, whilſt it was in diſpute where they ſhould begin the war. *Chalcis* was thought the meeteſt place to be firſt undertaken: whither if they came ſuddenly, they ſhould not peradventure need to uſe much force. The king had brought with him into *Etolia* but a thouſand foot; leaving the reſt behind him at *Demetrias*. With theſe he haſted away directly towards *Chalcis*; being overtaken by no great number of the *Etolians*, which accompanied him thither. At his coming, the magiſtrates, and ſome of the chief citizens, iſſued forth to parley with him. There the *Etolians* began, as they had lately done before, to tell, how the *Romans* had only in words and falſe ſemblance ſet *Greece* at liberty. But ſuch liberty as might be true and uſeful, they ſaid would never be obtained; until by removing the neceſſity of obeying their pleaſure that were moſt mighty, every ſeveral eſtate had where to find redreſs of any preſſure. And to this end was the great *Antiochus* come thither; a king well able to counterpoiſe, yea to over-weigh the *Romans*: who nevertheleſs deſired them only, ſo to join with him in league, as that if either the *Romans* or he ſhould offer them wrong, they might keep it in their power, to ſeek and redreſs at the other hands. The *Carthaginians* made hereto the ſame anſwer, which, to the like allegations, they had made not long before: That their freedom was not imaginary, but abſolute; for which they were to thank the *Romans*; without whoſe good liking, they would enter into no new confederacy. That which they ſpake of themſelves, they could likewiſe affirm of all the *Greeks*: foraſmuch as none of them payed any tribute; was kept under, by any garriſon; or lived otherwiſe than by their own *Laws*, and without being tied unto condition which diſpleaſed them. Wherefore they wondered, why the king ſhould thus trouble himſelf, to deliver cities that were already free. But ſince he, and the *Etolians*, requeſted their friendſhip: they beſought both him, and the *Etolians*, to do a friendly office, in departing from them quietly, and leaving them in ſuch good caſe as they were. With this anſwer the king departed: for he was not, as then, ſtrong enough to force them. But very ſoon after, he brought thither a greater power; which terrified them, and made them yield, before all the ſuccours could arrive, which *Titus* had ſent for their defence.

The chief city of *Eubœa* being thus gotten; all the reſt of the iſland ſhortly yielded to *Antiochus*. Four or five hundred *Roman* ſoldiers, that came over-late to have defended *Chalcis*, repoſed themſelves at *Delium*, a little town of *Bœotia*, lying over-againſt the iſland; where was a temple and grove, conſecrated unto *Apollo*, that had the privilege of an inviolable ſanctuary. In this place were ſome of them walking, and beholding the things there to be ſeen, whilſt others were buſied as they found cauſe: without fear of any danger; as being in ſuch a place, and no war hitherto proclaimed. But *Menippus*, one of *Antiochus*'s captains, that had wearied himſelf in many vain treaties of peace; took advantage of their careleſneſs, and uſed them with all extremity of war. Very few of them eſcaped: fifty were taken; and the reſt ſlain. Hereat *Quintius* was grieved: yet ſo as it pleaſed him well to conſider, that his *Romans* had now more juſt cauſe, than before, to make war upon the king.

Antiochus liked well theſe beginnings, and ſent ambaſſadors into all quarters of *Greece*; in hope, that his reputation ſhould perſwade very many to take his part. The wiſer ſort returned ſuch anſwer, as the *Chalcidians* had done. Some reſerved themſelves until he ſhould come among them: knowing that either, if he came not, he muſt hold them excuſed for not daring to ſtir; or, if he came, the *Romans* muſt pardon their juſt fear, in yielding to the ſtronger. None of thoſe that lay far off, joined with him in true meaning; ſave the *Eleans*, that always favoured the *Etolians*, and now feared the *Acheans*. Little reaſon there was, that he would think to draw the *Acheans* to his party. Nevertheleſs he aſſayed them, upon a vain hope that the envy, which *Titus* was ſaid to bear unto *Philopœmens*'s virtue, had bred a ſecret diſlike between that nation and the *Romans*. Wherefore both he and the *Etolians* ſent ambaſſadors to the council at *Ægium*, that ſpared not brave words, if the *Acheans* would have ſo been taken. The king's ambaſſador told of great armies and fleets that were coming: reckoning up the *Dahans*, *Medians*, *Elineans* and *Caduſians*; names that were not every day heard of, and therefore, as he thought, the more terrible. Then told he them what notable men at ſea, the *Sydonians*, *Tyrians*, *Aradians*, and *Pamphylians* were; ſuch indeed as could not be reſiſted. Now concerning money, and all warlike furniture; it was, he ſaid, well known, that the kingdoms of *Aſia* had always thereof great plenty. So as they were much deceived: who, conſidering the late war made againſt *Philip*, did think that this with *Antiochus* would prove the like: the caſe was too far different. Yet this moſt powerful king, that for the liberty of *Greece* was come from the utmoſt parts of the eaſt, requeſted no more of the *Acheans*, than that they would hold themſelves as neutral, and quietly look on, whilſt he took order with the *Romans*. To the ſame effect ſpake the *Etolian* ambaſſador: and further added, That in the battel at *Cynoſcephalæ*, neither *Titus* had done the part of a general, nor the *Romans* of good ſoldiers: but that both he and his army had been there deſtroyed, had they not been protected by virtue of the *Etolians*, which carried the day. *Titus* was preſent at the council, and heard all this; to which he made as fit anſwer, as could have been deſired. He told the *Acheans*, That neither the king's ambaſſador, nor the *Etolian*, did ſo greatly labour to perſwade thoſe unto whom they addreſſed their orations; as to vaunt themſelves the one unto the other. So as a man might well diſcern, what good correſpondence in vanity it was, that had thus linked the king and the *Etolians* together. For even ſuch brags as here they made, before the *Acheans* who knew them to be liars, had the *Etolians* alſo made unto king *Antiochus*: proclaiming the victory over *Philip* to be merely their act: and the whole country of *Greece* to be dependant on them. Interchangeably had they been feaſted by the king, with ſuch tales as his ambaſſador told even now; of *Dahans*, and *Aradians*, and *Elimeans*, and a many others; that were all but a company of *Syrians*, ſuch as were wont to be ſold about for bond-ſlaves, and good for little elſe. Theſe divers names of raſcally people were, he ſaid, like to the diverſity of veniſon, wherewith

wherewith a friend of his at *Chalcis* (no ſuch vaunter as were theſe ambaſſadors) had ſometime feaſted him. For all that variety, whereat he wondered, was none other, as his hoſt then merrily told him; than ſo many pieces of one tame ſwine, dreſs'd after ſeveral faſhions with variety of ſauces. Setting therefore aſide this vanity of idle pomp: it were good to make judgment of the great king, by his preſent doings. He had, notwithſtanding all this great noiſe, no more than ten thouſand men about him: for which little army he was fain, in a manner, to beg victuals of the *Etolians*; and take up money at uſury, to defray his charges. And thus he ran up and down the country; from *Demetrias* to *Lamia*; thence back to *Chalcis*; and being there ſhut out, to *Demetrias* again. Theſe were the fruits of lies; wherewith ſince both *Antiochus* and the *Etolians* had each deluded other; meet it was that they ſhould, as perhaps already they did, repent, whilſt wiſer men took heed by their example. To a favourable auditory much perſwaſion is needleſs. The *Acheans* did not love ſo well the *Etolians*, as to deſire that they ſhould become princes of *Greece*: but rather wiſhed to ſee them, of all other, made the verieſt abjects. Wherefore they ſtood not to hearken after news, what *Antiochus* did, how he ſped in *Eubœa*, or what other cities were like to take his part: but readily proclaimed war againſt him, and againſt the *Etolians*.

How the hatred between theſe two nations grew inveterate, ſufficiently appears in the ſtory foregoing. Now have they gotten each their patrons; the one, the *Romans*; the other king *Antiochus*. Herein did each of them unwiſely: though far the greater blame ought to be laid on the turbulent ſpirits of the *Etolians*. For when the *Romans* departed out of *Greece*, and left the country at reſt: there was nothing more greatly to have been deſired, than that they might never find occaſion to return with an army thither again. And in this reſpect ought the *Greeks* to have ſought, not how *Smyrna* and *Lampſacus* might recover their liberty (which had never been held a matter worth regarding, until now of late) but how the powers of the eaſt and weſt, divided and kept aſunder by their country, as two ſeas by an *Iſthmus* or neck of land might be kept from overflowing the bar that parted them. Neither had the *Romans* any better pretence for their ſeeking to make free thoſe baſe *Aſiatics*, which originally were *Greeks*; than the general applauſe wherewith all the nation entertained this their loving offer. Yet were *Lyſimachia*, and the towns in *Thrace*, lately gotten by *Antiochus*, pretended as a very great cauſe of fear, that ſhould move them to take arms even in their defence. But if all *Greece* would have made interceſſion, and requeſted that things might continue as they were, promiſing jointly to aſſiſt the *Romans* with their whole forces both by land and ſea, whenſoever king *Antiochus* ſhould make the leaſt offer to ſtir againſt them: then had not only this quarrel been at an end; but the *Roman* patronage over the country, had been far from growing, as ſoon after it did, into a lordly rule.

The *Acheans* were at this time, in a manner, the only nation of *Greece*, that freely and generouſly declared themſelves altogether for the *Romans*, their friends and benefactors. All the reſt gave doubtful anſwers of hope unto both ſides; or if ſome few, as did the *Theſſalians*, were firm againſt *Antiochus*; yet helped they not one another in the quarrel, nor ſhewed themſelves his enemies, till he preſſed them with open force. The *Bœotians* willingly received him, as ſoon as he entered upon their borders, not ſo much for fear of his power, as in hatred of *Titus* and the *Romans*, by whom they had been ſomewhat hardly uſed. *Aminander*, the *Athamanian*, beſides his old friendſhip with the *Etolians*, was caught with a bait; which it may be doubted, whether he did more fooliſhly ſwallow, or *Antiochus* caſt out. He had married the daughter of an *Arcadian*, that was an idle-headed man, and vaunted himſelf to be deſcended from *Alexander* the great: naming his two ſons, in that regard, *Philip* and *Alexander*. *Philip*, the elder of theſe brethren, accompanied his ſiſter to the poor court of *Athamania*: where having made his folly known, by talking of his pedigree; he was judged by *Antiochus* and the *Etolians*, a man fit for their turns. They made him believe, that in regard of his high parentage, and the famous memory of *Alexander*, his fore-father; it was their purpoſe, to do their beſt for the conqueſt of *Macedon* to his behoof: ſince no man had thereto ſo good title as he. But for the enabling of them hereunto; it behoved him to draw *Aminander* to their party, that ſo they might the ſooner have done with the *Romans*. *Philip* was highly pleaſed herewith; and by perſwaſions of himſelf, or of his ſiſter, effected as much as they deſired. But the firſt piece of ſervice done by this imaginary king (whether it proceeded from his own phrenzy, in hope to get love of the *Macedonians* that ſhould be his ſubjects, or whether from ſome vanity in king *Antiochus* that employed him) wrought more harm to his friends, than he and *Aminander* were able to do good. There were two thouſand men committed to his leading: with which he marched unto *Cynoſcephalæ*, there to gather up the bones of the ſlaughtered *Macedonians*: whom their king had ſuffered all this while to lie unburied. The *Macedons* troubled not themſelves to think on this charitable act, as if it were to them any benefit at all: but king *Philip* took it in high indignation; as intended merely unto his deſpight. Wherefore he preſently ſent unto the *Romans*; and gave them to underſtand, that he was ready, with all his power, to aid them wherein they ſhould be pleaſed to uſe him.

The *Etolians*, *Magnetians*, *Eubeans*, *Beotians*, and *Athamanians*, having now all joined with him; *Antiochus* took counſel of them about the proſecution of the war in hand. The chief queſtion was, Whether it were meet for him to invade *Theſſaly*, that would not hearken to his perſwaſions; or whether to let all alone until the ſpring: becauſe it was now midwinter. Some thought one thing, and ſome another: confirming each his own ſentence, with the weightieſt reaſons which he could alledge; as in a matter of great importance. *Hannibal* was at this meeting: who had long been caſt aſide, as a veſſel of no uſe; but was now required to deliver his opinion. He freely told the king, That what he ſhould now utter, was even the ſame which he would have ſpoken, had his counſel at any time before been aſked ſince their coming into *Greece*. For the *Magnetians*, *Beotians*, and other their good friends, which now ſo willingly took their parts: what were they elſe than ſo many poor eſtates, that, wanting force of their own, did adjoin themſelves for fear unto him, that was ſtrongeſt at the preſent; and would afterwards, when they ſaw it expedient, be as ready to fall to the contrary ſide, alledging the ſame fear for their excuſe? wherefore he thought it moſt behoveful, to win king *Philip* of *Macedon* unto their party: who (beſides that being once engaged, he ſhould not

not afterwards have power to recoil and forſake them at his pleaſure) was a mighty prince, and one that had means to ſuſtain the *Roman* war with his proper forces. Now that *Philip* might be eaſily perſwaded to join with them; the benefit likely to redound unto himſelf, by their ſociety, was a very ſtrong argument: though indeed what need was there, of proving by inference the likelihood of this hope? *For*, ſaid he, *theſe* Etolians *here preſent*; *and namely this* Thoas, *being lately ambaſſador from them into* Aſia, *among other motives which he then uſed to excite the king unto this expedition, inſiſted mainly on the ſame point. He told us, that* Philip *was moved beyond all patience, with the lordly inſolence of the* Romans: *likening that king to ſome wild beaſt that was chained, or lock'd up within ſome grate, and would fain break looſe. If this be ſo, let us break his chain, and pull down the gate; that he may regain his liberty, and ſatisfy his angry ſtomach, upon thoſe that are common enemies to us and him. But if it prove otherwiſe, and that his fear be greater than his indignation; then ſhall it behove us to look unto him, that he may not ſeek to pleaſe his good maſters the* Romans, *by offending us. Your ſon* Seleucus *is now at* Lyſimachia, *with part of your army: if* Philip *will not hearken to your ambaſſage; let* Seleucus *be in readineſs, to fall upon* Macedon, *and find him work to defend his own on the other ſide, without putting us here to trouble. Thus much concerning* Philip; *and the preſent war in* Greece. *But more generally for the managing of this great enterpriſe, wherein you are now embarked againſt the* Romans; *I told you my opinion at the beginning. Whereto had you then given ear; the* Romans *by this time ſhould have heard other news, than that* Chalcis *in* Eubœa *was become ours.* Italy *and* Gaul *ſhould have been on fire with war: and, little to their comfort, they ſhould have underſtood, that* Hannibal *was again come into* Italy. *Neither do I ſee what ſhould hinder us even now from taking the ſame courſe. Send for all your fleet, and army hither (but in any caſe let ſhips of burden come along with them, loaden with ſtore of victuals: for as the caſe now ſtands, we have here too few hands, and too many mouths.) Whereof let the one half be employed againſt* Italy; *whilſt you in perſon with the other half, tarrying on this ſide the* Ionian *ſea, may both take order for the affairs of* Greece, *and therewithal make countenance, as if you were even ready to follow us into* Italy: *yea, and be ready to follow us indeed, if it ſhall be requiſite. This is my advice: who though perhaps I am not very skilful in all ſorts of war: yet how to war with the* Romans, *I have been inſtructed by long experience, both to their coſt and mine own. Of this counſel which I give, I promiſe you my faithful and diligent ſervice for the execution: but what counſel ſoever you ſhall pleaſe to follow; I wiſh it may be proſperous.* Many were pleaſed with the great ſpirit of the man; and ſaid, he had ſpoken bravely: but of all this was nothing done; ſave only that one was ſent into *Aſia*, to make all things ready there. In the mean while, they went in hand with *Theſſaly*; about which they had before diſputed. There when they had won one town by force, many other places, doubting their own ſtrength, were glad to make ſubmiſſion. But *Lariſſa*, that was chief of the country, ſtood out: not regarding any terrible threats of the king, that lay before the walls with his whole army. This their faith and courage was rewarded by good fortune. For *M. Bœbius*, a *Roman* propretor, did ſend help thither. Likewiſe *Philip* of *Macedon*, profeſſed himſelf enemy unto *Antiochus*: whereby the fame of the ſuccour coming to *Lariſſa*, grew ſuch, as wrought more than the ſuccour could have done, had it arrived. For *Antiochus* perceiving many fires on the mountain's top afar off; thought that a great army of *Romans* and *Macedonians* had been coming upon him. Therefore excuſing himſelf, by the time of the year, he broke up his ſiege, and marched away to *Chalcis*. At *Chalcis* he fell in love with a young maiden, daughter unto a citizen of the town: whom, without regard of the much diſproportion that was between them, both in years and fortune, he ſhortly married; and ſo ſpent the winter following, as delightfully as he could, without thinking upon the war in hand. His great men and captains followed his example; and the ſoldiers as readily imitated their captains: in ſuch wiſe, that when he took the field, he might evidently perceive in what looſe manner of diſcipline his army had paſſed the winter. But *M. Acilius Glabrio*, the *Roman* conſul, ſhall meet him very ſhortly, and help him to reclaim them from this looſeneſs of nuptial revels; by ſetting them to harder exerciſe.

M. Acilius was choſen conſul with *P. Cornelius Scipio Naſica*. The war againſt *Antiochus* fell to him by lot; whereas otherwiſe he was no way ſo honourable, as *Naſica*'s colleague: unto whom fell a charge, of far leſs credit and importance. *Naſica*, beſides the great nobility of his family, had been long ſince, in time of the *Panic* war, crowned with the title of *The beſt man in Rome*: when the ſenate, for very fear and ſuperſtition, durſt not have ſo pronounced him, had they not ſo thought him; as being commanded by oracle, That none other man than the very beſt, ſhould entertain an old ſtone, which the devil then taught them to call *The mother of the Gods*. But no prerogative of birth, virtue, or good opinion, gave ſuch advantage to the better man, as to make choice of his own province; or arrogate more unto himſelf, than his lot ſhould afford him. This impartial diſtribution of employments, helped well to maintain peace and concord. *P. Scipio* therefore was appointed to make war againſt the *Boijans*: wherein he purchaſed the honour of a triumph, nothing ſo glorious as was that of his colleague; though purchaſed with harder ſervice, requiring the more ability in matter of war. But *M. Acilius* went over into *Greece*, with ten thouſand foot, two thouſand horſe, and fifteen elephants. *Ptolemy*, king of *Egypt*, notwithſtanding his late alliance with king *Antiochus*; and *Philip*, king of *Macedon*, had lately ſent ambaſſadors to *Rome*, making offer to come each of them in perſon with all his forces into *Etolia*, there to aſſiſt the conſul in this war. *Ptolemy* ſent alſo gold and ſilver, toward the defraying of charges; as one that meant none other than good earneſt. But he was too young, and dwelt too far off. So his money was returned unto him with thanks; and his loving offer as lovingly refuſed. Unto *Philip*'s ambaſſadors anſwer was made, That this his friendly offer was gratefully accepted: and that the ſenate and people of *Rome* would think themſelves beholden to him, for the aſſiſtance that he ſhould give to *Acilius* the conſul. *Maſaniſſa* likewiſe, and the *Carthaginians*, did ſtrive, which of them ſhould be moſt forward in gratifying the *Romans*. Each of them promiſed a great quantity of grain; which they would ſend partly to *Rome*, partly to the army in *Greece*. And herein *Maſaniſſa* far out-went the poor city of *Carthage*: as alſo, in that he offered to lend the conſul five hundred horſe, and twenty elephants. On the other ſide, the *Carthaginians*

ginians undertook to set out a fleet at their own charges: and to bring in at one payment all the tribute-money, which was behind, and ought to be discharged by many yearly pensions. But the *Romans* did neither think it good, to let them arm a fleet; nor would let them redeem themselves out of tribute, by paying all at once. As for the corn; it was accepted with condition, That they should be contented to receive the price of it.

The hasty and ridiculous issue of this war, that began with such noise and preparations, were hardly credible: were not the difference exceeding great, between the *Roman* and the *Asiatic* soldier. *Antiochus* had gotten this spring a few towns of *Acarnania*, after the same manner as he had prevailed in other parts of *Greece*; partly by fair words, and treason of the rulers; partly by terror, that was like to prove their excuse, when they should again forsake him. But king *Philip* and *Bœbius*, having recovered many places; and the *Roman* consul being arrived, against whom none made resistance; he was glad to withdraw himself. *Aminander* fled out of his *Athamania:* which the *Macedonian* took and enjoyed; as in recompence of his good service to the *Romans*. *Philip*, the brother of *Aminander's* wife, was taken by the consul; made a mocking-stock; and sent away prisoner to *Rome*. The *Thessalians* used much more diligence in returning to their old friends, than they had done in yielding to the king. All their cities, one after another, gave up themselves: the garrisons of *Antiochus*, compounding only for their own lives, and departing unarmed: yet so, that a thousand of them staid behind, and took pay of the *Romans*. This did wonderfully perplex *Antiochus:* who having withdrawn himself to *Chalcis*, and hearing how things went, cried out upon his friends: and said, That they had betrayed him. He had taken a great deal of toil during one half of a winter, and spent the other half in such nuptials, as were little to his honour: after which, in time of need, he found all the promises of the *Etolians* merely verbal; and himself reduced into terms of great extremity. He therefore admired *Hannibal* as a wise man, yea, a very great prophet, that had foreseen all this long before. Nevertheless he sent word to the *Etolians*, that they should now make ready all their forces: as considering their own need to be no less than his. But the *Etolians* had cause to think, that they themselves were shamefully disappointed by *Antiochus:* who having promised to do great wonders, was in all this while seconded by no greater numbers out of *Asia*, than so many as would fill up the same ten thousand which he first brought over. Yet came there some of them, though fewer than at any time before, which joined with him. Hereat the king was angry: and could get no better satisfaction, than that *Thoas* and his fellows had done their best, in vain, to have made all the nation take arms. Since therefore neither his own men came over to him out of *Asia*, nor his friends of *Greece* would appear in this time of danger; he seized upon the streights of *Thermopylæ*; as meaning to defend them against the *Romans*, until more help should come. Of the streights of *Thermopylæ* there hath been spoken enough [a] before, upon many occasions: and then chiefly, when they were defended by *Leonidas* against the huge army of *Xerxes*. Wherefore it may easily be conceived, how the *Romans*, that landed about *Apollonia*, and so came onwards into *Thessaly*, were unable to pass that ledge of mountains, dividing the one half of *Greece*; unless they could win this difficult entrance. But there was great difference between *Leonidas* and *Antiochus*. The former of these, with an handful of men, defended this passage two or three days together, against a world of men coming to invade the country. The latter, having taken upon him to do great miracles, and effect what he lifted himself in *Greece*; did commit himself unto the safety of this place, when he was charged by not many more than he had in his own army. There whilst he lay, he sent earnest messages one after another to the *Etolians*, entreating them not to forsake him thus: but at leastwise now to help, and keep the tops of the mountains, lest the *Romans*, finding any by-path, should come down upon him. By this importunity, he got of them two thousand, that undertook to make good the few passages by which only, and not without extream difficulty, it was possible for the enemy to ascend. The *Roman* consul in like sort, prepared to force the streights; without staying to expect king *Philip*, that was hindered by sickness from accompanying him. He had with him *M. Porcius Cato*, and *L. Valerius Flaccus*, that had both of them been consuls. These he sent forth by night with two thousand men, to try whether by any means they could get up to the *Etolians*. He himself encouraged his army: not only by telling them, with what base-conditioned enemies they had to deal; but what rich kingdoms *Antiochus* held, that should bountifully reward them if they were victors. This was on the day before the battel. All that night *Cato* had a sore journey (for what happened unto *L. Valerius* it is uncertain, save only that he failed in his intent) and so much the worse, for that he had no skilful guide. Seeing therefore his men exceedingly tired, with climbing up steepy rocks, and crooked ways: he commanded them to repose themselves; whilst he, being a very able man of body, took in hand the discovery, accompanied with no more than one of like mettle to himself. After a great deal of trouble, he found at length a path: which he took to be, as indeed it was, the best way leading unto the enemies. So thither he brought his men; and held on the same path till towards break of day. It was a place not haunted, because in time of peace there was a fair way through the streights below, that required no such trouble of climbing: neither had this entrance of the *Thermopylæ* been so often the seat of war, as might cause any travellers to search out the passages of those desolate mountains. Wherefore the way that *Cato* followed, though it were the best; yet did it lead him to a bog at the end, which would suffer him to pass no further. So he staid there until day-light; by which he discovered both the camp of the *Greeks* underneath him; and some of the *Etolians* very near unto him, that were keeping watch. He therefore sent forth a lusty crew of his men, whom he thought fittest for that service; and willed them by any means to get him some prisoners. This was effected: and he thereby understood, that these *Etolians* were no more than six hundred; as also that king *Antiochus* lay beneath in the valley. So he presently set upon the *Etolians*, overthrew them, slew a great part of them, and chaced the rest; that by flying to their camp, guided him unto it. The fight was already begun between the armies below; and the *Romans*, that had easily repelled the king's men, and driven them into their camp, found it in a manner a despe-

[a] L. 3. Ch. 6. §. 3.

rate piece of work to aſſault the camp it ſelf, which occupied the whole breadth of the ſtreights, was notably fortified; and not only defended by *Antiochus*'s long pikes, which were beſt at that kind of ſervice, but by archers and ſlingers that were placed over them on the hill-ſide, and poured down a ſhower of weapons upon their heads: but *Cato*'s approach determined the matter. It was thought at firſt that the *Etolians* had been coming to help the king's men; but when the *Roman* arms and enſigns were diſcovered, ſuch was the terror, that none made offer of reſiſtance; but all of them forſook the camp, and fled. The ſlaughter was not great, for that the badneſs of the way did hinder the *Roman* army from making purſuit. Yet this day's loſs drove *Antiochus* out of *Greece*, who directly fled to *Chalcis*; and from thence, with the firſt opportunity, got him back into *Aſia*.

All the cities that had embraced the friendſhip of *Antiochus*, prepared forthwith to entertain the *Romans*, and intreat for pardon; ſetting open their gates, and preſenting themſelves unto the conſuls in manner of ſuppliants. Briefly, in few days all was recovered that *Antiochus* had gained, the *Etolians* only ſtanding out, becauſe they knew not what elſe to do. Neither did the conſul give them any reſpite. At his return from *Chalcis*, he met with king *Philip*, that, having recovered health, came to join with him againſt *Antiochus*; over whom, ſince the victory was already gotten, he did gratulate unto the *Romans* their good ſucceſs; and offered to take part with them in the *Etolian* war. So it was agreed, that the conſul ſhould beſiege *Heraclea*, and *Philip Lamia* at the ſame time. Each of them plied his work hard; eſpecially *Philip*, who fain would have taken *Lamia* before the conſul ſhould come to help him. But it could not be, for his *Macedonians*, that uſed to work by mine, were over-much hindered by the ſtony ground. Yet was *Lamia* even ready to be taken, when the conſul, having won *Heraclea*, came thither; and told *Philip*, that the ſpoil of theſe towns was a reward unto thoſe that had fought at *Thermopylæ*. Herewith *Philip* muſt be contented, and therefore went his way quietly. But *Acilius*, that could ſo ill endure to ſee *Philip* in likelihood of thriving by the *Romans* victory, got not *Lamia* himſelf, until ſuch time as another conſul was ready to eaſe him of his charge.

The loſs of *Heraclea* did ſo affright the *Etolians*, that they thought no way ſafer than to deſire peace: yet had they ſent unto king *Antiochus*, preſently after his flight, intreating him not to forſake them utterly, but either to return with all thoſe forces which he had purpoſed to bring into *Greece*; or, if any thing with-held him from coming in perſon, at leaſtwiſe to help them with money and other aid. They prayed him to conſider, that this did not only concern him in honour, but appertained unto his own ſafety; ſince it would be much to his hurt, if the *Etolians*, being wholly ſubdued, the *Romans*, without any enemies at their backs, might ſet upon him in *Aſia*. He conſidered well of this, and found their words true. Therefore he delivered unto *Nicander*, one of their ambaſſadors, a ſum of money that might ſerve to defray the charges of the war; promiſing, that ere long he would ſend them ſtrong aid both by land and ſea. *Thoas*, another of their ambaſſadors, he retained with him; who willingly ſtayed, that he might urge the king to make his word good. But when *Heraclea* was taken from them, then did the *Etolians* lay aſide all hopes of amending their fortune by the help of *Antiochus*; and made ſuit unto the conſul to obtain peace upon any reaſonable condition. The conſul would ſcarce vouchſafe to give them audience; but ſaid, he had other buſineſs in hand: only he granted them ten days of truce, and ſent *L. Valerius Flaccus* with them to *Hypata*; willing them to make him acquainted with as much as they would have delivered unto himſelf. At their coming to *Hypata*, they began, as men favouring their own cauſe, to alledge how well they had deſerved of the *Romans*. Whereto *Flaccus* would not hearken. He told them plainly, that the memory of all ſuch good offices paſs'd, was quite obliterated by the malice which they had ſhewed of late. Wherefore he willed them to acknowledge their fault, and to intreat pardon. Better they thought to do ſo even betimes, than to ſtay till they were reduced into terms of more extremity. Hereupon they agreed to commit themſelves unto the faith of the *Romans*; and to that effect ſent ambaſſadors to the conſul. This phraſe of *committing unto the faith*, ſignified, in their uſe of it, little elſe than the acknowledgment of a fault done, and the craving of pardon. But the *Romans* uſed thoſe words in another ſenſe; and counted them all one as [a] *yielding to diſcretion*. Wherefore, when the conſul heard them ſpeak in this manner, he aſked them whether their meaning were agreeable to their words. They anſwered that it was, and ſhewed him the decree of their nation, lately made to this purpoſe. Then, ſaid he, I command you firſt of all, that none of ye preſume to go into *Aſia* upon any buſineſs, private or publick; then, that ye deliver up unto me *Dicæarchus* the *Etolian*, *Meneſtratus* the *Epirot*, *Aminander* the *Athamanian*, and ſuch of his countrymen as have followed him in revolting from us. Whilſt he was yet ſpeaking, *Phameas*, the ambaſſador, interrupted him; and prayed him not to miſtake the cuſtom of the *Greeks*, who had yielded themſelves *unto his faith, not unto ſlavery? What?* (ſaid the conſul) *Do ye ſtand to plead cuſtom with me, being now at my diſcretion? Bring hither a chain.* With that, chains were brought; and an iron collar, by his appointment, fitted unto every one of their necks. This did ſo affright them, that they ſtood dumb, and knew not what to ſay. But *Valerius*, and ſome others, intreated the conſul not to deal thus hardly with them, ſince they *came* as ambaſſadors; though *ſince*, their condition was altered. *Phameas* alſo ſpake for himſelf, and ſaid, that neither he, nor yet the *Apocleti*, or ordinary council of the nation, were able to fulfill theſe injunctions, without approbation of the general aſſembly. For which cauſe he intreated yet further ten days reſpite, and had granted unto him truce for ſo long.

This ſurceſance of war, during ten and other ten days together, began preſently after the taking of *Heraclea*; when *Philip* had been commanded away from *Lamia*, that elſe he might have won. Now becauſe of the indignity herein offered unto that king, and to the end that he might not return home with his army, like one that could not be truſted in employment; eſpecially the *Romans* being like hereafter to have farther need of him, in the continuance of this war: he was deſired to ſet upon the *Athamanians*, and ſome other petty nations, their borderers, whilſt the conſul was buſy with the *Etolians*; taking for his reward all that he could get. And he got in that ſpace all *Athamania*, *Perrhæbia*, *Aperantia*, and *Dolopia*. For the *Etolians*, hearing what had befallen their ambaſſadors, were ſo enraged, that although they were very ill provided for war;

[a] Legat. excerpt. è Polyb. 13.

yet

yet they could not endure to hear more talk of peace. And it happened that *Nicander*, about the ſame time was come back from *Antiochus*, with money, and hopeful promiſes, the *Romans* abiding ſtill about *Heraclea*; and *Philip* having lately riſen from before *Lamia*, yet not being far gone thence. His money *Nicander* conveyed into *Lamia*, by very unuſual dexterity. But he himſelf being to paſs further to the aſſembly of the *Etolians*, there to make report of his embaſſy, was very much perplexed about this his journey, which lay between the *Roman* and *Macedonian* camps. Yet he made the adventure, and keeping as far as he could from the *Roman* ſide, fell upon a ſtation of *Macedonians*, by whom he was taken, and led unto their king. He expected no good, but either to be delivered unto the *Romans*, or uſed ill enough by *Philip*. But it ſeems that the king had not hitherto concocted well the indignity of his being ſent away from *Lamia*. For he commanded his ſervants to intreat *Nicander* friendly: and he himſelf being then at ſupper, did viſit him as ſoon as he roſe up; giving him to underſtand, That the *Etolians* did now reap the fruits of their own madneſs; foraſmuch as they could never hold themſelves contented, but would needs be calling ſtrangers into *Greece*. They had pleaſed themſelves well in their acquaintance, firſt with the *Romans*, and then with king *Antiochus*: but himſelf, being their neighbour, they could never well endure. It was now therefore, he ſaid, high time, for them to have regard unto his friendſhip, whereof hitherto they had never made any trial: for ſurely their good affection, one unto the other, would be much more available unto each of them, than their mutual catching of advantages; whereby they had wrought themſelves much diſpleaſure. Thus much the king willed *Nicander* to ſignify unto his countrymen; and privately to hold in mind the courteſy which he then did him, in ſending him ſafe home. So giving him a convoy to guard him to *Hypata*; he lovingly diſmiſſed him. For this benefit, *Nicander* was always after dutifully affected to the crown of *Macedon*: ſo as in the war of *Perſeus* he made himſelf ſuſpected unto the *Romans*; and therefore was had away to *Rome*; where he ended his life.

When the conſul underſtood, that the *Etolians* refuſed to make their ſubmiſſion, in ſuch wiſe as he required it; he forthwith meant to proſecute the war againſt them, without any longer forbearance. They were preparing to make head againſt him at *Naupactus*: whither he therefore directly marched, to try what they could or durſt. The ſiege of *Naupactus* was of greater length, than the *Romans* had pre-conceived it: for it was a ſtrong city, and well manned. But *Acilius* ſtood upon point of honour; wherein he thought that he ſhould have been a loſer, by riſing from before it without victory. So he ſtaid there well-near all the following time of his conſulſhip; whilſt the *Macedonian* king, and the *Acheans*, made far better uſe of the *Roman* victory. *Philip*, as is ſaid before, being allowed to take in ſuch places as had revolted unto *Antiochus*, and were not hitherto reclaimed, won the ſtrong city of *Demetrias*; and with an haſty courſe of victory, ſubdued the *Athamanians* and others. The *Acheans* called to account the *Eleans* and *Meſſenians*: which had long been addicted to the *Etolian* ſide; and followed it in taking part with *Antiochus*. The *Eleans* gave good words; whereby they ſaved themſelves from trouble awhile. The *Meſſenians* being more ſtout, before they were invaded, had none other help, when the *Achean* pretor waſted their country, than to offer themſelves unto the *Romans*. *Titus* was then at *Corinth*: to whom they ſent word, That at his commandment, their gates ſhould be opened; but that unto the *Acheans* it was not their meaning to yield. A meſſage from *Titus* to the *Achean* pretor, did ſuffice to call home the army, and finiſh the war: as alſo the peremptory command of the ſame *Titus*, cauſed the *Meſſenians* to annex themſelves unto the *Acheans*, and become part of their common-weal. Such was now the majeſty of a *Roman* ambaſſador. *Titus* did favour the *Acheans*; yet could not like it well, that either they, or any other, ſhould take too much upon them. He thought it enough, that they had their liberty, and were ſtrong enough to defend it againſt any of their neighbours. That they ſhould make themſelves great lords, and able to diſpute with the *Romans* upon even terms; it was no part of his deſire. They had lately brought the iſle of *Zacynthus*, which had once been *Philip*'s, and was afterwards given by him to *Aminander*, who ſent a governour thither. But when *Aminander*, in this preſent war, was driven out of his own kingdom by *Philip*: then did the governour of *Zacynthus* offer to ſell the iſland to the *Acheans*; whom he found ready chapmen. *Titus* liked not of this; but plainly told them, That the *Romans* would be their own carvers, and take what they thought good of the lands belonging to their enemies, as a reward of the victory which they had obtained. It was bootleſs to diſpute. Wherefore the *Acheans* referred themſelves unto his diſcretion. So he told them, That their commonwealth was like tortoiſe, whereof *Peloponneſus* was the ſhell: and that holding themſelves within that compaſs, they were out of danger; but if they would needs be looking abroad, they ſhould lie open to blows, which might greatly hurt them. Having ſetled things thus in *Peloponneſus*, he went over to *Naupactus*: where *Glabrio*, the conſul, had lain two months, that might have been far better ſpent. There, whether out of compaſſion which he had upon the *Etolians*, or out of diſlike of king *Philip*'s thriving ſo faſt: he perſwaded the conſul to grant unto the beſieged, and to the whole nation, ſo long truce, that they might ſend ambaſſadors to *Rome*; and ſubmitting themſelves, crave pardon of the ſenate. Moſt like it is, that *Naupactus* was in great danger: elſe would not the *Etolians* have made ſuch earneſt ſuit as they did unto *Titus*, for procuring of this favour. But if *Glabrio* had been ſure to carry it, in any ſhort ſpace; it may well be thought he would not have gone away without it; ſince the winning of that town, wherein was then the whole flower of the nation, would have made the promiſed ſubmiſſion much more humble and ſincere. When they came to *Rome*, no intreaty could help them to better conditions, than one of theſe two: That either they ſhould wholly permit themſelves to the good pleaſure of the ſenate; or elſe pay a thouſand talents, and make neither peace nor war with any, further than as the *Roman* ſhould give approbation. They had not ſo much money: neither could they well hope to be gently dealt withal, if they ſhould give themſelves away *unto diſcretion*; which what it ſignified, they now underſtood. Wherefore they deſired to have it ſet down, in what points, and how far forth, they ſhould yield unto the good pleaſure of the ſenate. But hereof they could get no certain anſwer: ſo that they were diſmiſſed as enemies, after long and vain attendance.

Whilſt

Whilſt the *Etolians* were purſuing their hopes of peace, the conſul had little to do in *Greece*; and therefore took upon him gravely to ſet things in order among the tractable *Acheans*. He would have had them to reſtore the baniſhed *Lacedemonians* home into their country; and to take the *Eleans* into the fellowſhip of their commonwealth. This the *Acheans* liked well enough: but they did not like it, that the *Roman* ſhould be medling in all occurrences. Wherefore they deferred the reſtitution of the baniſhed *Lacedemonians:* intending to make it an act of their own mere grace. As for the *Eleans*, they were loth to be beholden to the *Romans*, and thereby to diſparage the *Acheans:* into whoſe corporation they were deſirous to be admitted; and ſaw that they ſhould have their deſire, without ſuch compulſive mediation.

The *Roman* admiral, *C. Livius*, much about the ſame time, fought a battel at ſea with *Polyxenidas*, admiral to the king *Antiochus*. King *Eumenes* brought help to the *Romans*, though it was not great: and five and twenty ſail of *Rhodians* came after the battel, when they were following the chace. The king's fleet was the better of ſail: but that of the *Romans* the better manned. Wherefore *Polyxenidas* being vanquiſhed in fight, was yet out of danger, as ſoon as he betook himſelf to a ſpeedy retreat.

And ſuch end had the firſt year's war, between king *Antiochus* and the *Romans*. After this, as many of the *Greeks* as had followed the vain hopes of the *Etolians*, were glad to excuſe themſelves by *fear*; thinking themſelves happy when by ambaſſadors they had obtained pardon. On the contrary ſide, *Philip* of *Macedon*, arch-enemy of late unto the *Romans*, did now ſend to gratulate this their victory: and, in recompence of his good affection, had reſtored unto him *Demetrius*, his younger ſon; whom ſome few years they had kept as an hoſtage. Alſo king *Ptolemy* of *Egypt*, gratulating the *Roman* victory, ſent word how greatly all *Aſia* and *Syria* were thereby terrified. In which regard he deſired the ſenate *not to foreſlow time*; but to ſend an army, as ſoon as might be, into *Aſia:* promiſing, that his aſſiſtance, wherein ſoever it pleaſed them to uſe it, ſhould not be wanting. This *Ptolemy* was the ſon-in-law of king *Antiochus:* but he was the friend of fortune. He underſtood long before, as did all that were indifferent beholders of the contention, that the *Romans* were like to have the upper-hand. The ſame did *Antiochus* now begin to ſuſpect, who had thought himſelf a while as ſafe at *Epheſus*, as if he had been in another world: but was told by *Hannibal*, That it was not ſo far out of *Greece* into *Aſia*, as out of *Italy* into *Greece*; and that there was no doubt, but the *Romans* would ſoon be there, and make him try the chance of a battel for his kingdom.

SECT. VIII.

Lucius Scipio, *having with him* Publius, *the* African, *his elder brother, for his lieutenant, is ſent into* Greece. *He grants long truce to the* Etolians, *that ſo he might at leiſure paſs into* Aſia. *Much troubleſome buſineſs by ſea; and divers fights. An invaſion upon* Eumenes's *kingdom; with the ſiege of* Pergamus, *raiſed by an handful of the* Acheans. L. Scipio, *the conſul, comes into* Aſia: *where* Antiochus *moſt earneſtly deſireth peace, and is denied it. The battel of* Magneſia: *wherein* Antiochus *being vanquiſhed, yielded to the* Roman's *good pleaſure. The conditions of the peace. In what ſort the* Romans *uſed their victory.* L. Cornelius Scipio, *after his moſt ſumptuous triumph over* Antiochus, *is ſurnamed* The Aſiatic, *as his brother was ſtiled* the African.

LUcius *Cornelius Scipio*, the brother of *P. Scipio, the African*, was choſen conſul at *Rome*, with *C. Lælius*. *Lælius* was very gracious in the ſenate: and therefore being deſirous (as generally all conſuls were) of the more honourable employment, offered to refer to the arbitrement of the ſenate, if *L. Cornelius* would be ſo pleaſed, the diſpoſition of their provinces; without putting it to the hazard of a lottery. *Lucius*, having talked with his brother *Publius*, approved well of the motion. Such a queſtion had not of long time been put unto the *Fathers:* who therefore were the more deſirous to make an unblamable decree. But the matter being otherwiſe ſomewhat indifferent; *P. Scipio, the African*, ſaid openly thus much, That if the ſenate would appoint his brother to the war againſt *Antiochus*, he himſelf would follow his brother in that war, as his lieutenant. Theſe words were heard with ſuch approbation, that the controverſy was forthwith at an end. For if *Antiochus* relied upon *Hannibal*, and ſhould happen to be directed wholly by that great captain: what better man could they oppoſe, than *Scipio*; that had been victorious againſt the ſame great worthy. But indeed a worſer man might have ſerved well enough the turn. For *Hannibal* had no abſolute command, nor ſcarce any truſt of great importance: excepting now and then in conſultation; where his wiſdom was much approved, but his liberty and high ſpirit as much diſliked. It is worthy of remembrance; as a ſign of the freedom that he uſed in his cenſures, even whilſt he lived in ſuch a court. *Antiochus* muſtered his army in preſence of this famous captain: thinking, as may ſeem, to have made him wiſh, that he had been ſerved by ſuch brave men in *Italy*. For they were gallantly decked, both men, horſes, and elephants, with ſuch coſtly furniture of gold, ſilver, and purple; as glittered with a terrible bravery on a ſhun-ſhine day. Whereupon the king, well-pleaſing himſelf with that goodly ſpectacle, aſked *Hannibal* what he thought; and whether all this were not enough for the *Romans? Enough* (ſaid *Hannibal*) *were the* Romans *the moſt covetous men in all the world:* meaning, that all this coſt upon the backs of cowardly *Aſiatics*, was no better than a ſpoil to animate good ſoldiers. How little this anſwer pleaſed the king; it is eaſy to gueſs. The little uſe that he made of this *Carthaginian*, teſtifies that his diſlike of the man, cauſed him to loſe the uſe of his ſervice, when he ſtood in greateſt neceſſity thereof.

The *Scipio's* made all haſte away from *Rome* as ſoon as they could. They carried with them, beſides other ſoldiers newly preſs'd to the war, about five thouſand voluntiers, that had ſerved under *P. Africanus*. There was alſo a fleet of thirty *Quinquereme* gallies, and twenty *Triremes* newly built, appointed unto *L. Æmilius Regillus*, that was choſen admiral the ſame year for that voyage. At their coming into *Greece*, they found the old conſul *Glabrio* beſieging *Amphiſſa*, a city of the *Etolians*. The *Etolians*, after that they were denied peace, had expected him once again at *Naupactus*. Wherefore they not only fortified that town: but kept all the paſſages thereto leading; which heedleſly, as in time of confuſion, they had left unregarded the laſt year. *Glabrio* knowing this, deceived their expectation, and fell upon *Lamia:* which being not long ſince much weakened by *Philip*, and now by him attempted on the ſudden,

was

was carried at the ſecond aſſault. Thence went he to *Amphiſſa*; which he had almoſt gotten; when *L. Scipio*, his ſucceſſor, came with thirteen thouſand foot, and five hundred horſe, and took charge of the army. The town of *Amphiſſa* was preſently forſaken by the inhabitants: but they had a caſtle, or higher town, that was impregnable; whereinto they all retired. The *Athenian* ambaſſadors had dealt with *P. Scipio*, in behalf of the *Etolians*; intreating him to ſtand their friend, and help them in obtaining ſome tolerable condition of peace. He gave them gentle words; and willed them to perſwade the *Etolians*, that they ſhould faithfully, and with true meaning deſire it. This was gladly taken. But many meſſages paſſing to and fro; though *Publius* continued to put them in good hope; yet the conſul made ſtill the ſame anſwer, with which they had been chaced from *Rome*. The concluſion was, That they ſhould ſue for a longer time of reſpite from war: whereby at more leiſure they might attend ſome better diſpoſition of the ſenate; or any helpful commodity which time ſhould afford. So they obtained half a year's leiſure of breathing. Hereof were they not more glad, than was *P. Scipio*; who thought all time loſt, which withheld the war from paſſing over into *Aſia*.

The buſineſs of *Etolia* being thus laid aſide; and the old conſul, *Glabrio*, ſent home into *Italy*: the *Scipios* marched into *Theſſaly*; intending thence to take their way by land, through *Macedon* and *Thrace*, unto the *Helleſpont*. Yet they conſidered, That hereby they muſt commit themſelves unto the loyalty of king *Philip*; who might either do them ſome miſchief by the way, if he were diſpoſed to watch a notable advantage: or at the leaſt, would he be unfaithful, though he were not ſo couragious; yet might he take ſuch order with the *Tracians*, that even for want of victuals, if by no greater inconvenience, they ſhould be diſgracefully forced to return. He had promiſed them the utmoſt of his furtherance: wherein, whether he meant ſincerely, they thought to make ſome trial; by cauſing a gentlemen to ride poſt unto him, and obſerve his doings, as he ſhould take him on the ſudden. The king was merry at a feaſt, and drinking, when the meſſenger came: whom he lovingly bade welcome; and ſhewed him the next day, not only what proviſion of victuals he had made for the army, but how he had made bridges over the rivers, and mended the bad ways by which they were to paſs. With theſe good news *Gracchus* returned back in haſte unto the *Scipios*: who entring into *Macedon*, found all things in a readineſs, that might help to advance their journey. The king entertained them royally; and brought them on their way, even to the *Helleſpont*; where they ſtaid a good while, until their navy was in readineſs to tranſport them into *Aſia*.

Much was done at ſea in the beginning of this year; though, for the moſt part, little of importance. *Polyxenidas*, the admiral of *Antiochus*, was a baniſhed *Rhodian*; true to the king, and deſirous of revenge upon his countrymen that had expelled him. He, hearing that the *Rhodian* fleet was at *Samos*, the *Romans* and *Eumenes* having not as yet put to ſea; thought to do ſomewhat upon thoſe that were ſo early in their diligence, before their fellows ſhould arrive to help them. Yet went he craftily to work; and ſent word, as in great ſecrecy, to the *Rhodian* admiral, That if the ſentence of his baniſhment might be repealed, he would, in requital thereof, betray all the king's fleet. After many paſſages to and fro, this was believed: and the *Rhodian* admiral grew ſo careleſs, expecting ſtill, when he ſhould receive a watch-word from *Polyxenidas*, that he himſelf was taken by *Polyxenidas* in his own haven. The king's fleet ſetting forth from *Epheſus* by night; and, for fear of being diſcovered, reſting one day in a harbour by the way; came the ſecond night to *Samos*: where, by morning, it was ready to enter the haven. *Pauſiſtratus*, the *Rhodian* admiral, ſeeing this, thought it his beſt way of reſiſtance, to beſtow his men on the two head-lands, or points of the haven; ſo to guard the mouth of it: for that he ſaw no likelihood of defending himſelf by ſea. But *Polyxenidas* had already landed ſome companies, in another part of the iſland: which falling upon the back of *Pauſiſtratus*, compelled him to alter his directions, and command his men aboard. This could not be without great confuſion; ſo as the enemies took him out of all order; and ſunk or boarded all his navy, five excepted, that by a ſudden device made ſhift to eſcape. Each of them hung out a burning Creſſet upon two poles, at the beak-head: and then rowed forwards directly upon the enemy: who, having not bethought himſelf what ſhift to make againſt ſuch unexpected danger of firing, was content to give way unto theſe deſperate gallies; for fear leſt they ſhould burn, together with themſelves, a part of the king's fleet.

Not long after this, the *Romans* had ſome loſs by tempeſt: whereof *Polyxenidas* could not take ſuch advantage as he had hoped; becauſe, putting to ſea for that purpoſe, he was driven back again by the like foul weather. But the *Rhodians*, to ſhew that they were not diſcouraged, ſet forth twenty other gallies: the *Romans* alſo, with king *Eumenes*, repaired their fleet; and all of them together, in great bravery, preſented battel to *Polyxenidas*, before the haven of *Epheſus*. When he durſt not accept it: they went from place to place, attempting many things, as either they were intreated by the *Rhodians*, or perſwaded by ſome appearing hopes of doing good. Yet performed they little or nothing: for that one while they were hindered by ſtorms at ſea; and another while by ſtrong reſiſtance, made againſt them by land.

Eumenes, with his fleet, was compelled to forſake them; and return home to the defence of his own kingdom. For *Antiochus* waſted all the grounds about *Elæa* and *Pergamus*: and leaving his ſon *Seleucus*, to beſiege the royal city of *Pergamus*, did, with the reſt of his army, ſpoil the whole country thereabout. *Attalus*, the brother of king *Eumenes*, was then in *Pergamus*; having with him no better men to defend the city, than were they that lay againſt it. Wherefore he had reaſon to ſtand in fear; being too much inferior in number. There came to his aid a thouſand foot, and an hundred horſe of the *Acheans*; old ſoldiers all, and trained up under *Philopœmen*; whoſe ſcholar, in the art of war, *Diophanes*, their commander, was. This *Diophanes*, beholding from the walls of *Pergamus*, which was an high town, the demeanour of the enemy; began to diſdain, that ſuch men as they ſhould hold him beſieged. For *Seleucus*'s army, which was encamped at the hill-foot, ſeeing that none durſt ſally forth upon them, grew ſo careleſs; as otherwiſe, than by ſpoiling all behind their backs, they ſeemed to forget that they were in an enemy's country. *Diophanes* therefore ſpake with *Attalus*; and told him, that he would go forth to viſit them. *Attalus* had no liking to this adventure; for he ſaid, that the match was nothing equal. But the *Achean* would needs have his will: and iſſuing forth, encamped not far from the enemy. They of *Pergamus* thought him little

better than mad. As for the beſiegers; they wondered at firſt what his meaning was: but when they ſaw that he held himſelf quiet, they made a jeſt of his boldneſs; and laughed to ſee with what an handful of men he looked ſo ſtoutly. So they returned unto their former negligence and diſorders. Which *Diophanes* perceiving, he commanded all his men to follow him, even as faſt as they well might: and he himſelf, with the hundred horſe, brake out on the ſudden upon the ſtation that was next at hand. Very few of the enemies had their horſes ready ſadled; but more few, or none, had the hearts to make reſiſtance: ſo as he drove them all out of their camp; and chaced them as far as he might ſafely adventure, with great ſlaughter of men, and no loſs of his own. Hereat all the citizens of *Pergamus* (who had covered the walls of the town, men and women, to behold this ſpectacle) were very joyful; and highly magnified the virtue of theſe *Acheans*. Yet would they not therefore iſſue forth of their gates, to help the *Acheans* in doing what remained to be done. The next day *Seleucus* encamped half a mile further from the town, than he had done before: and againſt him went forth *Diophanes* the ſecond time; who quietly reſted awhile in his old ſtation. When they had ſtaid many hours, looking who ſhould begin; *Seleucus*, in fair order, as he came, withdrew himſelf towards his lodging, that was further off. *Diophanes* moved not whilſt the enemy was in ſight: but as ſoon as the ground between them hindered the proſpect, he followed them in all haſte; and ſoon overtaking them with his horſe, charged them in rear; ſo as he brake them, and with all his forces purſued them at the heels, to their very trenches. This boldneſs of the *Acheans*, and the baſeneſs of his own men, cauſed *Seleucus* to quit the Siege, little to his honour. Such being the quality of theſe *Aſiatics*, *Philopœmen* had cauſe to tell the *Romans*, That he envied their victory. For when *Antiochus* lay feaſting at *Chalcis*, after his marriage, and his ſoldiers betook themſelves to riot, as it had been in a time of great ſecurity: a good man of war might have cut all their throats, even as they were tipling in their victualling-houſes; which *Philopœmen* ſaid that he would have done, had he been general of the *Acheans*, and not, as he then was, a private man.

Antiochus was full of buſineſs: and turning his care from one thing to another, with a great deal of travel, brought almoſt nothing to paſs. He had been at *Pergamus*: into which *Eumenes*, leaving the *Romans*, did put himſelf, with a few of his horſe, and light armature. Before *Pergamus* he left his ſon, as before hath been ſhewed, and went to *Elæa*: whither he heard that *Æmilius*, the *Roman* admiral, was come to bring ſuccour to *Eumenes*. There he made an overture of peace: about which to conſult, *Eumenes* was ſent for by *Æmilius*, and came from *Pergamus*. But when it was conſidered, that no concluſion could be made without the conſul; this treaty brake off. Then followed the overthrow newly mentioned; which cauſed *Seleucus* to give over the ſiege of *Pergamus*. Afterwards, four or five towns, of ſcarce any worth or note, were taken by the king: and the *Syrian* fleet, being of ſeven and thirty ſail, was beaten by the *Rhodian*, which was of like number. But of this victory the *Rhodian* had no great cauſe to rejoice; for that *Hannibal* the *Carthaginian*, who, together with *Apollonius* a courtier of *Antiochus*, was admiral of the *Syrians*, did them in a manner as great hurt as they could do to *Apollonius*; and having the victory taken out of his hand by *Apollonius*'s flight, yet made ſuch a retreat, that the *Rhodians* durſt not far adventure upon him. Now of theſe actions, which were but as prefaces unto the war; the laſt and greateſt was a victory of the *Romans* by ſea, againſt *Polyxenidas*, the king's admiral. The battel was fought by *Myonneſus*, a promontory in *Aſia*: where *Polyxenidas* had with him fourſcore and nine gallies; and five of them greater than any of the *Romans*. This being all the ſtrength which he could make by ſea: we may note the vanity of thoſe brags, wherewith *Antiochus* vaunted the laſt year, That his *Armada* ſhould cover all the ſhoars of *Greece*. The *Romans* had eight and fifty gallies; the *Rhodians*, two and twenty: the *Roman* being the ſtronger built, and more ſtoutly manned; the *Rhodian*, more light timber'd, and thin plank'd, having all advantage of ſpeed, and good ſea-men. Neither forgot they to help themſelves by the ſame device, with which five of their gallies had lately eſcaped from *Samos*. For with fire in their prows they ran upon the enemy: who declining them for fear, laid open his ſide: and was thereby in greater danger of being ſtemmed. After no long fight, the king's navy hoiſted ſail: and having a fair wind, bore away toward *Epheſus* as faſt as they could. Yet forty of their gallies they left behind them: whereof thirteen were taken; all the reſt burnt or ſunk. The *Romans*, and their fellows, loſt only two or three ſhips: but got hereby the abſolute maſtery of the ſea.

The report of this miſadventure may ſeem to have taken from *Antiochus* all uſe of reaſon. For as if no hope had been remaining, to defend thoſe places that he held in *Europe*: He preſently withdrew his garriſons from *Lyſimachia*: which might eaſily have been kept, even till the end of winter following, and had reduced the beſiegers (if the ſiege had been continued obſtinately) to terms of great extremity. He alſo gave over the ſiege of *Colophon*: and laying aſide all thought, ſave only of defence, drew together all his army, and ſent for help to his father-in-law, king *Ariarathes*, the *Cappadocian*.

Thus the *Roman* conſul, without impediment, not only came to the *Helleſpont*; but had yielded unto him all places there, belonging to *Antiochus* on *Europe* ſide. The fleet was then alſo in readineſs, to tranſport him over into *Aſia*: where *Eumenes* had taken ſuch care before, that he landed quietly at his own good eaſe; even as if the country had been his already. The firſt news that he heard of the enemy, was by an ambaſſador that came to ſue for peace. This ambaſſador declared in his maſter's name, That the ſame things which had hindered him from obtaining peace of the *Romans* heretofore, did now perſwade him, that he ſhould eaſily come to good agreement with them. For in all diſputations heretofore, *Smyrna*, *Lampſacus*, and *Lyſimachia*, had been the places about which they varied. Seeing therefore the king had now already given over *Lyſimachia*; and was further purpoſed, not to ſtrive with the *Romans* about *Lampſacus* and *Smyrna*: what reaſon was there, why they ſhould need to trouble him with war? If it was their deſire, that any other towns upon the coaſt of *Aſia*, not mentioned by them in any former treaties, ſhould be alſo ſet at liberty, or otherwiſe delivered into their hands; the king would not refuſe to gratify them therein. Briefly, let them take ſome part of *Aſia*: ſo as the bounds, dividing them from the king, might not be uncertain; and it ſhould be quietly put into their hands. If all this were

not

not enough: the king would likewiſe bear half the charges, whereat they had been in this war. So praying the *Romans* to hold themſelves content with theſe good offers, and not to be too inſolent upon confidence of their fortune; he expected their anſwer. Theſe offers, which to the ambaſſador ſeemed ſo great, were judged by the *Romans* to be very little. For they thought it reaſonable, that the king ſhould bear all the charges of the war, ſince it began through his only fault: and that he ſhould not only depart out of thoſe few towns which he held in *Æolis* and *Ionia*; but quite out of *Aſia the leſs*, and keep himſelf on the other ſide of mount *Taurus*. When the ambaſſador therefore ſaw, that no better bargain could be made, he dealt with *P. Scipio* in private: and to him he promiſed a great quantity of gold, together with the free reſtitution of his ſon; who (it is uncertain by what miſchance) was taken priſoner, and moſt honourably entertained by the king. *Scipio* would not hearken to the offer of gold: nor otherwiſe to the reſtitution of his ſon, than upon condition, that it might be with making ſuch amends for the benefit, as became a private man. As for the publick buſineſs: he only ſaid thus much, that ſince *Antiochus* had already forſaken *Lyſimachia*, and ſuffered the war to take hold on his own kingdom: there was now none other way for him, than either to fight, or yield to that which was required at his hands. Wherefore, ſaid he, tell your king in my name, that I would adviſe him to refuſe no condition whereby he may have peace.

The king was not any whit moved with this advice. For, ſeeing that the conſul demanded of him no leſs, than if he had been already ſubdued: little reaſon there was, that he ſhould fear to come to battel; wherein he could loſe, as he thought, no more, than by ſeeking to avoid it he muſt give away. He had with him threeſcore and ten thouſand foot, and twelve thouſand horſe; beſides two and fifty *Indian* elephants, and many chariots armed with hooks or ſcythes, according to the manner of the eaſtern countries. Yet was he nothing pleaſed, to hear that the conſul drew near him apace, as one haſtning to fight. But howſoever he was affected; he made ſo little ſhew of fear, that hearing *P. Scipio* to lie ſick at *Elæa*, he ſent thither unto him his ſon without ranſom: as one both deſirous to comfort this noble warriour in his ſickneſs, and withal not deſirous to retain the young gentleman for a pledge of his own ſafety. Thus ought his bounty to be conſtant. Otherwiſe it might be ſuſpected, that herein he dealt craftily: For ſince he could have none other ranſom of *Scipio*, than ſuch as an honourable man, that had no great ſtore of wealth, might pay: better it was to do ſuch a courteſie before the battel, as would afterwards have been little worth; than to ſtay until the *Romans*, perhaps victorious, ſhould exact it at his hands. *P. Scipio* was greatly comforted with the recovery of his ſon: ſo as the joy thereof was thought to have been much available unto his health. In recompence of the king's humanity, he ſaid only thus much unto thoſe that brought him this acceptable preſent, *I am now able to make your king none other amends, than by adviſing him not to fight, until he ſhall hear that I am in the camp.* What he meant by this, it is hard to conjecture. *Antiochus* reſolved to follow his counſel: and therefore withdrew himſelf from about *Thyatira*, beyond the river of *Phrygius* or *Hyllus*, unto *Magneſia* by *Sipylus*: where encamping, he fortified himſelf as ſtrongly as he could. Thither followed him *L. Scipio* the conſul; and ſat down within four miles of him. About a thouſand of the king's horſe, moſt of them *Gallo-Greeks*, came to bid the *Romans* welcome: of whom at firſt they ſlew ſome; and were anon, with ſome loſs driven back over the river. Two days were quietly ſpent, whilſt neither the king nor the *Romans* would paſs the water. The third day the *Romans* made the adventure: wherein they found no diſturbance; nor were at all oppoſed, until they came within two miles and a half of *Antiochus*'s camp. There, as they were taking up their lodging, they were charged by three thouſand horſe and foot; whom the ordinary *corps du guard* repelled. Four days together after this, each of them brought forth their armies, and ſet them in order before the trenches, without advancing any farther. The fifth day, the *Romans* came half way forward, and preſented battel; which the king would not accept. Thereupon the conſul took advice, what was to be done: For either they muſt fight upon whatſoever diſadvantage, or elſe reſolve to abide by it all winter, far from any country of their friends, and therefore ſubject unto many difficulties; unleſs they would ſtain their honour by returning far back, to winter in a more convenient place; and ſo defer the war until the next ſpring. The *Roman* ſoldier was throughly perſuaded of that enemy's baſe temper: Wherefore it was the general cry, that this great army ſhould be aſſailed, even in the camp where it lay; as if rather there were ſo many beaſts to be ſlaughtered, than men to be fought with. Yet a day or two paſſed, in diſcovering the fortifications of *Antiochus*, and the ſafeſt way to ſet upon him. All this while *P. Scipio* came not. Wherefore the king, being very loth to diſhearten his men, by ſeeming to ſtand in fear of his enemy, reſolved to put the matter to trial. So, when the *Romans* took the field again, and ordered their battels; he alſo did the like, and advanced ſo far, that they might underſtand his meaning to fight.

The *Roman* army conſiſted of four legions, two *Roman* and two *Latin*; in each of which were five thouſand and four hundred men. The *Latins*, as uſually, were in the points; the *Romans* in the main battel: All of them, in their wonted form, were divided into maniples. The *Haſtati* had the leading; after them followed the *Principes*, at ſuch diſtance as was uſual; and laſt of all the *Triarii*. Now beſides theſe, there were about three thouſand auxiliaries; partly *Acheans*, and partly ſuch as belonged to *Eumenes*; which were placed in an equal front beyond the *Latins* in the right wing. Utmoſt of all (ſave ſome five hundred *Cretans*, and of the *Trallians* were almoſt three thouſand horſe;) of which, *Eumenes* had brought thither eight hundred, the reſt being *Roman*. The left wing was fenced by the bank of the river; yet four troops of horſe were placed there, tho' ſuch help ſeemed in a manner needleſs. Two thouſand voluntaries, *Macedonians* and *Thracians*, were left to guard the camp. The conſul had with him ſixteen *African* elephants, which he beſtowed in his rear; foraſmuch as had they come to fight with thoſe of *Antiochus*, they only would have ſerved to diſcourage his men, as being ſure to be beaten; the *Indian* being far the greater, and more couragious beaſts: whereof *Antiochus* had likewiſe much advantage in number.

The king's army being compounded of many nations, diverſly appointed, and not all accuſtomed to one manner of fight, was ordered according to the ſeveral kinds, in ſuch wiſe as each might be of moſt uſe. The main ſtrength of his foot conſiſted in ſixteen thouſand, armed all *Macedonian*-like, and

and called *Phalangiers*. Theſe he placed in the midſt, and divided into ten battallions; every one having two and thirty in file, and fifty in front. Between every battalion were two elephants, goodly beaſts, and ſuch as being adorned with frontals, high creſts, towers on their backs; and beſides him that governed the elephant, four men in every tower, made a gallant and terrible ſhew. On the right hand of theſe were fifteen hundred horſe of the *Gallo-Greeks*: then, three thouſand barb'd horſe; and a regiment of almoſt a thouſand horſe called the *Agema*, that were all *Medians*, the choice of the country, and accompanied by ſome others. All which troops of horſe divided in their ſeveral kinds, do ſeem to have followed one another in depth, rather than to have been ſtretched out in front. Adjoyning to theſe were ſixteen elephants together in one flock. A litfurther to the right hand, was the king's own regiment: called the *Argyraſpides* or *ſilver-ſhields*, by a name borrowed from their furniture; but nothing like ſo valiant as thoſe of the ſame name, that had ſerved under great *Alexander*: then twelve hundred archers on horſeback, three thouſand light-armed foot, two thouſand and five hundred archers of *Myſia*; with four thouſand ſlingers and archers of the *Cyrteans*, and *Elymeans*. On the left hand of the *Phalangiers*, were placed the like numbers of *Gallo-Greeks* and barb'd horſe: as alſo two thouſand horſe that were ſent to *Ariarathes*, with two thouſand and ſeven hundred of divers nations, and a regiment of a thouſand horſe more lightly armed, that were called the *king's troop*, being *Syrians*, *Phrygians*, and *Lydians*. In front of all theſe horſe were the chariots armed with hooks or ſcythes, and the *Dromedaries*, whereon ſat *Arabians* with long rapiers, that would ſerve to reach from thoſe high camels. Beyond theſe were, as in the right wing, a rabble of many nations, *Carians*, *Cilicians*, *Pamphylians*, *Piſidians*, *Cyrteans*, *Elymeans*, and many others, having alſo with them ſixteen elephants. *Antiochus* himſelf commanded in the right wing; *Seleucus* in the left; and three of his principal captains commanded over the *Phalangiers*.

The firſt onſet was given by the *Dromedaries*, and armed chariots: of which the one, being like to terrifie the horſe; the other, to break the ſquadrons of the foot; *Eumenes* with a few light-armed *Cretans*, archers, darters, and ſlingers, eaſily made fruſtrate the danger threatened by them both. For with ſhoutings, and noiſes, and ſome wounds, they were driven out of the field; and running back upon their own men, did the ſame harm which they had intended to the enemies. Wherefore the *Roman* horſe following this advantage, charged upon the left wing: where they found no reſiſtance; ſome being out of order; others being without courage. It is ſhameful to rehearſe, and ſo ſtrange, that it may hardly ſeem credible: that the *Phalangiers*, with ſuch variety of auxiliaries, made little or no reſiſtance; but all of them fled, in a manner as ſoon as they were charged. Only the king, *Antiochus* himſelf, being in the left wing of his own battel: and ſeeing the *Latins*, that ſtood oppoſite unto him weakly flanked with horſe; gave upon them couragiouſly, and forced them to retire. But *M. Æmilius*, that had the guard of the *Roman* camp, iſſued forth with all his power to help his fellows: and, what by perſwaſion, what by threats, made them renew the fight. Succour alſo came from the right wing, where the *Romans* were already victorious: whereof, when *Antiochus* diſcovered the approach; he not only turned his horſe about, but ran away upon the ſpur, without further tarriance. The camp was defended a little while: and with no great valour; though by a great multitude that were fled into it. *Antiochus* is ſaid to have loſt in this battel fifty thouſand foot, and four thouſand horſe; beſides thoſe that were taken. Of the *Romans*, there were not ſlain above three hundred foot, and four and twenty horſe: of *Eumenes*'s followers five and twenty.

Antiochus fled into *Sardes*, and from thence to *Apamea*, the ſame night, hearing that *Seleucus* was gone thither before. He left the cuſtody of *Sardes*, and the caſtle there, to one whom he thought faithful. But the townſmen and ſoldiers were ſo diſmayed with the greatneſs of the overthrow; that one man's faith was worth nothing. All the towns in thoſe parts, without expecting ſummons, yielded up themſelves by ambaſſadors: whom they ſent to the *Romans*, whilſt they were on the way. Neither were there many days ſpent, ere *Antiochus*'s ambaſſador was in the camp: having none other errand, than to know what it would pleaſe the *Romans* to impoſe upon the king his maſter. *P. Scipio* was now come to his brother; who obtained leave to make the anſwer, becauſe it ſhould be gentle. They required no more than they had lately done: which was, that he ſhould quite abandon his dominions on this ſide of *Taurus*. For their charges in that war, they required fifteen thouſand talents: five hundred in hand; two thouſand and five hundred, when the ſenate and people of *Rome* ſhould have confirmed the peace; and the other twelve thouſand, in twelve years next enſuing by even portions. Likewiſe they demanded four hundred talents for *Eumenes*; and ſome ſtore of corn, that was due to him upon a reckoning. Now beſides twenty hoſtages which they required, very earneſt they were to have *Hannibal* the *Carthaginian*, and *Thoas* the *Etolian*, with ſome others, who had ſtirred up the king to this war, delivered into their hands. But any wiſe man might ſo eaſily have perceived, that it would be their purpoſe to make this one of their principal demands; as no great art was needful to beguile their malice. The king's ambaſſador had full commiſſion, to refuſe nothing that ſhould be enjoyned. Wherefore there was no more to do, than to ſend immediately to *Rome* for the ratification of the peace.

There were new conſuls choſen in the mean while at *Rome*, *M. Fulvius*, and *Cn. Manlius Volſo*. The *Etolians* deſired peace, but could not obtain it; becauſe they would accept neither of the two conditions before propounded. So it was decreed, that one of the conſuls ſhould make war upon the *Etolians*, the other upon *Antiochus* in *Aſia*. Now though ſhortly there came news, that *Antiochus* was already vanquiſhed in battel, and had ſubmitted himſelf unto all that could be required at his hands: yet ſince the ſtate of *Aſia* was not like to be ſo throughly ſettled by one victory, but that many things might fall out worthy of the *Romans* care; *Cn. Manlius*, to whom *Aſia* fell by lot, had not his province changed.

Soon after this came the ambaſſadors of king *Antiochus* to *Rome*, accompanied with *Rhodians* and ſome others; yea, by king *Eumenes* in perſon; whoſe preſence added a goodly luſtre to the buſineſs in hand. Concerning the peace to be made with king *Antiochus*, there was no diſputation; it was generally approved. All the trouble was, about the diſtribution of the purchaſe. King *Eumenes* reckoned up his own deſerts; and comparing himſelf with *Maſaniſſa*, hoped that the *Romans* would be more bountiful to him than they had been

been to the *Numidian*, ſince they had found him a king indeed, whereas *Maſaniſſa* was only ſuch in title; and ſince both he and his father had always been their friends, even in the very worſt of the *Roman* fortune. Yet was there much ado to make him tell what he would have: he ſtill referring himſelf to their courteſie; and they deſiring him to ſpeak plain. At length he craved that they would beſtow upon him, as much of the country by them taken from *Antiochus*, as they had no purpoſe to keep in their own hands. Neither thought he it needful that they ſhould trouble themſelves with the care of giving liberty to many of the *Greek* towns, that were on *Aſia* ſide. For ſince the moſt of thoſe towns had been partakers with the king in his war, it was no reaſon that they ſhould be gainers by his overthrow. The *Rhodians* did not like of this. They deſired the ſenate to be truly patrons of the *Grecian* liberty; and to call to mind, that no ſmall part of *Greece* itſelf had been ſubject unto *Philip*, and ſerved him in his war: which was not alledged againſt him as a cauſe why they ſhould not be made free, after that *Philip* was overcome. But the main point whereon they inſiſted, was this, That the victory of the *Romans* againſt king *Antiochus* was ſo great, as eaſily might ſatisfy the deſires of all their friends. The ſenate was glad to hear of this, and very bountifully gave away ſo much, that every one had cauſe to be well pleaſed.

Such end had the war againſt king *Antiochus*: after which, *L. Cornelius Scipio*, returning home, had granted unto him the honour of a triumph; the pomp whereof exceeded in riches, not only that of *Titus Quintius Flaminius*, but of any ten that *Rome* had beheld until that day. Now foraſmuch as the ſurname of *The African* had been given unto *P. Scipio*, it was thought convenient by ſome, to reward *L. Scipio* with the title of *The Aſiatic*: which the fortune of his victory had no leſs deſerved; though the virtue requiſite to the purchaſe thereof, was no way correſpondent.

SECT. IX.

The Etolians *and the* Gallo-Greeks, *vanquiſhed by the* Roman *conſuls*, Fulvius *and* Manlius. Manlius *hardly obtains a triumph: being charged* (*among other objections*) *with attempting to have paſſed the bounds appointed as fatal to the* Romans *by* Sibyl. *Of* Sibyl's *prophecies; the books of* Hermes; *and that inſcription*, Simoni Deo Sancto. *The ingratitude of* Rome *to the two* Scipio's. *Of the beginning of faction among the* Roman *nobility.*

M*Arc. Fulvius* and *Cn. Manlius* had the ſame charge divided between them, which *L. Cornelius Scipio*, now ſtiled *Aſiaticus*, had lately undergone. It was found more than one man's work, to look at once to *Greece* and *Aſia*. And for this reaſon was it apparent, that *L. Scipio* had granted ſo long a truce to the *Etolians*. But ſince, in this long *interim* of truce, that haughty little nation had not fought to humble it ſelf to the *Roman Majeſty*, it was now to be brought unto more lowly terms than any other of the *Greeks*. The beſt was, that ſo great a ſtorm fell not unexpected upon the *Etolians*. They had foreſeen the danger, when their ambaſſadors were utterly denied peace at *Rome*: and they had provided the laſt remedy; which was, to entreat the *Rhodians* and *Athenians* to become interceſſors for them. Neither were they ſo dejected, with any terrible apprehenſions, that they could not well deviſe, upon helping themſelves, even by re-purchaſe of countries loſt, where they ſpied advantage.

Poor king *Aminander* lived in exile among them, whilſt *Philip* of *Macedon* kept, for him, poſſeſſion of his lands and caſtles. But the *Athamanians* (beſides that many of them bore a natural affection to their own prince) having been long accuſtomed to ſerve a mountain lord, that converſed with them after an homely manner; could not endure the proud and inſolent manner of command, uſed by the captains of *Philip*'s garriſons. They ſent therefore ſome few of them to their king, and offered their ſervice towards his reſtitution. At the firſt there were only four of them; neither grew they, at length, to more than two and fifty, which undertook the work. Yet aſſurance, that all the reſt would follow, made *Aminander* willing to try his fortune. He was at the borders with a thouſand *Etolians*, upon the day appointed: at which time his two and fifty adventurers, having divided themſelves into four parts, occupied, by the ready aſſiſtance of the multitude, four the chief towns in the country, to his uſe. The fame of this good ſucceſs at firſt; with divers letters running from place to place, whereby men were exhorted to do their beſt in helping forward the action: made the lieutenants of *Philip* unable to think upon reſiſtance. One of them held the town of *Theium* a few days, giving thereby ſome leiſure unto his king to provide for the reſcue. But when he had done his beſt, he was forced thence; and could only tell *Philip*, whom he met on the way, that all was loſt. *Philip* had brought from home ſix thouſand men, of whom, when the greater part could not hold out, in ſuch a running march, he left all, ſave two thouſand behind him, and ſo came to *Athenæum*, a little *Athamanian* caſtle that ſtill was his, as being on the frontier of *Macedon*. Thence he ſent *Zeno*, who had kept *Theium* awhile, to take a place lying over *Argithea*, that was chief of the country. *Zeno* did as he was appointed: yet neither he, nor the king, had the boldneſs to deſcend upon *Argithea*: for that they might perceive the *Athamanians*, all along the hill ſides, ready to come down upon them, when they ſhould be buſy. Wherefore nothing was thought more honourable than a ſafe retreat; eſpecially when *Aminander* came in ſight with his thouſand *Etolians*. The *Macedonians* were called back from-wards *Argithea*, and preſently withdrawn by their king towards his own borders. But they were not ſuffered to depart in quiet, at their pleaſure. The *Athamanians* and *Etolians* way-layed them, and purſued them ſo cloſely, that their retreat was in a manner of a plain flight, with great loſs of men and arms; few of thoſe eſcaping that were left behind, as to make a countenance of holding ſomewhat in the country, until *Philip*'s return.

The *Etolians*, having found the buſineſs of *Athamania* ſo eaſy, made an attempt in their own behalf, upon the *Amphilochians* and *Aperantians*. Theſe had belonged unto their nation, and were lately taken by *Philip*; from whom they diligently revolted, and became *Etolian* again. The *Dolopians* lay next; that had been ever belonging to the *Macedonian*, and ſo did ſtill purpoſe to continue. Theſe took arms at firſt: but ſoon laid them away; ſeeing their neighbours ready to fight with them in the *Etolian* quarrel, and ſeeing their own king ſo haſtily gone, as if he meant not to return.

Of theſe victories the joy was the leſs; for that news came of *Antiochus*'s laſt overthrow, and

of *M. Fulvius* the new conſul's haſtning with an army into *Greece*. *Aminander* ſent his excuſes to *Rome*, praying the ſenate, not to take it in deſpight, that he had recovered his own from *Philip*, with ſuch help as he could get. Neither ſeems it that the *Romans* were much offended to hear of *Philip*'s loſſes: for of this fault they neither were ſharp correctors, nor earneſt reprovers. *Fulvius* went in hand with the buſineſs about which he came, and lay'd ſiege to *Ambracia*, a goodly city, that had been the chief ſeat of *Pyrrhus*'s kingdom. With this he began; for that it was of too great importance to be abandoned by the *Etolians:* yet could not by them be relieved, unleſs they would adventure to fight upon equal ground. To help the *Ambracians*, it was not in the *Etolians* power: for they were at the ſame time vexed by the *Illyrians* at ſea, and ready to be driven from their new conqueſt, by *Perſeus* the ſon of *Philip*, who invaded the countries of the *Amphilochians* and *Dolopians*. They were unable to deal with ſo many at once; and therefore as earneſtly ſought peace with the *Romans*, as they ſtoutly made head againſt the reſt. In the mean while, the *Athenian* and *Rhodian* ambaſſadors came; who beſought the conſul to grant them peace. It helped well that *Ambracia* made ſtrong reſiſtance, and would not be terrified by any violence of the aſſailants, or danger that might ſeem to threaten. The conſul had no deſire to ſpend half his time about one city, and ſo be driven to leave unto his ſucceſſor the honour of finiſhing the war. Wherefore he gladly hearkened unto the *Etolians*, and bade them ſeek peace with faithful intent, without thinking it over-dear, at a reaſonable price; conſidering with how great a part of his kingdom their friend *Antiochus* had made the ſame purchaſe. He alſo gave leave to *Aminander*, offering his ſervice as a mediator, to put himſelf into *Ambracia*, and try what good his perſwaſions might do with the citizens. So, after many demands and excuſes, the concluſion was ſuch, as was grievous to the weaker, but not unſufferable. The ſame ambaſſadors of the *Athenians* and *Rhodians* accompanied thoſe of the *Etolians* to *Rome*, for procuring the confirmation of peace. Their eloquence and credit was the more needful in this interceſſion; for that *Philip* had made very grievous complaint about the loſs of thoſe countries, which they had lately taken from him. Hereof the ſenate could not but take notice; though it hindered not the peace, which thoſe good mediators of *Rhodes* and *Athens* did earneſtly ſollicite. The *Etolians* were bound to uphold the majeſty of the people of *Rome*, and to obſerve divers articles, which made them leſs free, and more obnoxious to the *Romans*, than any people of *Greece*; they having been the firſt that called theſe their maſters into the country. The iſle of *Cephalenia* was taken from them by the *Romans:* who kept it for themſelves (as not long ſince they had gotten *Zacynthus* from the *Acheans*, by ſtiffly preſſing their own right) that ſo they might have poſſeſſion along the coaſt of *Greece*, whilſt they ſeemed to forbear the country. But concerning thoſe places, whereto *Philip*, or others, might lay claim, there was ſet down an order ſo perplexed, as would neceſſarily require to have the *Romans* judges of the controverſies, when they ſhould ariſe. And hereof good uſe will be ſhortly made; when want of employment elſewhere ſhall cauſe a more lordly inquiſition to be held, upon the affairs of *Macedon* and *Greece*.

Cn. Manlius, the other conſul, had at the ſame time war in *Aſia*, with the *Gallo-Greeks* and others. His army was the ſame that had followed *L. Scipio*; of whoſe victory his acts were the conſummation. He viſited thoſe countries on the hither ſide of *Taurus*, that had ſcarce heard of the *Romans*; to whom they were abandoned by *Antiochus*. Among theſe were ſome petty lords, or tyrants, ſome free cities, and ſome that were together at wars, without regard of the great alteration happened in *Aſia*. From every of theſe he got ſomewhat; and by their quarrels found occaſion to viſit thoſe provinces, into which he ſhould elſe have wanted an errand. He was even loaden with booty, when, having fetch'd a compaſs about *Aſia*, he came at length upon the *Gallo-Greeks*. Theſe had long domineered over the country: though of late times it was rather the fame and terrour of their forepaſſed acts, than any preſent virtue of theirs, which held them up in reputation. Of the *Romans* they had lately ſuch trial, when they ſerved under king *Antiochus*, as made them to acknowledge themſelves far the worſe men. Wherefore they thought it no ſmall part of their ſafety, that they dwelt upon the river *Halys*, in an inland country, where thoſe enemies were not very like to ſearch them out. But when ſuch hopes failed; and when ſome princes of their own nation, that had been friends of *Eumenes*, exhorted the reſt to yield: then was no counſel thought ſo good, as to forſake their houſes and country, and, with all that they could carry or drive, to betake themſelves unto the high mountains of *Olympus* and *Margana*. Theſe mountains were exceeding hard of aſcent, though none ſhould undertake the cuſtody. Being therefore well manned and victualled for a long time; as alſo the natural ſtrength being help'd, by ſuch fortification as promiſed greateſt aſſurance; it was thought, that the conſul would either forbear the attempt of forcing them, or eaſily be repelled; and that finally, when he had ſtay'd there a while, winter, and much want, ſhould force him to diſlodge. Yet all this availed not. For whereas the *Gallo-Greeks* had been careleſs of furniſhing themſelves with caſting weapons, as if the ſtones would have ſerved well enough for that purpoſe: the *Romans*, who came far otherwiſe appointed, found greater advantage in the difference of arms, than impediment in diſadvantage of ground. Archers and ſlingers did eaſily prevail againſt caſters of ſtones; eſpecially being ſuch as were theſe *Gallo-Greeks*, neither exerciſed in that manner of fight, nor having prepared their ſtones before-hand, but catching up what lay next, the too great, and the too little, oftner than thoſe of a fit ſize. Finally, the *Barbarians*, wanting defenſive arms, could not hold out againſt the arrows and weapons of the *Roman* light armature: but were driven from a piece of ground, which they had undertaken to make good, up into their camp on the top of the mountain; and being forced out of their camp, had no other way left, than to caſt themſelves headlong down the ſteep rocks. Few of their men eſcaped alive: all their wives, children, and goods, became a prey unto the *Romans*. In the very like manner, were the reſt of that nation overcome ſoon after, at the other mountain; only more of them ſaved themſelves by flight, as having fairer way at their backs.

Theſe wars being ended: *Fulvius* and *Manlius* were appointed, by the ſenate, each of them to retain as proconſul his province for another year. *Fulvius*, in his ſecond year, did little or nothing. *Manlius* gave peace to thoſe whom he had vanquiſhed, as likewiſe to *Ariarathes* the *Cappadocian*,

cian, and ſome others, not by him vanquiſhed, but ſubmitting themſelves for fear of the *Roman* arms. He drew from them all what profit he could; and laid upon them ſuch conditions as he thought expedient. He alſo did finiſh the league of peace with *Antiochus*; whereto he ſwore, and received the king's oath by ambaſſadors, whom he ſent for that purpoſe. Finally, having ſet in order the matters of *Aſia*, he took his way towards the *Helleſpont*, loaden with ſpoil, as carrying with him (beſides other treaſures) all that the *Gallo-Greeks* had in ſo many years extorted from the wealthy provinces which lay round about them. Neither did this army of *Manlius* return home rich in money alone, or cattel, or things of needful uſe, which the *Roman* ſoldiers had been wont to take for the only good purchaſe; but furniſhed with ſumptuous houſhold-ſtuff, and ſlaves of price, excellent cooks and muſicians for banquets; and, in a word, with the ſeeds of that luxury, which finally over-grew and choaked the *Roman* virtue.

The country of *Thrace* lay between *Helleſpont* and the kingdom of *Macedon*, which way *Manlius* was to take his journey homeward. *L. Scipio* had found no impediment among the *Thracians*: [a] either for that he paſſed through them, without any ſuch booty as might provoke them; or perhaps rather, becauſe *Philip* of *Macedon* had taken order, that the *Barbarians* ſhould not ſtir. But when *Manlius* came along with an huge train of baggage, the *Thracians* could not ſo well contain themſelves. Neither was it thought, that *Philip* took it otherwiſe than very pleaſantly, to have this *Roman* army robbed, and well beaten on the way. He had cauſe to be angry; ſeeing how little himſelf was regarded, and what great rewards were given to *Eumenes*. For he underſtood, and afterwards gave the *Romans* to underſtand, that *Eumenes* could not have abiden in his own kingdom, if the people of *Rome* had not made war in *Aſia*: whereas contrariwiſe, *Antiochus* had offered unto himſelf three thouſand talents, and fifty ſhips of war, to take part with him and the *Etolians*; promiſing moreover to reſtore unto him all the *Greek* cities, that had been taken from him by the *Romans*. Such being the difference between him and *Eumenes*, when the war began: he thought it no even dealing of the *Romans*, after their victory, to give away not only the half of *Aſia*, but *Cherſoneſus* and *Lyſimachia* in *Europe*, to *Eumenes*; whereas upon himſelf they beſtowed not any one town. It agreed not indeed with his nobility, to go to *Rome* and beg provinces in the ſenate, as *Eumenes* and the *Rhodians* had lately done. He had entertained lovingly the two *Scipio's*, whom he thought the moſt honourable men in *Rome*; and was grown into near acquaintance with *Publius*, holding correſpondence with him by letters, whereby he made himſelf acquainted with the wars in *Spain* and *Afric*. This perhaps he deemed ſufficient, to breed in the *Romans* a due reſpect of him. But *Eumenes* took a ſurer way. For the *Scipio's* had not the diſpoſing of that which they won from *Antiochus*; as neither indeed had *Manlius*, nor the ten delegates aſſiſting him; but the ſenate of *Rome*, by which thoſe delegates were choſen, and inſtructed how to proceed. When *Philip* therefore ſaw theſe upſtart kings of *Pergamus*, whom he accounted as baſe companions, advanced ſo highly, and made greater than himſelf; yea himſelf unregarded, contemned, and expoſed to many wrongs: then found he great cauſe to wiſh, that he had not ſo haſtily declared himſelf againſt *Antiochus*, or rather that he had joined with *Antiochus* and the *Etolians*, by whom he might have been freed from his inſolent maſters. But what great argument of ſuch diſcontentedneſs the *Macedonian* had, we ſhall very ſhortly be urged to diſcourſe more at large. At the preſent it was believed, that the *Thracians* were by him ſet on, to aſſail the *Romans* paſſing through their country. They knew all advantages: and they fell unexpected upon the carriages, that were beſtowed in the midſt of the army; whereof part had already paſſed a dangerous wood, through which the baggage followed; part was not yet ſo far advanced. There was enough to get, and enough to leave behind; though both the getting, and the ſaving, did coſt many lives, as well of the *Barbarians* as of the *Romans*. They fought until it grew night; and then the *Thracians* withdrew themſelves; not without as much of the booty, as was to their full content. And of ſuch trouble there was more, though leſs dangerous, before the army could get out of *Thrace* into *Macedon*. Through the kingdom they had a fair march into *Epirus*; and ſo to *Apollonia*, which was their handle of *Greece*.

To *Manlius*, and to *Fulvius*, when each of them returned to the city, was granted the honour of triumph. Yet not without contradiction, eſpecially to *Manlius*; whom ſome of the ten delegates appointed to aſſiſt him, did very bitterly tax, as an unworthy commander. Touching the reſt of their accuſation; it ſufficeth, that he made good anſwer, and was approved by the chief of the ſenate. One clauſe is worthy of more particular conſideration. Reprehending his deſire to have hindered the peace with *Antiochus*; they ſaid, [b] *That with much ado he was kept from leading his army over* Taurus, *and adventuring upon the calamity threatened by* Sibyl's *verſes, unto thoſe that ſhould paſs the fatal bounds.* What calamity or overthrow this was, wherewith *Sibyl's* prophecy threatned the *Roman* captain or army, that ſhould paſs over *Taurus*, I do not conceive. *Pompey* was the firſt that marched with an army beyond thoſe limits: though the victories of *Lucullus* had opened unto him the way, and had before-hand won, in a ſort, the countries on the other ſide of the mount; which *Lucullus* gave to one of *Antiochus's* race, though *Pompey* occupied them for the *Romans*. But we find not, that either *Lucullus* or *Pompey* ſuffered any loſs, in preſuming to neglect the bounds appointed by *Sibyl*. Indeed the accompliſhment of this prophecy, fell out near about one time, with the reſtitution of *Ptolemy* king of *Egypt*; that was forbidden unto the *Romans* by the ſame *Sibyl*. It may therefore ſeem to have had reference unto the ſame things that were denounced, as like to happen unto the reduction of the *Egyptian* king. Whether the oracles of *Sibyl* had in them any truth, and were not, as *Tully* noteth, [c] *ſowed at random in the large field of time*, there to take root, and get credit by event; I will not here diſpute. But I hold this more probable, than the reſtitution of *Ptolemy* to his kingdom by *Gabinius* the *Roman*, ſhould have any way betokened the coming of our Saviour: as ſome both ancient and modern *Chriſtian* writers have been well pleaſed to interpret *Sibyl* in that Prophecy. Of the *Sibylline* predictions I have ſometimes thought reverendly: though not knowing what they were (as I think few men know) yet following the common belief and good autho-

[a] Liv. l. 39. [b] Liv. l. 38. [c] Tull. de Divin. l. 2.

rity.

rity. But obſervation of the ſhameful idolatry, that upon all occaſions was advanced in *Rome* by the books of *Sibyl*, had well prevailed upon my credulity, and made me ſuſpect, though not the faith and pious meaning, yet the judgment of *Euſebius:* when that learned and excellent work of maſter *Caſauban* [a] upon the *Annals* of cardinal *Baronius:* did altogether free me from mine errour; making it apparent, That not only thoſe prophecies of *Sibyl*, wherein *Chriſt* ſo plainly was foreſhewed, but even the books of *Hermes*, which have borne ſuch reputation, were no better than counterfeited pieces, and at firſt entertained (whoſoever deviſed them) by the undiſcreet zeal of ſuch, as delighted in ſeeing the *Chriſtian* religion ſtrengthned with foreign proofs. And in the ſame rank, I think, we ought to place that notable hiſtory, reported by [b] *Euſebius* from no mean authors, of the honour which was done to *Simon Magus* in *Rome*; namely of an altar to him erected, with an inſcription *Simoni Deo Sancto*, that is, *To Simon the holy God.* For what can be more ſtrange, than that a thing ſo memorable, and ſo publick, ſhould have been quite omitted by *Tacitus*, by *Suetonius*, by *Dion*, and by all which wrote of thoſe times? Philoſophers and poets would not have ſuffered the matter to eſcape in ſilence, had it been true; neither can it be thought that *Seneca*, who then lived and flouriſhed, would have abſtained from ſpeaking any word of an argument ſo famous. Wherefore I am perſwaded, that this inſcription, *Simoni Deo Sancto*, was, by ſome bad *Criticiſm*, taken amiſs in place of *Semoni Sango*; a title four hundred years older than the time of *Simon Magus*. For the goods of one *Vitruvius* a rebel, had many ages before been conſecrated *Semoni Sango*, that is, *to the ſpirit or demi-god Sangus*, in whoſe chapel they were beſtowed. So as either by the ill ſhape of the old *Roman* letters, or by ſome ſpoil that time had wrought upon them; it might eaſily come to paſs, that the words ſhould be miſs-read, *Simoni Sancto*, and that ſome *Chriſtian* who had heard of *Simon Magus*, but not of *Sangus*, thereupon ſhould frame the conjecture, which now paſſeth for a true hiſtory. Such conjectures, being entertained without examination, find credit by tradition; whereby alſo, many times, their faſhion is amended, and made more hiſtorical, than was conceived by the author. But it cannot be ſafe, to let our faith (which ought to ſtand firm upon a ſure foundation) lean over-hardly on a well painted, yet rotten, poſt.

Now concerning the triumph of *Cn. Manlius*, it may be numbred among a few of the richeſt, which ever the city beheld. Out of that which he brought into the treaſury, was made the laſt payment of thoſe monies, which the commonwealth had borrowed from private men, in the ſecond *Punic* war. So long was it, that *Rome* had ſtill ſome feeling of *Hannibal:* which being paſt, there was remaining neither care, nor memory, of any danger. This triumph of *Manlius* was deferred by him, even ſo long as he well could: for that he thought it not ſafe, to make his entrance into the city, until the heat of an inquiſition, then raging therein, ſhould be allayed. The two *Scipio's* were called, one after another, into judgment, by two tribunes of the people; men only by this accuſation, known to poſterity. *P. Scipio* the *African*, with whom they began, could not endure that ſuch unworthy men ſhould queſtion him, of purloining from the common treaſury, or of being hired with bribes by *Antiochus*, to make an ill bargain for his country. When therefore his day of anſwer came; he appeared before the tribunes, not humbly as one accuſed, but followed by a great train of his friends and clients, with which he paſſed through the midſt of the aſſembly, and offered himſelf to ſpeak. Having audience, he told the people, That upon the ſame day of the year he had fought a great battel with *Hannibal*, and finiſhed the *Punic* war by a ſignal victory. In memory whereof, he thought it no fit ſeaſon to brabble at the law; but intended to viſit the *Capitol*, and there give thanks to *Jupiter* and the reſt of the Gods, by whoſe grace, both on that day and at other times, he had well and happily diſcharged the moſt weighty buſineſs of the commonwealth. And hereto he invited with him all the citizens: requeſting them, *That if ever ſince the ſeventeenth year of his life, until he now grew old, the honourable places by them conferred upon him, had prevented the capacity of his age, and yet his deſerts had exceeded the greatneſs of thoſe honourable places; then would they pray, that the princes and great ones of their city might ſtill be like to him.* Theſe words were heard with great approbation; ſo as all the people, even the officers of the court, followed *Scipio*; leaving the tribunes alone, with none about them, excepting their own ſlaves and a crier, by whom ridiculouſly they cited him to judgment, until for very ſhame, as not knowing what elſe to do, they granted him, unrequeſted, a further day. After this, when the *African* perceived that the tribunes would not let fall their ſuit, but enforce him to ſubmit himſelf to a diſgraceful trial, he willingly relinquiſhed the city, and his unthankful *Romans*, that could ſuffer him to undergo ſo much indignity. The reſt of his time he ſpent at *Liternum*; quietly, with a few of his inward friends, and without any deſire of ſeeing *Rome* again. How many years he lived, or whether he lived one whole year, in this voluntary baniſhment; it is uncertain. The report of his dying in the ſame year, with *Hannibal* and *Philopœmen*, as alſo of his private behaviour at *Liternum*, render it probable, that he outlived the tribuneſhip of his accuſers; who meant to have drawn him back to his anſwer, if one of their colleagues (as one of them had power to hinder all the reſt from proceeding) had not cauſed them to deſiſt. Howſoever it was; the ſame tribunes went more ſharply to work with *L. Scipio* the *Aſiatic*. They propounded a decree unto the people, touching money received of *Antiochus*, and not brought into the common treaſury; that the ſenate ſhould give charge unto one of the pretors, to inquire, and judicially determine thereof. In favour of this decree an oration was made by *Cato*, the ſuppoſed author of theſe contentions, and inſtigator of the tribunes. He was a man of great, but not perfect, virtue: temperate, valiant, and of ſingular induſtry; frugal alſo, both of the publick, and of his own; ſo as in this kind he was even faulty: for though he would not be corrupted with bribes, yet was he unmerciful and unconſcionable, in ſeeking to encreaſe his own wealth, by ſuch means as the law did warrant. Ambition was his vice; which being poiſoned with envy, troubled both himſelf, and the whole city, whilſt he lived. His mean birth cauſed him to hate the nobility, eſpecially thoſe that were in chief eſtimation. Neither did he ſpare to bite at ſuch as were of his own rank, men raiſed by deſert, if their advancement

[a] Iſaac. Caſaub. Exercitat. 1. ad Annal. Bar. n. 10. & 11.

[b] Euſeb. Eccl. hiſt. l. 2. c. 13.

were

were like to hinder his; but lately before this, when *Glabrio*, whose lieutenant he had been at *Thermopylæ*, was his competitor for the censorship, and likely to carry it, he took an oath against him, which was counted as no better than malicious perjury. That he had not brought into the common treasury some vessels of gold and silver, gotten in the camp of *Antiochus*. Now the hatred which he bore unto the *Scipio's* grew partly (besides his general spight at the nobility) from his own first dealing, wherein he was countenanced by *Fabius Maximus*, who brooked not the *African*; partly from some check, that was given unto himself, in the *African* voyage by *P. Scipio*, whose treasurer he then was. For when *Cato* did utter his dislike of the consul's bad husbandry (judging magnificence to be no better) in some peremptory manner, *Scipio* plainly told him, That he had no need of such double diligence in his treasurer. Wherefore, either not caring what lies he publish'd, or for want of judgment thinking unworthily of the virtue that was far above him, *Cato* filled *Rome* with untrue reports against his general, whose noble deeds confuted sufficiently the author of such false tales. And thus began the hatred; which being not regarded, nor thought upon by the *Scipio's*, whilst it was nourish'd by their enemy, broke out upon advantage, especially against *L. Scipio*, his brother being dead, or out of the way. A severe inquiry and judgment being appointed of purpose against *Scipio*, matters were so carried, that he was soon condemn'd in a sum of money, far exceeding his ability to pay. For *non-payment*, his body should have been laid up in prison; but from this rigour of the law he was freed by *Tiberius Gracchus*, the same tribune who had caused the suit against the *African* to be let fall. In his estate, which was confiscated to the use of the city, when there neither appeared any sign of his having been beholden to *Antiochus*, nor was found so much as what he had been condemned to pay; then fell his accusers, and all whose hands had been against him, into the indignation of the people. But for this was *L. Scipio* no whit the better. His kindred, friends, and clients made such a collection for him, as would have set him in better estate than before, if he had accepted it. He took no more than such of his own goods, as were of necessary use, being redeemed for him by his nearest friends.

And thus began the civil war of the *tongue*, in the *Roman* pleadings; which had either not been, or not been much regardable, until now, since the *Punic* war. Security of danger from abroad, and some want of sufficient employment, were especial helps to the kindling of this fire; which first caught hold upon that great worthy, to whose virtue *Rome* was indebted, for changing into so great security her extream danger. But these factious contentions did no long while contain themselves within heat of words, and cunning practice: for when the art of leading the multitude, in such quarrelsome business, grew to perfection, they that found themselves over-match'd by their adversaries at this kind of weapon, began to make opposition, first with clubs and stones, afterwards with swords, and finally, proceeded from frays and murders in the streets, unto battel in the open field. *Cornelia*, daughter of *Scipio* the *African*, a lady of rare virtue, that, in honour of her two sons, was more commonly named *Mother of the Gracchi*, saw those her two sons, whilst they were but young, slaughter'd in *Rome* together, with some of their friends, by those whom they opposed; and their death not revenged by order of law, but rather approved by the senate. At these times the senators began to take upon them authority, more than was to them belonging. They conferred upon the consuls all the whole power of the city, under this form, *Let the consuls provide, that the commonweal receive no detriment.* By this decree of theirs, and by their proclaiming any citizen *enemy to the state*, they thought to have won a great advantage over the multitude. But after the death of *C. Gracchus*, and of *Saturninus*, a popular man, whom, by such authority, they did put out of the way; it was not long ere *Marius*, a famous captain of theirs, was so condemn'd, who, by force of arms, return'd into the city, and murder'd all the principal senators: whereupon began the civil wars; which giving unto *Sylla*, who prevailed therein, means to make himself absolute lord of *Rome*, taught *Cesar*, a man of higher spirit, to affect and obtain the like soveraign power, when by the like decree of the senate he was provoked. It is true, that never any consul had finally cause to rejoice, of his having put in execution such authority to him committed by the senate. But, as the fury of the multitude, in passing their laws, by throwing of stones, and other violence, made the city stand in need of a soveraign lord: so the vehemency of the senate, in condemning as enemies those that would not submit themselves, when they were over-topp'd by voices in the house, did compel *Cesar*, or give him at least pretence, to right himself by arms; wherewith prevailing against his adversaries, he took such order, that neither senate, nor people, should thenceforth be able to do him wrong. So by intestine discord, the *Romans* consuming all or most of their principal citizens, lost their own freedom, and became subjects unto the arbitrary government of one: suffering this change in three generations, after this beginning of their insolent rule, wherein they took upon them, as the highest lords on earth, to do even what they listed. Yet had not *Rome* indeed attained hitherto unto compleat greatness, nor believed of herself as if she had, whilst a king sat crowned on the throne of *Alexander*, continuing and upholding the reputation of a former empire. Wherefore, this consummation of her honour was thought upon betimes. How it was effected, the sequel will discover.

CHAP. VI.

The ſecond Macedonian *war.*

SECT. I.

The condition wherein thoſe princes and eſtates remained, which were aſſociates of the Romans, *when the war with* Antiochus *was finiſhed. The* Romans *quarrel with* Philip. *They deal inſolently with the* Acheans. *The* Macedonian, *being unready for war, obtains peace at* Rome, *by his ſon* Demetrius; *of whom thenceforth he becomes jealous.*

AFTER the overthrow of *Antiochus*, although *Philip* of *Macedon*, *Eumenes* king of *Pergamus*, the commonweal of the *Acheans*, and all other the ſtates of *Greece*, were governed by the ſame laws and magiſtrates, as they formerly had been, before the arrival of the *Romans* in thoſe parts: yet in very truth (the publick declaration excepted) they were none other than abſolute vaſſals to the people of *Rome*. For of thoſe five prerogatives belonging to a monarch, or unto ſoveraign power, in whomſoever it reſt; namely, *to make laws*, *to create magiſtrates*, *to arbitrate peace and war*, *to beat money*; and *to reſerve* (as the *French* call it) *le dernier reſort*, or *the laſt appeals*, the *Romans* had aſſumed four; and the greateſt of them ſo abſolutely, that is, *the appeal*, or laſt reſort, as every petty injury offered to each other by the fore-named kings or ſtates, was heard and determined either by the *Roman* ambaſſadors, or commiſſioners, in thoſe places whence the complaint came, or otherwiſe by the ſenators themſelves within *Rome*: from whoſe arbitrement, or direction, if either king, or commonweals declined, he or they were beaten, and enforced to obedience; or had their eſtates and regalities utterly diſſolved. Nevertheleſs it is true, that they had their own laws, and officers of their own ordaining: yet ſo, as neither their laws were of force, when the *Romans* interpoſed their will to the contrary; neither was their election of magiſtrates ſo free, as that they had not therein eſpecial regard unto the good pleaſure of theſe their maſters.

And to ſuch degree of ſervitude the ſeveral eſtates of *Greece* did bow very gently: either as being thankful for their deliverance from a yoke more ſenſibly grievous; or, as being ſkilful in the art of flattery, and therein taking delight, ſince therein conſiſted their chief hope of thriving; or, as being more fearful of diſpleaſing the ſtrongeſt, than mindful of their own honour. But *Eumenes* living further off, and being moſt obſequious unto the *Romans*, was not of long time queſtioned about any of his doings: his conformity unto them in matter of war and peace, together with the diverſion of their thoughts another way, giving him leave to uſe his own even as he liſted, until they ſhould otherwiſe diſpoſe of him. Neither was it a little available to him, that his kingdom bordered upon the nations, by them not throughly ſubdued. For upon the ſame reaſon (as well as upon his own high deſerts) were they very loving unto *Maſaniſſa*, and to his houſe, until *Carthage* was ruined, and their dominion ſettled in *Afric*: as likewiſe afterwards to the kings of *Mauritania*, *Cappadocia*, and others: holding people in ſubjection unto themſelves, by the miniſtry of kings: eſpecially of ſuch kings, as were uſeful and obſequious unto them.

Now the *Macedonian* was of a more noble temper, and ſhewed himſelf not forgetful of his own former greatneſs, the honour of his race, or the high reputation of his kingdom. But ſuch magnanimity was none otherwiſe conſtrued by the *Romans*, than as want of due reverence to their eſtate, and a valuation of himſelf againſt them: which, in the pride of their fortune, they could not endure. Wherefore, notwithſtanding that he had lately given paſſage to their armies through his country, prepared the ways for them, and furniſhed them both with victuals, and other things needful, to tranſport them over the *Helleſpont* into *Aſia*, againſt *Antiochus*: yet upon the complaint of *Eumenes*, and the ſtates of *Theſſaly* and *Thrace*, he was commanded to abandon the cities of *Ænus* and *Maronea*, with all pieces and places demanded by any of his neighbours; whereof many of them he had lately conquered, by direction, or licence, even from the *Romans* themſelves.

Theſe towns of *Ænus* and *Maronea* had been part of *Lyſimachus*'s kingdom: who from *Thrace* northwards, and to the north-weſt, extended his dominion very far. He is thought to have made himſelf lord of *Tranſylvania*: in which province it is ſaid, [a] that innumerable medals of gold have been found in the age of our grandfathers, each of them weighing two or three crowns, and ſtamped with his image on the one ſide, on the other ſide with *victory*. Of all theſe lordſhips, the poſſeſſion, or rather the title (for he lived not to ſettle his eſtate in *Europe*) fell to *Seleucus Nicator* by right of war, wherein he vanquiſhed and ſlew *Lyſimachus*: as alſo, by the like right, *Ptolemy Ceraunus* thought them his own, when he had murdered *Seleucus*. But the inundation of the *Gauls*, which the kingdom of *Macedon* could not ſuſtain, did ſhortly and eaſily waſh away from that crown, together with the more part of *Thrace*, all thoſe heaps of land newly thereto annexed. Somewhat of this was afterwards regained by *Antigonus* the ſon of *Demetrius*, and his ſucceſſors: though not much; for they were otherwiſe buſied. The fury of the *Gauls* being over-paſt, thoſe countries which lately had been oppreſſed by them, recovered their liberty; and not only held it, but learned ſome of them, eſpecially the *Dardanians* and wild *Thracians*, to find their advantages, and make uſe of them, even upon *Macedon*. Againſt the miſchiefs commonly done by theſe, king *Philip* did provide the moſt convenient remedies; by ſhutting up the ways, whereby the *Dardanians* might enter into his kingdom; and by occupying *Lyſimachia*, with ſome other towns in *Thrace*, which he fortified, as bulwarks of his own country, againſt the *Barbarians*. Now, although it behoved him thus to do, for the defence of his own eſtate: yet foraſmuch as theſe towns were, in a manner, at abſolute liberty, his poſſeſſion of them was thought to partake more of violence than of juſtice. And in this reſpect, he

[a] Hiſtory of Hungary by Mart. Fumee, lib. 5.

was

was formerly accuſed by the *Etolians* of wrongful uſurpation and oppreſſion, in his having occupied *Lyſimachia*. Hereto he made a good anſwer, that his garriſon did only ſave it from the *Thracians:* who, as ſoon as he thence withdrew his men, did ſeize upon the town, and ruin it. The like perhaps he might have ſaid, touching *Ænus* and *Maronea*; that they were places unable to defend themſelves, and gates, by which the *Barbarians* might have entrance into his kingdom. But this plea had not availed him, in the diſputation about *Lyſimachia:* and in the preſent queſtion, the *Romans* were not without their own title; ſince *Antiochus* had gotten all the country thereabout, whilſt *Philip* was buſied in his former war; and ſince they, by their victory, had gotten unto themſelves all the title, which *Antiochus* thereto could pretend. Wherefore he only ſubmitted his right unto the good pleaſure of the ſenate: referring it unto their diſpoſition, whether *Ænus* and *Maronea* ſhould be ſet at liberty, whether left in his hand, or whether beſtowed upon *Eumenes*; who begged them, as an appendix to *Lyſimachia* and *Cherſoneſus*, that were already his by their gift. What they would determine, he might eaſily perceive, by the demeanor of their ambaſſadors towards him: who ſitting as judges between him and all that made complaint upon him, gave ſentence againſt him in every controverſy. Nevertheleſs, he ſent ambaſſadors to *Rome*, there to maintain his right unto theſe towns, wherein he thought, that equity (if it might prevail) was wholly on his ſide. For he had holpen their conſuls in the war againſt *Antiochus* and the *Etolians:* wherein whatſoever he had gotten for himſelf, was now taken from him by their ambaſſadors: and would they now deprive him of thoſe two towns, lying ſo fitly for the guard of his kingdom, which he had gotten to himſelf out of the ruins of *Antiochus*, like as out of his own ruins *Antiochus* had gotten in thoſe quarters a great deal more? By ſuch allegations either he was likely to prevail, or at leaſtwiſe to gain time, wherein he might bethink himſelf what he had to do. It was not long ere he had word from *Rome*, that the ſenate were no more equal to him than had been their ambaſſadors. Wherefore, conſidering how inſolently the *Maronites* had behaved themſelves, in pleading againſt him for their liberty, he took counſel of his own paſſions; and (as by nature he was very cruel) gave order to *Onomaſtus*, that was warden of the ſea-coaſts, to handle theſe *Maronites* in ſuch ſort, as they might have little joy of the liberty by them ſo earneſtly deſired. *Onomaſtus* employed *Caſſander*, one of the king's men, dwelling in *Maronea*, and willed him to let in the *Thracians* by night, that they might ſack the town, and uſe all cruelties of war. This was done, but ſo ill taken by the *Roman* ambaſſadors, who had better notice than could have been feared of theſe proceedings, that the king was by them directly charged with the crime, and called more ſtrictly, than became his majeſty, to an account. He would have removed the blame from himſelf, and laid it even upon the *Maronites*; affirming, that they, in heat of their factions, being ſome inclinable to him, other-ſome to *Eumenes*, had fallen into ſuch an outrage, that they had cut one another's throats. And hereof he willed the ambaſſadors to enquire among the *Maronites* themſelves, as well knowing, that they who ſurvived were either his own friends, or ſo terrified and amazed by the late execution of his vengeance among them, that they durſt not utter an offenſive word. But he found the *Romans* more ſevere, and more throughly informed in the buſineſs, than to reſt contented with ſuch an anſwer. He was plainly told, that if he would diſcharge himſelf of the crime objected, he muſt ſend *Onomaſtus* and *Caſſander* to *Rome*, there to be examined as the ſenate ſhould think fit. This did not a little trouble him; yet he collected his ſpirits, and ſaid, that *Caſſander* ſhould be at their diſpoſition; but concerning *Onomaſtus*, who had not been at *Maronea*, nor near to it, he requeſted them not to preſs him; ſince it ſtood not with his honour, ſo lightly to give away his friends. As for *Caſſander*, becauſe he ſhould tell no tales, he took order to have him poiſoned by the way. By this we ſee that the doctrine which *Machiavel* taught unto *Ceſar Borgia*, to employ men in miſchievous actions, and afterwards to deſtroy them when they have performed the miſchief, was not of his own invention. All ages have given us examples of this goodly policy, the latter having been apt ſcholars in this leſſon to the more ancient; as the reign of *Henry* the eighth here in *England*, can bear good witneſs; and therein eſpecially the lord *Cromwell*, who periſhed by the ſame unjuſt law that himſelf had deviſed for the taking away of another man's life.

Such actions of *Philip* made an unpleaſant noiſe at *Rome*, and were like to have brought upon him the war which he feared, before he was ready to entertain it. Wherefore he employed his younger ſon *Demetrius* as ambaſſador unto the ſenate, giving him inſtructions how to make anſwer to all complaints; and withal to deliver his own grievances in ſuch wiſe, that if ought were amiſs, yet might it appear that he had been ſtrongly urged to take ſuch courſes. The ſum of his embaſſy was, to pacify the *Romans*, and make all even for the preſent. *Demetrius* himſelf was known to be very acceptable unto the ſenate; as having been well approved by them when he was hoſtage in *Rome*, and therefore ſeemed the more likely to prevail ſomewhat; were it only in regard that would be borne unto his perſon.

Whilſt this buſineſs with the *Macedonian* hung in ſuſpence, and whilſt he, by his readineſs to make ſubmiſſion, ſeemed likely to divert from himſelf ſome other way the *Roman* arms, the ſame ambaſſadors, that had been judges between him and his neighbours, made their progreſs through the reſt of *Greece*; and took notice of the controverſies which they found between ſome eſtates in the country. The greateſt cauſe that was heard before them, was the complaint of the baniſhed *Lacedemonians* againſt the *Acheans*. It was objected unto the *Acheans*, that they had committed a grievous ſlaughter upon many citizens of *Lacedemon*; that unto this cruelty they had added a greater, in throwing down the walls of the city: as alſo further, in changing the laws, and abrogating the famous inſtitutions of *Lycurgus*. Hereto *Lycortas*, then pretor of the *Acheans*, made anſwer, that theſe baniſhed *Lacedemonians*, who now took upon them to accuſe the nation that had once protected them, were notoriouſly known to be the men who had themſelves committed that murder, whereof ſhameleſly they laid the blame upon others; the *Acheans* having only called thoſe unto judgment, that were ſuppoſed to be chief authors of a rebellion againſt both them and the *Romans*; and theſe plaintiffs having ſlain them upon private, though juſt hatred, as they were coming to make anſwer for themſelves. Concerning their throwing down the walls of *Lacedemon*, he ſaid, it was moſt agreeable to *Lycurgus*'s ordinance, who, having perſwaded his citizens to defend their town and liberty by their proper virtue, did inhibit unto them all kinds of fortifications, as the retreats and

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neſts either of cowards, or (whereof *Lacedemon* had woful experience) of tyrants and uſurpers. Further, he ſhewed, how the ſame tyrants, that had built theſe walls, and hemmed in the *Spartans*, had alſo quite aboliſhed *Lycurgus*'s ordinances, and governed the city by their own lawleſs will. As for the *Acheans*, they communicated their own laws, which they held for the beſt, or elſe would change them, and take better unto the *Lacedemonians*, whom they found without laws, or any tolerable form of policy. For concluſion, *Lycortas* plainly told *App. Claudius*, the chief of the ambaſſadors, that he and his countrymen held it ſtrange, being friends and faithful allies of the *Romans*, to ſee themſelves thus conſtrained to anſwer and give account of their actions, as vaſſals and ſlaves unto the people of *Rome*. For if they were indeed at liberty, why might not the *Acheans* as well require to be ſatisfied about that which the *Romans* had done at *Capua*, as the *Romans* did buſy themſelves to take account how things went at *Lacedemon*? For, if the *Romans* would ſtand upon their greatneſs, and intimate, as they began, that the liberty of their friends was nothing worth, longer than ſhould pleaſe themſelves to ratify it; then muſt the *Acheans* have recourſe unto thoſe agreements that were confirmed by oath, and which, without perjury, could not be violated; as reverencing, and indeed fearing the *Romans*, but much more the immortal gods. To this bold anſwer of *Lycortas*, *Appius* found little to reply. Yet, taking ſtate upon him, he pronounced more like a maſter than a judge, that if the *Acheans* would not be ruled by fair means, and earn thanks whilſt they might, they ſhould be compelled with a miſchief to do what was required at their hands, whether they would or no. This altercation was in the parliament of the *Acheans*, which groaned to hear the lordly words of *Appius*. Yet fear prevailed above indignation, and it was permitted unto the *Romans* to do as they liſted. Hereupon the ambaſſadors reſtored ſome baniſhed and condemned men; but the *Roman* ſenate, very ſoon after, did make void all judgment of death or baniſhment that had been laid by the *Acheans* upon any citizen of *Lacedemon*; as likewiſe they made it a matter of diſputation, whether or no the city and territory of *Lacedemon* ſhould be ſuffered to continue a member of the *Achean* commonwealth, or taken from them, and made, as it had been, an eſtate by it ſelf. By bringing ſuch a matter into queſtion, the *Romans* well declared, that they held it to depend upon their own will, how much or how little any of their confederates ſhould be ſuffered to enjoy, though by contributing *Sparta* to the council of *Achaia*, they diſcovered no leſs, as to them ſeemed, the love which they bare unto the *Acheans*, than the power which they had over them.

Into ſuch ſlavery had the *Greeks*, and all kings and common-weals whatſoever bordering upon any part of the *Mediterranean* ſeas, reduced themſelves, by calling in the *Romans* to their ſuccour. They wanted not the good counſel and perſwaſions of many wiſe and temperate men among them; they had alſo the examples of the *Italians*, *Spaniards*, *Gauls*, and *Africans*, all ſubdued by the *Romans*; and, by ſeeking patronage, made mere vaſſals, to inſtruct them what, in the like caſe, they ſhould expect: yet could not the true reaſons of eſtate and policy ſo prevail with them, but their private paſſions and neighbouring hatred, which hath evermore bought revenge at the price of ſelf-ruin, brought them from the honour which they enjoyed, of being free princes and cities, into moſt baſe and fearful ſervility.

All this made well for *Philip* of *Macedon*, who, though he ſaw the *Greeks* very far from daring to ſtir againſt thoſe, by whom both he and they were kept in awe; yet was he not without hope that (few of them excepted, whom the *Romans*, by freeing from his ſubjection, had made his implacable enemies) in hearty affection all the country would be his whenſoever he ſhould take arms, as ſhortly he was like to do. Young *Demetrius*, coming home from *Rome*, brought with him the deſired ratification of peace; though qualified with much indignity ſoon following. He had been lovingly uſed at *Rome*, and heard with great favour in the ſenate. There being confounded with the multitude of objections, whereto his youth, unſkilful in the art of wrangling, could not readily make anſwer; it was permitted unto him to read ſuch brief notes as he had received from his father, and out of thoſe the ſenate were contented to gather ſatisfaction; more for *Demetrius*'s own ſake, as they then ſaid and wrote into *Macedon*, than for any goodneſs in the defence. Such pride of theirs, in remitting his faults at the intreaty of his ſon, together with ſome inſolence of his ſon, growing (as appeared) from this favour of the *Romans*, did increaſe in *Philip* his hatred unto *Rome*, and breed in him a jealouſy of his too forward ſon. To ſet him forward in theſe paſſions, there came daily new ambaſſadors from *Rome*; ſome bringing one commandment; ſome another; and ſome requiring him to fulfill thoſe things which had been impoſed upon him by their fore-goers. Neither were there wanting that obſerved his countenance; and when he had fulfilled all that was required at his hands, yet laid it to his charge that he had done things unwillingly, and would be obedient no longer than he needs muſt. With theſe ambaſſadors young *Demetrius* was converſant; rather perhaps out of ſimplicity, and for that they made much of him, than for any ambitious reſpect; yet a great deal more than was pleaſing to his father. So the rumour grew current through all *Macedon*, that *Perſeus*, the elder ſon of the king, ſhould not ſucceed unto his father; but that the diadem ſhould be conferred upon *Demetrius*, if not by ſome other pretence, yet by mere favour of the *Romans*. This offended not only *Perſeus*, but *Philip* himſelf, who ſuſpected his younger ſon, as more *Roman* than his own; and accordingly miſconſtrued all his doings. But ere we proceed unto the bitter fruits of this jealouſy, it will not be amiſs to ſpeak of ſome memorable accidents that were in the mean time.

SECT. II.

The death of Philopœmen, Hannibal, *and* Scipio. *That the military profeſſion is of all other the moſt unhappy, notwithſtanding ſome examples which may ſeem to prove the contrary.*

THE *Romans*, wanting other matter of quarrel in the continent of *Greece*, had of late been ſo peremptory with the *Acheans*, that they ſeemed not unlikely to take part againſt them in any controverſy that ſhould be moved. Hereupon the *Meſſenians*, who againſt their will were annexed unto the *Achean* common-wealth, having long been of a contrary faction thereto, grew bold to withdraw themſelves from that ſociety, with purpoſe to ſet up again an eſtate of their own, ſevered from communion with any other. This was the device of ſome that were powerful in their city, who, finding the multitude only inclinable to their purpoſe, and not over-ſtrongly affected in the buſineſs, were careful

ful to ſeek occaſion of reducing things to ſuch paſs, that all their citizens might be entangled in a neceſſity of ſtanding out, and of not returning to the *Achean* league. And hereupon they began to do ſome acts of hoſtility, whereby it was probable that blood ſhould be drawn, and either ſide ſo far exaſperated, that little hopes of agreement would be left. Upon the fame of their commotion and proceedings, *Philopœmen*, then pretor of the *Acheans*, levied ſuch forces as he could in haſte, and went againſt them. Many principal gentlemen of the *Acheans*, eſpecially of the *Megalopolitans*, were ſoon in a readineſs to wait upon him. Beſides theſe, which were all, or for the moſt part, horſe; he had ſome auxiliaries out of *Thrace* and *Crete*, that uſually were kept in pay. Thus accompanied, he met with *Dinocrates*, captain of the *Meſſenians*, whom he charged and forced to run. But whilſt his horſemen were too earneſt in following the chace, there arrived by chance a ſupply of five hundred from *Meſſene*, which gave new courage unto thoſe that fled. So the enemies began to make head again, and with the help of thoſe who very ſeaſonably came to their aid, compelled *Philopœmen*'s horſemen to turn back. *Philopœmen* himſelf had long been ſick of an ague, and was then very weak; yet the greatneſs of his courage would not ſuffer him to be negligent of their ſafety, which had ſo willingly adventured themſelves under his conduct. He took upon him to make the retreat; and ſuffering his horſemen to paſs along by him in a narrow lane, he often turned about againſt the *Meſſenians*, whom his reputation, and the knowledge of his great worth, did terrify from approaching over-near to him. But it fell out unhappily, that, being caſt to the ground by a fall of his horſe, and being withal in very weak plight of body, he was unable to get up again. So the enemies came upon him, and took him; yet ſcarce believed their fortune to be ſo good, although their eyes were witneſſes. The firſt meſſenger that brought this news to *Meſſene*, was ſo far from being believed, that he was hardly thought to be in his right wits. But when the truth was affirm'd by many reports, all the city ran forth to meet him, and behold the ſpectacle ſeeming ſo incredible. They cauſed him to be brought into the theatre, that there they might ſatisfy themſelves with beholding him. The greateſt part of them had compaſſion on his misfortune; and, in commemoration both of his virtue, and of the ſingular benefits by him done unto them, eſpecially in delivering them from *Nabis* the tyrant, began to manifeſt their good will for his delivery. Contrariwiſe, *Dinocrates*, and his faction, were deſirous haſtily to take away his life; becauſe they held him a man implacable, and one that would never leave any diſgrace or injury done to him unrevenged. They durſt not one truſt another with the keeping of him; but committed him into a ſtrong vault under ground, that had been made for the cuſtody of their treaſure. So thither they let him down faſt bound, and with an engine laid an heavy ſtone upon the mouth of the vault. There he had not ſtaid long, ere his enemies had concluded his preſent death. The hangman of the city was let down unto him, with a cup of poiſon, which *Philopœmen* took in his hand; and asking no more than whether the horſemen were eſcaped, and particularly whether *Lycortas* was ſafe: when he heard an anſwer to his mind, he ſaid it was well; and ſo, with a chearful countenance, drank his laſt draught. He was ſeventy years old, and weaken'd with long ſickneſs, whereby the poiſon wrought the ſooner, and eaſily took away his life.

The *Acheans*, when they miſſed him in their flight, were marvellouſly offended with themſelves, for that they had been more mindful to preſerve their own lives, than to look unto the ſafety of ſo excellent a commander. Whilſt they were deviſing what to do in ſuch a caſe, they got advertiſement of his being taken. All *Achaia* was by this report vehemently afflicted: ſo as ambaſſadors were forthwith diſpatch'd unto *Meſſene*, craving his enlargement; and yet preparation made withal to obtain it by force, in caſe that fair means would not ſerve. *Lycortas* was choſen general of the army againſt *Meſſene*; who coming thither, and laying ſiege to the town, forced it in a ſhort time to yield. Then *Dinocrates*, knowing what he was to expect, laid hands upon himſelf, and made an end of his own life. The reſt of thoſe that had been partakers in the murder, were compelled to wait in bonds upon the aſhes of *Philopœmen*, that were carried home in ſolemn pomp to *Megalopolis*; where they were all of them ſlain at his funeral, as ſacrifices to his ghoſt, whom they had offended. *Q. Martius*, a *Roman* ambaſſador, was then in *Greece*; whence, upon one occaſion or other, the *Roman* ambaſſadors were ſeldom abſent. He would have intermeddled in this buſineſs of *Meſſene*, had not *Lycortas* made ſhort work, and left him nothing to do.

About the ſame time was *T. Quintius Flaminius* ſent ambaſſador to *Pruſias*, king of *Bithynia*; not ſo much to withdraw him from proſecuting the war againſt *Eumenes*, as to intreat him that he would deliver *Hannibal*, the moſt ſpightful enemy in all the world unto the ſenate and people of *Rome*, into his hands. *Pruſias* (therein unworthy of the crown he wore) did readily condeſcend; or rather (as *Livy* thinks) to gratify the *Romans*, he determined either to kill *Hannibal*, or to deliver him alive to *Flaminius*. For upon the firſt conference between the king and *Flaminius*, a troop of ſoldiers were directed to guard and environ the lodging where *Hannibal* lay. That famous captain having found cauſe, before this, to ſuſpect the faith of *Pruſias*, had deviſed ſome ſecret ſallies under ground, to ſave himſelf from any treaſonable and ſudden aſſault. But finding now that all parts about him were fore-cloſed, he had recourſe to his laſt remedy; which he then was conſtrained to practiſe, as well to fruſtrate his enemies of their triumphing over him, as to ſave himſelf from their torture and mercileſs hands; who, as he well knew, would neither reſpect his famous enterpriſes, his honour, nor his age. When therefore he ſaw no way of eſcape, nor counſel to reſort unto, he took the poiſon into his hand, which he always preſerved for a ſure antidote againſt the ſharpeſt diſeaſes of adverſe fortune; which being ready to ſwallow down, he uttered theſe words: *I will now* (ſaid he) *deliver the* Romans *of that fear, which hath ſo many years poſſeſs'd them; that fear, which makes them impatient to attend the death of an old man. This victory of* Flaminius *over me, which am diſarmed, and betrayed into his hands, ſhall never be numbred among the reſt of his heroical deeds: No, it ſhall make it manifeſt to all the nations of the world, how far the ancient* Roman *virtue is degenerate and corrupted. For ſuch was the nobleneſs of their fore-fathers; as, when* Pyrrhus *invaded them in* Italy, *and was ready to give them battel at their own doors, they gave him knowledge of the treaſon intended againſt him by poiſon: whereas theſe of a latter race have employed* Flaminius, *a man who hath heretofore been one of their conſuls, to practiſe with* Pruſias, *contrary to the ho-*

nour of a king, contrary to his faith given, and contrary to the laws of hoſpitality, to ſlaughter, or deliver up his own gueſt. He then curſing the perſon of *Pruſias, and all his, and deſiring the immortal Gods to revenge his infidelity*, drank off the poiſon, and died.

In this year alſo (as good authors have reported) to accompany *Philopœmen* and *Hannibal*, died *Scipio* the *African:* theſe being, all of them, as great captains as ever the world had; but not more famous than unfortunate. Certainly, for *Hannibal*, whoſe tragedy we have now finiſhed, had he been prince of the *Carthaginians*, and one who by his authority might have commanded ſuch ſupplies, as the war which he undertook required; it is probable, that he had torn up the *Roman* empire by the roots. But he was ſo ſtrongly croſs'd by a cowardly and envious faction at home; as his proper virtue, wanting publick force to ſuſtain it, did laſtly diſſolve itſelf in his own, and in the common miſery of his country and common-weal.

Hence it comes, to wit, from the envy of our equals, and jealouſy of our maſters, be they kings, or common-weals, That there is no profeſſion more unproſperous, than that of men of war, and great captains, being no kings. For, beſides the envy and jealouſy of men; the ſpoils, rapes, famine, ſlaughter of the innocent, vaſtation, and burnings, with a world of miſeries laid on the labouring man, are ſo hateful to God, as with good reaſon did *Monluc*, the marſhal of *France*, confeſs, That *were not the mercies of* God *infinite, and without reſtriction, it were in vain for thoſe of his profeſſion to hope for any portion of them: ſeeing the cruelties, by them permitted and committed, were alſo infinite.* Howſoever, this is true, That the victories, which are obtained by many of the greateſt commanders, are commonly either aſcribed to thoſe that ſerve under them, to fortune, or to the cowardiſe of the nation againſt whom they ſerve. For the moſt of others, whoſe virtues have raiſed them above the level of their inferiors, and have ſurmounted their envy: yet have they been rewarded in the end, either with diſgrace, baniſhment, or death. Among the *Romans* we find many examples hereof; as *Coriolanus*, *M. Livius*, *L. Emilius*, and this our *Scipio*, whom we have lately buried. Among the *Greeks* we read of not many, that eſcaped theſe rewards. Yea, long before theſe times, it was a legacy that *David* bequeathed unto his victorious captain *Joab*. With this fare *Alexander* feaſted *Parmenio*, *Philotas*, and others; and prepared it for *Antipater* and *Caſſander*. Hereto *Valentinian*, the emperor, invited *Ætius:* who, after many other victories, overthrew *Attila* of the *Hunnes*, in the greateſt battel, for the well fighting and reſolution of both armies, that ever was ſtrucken in the world; for there fell of thoſe that fought, beſides run-aways, an hundred and fourſcore thouſand. Hereupon it was well and boldly told unto the emperor, by *Proximus*, That in killing of *Ætius*, he had cut off his own right hand with his left: for it was not long after, that *Maximus* (by whoſe perſuaſion *Valentinian* ſlew *Ætius*) murder'd the emperor, which he never durſt attempt, *Ætius* living. And, beſides the loſs of that emperor, it is true, that with *Ætius* the glory of the weſtern empire was rather diſſolved than obſcured. The ſame unworthy deſtiny, or a far worſe, had *Belliſarius*; whoſe undertakings and victories were ſo difficult and glorious, as after-ages ſuſpected them for fabulous: for he had his eyes torne out of his head by *Juſtinian*; and he died a blind beggar. *Narſes* alſo, to the great prejudice of the chriſtian religion, was diſgraced by *Juſtine*. That rule of *Cato* againſt *Scipio* hath been well obſerved in every age ſince then; to wit, That the common-weal cannot be accounted free, which ſtandeth in awe of any one man. And hence have the *Turks* drawn another principle, and indeed a *Turkiſh* one, That every warlike prince ſhould rather deſtroy his greateſt men of war, than ſuffer his own glory to be obſcured by them. For this cauſe did *Bajazet the Second* diſpatch *Baſſa Acomat*, *Selim* ſtrangle *Baſſa Muſtapha*; and moſt of thoſe princes bring to ruin the moſt of their viſiers. Of the *Spaniſh* nation, the great *Gonſalvo*, who drove the *French* out of *Naples*; and *Ferdinando Corteſe*, who conquer'd *Mexico*, were crown'd with nettles, not with laurel. The earls of *Egmond* and *Horn* had no heads left them to wear garlands on: and that the great captains of all nations have been paid with this copper coin, there are examples more than too many. On the contrary it may be ſaid, that many have acquired the ſtate of princes, kings and emperors, by their great ability in matter of war. This I confeſs. Yet muſt it be had withal in conſideration, that theſe high places have been given or offer'd unto very few, as rewards of their military virtue; though many have uſurped them, by the help and favour of thoſe armies which they commanded. Neither is it unregardable, that the tyrants which have oppreſſed the liberty of free cities, and the lieutenants of kings or emperors, which have traiterouſly caſt down their maſters, and ſtepped up into their ſeats, were not all of them good men of war; but have uſed the advantage of ſome commotion; or many of them, by baſe and cowardly practices, have obtained thoſe dignities, which undeſervedly were aſcribed to their perſonal worth. So that the number of thoſe that have purchaſed abſolute greatneſs, by the greatneſs of their warlike virtue, is far more in ſeeming, than in deed. *Phocas* was a ſoldier, and by the help of ſoldiers he got the empire from his lord *Mauritius:* but he was a coward; and with a barbarous cruelty, ſeldom found in any other than cowards, he ſlew firſt the children of *Mauritius*, a prince that never had done him wrong, before his face; and after them *Mauritius* himſelf. This his bloody aſpiring was but as a debt, which was paid unto him again by *Heraclius*; who took from him the imperial crown, unjuſtly gotten; and ſet it on his own head. *Leontius* laid hold on the emperor *Juſtine*, cut off his noſe and ears, and ſent him into baniſhment: but God's vengeance rewarded him with the ſame puniſhment, by the hands of *Tiberius*, to whoſe charge he had left his own men of war. *Juſtine*, having recovered forces, lighted on *Tiberius*, and barbed him after the ſame faſhion. *Philippicus*, commanding the forces of *Juſtine*, murder'd both the emperor and his ſon. *Anaſtaſius*, the vaſſal of this new tyrant, ſurpriſed his maſter *Philippicus*, and thruſt out both his eyes. But with *Anaſtaſius*, *Theodoſius* dealt more gently; for, having wreſted the ſcepter out of his hands, he enforced him to become a prieſt. It were an endleſs, and a needleſs work to tell, how *Leo* rewarded this *Theodoſius*; how many others have been repaid with their own cruelty, by men alike ambitious and cruel; or how many hundreds, or rather thouſands, hoping of captains to make themſelves kings, have, by God's juſtice, miſerably periſh'd in the attempt. The ordinary, and perhaps the beſt way of thriving by the practice of arms, is to take what may be gotten by the ſpoil of enemies, and the liberality of thoſe princes and cities in whoſe ſervice one hath well deſerved. But ſcarce one of a thouſand have proſpered by this courſe. For that

that obſervation made by *Solomon*, of unthankfulneſs in this kind, hath been found belonging to all countries and ages: [a] *A little city, and few men in it, and a great king came againſt it, and compaſſed it about, and builded forts againſt it: and there was found a poor and wiſe man therein, and he delivered the city by his wiſdom; but none remembered this poor man.* Great monarchs are unwilling to pay great thanks, leſt thereby they ſhould acknowledge themſelves to have been indebted for great benefits, which the unwiſer ſort of them think to ſavour of ſome impotency in themſelves. But in this reſpect they are oftentimes couſened and abuſed: which proves that weakneſs to be in them indeed, whereof they ſo gladly ſhun the opinion. Contrariwiſe, free eſtates are bountiful in giving thanks; yet ſo, as thoſe thanks are not of long endurance. But concerning other profit which their captains have made, by enriching themſelves with the ſpoil of the enemy, they are very inquiſitive to ſearch into it, and to ſtrip the well-deſervers out of their gettings; yea, moſt injuriouſly to rob them of their own, upon a falſe ſuppoſition, that even they, whoſe hands are moſt clean from ſuch offences, have purloined ſomewhat from the common treaſury. Hereof I need not to produce examples, that of the two *Scipio's* being ſo lately recited.

In my late ſoveraign's time, although for the wars, which for her own ſafety ſhe was conſtrained to undertake, her majeſty had no leſs cauſe to uſe the ſervice of martial men both by ſea and land, than any of her predeceſſors for many years had; yet, according to the deſtiny of that profeſſion, I do not remember that any of hers, the lord admiral excepted, her eldeſt and moſt proſperous commander, were either enriched, or otherwiſe honoured, for any ſervice by them performed. And that her majeſty had many adviſed, valiant, and faithful men, the proſperity of her affairs did well witneſs, who in all her days never received diſhonour, by the cowardiſe or infidelity of any commander, by her ſelf choſen and employed.

For as all her old captains by land died poor men; as *Malbey*, *Randol*, *Drewry*, *Reade*, *Wilford*, *Layton*, *Pellam*, *Gilbert*, *Cunſtable*, *Bourchier*, *Barkley*, *Bingham*, and others; ſo thoſe of a later and more dangerous employment, whereof *Norrice* and *Vere* were the moſt famous, and who have done as great honour to our nation (for the means they had) as ever any did: thoſe (I ſay) with many other brave colonels, have left behind them (beſides the reputation which they purchaſed with many travels and wounds) nor title nor eſtate to their poſterity. As for the L. *Thomas Burrough*, and *Peregrine Berty*, L. *Willoughby* of *Eresby*, two very worthy and exceeding valiant commanders, they brought with them into the world their titles andeſtates.

That her majeſty, in the advancement of her men of war, did ſooner believe other men than her ſelf; a diſeaſe unto which many wiſe princes, beſides her ſelf, have been ſubject: I ſay, that ſuch a confidence, although it may ſeem altogether to excuſe her noble nature, yet can it not but in ſome ſort accuſe her of weakneſs. And exceeding ſtrange it were, were not the cauſe manifeſt enough, that where the proſperous actions are ſo exceedingly prized, the actors are ſo unproſperous, and ſo generally neglected. The cauſe, I ſay, which hath wrought one and the ſame effect in all times, and among all nations, is this, that thoſe which are neareſt the perſons of princes (which martial men ſeldom are) can with no good grace commend, or at leaſt magnify a profeſſion far more noble than their own, ſeeing therein they ſhould only mind their maſters of the wrong they did unto others, in giving leſs honour and reward to men of far greater deſerving, and of far greater uſe, than themſelves.

But his majeſty hath already paid the greateſt part of that debt; for, beſides the relieving by penſions all the poorer ſort, he hath honoured more martial men than all the kings of *England* have done for this hundred years.

He hath given a coronet to the Lord *Thomas Howard*, for his chargeable and remarkable ſervice, as well in the year 1588, as at *Calais*, the iſlands, and in our own ſeas; having firſt commanded as a captain, twice admiral of a ſquadron, and twice admiral in chief. His majeſty hath changed the baronies of *Montjoy* and *Burley* into earldoms, and created *Sidney* viſcount, *Knollys*, *Ruſſel*, *Carew*, *Danvers*, *Arundel* of *Warder*, *Gerald*, and *Chicheſter*, barons, for their governments and ſervices in the *Netherlands*, *France*, *Ireland*, and elſewhere.

SECT. III.

Philip *making proviſion for war againſt the* Romans, *deals hardly with many of his own ſubjects. His negotiation with the* Baſtarnæ. *His cruelty. He ſuſpecteth his ſon* Demetrius. Demetrius *accuſed by his brother* Perſeus; *and ſhortly after ſlain by his father's appointment.* Philip *repenteth him of his ſon's death, whom he findeth to have been innocent: and intending to revenge it on* Perſeus, *he dieth.*

QUintius *Martius*, the *Roman* ambaſſador, who travelled up and down, ſeeking what work might be found about *Greece*, had received inſtruction from the ſenate, to uſe the moſt of his diligence in looking into the eſtate of *Macedon*. At his return home, that he might not ſeem to have diſcovered nothing, he told the *fathers*, that *Philip* had done whatſoever they enjoyned him; yet ſo, as it might appear, that ſuch his obedience would laſt no longer, than mere neceſſity ſhould enforce him thereunto. He added further, that all the doings and ſayings of that king did wholly tend unto rebellion, about which he was deviſing. Now it was ſo indeed, that *Philip* much repented him of his faithful obſequiouſneſs to the *Romans*, and foreſaw their intent, which was, to get his kingdom into their own hands, with ſafety of their honour, if they could find convenient means; or otherwiſe (as to him ſeemed apparent) by what means ſoever. He was in an ill caſe, as having been already vanquiſhed by them; having loſt exceedingly both in ſtrength and reputation; having ſubjects that abhorred to hear of war with *Rome*; and having neither neighbour nor friend, that, if he were thereto urged, would adventure to take his part; yet he provided as well as he could deviſe againſt the neceſſity which he daily feared. Such of his own people, as dwelt in the maritime towns, and gave him cauſe to ſuſpect that they would do but bad ſervice againſt the *Romans*, he compelled to forſake their dwellings, and removed them all into *Emathia*. The cities and country whence theſe were tranſplanted, he filled with a multitude of *Thracians*, whoſe faith he thought a great deal more aſſured againſt thoſe enemies that were terrible to the *Macedonians*. Further, he deviſed upon alluring the *Baſtarnæ*, a ſtrong and hardy nation, that dwelt beyond the river of *Danubius*, to abandon their ſeat, and come to him with all their multitude; who, beſides other great rewards, would help them to root out the *Dardanians*, and take poſſeſſion of their

[a] Eccleſ. c. 9. 14, and 15.

country

country. Theſe were like to do him notable ſervice againſt the *Romans*, being not only ſtout fighting men; but ſuch, as being planted in thoſe quarters by him, would bear reſpect unto him alone. The leaſt benefit that could be hoped by their arrival, muſt be the utter extirpation of the *Dardanians*; a people always troubleſome to the kingdom of *Macedon*, whenſoever they found advantage. Neither was it judged any hard matter to perſwade thoſe *Baſtarnæ*, by hope of ſpoil, and other inticements, unto a more deſperate expedition, through *Illyria*, and the countries upon the *Adriatic* ſea, into *Italy* itſelf. It was not known who ſhould withſtand them upon the way. Rather it was thought that the *Scordiſci*, and peradventure ſome others, through whoſe countries they were to paſs, would accompany them againſt the *Romans*, were it only in hope of ſpoil. Now to facilitate the remove of theſe *Baſtarnæ* from their own habitations, into the land of the *Dardanians*, upon the border of *Macedon*; a long and tedious journey unto them, that carried with them their wives and children: *Philip* with gifts did purchaſe the good will of ſome *Thracian* princes, lords of the countries through which they were to paſs. And thus he ſought means to ſtrengthen himſelf, with help of the wild nations, which neither knew the *Romans*, nor were known unto them; ſince he was not like to find aſſiſtance from any civil nation, about the whole compaſs of the *Mediterranean* ſeas. But theſe devices were long ere they took effect: ſo as the *Baſtarnæ* came not before ſuch time as he was dead; his death being the overthrow of that purpoſe. In the mean time he neglected not the training of his men to war, and the exerciſe of them in ſome ſmall expeditions, againſt thoſe wild people that bordered upon him, and ſtood worſt affected toward him.

But theſe his counſels and proceedings were miſerably diſturbed by the calamities that fell upon him, both in his kingdom, and in his own houſe. The families and whole townſhips, which he had cauſed much againſt their wills to forſake their ancient dwellings, and betake themſelves to ſuch new habitations, as he in his diſcretion thought meeter for them, were vehemently offended at the change. Yet their anger at firſt contained itſelf within words: he having done them no great wrong in that alteration, otherwiſe than by neglecting their affection to the places wherein they had long lived: which alſo he did unwillingly, being himſelf over-ruled by neceſſity, that ſeemed apparent. This evil therefore would ſoon have been determined, had not his cruel and vindictive nature made it worſe. He could not pardon words proceeding from juſt ſorrow: but imputed all to traiterous malice; and accordingly ſought revenge where it was needleſs. In his rage he cauſed many to die: among whom, were ſome eminent men; and few or none of them deſervedly. This encreaſed the hatred of the people, and turned their former exclamations into bitter curſes. Which grew the more general; when the king, in a moſt barbarous and baſe fury, miſtruſting all alike whom he had injured, thought himſelf unlike to be ſafe, until he ſhould have maſſacred all the children of thoſe parents, whom tyrannically he had put to death. In the execution of this his unmanly pleaſure, ſome accidents, more tragical than perhaps he could have deſired, gave men cauſe to think (as they could not in reaſon think otherwiſe) that, not without vengeance poured on him from heaven, he felt the like miſery in his own children. It is hard to ſay what the *Romans* intended, in the extraordinary favour which they ſhewed unto *Demetrius*, the king's yonger ſon. It may well be (though it may be alſo ſuſpected) that they had no purpoſe to make and nouriſh diſſenſion between the brethren, but only to cheriſh the virtue and towardlineſs of *Demetrius*: like as we find it in their hiſtories. But their notable favour towards this young prince, and his mutual reſpect of them, bred extream jealouſy in the father's head. If any cuſtom of the *Romans*, the manner of their life, the faſhion of their apparel, or the unſightly contriving and building (as then it was) of the town of *Rome*, were jeſted at in ordinary diſcourſe and table-talk, *Demetrius* was ſure to be preſently on fire, defending and praiſing them, even in ſuch points as rather needed excuſe. This, and his daily converſation with their ambaſſadors, as often as they came, gave his father cauſe to think, that he was no fit partaker of any counſel held againſt them. Wherefore he communicated all his devices with his elder ſon *Perſeus*; who, fearing ſo much leſt his brother ſhould ſtep between him and the ſucceſſion, converted wholly unto his deſtruction, that grace which he had with his father. *Perſeus* was then thirty years old; of a ſtirring ſpirit, though much defective in valour. *Demetrius* was younger by five years, more open and unwary in his actions, yet thought old and crafty enough, to entertain more dangerous practices, than his free ſpeeches diſcovered. The jealous head of the king having entertained ſuch ſuſpicions, that were much encreaſed by the cunning practice of his elder ſon, a ſlight occaſion made the fire break out, that had long lain ſmothered. A muſter, and ceremonious luſtration of the army, was wont to be made at certain times with great ſolemnity. The manner of it at the preſent was thus. They cleft in twain a bitch; and threw the head and fore-part, with the entrails, on the right hand, and the hinder-part on the left hand of the way, which the army was to paſs. This done, the arms of all the kings of *Macedon*, from the very firſt original, were borne before the army. Then followed the king between his two ſons: after him came his own band, and they of his guard; whom all the reſt of the *Macedonians* followed. Having performed other ceremonies, the army was divided into two parts: which, under the king's two ſons, charged each other in manner of a true fight, uſing poles, and the like, inſtead of their pikes and accuſtomed weapons. But in this preſent ſkirmiſh there appeared ſome extraordinary contention for victory: whether happening by chance, or whether the two captains did over-earneſtly ſeek each to get the upper hand, as a betokening of their good ſucceſs in a greater trial. Some ſmall hurt there was done, and wounds given, even with thoſe ſtakes, until *Perſeus*'s ſide at length recoiled. *Perſeus* himſelf was ſorry for this, as it had been ſome bad preſage: but his friends were glad, and thought, that hereof might be made good uſe. They were of the craftier ſort: who perceiving which way the king's favour bent, and how all the courſes of *Demetrius* led unto his own ruin, addreſſed their ſervices to the more malicious and crafty head. And now they ſaid, that this victory of *Demetrius* would afford matter of complaint againſt him; as if the heat of his ambition had carried him beyond the rules of that ſolemn paſtime. Each of the brethren was that day to feaſt his own companions, and each of them had ſpies in the other lodging, to obſerve what was ſaid and done. One of *Perſeus*'s intelligencers behaved himſelf ſo indiſcreetly, that he was taken and well beaten by three or four of *Demetrius*'s men, who turned him out of doors.

After

After ſome ſtore of wine, *Demetrius* told his companions, that he would go viſit his brother, and ſee what cheer he kept. They agreed to his motion, excepting ſuch of them as had ill handled his brother's man: yet he would leave none of his train behind, but forced them all to bear him company. They, fearing to be ill-rewarded for their late diligence, armed themſelves ſecretly to prevent all danger. Yet was there ſuch good eſpial kept, that this their coming armed was forthwith made known to *Perſeus*; who thereupon tumultuouſly locked up his doors, as if he ſtood in fear to be aſſaulted in his houſe. *Demetrius* wondered to ſee himſelf excluded, and fared very angerly with his brother. But *Perſeus*, bidding him be gone as an enemy, and one whoſe murderous purpoſe was detected, ſent him away with entertainment, no better than defiance. The next day the matter was brought before the king. The elder brother accuſed the younger unto the father of them both. Much there was alledged, and in effect the ſame hath been here recited, ſave that by miſconſtruction all was made worſe. But the main point of the accuſation, and which did aggravate all the reſt, was, That *Demetrius* had undertaken this murder, and would perhaps alſo dare to undertake a greater, upon confidence of the *Romans*; by whom he knew that he ſhould be defended and borne out. For *Perſeus* made ſhew, as if the *Romans* did hate him; becauſe he bore a due reſpect unto his father, and was ſorry to ſee him ſpoiled, and daily robbed of ſomewhat by them. And for this cauſe he ſaid it was, that they did animate his brother againſt him: as alſo that they ſought how to win unto *Demetrius* the love of the *Macedonians*. For proof hereof he cited a letter, ſent of late from *T. Quintius* to the king himſelf: whereof the contents were, That he had done wiſely in ſending *Demetrius* to *Rome*; and that he ſhould yet further do well to ſend him thither again, accompanied with a greater and more honourable train of *Macedonian* lords. Hence he enforced, That this counſel was given by *Titus*, of purpoſe to ſhake the allegiance of thoſe, that ſhould wait upon his brother to *Rome*; and make them, forgetting their duties to their old king, become ſervants to this young traitor *Demetrius*. Hereto *Demetrius* made anſwer, by rehearſing all paſſages of the day and night foregoing, in ſuch manner as he remembered them, and had conceived of them: bitterly reprehending *Perſeus*, that converted matters of paſtime, and what was done or ſpoken in wine, to ſuch an accuſation, whereby he ſought his innocent brother's death. As for the love which the *Romans* did bear him; he ſaid that it grew, if not from his own virtue, at leaſtwiſe from their opinion thereof: ſo as by any impious practice, he were more like to loſe it wholly, than to encreaſe it. In this wretched pleading, there wanted not ſuch paſſions, as are incident to fathers, children, and brethren; beſides thoſe that are common to all plaintiffs and defendants, before ordinary judges. The king pronounced like a father, though a jealous father, That he would conclude nothing upon the exceſs or error, whatſoever it were, of one day and night, nor upon one hour's audience of the matter; but upon better obſervation of their lives, manners, and whole carriage of themſelves both in word and deed. And herein he may ſeem to have dealt both juſtly and compaſſionately. But from this time forward, he gave himſelf over wholly to *Perſeus*: uſing ſo little conference with his younger ſon, that when he had matters of weight in hand, ſuch eſpecially as concerned the *Romans*, he liked neither to have him preſent, nor near unto him. Above all, he had eſpecial care to learn out what had paſſed between *Demetrius* and *T. Quintius*, or any other of the *Roman* great ones. And to this purpoſe he ſent ambaſſadors to *Rome*, *Philocles* and *Apelles*; men whom he thought no way intereſted in the quarrels between the brethren; though indeed they altogether depended on the elder, whom they ſaw the more in grace. Theſe brought home with them a letter, ſaid to be written by *Titus* (whoſe ſeal they had counterfeited) unto the king. The contents whereof were, A deprecation for the young prince; with an intimation, as by way of granting it, That his youthful and ambitious deſires had cauſed him to enter into practices unjuſtifiable, againſt his elder brother; which yet ſhould never take effect, for that *Titus* himſelf would not be author, or abettor, of any impious device. This manner of excuſe did forcibly perſwade the king, to think his ſon a dangerous traitor. To ſtrengthen him in this opinion, one *Didas*, to whom he gave *Demetrius* in cuſtody, made ſhew as if he had pitied the eſtate of the unhappy prince; and ſo wrung out of him his ſecret intentions, which he ſhortly diſcovered unto *Philip*. It was the purpoſe of *Demetrius* to fly ſecretly to *Rome*; where he might hope not only to live in ſafety, from his father and brother, but in greater likelihood, than he could find at home, of bettering ſuch claim as he had in reverſion unto the crown of *Macedon*. Whatſoever his hopes and meanings were, all came to nought through the falſhood of *Didas*: who, playing on both hands, offered unto the prince his help for making the eſcape, and in the mean while revealed the whole matter to the king. So *Philip* reſolved to put his ſon to death, without further expence of time. It was thought behoveful to make him away privily, for fear leſt the *Romans* ſhould take the matter to heart, and hold it as a proof, ſufficient at leaſt, of the king's deſpight againſt them, if not of his meaning to renew the war. *Didas* therefore was commanded to rid the unhappy prince out of his life. This accurſed miniſter of his king's unadviſed ſentence, firſt gave poiſon to *Demetrius*; which wrought neither ſo haſtily, nor ſo ſecretly, as was deſired. Hereupon he ſent a couple of ruffians, to finiſh the tragedy: who villainouſly accompliſhed their work by ſmothering that prince, in whoſe life conſiſted the greateſt hope of *Macedon*.

In all the race of *Antigonus* there had not been found a king, that had thus cruelly dealt with any prince of his own blood. The houſes of *Lyſimachus* and *Caſſander* fell either with themſelves, or even upon their heels, by inteſtine diſcord and jealouſies, grounded on deſire of ſoveraign rule, or fear of loſing it. By the like unnatural hatred, had almoſt been cut off the lines of *Ptolemy* and *Seleucus*: which though narrowly they eſcaped the danger, yet were their kingdoms thereby grievouſly diſtempered. Contrariwiſe, it was worthy of extraordinary note, how that upſtart family of the kings of *Pergamus* had raiſed itſelf to marvellous greatneſs, in very ſhort ſpace, from the condition of mere ſlavery: whereof a principal cauſe was, the brotherly love maintained by them, with ſingular commendation of their piety. Neither was *Philip* ignorant of theſe examples; but is ſaid to have propounded the laſt of them, to his own children, as a pattern for them to imitate. Certainly he had reaſon ſo to do: not more in regard of the benefit which his enemies reaped by their concord, than in remembrance

brance of the tender foſterage, wherewith king *Antigonus*'s tutor had faithfully cheriſh'd him in his minority. But he was himſelf of an unmerciful nature; and therefore unmeet to be a good perſuader unto kindly affection. The murders by him done upon many of his friends, together with the barbarous outrages, which, for the ſatiating of his blood-thirſty appetite, he delightfully had committed upon many innocents, both ſtrangers and ſubjects of his own; did now procure vengeance down from heaven, that rewarded him with a draught of his own poiſon. After the death of his ſon, he too late began to examine the crimes that had been objected, and to weigh them in a more equal ballance. Then found he nothing that could give him ſatisfaction, or by good probability induce him to think, that malice had not been contriver of the whole proceſs. His only remaining ſon *Perſeus* could ſo ill diſſemble the pleaſure which he took, in being freed from all danger of competition, as there might eaſily be perceived in him a notable change, proceeding from ſome other cauſe, than the remove of thoſe dangers which he had lately pretended. The *Romans* were now no leſs to be feared than at other times, when he, as having accompliſh'd the moſt of his deſires, left off his uſual trouble of mind, and carefulneſs of making proviſion againſt them. He was more diligently courted, than in former times, by thoſe that well underſtood the difference between a riſing and a ſetting ſun. As for old *Philip*, he was left in a manner deſolate; ſome expecting his death, and ſome ſcarce enduring the tedioufneſs of ſuch expectation. This bred in the king a deep melancholy, and filled his head with ſuſpicious imaginations; the like whereof he had never been ſlow to apprehend. He was much vexed; and ſo much the more, for that he knew neither well to whom, nor perfectly whereof, to complain. One honourable man, a couſin of his, named *Antigonus*, continued ſo true to *Philip*, that he grew thereby hateful to *Perſeus*; and thus becoming ſubject unto the ſame jealous impreſſions which troubled the king, became alſo partaker of his ſecrets. This counſellor, when he found that the anger conceived againſt *Perſeus* would not vent itſelf, and give eaſe to the king, until the truth were known, whether *Demetrius* were guilty or no of the treaſon objected; as alſo that *Philocles* and *Apelles* (the ambaſſadors which had brought from *Rome* that epiſtle of *Flaminius*, that ſerved as the greateſt evidence againſt *Demetrius*) were ſuſpected of forgery in the buſineſs; made diligent inquiry after the truth. In thus doing, he found one *Xichus*, a man moſt likely to have underſtood what falſe dealing was uſed by thoſe ambaſſadors. Him he apprehended, brought to court, and preſented unto the king; ſaying, that this fellow knew all, and muſt therefore be made to utter what he knew. *Xichus*, for fear of torture, utter'd as much as was before ſuſpected; confeſſing againſt himſelf, that he had been employ'd by the ambaſſadors in that wicked piece of buſineſs. No wonder, if the father's paſſions were extreme, when he underſtood, that by the unnatural practice of one ſon, he had ſo wretchedly caſt away another, far more virtuous and innocent. He raged exceedingly againſt himſelf, and withal againſt the authors of the miſchief. Upon the firſt news of this diſcovery, *Apelles* fled away, and got into *Italy*. *Philocles* was taken; and either, foraſmuch as he could not deny it when *Xichus* confronted him, yielded himſelf guilty, or elſe was put to torture. *Perſeus* was now grown ſtronger, than that he ſhould need to fly the country; yet not ſo ſtout as to adventure himſelf into his father's preſence. He kept on the borders of the kingdom, towards *Thrace*, whilſt his father winter'd at *Demetrius*. *Philip* therefore, not hoping to get into his power this his ungracious ſon, took a reſolution to alien the kingdom from him, and confer it upon *Antigonus*. But his weak body, and exceſſive grief of mind, ſo diſabled him in the travel hereto belonging, that ere he could bring his purpoſe to effect, he was conſtrained to yield to nature. He had reigned about two and forty years, always full of trouble; as vexed by others, and vexing himſelf, with continual wars; of which that with the *Romans* was moſt unhappy, and few or none of the reſt found the concluſion, which a wiſe prince would have deſired, of bringing forth together both honour and profit. But for all the evil that befel him, he might thank his own perverſe condition; ſince his uncle king *Antigonus* had left unto him an eſtate ſo great, and ſo well ſettled, as made it eaſy for him to accompliſh any moderate deſires, if he had not abhorred all good counſel. Wherefore he was juſtly puniſh'd, by feeling the difference between the imaginary happineſs of a tyrant, which he affected, and the life of a king, whereof he little cared to perform the duty. His death, even whilſt yet it was only drawing near, was fore-ſignified unto *Perſeus*, by *Calligenes* the phyſician; who alſo concealed it a while from thoſe that were about the court. So *Perſeus* came thither on a ſudden, and took poſſeſſion of the kingdom; which, in fine, he no leſs improvidently loſt, than he had wickedly gotten.

SECT. IV.

How the Baſtarnæ *fell upon* Dardania. *The behaviour of* Perſeus *in the beginning of his reign. Some wars of the* Romans; *and how they ſuffer'd* Maſaniſſa *cruelly to oppreſs the* Carthaginians. *They quarrel with* Perſeus. *They allow not their confederates to make war without their leave obtained. The treaſon of* Callicrates; *whereby all* Greece *became more obnoxious to* Rome *than in former times. Further quarrels to* Perſeus. *He ſeeks friendſhip of the* Acheans, *and is withſtood by* Callicrates. *The* Romans *diſcover their intent of warring upon him.*

IMmediately, upon the death of *Philip*, came the *Baſtarnæ* into *Thrace*; where order had been taken, long before, both for their free paſſage, and for the indemnity of the country. This compact was friendly obſerved, as long as none other was known than that *Philip* did live, to recompenſe all that ſhould be done or ſuſtained for his ſervice. But when it was heard, that a new king reigned in *Macedon*, and not heard withal, that he took any care what became of the enterprize, then was all daſh'd and confounded. The *Thracians* would no longer afford ſo good markets unto theſe ſtrangers, as formerly they had done. On the other ſide, the *Baſtarnæ* would not be contented with reaſon, but became their own carvers. Thus each part, having loſt the rich hopes repoſed in *Philip*, grew careful of thriving in the preſent, with little regard of right or wrong. Within a while they fell to blows; and the *Baſtarnæ* had the upper hand, ſo as they chaſed the *Thracians* out of the plain countries. But the victors made little uſe of their good fortune. For, whether by reaſon of ſome overthrow, received by them, in aſſaulting a place of ſtrength; or whether, becauſe of extreme bad weather, which is ſaid to have afflicted them, as it were miraculouſly; all of them return'd home, ſave thirty thouſand, which pierced on into *Dardania*. How theſe thirty thouſand

ſand ſped in their voyage, I do not find. It ſeems, that, by the careleſs uſing of ſome victories, they drew loſs upon themſelves; and, finally, took that occaſion to follow their companions back into their own country.

As for *Perſeus*, he thought it not expedient, in the novelty of his reign, to embroil himſelf in a war ſo dangerous, as that with the *Romans* was likely to prove. Wherefore he wholly gave his mind to the ſettling of his eſtate; which, well done, he might afterwards accommodate himſelf, as the condition of his affairs ſhould require, either for war or peace. To prevent all danger of rebellion, he quickly took away the life of *Antigonus*. To win love of his people, he ſat perſonally to hear their cauſes in judgment (though herein he was ſo over-diligent and curious, that one might have perceived this his virtue of juſtice to be no better than feigned) as alſo he gratified them with many delightful ſpectacles, magnificently by him ſet forth. Above all, he had care to avoid all neceſſity of war with *Rome*; and therefore made it his firſt work to ſend ambaſſadors thither to renew the league, which he obtained, and was by the ſenate ſaluted king and friend unto the ſtate. Neither was he negligent in ſeeking to purchaſe goodwill of the *Greeks*, and other his neighbours; but was rather herein ſo exceſſively bountiful, that it may ſeem a wonder, how in few years, to his utter ruin, he became ſo griping and tenacious. His fear was indeed the maſtering paſſion which over-ruled him, and changed him into ſo many ſhapes, as made it hard to diſcern which of his other qualities were naturally his own. For proof of this, there is requiſite no more than the relation of his actions paſs'd and following.

The *Romans* continued, as they had long, buſy in wars againſt the *Spaniards* and *Ligurians*; people often vanquiſhed, and as often breaking forth into new rebellion. They alſo conquered *Iſtria*; ſubdued the rebelling *Sardinians*; and had ſome quarrels, though to little effect, with the *Illyrians* and others. Over the *Carthaginians* they bore (as ever ſince the victory) a heavy hand; and ſuffered *Maſaniſſa* to take from them what he liſted. The *Carthaginians*, like obedient vaſſals to *Rome*, were afraid, though in defence of their own, to take arms, from which they were bound by an article of peace, except it were with leave of the *Romans*. *Maſaniſſa* therefore had great advantage over them, and was not ignorant how to uſe it. He could get poſſeſſion by force of whatſoever he deſired, ere their complaining ambaſſadors could be at *Rome*; and then were the *Romans* not hardly intreated, to leave things as they found them.

So had he once dealt before, in taking from them the country of *Emporia*; and ſo did he uſe them again and again, with pretence of title, where he had any; otherwiſe, without it. *Gala*, the father of *Maſaniſſa*, had won ſome land from the *Carthaginians*; which afterwards *Syphax* won from *Gala*; and, within a while, reſtored to the right owners, for love of his wife *Sophonisba*, and of *Aſdrubal*, his father-in-law. This did *Maſaniſſa* take from them by force, and by the *Romans*, to whoſe judgment the caſe was referred, was permitted quietly to hold it. The *Carthaginians* had now good experience, how beneficial it was for their eſtate, to uſe all manner of ſubmiſſive obedience to *Rome*. They had ſcarcely digeſted this injury, when *Maſaniſſa* came upon them again, and took from them above ſeventy towns and caſtles, without any colour of right. Hereof by their ambaſſadors they made lamentable complaint unto the *Roman* ſenate. They ſhewed how grievouſly they were oppreſſed, by reaſon of two articles in their league; that they ſhould not make war out of their own lands; nor with any confederates of the *Romans*. Now, although it were ſo, that they might lawfully withſtand the violence of *Maſaniſſa's* invading their country, howſoever he was pleaſed to call it his; yet ſince he was confederate with the *Romans*, they durſt not preſume to bear defenſive arms againſt him, but ſuffered themſelves to be eaten up, for fear of incurring the *Romans* indignation. Wherefore they intreated, that either they might have fairer juſtice, or be ſuffered to defend their own by ſtrong hand: or at leaſt, if right muſt wholly give place to favour, that the *Romans* yet would be pleaſed to determine how far forth *Maſaniſſa* ſhould be allowed to proceed in theſe outrages. If none of theſe petitions could be obtained, then deſired they that the *Romans* would let them underſtand wherein they had offended ſince the time that *Scipio* gave them peace; and vouchſafe to inflict on them ſuch puniſhment, as they themſelves in honour ſhould think meet; for that better and more to their comfort it were, to ſuffer at once, what ſhould be appointed by ſuch judges, than continually to live in fear, and none otherwiſe draw breath, than at the mercy of this *Numidian* hangman. And herewithal the ambaſſadors threw themſelves proſtrate on the ground, weeping, in hopes to move compaſſion. Here may we behold the fruits of their envy to that valiant houſe of the *Barchines*; of their irreſolution, in proſecuting a war ſo important as *Hannibal* made for them in *Italy*; and of their halfpenny-worthing, in matter of expence, when they had adventured their whole eſtate in the purchaſe of a great empire. Now are they ſervants, even to the ſervants of thoſe men, whoſe fathers they had often chaſed, ſlain, taken, and ſold as bond-ſlaves in the ſtreets of *Carthage*, and in all cities of *Afric* and *Greece*. Now have they enough of that *Roman* peace, which *Hanno* ſo often and ſo earneſtly deſired. Only they want peace with *Maſaniſſa*, once their mercenary, and now their maſter, or rather their tormentor, out of whoſe cruel hands they beſeech their maſters to take the office of correcting them. In ſuch caſe are they, and adore the *Romans*, whom they ſee flouriſhing in ſuch proſperity as might have been their own. But the *Romans* had far better intreated *Varro*, who loſt the battel at *Cannæ*; than *Hannibal*, that won it, was uſed by the *Carthaginians*: they had freely beſtowed, every man of them all his private riches, upon the common-wealth; and employed their labours for the publick, without craving recompence: as alſo they had not thought it much, though being in extream want, to ſet out an army into *Spain*, at what time the enemy lay under their own walls. Theſe were no *Carthaginian* virtues: and therefore the *Carthaginians*, having fought againſt their betters, muſt patiently endure the miſeries belonging to the vanquiſhed. Their pitiful behaviour bred peradventure ſome commiſeration, yet their tears may ſeem to have been miſtruſted, as proceeding no leſs from envy to the *Romans*, than from any feeling of their own calamity. They thought themſelves able to fight with *Maſaniſſa*: which eſtimation of their forces was able to make them, after a little while, enter into compariſons with *Rome*. Wherefore they obtained no ſuch leave as they ſought, of defending their own right by arms: but contrariwiſe, when without leave obtained they preſumed ſo far, the deſtruction of *Carthage* was thought an eaſy puniſhment of that offence. At the preſent, they received a gentle anſwer; though they had otherwiſe little amends. *Guluſſa* the

the ſon of *Maſaniſſa* was then in *Rome*; and had not as yet craved audience. He was therefore called before the ſenate, where he was demanded the reaſon of his coming; and had related unto him the complaint made by the *Carthaginians* againſt his father. He anſwered, That his father, not being throughly aware of any ambaſſadors thither ſent from *Carthage*, had therefore not given him inſtructions, how to deal in that buſineſs. Only it was known, that the *Carthaginians* had held council divers nights, in the temple of *Æſculapius:* whereupon he himſelf was diſpatched away to *Rome*, there to entreat the ſenate, that theſe common enemies of the *Romans* and of his father, might not be overmuch truſted; eſpecially againſt his father, whom they hated moſt maliciouſly, for his conſtant faith to the people of *Rome*. This anſwer gave little ſatisfaction. Wherefore the ſenate replied, that for *Maſaniſſa*'s ſake they had done, and would do, whatſoever was reaſonable; but that it ſtood not with their juſtice, to allow of this his violence, in taking from the *Carthaginians* thoſe lands, which by the covenants of the league, were granted unto them freely to enjoy. With this mild rebuke they diſmiſſed *Guluſſa*; beſtowing on him friendly preſents (as alſo they did on the *Carthaginians*) and willing him to tell his father, that he ſhould do well to ſend ambaſſadors, more fully inſtructed in this matter. This happened when the *Macedonian* war was even ready to begin: at which time the *Romans* were not willing too much to offend, either the *Carthaginians* (for fear of urging them unſeaſonably to rebellion) or *Maſaniſſa*, at whoſe hands they expected no little help. So were they aided both by the *Carthaginians*, and *Maſaniſſa:* by the *Carthaginians*, partly for fear, partly for hope of better uſage in the future; by *Maſaniſſa*, in way of thankfulneſs; though if it had happened (which was unlikely) that they ſhould be vanquiſhed; he made none other account, than that all *Afric* round about him and *Carthage* therewithal ſhould be his own.

In the midſt of all theſe cares, the *Romans* had not been unmindful of *Perſeus*. They viſited him daily with ambaſſadors: that is, with honourable ſpies to obſerve his behaviour. Theſe he entertained kindly at firſt, until (which fell out ere long) he perceived whereto their diligence tended. Firſt, they quarrelled with him about the troubles in *Dardania:* neither would they take any ſatisfaction, until the *Baſtarnæ* were thence gone; though he proteſted, that he had not ſent for them. Afterwards, they pryed narrowly into his doings; and were no leſs ill contented with good offices, by him done to ſundry of his neighbours, than with thoſe wrongs, which (they ſaid) that he did unto other ſome. Where he did harm to any; they called it making war upon their friends: where he did good; they called ſuch his bounty, ſeeking friends to take his part againſt them. The *Dolopians*, his ſubjects (upon what occaſion it is uncertain) rebelled, and with exquiſite torments ſlew *Euphranor*, whom he had appointed their governour. It ſeems that *Euphranor* had played the tyrant among them. For they were a people without ſtrength to reſiſt the *Macedonian:* and therefore unlikely to have preſumed ſo far; unleſs either they had been extreamly provoked, or elſe were ſecretly animated by the *Romans*. Whatſoever it was that bred this courage in them; *Perſeus* did ſoon allay it, and reclaim them by ſtrong hand. But the *Romans* took very angrily this preſumption of the king, even as if he had invaded ſome country of their *Italian* confederates, and not corrected his own rebels at home. Fain they would have had him to draw in the ſame yoke with the *Carthaginians*; whereto had he humbled once his neck, they could themſelves have done the part of *Maſaniſſa*; though *Eumenes*, or ſome other fit for that purpoſe, had been wanting. And to this effect, they told him, that conditions of the league between them were ſuch, as made it unlawful, both to his father heretofore, and now to him, to take arms without their licence firſt obtained.

To the ſame paſs they would alſo fain have reduced the *Greeks*, and generally all their adherents; even ſuch as had entred into league with them upon equal terms: whom uſually they rewarded with a frown, whenſoever they preſumed to right themſelves by force of arms, without ſeeking firſt the oracle at *Rome*. Hereof the *Acheans* had good experience: whoſe confidence in their proper ſtrength made them otherwhiles bold to be their own carvers; and whoſe hope of extraordinary favour at *Rome* cauſed them the more willingly to refer their cauſes to arbitrement. For, when they went about to have chaſtiſed the *Meſſenians* by war, *T. Quintius* rebuked them, as too arrogant in taking ſuch a work in hand, without his authority: yet by his authority he ended the matter, wholly to their good liking. Probably at other times were they reprehended, even with lordly threats, when they took upon them to carry any buſineſs of importance, by their own power, without ſtanding unto the good grace of the *Romans*. Who nevertheleſs, upon ſubmiſſion, were apt enough to do them right. Thus were they tamed by little and little, and taught to forget their abſolute liberty, as by which they were not like to thrive; eſpecially in uſurping the practice of arms, which belonged only to the imperial city. In learning this [a] hard leſſon, they were ſuch untoward ſcholars, that they needed, and not long after felt very ſharp correction. Yet, was there no ſmall part of blame to be imputed unto their maſters. For the *Roman* ſenate, being deſirous to humble the *Acheans*, refuſed not only to give them ſuch aid as they requeſted, and as they challenged by the tenor of the league between them; but further, with a careleſs inſolency, rejected this honeſt and reaſonable petition, that the enemy might not be ſupplied from *Italy* with victuals or arms. Herewith not content, the fathers, as wearied with dealing in the affairs of *Greece*, pronounced openly, that if the *Argives*, *Lacedemonians*, or *Corinthians*, would revolt from the *Acheans*, they themſelves would think it a buſineſs no way concerning them. This was preſently after the death of *Philopœmen*, at what time, it was believed, that the commonwealth of *Achaia* was like to fall into much diſtreſs, were it not upheld by countenance of the *Romans*. All this notwithſtanding, when *Lycortas*, pretor of the *Acheans*, had utterly ſubdued the *Meſſenians* far ſooner than was expected; and when as not only no town rebelled from the *Acheans*, but many entered into their corporation; then did the *Roman*, with an ill-favour'd grace, tell the ſame ambaſſadors, to whoſe petition they had made ſuch bad anſwer (and who as yet were not gone out of the city) that they had ſtreightly forbidden all mannner of ſuccour to be carried to *Meſſene*. Thus thinking, by a feigned gravity, to have ſerved their own turns, they manifeſted their condition; both to ſet on the weaker, againſt the

[a] Polyb. legat. 51. & 53.

ſtronger

ſtronger and more ſuſpected; and alſo to aſſume unto themſelves a ſoveraign power, in directing all matters of war, which diſſemblingly they would have ſeemed to neglect. In like manner dealt they with all their confederates: not permitting any of them to make war, whether offenſive or defenſive; though it were againſt meer ſtrangers; without interpoſing the authority of the ſenate and people of *Rome:* unleſs peradventure ſometimes they winked at ſuch violence, as did help towards the accompliſhment of their own ſecret malice. Now theſe *Roman* arts howſoever many (for gainful or timerous reſpects) would ſeem to underſtand them; yet were generally diſpleaſing unto all men endued with free ſpirits. Only the *Athenians*, once the moſt turbulent city in *Greece*, having neither ſubjects of their own that might rebel, nor power wherewith to bring any into ſubjection; for want of more noble argument wherein to practiſe their eloquence that was become the whole remainder of their ancient commendations, were much delighted in flattering the moſt mighty. So they kept themſelves in grace with the *Romans*, remained free from all trouble, until the war of *Mithridates:* being men unfit for action, and thereby innocent; yet bearing a part in many great actions, as gratulators of the *Roman* victories, and pardon-cravers for the vanquiſhed. Such were the *Athenians* become. As for thoſe other common-weals and kingdoms, that with over-nice diligence ſtrove to preſerve their liberties and lands from conſuming by piece-meal: they were to be devoured whole, and ſwallowed up at once. Eſpecially the *Macedonian*, as the moſt unpliant, and wherein many of the *Greeks* began to have affiance, was neceſſarily to be made an example, how much better it were to bow than to break.

Neither *Perſeus*, nor the *Romans* were ignorant, how the *Greeks* at this time ſtood affected. *Perſeus*, by reaſon of his near neighbourhood, and of the daily commerce between them and his ſubjects, could not want good information of all that might concern him in their affairs. He well knew, that all of them now apprehended the danger, which *Philopœmen* had long ſince foretold; of the miſerable ſubjection, whereinto *Greece* was likely to be reduced by the *Roman* patronage. Indeed they not only perceived the approaching danger: but, as being tenderly ſenſible of their liberty, felt themſelves grieved with the preſent ſubjection, whereto already they were become obnoxious: wherefore though none of them had the courage, in matters of the publick to fall out with the *Romans:* yet all of them had the care, to chooſe among themſelves none other magiſtrates, than ſuch as affected the good of their country, and would for no ambition, or other ſervile reſpect, be flatterers of the greatneſs which kept all in fear. Thus it ſeemed likely, that all domeſtical conſpiracies would ſoon be at an end; when honeſty and love of the common-weal, became the faireſt way to preferment. Of this careful proviſion for the ſafety of *Greece*, the *Romans* were not throughly advertiſed: either becauſe things were diligently concealed from their ambaſſadors, whom all men knew to be little better than ſpies; or becauſe little account was made of that intelligence, which was brought in by ſuch traytors (of whom every city in *Greece* had too many) as were men unregarded among their own people, and therefore more like to ſpeak maliciouſly than truly; or perhaps becauſe the ambaſſadors themſelves, being all ſenators, and capable of the greateſt office of charge, had no will to find out other matter of trouble, than was fitting to their own deſires of employment. But it is hard to conceal that which many know, from thoſe that are feared or flattered by many. The *Acheans* being to ſend ambaſſadors to *Rome*, that ſhould both excuſe them, as touching ſome point wherein they refuſed to obey the ſenate; and inform the ſenate better in the ſame buſineſs; choſe one *Callicrates*, among others, to go in that ambaſſage. By their making choiſe of ſuch a man; one may perceive the advantage, which miſchievous wretches, who commonly are forward in purſuing their vile deſires, have againſt the plain ſort of honeſt men, that leaſt earneſtly thruſt themſelves into the troubleſome buſineſs of the weal publick. For this *Callicrates* was in ſuch wiſe tranſported with ambition; that he choſe much rather to betray his country, than to let any other be of more authority than himſelf therein. Wherefore, inſtead of well diſcharging his credence, and alledging what was meeteſt in juſtification of his people: he uttered a quite contrary tale; and ſtrongly encouraged the *Romans* to oppreſs both the *Acheans*, and all the reſt of *Greece*, with a far more heavy hand. He told the ſenate, that it was high time for them, to look unto the ſettling of their authority, among his froward countrymen; if they meant not wholly to forego it. For now there was taken up a cuſtom, to ſtand upon points of confederacy and laws: as if theſe were principally to be had in regard; any injunction from *Rome* notwithſtanding. Hence grew it, that the *Acheans* both now, and at other times, did what beſt pleaſed themſelves, and anſwered the *Romans* with excuſes: as if it were enough to ſay, that by ſome condition of league, or by force of ſome law, they were diſcharged, or hindred, from obeying the decrees of the ſenate. This would not be ſo, if he, and ſome other of his opinion, might have their wills: who ceaſed not to affirm, that no columns or monuments erected, nor no ſolemn oath of the whole nation, to ratifie the obſervance of confederacy or ſtatute, ought to be of force, when the *Romans* willed the contrary. But it was even the fault of the *Romans* themſelves, that the multitude refuſed to give ear unto ſuch perſwaſions. For howſoever in popular eſtates, the ſound of liberty uſed to be more plauſible, than any diſcourſe tending againſt it: yet if they, which undertook the maintenance of an argument, ſeeming never ſo bad, were ſure by their ſo doing, to procure their own good; the number of them would increaſe apace, and they become the prevalent faction. It was therefore ſtrange, how the *fathers* could ſo neglect the advancement of thoſe, that ſought wholly to enlarge the amplitude of the *Roman* majeſty. More wiſely, though with ſeditious and rebellious purpoſe, did the *Greeks*; who many times, yea, and ordinarily, conferred great honours, upon men otherwiſe of little account or deſert; only for having uttered ſome brave words againſt the *Romans*. The *fathers*, hearing theſe and the like reaſons, wherewith he exhorted them to handle roughly thoſe that were obſtinate, and by cheriſhing their friends, to make their party ſtrong; reſolved to follow this good counſel in every point, yea, to depreſs all thoſe that held with the right, and to ſet up their own followers, were it by right or wrong. And to this end, [a] they not only dealt thenceforth more peremptorily with the *Acheans*, than had been their manner in former times; but wrote at the preſent unto all cities of

[a] Polyb. legat 78.

Greece, requiring them to ſee that their mandate (which was concerning the reſtitution of thoſe that were baniſhed out of *Lacedemon*) ſhould be fulfilled. Particularly in behalf of *Callicrates*; they adviſed all men, to be ſuch, and ſo affected, as he was, in their ſeveral common-weals. With this diſpatch, *Callicrates* returned home a joyful man: having brought his country into the way of ruin, but himſelf into the way of preferment. Nevertheleſs he forbore to vaunt himſelf, of his eloquence uſed in the ſenate. Only he ſo reported his ambaſſage, that all men became fearful of the danger, wherewith he threatened thoſe that ſhould preſume to oppoſe the *Romans*. By ſuch arts he obtained to be made pretor of the *Acheans*: in which magiſtracy, as in all his courſes following, he omitted nothing, that might ſerve to manifeſt his ready obſequiouſneſs unto thoſe whom he had made his patrons.

Now as the *Romans* by threatning terms won many flatterers, and loſt as many true friends: ſo *Perſeus* on the other ſide, thinking by liberal gifts, and hopeful promiſes, to aſſure unto himſelf thoſe that ill could brook his enemies; got indeed a multitude of partakers, though little honeſter than his enemies had. Thus were all the cities of *Greece* diſtracted with factions: ſome holding with the *Romans*; ſome with the *Macedonian*; and ſome few, reſpecting only the good of the eſtates wherein they lived. Hereat the lords of the ſenate were highly offended; and thought it an indignity not ſufferable, That a king, no better than their vaſſal, ſhould dare to become head of a faction againſt them. This therefore muſt be reckoned in the number of his treſpaſſes: whereof if not any one alone, yet all of them together, ſhall afford them juſt occaſion to make war upon him. *Perſeus* having finiſhed his buſineſs among the *Dolopians*, made a journey to *Apollo*'s temple at *Delphi*. He took his army along with him; yet went, and returned, in ſuch peaceable and friendly wiſe, that no place was the worſe for his journey, but the good affection towards him generally increaſed thereby. With thoſe that were in his way, he dealt himſelf; to ſuch as lay further off, he ſent ambaſſadors, or letters: praying them, That the memory of all wrongs whatſoever, done by his father, might be buried with his father; ſince his own meaning was to hold friendſhip ſincerely with all his neighbours. The *Romans* perhaps could have been pleaſed better, if he had behaved himſelf after a contrary faſhion, and done ſome acts of hoſtility in his paſſage. Yet, as if he ought not to have taken ſuch a journey, without their licence; this alſo was made a valuable matter, and caſt into the heap of his faults. He laboured greatly to recover the love of the *Acheans*: which his father had ſo loſt, that by a ſolemn decree, they forbid any *Macedonian* to enter their territories. It was jealouſy perhaps no leſs than hatred, which cauſed them, at the firſt, to make ſuch a decree. For howſoever *Philip* had by many vile acts, eſpecially by the death of the two *Arati*, given them cauſe to abhor him: yet in the publick adminiſtration of their eſtate, he had, for the more part, been to them ſo beneficial, that not without much ado, and at length, without any general conſent, they reſolved to forſake him. Wherefore it was needful, even for preſervation of concord among them, to uſe all circumſpection; that he might not, by his agents, negotiate and hold intelligence with any, in a country towards him ſo doubtfully affected: eſpecially when by hearkning to his meſſages, they might make themſelves ſuſpected by their new friends. But the continuance of this decree beyond the time of war, and when all danger of innovation was paſt, was uncivil, if not inhumane, as nouriſhing deadly hatred, without leaving means of reconciliation. And hereof the *Acheans* reaped no good fruit. For although they were not in like ſort forbidden the kingdom of *Macedon*: yet underſtanding what would be due to them, if they ſhould adventure thither, none of them durſt ſet foot therein. Hence it came to paſs, that their bondmen, knowing a ſafe harbour, out of which their maſters could not fetch them, ran daily away, in great numbers; exceedingly to the loſs of ſuch, as made of their ſlaves very profitable uſe. But *Perſeus* took hold upon this occaſion: as fitly ſerving to pacify thoſe, whoſe enmity fain he would have changed into love. He therefore apprehended all theſe fugitives to ſend them home again: and wrote unto the *Acheans*, That as for good-will unto them, he had taken pains to reſtore back their ſervants; ſo ſhould they do very well to take order for keeping them, that hereafter they might not run away again. His meaning was readily underſtood, and his letters kindly accepted by the greater part; being openly rehearſed by the pretor, before the council. But *Callicrates* took the matter very angrily: and bade them be adviſed what they did: for that this was none other than a plain device, to make them depart from the friendſhip of the *Romans*. Herewithal he took upon him, ſomewhat liberally, to make the *Acheans* before-hand acquainted with the war, that was coming upon *Perſeus*, from *Rome*. He told them, how *Philip* had made preparations for the ſame war; how *Demetrius* had been made away; becauſe of his good affection to the *Romans*; and how *Perſeus* had, ſince his being king, done many things, tending to the breach of peace. Briefly he rehearſed all thoſe matters, which were afterwards alledged by the *Romans*; the invaſion of the *Baſtarnæ*, upon the *Dardanians*; the king's journey againſt the *Dolopians*; his voyage to *Delphi*, and finally his peaceable behaviour, which was (he ſaid) a dangerous temptation of men to his party. Wherefore he adviſed them, to expect the event of things, and not over-haſtily to enter into any degree of friendſhip with the *Macedonians*. Hereto good anſwer was made by the pretor's brother: That *Callicrates* was too earneſt, in ſo light a matter; and that, being neither one of the king's cabinet, nor of the *Roman* ſenate, he made himſelf too well acquainted with all that had paſſed, or was like to follow. For it was well known, that *Perſeus* had renewed his league with the *Romans*; that he was by them ſaluted king, and friend to the eſtate; and that he had lovingly entertained their ambaſſadors. This being ſo: why might not the *Acheans*, as well as the *Etolians*, *Theſſalians*, *Epirots*, and all the *Greeks*, hold with him ſuch correſpondence, as common humanity required? Nevertheleſs *Callicrates* was grown a man ſo terrible, by his *Roman* acquaintance, that they durſt not over-ſtifly gainſay him. Therefore the matter was referred unto further deliberation; and anſwer made the whilſt, That ſince the king had only ſent a letter without an ambaſſador, they knew not how to reſolve. Better it was to ſay thus, than that they were afraid to do as they thought moſt reaſonable and convenient. But when *Perſeus*, herewith not contented, would needs urge them further, and ſend ambaſſadors: then were they fain, without any good pretence, to put on a countenance of anger, and deny to give audience: which was proof ſufficient (to one that could underſtand)

derſtand) of the condition wherein they lived. For hearkening to this advice of *Callicrates*; they were ſoon after highly commended by a *Roman* ambaſſador: whereby it became apparent, that the *Romans* intended war upon the [a] *Macedonian*; though hitherto no cauſe of war was given.

SECT. V.

How Eumenes, *king of* Pergamus, *was buſied with* Pharnaces, *the* Rhodians, *and others. His hatred to the* Macedonian; *whom he accuſeth to the* Roman *ſenate. The ſenate honours him greatly, and contemns his enemies the* Rhodians; *with the cauſes thereof. The unuſual ſtoutneſs of the* Macedonian *ambaſſadors.* Perſeus's *attempt upon* Eumenes. *The brotherly love between* Eumenes *and* Attalus. Perſeus's *device to poiſon ſome of the* Roman *ſenators; whereupon they decree war againſt him, and ſend him defiance. Other things concerning the juſtice of this war.*

EUmenes, king of *Pergamus*, had been troubled about theſe times by the kings *Pharnaces* and *Mithridates*, his neighbours. He had taken the right courſe in making firſt his complaint to the *Romans*; by whom he was animated with comfortable words and promiſes, [b] That they, by their authority, would end the buſineſs to his content. But, in concluſion, by the help of the kings *Pruſias* and *Ariarathes*, he ended the war himſelf; and brought his enemies to ſeek and accept peace, on ſuch conditions as pleaſed him to give them. After this, being at good leiſure, he began to conſider how the affairs of *Macedon* ſtood under *Perſeus*. His hatred to *Perſeus* was very great; and therefore he was glad to underſtand, that the hatred of the *Romans*, to the ſame his enemy, was as great, and withal notorious. Now, beſides his ancient and hereditary quarrel with the *Macedonian*, it vexed him exceedingly, that his own honours (whereof the *Greeks*, prodigal in that kind, had heaped immoderate ſtore on his father and him) began to wax every where ſtale; whilſt *Perſeus*, either by his currying favour, or by the envy borne to the *Romans*, had gotten their beſt liking and wiſhes. For deſpight of this indignity, he ſtirred up the *Lycians* againſt the *Rhodians*, his old friends; and in helping theſe rebels was ſo violent, that he proceeded, in a manner, to open war. But ſmall pleaſure found he in theſe poor and indirect courſes of revenge. The *Lycians* could not be ſaved by his patronage from ſevere and cruel chaſtiſement, given to them by the *Rhodians*. This rendered him contemptible; as likewiſe his acts of hoſtility, little different from robberies, made him hateful to thoſe which loved him before. [c] As for his honours in the cities of *Greece*, they not only continued falling into neglect; but were abrogated by a decree of the *Acheans*, as too unmeaſured, miſ-beſeeming them to give, and affected by him beyond the proportion of his deſervings. [d] All this (which he needed not to have regarded, had he not been too vainly ambitious) befel him, eſpecially for his being over-ſerviceable to the *Romans*, and for his malice to that noble kingdom; which, if it fell, the liberty of *Greece* was not like to ſtand. Now for the redreſs hereof; he thought it in vain to ſtrive any longer with bounty, againſt ſuch an adverſary, as by hopeful promiſes alone, without any great performance, had over-topped him in the general favour. And therefore he reſolved even to overturn the foundations of this popularity, by inducing the *Romans* utterly to take away from the eyes of men, this idol, the *Macedonian* kingdom, which all ſo vainly worſhipped. Neither would it prove a difficult matter, to perſwade thoſe that were already deſirous: rather he was like to be highly thanked, for ſetting forward their wiſhes; and perhaps to be recompenſed with ſome piece of the kingdom, as he had been rewarded for the like ſervice, when *Antiochus* was vanquiſhed.

To this end he made a ſecond voyage to *Rome*; where, though he had little to ſay, which they knew not before; yet his words were heard with ſuch attention, as if they had contained ſome ſtrange novelty, and ſo pondered by the fathers, as if the weight of them were to turn the ballance, that before was equal. The death of *Demetrius*; the expedition of the *Baſtarnæ* into *Dardania*; that of *Perſeus* himſelf againſt the *Dolopians*, and to *Delphi*; the great eſtimation of the *Macedonian* in *Greece*; his intermedling in buſineſs of his neighbours; his riches, and his great proviſions; were all the material points of *Eumenes*'s diſcourſe. Only he deſcended unto particulars, having ſearched into all (as he profeſſed) like unto a ſpy. He ſaid, that *Perſeus* had thirty thouſand foot, and five thouſand horſe of his own; money in a readineſs to entertain ten thouſand mercenaries for ten years; arms to furniſh a number thrice as great; the *Thracians* his friends at hand, ready at a call, to bring him ſoldiers as many as he ſhould require; and that he prepared victuals for ten years, becauſe he would not be driven, either to live upon ſpoil, or to take from his own ſubjects. Herewithal he prayed them to conſider, that king *Seleucus*, the ſon and ſucceſſor of *Antiochus* the great, had given his daughter *Laodice* in marriage to *Perſeus*; *Perſeus* not wooing, but *Seleucus* offering the match; that king *Pruſias* of *Bithynia*, by earneſt ſuit, had gotten to wife the ſiſter of *Perſeus*; and that theſe marriages were ſolemnized with great concourſe of ambaſſages from all quarters. Neither ſpared he to tell them (though ſeeming loth to utter it plainly) that even the envy to their eſtate was the cauſe, why many that could not endure to hear of amity with *Philip*, were now grown marvellouſly well affected to his ſon. All this, and ſome facts of *Perſeus*, which might either be denied, or juſtified (as that he had procured the death of ſome which were friends to the *Romans*; and that he had expelled *Abrypolis* the *Illyrian*, who invaded *Macedon*, out of his kingdom, or lordſhip) *Eumenes* failed not to amplifie unto the moſt; ſaying, that he thought it his duty to forewarn them; ſince it would be to himſelf a great ſhame, if *Perſeus* got the ſtart of him, and were in *Italy* making war upon the *Romans*, ere *Eumenes* could come thither to tell them of the danger.

It were too great folly, to believe that the *Romans* ſtood in fear of *Perſeus*, leſt he ſhould ſet upon them in *Italy*. Nevertheleſs, foraſmuch as they loved not to make war without fair pretence, not only of wrong done to them or their aſſociates, but of further hurt intended, great thanks were given to *Eumenes*, who had every way furniſhed them with ſuch goodly colour to beautify their intendment. Now tho' it were ſo, that he told them little elſe than what they knew before; yet his perſon, and the manner of his coming, made all ſeem greater. For, if upon any relation made by their own ambaſſadors, or upon tales deviſed by their flatterers and ſpies, they had warred againſt *Perſeus*, ere he had committed any open act of hoſtility

[a] Liv. lib. 42. [b] Polyb. legat. 56, & 59. [c] Polyb. legat. 74. [d] Liv. lib. 42.

againſt

againſt them, their injuſtice and oppreſſion would have been moſt manifeſt. But when the wrongs to them done were ſo notorious, and the danger threatning them ſo terrible, that ſuch a prince as *Eumenes* came out of his own kingdom, as far as from *Aſia*, to bid them look to themſelves, who could blame them, if they took the ſpeedieſt order to obtain their own right and ſecurity? Toward this juſtification of the war, and magnifying the neceſſity that enforced them thereto, their more than uſual curioſity, in concealing what *Eumenes* had uttered in the ſenate, when they could not but underſtand that his errand was well known, helped not a little. The *Macedonian* and *Rhodian* ambaſſadors were, at *Rome*, provided of anſwers to the words which they knew before-hand that he would ſpeak; and with matter of recrimination. The vanity either of him, or of ſome about him, ſeems to have diſcloſed all, when the warineſs of the *fathers*, in hiding that which all men knew, made a notable ſhew of ſome fearful apprehenſion; againſt which, it behoved their wiſdom to neglect no poſſible remedy. Wherefore, careleſs audience was given to the *Rhodian* ambaſſadors, who accuſed *Eumenes*, as one more troubleſome to *Aſia*, than *Antiochus* had ever been, and a provoker of the *Lycians* to rebellion. The *Rhodians* had, with great pomp, conveyed by ſea unto *Perſeus*, his bride *Laodice*; which friendly office, as the *Macedonian* bountifully requited, ſo the *Romans* deſpitefully accepted. [a] Hence it grew, that when the *Lycians*, as already vanquiſhed, were ſettling themſelves in their obedience to the people of *Rhodes*, ambaſſadors came from *Rome* with ſtrange news, which gave new life to the rebellion. For the ſenate pronounced, that it ſtood not with the manner of the *Romans*, to alien quite from their own protection any [b] people or nation by them vanquiſhed; and that the *Lycians* were by them aſſigned unto thoſe of *Rhodes*, not as mere vaſſals, but as dependants and aſſociates. For proof hereof, they referred themſelves unto the commentaries of the ten ambaſſadors, whom they had ſent to diſpoſe of things in *Aſia*, after the victory againſt king *Antiochus*. Hereat *Eumenes*, *Maſaniſſa*, the *Etolians*, and all other kings or eſtates, that were beholden to *Rome* for increaſing the number of their ſubjects, had cauſe to find themſelves aggrieved, if they well conſidered the matter; ſince, by force of this, or the like decree, thoſe their ſubjects might eaſily be made their fellows, whenſoever it ſhould pleaſe the ſenate; though it were ſo, that all men knew the preſent meaning of the ſenate, which was only to plague the *Rhodians* for their good-will to *Perſeus*, by ſetting them and the *Lycians* together by the ears. The *fathers* could therefore ſee no reaſon to diſlike *Eumenes*, upon this complaint made by the *Rhodian* ambaſſadors; which indeed more nearly touched themſelves. Rather, they honoured the king ſo much the more, for that others (as they would needs take it) conſpired againſt him, becauſe of his love to *Rome*.

But the *Macedonian* embaſſy they heard not ſo careleſly, as angrily; though, peradventure, it well contented them to find cauſe of anger. For whereas at other times, all care had been taken to pacify them with gentle words and excuſes; now heard they plainer language, and were told, that king *Perſeus* deſired much to give them ſatisfaction concerning any deed or word of his, that might ſavour of hoſtility; but that if his travel in this kind proved vain, then would he be ready to defend himſelf by arms, and ſtand to the chance of war, which often falls out contrary to expectation. Theſe big words may ſeem to have proceeded from the vehemency of *Harpalus*, that was chief of the ambaſſadors, rather than from inſtruction, given by the king, with whoſe faint heart they agreed not. Yet was there good reaſon why *Perſeus* himſelf might, at this time, think to ſpeed better by a ſhew of daring, than he was like to do by any ſubmiſſion. For the eyes of all *Greece* being now caſt upon him, as on the greateſt hope of deliverance from the *Roman* ſervitude, it was not expedient that he ſhould leſſen, or perhaps utterly cut off, the general expectation, and the good affection borne to him, which thereon depended, by diſcovering his too much weakneſs of ſpirit, unanſwerable to a work of ſuch importance. Wherefore he, or his ambaſſador for him, was bold to ſet a good countenance on a game not very bad, but ſubject (in appearance) to fortune; which might have been his, had he known how to uſe it.

Now that this bravery (as better it may be termed than courage) proceeded from the king's own heat, it appears by his daring to adventure ſoon after, on a practice that more juſtly might anger the *Romans*, and give them fairer ſhew of reaſon to make war upon him. It was known that *Eumenes*, in returning home, would take *Delphi* in his way, and there do ſacrifice to *Apollo*. *Perſeus* deadly hating him, and, thirſting after his blood, reſolved to way-lay him; and, by making there of him a ſacrifice, to rid his own hands of a moſt miſchievous enemy. So there were appointed three or four ſtout ruffians to do the murder; who, placing themſelves behind a broken mud-wall, on the ſide of a very narrow path leading up from the ſea to the temple, did thence aſſault the king, whom they ſorely bruiſed with great ſtones, and left for dead. They might have finiſhed their work, ſuch was the opportunity of the place which they had choſen; but fear of being apprehended, made them, without ſtaying to ſee all ſure, flee in ſuch haſte, that they killed one of their own companions, who could not hold pace with them, becauſe he ſhould not diſcover them. *Eumenes* was conveyed away to the little iſle of *Ægina*, where he was cured, being all the while kept ſo ſecretly, that the fame of his death was current in *Aſia*. Hence it came that his brother *Attalus* took upon him as king, and either took, or would have taken to wife (ſuppoſing it belike a matter of ſtate) *Stratonica*, the daughter of *Ariarathes*, whom he then thought the widow of *Eumenes*. It may well be number'd among the rare examples of brotherly love, that when the king returned alive home, *Attalus* going forth to meet him, and do his duty, as in former times, received none other check, than *That he ſhould forbear to marry with the queen, until he were well aſſured of the king's death*. More than this, *Eumenes* never ſpake of theſe matters; but bequeathed at his death unto the ſame brother both his wife and his kingdom. As likewiſe *Attalus* forbore to attempt any thing to the prejudice of the king his brother, though the *Romans* (with whom he continued and grew in eſpecial favour, when *Eumenes* fell into their hatred) were in good readineſs to have tranſferred the kingdom from his brother to him. By ſuch concord of brethren was the kingdom of *Pergamus* raiſed and upheld; as might alſo that of *Macedon* have been, if *Demetrius* had lived and employed his grace with the *Romans* to the benefit of *Perſeus*.

a Polyb. Legat. 60. & 61. b Liv. lib. 41.

It is likely that *Perſeus* was very glad, when he underſtood that his miniſters had both accompliſhed his will, and had ſaved all from diſcovery. But, as he was deceived in the main point, and heard ſhortly after that *Eumenes* lived; ſo was he beguiled in that other hope, of the concealment, which he vainly eſteemed the leſs material. For he had written to one *Praxo*, a gentlewoman of *Delphi*, to entertain the men whom he ſent about this buſineſs; and ſhe being apprehended by *C. Valerius*, a *Roman* ambaſſador then attending upon the matters of *Greece*, was carried to *Rome*. Thus all came to light. *Valerius* alſo brought with him to *Rome*, out of *Greece*, one *Rammius*, a citizen of *Brunduſium*; who, coming newly from the court of *Macedon*, loaden with a dangerous ſecret, had preſently ſought out the ambaſſador, and thereof diſcharged himſelf. *Brunduſium* was the ordinary port for ſhips paſſing between *Italy* and *Greece*. There had *Rammius* a fair houſe, wherein he gave entertainment, being a wealthy man, to ambaſſadors, and other honourable perſonages, both *Romans* and *Macedonians*, journeying to and fro. By occaſion of ſuch his hoſpitality, he was commended to *Perſeus*, and invited into *Macedon* with friendly letters; as one, whoſe many courteſies to his ambaſſadors the king was ſtudious to requite. At his coming, he was much made of; and ſhortly, with more familiarity than he expected or deſired, made partaker of the king's ſecrets. The ſum of all was, that he muſt needs do a turn, in giving to ſuch of the *Romans*, as the king ſhould hereafter name, a poiſon of rare quality, ſure in operation, yet not to be perceived either in the taking, or afterwards. He durſt not refuſe to accept this employment, for fear leſt the virtue of this medicine ſhould be tried upon himſelf. But, being once at liberty, he diſcovered all. *Rammius* was but one man, and one whom the king had never ſeen before, nor was like to ſee again; and therefore, beſides that the king's denial ought to be as good as ſuch a fellow's affirmation, the accuſation was improbable. Thus did *Perſeus*, in time ſhortly following, anſwer for himſelf; and in like ſort concerning the attempt upon *Eumenes*, denying to have had any hand either in the one or other; yet withal profeſſing, that ſuch objections were not to be made unto a king, to prove the righteouſneſs of making war upon him; but rather unto a ſubject pleading for his life in judgment. But howſoever the *Romans* neglected the getting of ſtronger proof (which might have been eaſy) than any that we find by them produced; yet the baſe and cowardly temper of *Perſeus* was very ſuitable to theſe practices. Neither did the ſenate greatly ſtand to diſpute the matter with him, theſe his treacheries being held inexcuſable. And as for his royal eſtate, wherein he ſuppoſed that they ought not to touch him for ſuch private offences, it gave him no privilege, they judging him to have offended in the nature of a king. Herein ſurely they wanted not good reaſon. For, if he might not lawfully make war upon *Eumenes*, their confederate; that is, if he might not ſend men to waſte the kingdom of *Pergamus*, or to beſiege the towns, might he ſend ruffians to murder the king? If it were no leſs breach of the league to deſtroy the ſenators by fire or famine, than by violence of the ſword; was it lawful for him to do it by poiſon? Wherefore they preſently decreed war againſt him, and ſent ambaſſadors to denounce it unto him, unleſs he would yield to make ſuch amends as they ſhould require. He ſeems, at this time, to have been ſo confident in the general favour of *Greece*[a] and other comfortable appearances; that if he deſired not war, yet he did not fear it; or at leaſt he thought, by ſhew of courage, to make his enemies the more calm. He cauſed the ambaſſadors to dance attendance, till, being weary, they departed without audience. Then called he them back, and bade them do their errand. They made a tedious rehearſal of all matters, which they had long been collecting againſt him, and wherewith *Eumenes* had charged him; adding thereto, that he had entertained long and ſecret conference in the iſle of *Samothrace*, with ambaſſadors ſent to him out of *Aſia*, about ſome ill purpoſe. In regard of all which, they peremptorily required ſatisfaction, as was their manner when they intended to give defiance. Better they might have ſtood upon the evidence brought againſt him by *Rammius* and *Praxo*. For, if thoſe accuſations could be verified, then wanted they not good ground whereon to build, of which otherwiſe they were deſtitute; it being no fault in a king to be ſtrong, well-beloved, and well-friended. *Perſeus* anſwered, for the preſent, in a rage; calling the *Romans* greedy, proud, inſolent, and underminers of him, by their daily ambaſſadors, that were no better than mere ſpies. Finally, he promiſed to give them in writing their full anſwer, which was to this effect; That he would no longer ſtand to the league made between them and his father, and renewed by himſelf indeed only for fear; but wiſhed them to deſcend to more equal conditions, whereupon he, for his part, would adviſe, as they might alſo do for theirs.

In the form of the league between *Philip* and the *Romans*, as it is ſet down by [a] *Polybius*, we find no condition, binding the *Macedonian* to any inconvenience in the future, excepting thoſe which he immediately performed. But [b] *Livy* inſerts a clauſe, whereby he was expreſly forbidden to make any war abroad, without leave of the *Romans*. It is moſt likely, that all the *Roman* confederates were included in this peace, whereby every one of the neighbours round about *Macedon*, entering ſhortly into league with *Rome*, did ſo bind the king's hands, that he could no more make war abroad, than if he had been reſtrained by plain covenant. And thus might that ſeem an article of the peace, which never was agreed upon, but only was inferred by conſequence. Now if the *Romans* would urge this point further, and ſay, that the *Macedonian* might not bear defenſive arms without their permiſſion; then had *Perſeus* very juſt reaſon to find himſelf aggrieved. For ſince they had allowed his father, without controul, to make war in *Thrace* (whilſt they themſelves were unacquainted with the *Thracians*) and elſewhere abroad, though he aſked not their licence, why ſhould they now interpret the bargain after another faſhion? Was it now become unlawful for him to chaſtiſe his own rebels, or to repay an *Illyrian* that invaded *Macedon*? By ſuch allegations he maintained the right of his cauſe in very mild ſort, when it was too late. At the preſent, by diſclaiming the league, as unjuſt, he miniſtred occaſion unto the ambaſſadors to give him defiance. Having heard the worſt of their meſſage, he commanded them to be gone out of his kingdom in three days. But either he ſhould have been leſs vehement, or more conſtant in his reſolution. For, if his heart could ſerve him to undertake the war, he ſhould couragiouſly have managed it, and have fallen to work immediately, whilſt the enemy was unprepared; not have loſt opportunity, as now and often he did, in hope of obtaining a worſe peace than the former.

[a] Polyb. Legat. 9.

[b] Liv. lib. 33.

SECT. VI.

The Romans *ſollicit the* Greeks *to join with them in the war againſt* Perſeus. *How the* Greeks *ſtood affected in that war. The timorouſneſs of* Perſeus. Martius, *a* Roman *ambaſſador, deludes him with hopes of peace. His forces. He takes the field; and wins part of* Theſſaly. *The forces of* Licinius, *the* Roman *conſul: and what aſſiſtance the* Romans *had in this war. Of* Tempe *in* Theſſaly: *and what advantages the* Macedonian *had, or might have had; but loſt by his fear.* Perſeus *braves the* Romans; *fights with them; knows not how to uſe his victory; ſues for peace; and is denied it by the vanquiſhed.* Perſeus, *having the worſe in a skirmiſh, forſakes all the country lying without* Tempe. *The* Beotians *rebel againſt the* Romans, *and are rigorouſly puniſhed. The* Roman *commanders unfortunate in the war againſt* Perſeus. *They vex the* Greeks, *their friends, for whoſe eaſe the ſenate makes proviſion, having heard their complaints. The flattering* Alabanders.

SO long had the *Romans* been ſeeking occaſion to take in hand this *Macedonian* war, that well might they have been ready for it, when it came; and not (as they were) behind-hand in proviſions. But it was on a ſudden that they met with a confluence of good pretences to make the war; whereof if no one alone had weight enough, yet all of them together ſeemed more than ſufficient. This opportunity of making their cauſe honeſt in common opinion, was not to be neglected; though otherwiſe they were unprepared for the action. Wherefore knowing, or having reaſon to believe, that their own ſtrength was ſuch as would prevail in the end, they haſtily embraced the fair occaſion of beginning, and referred other cares to the diligence of time. Neither was this their unreadineſs a ſmall help towards examining the diſpoſition of the *Greeks*, and others, who muſt afterwards dearly pay for any backwardneſs found in their good-will. There was not indeed any cauſe to fear that all of the *Greeks*, or other eaſtern people, ſhould conſpire together, and take part with the *Macedonian:* ſuch was the diſſenſion between their ſeveral eſtates, howſoever the generality of them were inclined the ſame way. Nevertheleſs, ambaſſadors were ſent to deal with them all, and to crave their help againſt *Perſeus*, or rather to demand it, in no leſs ample manner, than heretofore they had yielded it againſt *Philip* and *Antiochus*, in wars, pretending the liberty of *Greece*. The ambaſſadors uſed as gentle words for faſhion's ſake, as if they had ſtood in doubt that their requeſt might happen to be denied. But the *Greeks* were now grown well acquainted with ſuch *Roman* courteſy, and underſtood, that not only ſuch as made refuſal, but even they who might ſeem to have granted half unwillingly, were like to hear other manner of words, when once this buſineſs was ended. Wherefore none of them were ſcrupulous in promiſing the beſt of their help to the *Romans*, the [a] *Acheans* and *Rhodians*, which were chief among them, being rather doubtful, even when they had done their beſt, leſt it ſhould be ill taken, as if they had halted in ſome part of their duty. It is ſtrange that men could be ſo earneſt to ſet up the ſide, whereof they gladly would have ſeen the ruin. The vulgar ſort was every-where addicted to *Perſeus*; of the nobles and and rulers, if ſome were vehemently *Roman*, they wanted not oppoſers that were wholly *Macedonian*; yea, the wiſeſt and moſt honeſt, who regarded only the benefit of their country, wiſhed better to *Perſeus* than to the *Romans*. And of this number, *Polybius*, the chief of hiſtorians, was one; who, though he [b] judged the victory of *Perſeus* like to prove hurtful to *Greece*, yet wiſhed he the *Romans* ill to thrive, that ſo the *Greeks* might recover perfect liberty; for his endeavours in which courſe, he was at length tyrannically handled, as ſhall be ſhewed hereafter. This conſidered, it appears, that an extraordinary fear, and not only reverence of the imperial city, made the *Acheans*, and other eſtates of *Greece* thus conformable to the *Romans*. The occaſion of this their fear, may be juſtly imputed unto the timorous demeanor of *Perſeus* himſelf. He had undertaken a war, whereof the benefit ſhould redound not only to his own kingdom, but unto all that were oppreſſed by the *Romans*. Yet no ſooner were ſome few companies brought over-ſea, to make a countenance of meaning ſomewhat againſt him, than he began to ſpeak the enemy fair, and ſue for peace at *Rome*. Since therefore it was known, that every ſmall thing would ſerve to terrify him; and conſequently, that it ſhould at all times be in the *Romans* power, by giving him any tolerable conditions of peace, to take revenge at leiſure upon thoſe which had aſſiſted him, little occaſion was there, why any ſhould adventure to partake with him. He made indeed a great noiſe; leading about his army; taking by force, or compoſition, ſome few towns; and ſolliciting all to join with him. But wiſe men could not be ſo beguiled: for at the ſame time he ſought all means of pacification; and to that end, made humble ſuit unto the *Roman* ambaſſadors. *Q. Martius*, the chief of thoſe ambaſſadors, and a man of more *fineſſe* in cunning than was uſual among the *Romans*, made ſhew of inclination to the king's deſire; and gave out ſuch comfortable words, that the king intreated and obtained a meeting at the river *Peneus*. There did *Martius* very gently rebuke the king, and charge him with thoſe crimes that are before-mentioned. Whereto though *Perſeus* made none other anſwer, than the ſame which they could have made for him; yet the ambaſſadors, and eſpecially *Martius*, took it in good part, as therewith ſatisfied: and adviſed him to give the like ſatisfaction to the ſenate. That this might conveniently be done; a truce was agreed upon. Thus had *Martius* his deſire; which was to make the king loſe time. For *Perſeus* had all things then in readineſs, and might have done much, ere the *Roman* army could have been in *Greece*. But by the interpoſition of this truce, he no way increaſed his forces; he ſuffered a moſt convenient ſeaſon of winning upon the enemy, to ſlip away; and obtained in recompence nothing elſe, than leiſure and vain hope. Yet was he pleaſed herewith, as it had been with ſome victory: publiſhing a copy of the diſputation between him and the *Romans*, whereby he gave men to underſtand, how much he had the better, and what hope there was of peace. He ſent ambaſſadors alſo to the *Rhodians*, of whoſe good will to him he was beſt perſwaded; not only to let them know how much he was ſuperiour in cauſe; but to intreat them, that they would take upon them, as moderators, to compound the differences between him and the *Romans*, if perhaps, notwithſtanding the goodneſs of his cauſe, he ſhould be denied peace. Theſe were poor helps. For hereby it appeared, that his late ſtanding upon point of honour, was no better than mere vanity: his own ſafety being the utmoſt of his ambition. This his fearfulneſs might ſeem ex-

[a] Polyb. Legat. 73, 78, & 80. [b] Polyb. Legat. l. 77.

cuſable, and the blame thereof to appertain unto the *Greeks*; who deceived his expectation, by being wanting to him in a time of neceſſity, that was partly their own: had it not been his office, who took upon him as their champion to give ſuch a manly beginning to the war, as might incourage all others to follow him. But his timorous quality being found, men grew daily more and more averſe from him, and grew careful, not to put their ſhoulders to a falling wall. The *Rhodians*, among whom he had many ſtout partizans, deſired him not to crave any thing at their hands, in which they might ſeem to do againſt the good liking of the *Romans*. The *Beotians* alſo, who had entred of late into a ſtrict ſociety with the *Macedonian*, renounced it now, and made the like with the *Romans*: to whom further, in a ſort, they yielded themſelves as vaſſals. Neither was *Martius* contented to accept their ſubmiſſion under a general form; but cauſed their ſeveral towns to make covenant apart, each for it ſelf; to the end, that being thus diſtracted into many little common-weals, they might not (were they never ſo deſirous to rebel) have ſuch force to do hurt, as when they agreed, and were incorporated in one, under the city of *Thebes*. This work, of ſeparating the *Beotians* from *Thebes* their head, was more than *Ageſilaus* could effect, or *Epaminondas* would ſuffer, then when all *Greece* followed the *Lacedemonians*. So far more available to *Thebes*, being deſtitute of help from abroad, was the virtue of *Epaminondas*, and a few brave citizens; than was the ſociety with king *Perſeus*, againſt a number not ſo great as followed the *Lacedemonians*.

Martius brought this to effect, whilſt the king ſat ſtill, as being bound by the truce: and having done this, he returned to the city; where vaunting what he had wrought by his craft, he was commended, and (though ſome reproved it as diſhoneſt) employed it again by the ſenate, with commiſſion to deal as he ſhould think expedient. Touching the ambaſſadors which *Perſeus* had ſent; audience was given to them, for that they ſhould not plainly ſee how their maſter was deluded: but neither excuſe nor entreaty, would ſerve their turn; the ſenate being reſolved before-hand what to do. It was enough that they were admitted into the city, and had thirty days reſpite allowed them to depart out of *Italy*: whereas they, who came laſt on the ſame errand, did their meſſage without the walls, in the temple of *Bellona* (the uſual place of giving audience to open enemies, or to ſuch commanders, as might not, by reaſon of ſome cuſtom, enter the city) and had only the ſhort warning of eleven days, to be gone out of *Italy*. Neither did this poor courteſy ſerve alone to hide the craft of *Martius*, as if he had meant none other than good earneſt: but it was a likely mean, both to keep a long while from *Perſeus* the knowledge of his buſineſs, and to ſtagger his reſolution, when it ſhould need it moſt firm.

And accordingly it fell out. For *Licinius*, the *Roman* conſul, was at *Apollonia* in a manner as ſoon as the *Macedonian* ambaſſadors were with their king at *Pella*. Which though it were enough to have rouzed *Perſeus*, and have made him lay aſide all cowardly hope of getting pardon; yet was he content to deliberate awhile, Whether it were not better to offer himſelf tributary to the *Romans*, and to redeem their good-will with ſome part of his kingdom, that ſo he might enjoy the reſt; than to put all at once to hazard. But finally, the ſtouteſt counſel prevailed: which alſo was the wiſeſt; and ſo would have proved, had it been ſtoutly and wiſely followed. He now began, as if the war had not begun until now, to do what ſhould have been done long afore. He cauſed all his forces to be drawn together; and appointed their rendezvous at *Citium*, a town in *Macedon*. All being in readineſs, he did royal ſacrifice, with an hundred beaſts, to I know not what *Minerva*, that was peculiarly honoured in his country: and then, with all his courtiers, and thoſe of his guard, ſet forward to *Citium*. His army he found conſiſting of nine and thirty thouſand foot, and four thouſand horſe: whereof about twelve thouſand foot, and a thouſand horſe, were ſtrangers, of ſundry nations, moſt part *Thracians*; the reſt his own *Macedonians*. Theſe he animated with lively ſpeeches; laying before them the glory of their anceſtors, the inſolency of the *Romans*, the goodneſs of his cauſe, the greatneſs of his proviſions, and the many advantages which they had of the enemy, eſpecially in numbers. They anſwered him chearfully, with loud acclamations, and bade him be of good courage. From all cities of *Macedon* there came likewiſe meſſengers, offering to help him with money and victuals, according to their ſeveral abilities. He gave them thanks: but anſwered, That his own proviſions would abundantly ſuffice; willing them only to furniſh him with carts, for his engines and munition.

Out of his own kingdom he iſſued forth into *Theſſaly*: knowing that the *Romans* were to paſs through that country, in their journey towards him. Some towns of *Theſſaly* opened their gates unto him, without making offer to defend themſelves; ſome he balked, thinking them too ſtrong or well manned; and ſome he won by force. Of theſe laſt was *Mylæ*; a town thought impregnable, and therefore not more ſtoutly than proudly defended by the inhabitants, who gave contumelious language to the aſſailants. It was taken by reaſon of a ſally, which the townſmen raſhly made, and being driven back, received the *Macedonians*, that entred pell-mell with them at the gates. All cruelty of war was practiſed here, to the greater terror of the obſtinate. So *Velatiæ* and *Connus* (towns of much importance, eſpecially *Connus*, which ſtood in the ſtreights of *Oſſa*, leading into *Tempe*) yielded at the firſt. Having well fortified this paſſage, the king marched onwards to *Sycurium*, a town ſeated on the foot of mount *Oſſa*; where he reſted a while, expecting news of the enemy.

Licinius, the conſul, brought with him only two *Roman* legions; being promiſed other ſtrength of auxiliaries, which was thought ſufficient. *Eumenes*, and *Attalus*'s brother, came to him in *Theſſaly*, with four thouſand foot and a thouſand horſe. Thither alſo came, from every part of *Greece*, ſuch aid as the ſeveral eſtates could afford, or thought expedient to ſend: which from the moſt of them was very little. Of the kings abroad, *Maſaniſſa* ſent thither his ſon *Miſagenes*, with a thouſand foot, as many horſe, and two and twenty elephants. *Ariarathes* the *Cappadocian*, by reaſon of his affinity with *Eumenes*, was friend to the *Romans*, and had ſent to *Rome* his young ſon, there to be brought up: yet he did little or nothing in this war; perhaps becauſe *Eumenes* himſelf began within a while, but when it was too late, to be otherwiſe adviſed, than he had been in the beginning. *Pruſias* was content to be a looker on: as being allied to *Perſeus*, and yet fearing the *Romans*. *Antiochus*, and *Ptolemy* (though *Ptolemy* was then young, and under tutors) had buſineſs of their own; the *Syrian* meaning to invade the *Egyptian*: yet each of them promiſed help to the

Romans,

Romans, which they cared not to perform. *Gentius* the *Illyrian* was inclinable to the *Macedonian*: yet made good countenance to the *Romans*, for fear. It was a pretty trick, wherewith *M. Lucretius*, the *Roman* admiral's brother ſerved him for this his counterfeit good will. This king had four and fifty ſhips, riding in the haven of *Dyrrachium*, uncertain to what purpoſe: all which *Lucretius* took away, after a very kind ſort; making ſhew to believe, That for none other end than to ſerve the *Romans*, their good friend *Gentius* had ſent thither this fleet. But whatſoever *Gentius* thought in the beginning; he fooliſhly loſt both his kingdom and himſelf, in the end of this war; by offering, rather than giving, his help to *Perſeus*.

With none other company than what he brought over the ſea, *Licinius* came into *Theſſaly*: ſo tired with a painful journey, through the mountainous country of *Athamania*, which ſtood in his way from *Epirus*; that if *Perſeus* had been ready, attending his deſcent into the plains, the *Romans* muſt needs have taken a great overthrow. He refreſhed himſelf and his wearied army, by the river *Peneus*; where he encamped, attending his auxiliaries, that came in as faſt as they could. It was not any ſlender help, that could enable him to deal with *Perſeus*. Therefore he reſolved to abide where he then was, and keep his trenches, until his numbers were ſufficiently increaſed: contenting himſelf in the mean while, to have gotten quiet entrance into the country. The land of *Theſſaly*, in which theſe two armies lay, was better affected to the *Romans*, than any part of *Greece* beſides: as having been freed by them, from a more heavy yoke of bondage to the *Macedonian*, when there was little hope or expectation of ſuch a benefit. It was generally rich, fruitful, and abounding in all things needful to man's life. In the midſt of it, but ſomewhat more to the eaſt, was that beautiful valley of *Tempe*, ſo exceedingly full of all delights, that the name was often uſed at large, to ſignifie the moſt pleaſant and goodly places. This valley of itſelf was not great; but adding to it thoſe huge mountains, *Oſſa* and *Olympus* (famous in poeſy) with their ſpurs or branches, by which it was on all ſides encloſed; it occupied the better part of *Theſſaly*. And this way were the *Romans* to enter into *Macedon*; unleſs they would make an hungry journey through the country of the *Daſſaretians*, as in the former war with *Philip* they had long in vain attempted to do. *Perſeus* therefore had no ſmall advantage, by being maſter of the ſtreights leading into *Tempe*: though far greater he might have had, if by miſpending of time he had not loſt it. For, if in defending the ragged paſſages of theſe mountains, he were able to put the *Romans* often to the worſe; yea to win upon them (for a while) every year more than other, both in ſtrength and reputation: queſtionleſs, he might have done far greater things, had he ſeized upon the ſtreights of *Aous*, which his father once kept, and defended all the country behind the mountains of *Pindus*. Surely not without extream difficulty, muſt the *Romans* have either travelled by land, with all their carriages and impediments, through places wherein was no relief to be found; or elſe have committed their armies, and all things thereto needful, unto the mercy of ſeas that were very dangerous; if they would have fought other way into *Macedon*, than through the heart of *Greece*: upon neither of which courſes they once deviſed, notwithſtanding any trouble which they found in this preſent war. It may perhaps be ſaid, that the *Greeks*, and others, whom the king muſt have left on his back, would have made him unable to defend any places too far from his own home. But they were all, excepting the *Theſſalians*, better affected now to him, than they had been to his father in the former war. The *Etolians*, upon whom the *Athamanians* depended, grew into ſuſpicion with the *Romans* (as we ſhall find anon) even as ſoon as they met with *Perſeus*. The *Beotians*, how politic ſoever *Martius* had wrought with them, adventured themſelves deſperately in the *Macedonians* quarrel: what would they have done, if he at firſt had done his beſt? The *Rhodians*, *Illyrians*, yea, and *Eumenes* himſelf after a while began to waver, when they ſaw things go better with *Perſeus*, than they had expected. So that if, inſtead of diſcouraging his friends, by ſuing baſely for peace; he had raiſed their hopes, by any brave performance in the beginning; and encreaſed the number of his well willers, yea, and bought down with money (as he might have done) ſome of his enemies, and among them *Eumenes*, who offered for good recompence, to forget his broken head: then might the *Romans* perhaps have been compelled to forſake their imperious patronage over *Greece*; and to render the liberty, by them given, entire; which otherwiſe was but imaginary. Such benefit of this war, ſince it was hoped for afterwards, might with greater reaſon have been expected at firſt, from greater advantages. But, as a fearful company running from their enemies, till ſome river ſtay their flight; are there compelled by mere deſperation to do ſuch acts, as done, while the battel laſted, would have won the victory: ſo fell it out with *Perſeus*. In ſeeking to avoid the danger of that war, whereof he ſhould have fought the honour; he left his friends that would have ſtood by him, and gave them cauſe to provide for their own ſafety; yet being overtaken by neceſſity, he choſe rather to ſet his back to the mountains of *Tempe*, and defend himſelf with his proper forces; than to be driven into ſuch miſery, as was inevitable, if he gave a little further ground. What was performed by him or the *Romans*, all the while that he kept his footing in *Theſſaly*, it is hard to ſhew particularly; for that the hiſtory of thoſe things is much periſhed. Wherefore, we muſt be contented with the ſum.

The conſul, having no deſire to fight until ſuch time as all his forces were arrived, kept within his trenches, and lay ſtill encamped by the river of *Peneus*, about three miles from *Lariſſa*. That which perſwaded the conſul to protract the time, did contrariwiſe incite the king to put the matter into a haſty trial. Wherefore he invited the *Romans* into the field, by waſting the land of the *Phereans*, their confederates. Finding them patient of this indignity, he grew bold to adventure even unto their trenches, out of which if they iſſued, it was likely that his advantage in horſe would make the victory his own. At his coming they were troubled, for that it was ſudden; yet no way terrified, as knowing themſelves to be ſafely lodged. They ſent out a few of king *Eumenes*'s horſe, and with them ſome light-armed foot, to entertain ſkirmiſh. The captain, and ſome other of theſe, were ſlain; but no matter of importance done; for that neither *Licinius* nor *Eumenes* found it reaſonable to hazard battel. Thus day after day, a while together, *Perſeus* continued offering battel, which they ſtill refuſed. whereby his boldneſs much increaſed; and much more his reputation, to the grief of thoſe, who being ſo far come to make a conqueſt, could ill digeſt the ſhame that fell upon them by their enduring

enduring theſe bravadoes. The town of *Sycurium*, where *Perſeus* then lay, was twelve miles from the *Romans:* neither was there any convenient watering in that long march, which uſed to take up four hours of the morning; but he was fain to bring water along with him in carts, that his men might not be both weary and thirſty when they came to fight. For remedy of theſe inconveniences, he found out a lodging, ſeven miles nearer to the enemy, whom he viſited the next day by the ſun-riſing. His coming at ſuch an unuſual hour, filled the camp with tumult; inſomuch, as though he brought with him only his horſe and light armature, that were unfit to aſſail the trenches, yet the conſul thought it neceſſary, and reſolved to give check to his pride. Wherefore, he ſent forth his brother *C. Licinius*, king *Eumenes*, *Attalus*, and many brave captains, with all his power of horſe, his *velites*, and all the reſt of his light armature, to try their fortune: he himſelf remaining in the camp, with his legions in readineſs. The honour of this morning, was the *Macedonian* king's; for he obtained the victory in a manner entire (though the *Theſſalians* made a good retreat) with little loſs of his own. But he diſcovered his weakneſs ere night, by hearkening, as princes commonly do, to counſel, given by one of his own temper. For, whereas the *Romans* were in great fear, leſt he ſhould aſſault their camp; and, to that purpoſe, upon the firſt news of his ſucceſs, his phalanx was brought unto him by the captains, though unſent for: he nevertheleſs took it for ſound advice, which indeed was timorous and baſe, To work warily, and moderate his victory; by which means it was ſaid, that either he ſhould get honeſt conditions of peace, or at leaſtwiſe many companions of his fortune. Certainly it was like that his good fortune would exalt the hope and courage of his friends. Yet had it been greater; and had he won the *Roman* camp, his friends would have been the more, and the bolder. But over-great was his folly, in hoping then for peace: and in ſuing for it, even when he had the victory, what elſe did he, than proclaim unto all which would become his partakers, that neither good nor bad fortune ſhould keep him from yielding to the *Romans*, whenſoever they would be pleaſed to accept him? At this time the joy of his victory would admit none of theſe conſiderations. He had ſlain of the *Roman* horſe two hundred, and taken of them priſoners the like number. Of their foot he had ſlain about two thouſand: loſing of his own no more than twenty horſe and forty foot. The *Roman* camp, after this diſaſter, was full of heavineſs and fear; it being much doubted that the enemy would ſet upon it. *Eumenes* gave counſel to diſlodge by night, and remove to a ſurer place beyond the river *Peneus*. The conſul, though aſhamed to profeſs, by ſo doing, in what fear he ſtood; yet thought it better to acknowledge the loſs paſt, than by ſtanding on proud terms, to draw upon himſelf a greater calamity. So he paſſed the river in the dead of the night, and incamped more ſtrongly on the further ſide. The *Etolians* were ſorely blamed for this loſs; as if rather a traiterous meaning, than any true fear, had occaſioned their flight, wherein the reſt of the *Greeks* followed them. Five of them that were men of eſpecial mark, had been obſerved to be the firſt which turned their backs: an obſervation likely to coſt them dear, at a time of better leiſure. As for the *Theſſalians*, their virtue was honoured with reward: ſo as the *Greeks* might learn, by examples of either kind, that if they would ſhun indignation, or incur favour, then muſt they adventure no leſs for their lords the *Romans*, than gladly they would do for their own liberty. Thus fared it with the conſul and his army. *Perſeus* came the next day to correct the former day's error; which how great it was, he not until then found. The *Romans* were gotten into a place of ſafety; whither they could never have attained, if the king had either preſſed his victory, or given better heed to them that night: his light armature alone being ſufficient to have routed them, whilſt they were conveying themſelves to the other ſide of *Peneus*. But it was vain to tell what might have been done, ſince there was no remedy. The *Romans* were beaten, even the flower of their city, the gentlemen of *Rome*; out of whom were choſen their ſenators, and conſequently the generals themſelves, pretors, conſuls, and all that bore office or command among them; yea, they were beaten ſo ſhamefully, that they ſtole away by night, and ſuffered him to gather up the ſpoils of them without reſiſtance, as yielding themſelves overcome. With ſuch brave words did the king ſet out the glory of his action; dividing the ſpoils among his followers. But there was much wanting within him, to have made his honour ſound. He came nearer to the *Romans*, and encamped at *Mopſelus*, a place in the mid-way between *Tempe* and *Lariſſa:* as if it were his meaning to preſs them ſomewhat harder. Nevertheleſs he was eaſily perſwaded to uſe the occaſion, which he ſeemed to have, of obtaining peace. Therefore he ſent unto the conſul, and offered to yield unto the ſame conditions, wherein his father had been bound to the *Romans*, if the war might ſo take end. It were needleſs here again to ſhew the folly of this his courſe. Towards the accompliſhment of this deſired peace, there was in the conſul no greater power, than to grant a truce, whilſt ambaſſadors might go to *Rome:* it reſting in the ſenate and people to approve the conditions, and ratifie the league. And of ſuch a truce granted by *Martius*, he had lately found no ſmall diſcommodity redounding. But *Licinius* dealt plainly, and returned anſwer that other hope of peace there was none; ſave that *Perſeus* would yield both his kingdom and perſon, ſimply and abſolutely, to diſcretion of the ſenate. A manly part it was of *Licinius* to be ſo reſolute in adverſity. On the other ſide, it argued a faint heart in *Perſeus*, that having received an anſwer ſo peremptory, he ſtill perſiſted making vain offers of great tribute. Finding that the peace, which he ſo much deſired, could not be purchaſed with money, the king withdrew himſelf back to *Sycurium*. There he lay hearkening what the enemy did; whoſe forces were well repaired by the coming of *Miſagenes* the ſon of *Maſaniſſa*, with the aid before mentioned. This diſtance between the king and them, cauſed the *Romans* to wax the more bold in making their harveſt: about which buſineſs they ranged all over the fields. Their careleſs demeanour gave him hope to do ſome notable exploit; which he attempted, both upon their camp, and upon thoſe that were abroad. The camp he thought to have fired on the ſudden: but the alarm being taken in good ſeaſon, he failed in the enterpriſe. As for the forragers; he had a good hand upon them, if he could have withdrawn it, and given over in time. But whilſt he ſtrove to force a guard, he was viſited by the conſul; by whom either in a ſkirmiſh of horſe, or (for the report is diverſe) in a great battel he was overcome. This miſadventure, whether great or ſmall, cauſed *Perſeus*, after a few days, to fall back into *Macedon*; as being naturally given to fear danger, even where none was; whereby what loſs he felt will appear here-

hereafter. He left all behind him, ſave only *Tempe*, weakly guarded; and conſequently an eaſy prey to the *Romans*.

After the king's departure, *Licinius* went ſtreight unto *Connus*; hoping to have taken it, and ſo to have gotten entrance into *Tempe*. But finding the work too hard, he returned back upon the *Perrhebians* and others; from whom he won ſome towns, and among the reſt *Lariſſa*. There were ſundry towns thereabout, bearing the ſame name of *Lariſſa*: ſo that this which the conſul took, may ſeem not to have belonged unto the *Theſſalians*; unleſs, perhaps, after this victory, *Perſeus* did greater acts than we find recorded, and got ſome part of *Theſſaly*.

Of matters happening in *Greece* at this time, it is hard to give a preciſe account; for that the hiſtories of them are greatly defective. One may think it ſtrange, that the *Beotians*, whom a *Roman* ambaſſador could terrify, and bring altogether to his own will, ſhould not be afraid of a *Roman* army, then on foot in *Greece*, and a navy on their coaſt. But more ſtrange it is, that the *Thebans*, from whom their dependants were taken by the art of *Martius*, were more true to *Rome*, than other petty towns, which by that ſame diſtraction of the *Beotians*, became within themſelves more abſolute, than formerly they had been. The cauſes hereof were to have been ſought among the changes happening in their variable factions: whereof the knowledge is now loſt. Some of them rebelled, and were throughly puniſhed by *Lucretius* the *Roman* admiral: who got ſo much by ſpoiling them, that he would have brought others to rebel in like ſort, if by extream oppreſſion he could have driven them ſo far. Neither was *Licinius* the conſul undiligent in the ſame kind. What his doings were, after ſuch time as he was at leiſure from *Perſeus*, I find no where mentioned. Only this is ſaid in general, That in the war which he made, he [a] cruelly and covetouſly demeaned himſelf.

After the ſame faſhion dealt they, that commanded in the year following; *Hoſtilius* the conſul, and *Hortenſius* the admiral, or pretor of the fleet. *Hoſtilius* ſhewed more of his induſtry, in picking quarrels with the confederates of *Rome*, than in proſecuting the war againſt the *Macedonian*. For, concerning the *Roman* war upon his kingdom, after that the conſul had ſought paſſage in vain over certain mountains, *Perſeus* ſeemed, in a manner [b] free from it. He was troubled indeed on that ſide which looked toward *Illyria*, by *Ap. Claudius*, whom the conſul ſent thither with an army of four thouſand, and who, by levies made upon the confederates, doubled this his army. But *Claudius* thinking to have taken *Uſcana*, a border town of *Illyria*, by treaſon, came thither in ſuch careleſs order, that the inhabitants, which had made ſhew of treaſon, with purpoſe only to train him into danger, ſallied forth upon him, overthrew him, and chaſed him ſo far, that hardly he eſcaped with a fourth part of his company. Yet this town of *Uſcana* ſhortly after became *Roman*: which howſoever it happened, *Perſeus* very ſoon recovered it, and many other places therewithal: *Cotys*, a *Thracian* king, ſecuring him on the one ſide of *Macedon*; and *Cephalus* an *Epirot* revolted from the *Romans*, on the other. *Perſeus* likewiſe made a painful journey into *Ætolia*: where he was promiſed to be admitted into *Stratus*, that was the ſtrongeſt city in that region. Of this hope, though he were diſappointed by thoſe of the *Roman* faction; yet in his return home, he took in *Aperantia*; and ſhortly heard good news, That *Ap. Claudius* was again throughly beaten by *Clevas*, one of his lieutenants. Such ſucceſs had the *Macedonian* war under *Hoſtilius*. The ſame conſul offended much the *Greeks*, by the ſtrict inquiſition which his ambaſſadors made into men's affection towards *Rome*. For theſe ambaſſadors travelling thorough all the cities of *Peloponneſus*, gave out ſpeeches tending to ſhew, That they liked no better of thoſe who fought not by might and main to advance their buſineſs, than of thoſe which were of the *Macedonian* faction. [c] Their meaning was, to have accuſed by name, in the parliament of *Achaia*, *Lycortas*, that worthy commander, who nobly followed the ſteps of *Philopœmen*; and together with him, his ſon *Polybius*, who ſoon after was general of the *Achean* horſe; but more notable by that excellent hiſtory which he wrote, than by his great employments, which he well and honourably diſcharged. The ſum of the accuſation ſhould have been; That theſe were not hearty friends unto the *Romans*, but ſuch as abſtained from raiſing troubles, more for lack of opportunity, than for any love to the common quiet. But ſince no colour of truth could be found, that might give countenance to ſuch a tale; it was thought better, for the preſent, to let it alone, and give gentle words, as if all were well. In like manner dealt they among the *Etolians*: they demanded hoſtages; and found ſome in the council that approved the motion: as alſo among the *Acarnanians*, there were that entreated to have *Roman* garriſons beſtowed in their towns. But neither the one nor the other of theſe propoſitions took effect. They of the *Roman* faction accuſed not only ſuch as were inclinable to the *Macedonian*, but alſo the good *patriots*; making it no leſs than a matter of treaſon, to be a *Grecian* in *Greece*. On the contrary ſide, there wanted not ſome, who roundly told theſe pick-thanks of their baſe flattery; rating them openly in ſuch ſort, that one of them hardly eſcaped being ſtoned, even in preſence of the ambaſſadors. Thus was all full of accuſations and excuſes: among which the ambaſſadors carried themſelves, as men that could believe none ill; though it were well enough known what they thought. The beſt was, that an order from the ſenate was brought into *Greece*, and publiſhed, to this effect: That it ſhould be free for all men, to refuſe obedience to any *Roman* magiſtrate, impoſing any burthen for the preſent war, unleſs it were ſuch, as the ſenate had likewiſe thought meet. Of this decree the whole country was glad: for it was, or ſeemed, a good remedy of many inconveniencies. But they that ſtanding on the priviledge hereof, refuſed to fulfill every commandment, were numbered among the *patriots*; which in the end of this war proved little better, if not worſe, than to have been traitors. The ſenate was driven to ſet down this order; by reaſon of the many and vehement complaints brought to *Rome*, concerning the wrongs done by *Roman* magiſtrates, and eſpecially by the admirals, *Lucretius* and *Hortenſius*. *Lucretius* was condemned in a great ſum of money, for the wrongs by him done: highly to the commendation of the *Romans*, in that they loved not to have their ſubjects oppreſſed. *Hortenſius* being ſtill in office, had warning to amend.

[a] Liv. lib. 43. [b] Polyb. Legat. 70. [c] Polyb. Legat. 74.

Among the great number of embaſſages that came to *Rome* about this time, either to ſeek redreſs of injuries, or to offer their ſervices: it is note-worthy, that from *Alabanda*, a town of the leſſer *Aſia*, there was preſented unto the ſenate, and well accepted, a moſt baſe piece of flattery. Theſe *Alabanders* brought three hundred horſemen's targets, and a crown of gold, to beſtow upon *Jupiter* in the capitol. But having a deſire to gratify the *Romans* with ſome exquiſite token of their dutiful obedience, wherein they would be ſingular; and being not able to reach unto any great performance: they built a temple, unto the town *Rome*, and appointed anniverſary games to be celebrated among them, in honour of that *Goddeſs*. Now, who can wonder at the arrogant folly of *Alexander*, *Antigonus*, *Ptolemy*, and the like vain men, that would be thought Gods; or at the ſhameleſs flattery of ſuch as beſtowed upon men, and not the moſt virtuous of men, divine honours; when he ſees a town of houſes, wherein powerful men dwell, worſhipped as a goddeſs, and receiving (without ſcorn of the givers, or ſhame of the preſent) the title of *Deity*, at the gift of ſuch a raſcal city as *Alabanda?*

SECT. VII.

Q. Martius *the* Roman *conſul, with extream difficulty and danger, enters into* Tempe. *The cowardiſe of* Perſeus *in abandoning* Tempe. *The town of* Dium *quitted by* Martius; *repaired and fortified by the king. The* Romans *attempt many places, with ill ſucceſs. Their affairs in hard eſtate.* Martius *a cunning and a bad man.* Polybius *ſent ambaſſador to* Martius *from the* Acheans. Polybius's *honeſt wiſdom beneficial te the* Acheans. *King* Eumenes *grows averſe from the* Romans. Perſeus *negotiates with* Antiochus *and* Eumenes. *His falſe dealing with* Gentius *king of* Illyria; *whom he draws into the* Roman *war. He ſends ambaſſadors to the* Rhodians; *who vainly take upon them to be arbitrators betweeen him and the* Romans. Perſeus *loſeth a mighty ſuccour of the* Baſtarnæ, *by his wretched parſimony.*

AFTER two years of the *Macedonian* war, things were further out of tune in *Greece*, than when the war began, which had been thought likely to reform all thoſe countries, and bring them to what paſs the *Romans* deſired, as it did in the end. *Perſeus* had hitherto the better, and was ſtronger now, than when he lived in peace. He had enlarged his borders on the *Illyrian* ſide; his friends in all parts of *Greece*, took courage daily; and his reputation grew ſuch, as cauſed thoſe that were wholly *Roman*, to ſuſpect what the iſſue of the war might prove, and thereupon to become wiſe for themſelves. Contrariwiſe, *Licinius* and *Hoſtilius* the conſuls, had one after the other ſpent their time in vain, ſeeking way into *Macedon*; and defaced the glorious enterpriſe of conqueſt, by many loſſes received. The *Roman* admirals had ſo demeaned themſelves, that many towns, even of the beſt affected to *Rome*, kept them out by force. Generally, the fear was great on the *Roman* ſide; and the army much leſſened, not only by caſualties of war, but by the facility of the tribunes or colonels, or elſe of the conſul himſelf (for they laid the blame one upon the other) in licenſing the ſoldiers to depart. *Quintius Martius* the new conſul, who ſucceeded unto *Hoſtilius*, was to amend all this: which nevertheleſs was more than he knew how to do, though he brought with him a ſtrong ſupply of men. He began hotly to ſet the war on foot, which a long time had ſlept. And he began the right way, not ſeeking to force the ſtreights that were ſurely guarded, but taking pains to climb the mountains, which were thought able to forbid all paſſage over them, without help or need of any cuſtody. The king heard of his approach, and being uncertain what way he meant to take, diſtributed his own forces to the defence of all places which might give entrance, or permit aſcent. But the conſul proceeded in his journey, with hope either not to be diſcovered by the enemy, or to break through all oppoſition, or at leaſtwiſe, to fight on as convenient ground, as they ſhould have that lay to ſtop him; and at length, if all failed, to make a ſafe retreat. He ſent before him four thouſand of his moſt expedite foot, to diſcover the ways. Two days was this company troubled, in overcoming the difficulty of no more than fifteen miles, after which they had ſight of the enemy, that lay to deny their paſſage. They occupied therefore a ſafe piece of ground, and ſent back word to the conſul where they were, intreating him to haſten unto them, which he did. The *Macedonians* were not a whit diſmayed at his arrival, but met him, and fought with him two or three days together, each returning to their own camp at night, with little loſs on either ſide. This bickering was on the narrow ridge of a mountain, which gave ſcarcely room unto three to march in front. So that very few hands came to be employed, all the reſt were beholders. In this caſe, it was impoſſible to get forwards, yet a ſhame to return. Wherefore *Martius* took the only courſe remaining, and indeed the beſt. Part of his men he left with *Popilius*, to attend upon the *Macedonians*, whilſt he, with the reſt, fetched a compaſs about, and ſought out ways that never had been trodden. Herein he found extreme difficulty, which notwithſtanding he overcame. Beſides the troubles commonly incident to ſuch journeys, through places unfit for habitation, he was compelled by labour of hand to make paths where none were, yea, where nature might ſeem to have intended that none ſhould be. So ſteep he found the deſcent of the mountains, in this way which he took, that of ſeven miles, which they travelled the firſt day, his men were compelled, for the moſt part, to rowl themſelves down, as not daring to truſt their feet. Neither was this the worſt; for they met with rocks that ſtood one over another, ſo upright, and cumberſome to get down, that their elephants were afraid of the giddy proſpect; and, caſting their governors, made a terrible noiſe, which affrighted the horſes, and bred great confuſion. Having therefore gone, or wallowed four miles of this grievous journey, there was nothing more deſired by the ſoldiers, than that they might be ſuffered to creep back again the ſame way which they had come. But ſhift was made to let down the elephants by a kind of bridges, like unto falling draw-bridges, whereof the one end was joined to the edge of the cliff, the other ſuſtained by two long poſts, faſtened in the ground below. Upon theſe two poſts, or poles, which indeed (not being very ſtrong, ſince it was intended that they ſhould be either cut or broken) were faſtened two rafters, anſwerable in length to the diſtance between the higher and the lower fall; ſo as the end of one bridge might reach to the beginning of another. Theſe were covered with planks and turf, that they might ſeem continent with the ground, ſo as to make the beaſts adventurous to go upon them. If there were a plain of any good extent from the foot of a rock to the next downfal, then might the bridge be ſhorter.

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When an elephant was gone a pretty way upon one of theſe, the poſts upholding the frame were cut aſunder, thereby cauſing him to ſink down unto the next bridge; whence he was conveyed in like manner to the third, and onward ſtill to the very bottom. Thus went they down ſliding, ſome on their feet, others on their buttocks, till they came to an even valley. By this it appears how throughly provided the *Romans* uſed to be in their journeys, of things needful in all occaſions; as alſo what ineſtimable pains they took in this deſcent, about the conveyance of themſelves and all their carriages down the mountains. The next day they reſted, ſtaying for *Popilius* and his company, who hardly, or perhaps never, ſhould have over-taken them, if the enemy had followed, and ſet upon him from aloft. The third and fourth days journeys were like unto the firſt, ſave that cuſtom, and the nearneſs to their way's end, without meeting the enemy, cauſed them the better to endure the labour.

Perſeus could not be ignorant of the *Romans* coming towards him, ſince they fought with his men upon the paſſage three days together, he lying ſo nigh, that he might well near have heard the noiſe. Yet was he ſo poſſeſſed with fear, that he neither ſtirred to help his own men, or to hinder the conſul, nor made any proviſion for that which might fall out; but, as one void of counſel, ſat hearkening after the event. Four only paſſages there were leading into *Tempe*; the firſt by *Connus*, which the *Romans* were unable to force; the ſecond and third were the ſame which *Martius* had attempted in vain, and another like unto it; the laſt by the city of *Dium*, out of *Macedon*. All theſe were ſufficiently guarded, and whoſoever would ſeek any other way, muſt be fain to take ſuch pains as *Martius* had undergone. The entrance by *Dium* was fairer than any of the reſt, whereof only the king had benefit; for that his enemies could not get thither, ſave through the valley it ſelf, into which they muſt firſt pierce another way. *Dium* ſtood upon the foot of the huge mountain *Olympus*, about a mile from the ſea; of which mile, the river *Helicon* becoming there a lake, and called *Baphyras*, took up the one half; the reſt being ſuch as might eaſily have been fortified. Beſides all theſe, there was in the midſt of *Tempe* a paſſage, which ten men might eaſily keep, where the ſpurs of the mountains reaching far into the valley, drew near to the very banks of *Peneus*, a goodly and deep river, which ran through it. Wherefore nothing had been more eaſy, than to make the conſul repent him of his troubleſome journey, if *Perſeus* could have ſeen his own advantages. For the *Roman* army was not only in ill caſe to fight, after the vexation of that miſerable travel, but muſt needs have either periſhed for want of victuals, or been enforced to return the ſame way that it came, if the king had made good the ſtreight of *Dium*. To have returned, and climbed up with their elephants and carriages againſt thoſe rocks, from which, with extreme labour, they could hardly get down, it ſeems a matter of impoſſibility; eſpecially conſidering how the enemy, from above their heads, would have beaten upon them, being now aware of the path which they had taken, though he knew it not when they ſtole away from him. It may therefore be thought ſtrange, that the *Romans* did not rather take their journey into *Macedon*, from the ſide of *Illyria*, whence that kingdom had often been invaded, as lying open on that part, than put themſelves to the trouble of breaking into *Tempe*; whence, after that they were there arrived, there was no means to eſcape, without forcing one of thoſe paſſages, which they deſpared to win. But the cowardiſe of *Perſeus* did commend the counſel by them followed, as wiſe. For he no ſooner heard that the enemy was come over the mountains into *Tempe*, than he feared like one out of his wits; ſaying, that he was vanquiſhed, and had loſt all without battel. Herewithal he began to take out of *Dium*, what he could carry away in haſte; and ſtraightways abandoned the town. In the ſame vehemency of amazement, he ſent a ſtrait commandment to *Theſſalonica*, that the arſenal there ſhould be ſet on fire; and to *Pella*, that his treaſures there ſhould be caſt into the ſea; as if the *Romans* were like preſently to be maſters of theſe two cities. *Nicias*, who was appointed to drown the treaſure, performed it haſtily as well as he could; though ſoon after, his maſter grew ſorry for the loſs, and it was all, in a manner, recovered by divers from under the water. But *Andronicus*, who had charge to ſet fire on the king's arſenal, deferred the execution, foreſeeing that repentance might follow; and ſo he prevented the damage. Whether *Nicias*, for his abſolute and blind obedience, or *Andronicus*, for his careful providence, merited the greater commendation, or more eaſy pardon, it reſted in the king to interpret. The reward of their ſervice was this. *Perſeus*, growing aſhamed of his mad cowardiſe, that appeared in this haſty direction, cauſed them both to be ſlain. Alſo thoſe poor men, which had fetched his treaſure out of the ſea by their diving, were pay'd their wages after the ſame ſort, that ſo there might be no witneſs of the king's baſe folly. Such end muſt they fear, who are privy to diſhonourable actions of great princes. If *Perſeus* would have gone ſurely to work for the hiding of his fault; then muſt he ſo royally have behaved himſelf, that no man might believe him to be the author of any unworthy act or counſel. But his virtue was of no ſuch capacity. He thought it enough to lay the blame upon others. And therefore having called *Hippias* away (the captain which had ſtopped the conſul on the top of the mountain) and *Aſclepiodatus*, from defence of the paſſages, whereto they were by him appointed, he rated them openly; ſaying, that they had betrayed unto the enemy the gates and bars of *Macedon*. Of this reproach if they would diſcharge themſelves, by laying it upon him, to whom of right it belonged; then might they have ſped as did *Nicias* and *Andronicus*.

The conſul *Martius* had great cauſe to rejoyce, for that the king ſo haſtily relinquiſhed his poſſeſſion of *Tempe*, and all the paſſages leading thereinto, ſince the *Roman* army; this notwithſtanding, was hardly able to ſubſiſt for want of victuals. He took *Dium* without reſiſtance, and thence went forward into *Macedon:* wherein having travelled about a day's journey, and gotten one town that yielded, he was compelled, by mere lack of food for his men, to return back towards *Theſſaly*. His fleet came to him in this time of neceſſity, well appointed to have holpen him in the war: but having left behind at *Magneſia*, the ſhips of burthen, which carried the proviſions. Wherefore it fell out happily, that one of his lieutenants had been careful to occupy one of the caſtles about *Tempe*, which were forſaken by the *Macedonians:* for by thoſe ways only might corn be brought into the army. To meet the ſooner with this corn, which was moſt deſirouſly expected; he forſook *Dium*, and went to *Phila*; by which fooliſh journey (if not worſe than fooliſh) he loſt more, than a little the longer faſting had been worth. It is probable that his carts, with all or the moſt of his ſtore, were loſt among the mountains: for otherwiſe it had been madneſs to

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put himſelf on ſuch an enterpriſe, ſo ſlenderly provided, as that without enforcement, or ſight of the enemy, he ſhould be fain to quit it. Howſoever it was; men thought him a coward, or at leaſt a bad man of war; ſince he thus recoiled and gave off, when it moſt behoved him to have proſecuted the action.

By underſtanding the folly and cowardiſe of *Martius*; the king recollected himſelf; underſtood his own error; ſought to hide it by ſuch poor means as have been ſhewed; and laboured to make what amends he could. He quickly repoſſeſſed the town of *Dium*, which he haſtily repaired, finding it diſmantled by the *Romans*. This done, he encamped ſtrongly by the river *Enipeus*: meaning there to ſtop the enemies proceeding all that ſummer. Leſs diligence, more timely uſed, would have been enough not only to have delivered *Martius* into his hand, who had beguiled him with an idle hope of peace: but to have given him ſuch a noble victory, as might cauſe the *Romans* to ſeek a good end of the war upon fair conditions, and not to begin again in haſte. Yet this recovery and fortification of *Dium*, was to the conſul an exceeding hinderance. For little or nothing could afterward be done toward the conqueſt in hand, in all the continuance of his office. Only the town of *Heraclea*, ſtanding on the river of *Peneus*, five miles from *Dium*, was taken by force; or rather by a trick of climbing up on mens heads, ſomewhat after the manner of our tumblers. But it made ſuch defence as it could; and was not given up for fear. After this, *Martius* did ſet a bold face towards *Dium*; as if he would have taken it again, and have driven the king further off; though his intent or hope, was nothing like ſo great: his chief care being to provide for his wintering. He ſent the admiral to make attempt upon the ſea-towns, *Theſſalonica*, *Caſſandrea*, *Demetrias* and others. All theſe were aſſayed; but in vain. The fields about *Theſſalonica* were waſted; and ſome companies, that ſundry times adventured forth of the town, were ſtill put to the worſe. As for the town itſelf, there was danger in coming near it, either by land or ſea; by reaſon of the engines which ſhot from the walls, and reached unto the fleet. Wherefore the admiral ſetting ſail from thence, ran along by *Enia*, and *Antigonea* (landing near to each of them, and both doing and receiving hurt) until he came unto *Pallene*, in the territory of *Caſſandrea*. There king *Eumenes* joyned with him, bringing twenty ſhips of war: and five other were ſent thither from king *Pruſias*. With this acceſs of ſtrength the admiral was bold to try his fortune at *Caſſandrea*; which was bad. There was a new ditch lately caſt by *Perſeus*, before the town: which while the *Romans* were filling up, queſtion was made, what became of the earth taken thence, for that it lay not upon the bank. By this occaſion it was learned, that there were arches in the town-wall filled up with that earth, and covered with one ſingle row of brick. Hence the admiral gathered hope of making way into the town, by ſapping the walls. To this work he appointed ſuch as he thought meeteſt: giving an alarm to the other ſide of the town, thereby to ſhadow his attempt. The breach was ſoon made. But whilſt the *Romans* were ſhouting for joy, and ordering themſelves for the aſſault: the captains within the town perceived what was done; and ſallying forth unexpected, gave a fierce charge on the companies that were between the ditch and the wall; of whom they ſlew about ſix hundred, and ſuffered few to eſcape unwounded. This diſaſter, and the want of good ſucceſs on that part of the town which king *Eumenes* aſſailed (a ſupply in the mean while entring the town by ſea) cauſed the ſiege to break up. *Terone* was the next place which the admiral thought meet to attempt: and thence likewiſe he was repelled. Finding this too well manned; he made way towards *Demetrias*; whereinto *Euphranor*, a *Macedonian* captain, was gotten before his coming, with ſuch forces, as were not only ſufficient to have defended the town, if the admiral had layed ſiege to it, but to keep the land about it from ſpoil; or at leaſt (as they did) to make the enemy pay dear for all that he could get. This *Euphranor* had taken his journey to *Demetrias*, by *Melibea*; whither the conſul (that he might not be quite without work) had ſent his lieutenant to beſiege it: and by the terror of his appearing ſuddenly over their heads, cauſed the beſiegers to diſlodge in all haſte, ſetting their camp on fire.

Such fortune attended on the *Romans*; or rather, ſo far was their ability ſhort of their enterprizes; ever ſince their conſul (whether daſtardly, or carelеſly) moſt unlike a good commander, had let go his hold of *Macedon*, by forſaking *Dium*: yea, it is to be ſuſpected, that ſome greater harm befel them, or at leaſt, that they were in ſome greater danger, than is expreſſed in the broken remaining hiſtory of this war. For *Martius* perſwaded the *Rhodians*, by *Ageſipolis* their ambaſſador, who came to him at *Heraclea* about other buſineſs of leſs importance, that they ſhould do well to interpoſe themſelves as mediators, and ſeek to finiſh the war. Now, although [a] *Polybius* do moſt probably conjecture, that this was rather a malicious device of *Martius*, craftily ſeeking to bring the *Rhodians* in danger (as anon it fell out) by their oppoſing the reſolution of the ſenate; than that it proceeded from any true fear in him, either of *Perſeus*, or of *Antiochus*, who had then an army on foot; yet ſince he made ſhew of fear, it is like withal, that ſomewhat had happened, which might make his fear ſeem not counterfeit. And ſo were the *Rhodians* moved to think of him; not only for that the extraordinary courteſy, both of him and of the admiral, towards their ambaſſador, coming from proud natures, did argue diffidence, where there was no ambition to cauſe it; but much more, for that ſhortly after the ambaſſadors of *Perſeus*, and of *Gentius* the *Illyrian*, did ſet out their buſineſs at *Rhodes*, not more with the ſtrength of a good fleet, which the *Macedonian* had gotten, than with the honour of ſome victory, wherein he had lately ſlain great numbers of the *Roman* horſe. [b] Thus much we find intimated; though the time, place, or other circumſtances of the fight be not ſpecified. And hereto may be referred, the report of thoſe that were ſent from *Rome*, to view the eſtate of *Martius*'s army. For they found the conſul wanting meat; the admiral wanting men; and, for thoſe few that he had, wanting both money and cloaths: and *Ap. Claudius* the pretor, who lay on the frontier of *Illyria*, ſo unable to invade *Macedon*, that contrariwiſe, he was in extream danger, ſo as either he muſt quickly be ſent for thence, or a new army be ſent thither to him. Wherefore it may ſeem, that ſome blow had been taken on the *Illyrian* ſide, which made all to halt; or at leaſt, that the *Romans* with greater loſs, than is before ſpoken of, had been driven from ſome of the towns which they beſieged.

[a] Polyb. legat. 80.

[b] Polyb. legat. 87.

Now although it were ſo, that *Martius*, in very few of his actions, behaved himſelf like a man of war; yet in exerciſe of cunning, which one hath moſt aptly termed, *a crooked or ſiniſter kind of wiſdom*, he dealt as a craftſmaſter, with a reſtleſs working diligence. This indeed neither proved his ſufficiency, nor commended his honeſty; ſince thereby he effected nothing to his own benefit: and nevertheleſs, out of envy, vain-glory, or ſuch delight as weak and buſy-headed men take in creating inexplicable troubles, he directly made oppoſition to the good of his country. At ſuch time as *Perſeus*, by the ſucceſs of his doings againſt *Hoſtilius*, had gotten much reputation, and was thought likely to invade *Theſſaly*; *Archo*, *Lycortas*, and other good patriots among the *Acheans*, judged it expedient for their nation to help the *Romans*, as in a time of adverſity, whom in proſperity they loved not to flatter. Wherefore *Archo* propoſed a decree, which paſſed; that the *Acheans* ſhould ſend their whole power into *Theſſaly*, and participate with the *Romans* in all danger. So the army was levied, and [a] *Polybius*, with others, ſent ambaſſadors unto *Martius*, to certify him thereof, and know his pleaſure. *Polybius* found the conſul buſied in ſeeking paſſage through *Tempe* into *Macedon*. He went along with the army, and awaited the conſul's leiſure, till they came to *Heraclea*; where, finding the time convenient, he preſented the decree, and offered the ſervice of his nation, wherein ſoever it ſhould be commanded. *Martius* took this very kindly; but ſaid, that he needed now no manner of help. Forthwith *Polybius* diſpatched home his companions, to ſignify thus much, tarrying himſelf behind in the camp. After a while, word was brought to *Martius*, that *Ap. Claudius* deſired, or rather imperiouſly required of the *Acheans*, five thouſand men, to be ſent him into *Epirus*. It was manifeſt, that *Appius* had need of theſe men; and that if he were ſtrong in the field, he might do notable ſervice, by diſtracting the forces of *Perſeus*. But the labyrinthian head of *Martius* could not allow of ſuch plain reaſon. He called unto him *Polybius*, to whom he declared, that *Appius* had no need of ſuch aid; and therefore willed him to return home, and in any wiſe take order that the men might not be ſent, nor the *Acheans* be put to ſuch needleſs charges. Away went *Polybius*, muſing, and unable to reſolve, whether it were for love to the *Acheans*, that the conſul was ſo earneſt in this buſineſs; or rather for envy, and to hinder *App. Claudius* from doing any thing, ſince himſelf could do nothing. But when *Polybius* was to deliver his opinion in the council, touching this matter; then found he a new doubt, that more nearly concerned his own ſelf, and thoſe of his own party. For, as he was ſure to incur the great indignation of the conſul, if he ſhould neglect what was given him in charge; ſo was it manifeſt, on the other ſide, that the words by *Martius*, uttered to him in private, would prove no good warrant for him and his friends, if openly they ſhould refuſe to help *Claudius*, alledging, that he had no need. In this caſe therefore, he had recourſe unto the decree of the ſenate, which exempted men from neceſſity of doing what the *Roman* commanders ſhould require, unleſs by ſpecial order from the ſenate the ſame were likewiſe appointed. So for lack of warrant from the ſenate, this demand of *Appius* was referred unto the advice of the conſul, by whom it was ſure to be made fruſtrate. Hereby the *Acheans* were ſavers of more than an hundred and twenty talents, though *Polybius* himſelf ran into danger of *Appius*'s diſpleaſure; and for ſuch honeſt dealing in his country's behalf, was afterwards rewarded by the *Romans* with many a long year's impriſonment.

Whether it were by the like policy of *Martius*, that king *Eumenes* grew cold in his affection to the *Romans*, or whether this king began when it was too late to ſtand in fear, leſt the fire, which he himſelf had helped to kindle, would ſhortly take hold on his own lodging; or whether the regard of money were able to overſway all other paſſions, it is hard to determine; ſince they, that had better means to know the truth, have not preciſely affirmed any certainty. One report is, that *Eumenes* did not ſo much as give any help to *Martius*; but, coming to have joined with him in ſuch friendly manner as he did with the former conſuls, was not entertained according to his liking; and thereupon returned home in ſuch anger, that he refuſed to leave behind him certain horſe of the *Gallo-Greeks*, being requeſted to have done it. If this were true, and that his brother *Attalus* tarrying behind with the conſul, did the *Romans* good ſervice; then is the reaſon apparent of the hatred borne afterwards by the ſenate to *Eumenes*, and the love to *Attalus*. But it is more generally received, that *Eumenes* gave a willing ear to *Perſeus*'s deſire of accord, for mere deſire of gain. And it might well be, that covetouſneſs drew him on in the courſe whereinto indignation firſt led him. Howſoever it befel, *Perſeus* cauſed *Eumenes* to be ſounded, and found him ſo tractable, that he was bold to ſollicit him by an embaſſy. The tenor of his advertiſements both to *Eumenes*, and to *Antiochus*, was, that there could be no perfect love between a king and a free city; that the *Romans* had quarrel alike to all kings, though they dealt with no more than one at a time, and uſed the help of one againſt another; that *Philip* was oppreſſed by them, with the help of *Attalus*; *Antiochus*, with the help of *Philip* and *Eumenes*; and now *Perſeus* aſſailed, with the help of *Eumenes* and *Pruſias*. Herewith he willed *Eumenes* to conſider, that when *Macedon* was taken out of their way, they would be doing with him in *Aſia*, which lay next at hand; yea, that already they began to think better of *Pruſias* than of him. In like ſort, he admoniſhed *Antiochus* not to look for any good concluſion of his war with the *Egyptian*, ſo long as the *Romans* could make him give over, by denouncing their will and pleaſure. Finally, he requeſted both of them either to compel the *Romans* to ſurceaſe from their war upon *Macedon*, or elſe to hold them as common enemies unto all kings. *Antiochus* lay far out of the *Romans* way, and therefore was little troubled with ſuch remonſtrances. *Eumenes* was more nearly touch'd, and as he felt part of this to be true, ſo had he reaſon to ſtand in doubt of the reſt. Yet, when he ſhould give anſwer, he began to offer a bargain of peace for money. He thought the *Romans* to be no leſs weary, than *Perſeus* was afraid. Wherefore he promiſed, for his own part, that if he might have fifteen hundred talents for withdrawing his hand from this war, then would he remain a neuter therein; and that for ſome greater quantity of money (how much I find not) he would alſo bring the *Romans* to condeſcend unto peace: and, for aſſurance of his true meaning herein, he offered to give hoſtages. *Perſeus* liked well to receive the hoſtages, but not to lay out the money; eſpecially before-hand, as was required. He would fain have peace with *Rome*, and not with *Eumenes* only. For procuring of this,

[a] Polyb. Legat. 78.

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he promiſed to be at any reaſonable coſt; but he would lay down the money in the temple at *Samothrace*, whence it ſhould be delivered unto *Eumenes*, after that the peace was fully concluded and ratified. The iſle of *Samothrace* was *Perſeus*'s own, and therefore *Eumenes* thought the money no nearer to him, being there, than if it remained in *Pella*. Beſides, his labour deſerved ſomewhat, howſoever the buſineſs might happen to ſucceed; ſo that needs he would have part of his wages in *prêt*. Thus the two kings did no more than loſe time; and *Eumenes* grew ſuſpected of the *Romans* as a traytor.

After the ſame manner dealt *Perſeus* with king *Gentius* the *Illyrian*. He had attempted this *Illyrian* before, who dealt plainly, and ſaid, that without money he could not ſtir. Hereunto *Perſeus* loved not to hearken, thinking that his treaſures would ſerve at the laſt caſt, to deliver him from all his fears. But when the *Romans* had gotten within *Tempe*, then did his fear urge him to prodigality; ſo as he agreed to pay three hundred talents, which *Gentius* demanded for a recompence. So the bargain was ſoon made, and pledges on both ſides delivered for performance. This was openly done by *Perſeus*, to the end that all his army might have comfort by ſuch acceſs of ſtrength to their party. Preſently, upon the bargain made, ambaſſadors were ſent to *Rhodes*, both from *Perſeus* and *Gentius*, who deſired the *Rhodians* to take upon them as arbitrators between *Perſeus* and the *Romans*, and to bring the war to an end. The *Rhodians*, thinking that *Martius* the conſul was no leſs deſirous of peace than the *Macedonian*, arrogantly promiſed, that they, by their authority, would make peace; wiſhing the kings to ſhew themſelves conformable. But the *Roman* ſenate, hearing proud words to the ſame effect from the *Rhodian* ambaſſadors, gave an anſwer as diſdainful, angry, and menacing as they could deviſe; ſo as this vain glory of the *Rhodians* was throughly chaſtiſed; and more throughly ſhould have been, if their ſubmiſſion had not been as humble, as their folly was proud. Such uſe of *Gentius*'s friendſhip made *Perſeus*, without laying out one ounce of ſilver. Now fain he would have haſtned this young and raſh *Illyrian* to enter with all ſpeed into the war; but then muſt the money be haſtned away. *Pantauchus*, the *Macedonian* ambaſſador, who remained with *Gentius*, exhorted him daily to begin the war by land and ſea, whilſt the *Romans* were unprovided. But finding what it was that made all to ſtay, he ſent word to *Perſeus*. Hereupon ten talents were ſent to *Pantauchus*, who delivered it to the young king, as earneſt of that which followed. More followed indeed, and ſealed up with the ſeal of the *Illyrians*; but carried by *Macedonians*, and not too faſt. Before this money came into *Illyria*, *Gentius* had laid hands upon two *Roman* ambaſſadors, and caſt them into priſon; which *Perſeus* no ſooner heard, than he recalled his treaſure-bearers, and ſent them with their load to *Pella*; for that now the *Illyrian* was of neceſſity to make war with the *Romans*, whether he were hired thereto or not.

[a] There came about the ſame time, through *Illyria*, to the aid of *Perſeus*, under one *Clondicus* a petty king, ten thouſand horſe and ten thouſand foot, of the *Gauls*, which were (as *Plutarch* hath it) the *Baſtarnæ*. Theſe had before-hand made their bargain, and were to receive preſent pay at the firſt. At their entry into the kingdom, *Perſeus* ſent one to them; deſiring their captains to come viſit him, whom he promiſed to gratify with goodly rewards; hoping that the multitude would take good words for payment. But the firſt queſtion that their general aſked, was, Whether the king had ſent money to give the ſoldiers their pay in hand, according to his bargain? Hereto the meſſenger had not what to anſwer. Why then (ſaid *Clondicus*) tell thy maſter, That the *Gauls* will not ſtir one foot further, until they have gold, as was agreed, and hoſtages. *Perſeus* hereupon took counſel: if to utter his own opinion, before men ſo wiſe that they would not contradict him, were to take counſel. He made an invective againſt the incivility and avarice of the *Baſtarnæ*: who came with ſuch numbers, as could not but be dangerous to him and to his kingdom. Five thouſand horſe of them, he ſaid, would be as many as he ſhould need to uſe; and not ſo many, that he ſhould need to fear them. It had been well done, if any of his counſellors would have told him, that there wanted not employment for the whole army of them, ſince without any danger to the kingdom, they might be let out by the way of *Perrhæbia*, into *Theſſaly*: where waſting the country, and filling themſelves with ſpoil, they ſhould make the *Romans* glad to forſake *Tempe*, even for hunger and all manner of want; therein doing the king notable ſervice, whether they won any victory, or not. This, and a great deal more might have been alledged, if any man had dared to give advice freely. In concluſion *Antigonus*, the ſame meſſenger that had been with them before, was ſent again, to let them know the king's mind. He did his errand: upon which followed a great murmur of thoſe many thouſands that had been drawn ſo far to no purpoſe. But *Clondicus* aſked him now again, whether he had brought the money along with him, to pay thoſe five thouſand, whom the king would entertain. Hereto, when it was perceived, that *Antigonus* could make no better anſwer than ſhifting excuſes; the *Baſtarnæ* returned preſently towards *Danubius*, waſting the neighbour parts of *Thrace*; yet ſuffering this crafty meſſenger to eſcape unhurt: which was more than he could have well expected.

Thus dealt *Perſeus*, like a careful treaſurer, and one that would preſerve his money for the *Romans*, without diminiſhing the ſum. But of this painful office he was very ſoon diſcharged by *L. Æmylius Paulus* the new conſul: who in fifteen days after his ſetting forth from *Italy*, brought the kingdom of *Macedon* to that end, for which God had appointed over it a king ſo fooliſh and ſo cowardly.

SECT. VIII.

Of L. Æmylius Paulus *the conſul. His journey. He forceth* Perſeus *to diſcamp. He will not hazard battel with any diſadvantage. Of an eclipſe of the moon.* Æmylius's *ſuperſtition. The battel of* Pydna. Perſeus's *flight. He forſakes his kingdom: which haſtily yields to* Æmylius. Perſeus *at* Samothrace. *He yields himſelf to the* Roman *admiral; and is ſent priſoner to* Æmylius.

BY the war of *Macedon*, the *Romans* hitherto had gotten much diſhonour. Which though it were not accompanied with any danger, yet the indignity ſo moved them, that either [a] they decreed that province to *L. Æmylius Paulus*, without putting it, as was otherwiſe their manner, to the chance of lot, between him and his fellow con-

[a] Liv. lib. 44. Plutarch in vit. Æmyl. [b] Plutarch in vit. Æmyl.

ſul;

ſul; or at leaſt were gladder that the lot had caſt it upon him, than that ſo worthy a man was advanced to the dignity of a ſecond conſulſhip. He refuſed to propound unto the ſenate any thing that concerned his province; until by his ambaſſadors, thither ſent to view the eſtate of the war, it was perfectly underſtood, in what condition both the *Roman* forces, and the *Macedonian*, at the preſent remained. This being throughly known to be ſuch, as hath been already told; the ſenate appointed a ſtrong ſupply, not only unto the conſul, but unto the navy, and likewiſe to the army that lay between *Illyria* and *Epirus*; from which *Ap. Claudius* was removed, and *L. Anicius* ſent thither in his place. *Æmylius*, before his departure from *Rome*, making an oration to the people, as was the cuſtom, ſpake with much gravity and authority. He requeſted thoſe that thought themſelves wiſe enough to manage this war, either to accompany him into *Macedon*, and there aſſiſt him with their advice; or elſe to govern their tongues at home, and not take upon them to give directions by hearſay, and cenſure by idle reports: for he told them plainly, that he would frame his doings to occaſions; not to the expectation of the multitude. The like ſpeech of his father *L. Æmylius*, who died valiantly in the battel of *Cannæ*, might well be living in ſome of their memories: which was enough to make them conform themſelves the more gladly unto the inſtructions given by a wiſe and reſolute conſul.

All his buſineſs within the city being diſpatched, *Æmylius* was honourably attended, at his ſetting forth on his journey; with an eſpecial hope of men, that he ſhould finiſh the war: though that he ſhould finiſh it ſo ſoon and happily, was more than could have been hoped or imagined. He came to *Brunduſium*; whence, when the wind came fair, he ſet ſail at break of day, and arrived ſafely at the iſle of *Corcyra* before night. Thence paſſed he to *Delphi*: where, having done ſacrifice to *Apollo*, after the fifth day he ſet forwards to the camp; and was there in five days more. So are there but five of the fifteen days remaining, in which he finiſhed the war.

Perſeus lay ſtrongly encamped at *Dium*; having ſpared no labour of men and women to fortify the banks of *Enipeus*, where it was fordable in dry weather. So as there was little hope, or none, to force him; and conſequently as little poſſibility to enter that way into *Macedon*. One great inconvenience troubling the *Romans*, and much diſabling them to make attempt upon *Dium*, was lack of freſh water. For there were ten miles between *Dium* and *Tempe*; all the way lying between the ſeaſhore and the foot of *Olympus*, without any brook or ſpring breaking forth on that ſide. But *Æmylius* found preſent remedy for this, by digging wells on the ſhore, where he found ſweet ſprings; as commonly there is no ſhore that wants them, though they riſe not above the ground. Want of this knowledge was enough to hinder *Martius* from taking up his lodging any nearer to the enemy, than the town of *Heraclea*, on the river *Peneus*; where he had watering at pleaſure, but could perform no ſervice of any worth. Yet when the *Roman* camp had ſuch means to lye cloſe to the *Macedonian*, as it preſently did; the paſſage onward being defended as hath been already ſhewed, ſeemed no leſs difficult than before. Wherefore it was neceſſary to ſearch another way; which by enquiry was found out. There was a narrow paſſage over *Olympus*, leading into *Perrhæbia*: hard of aſcent, but ſlenderly guarded, and therefore promiſing a fair journey. *Martius* either had not been informed hereof; or durſt not attempt it: or perhaps could not get his ſoldiers to make the adventure; they fearing leſt it would prove ſuch a piece of work, as had been their march over *Oſſa* into *Tempe*. But *Paulus* was a man of greater induſtry, courage, and ability, to command. He had reformed, even at his firſt coming, many diſorders in the *Roman* camp; teaching the ſoldiers, among other good leſſons, to be obedient and ready in execution; without troubling themſelves, as had been their manner, to examine the doings and purpoſes of their general. And now he appointed about five thouſand men to this enterpriſe: whereof he committed the charge unto *Scipio Æmylianus* and *Q. Fabius Maximus*, his own ſons by nature, but adopted; the one of them, by a ſon of *Scipio* the *African*; the other by one of the *Fabii*. *Scipio* took with him ſome light-armed *Thracians* and *Cretans*; but his main ſtrength was of legionaries. For the king's guard, upon the mountain, conſiſted in a manner wholly of archers and ſlingers: who, though at ſome diſtance they might do notable ſervice againſt thoſe that ſhould climb up unto them; yet when the darkneſs took away their aim, they were like to make a bad night's work, being to deal with thoſe that were armed to fight at hand. To conceal the buſineſs about which they went, *Scipio* and *Fabius* took a wrong way towards the fleet; where victuals were provided for their journey: it being noiſed, that they were to run along the coaſt of *Macedon* by ſea, and waſte the country. All the while that they were paſſing the mountains (which was about three days) the conſul made ſhew of a meaning to ſet upon *Perſeus* where he lay; rather to divert the king's attention from that which was his main enterpriſe, than upon any hope to do good, in ſeeking to get over *Enipeus*. The chanel of *Enipeus*, which received in winter time a great fall of waters from the mountains, was exceeding deep and broad; and the ground of it was ſuch, as though at the preſent it lay well-near all dry, yet it ſerved not for thoſe that were weightily armed to fight upon. Wherefore *Æmylius* employed none ſave his *Velites*; of whom the king's light armature had advantage at far diſtance, though the *Romans* were better appointed for the cloſe. The engines from off the towers which *Perſeus* had raiſed on his own bank, did alſo beat upon the *Romans*, and gave them to underſtand, that their labour was in vain. Yet *Æmylius* perſiſted as he had begun; and continued his aſſault, ſuch as it could be, the ſecond day. This might have ſerved to teach the *Macedonians*, that ſome greater work was in hand: ſince otherwiſe a good captain, as *Æmylius* was known to be, would not have troubled himſelf with making ſuch bravado's, that were ſomewhat coſtly. But *Perſeus* only looked unto that which was before his eyes: until his men that came running fearfully down the mountain, brought word into the camp, That the *Romans* were following at their backs. Then was all full of tumult, and the king himſelf no leſs (if not more) amaz'd than any of the reſt. Order was forthwith given to diſlodge; or rather, without order, in all tumultuous haſte, the camp was broken up, and a ſpeedy retreat made to *Pydna*. Whether it were ſo, that they which had cuſtody of the paſſage were taken ſleeping, or whether they were beaten by plain force; *Scipio* and *Fabius* had very good ſucceſs in their journey. It may well be, that they ſlept until the *Romans* came ſomewhat near to them; and then taking alarm, when their arrows and

ſlings

ſings could do little ſervice, were beaten at handy-ſtroaks: ſo as the different relations that are cited by *Plutarch* out of *Polybius*, and an epiſtle of *Scipio*, may each of them have been true. Thus was an open way cleared into *Macedon:* which had been effected by *Martius* in the year foregoing; but was cloſed up again, through his not proſecuting ſo rich an opportunity.

Perſeus was in extream doubt what courſe to take, after this unhappy beginning. Some gave advice, to man his towns, and ſo to linger out the war: having been taught by the laſt year's example, how reſolute the people were in making defence. But far worſe counſel prevailed; as generally it doth in turbulent and fearful deliberations. The king reſolved to put all at once to hazard of battel: fearing belike to put himſelf into any one town, leſt that ſhould be firſt of all beſieged; and he therein (as cowardly natures always are jealous) not over-carefully relieved. This was even the ſame that *Æmylius*, or any invader, ſhould have deſired. So a place was choſen near unto *Pydna*, that ſerved well for the *Phalanx*, and had likewiſe on the ſides of it ſome pieces of higher ground, fit for the archers and light armature. There he abode the coming of the enemy; who ſtayed not long behind him. As ſoon as the *Romans* had ſight of the king's army; which, with greater fear than diſcretion, had haſted away from them, forſaking the camp that was ſo notably well fortified: they deſired nothing more, than to give battel immediately; doubting leſt otherwiſe the king ſhould change his mind, and get further off. And to this effect *Scipio* brake with the conſul; praying him not to loſe occaſion by delay. But *Æmylius* told him, that he ſpake like a young man; and therefore willed him to have patience. The *Romans* were tired with their journey; had no camp wherein to reſt themſelves; nor any thing there, ſave only the bare ground whereon they trod. For theſe and the like reſpects, the conſul made a ſtand, and, ſhewing himſelf unto the *Macedonian*, who did the like, in order of battel, gave charge to have the camp meaſured out and entrenched behind the army; whereunto at good leiſure, he fell back without any manner of trouble. After a night's reſt, it was hoped both by the *Romans* and the *Macedonians*, that the matter ſhould be determined; each part thinking their own general to blame, for that they had not fought the ſame day. As for the king, he excuſed himſelf by the backwardneſs of the enemy; who advanced no further, but kept upon ground ſerving ill for the *Phalanx:* as on the other ſide, the conſul had the reaſons before ſhewed, which he communicated to thoſe about him the next day.

That evening (which followed the third of *September*, by the *Roman* account) *C. Sulpicius Gallus*, a colonel, or tribune of a legion, who had the former year been pretor, foretold unto the conſul, and (with his good liking) unto the army, an eclipſe of the moon, which was to be the ſame night: willing the ſoldiers not to be troubled therewith, for that it was natural, and might be known long before it was ſeen. It was the manner of the *Romans*, in ſuch eclipſes, to beat pans of braſs and baſons, as we do in following a ſwarm of bees; thinking that thereby they did the moon great eaſe, and helped her in her labour. But this prognoſtication of *Sulpicius* converted their ſuperſtition into admiration of his deep ſkill, when they ſaw it verified. Contrariwiſe, the *Macedonians* howled and made a great noiſe as long as the eclipſe laſted: rather perhaps becauſe it was their faſhion, than for that they were terrified therewith as with a prodigy, betokening their loſs; ſince their deſire to fight was no wit leſſened by it. I will not here ſtand to diſpute, whether ſuch eclipſes do ſignify, or cauſe, any alteration in civil affairs, and matters that have ſmall dependance on natural complexion: for the argument is too large. More worthy of obſervation it is, how ſuperſtition captivates the underſtanding of the wiſeſt, where the help of true religion is wanting. *Æmylius*, though he were ſufficiently inſtructed concerning this defect of the moon, that it was no ſupernatural thing, nor above the reach of human underſtanding, ſo as he ſhould need to trouble himſelf with any devout regard thereof: yet could he not refrain from doing his duty to this moon, and congratulating with ſacrifice her delivery, as ſoon as ſhe ſhone out bright again: for which, he is commended even by *Plutarch* a ſage philoſopher, as a godly and religious man. If *Sulpicius* perhaps did not aſſiſt him in this fooliſh devotion; yet is it like, that he being a ſenator, and one of the council for war, was partaker the next morning in a ſacrifice done to *Hercules*; which was no leſs fooliſh. For a great part of the day was vainly conſumed, ere *Hercules* could be pleaſed with any ſacrifice, and vouchſafe to ſhew tokens of good luck in the entrails of the beaſts. At length in the belly of the one and twentieth ſacrifice, was found a promiſe of victory to *Æmylius*; but with condition, that he ſhould not give the onſet. *Hercules* was a *Greek*, and partial, as nearer in alliance to the *Macedonian* than to the *Roman*. Wherefore it had been better to call upon the new goddeſſes, lately canonized at *Alabanda*; or upon *Romulus*, founder of their city, on whom the *Romans* had beſtowed his deity; or (if a god of elder date were more authentical) upon *Mars* the father of *Romulus*, to whom belonged the guidance of military affairs; and who therefore would have limited his favour with no injunctions contrary to the rules of war.

Now concerning the battel; *Æmylius* was throughly perſwaded, that the king meant to abide it: for that otherwiſe he would not have ſtayed at *Pydna*, when, as a little before, his leiſure ſerved to retire whither he liſted, the *Romans* being further off. In regard of this, and perhaps of the tokens appearing in the ſacrifices, the conſul thought that he might wait upon advantage, without making any great haſte. Neither was it to be neglected, that the morning ſun was full in the *Roman*'s faces: which would be much to their hinderance all the forenoon. Since therefore *Perſeus* kept his ground, that was commodious for the *Phalanx*, and *Æmylius* ſent forth part of his men to bring in wood and fodder; there was no likelihood of fighting that day. But about ten of the clock in the morning, a ſmall occaſion brought to paſs that, whereto neither of the generals had over-earneſt deſire. A horſe brake looſe at watering; which two or three of the *Roman* ſoldiers followed into the river, wading after him up to the knees. The king's men lay on the further bank; whence a couple of *Thracians* ran into the water, to draw this horſe over to their own ſide. Theſe fell to blows, as in a private quarrel; and one of the *Thracians* was ſlain. His countrymen ſeeing this, haſted to revenge their fellow's death, and followed thoſe that had ſlain him, over the river. Hereupon company came in, to help on each part, until the number grew ſuch, as made it paſt a fray, and cauſed both the armies to be careful of the event. In fine, each of the generals placed his men in order of battel, accordingly as the

ner of his country, and the arms, wherewith they ſerved, did require. The ground was a flat level, ſave that on the ſides a few hillocks were raiſed here and there; whereof each part might take what advantage it could. The *Macedonians* were the greater number, the *Romans* the better ſoldiers, and better appointed. Both the king and the conſul encouraged their men with lively words; which the preſent condition could bountifully afford. But the king having finiſhed his oration, and ſent on his men, withdrew himſelf into *Pydna*; there to do ſacrifice, as he pretended, unto *Hercules*. It is the leſs marvel, that he durſt adventure battel, ſince he had bethought himſelf of ſuch a ſtratagem, whereby to ſave his own perſon. As for *Hercules*, he liked not the ſacrifice of a coward: whoſe unſeaſonable devotion could be no better than hypocriſy. For he that will pray for a good harveſt, ought alſo to plow, ſow, and weed his ground. When therefore the king returned to the battel, he found it no better than loſt: and he, in looking to his own ſafety, cauſed it to be loſt altogether, by beginning the flight.

The acts of this day, ſuch as we find recorded, are, that the *Roman* elephants could do no manner of good; that the *Macedonian Phalanx* did ſo ſtoutly preſs onwards, and beat off all which came before it, as *Æmylius* was thereat much aſtoniſhed; that the *Peligni* ruſhing deſperately on the *Phalanx*, were over-borne, many of them ſlain, and the ſquadrons following them ſo diſcouraged herewith, as they retired apace towards an hill. Theſe were the things that fell out adverſe to the *Romans*; and which the conſul beholding, is ſaid to have rent his coat-armour for grief. If the king, with all his power of horſe, had in like manner done his devoir, the victory might have been his own. That which turned the fortune of the battel, was the ſame, which doubtleſs the conſul expected even from the beginning: the difficulty, or almoſt the impoſſibility, of holding the *Phalanx* long in order. For, whilſt ſome of the *Romans* ſmall battalions preſſed hard upon one part of it, and others recoiled from it; it was neceſſary (if the *Macedonians* would follow upon thoſe which were put to the worſe) that ſome files having open way before them, ſhould advance themſelves beyond the reſt that were held at a ſtand. This coming ſo to paſs, admoniſhed the conſul what was to be done. The long pikes of the *Macedonians* were of little uſe, when they were charged in flank by the *Roman* targettiers; according to the direction given by *Æmylius*, when he ſaw the front of the enemies great battel become unequal, and the ranks in ſome places open, by reaſon of the unequal reſiſtance which they found. Thus was the uſe of the *Phalanx* proved unavailable againſt many ſmall ſquadrons, as it had been formerly in the battel of *Cynoſcephalæ:* yea, this form of embatteling was found unſerviceable againſt the other, by reaſon, that being not every-where alike diſtreſſed, it would break of itſelf; though here were little ſuch inconvenience of ground, as had been at [a] *Cynoſcephalæ*.

Perſeus, when he ſaw his battel begin to rout, turned his bridle preſently, and ran amain towards *Pella*. All his horſe eſcaped in a manner untouched, and a great number followed him; the little harm which they had taken, witneſſing the little good ſervice which they had done. As for the poor foot, they were left to the mercy of the enemy; who ſlew above twenty thouſand of them; though having little cauſe to be furious, as having loſt in that battel, only ſome fourſcore, or ſixſcore men at the moſt. Some of the foot eſcaping from the execution, overtook the king and his company in a wood; where they fell to railing at the horſemen, calling them cowards, traytors, and ſuch other names, till at length they fell to blows. The king was in doubt leſt they had ill meaning to himſelf: and therefore turned out of the common way, being followed by ſuch as thought it good. The reſt of the company diſperſed themſelves: every one as his own occaſions guided him. Of thoſe that kept along with their king, the number began within a while to leſſen. For he fell to deviſing upon whom he might lay the blame of that day's misfortune, which was moſt due to himſelf: thereby cauſing thoſe that knew his nature, to ſhrink away from him how they could. At his coming to *Pella*; he found his pages and houſhold ſervants ready to attend him, as they had been wont. But of his great men that had eſcaped from the battel, there was none appearing in the court. In this melancholy time, there was two of his treaſurers, that had the boldneſs to come to him, and tell him roundly of his faults. But in reward of their unſeaſonable admonitions, he ſtabbed them both to death. After this, none whom he ſent for would come at him. This boded no good. Wherefore ſtanding in fear, leſt they that refuſed to come at his call, would ſhortly dare ſome greater miſchief; he ſtole out of *Pella* by night. Of his friends he had with him only *Evander* (who had been employed to kill *Eumenes* at *Delphi*) and two other. There followed him likewiſe about five hundred *Cretans*; more for love of his money than of him. To theſe he gave of his plate, as much as was worth about fifty talents, though ſhortly he cozened them of ſome part thereof; making ſhew as if he would have redeemed it; but never paying the money. The third day after the battel he came to *Amphipolis*; where he exhorted the townſmen to fidelity, with tears; and his own ſpeech being hindred by tears, appointed *Evander* to ſpeak what himſelf would have uttered. But the *Amphipolitans* made it their chief care to look well to themſelves. Upon the firſt fame of the overthrow, they had emptied their town of two thouſand *Thracians* that lay there in garriſon: ſending them forth under colour of a gainful employment, and ſhutting the gates after them. And now to be rid of the king; they plainly bid *Evander* be gone. The king hearing this, had no mind to tarry: but embarking himſelf and the treaſure which he had there, in certain veſſels that he found in the river *Strymon*; paſſed over to the iſle of *Samothrace:* where he hoped to live ſafe, by privilege of the religious ſanctuary therein.

Theſe miſerable ſhifts of the king made it the leſs doubtful how all the kingdom fell into the power of *Æmylius*, within ſo few days after his victory. *Pydna*, which was neareſt at hand, was the laſt that yielded. About ſix thouſand of the ſoldiers that were of ſundry nations, fled out of the battel into that town, and prepared for defence: the confuſed rabble of ſo many ſtrangers hindering all deliberation and conſent. *Hippius*, who had kept the paſſage over *Oſſa* againſt *Martius*, with *Pantauchus*, who had been ſent ambaſſador to *Gentius* the *Illyrian*, were the firſt that came in: yielding themſelves and the town of *Berea*, whither they had retired out of the battel. With the like meſſage came others from *Theſſalonica*, from *Pella*, and from all the towns of *Macedon*, within

[a] *Chap.* 4. §. 14.

two days: the loſs of the head bereaving the whole body of all ſenſe and ſtrength. Neither did they of *Pydna* ſtand out any longer, when they knew that the king had forſaken his country; but opened their gates upon ſuch terms, that the ſack of it was granted to the *Roman* army. *Æmylius* ſent abroad into the country ſuch as he thought meeteſt, to take charge of other cities; he himſelf marching towards *Pella*. He found in *Pella* no more than three hundred talents; the ſame whereof *Perſeus* had lately defrauded the *Illyrian*. But within a very little while he ſhall have more. It was ſoon underſtood, that *Perſeus* had taken ſanctuary in the temple at *Samothrace:* his own letters to the conſul, confirming the report. He ſent theſe letters by a perſon of ſuch mean condition, that his caſe was pitied, for that he wanted the ſervice of better men. The ſcope of his writing was, to deſire favour; which though he begged in terms ill beſeeming a king; yet ſince the inſcription of his epiſtle was, *king Perſeus to the conſul Paulus*; the conſul, who had taken from him his kingdom, and would not allow him to retain the title, refuſed to make any anſwer thereunto. So there came other letters, as humble as could be expected; whereby he craved and obtained, that ſome might be ſent to confer with him about matters of his preſent eſtate. Nevertheleſs, in this conference he was marvellous earneſt, that he might be allowed ſtill to retain the name of king. And to this end it was perhaps, that he had ſo carefully preſerved his treaſure unto the very laſt: flattering himſelf with ſuch vain hopes as theſe; that the *Romans* would neither violate a ſanctuary, nor yet neglect thoſe great riches in his poſſeſſion; but compound with him for money, letting him have his deſire to live at eaſe, and to be called king. Yea, it ſeems that he had indeed, even from the beginning, a deſire to live in this iſle of *Samothrace:* both for that in one of his conſultations about the war, he was dehorted by his friends, from ſeeking to exchange his kingdom of *Macedon*, for [a] ſuch a paltry iſland; and for that he offered to lay up the money which *Eumenes* demanded in the holy temple that was there. But he finds it otherwiſe. They urge him to give place unto neceſſity, and without much ado, to yield to the diſcretion and mercy of the people of *Rome*. This is ſo far againſt his mind, that the conference breaks off without effect. Preſently there arrives at *Samothrace Cn. Octavius* the *Roman* admiral with his fleet; who aſſays, as well by terrible threats, as by fair language, to draw the king out of his lurking hole; wherein, for fear of impriſonment, he had now already impriſoned himſelf. When all would not ſerve, a queſtion was moved to the *Samothracians*; how they durſt pollute their temple, by receiving into it one that had violated the like privilege of ſanctuary, by attempting the murder of king *Eumenes* at *Delphi?* This went to the quick. The *Samothracians*, being now in the power of the *Romans*, take this matter to heart; and ſend word to the king that *Evander*, who lives with him in the temple, is accuſed of an impious fact committed at *Delphi*, whereof unleſs he can clear himſelf in judgment, he muſt not be ſuffered to prophane that holy place, by his abiding in it. The reverence borne to his majeſty now paſt, makes them forbear to ſay, that *Perſeus* himſelf is charged with the ſame crime. But what will this avail, when the miniſter of the fact being brought into judgment, ſhall (as is to be feared) impeach the author? *Perſeus* therefore willed *Evander* to have conſideration of the little favour that can be expected at the *Romans* hand, who are like to be preſidents and overſeers of this judgment: ſo as it were better to die valiantly, ſince none other hope remains, than hope to make good an ill cauſe; where, though he had a good plea, yet it could not help him. Of this motion *Evander* ſeems to like well, and either kills himſelf, or hoping to eſcape thence, by deferring the time as it were to get poiſon wherewith to end his life, is killed by the king's commandment. The death of this man, who had ſtuck to *Perſeus* in all times of need, makes all the king's friends that remained hitherto to forſake him; ſo as none are left with him, ſave his wife and children, with his pages. It is much to be ſuſpected, that they which leave him upon this occaſion, will tell perilous tales, and ſay, that the king hath loſt the privilege of this holy ſanctuary, by murdering *Evander* therein. Or, if the *Romans* will affirm ſo much, who ſhall dare to gainſay them? Since therefore there is nothing but a point of formality, and even that alſo liable to diſpute, which preſerves him from captivity, he purpoſeth to make an eſcape, and fly, with his treaſures, unto *Cotys*, his good friend, into *Thrace*. *Oroandes*, a *Cretan*, lay at *Samothrace* with one ſhip; who eaſily was perſwaded to waft the king thence. With all ſecrecy the king's money, as much as could be conveyed, was carried aboard by night; and the king himſelf, with his wife and children (if rather it were not true, that he had with him only [b] *Philip*, his elder ſon, who was only by adoption his ſon, being his brother by nature) with much ado got out of a window by a rope, and over a mud-wall. At his coming to the ſea-ſide, he found no *Oroandes* there; the *Cretans* had played a *Cretan* trick, and he was gone with the money to his own home. So it began to wax clear day, whilſt *Perſeus* was ſearching all along the ſhoar, who had ſtayed ſo long about this, that he might fear to be intercepted ere he could recover the temple. He ran therefore amain towards his lodging, and, thinking it not ſafe to enter it the common way, leſt he ſhould be taken, he hid himſelf in an obſcure corner. His pages miſſing him, ran up and down making enquiry, till *Octavius* made proclamation, that all the king's pages, and *Macedonians* whatſoever, abiding with their maſter in *Samothrace*, ſhould have their lives and liberty, with all to them belonging, which they had either in that iſle, or at home in *Macedon*, conditionally, that they ſhould preſently yield themſelves to the *Romans*. Hereupon they all came in. Likewiſe *Ion*, a *Theſſalonian*, to whom the king had given the cuſtody of his children, delivered them up to *Octavius*. Laſtly, *Perſeus* himſelf, with his ſon *Philip*, accuſing the gods of *Samothrace*, that had no better protected him, rendered himſelf, and made the *Roman* victory compleat. If he had not truſted in thoſe gods of *Samothrace*, but employed his whole care in the defence of *Macedon*, without other hopes of living, than of reigning therein, he might well have brought this war to an happier end. Now, by dividing his cogitations, and purſuing at once thoſe contrary hopes of ſaving his kingdom by arms, and himſelf by flight, he is become a ſpectacle of miſery, and one among the number of thoſe princes, that have been wretched by their own default. He was preſently ſent away to *Æmylius*, before whom he fell to the ground ſo baſely, that he ſeemed thereby to diſhonour the victory over himſelf, as

[a] Liv. lib. 42. [b] Plut. in vit. Æmyl. Liv. lib. 45. Liv. lib. 42.

gotten

gotten upon one of abject quality, and therefore the leſs to be eſteemed. *Æmilius* uſed to him the language of a gentle victor, blaming him, though mildly, for having with ſo hoſtile a mind made war upon the *Romans*. Hereto good anſwer might have been returned by one of better ſpirit. As for *Perſeus*, he anſwered all with a fearful ſilence. He was comforted with hope of life, or (as the conſul termed it) almoſt aſſurance; for that ſuch was the mercy of the people of *Rome*. After theſe good words, being invited to the conſul's table, and reſpectively intreated, he was committed priſoner to *Q. Ælius*.

Such end had this *Macedonian* war, after four years continuance; and ſuch end therewithal had the kingdom of *Macedon*, the glory whereof, that had ſome time filled all parts of the world then known, was now tranſlated unto *Rome*.

SECT. IX.

Gentius, *king of the* Illyrians, *taken by the* Romans.

ABOUT the ſame time, and with like celerity, *Anicius*, the *Roman* pretor, who ſucceeded unto *App. Claudius*, had the like ſucceſs againſt king *Gentius*, the *Illyrian*. *Gentius* had an army of fifteen thouſand, with which he was at *Liſſus*, ready to aſſiſt king *Perſeus* as ſoon as the money ſhould come, whereof he had received only ten talents. But *Anicius* arreſted him on the way; fought with him; overcame him; and drove him into [a] *Scodra*. This town was very defenſible by nature, beſides the help of fortification, and ſtrongly manned with all the force of *Illyria*; which, aſſiſted with the king's preſence, made it ſeem impoſſible to be won in any, not a very long time. Yet *Anicius* was confident in his late victory, and therefore preſented his army before the walls, making countenance to give an aſſault. The *Illyrians*, that might eaſily have defended themſelves within the town, would needs iſſue forth and fight. They were it ſeems rather paſſionate than couragious, for they were beaten; and thereupon forthwith began amazedly to treat about yielding. The king ſent ambaſſadors, by whom, at firſt, he deſired truce for three days, that he might deliberate concerning his eſtate. It ill became him, who had laid violent hands on the *Roman* ambaſſadors, to have recourſe to ſuch mediation. But he thought his own fault pardonable, inaſmuch as hitherto there was no greater harm done by him, than the caſting of thoſe ambaſſadors into priſon, where they were ſtill alive. Having obtained three days reſpite, he paſſed up a river, within half a mile of the *Roman* camp, into the lake of *Scodra*, as it were to conſult the more privately; though indeed, to hearken whether the report were true, that his brother *Caravantius* was coming to his reſcue. Finding that no ſuch help was toward, it is a wonder that he was ſo fooliſh as to return into *Scodra*. He ſent meſſengers craving acceſs unto the pretor, before whom having lamented his folly paſt (which, excepting the diſhoneſty, was not ſo great as his folly preſent) he fell down humbly, and yielded himſelf to diſcretion. All the towns of his kingdom, together with his wife, children, brother, and friends, were preſently given up. So this war ended in thirty days, the people of *Rome* not knowing that it was begun, until *Perpenna*, one of the ambaſſadors that had been impriſoned, brought word from *Anicius* how all had paſſed.

SECT. X.

How the Romans *behaved themſelves in* Greece *and* Macedon, *after their victory over* Perſeus.

NOW began the *Romans* to ſwell with the pride of their fortune, and to look tyrannically upon thoſe that had been unmannerly towards them before, whilſt the war with *Perſeus* ſeemed full of danger. The *Rhodian* ambaſſadors were ſtill at *Rome*, when the tidings of theſe victories were brought thither. Wherefore it was thought good to call them into the ſenate, and bid them do their errand again. This they performed with a bad grace, ſaying, that they were ſent from *Rhodes* to make an overture of peace; foraſmuch as it was thought, that this war was no leſs grievous to the *Romans* themſelves, than to the *Macedonians* and many others; but that now they were very glad, and in behalf of the *Rhodians* did congratulate with the ſenate and people of *Rome*, that it was ended much more happily than had been expected. Hereto the ſenate made anſwer, that the *Rhodians* had ſent this embaſſy to *Rome*, not for love of *Rome*, but in favour of the *Macedonian*, whoſe partiſans they were, and ſhould be ſo taken. By theſe threats, and the deſire of ſome (covetous of the charge) to have war proclaimed againſt *Rhodes*, the ambaſſadors were ſo affrighted, that in mourning apparel, as humble ſuppliants, they went about the city; beſeeching all men, eſpecially the great ones, to pardon their indiſcretion, and not to proſecute them with vengeance for ſome fooliſh words. This danger of war from *Rome* being known at *Rhodes*, all that had been any whit averſe from the *Romans* in the late war of *Macedon*, were either taken and condemned, or ſent priſoners to *Rome*; excepting ſome that ſlew themſelves for fear, whoſe goods alſo were confiſcated. Yet this procured little grace, and leſs would have done, if old *M. Cato*, a man by nature vehement, had not uttered a mild ſentence, and advertiſed the ſenate, that in decreeing war againſt *Rhodes*, they ſhould much diſhonour themſelves, and make it thought, that [b] rather the wealth of that city, which they were thought greedy to ranſack, than any juſt cauſe, had moved them thereto. This conſideration, together with their good deſerts in the wars of *Philip* and *Antiochus*, helped well the *Rhodians*; among whom, none of any mark remained alive, ſave thoſe that had been of the *Roman* faction. All which notwithſtanding, many years paſſed, ere by importunate ſuit, they could be admitted into the ſociety of the *Romans*; a favour which, till now, they had not eſteemed; but thought themſelves better without it, as equal friends.

With the like, or greater ſeverity, did the *Romans* make themſelves terrible in all parts of *Greece*. *Æmilius* himſelf made progreſs through the country, viſiting all the famous places therein, as for his pleaſure; yet not forgetting to make them underſtand what power he had over them. More than five hundred of the chief citizens in *Demetrias* was ſlain at one time by thoſe of the *Roman* faction, and with help of the *Roman* ſoldiers. Others fled, or were baniſhed, and their goods confiſcated. Of which things, when complaint was made to the conſul, the redreſs was ſuch.

[a] *Called now* Scutari. [b] Cæſar. in orat. apud Saluſt. de Conjurat. Catilinæ.

as

as requited not the pains of making ſupplication. His friends, that is to ſay, thoſe which betrayed unto the *Romans* the liberty of their country, he feaſted like a king, with exceſſive cheer; yet ſo, that he had all things very cheap in his camp: an eaſy matter, ſince no man durſt be backward in ſending proviſions, nor ſet on them the due price. Ambaſſadors likewiſe were ſent to *Rome*; ſome to give order for ſettling the eſtate of *Macedon*, towards which they had more particular inſtruction from the ſenate than was uſual in ſuch caſes; and ſome to viſit the affairs of *Greece*. The kingdom of *Macedon* was ſet at liberty by *Æmylius*, and the ambaſſadors, his aſſiſtants, who had order therefore from the ſenate. But this liberty was ſuch as the *Romans* uſed to beſtow. The beſt part of it was, that the tribute which had been pay'd unto the kings, was leſſened by half. As for the reſt, the country was divided into four parts, and they forbidden commerce one with the other. All the nobility were ſent captive into *Italy*, with their wives and children, as many as were above fifteen years old. The ancient laws of the country were abrogated, and new given by *Æmylius*. Such miſchief the ſenate thought it better to do, at the firſt alteration of things in this province, and in the time of conqueſt, than otherwiſe to leave any inconvenience that ſhould be worſe in the future. But concerning the *Greeks*, that were not ſubject to *Rome*, the things done to them, could deſerve no better name than mere tyranny, yea, and ſhameleſs perjury; were it not ſo, that the familiar cuſtom among princes and great eſtates of violating leagues, doth make the oaths of confederation ſeem of no validity. The ambaſſadors, that were ſent to viſit the *Greeks*, called before them all ſuch men of note, from every quarter, as had any way diſcovered an unſerviceable diſpoſition towards the *Romans*. Theſe they ſent to *Rome*, where they were made ſure enough. Some of theſe had ſent letters to *Perſeus*, which fell at length into the *Romans* hands; and in that reſpect, though they were no ſubjects, yet wanted there no colour for uſing them as traitors, or at leaſt as enemies. But ſince only two men were beheaded, for having been openly on the *Macedonian* ſide; and ſince it is confeſſed, that the good patriots were no leſs afflicted in this inquiſition, than they that had ſold themſelves to the king: this manner of proceeding, was inexcuſable tyranny. With the *Acheans* theſe ambaſſadors were to deal more formally; not ſo much becauſe that commonwealth was ſtrong (though this were to be regarded by them, having no commiſſion to make or denounce war) and like to prove untractable, if manifeſt wrong were offered; as for that there appeared no manner of ſign by letters, or otherwiſe, whereby any one of the *Acheans* could be ſuſpiciouſly charged to have held correſpondence with the *Macedonian*. It was alſo ſo, that neither *Callicrates*, nor any of his adherents, had been employed by the nation in doing or offering their ſervice to the *Romans*, but only ſuch as were the beſt patriots. Yet would not therefore the ambaſſadors neglect to uſe the benefit of the time; wherein, ſince all men trembled for fear of *Rome*, the ſeaſon ſerved fitly to rank the *Acheans* with the reſt. And hereto *Callicrates* was very urgent, fearing, and procuring them to fear in behalf of him and his friends, that if ſome ſharp order were not now taken, he and his fellows ſhould be made to pay for their miſchievous devices, ere long time paſſed. So the ambaſſadors came among the *Acheans*, where one of them, in open aſſembly of the nation, ſpake as *Callicrates* had before inſtructed him. He ſaid, that ſome of the chief among them had, with money and other means, befriended *Perſeus*. This being ſo, he deſired that all ſuch men might be condemned, whom, after ſentence given, he would name unto them. After ſentence given (cried out the whole aſſembly) what juſtice were this? Name them firſt, and let them anſwer; which if they cannot well do, we will ſoon condemn them. Then ſaid the *Roman* boldly, that all their pretors, as many as had led their armies, were guilty of this crime. If this were true, ſaid *Xenon*, a temperate man, and confident in his innocence, then ſhould I likewiſe have been friend to *Perſeus*; whereof, if any man can accuſe me, I ſhall throughly anſwer him, either here preſently, or before the ſenate at *Rome*. Upon theſe words of *Xenon*, the ambaſſador laid hold, and ſaid, that even ſo it were the beſt way for him and the reſt to purge themſelves before the ſenate at *Rome*. Then began he to name others, and left not until he had cited above a thouſand; willing them to appear and anſwer before the ſenate. This might even be termed the captivity of *Greece*, wherein ſo many of the honeſteſt and worthieſt men were carried from home, for none other cauſe than their love to their country, to be puniſhed according to the will of thoſe, who could not endure, that virtue, and regard of the publick liberty, ſhould dwell together in any of the *Greeks*. At their coming to *Rome*, they were all caſt into priſon, as men already condemned by the *Acheans*. Many embaſſies were ſent from *Achaia* (where it is to be wondered, that any ſuch honeſt care of theſe innocent men could be remaining; ſince honeſty had been thus puniſhed as a vice in ſo many of the worthieſt among them) to inform the ſenate, that theſe men were neither condemned by the *Acheans*, nor yet held to be offenders. But inſtead of better anſwer, it was pronounced, that the *ſenate thought it not expedient for the country, that theſe men return into* Achaia. Neither could any ſollicitation of the *Acheans*, who never ceaſed to importune the ſenate for their liberty, prevail at all; until after ſeventeen years, fewer than thirty of them were enlarged, of whom that wiſe and virtuous man *Polybius*, the great hiſtorian, was one. All the reſt were either dead in priſon, or, having made offer to eſcape, whether upon the way before they came to *Rome*, or whether out of jail after that they were committed thereto, ſuffered death as malefactors.

This was a gentle correction, in regard of what was done upon the *Epirots*. For the ſenate being deſirous to preſerve the *Macedonian* treaſure whole, yet, withal to gratify the ſoldiers, gave order that the whole country of *Epirus* ſhould be put to ſack. This was a barbarous and horrible cruelty; as alſo it was performed by *Æmylius*, with miſchievous ſubtilty. Having taken leave of the *Greeks*, and of the *Macedonians*, with bidding them well to uſe the liberty beſtowed upon them by the people of *Rome*, he ſent unto the *Epirots* for ten of the principal men out of every city. Theſe he commanded to deliver up all the gold and ſilver which they had; and ſent along with them into every of their towns what companies of men he thought convenient, as it were to fetch the money. But he gave ſecret inſtruction to the captains, that upon a certain day by him appointed they ſhould fall to ſack, every one the town whereinto he was ſent. Thus in one day

were threeſcore and ten cities, all confederate with the *Romans*, ſpoiled by the *Roman* ſoldiers: and, beſides other acts of hoſtility in a time of peace, a hundred and fifty thouſand of that nation made ſlaves. It may be granted, that ſome of the *Epirots* deſerved puniſhment, as having favoured *Perſeus*. But ſince they among this people, that were thought guilty of this offence, yea, or but coldly affected to the *Romans*, had been already ſent into *Italy*, there to receive their due; and ſince this nation in general was not only at the preſent in good obedience, but had, even in this war, done good ſervice to the *Romans:* I hold this act ſo wicked, that I ſhould not believe it, had any one writer delivered the contrary. But the truth being manifeſt by conſent of all; it is the leſs marvellous, that God was pleaſed to make *Æmylius* childleſs, even in the glory of his triumph, how great ſoever otherwiſe his virtues were.

In ſuch manner dealt the *Romans*, after their victory, with the *Greeks* and *Macedonians*. How terrible they were to other kingdoms abroad, it will appear by the efficacy of an ambaſſage ſent from them to *Antiochus:* whereof before we ſpeak, we muſt ſpeak ſomewhat of *Antiochus*'s fore-goers, of himſelf, and of his affairs, about which theſe ambaſſadors came.

SECT. XI.

The war of Antiochus *upon* Egypt, *brought to end by the* Roman *ambaſſadors.*

ANtiochus the great, after his peace with the *Romans*, did nothing that was memorable in the ſhort time following of his reign and life. He died the ſix and thirtieth year after he had worn a crown, and in the ſeventeenth or eighteenth of *Ptolemy Epiphanes:* while he attempted to rob the temple of *Bel*, or (according to [a] *Juſtin*) of *Jupiter*. He left behind him three ſons, *Seleucus Philopator*, *Antiochus Epiphanes*, *Demetrius Soter*; and one daughter, *Cleopatra*, whom he had given in marriage to *Ptolemy Epiphanes*, king of *Egypt*. *Seleucus*, the fourth of that name, and the eldeſt of *Antiochus*'s ſons, reigned in *Syria* twelve years, according to [b] *Euſebius*, *Appian*, and *Sulpitius:* though *Joſephus* give him but ſeven. A prince, who as he was ſlothful by nature, ſo the great loſs which his father *Antiochus* had received, took from him the means of managing any great affair. Of him, about three hundred years before his birth, [c] *Daniel* gave this judgment, *& ſtabit in loco ejus viliſſimus & indignus decore regio*; *And in his place* (ſpeaking of *Antiochus* the father of this man) *ſhall ſtart up a vile perſon, unworthy the honour of a king*. Under this *Seleucus*, thoſe things were done which are ſpoken of *Onias* the high prieſt, in theſe words, and other to the ſame effect. [d] *What time as the holy city was inhabited with all peace, becauſe of the godlineſs of Onias the prieſt, it came to paſs, that even the king did honour the place, and garniſhed the temple with great gifts.* And all that is written in the third chapter of the ſecond of *Maccabees*, of *Simon* of *Benjamin*, who by *Apollonius* betrayed the treaſures of the temple; and of *Heliodorus* ſent by the king to ſeize them; of his miraculous ſtriking by God; and his recovery at the prayers of *Onias*; of the king's death, and of his ſucceſſor *Antiochus Epiphanes*. It is therefore from the reign of this king, that the books of the *Maccabees* take beginning: which books ſeem not to be delivered by one and the ſame hand. For the firſt book, although it touch upon *Alexander* the great, yet it hath nothing elſe of his ſtory, nor of the acts of his ſucceſſors, till the time of *Antiochus Epiphanes*, the brother and ſucceſſor of this *Seleucus*; from whom downward to the death of *Simon Maccabeus* (who died in the hundred threeſcore and ſeventeenth year of the *Greeks* in *Syria*) that firſt book treateth. The author of the ſecond book, although he take the ſtory ſomewhat further off, by way of a proem, yet he endeth with the hundred and one and fiftieth year of the *Grecian* reign, and with the death of *Nicanor*, ſlain by *Judas:* remembring in the fourth chapter the practice of *Jaſon*, the brother of *Onias*, who, after the death of *Seleucus*, prevailed with *Antiochus Epiphanes*, his ſucceſſor, for the prieſthood. [e] It is alſo held by *Janſenius* and other grave writers, that it was in the time of this *Onias*, that *Arius* king of the *Spartans* ſent ambaſſadors to the *Jews*, as to their brothers and kinſmen. Which intelligence between them and the *Greeks*, *Jonathan* the brother and ſucceſſor of *Judas*, remembreth in the preamble of that epiſtle, which he himſelf directed to the people of *Sparta* by *Numenius* and *Antipater* his ambaſſadors, whom he employed at the ſame time to the ſenate of *Rome*; repeating alſo the former letters word by word, which *Arius* had ſent to *Onias* the high-prieſt, whereto *Joſephus* adds, that the name of the *Lacedemonian* ambaſſador was *Demoteles*, and that the letters had a ſquare volume, and were ſealed with an eagle holding a dragon in her claws.

Now to this *Seleucus*, the fourth of that name, ſucceeded *Antiochus Epiphanes*, in the hundred and ſeven and thirtieth year of the *Greeks* in *Syria*. He was the ſecond ſon of the great *Antiochus:* and he obtained his kingdom by procuring the death of the king his brother; which alſo he uſurped from his brother's ſon.

Ptolemy Philometor, his nephew by his ſiſter *Cleopatra*, being then very young, had been about ſeven years king of *Egypt*.

Ptolemy Epiphanes, the father of this king *Philometor*, had reigned in *Egypt* four and twenty years, in great quiet, but doing little or nothing that was memorable. *Philip* of *Macedon*, and the great *Antiochus*, had agreed to divide his kingdom between them, whilſt he was a child. But they found ſuch other buſineſs, ere long, with the *Romans*, as made them give over their unjuſt purpoſe; eſpecially *Antiochus*, who gave with his daughter in marriage, unto this *Ptolemy*, the provinces of *Cœleſyria*, *Phenice*, and *Judea*, which he had won by his victory over *Scopas*, that was general of the *Egyptian* forces in thoſe parts. Nevertheleſs, *Ptolemy* adhered to the *Romans*; whereby he lived in the greater ſecurity. He left behind him two ſons; this *Ptolemy Philometor*, and *Ptolemy Phyſcon*, with a daughter *Cleopatra*. *Cleopatra* was wife to the elder of her brethren, and after his death to the younger, by whom ſhe was caſt off, and her daughter taken in her ſtead. Such were the marriages of theſe *Egyptian* kings.

Ptolemy Philometor, ſo call'd (that is, the lover of his mother) by a bitter nick-name, becauſe he ſlew her, fell into hatred with his ſubjects, and was like to be chaſed out of his kingdom; his younger brother being ſet up againſt him. *Phyſcon* having a ſtrong party, got poſſeſſion of *Alexandria*; and *Philometor* held himſelf in *Memphis*, craving ſuccour of king *Antiochus*'s uncle. Hereof *Antiochus*

[a] Strab. lib. 16. Juſt. lib. 35. [b] Euſeb. in Chron. App. de bell. Syr. Ant. 12. c. 5. [c] Dan. 11. 21. [d] 2 Mac. c. 3.
[e] 2 Mac. 1. 12. Super Eccleſ. c. 5.

was glad; who, under colour to take upon him the protection of the young prince, ſought by all means poſſible to poſſeſs himſelf of that kingdom. He ſent *Apollonius* the ſon of *Meneſtheus* ambaſſador into *Egypt*, and, under colour to aſſiſt the king's coronation, he gave him inſtructions to perſwade the governours of the young king *Philometor*, to deliver the king his nephew, with the principal places of that kingdom into his hands; pretending an extraordinary care and deſire of his nephew's ſafety and well doing. And, the better to anſwer all argument to the contrary, he prepared a forcible army to attend him. Thus came he along the coaſt of *Syria*, to *Joppe*, and from thence on the ſudden he turned himſelf towards *Jeruſalem*, whereby [a] *Jaſon* the prieſt (a chaplain fit for ſuch a patron) he was with all pomp and ſolemnity received into the city. For though lately, in the time of *Seleucus*, the brother and predeceſſor of [b] *Epiphanes*, that impious traitor *Simon* of the tribe of *Benjamin*, ruler of the temple, when he would have delivered the treaſures thereof to *Apollonius* the governour of *Cœleſyria* and *Phœnicia*, was diſappointed of his wicked purpoſe by miracle from heaven; the ſaid *Apollonius* being ſtricken by the angel of God, and recovering again at the prayer of *Onias*: yet ſufficed not this example to terrify others from the like ungodly practices. Preſently upon the death of *Seleucus*, this *Jaſon*, the brother of *Onias*, ſeeking to ſupplant his brother, and to obtain the prieſthood for himſelf, offered unto the king three hundred and threeſcore talents of ſilver, with other rents and ſums of money. [c] So he got his deſire, though he not long enjoyed it.

This naughty dealing of *Jaſon*, and his being over-reached by another, in the ſame kind, calls to mind a by-word taken up among the *Acheans*, when as that miſchievous *Callicrates*, who had been too hard for all worthy and virtuous men, was beaten at his own weapon, by one of his own condition. It went thus:

One fire than others burn more forcibly;
One wolf than other wolves does bite more ſore;
One hawk than other hawks more ſwift does fly.
So one moſt miſchievous of men before,
Callicrates, *falſe knave as knave might be,*
Met with Menalcidas *more falſe than he.*

And even thus fell it out with *Jaſon*; who within three years after, was betrayed, and overbidden by *Menelaus* the brother of *Simon*, that for three hundred talents more obtained the prieſthood for himſelf: *Jaſon* thereupon being forced to fly from *Jeruſalem*, and to hide himſelf among the *Ammonites*.

From *Jeruſalem*, *Antiochus* marched into *Phœnicia*, to augment the numbers of his men of war, and to prepare a fleet for his expedition into *Egypt*: with which, and with a mighty army of land-forces, [d] *He went about to reign over* Egypt, *that he might have the dominion of two realms, and entred* Egypt *with a mighty company, with chariots and elephants, with horſemen, and with a great navy, and moved war againſt* Ptolemæus *king of* Egypt, *but* Ptolemæus *was afraid of him and fled, and many were wounded to death. He won many ſtrong cities, and took away the ſpoils of the land of* Egypt. Thus was fulfilled the prophecy of [e] *Daniel. He ſhall enter into the quiet and plentiful provinces, and he ſhall do that which his fathers have not done, nor his father's fathers.* Never indeed had any of the kings of *Syria* ſo great a victory over the *Egyptians*, nor took from them ſo great riches. For he gave a notable overthrow to the captains of *Ptolemy*, between *Peluſium* and the hill *Caſſius*; [f] after which, he entered and ſack'd the greateſt and richeſt of all the cities of *Egypt*, *Alexandria* excepted, which he could not force. In concluſion, after *that* Antiochus *had ſmitten* Egypt, [g] *He turned again and went up towards* Iſrael *and* Jeruſalem, *with a mighty people, and entered proudly into the ſanctuary, and took away the golden altar, and the candleſtick for the light, and all the inſtruments thereof, and the table of the ſhew-bread, and the pouring veſſels and the bowls, and the golden baſons, and the vail, and the crowns, and the golden apparel. He took alſo the ſilver and the gold, and the precious jewels, and the ſecret treaſures: and when he had taken away all, he departed into his own land, after he had murdered many men.*

[h] It was about the beginning of the *Macedonian* war that *Antiochus* took in hand this *Egyptian* buſineſs. At what time he firſt laid claim to *Cœleſyria*; juſtifying his title by [i] the ſame allegations which his father had made; and ſtiffly averring, that this province had not been conſigned over to the *Egyptian*, or given in dowry with *Cleopatra*. [k] Eaſy it was to approve his right unto that which he had already gotten, when he was in a fair way to get all *Egypt*. The *Acheans*, *Rhodians*, *Athenians*, and other of the *Greeks*, preſſed him, by ſeveral ambaſſages, to ſome good concluſion. But his anſwer was; that if the *Alexandrians* could be contented to receive their king his nephew *Philometor*, the elder brother of the *Ptolemies*, then ſhould the war be preſently at an end; otherwiſe not. Yet when he ſaw that it was an hard piece of work to take *Alexandria* by force; he thought it better to let the two brothers conſume themſelves with inteſtine war, than by the terror of his arms, threatning deſtruction unto both of them, to put into them any deſire of coming to agreement. He therefore withdrew his forces for the preſent; leaving the *Ptolemies* in very weak eſtate; the younger, almoſt ruinated by his invaſion: the elder hated and forſaken by his people.

But how weak ſoever theſe *Egyptians* were, their hatred was thought to be ſo ſtrong, that *Antiochus* might leave them to the proſecution thereof; and follow, at good leiſure, his other buſineſs at *Jeruſalem* or elſewhere. So after the ſack of *Jeruſalem*, he reſted him a while at *Antioch*; and then made a journey into *Cilicia*, to ſuppreſs the rebellion of the *Thracians* and other in thoſe parts, who had been given, as it were, by way of dowry, to a concubine of the king's called *Antiochis*. For governour of *Syria* in his abſence, he left one *Andronicus*, a man of great authority about him. In the mean while *Menelaus* the brother of *Simon*, the ſame who had thruſt *Jaſon* out of the prieſthood, and promiſed the king three hundred talents for an income, committing the charge of the prieſthood to his brother *Lyſimachus*, ſtole certain veſſels of gold out of the temple: whereof he preſented a part to *Andronicus* the king's lieutenant, and ſold the reſt at *Tyre*, and other cities adjoining. This he did, as it ſeemeth, to advance the payment of the three hundred talents promiſed; the ſame being now by *Soſtra-*

[a] 2 Mac. 4. [b] 2 Mac. cap. 3. [c] 2 Mac. c. 4. [d] 1 Mac. c. 1. v. 17, 18, 19, 20, &c. [e] Dan. c. 11. v. 24. [f] Hieron. in Dan. [g] 1 Mac. c. 1. [h] Lib. 6. [i] Cap. 5. §. 2. [k] Polyb. Legat. 81, 82, &c.

tus

tus eagerly demanded. Hereof when *Onias* the prieſt (formerly diſpoſſeſſed by *Jaſon*) had certain knowledge, being moved with zeal, and deteſting the ſacrilege of *Menelaus*, he reproved him for it; and fearing his revenge, he withdrew himſelf into a ſanctuary at *Daphne*.

Daphne was a place of delight adjoining as a ſuburb to *Antioch*. In compaſs it had about ten miles: wherein were the temples of *Apollo* and *Diana*, with a grove, ſweet ſprings, banquetting places, and the like; which were wholly, in a manner, abuſed to luſt, and other ſuch voluptuouſneſs. Whether it were well done of *Onias*, to commit himſelf to the protection of *Apollo* and *Diana*, or to claim privilege from the holineſs of a ground conſecrated to any of the heathen gods, I will not ſtand to diſcourſe. Only I ſay for my own opinion; that the inconvenience is far leſs, to hold this book as *Apocryphal*; than to judge this fearful ſhift which *Onias* (though a virtuous man) made for his life, either commendable, or allowable, as the book ſeems to do. As for this refuge, it could not ſave the life of the poor old man: [a] *For* Menelaus *taking* Andronicus *apart, prayed him to ſlay* Onias. *So when he came to* Onias, *he counſelled him craftily, giving him his right hand with an oath, and perſwading him to come out of the ſanctuary: ſo he ſlew him incontinently, without any regard of righteouſneſs.* Hereof when complaint was made to *Antiochus*, after his return out of *Cilicia*, [b] *He took away* Andronicus's *garment of purple, and rent his cloaths, and commanded him to be led throughout the city, and in the ſame place where he had committed the wickedneſs againſt* Onias, *he was ſlain as a murderer.* In taking revenge of this innocent man's death, I ſhould have thought that this wicked king had once in his life-time done juſtice. But preſently after this, at the ſuit of one *Ptolemy*, a traitor to *Ptolemy Philometor*, he condemned innocent men to death; who juſtly complained againſt *Menelaus*, and his brother *Lyſimachus*, for a ſecond robbing of the temple, and carrying thence the veſſels of gold remaining. Hereby it is manifeſt, that he was guided by his own outragious will, and not by any regard of juſtice: ſince he revenged the death of *Onias*, yet ſlew thoſe that were in the ſame cauſe with *Onias*, [c] *Who, had they told their cauſe, yea, before the* Scythians, *they ſhould have been heard as innocent.* By reaſon of ſuch his unſteadineſs, this king was commonly termed *Epimanes*, that is, mad, inſtead of *Epiphanes*, which ſignified noble or illuſtrious.

After this, *Antiochus* made a preparation for a ſecond voyage into *Egypt*, [d] *and then were there ſeen throughout all the city of* Jeruſalem, *forty days long, horſemen running in the air with robes of gold, and, as bands of ſpearmen, and as troops of horſemen ſet in array, encountring and courſing one againſt another.* Of theſe prodigious ſigns, or rather forewarnings of God, all hiſtories have delivered us, ſome more, ſome leſs. Before the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem* by *Veſpaſian*, a ſtar in the form of a ſword appeared in the heavens, directly over the city; after which there followed a ſlaughter like unto this of *Epiphanes*, though far greater. In the *Cymbrian* wars, [e] *Pliny* tells us, that armies were ſeen fighting in the air from the morning till the evening.

In the time of pope *John* the eleventh, a fountain poured out blood inſtead of water, in or near the city of *Genoa*; ſoon after which the city was taken by the *Saracens*, with great ſlaughter. Of theſe and the like prodigious ſigns, [f] *Vipera* hath collected many, and very remarkable. But this one ſeemeth to me the moſt memorable, becauſe the moſt notorious. All men know that in the emperor *Nero*, the off-ſpring of the *Ceſars*, as well natural as adopted, took end; whereof this notable ſign gave warning.

[g] When *Livia* was firſt married to *Auguſtus*, an eagle let fall into her arms a white hen, holding a lawrel branch in her mouth. *Livia* cauſed this hen to be carefully nouriſhed, and the lawrel branch to be planted: of the hen came a fair increaſe of white poultry, and from the little branch there ſprang up in time a grove of lawrel; ſo that afterwards, in all triumphs, the conquerors did uſe to carry in their hands a branch of bays taken out of this grove; and, after the triumphs ended, to ſet it again in the ſame ground; which branches were obſerved, when they happened to wither, to foreſhew the death of thoſe perſons who carried them in triumph. And in the laſt year of *Nero*, all the broods of the white hen died, and the whole grove of bays withered at once. Moreover, the heads of all the *Ceſars* ſtatues, and the ſcepter placed in *Auguſtus*'s hand, were ſtricken down with lightning. That the *Jews* did not think ſuch ſtrange ſigns to be unworthy of regard, it appears by their calling upon GOD, and praying, that theſe tokens might turn to good.

Now, as the firſt voyage of *Antiochus* into *Egypt* was occaſioned by diſcord of the two brethren therein reigning; ſo was his ſecond expedition cauſed by their good agreement. For the elder *Ptolemy* being left in *Memphis*, not ſtrong enough to force his brother, who had defended *Alexandria* againſt all the power of their uncle, thought it the beſt way to ſeek entrance into that royal city, rather by perſwaſion than by arms. *Phyſcon* had not as yet forgotten the terror of the former ſiege: the *Alexandrians*, though they loved not *Philometor*, yet loved they worſe to live in ſcarcity of victuals (which was already great among them, and like to grow extreme) ſince nothing was brought in from the country; and the friends of the younger brother ſaw no likelihood of good iſſue to be hoped for without reconciliation. Theſe good helps, and above all theſe, the loving diſpoſitions of *Cleopatra*, who then was in *Alexandria*, encouraged *Philometor* in his purpoſe. But that which made him earneſtly deſirous to accompliſh it, was the fear wherein he ſtood of his uncle. For though *Antiochus* were gone out of *Egypt* with his army, yet had he left behind him a ſtrong garriſon in *Peluſium*; retaining that city, which was the key of *Egypt*, to his own uſe. This conſideration wrought alſo with *Phyſcon*, and with thoſe that were about him; ſo as by the vehement mediation of *Cleopatra*, their ſiſter, the two brethren made an end of all quarrels.

When the news of this accord was brought to *Antiochus*, he was greatly enraged; for notwithſtanding that he had pretended no other thing than the eſtabliſhment of the king *Philometor*, his nephew, and a meaning to ſubject his younger brother unto him, which he gave in anſwer to all ambaſſadors; yet he now prepared to make ſharp war upon them both. And to that end, he preſently furniſhed and ſent out his navy towards *Cyprus*, and drew his land-army into *Cœleſyria*,

[a] 2 Mac. cap. 4. [b] 2 Mac. c. 4. v. 38. [c] Ver. 47. [d] 2 Mac. c. 5. v. 1. [e] Plin. lib. 2. c. 57.
[f] Mercur. Vipera de Prodig. lib. 8. Vipera de priſco & ſacro inſtituto. [g] Sueton. Galba.

ready to enter *Egypt* the ſpring following. When he was on his way as far as *Rhinocorura*, he met with ambaſſadors ſent from *Ptolemy*. Their errand was partly to yield thanks to *Antiochus* for the eſtabliſhing of *Philometor* in his kingdom; partly to beſeech him, that he would rather be pleaſed to ſignify what he required to have done in *Egypt*, which ſhould be performed, than to enter it as an enemy with ſo puiſſant an army. But *Antiochus* returned this ſhort anſwer, that he would neither call back his fleet, nor withdraw his army, upon any other condition, than that *Ptolemy* ſhould ſurrender into his hands, together with the city of *Peluſium*, the whole territory thereto belonging; and that he ſhould alſo abandon and leave unto him the iſle of *Cyprus*, with all the right that he had unto either of them, for ever. For anſwer unto theſe demands, he ſet down a day certain, and a ſhort one. Which being come and paſs'd, without any accord made, the *Syrian* fleet enter'd *Nilus*, and recovered as well thoſe places which appertained to *Ptolemy* in *Arabia*, as in *Egypt* it ſelf; for *Memphis*, and all about it, received *Antiochus*, being unable to reſiſt him. The king having now no ſtop in his way to *Alexandria*, paſſed on thitherwards by eaſy journeys.

Of all theſe troubles paſs'd, as well as of the preſent danger wherein *Egypt* ſtood, the *Romans* had notice long ago. But they found, or were contented to find, little reaſon for them to intermeddle therein. For it was a civil war, and wherein *Antiochus* ſeemed to take part with the juſter cauſe. Yet they gave ſignification, that it would be much diſpleaſing unto them, to have the kingdom of *Egypt* taken from the rightful owners. More they could not, or would not do, being troubled with *Perſeus*; and therefore loth to provoke *Antiochus* too far. Nevertheleſs, the *Egyptian* kings being reconciled, and ſtanding jointly in need of help againſt their uncle, who prepared and made open war againſt them both; it was to be expected, that not only the *Romans*, but many of the *Greeks*, as being thereto obliged by notable benefits, ſhould arm in defence of their kingdom. *Rome* had been ſuſtained with food from *Egypt*, in the war of *Hannibal*; when *Italy* lying waſte, had neither corn nor money wherewith to buy ſufficient ſtore. By help of the *Egyptian*, had *Aratus* laid the foundation of that greatneſs whereto the *Acheans* attained. And by the like help, had *Rhodes* been defended againſt *Demetrius Poliorcetes*. Neither were theſe friendly turns, which that bountiful houſe of the *Ptolemies* had done for ſundry people abroad, ill followed or ſeconded, by other as bad in requital; but with continuance of ſuitable beneficence from time to time increaſed. Wherefore the two brothers ſent abroad confidently for aid; eſpecially to the *Rhodians* and *Acheans*, who ſeemed moſt able to give it effectually. To the *Romans*, *Phyſcon* and *Cleopatra* had ſent a year ſince; but their ambaſſadors lay ſtill in *Rome*. Of the *Acheans* they deſired in particular, that *Lycortas*, the brave warrior, might be ſent to them as general of all the auxiliaries, and his ſon *Polybius* general of the horſe. Hereunto the *Acheans* readily condeſcended, and would immediately have made performance, if *Callicrates* had not interpoſed his miſchievous art. He, whether ſeeking occaſion to vaunt his obſequiouſneſs to the *Romans*; or, much rather, envying thoſe noble captains, whoſe ſervice the kings deſired, withſtood the common voice, which was, that their nation ſhould not with ſuch ſmall numbers, as were requeſted, but with all their power, be aiding unto the *Ptolemies*. For it was not now (he ſaid) convenient time to entangle themſelves in any ſuch buſineſs, as might make them the leſs able to yield unto the *Romans* what help ſoever ſhould be required in the *Macedonian* war. And in this ſentence, he, with thoſe of his faction, obſtinately perſiſted; terrifying others with big words, as it were, in behalf of the *Romans*. But *Polybius* affirmed, that *Martius*, the late conſul, had ſignified unto him, that the *Romans* were paſs'd all need of help; adding further, that a thouſand foot and two hundred horſe might well be ſpared to the aid of their benefactors, the *Egyptian* kings, without diſabling their nation to perform any ſervice to the *Romans*; foraſmuch as the *Acheans* could, without trouble, raiſe thirty or forty thouſand ſoldiers. All this notwithſtanding, the reſolution was deferred from one meeting to another; and finally broken by the violence of *Callicrates*. For when it was thought that the decree ſhould have paſs'd, he brought into the theatre where the aſſembly was held, a meſſenger, with letters from *Martius*; whereby the *Acheans* were deſired to conform themſelves to the *Roman* ſenate, and to labour, as the ſenate had done, by ſending ambaſſadors to ſet *Egypt* in peace. This was an advice againſt all reaſon. For the ſenate had indeed ſent ambaſſadors to make peace; but as in a time of greater buſineſs elſewhere, with ſuch mild words, that nothing was effected. Wherefore it was not likely, that the *Acheans* ſhould do any good in the ſame kind. Yet *Polybius* and his friends durſt not gainſay the *Roman* council, which had the force of an injunction. So the kings were left in much diſtreſs; diſappointed of their expectation. But within a while was *Perſeus* overcome; and then might the ambaſſador ſent from the *Roman* ſenate perform as much as any army could have done.

Audience had been lately given by the ſenate unto thoſe ambaſſadors of *Phyſcon* and *Cleopatra*; which having ſtay'd more than a whole year in the city, brought nothing of their buſineſs to effect until now. The ambaſſadors delivered their meſſage in the name of thoſe that had ſent them; though it concerned (which perhaps they knew not) *Philometor* no leſs than his brother and ſiſter.

In this embaſſy of *Ptolemy*, now requeſting help from *Rome*, appeared a notable change of his fortune, from ſuch as it had been before three or four years laſt paſt. For in the beginning of theſe his troubles, which began with the *Macedonian* war, either he, or [a] *Eulæus*, or *Lenæus* (upon whom the blame was afterwards laid) which had the government of him, thought his affairs in ſuch good eſtate, that not only he determined to ſet upon *Antiochus*, for *Ceoleſyria*, but would have interpoſed himſelf between the *Romans* and *Perſeus*, as a competent arbitrator; though it fell out well, that his ambaſſador was by a friend perſwaded to forget that point of his errand. From theſe high thoughts, he fell on the ſudden, by the rebellion of his brother and ſubjects, to live under the protection of the ſame *Antiochus*. And now at ſuch time, as by atonement with his brother and ſubjects, he might have ſeemed to ſtand in no need of ſuch protection, he hath remaining none other help whereby to ſave both his kingdom and life, than

[a] Polyb. Legat. 72.

what can be obtained by their interceſſion which were employed againſt him. This miſerable condition of him, his brother, and ſiſter, ſhewed it ſelf even in the habit of thoſe ambaſſadors. They were poorly clad; the hair of their heads and beards over-grown, as was their manner in time of affliction; and they carried in their hands branches of olive. Thus they entered into the ſenate, and there fell groveling and proſtrate upon the floor. Their garments were not ſo mean and mournful, nor their looks and countenances ſo ſad and dejected, but that their ſpeech was than either of the other far more lamentable. For having told in what danger their king and country ſtood, they made a pitiful and grievous complaint unto the ſenate, beſeeching them to have compaſſion of their eſtate, and of their princes, who had always remained friendly and faithful to the *Romans*. They ſaid, that the people of *Rome* had ſo much heretofore favoured this *Antiochus* in particular, and were of ſuch account and authority with all other kings and nations, as if they pleaſed but to ſend their ambaſſadors, and let *Antiochus* know that the ſenate was offended with his undertaking upon the king their confederate, then would he preſently raiſe his ſiege from before *Alexandria*, and withdraw his army out of *Egypt* into *Syria*. But that if the ſenate protracted any time, or uſed any delay, then ſhould *Ptolemy* and *Cleopatra* be ſhortly driven out of their realms, and make repair to *Rome*, with ſhameful diſhonour to the ſenate and people thereof, in that, in the extreme dangers of all their fortunes, they had not vouchſafed to relieve them.

The lords of the ſenate, moved with compaſſion, ſent incontinently *C. Popilius Lenus*, *C. Decimius*, and *A. Hoſtilius*, as ambaſſadors, to determine and end the war between thoſe kings. In commiſſion they had firſt to find king *Ptolemy*, and then *Antiochus*, and to let them both underſtand, that unleſs they ſurceaſed and gave over arms, they would take that king no more for a friend to the ſenate and people of *Rome*, whom they found obſtinate, or uſing delay. So theſe *Romans*, together with the *Alexandrian* ambaſſadors, took their leave, and went onward their way within three days after.

Whilſt *Popilius* and his fellows were on their way towards *Egypt*, *Antiochus* had tranſported his army over *Lucine*, ſome forty miles from *Alexandria*. So near was he to the end of his journey, when the *Roman* ambaſſadors met him. After greeting and ſalutations at their firſt encounter, *Antiochus* offered his right hand to *Popilius*; but *Popilius* filled it with a roll of *Paper*, willing him to read thoſe mandates of the ſenate, before he did any thing elſe. *Antiochus* did ſo, and having a little while conſidered of the buſineſs, he told *Popilius*, that he would adviſe with his friends, and then give the ambaſſadors their anſwer. But *Popilius*, according to his ordinary blunt manner of ſpeech, which he had by nature, made a circle about the king with a rod which he held in his hand, willing him to make him ſuch an anſwer as he might report to the ſenate, before he moved out of that circle. The king, aſtoniſhed at this ſo rude and violent a commandment, after he had ſtay'd and pauſed a while, I will be content (quoth he) to do whatſoever the ſenate ſhall ordain. Then *Popilius* gave unto the king his hand, as to a friend and ally of the *Romans*.

Thus *Antiochus* departed out of *Egypt* without any good iſſue of his coſtly expedition, even in ſuch manner as [a] *Daniel* had propheſied long before; yea, fulfilling every particular circumſtance, both of returning, and of doing miſchief to *Jeruſalem* after his return; like as if theſe things had rather been hiſtorified than fore-told by the prophet. As for the *Roman* ambaſſadors, they ſtayed a while, and ſettled the kingdom of *Egypt*, leaving it unto the elder brother, and appointing the younger to reign over *Cyrene*. This done they departed towards *Cyprus*; which they left, as it had been, in the power of the *Egyptian*, having firſt ſent away *Antiochus*'s fleet, which had already given an overthrow to the *Egyptian* ſhips.

SECT. XII.

How the Romans *were dreadful to all kings. Their demeanour towards* Eumenes, Pruſias, Maſaniſſa, *and* Cotys. *The end of* Perſeus *and his children. The inſtability of kingly eſtates. The triumphs of* Paulus, Anicius, *and* Octavius. *With the concluſion of the work.*

BY this peremptory demeanour of *Popilius*, in doing his meſſage, and by the ready obedience of king *Antiochus* to the will of the ſenate; we may perceive how terrible the *Romans* were grown, through their conqueſt of *Macedon*. The ſame *Popilius* had been well contented a year before this, to lay aſide the roughneſs of his natural condition, and to give good language to the *Acheans* and *Etolians*, when he went ambaſſador to thoſe people of *Greece*, that were of far leſs power than king *Antiochus*. Likewiſe, *Antiochus* had with good words, and no more than good words, diſmiſſed other ambaſſadors which came from *Rome*, in ſuch ſort, as they complained not, much leſs uſed any menacing terms, though he performed nothing of their requeſt. But now the caſe was altered. So found other kings as well as *Antiochus*.

Eumenes ſent to *Rome* his brother *Attalus* to gratulate the victory over *Perſeus*, and to crave help or countenance of the ſenate againſt the *Gallo-Greeks*, which moleſted him. Very welcome was *Attalus*, and lovingly entertained by moſt of the ſenators; who bade him be confident, and requeſt of the ſenate his brother's kingdom for himſelf; for it ſhould ſurely be given him. Theſe hopeful promiſes tickled *Attalus* with ſuch ambition, that he either approved, or ſeemed to approve the motion. But his honeſt nature was ſoon reclaimed by the faithful counſel of *Stratius* a phyſician; whom *Eumenes* had ſent to *Rome* of purpoſe to keep his brother upright. So when he came into the ſenate, he delivered the errand about which he had been ſent; recounting his own ſervices done to the *Romans* in the late war, [b] wherewithal he forgat not to make of his brother as good mention as he could: and finally requeſted, that the towns of *Ænus* and *Maronea* might be beſtowed upon himſelf. [c] By his omitting to ſue for his brother's kingdom, the ſenate conceived opinion, that he meant to crave another day of audience for that buſineſs alone. Wherefore, to make him underſtand how gracious he was, they not only granted all his deſire; but in the preſents which they gave to him (as was their cuſtom to ambaſſadors that came with an acceptable meſſage) they uſed ſingular magnificence. [d] Nevertheleſs, *Attalus* took no notice of their meaning; but went his way, contented with what they had already granted. This did ſo highly diſpleaſe the ſenate, that whilſt he was yet in *Italy*,

[a] Dan. c. 11. v. 29, 30, &c. [b] Liv. lib. 45. [c] Polyb. legat. 93. [d] Pol. b. i id.

they

they gave order for the liberty of *Ænus* and *Maronea:* thereby making ineffectual their promiſe; which otherwiſe they could not, without ſhame, revoke. And as for the *Gallo-Greeks*, which were about to invade the kingdom of *Pergamus*; they ſent ambaſſadors to them, with ſuch inſtructions, as rather encouraged than hindered them in their purpoſe. The diſpleaſure of the ſenate being ſo manifeſt; *Eumenes* thought it worthy of his labour to make another voyage to *Rome*. He might well blame the folly of his ſecond voyage thither, for this neceſſity of the third; ſince, by his malice to *Perſeus*, he had lay'd open unto theſe ambitious potentates the way to his own doors. No ſooner was he come into *Italy*, than the ſenate was ready to ſend him going. It was not thought expedient to uſe him as an enemy, that came to viſit them in love: neither could they in ſo doing, have avoided the note of ſingular inconſtancy; and to entertain him as a friend, was more than their hatred to him, for his ingratitude, as they deemed it, would permit. Wherefore they made a decree, that no king ſhould be ſuffered to come to *Rome*; and by virtue thereof ſent him home, without expence of much further complement.

Pruſias king of *Bithynia* had been at *Rome* ſomewhat before; where he was welcomed after a better faſhion. He had learned to behave himſelf as humbly as the proud *Romans* could expect or deſire. For entring into the ſenate, he lay down, and kiſſed the threſhold, calling the *fathers* his gods and ſaviours: as alſo he uſed to wear a cap, after the manner of ſlaves newly manumiſed, profeſſing himſelf an enfranchiſed bondman of the people of *Rome*. He was indeed naturally a ſlave, and one that by ſuch abject flattery kept himſelf ſafe; though doing otherwiſe greater miſchief than any wherewith *Perſeus* had been charged. His errand was, beſides matter of complement, to commend unto the ſenate the care of his ſon *Nicomedes*, whom he brought with him to *Rome*, there to receive education. Further petition he made, to have ſome towns added to his kingdom: whereto, becauſe the grant would have been unjuſt, he received a cold anſwer. But concerning the wardſhip of his ſon, it was undertaken by the ſenate: which, vaunting of the pleaſure lately done to *Egypt*, in freeing it from *Antiochus*, willed him thereby to conſider what effectual protection the *Romans* gave unto the children of kings, that were to their patronage commended.

But above all other kings, *Maſaniſſa* held his credit with the *Romans* good. His quarrels were endleſs with the *Carthaginians:* which made the friendſhip of the *Romans* to him the more aſſured. In all controverſies they gave judgment on his ſide; and whereas he had invaded the country of *Emporia*, holding the lands, but unable to win the towns; the *Romans* (though at firſt they could find no pretext, whereby to countenance him in this oppreſſion) compelled finally the *Carthaginians* both to let go all their hold, and to pay five hundred talents to the *Numidian*, for having hindered him of his due ſo long. Now indeed had *Rome* good leiſure to deviſe upon the ruin of *Carthage:* after which, the race of *Maſaniſſa* himſelf was ſhortly by them rooted up. But hereof the old king never dreamed. He ſent to *Rome* one of his ſons, to congratulate the victory over *Perſeus*; and offered to come thither himſelf, there to ſacrifice for joy unto *Jupiter* in the *Capitol*. His good will was lovingly accepted; his ſon rewarded; and he entreated to ſtay at home.

Cotys the *Thracian* ſent ambaſſadors, to excuſe himſelf touching the aid by him given to *Perſeus*, for that the *Macedonian* had him bound by hoſtages; and to entreat, that his ſon which was taken with the children of *Perſeus*, might be ſet at liberty for convenient ranſom. His excuſe was not taken; ſince he had voluntarily obliged himſelf to *Perſeus*, by giving hoſtages without neceſſity: yet was his ſon given back to him ranſom-free; with admonition, to carry himſelf better toward the *Romans* in time following. His kingdom lay between *Macedon* and ſome barbarous nations; in which reſpect, it was good to hold him in fair terms.

As for thoſe unhappy kings, *Perſeus* and *Gentius*, they were led through *Rome*, with their children and friends, in the triumphs of *Æmylius* and *Anicius*. *Perſeus* had often made ſuit to *Æmylius*, that he might not be put to ſuch diſgrace; but he ſtill received one ſcornful anſwer, that it lay in his own power to prevent it; whereby was meant, that he might kill himſelf. And ſurely, had he not hoped for greater mercy than he found, he would rather have fought his death in *Macedon*, than have been beholden to the courteſy of his inſolent enemies for a wretched life. The iſſue of the *Roman* clemency, whereof *Æmylius* had given him hope, was no better than this: after that he, and his fellow king, had been led in chains through the ſtreets, before the chariots of their triumphing victors, they were committed to priſon, wherein they remained without hope of releaſe. It was the manner, that when the triumpher turned his chariot up towards the *Capitol*, there to do ſacrifice, he ſhould command the captives to be had away to priſon, and there put to death: ſo as the honour of the vanquiſher, and miſery of thoſe that were overcome, might be both together at the utmoſt. This laſt ſentence of death was remitted unto *Perſeus:* yet ſo, that he had little joy of his life; but either famiſhed himſelf, or (for it is diverſly reported) was kept watching perforce by thoſe that had him in cuſtody; and ſo died for want of ſleep. Of his ſons, two died; it is uncertain how. The youngeſt called *Alexander* (only in name like unto the *Great*, though deſtined ſometimes perhaps by his father, unto the fortunes of the great) became a joyner, or turner, or, at his beſt preferment, a ſcribe under the *Roman* officers. In ſuch poverty ended the royal houſe of *Macedon:* and it ended on the ſudden; though ſome eightſcore years after the death of that monarch, unto whoſe ambition this whole earth ſeemed too narrow.

If *Perſeus* had known it before, that his own ſon, ſhould be compelled to earn his living by handy-work, in a painful occupation; it is like, that he would not, as in a wantonneſs of ſoveraignty, have commanded thoſe poor men to be ſlain, which had recovered his treaſures out of the ſea, by their ſkill in the feat of diving. He would rather have been very gentle, and would have conſidered, that the greateſt oppreſſors, and the moſt untrodden wretches are all ſubject unto the one high power, governing all alike with abſolute command. But ſuch is our unhappineſs; inſtead of that bleſſed counſel, *Do as ye would be done unto*; a ſentence teaching all moderation, and pointing out the way to felicity; we entertain that arrogant thought, *I will be like to the moſt high:* that is, I will do what ſhall pleaſe my ſelf. One hath ſaid truly:

---- *Et*

——— *Et qui nolunt occidere quenquam,*
Posse volunt [a] ——— ———

Even they that have no murd'rous will,
Would have it in their power to kill.

All, or the moſt, have a vain deſire of ability to do evil without controul: which is a dangerous temptation unto the performance. God, who beſt can judge what is expedient, hath granted ſuch power to very few: among whom alſo, very few there are, that uſe it not to their own hurt. For who ſees not, that a prince, by racking his ſoveraign authority, to the utmoſt extent, enableth (beſides the danger to his own perſon) ſome one of his own ſons or nephews to root up all his progeny? Shall not many excellent princes, notwithſtanding their brotherhood, or other nearneſs in blood, be driven to flatter the wife, the minion, or perhaps the harlot, that governs one, the moſt unworthy of his whole houſe, yet reigning over all? The untimely death of many princes, which could not humble themſelves to ſuch flattery; and the common practice of the *Turkiſh* emperors, to murder all their brethren, without expecting till they offend; are too good proofs hereof. Hereto may be added, That the heir of the ſame *Roger Mortimer*, who murdered moſt traiterouſly and barbarouſly king *Edward* the ſecond, was, by reaſon of a marriage, proclaimed, in time not long after following, heir apparent to the crown of *England*: which had he obtained, then had all the power of *Edward* fallen into the race of his mortal enemy, to exerciſe the ſame upon the line of that unhappy king. Such examples of the inſtability whereto all mortal affairs are ſubject; as they teach moderation, and admoniſh the tranſitory gods of kingdoms, not to authorize by wicked precedents, the evil that may fall on their own poſterity: ſo do they neceſſarily make us underſtand, how happy that country is, which hath obtained a king able to conceive and teach, That [b] *God is the ſoreſt and ſharpeſt ſchoolmaſter, that can be deviſed, for ſuch kings, as think this world ordained for them, without controulment to turn it upſide down at their pleaſure.*

Now, concerning the triumph of *L. Æmylius Paulus*; it was in all points like unto that of [c] *T. Quintius Flaminius*: though far more glorious, in regard of the king's own perſon, that was led along therein, as part of his own ſpoils; and in regard likewiſe both of the conqueſt and of the booty. So great was the quantity of gold and ſilver carried by *Paulus* into the *Roman* treaſury, that from thenceforth, until the civil wars which followed upon the death of *Julius Cæſar*, the eſtate had no need to burthen it ſelf with any tribute. Yet was this noble triumph likely to have been hindered by the ſoldiers; who grudged at their general, for not having dealt more bountifully with them. But the princes of the ſenate over-ruled the people and ſoldiers herein, and brought them to reaſon by ſevere exhortations. Thus *Paulus* enjoyed as much honour of his victory as men could give. Nevertheleſs, it pleaſed God to take away from him his two remaining ſons, that were not given in adoption: of which, the one died five days before the triumph; the other, three days after it. This loſs he bore wiſely: and told the people, That he hoped to ſee the commonwealth flouriſh in a continuance of proſperity; ſince the joy of his victory was requited with his own private calamity, inſtead of the publick.

About the ſame time, *Octavius* the admiral, who had brought *Perſeus* out of *Samothrace*: and *Anicius* the pretor, who had conquered *Illyria*, and taken king *Gentius* priſoner: made their ſeveral triumphs. The glory of which magnificent ſpectacles; together with the confluence of ambaſſages from all parts; and kings either viſiting the imperial city, or offering to viſit her, and do their duties in perſon; were enough to ſay unto *Rome*, *Sume ſuperbiam*; *Take upon thee the majeſty, that thy deſerts have purchaſed.*

BY this which we have already ſet down, is ſeen the beginning and end of the three firſt monarchies of the world; whereof the founders and erectors thought that they could never have ended. That of *Rome* which made the fourth, was alſo at this time almoſt at the higheſt. We have left it flouriſhing in the middle of the field; having rooted up or cut down, all that kept it from the eyes and admiration of the world. But after ſome continuance, it ſhall begin to loſe the beauty it had; the ſtorms of ambition ſhall beat her great boughs and branches one againſt another; her leaves ſhall fall off; her limbs wither, and a rabble of barbarous nations enter the field, and cut her down.

Now theſe great kings, and conquering nations have been the ſubject of thoſe ancient hiſtories, which have been preſerved, and yet remain among us; and withal of ſo many tragical poets as in the perſons of powerful princes, and other mighty men, have complained againſt infidelity, time, deſtiny; and moſt of all, againſt the variable ſucceſs of worldly things, and inſtability of fortune. To theſe undertakings, theſe great lords of the world have been ſtirred up, rather by the deſire of *fame*, which ploweth up the air, and ſoweth in the wind; than by the affection of bearing rule, which draweth after it ſo much vexation, and ſo many cares. And that this is true, the good advice of *Cyneas* to *Pyrrhus* proves. And certainly, as fame hath often been dangerous to the living, ſo is it to the dead of no uſe at all; becauſe ſeparate from knowledge. Which were it otherwiſe, and the extream ill bargain of buying this laſt diſcourſe, underſtood by them which were diſſolved; they themſelves would then rather have wiſhed, to have ſtolen out of the world without noiſe; than to be put in mind, that they have purchaſed the report of their actions in the world, by rapine, oppreſſion and cruelty, by giving in ſpoil the innocent and labouring ſoul to the idle and inſolent, and by having emptied the cities of the world of their ancient inhabitants, and filled them again with ſo many and ſo variable ſorts of ſorrows.

Since the fall of the *Roman* empire (omitting that of the *Germans*, which had neither greatneſs nor continuance) there hath been no ſtate fearful in the eaſt, but that of the *Turk*; nor in the weſt any prince that hath ſpred his wings far over his neſt, but the *Spaniard*; who ſince the time that *Ferdinand* expelled the *Moors* out of *Granado*, have made many attempts to make themſelves maſters of all *Europe*. And it is true, that by the treaſures of both *Indies*, and by the many kingdoms which they poſſeſs in *Europe*, they are at this day the moſt powerful. But as the *Turk* is now counterpoiſed by the *Perſian*, ſo inſtead of ſo many millions as have been ſpent by the *Engliſh*, *French*,

[a] Juvenal. Sat. 10. [b] *The true law of free monarchies.* [c] Chap. 3. §

and

and *Netherlands* in a defenſive war, and in diverſions againſt them, it is eaſy to demonſtrate, that with the charge of two hundred thouſand pounds, continued but for two years or three at the moſt, they may not only be perſwaded to live in peace; but all their ſwelling and over-flowing ſtreams may be brought back into their natural channels and old banks. Theſe two nations, I ſay, are at this day the moſt eminent and to be regarded; the one ſeeking to root out the chriſtian religion altogether, the other the truth and ſincere profeſſion thereof; the one to join all *Europe* to *Aſia*, the other the reſt of all *Europe* to *Spain*.

For the reſt, if we ſeek a reaſon of the ſucceſſion and continuance of this boundleſs ambition in mortal men, we may add to that which hath been already ſaid; That the kings and princes of the world have always laid before them, the actions, but not the ends, of thoſe great ones which preceded them. They are always tranſported with the glory of the one; but they never mind the miſery of the other, till they find the experience in themſelves. They neglect the advice of God, while they enjoy life, or hope it; but they follow the counſel of death, upon his firſt approach. It is he that puts into man all the wiſdom of the world, without ſpeaking a word; which God with all the words of his law, promiſes or threats, doth not infuſe. *Death*, which hateth and deſtroyeth man, is believed; God, which hath made him and loves him, is always deferred. *I have conſidered* (ſaith *Solomon*) *all the works that are under the ſun, and behold, all is vanity and vexation of ſpirit:* but who believes it, till death tells it us. It was death, which opening the conſcience of *Charles* the fifth, made him enjoyn his ſon *Philip* to reſtore *Navarre*; and king *Francis* the firſt of *France*, to command that juſtice ſhould be done upon the murderers of the proteſtants in *Merindol* and *Cabrieres*, which till then he neglected. It is therefore death alone, that can ſuddenly make man to know himſelf. He tells the proud and inſolent, that they are but abjects, and humbles them at the inſtant; makes them cry, complain, and repent; yea, even to hate their fore-paſſed happineſs. He takes the account of the rich, and proves him a beggar; a naked beggar, which hath intereſt in nothing, but in the gravel that fills his mouth. He holds a glaſs before the eyes of the moſt beautiful, and makes them ſee therein, their deformity and rottenneſs; and they acknowledge it.

O eloquent, juſt and mighty death! whom none could adviſe, thou haſt perſwaded; what none hath dared, thou haſt done; and whom all the world hath flattered, thou only haſt caſt out of the world and deſpiſed: thou haſt drawn together all the far ſtretched greatneſs, all the pride, cruelty, and ambition of man, and covered it all over with theſe two narrow words, *Hîc jacet*.

Laſtly, whereas this book, by the title it hath, calls itſelf, the firſt part of the *general hiſtory* of the *world*, implying a *ſecond*, and *third* volume; which I alſo intended, and have hewn out; beſides many other diſcouragements, perſwading my ſilence; it hath pleaſed GOD to take that glorious *prince* out of the world, to whom they were directed; whoſe unſpeakable and never enough lamented loſs, hath taught me to ſay with *Job*, *Verſa eſt in luctum cithara mea, & organum meum in vocem flentium.*

FINIS.

To the READER.

THE use of chronological tables is needful to all hiſtories, that reach to any length of time; and moſt of all, to thoſe that are moſt general: ſince they cannot, like annals, yearly ſet down all occurrences not coherent. This here following, may ſerve as an index to the preſent part of this work; pointing unto the ſeveral matters, that having fallen out at one time, are far disjoined in the relation. Certainly it is not perfect: neither do I think, that any can be. For howſoever the years of the firſt patriarchs may ſeem to have been well-near compleat; yet in the reigns of the kings of Juda *and* Iſrael, *we find many fractions, and the laſt year, or years, of one king reckoned alſo as the foremoſt of another. The ſame is moſt likely to have fallen out in many other; though not ſo preciſely recorded. Hereto may be added the diverſe and imperfect forms of the year, which were in uſe among ſundry nations: cauſing* [a] *the ſummer months, in proceſs of ſome ages, to fall into the winter; and ſo breeding extream confuſion in the reckoning of their times. Neither is it a ſmall part of trouble, to chuſe out of ſo many, and ſo utterly diſagreeing computations, as have already gotten authority, what may probably be held for truth. All this, and a great deal more, is to be alledged, in excuſe of ſuch error as a more attentive and perfect calculator ſhall happen to find herein. It may ſerve to free the book, and likewiſe the reader (if but of mean judgment) from any notorious* Anachroniſm; *which ought to ſuffice. The book indeed will need it, even in that regard; not only for ſome errors of the preſs, in the numbring of years, but for ſome haſty miſ-reckonings of mine own; which I deſire to have hereby reformed, in hope that the printing of this table ſhall not want careful diligence. The reader, if he be not offended with the reſt, ſhall find reaſon to be pleaſed with this, as tending wholly to his own eaſe.*

The titles over the columns, have reference to that which follows under them; as will readily be conceived. Where two titles, or more, are over the head, as | Rome / Nabonaſſar | *there do the numbers underneath anſwer proportionably, the higher to the higher, the lower to the lower. For example: the walls of* Jeruſalem *were finiſh'd in the* 319 *year from the building of* Rome, *and in the* 314 *from* Nabonaſſar. *In like manner it is to be underſtood, That* Jehoſaphat *began his reign in the* 3774 *of the* Julian Æra, *in the* 3092 *of the world, and in the* 99 *year of the temple. This needs not more illuſtration; nor indeed ſo much, to thoſe that are acquainted with works of this kind. To avoid prolixity, I have forborn to inſert thoſe years, which I find not ſigned with ſome regardable accident: as with the birth or death of ſome patriarch; the beginning of ſome king's reign; ſome change of government; ſome battel fought; or the like. So, of the* 13 *years wherein* Sylvius Capetus *reigned over the* Latins, *I note only the firſt; that is, omitting all between the* 4 *of* Jehoſaphat, *wherein* Capetus *began, unto the* 17, *wherein* Sylvius Aventinus *ſucceeded, and wherein* Jehoram *firſt reigned with* Jehoſaphat *his father. For I thought it vain to have filled up a page with* 12 *lines of idle cyphers; numbring forth* 2, 3, 4, 5, *and ſo ſtill onwards, till I had come to the firſt of* Aventinus, *and* 17 *of* Jehoſaphat. *In ſetting down the kings, there is noted over the head of every one, what place he held in order of ſucceſſion; as whether he were the firſt, ſecond, fifth, ſeventh, or ſo forth, in rank, of thoſe that reigned in his country, without notable interruption: Before the name is the firſt year of his reign; at the end, or foot of the name (as the ſpace gives leave) is the whole number of years in which he reigned; in the ſpaces following underneath are thoſe years of his, which were concurrent with the beginning of ſome other king, or with the year of any remarkable accident. Where two numbers, or more, are found before one king's name, there it is to be underſtood, that the ſame year belonged, not*

[a] See *Lib.* 2. *Chap.* 3. §. 6.

only

only to the king then beginning, but unto ſome one or more of his fore-goers; as the firſt year of Jehoram, *king of* Iſrael *was the ſame with the ſecond of his brother* Ahazia, *and the twenty-ſecond of his father* Ahab. *So, where two or three names are found in one ſpace; as in the* 3077 *year of the world,* Zimri, Tibni, *and* Omri, *it is meant, that every one of them reigned in ſome part of the ſame year; which is reckoned the ſecond of* Ela, *and the firſt of* Omri. *Particularly, under the years of the* Egyptian *kings, are ſet down the years of thoſe* Dynaſties, *which it was thought meet to inſert; as likewiſe, otherwhiles, the day of the month upon which* Nabonaſſar's *year began; which, how it varied in other years, may be found in the place laſt above-cited.*

Concerning the Æra, *or account of years, from* Iphitus, *who began the* Olympiads, *from* Rome *built, from* Nabonaſſar, *and the like, as much as was thought convenient hath been ſaid, where due place was in the book it ſelf; ſo as it remaineth only to note, that under the title of* Olympiads *is ſet down firſt the number of the* Olympiad, *and beneath it the year of that* Olympiad; *as that* Cyrus *began his reign in* Perſia, *in the fifty-fifth* Olympiad, *and the firſt year thereof.*

Now, for that the years of the world, of the Olympiads, *of* Rome, *of* Nabonaſſar, *and other, had not beginning in one month, but ſome of them in* March, *ſome in* April, *ſome about* Midſummer, *and ſome at other times; the better to expreſs their ſeveral beginnings, ſome painful chronologers have divided them proportionably in their ſeveral columns; oppoſing part of the one year to part of the other: not (as I have here done) cutting all overthwart with one ſtrait line, as if all had begun and ended at one time. But this labour have I ſpared, as more troubleſome than uſeful; ſince the more part would not have apprehended the meaning, and ſince the learned might well be without it. It will only be needful to obſerve, that howſoever the* Æra *of the* Olympiads *be* 24 *years older than that of* Rome, *and* 29 *than that of* Nabonaſſar; *yet the reign of ſome king may have begun at ſuch a time of the year, as did not ſuit with this difference. But hereof I take little regard. The more curious will eaſily find my meaning; the vulgar will not find the difficulty. One familiar example may explain all. Queen* Elizabeth *began her reign the* 17*th of* November, *in the year of our lord* 1558: *ſhe was crowned; held a parliament; brake it up; threw down images; and reformed many things in religion; all in her firſt year: yet not all in that year* 1558, *but the greater part in the year following; whether we begin with the firſt of* January, *or with the* 25*th of* March. *The like may be otherwhiles found in this table; but ſo, as the difference is never of a whole year.*

The Julian *period, which I have placed, as the greater number, over the years of the world, was deviſed by that honourable and excellently learned* Joſeph Scaliger; *being accommodated to the* Julian *years, now in uſe among us. It conſiſteth of* 7980 *years; which reſult from the multiplication of* 19, 28, *and* 15; *that is, of the cycle of the moon, the cycle of the ſun, and the years of an indiction. Being divided by any of theſe, it leaves the number of the preſent year; or, if no fraction remain, it ſhews the laſt year of that cycle to be current. For example, in the* 4498*th of this period, when was fought the great battel of* Cannæ, *the prime, or golden number was* 14, *the cycle of the ſun* 18, *and conſequently the dominical letter* F, *as may be found by dividing the ſame number of the* Julian *period* 4498, *by* 19, *for the prime, by* 28, *for the cycle of the ſun. This* Julian *period, after the preſent account, always exceeds the years of the world by* 682. *Beſides the former uſes, and other thence redounding, it is a better character of a year, than any other* Æra (*as* From the beginning of the world, from the flood, from *Troy* taken, *or the like*) *which are of more uncertain poſition.*

More I ſhall not need to write, as touching the uſe or explication of theſe tables. Neither was thus much requiſite to ſuch as are converſant in works of this kind; it ſufficeth, if hereby all be made plain enough to the vulgar.

A

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

YEARS of the *JULIAN* PERIOD, WORLD, PATRIARCHS, &c.

	Julian. The World and Adam.														
	683 1 *Adam* 930														
	813 131	1 *Seth* 912													
	918 236	196	1 *Enos* 905												
	1008 326	996	91	1 *Canaan* 910	*All the years of the Patriarchs, wherein they begat children, died, or performed any thing, are reckoned compleat: which is inferred out of the addition of the years before they begat children, unto those that followed; making always a compleat sum,* Genesis 5.										
	1078 396	266	161	71	1 *Mahalaleel* 895										
	1143 461	331	226	136	66	1 *Jared* 962									
	1305 623	493	388	298	228	163	1 *Enoch* 263								
	1370 688	558	453	363	293	228	66	1 *Methuselah* 969							
	1557 875	745	640	550	480	415	253	188	1 *Lamech* 777						
Adam *died about the end of this year*	1612 930	800	695	605	535	470	308	243	56						
Enoch *translated*	1669 98	857	752	662	592	527	365	300	113						
Seth *died about the end of this year.*	1724 1042	912	807	717	647	582		355	168						
	1739 1057		822	732	662	597		370	183	1 *Noah* 950					

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. The World	*Enos*	*Cainan*	*Mahalaleel*	*Jared*	*Methuselah.*	*Lamech*	*Noah*	*Sem*				
Enos *died*	1822 1140	905	815	745	680	453	266	84					
Canaan *died*	1917 1235		910	842	775	548	361	179					
Mahalaleel *died this year*	1972 1290			895	830	603	416	234					
Jared *died*	2104 1422					735	584	366					
Flood threatned, Gen. 6. 3.	2219 1537					850	663	481					
	2241 1559					872	685	503	1 *Sem* 600				
Lamech *died*	2333 1651					964	777	595	93				
Methuselah *died this year a little before the flood.* Noah *entereth into the Ark.* c. 7. §. 8. & 9. *The flood.*	2338 1656					969		600	98				
The flood ceaseth. Noah *issued out of the ark.*	2339 1657							601	99				
	Julian. World Flood	*Noah*	*Sem*	1 *Arphaxad* 438									
	2341 1659	603	101										
	2376 1694 37	638	136	36	1 *Salah* 433								
	2406 1724 67	668	166	66	31	1 *Heber* 464							
	2440 5758 101	702	200	100	65	35	1 *Peleg*		*Kings of* Assyria				
	2470 1788 131	732	230	130	95	65	31	1 *Reu.* 239	1 *Nimrod* 114				
	2502 1820 163	764	262	162	127	97	63	33	33	1 *Sarug* 230	*Kings of* Egypt.		
Vide Lib. 2. c. 2. §. 2.	2530 1848 191	792	290	190	155	125	91	61	61	29	1 1 *Chan* 161		
	2532 1850 193	694	292	192	157	127	93	63	63	31	3	1 *Nahor* 148	
	2561 1879 222	823	321	221	186	156	122	92	92	69	32	30	1 *Terah* 205
	2584 1902 245	846	344	244	209	179	145	115	2 1 *Belus* 65	83	55	53	24

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. Wo. Fl.	Noah	Sem	Arphaxad	Salah	Heber	Peleg	Reu	Assyria	Sarug	Egypt	Nahor	Terah	Kings of Sicyon	
	2618 1936 279	880	378	278	243	213	179	149	35	117	89	87	58	1 1 *Ægyalens* 52	
	2649 1967 310	911	409	309	274	244	210	180	3 1 *Ninus* 52	148	120	118	89	32	
	2670 1988 331	932	430	330	295	265	231	201	22	169	141	139	110	2 1 *Europ* 45	
The last year of Peleg's *life*	2678 1996 339	940	438	338	303	273	239	209	30	177	149	147	118	9	
The death of Nahor	2679 1997 340	941	439	339	304	274		210	31	178	150	148	119	10	
Noah *died this year*	2688 2006 349	950	448	348	313	283		219	40	187	159		128	19	
The 16 *Dynasty in* Egypt. Vid. *l.* 2. *c.*2. §.3,4,5, *&c.*	2691 2009 352		451	351	316	286		222	43	190	2 1 *Mizrim* or *Osiris* 261		131	22	1 *Abram* 175
	2701 2019 362		461	361	326	296		232	4 1 *Semiramis* 42	200	11		141	32	11
The last year of Reu	2708 2026 269		468	368	333	303		239	8	207	18		148	39	18
	2715 2033 376		475	375	340	310			15	214	25		155	3 1 *Telchis* or *Selchis* 20	25
The last of Sarug	2731 2049 392		491	391	356	326			31	230	41		171	17	41

	Julian. World. Flood.	Sem	Arxphaxad	Salah	Heber	Assyria	Egypt	Terah	Sicyon	Abram
	2735 2053 396	495	395	360	330	35	45	175	4 1 *Apis* 25	45
	2743 2061 404	503	403	368	338	5 1 *Ninias* 38	53	183	9	53
	2760 2078 421	520	420	385	355	18	70	200	5 1 *Thelxion* or *Thelaſion* 52	70
Abram *receives the promiſe* Terah *dies in Haran* *l.*2.*c.*1. §.1,2,3, *&c.*	2765 2083 426	525	425	390	360	23	75	205	6	75

	Julian. World. Promiſe	Sem	Arphaxad	Salah	Heber	Abram	Assyria	Egypt	Sicyon	
Abram *enters into* Canaan: *and deſcends into* Egypt. *The firſt of the* 430 *years of ſervitude*	2766 2084 1	526	426	391	361	76	24	76	7	
Abram *returns into* Canaan	2767 2085 2	527	427	392	362	77	25	77	8	
Abram *his victory over* Chedorlaomer *and other kings.* *L.*2.*c.*1. §.8,9, *&c.*	2775 2093 10	535	435	400	370	85	33	85	16	
Iſmael born	2777 2095 12	537	437	402	372	87	35	87	18	
Arphaxad dies	2778 2096 13	538	438	403	373	88	36	88	19	

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Promiſ	*Sem*	*Salah*	*Heber*	*Abraham*	*Aſſyria*	*Egypt*	*Sicyon*		
	2781 2099 16	541	406	376	91	6 1 *Ariu.* 30	91	22		
Iſaac *born when* Abraham *was* 100 *years old compleat,* 101 *current.*	2791 2109 26	551	416	386	101	11	101	32	1 *Iſaac* 180	
The laſt year of Salah.	2808 2126 43	568	433	403	118	28	118	49	18	
	2811 2129 46	571		406	121	7 1 *Arali-us* 40	121	52	21	
	2812 2130 47	572		407	122	2	122	6 1 *Ægy-rus* 34	22	
Sarai *the wife of* Abraham *died this year.*	2827 2145 62	587		422	137	17	137	16	37	
Iſaac *took* Rebecca *to wife when he was* 40 *years old compleat.*	2831 2149 66	591		426	141	21	141	20	41	
The laſt year of Sem.	3840 2158 75	600		435	150	30	150	29	50	
	Julian. World. Promiſe	*Heber*	*Abraham*	*Iſaac*	*Jacob*	*Aſſyria*	*Egypt*	*Sicyon*	*Argives*	
	2846 2164 81	441	156	56		36	156	7 1 *Thuri-mac.* 45		
	2851 2169 86	446	161	61	1 *Jacob* 147	8 1 *Baleus* 30	161	6	1 1 *Ina-chus* 50	
Abraham *died this year.*	2865 2183 100	460	175	75	15	15	175	20	15	
Heber *died this year.*	2869 2187 104	464		79	19	19	179	24	19	
The 17 *Dynaſtie, called of the ſhepherds, beginning this year, laſted* 103 *years.*	2881 2199 116			91	31	9 1 *Arma-mith.* 38	191 1	36	31	
	2891 2209 126			101	41	11	201 11	8 1 *Leu-cippus* 53	41	
	2901 2219 136			111	51	21	211 21	11	2 1 *Phoro-neus* 60	
The flood of Ogyges, *a thouſand and twenty years before the* Olympiads. *See lib.* 1. *cap.* 7. §. 2.	2919 2237 154			129	69	10 1 *Belochus Priſcus* 3	229 39	29	19	
	2942 2260 177			152	92	24	252 62	52	42	1 *Joſeph* 110
	2944 2262 179			154	94	26	254 64	9 1 *Meſſa-ius* 47	44	3
See l. 2. *cap.* 2. §. 6.	2952 2270 187			162	102	34	3 & 4 1 *Typhon.* & af. him *Herc.* 7. 72	9	52	11
	2954 2272 189			164	104	11 1 *Baleu.* 52	3 74	11	54	

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Promiſ			*Iſaac*	*Jacob*	*Aſſyria*	*Egypt*	*Sicyon*	*Argives*	
Joſeph *ſold into* Egypt.	2959 2277 194			169	109	6	5 1 *Orus* 79 115	16	59	18
	2961 2279 196			171	111	8	3 81	18	3 1 *Apis* 35	20
The laſt year of Iſaac.	2970 2288 205			180	120	17	12 90	27	10	29
Iſrael *into* Egypt.	2980 2298 215				130	27	22 100	37	20	39
The eighteenth Dynaſty in Egypt, *which laſted* 348 *years.*	2984 2302 219				134	31	26 1	41	24	43
	2991 2309 226				141	38	33 8	10 1 *Peratus* 46	31	59
	2996 2314 231				146	43	38 13	6	4 1 *Argu.* 70	55
Jacob *dies in* Egypt.	2997 2315 232				147	44	39 14	7	2	56
	Julian. World. Promiſ	*Joſeph*	*Aſſyria*		*Egypt*		*Sicyon*	*Argives*		
	3006 2324 241	65	12 1 *Altades* 32		48 23		16	11		
	3037 2355 272	96	32		79 54		11 1 *Plemnæus* 43	42		
	3038 2356 273	97	13 1 *Mamitus* 30		80 55		2	43		
The laſt year of Joſeph.	3051 2369 286	110	14		93 68		15	56		
	3066 2384 301		29		108 83		30	5 1 *Piraſus, or Criaſus* 54		
	3068 2386 303		14 1 *Mancaleus* 30		110 85		32	3		
	3074 2392 309		7		6 1 *Seſoſtris the Great* 33 91		38	9		
	3085 2403 320		18		12 102		12 1 *Orthopolis* 63	20		
	3098 2416 333		15 1 *Spherus*, or *Iphereus* 20		25 115		14	33		
	3107 2425 342		10		7 1 *Seſoſtris 2d.* 14 124		23	42		
	3116 2434 351	1 *Moſes* 120	19		10 133		32	51		

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Promise	*Moses*	*Assyria*	*Egypt*	*Sicyon*	*Argive*		
	3118 2436 353	3	16 1 *Mamilas*, or *Mamelus* 30	12 135	34	53		
	3120 2438 355	5	3	14 137	36	6 1 *Phor-bas* 35		
	3121 2439 356	6	4	8 1 *Orus* 2, or *Busiris* 38 138	37	2	*Cheni-ans*	
	3148 2466 383	33	17 1 *Sparetus* 40	28 165	13 *Mara-thus* 37	29		
	3151 2469 386	36	4	31 168	4	32	1 1 *Ce-crops* 50	
Moses *visits his brethren the* Israelites; *kills an* Egyptian, *and flies into* Midian.	3155 2473 390	40	8	35 172	8	7 1 *Tria-pas* 40	5	
	3159 2477 394	44	12	9 1 *Thermutis*, or *Acen-cheres*. *Qu.* 12. 176	12	5	9	
	3171 2489 406	56	24	10 1 *Rathoris*, or *Achoris* 9 188	24	17	21	
	3178 2496 413	63	31	8 195	14 1 *Mam-thus* 20	24	28	
	3180 2498 415	65	33	11 1 *Chencres* 16 197	3	26	30	
	3188 2506 423	73	18 1 *Ascatides* 40	9 205	11	34	38	
Moses *his wonders in* Egypt.	3195 2513 430	80	8	16 212	18	41	45	
	Julian. World. Exodus	*Moses*	*Assyria*	*Egypt*	*Sicyon*	*Argos*	*Athens*	
The passover. Israel *delivered out of* Egypt. Pharaoh *drowned. The law given. The first of the* 480 *years from Exodus to building the temple.*	3196 2514 1	81	9	12 1 *Acherres* 8 213	19	42	46	
The flood of Deucalion, *and conflagation of* Phaeton *about this time.*	3198 2516 3	83	11	3 215	15 1 *Echi-reus* 55	44	48	
	3201 2519 6	86	14	6 218	4	8 1 *Cro-pus* 25	2 1 *Cra-naus* 10	
	3204 2522 9	89	17	13 1 *Cherres* 15 221	7	4	4	
	3211 2529 16	96	24	8 228	14	11	3 1 *Amphi-tryon* 12	
	3219 2537 24	104	32	14 1 *Armeus*, or *Danaus* 5 236	22	19	9	
	3222 2540 27	107	35	4 239	2	9 *Cheni-lus* 11	12	

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. *World.* *Exodus.*	*Moſes*	*Aſſyria*	*Egypt*	*Sicyon*	*Argos*	*Athens*	
	3223 2541 28	108	36	5 240	26	2	4 4 *Ericthonius* 50	
	3224 2542 29	109	37	14 1 *Rameſſes* 68 241	27	3	2	*Troy*
	3228 2546 33	113	19 1 *Amyntas* 45	5 245	31	7	6	
	3229 2547 34	114	2	6 246	32	8	7	1 1 *Dardanus*64
	3233 2551 38	118	6	10 250	36	10 1 *Danaus* 50	11	5
The laſt year of Moſes.	3235 2553 40	120	8	12 252	38	3	13	7
	Julian. *World.* *Exodus.*	*Iſrael*	*Aſſyria*	*Egypt*	*Sicyon*	*Argos*	*Athens*	*Troy*
The Iſraelites *enter the* Land of Promiſe.	3236 2554 41	1 1 *Joſua* 18	9	13 253	39	4	14	8
	3253 2571 58	18	26	30 270	16 1 *Corax* 30	21	31	25
	3254 2572 59	2 1 *Othoniel* 40	27	31 271	2	22	32	26
	3273 2591 78	20	20 1 *Belochus the ſecond* 25	50 290	21	41	5 1 *Panlion* 40	45
	3283 2601 88	30	11	60 300	17 1 *Epopæus* 35	11 1 *Lynceus* 41	11	55
	3292 2610 97	39	20	16 1 *Menophis* 40 309	10	10	20	64
	3293 2611 98	40	21	2 310	11	11	21	2 1 *Erichthonius* 46
	3294 2612 99	3 1 *Ehud* 80	22	3 311	12	12	22	2
	3298 2616 103	5	21 1 *Belopares* 30	7 315	16	16	26	6
	3313 2631 118	20	16	22 330	31	31	6 1 *Erectheus* 50	21
	3318 2636 123	25	21	27 335	18 1 *Lamedon* 40	36	6	26
	3324 2642 129	31	27	33 341	7	12 1 *Abbas* 2	12	32
	3328 2646 133	35	22 1 *Lamprides* 32	37 345	11	5	16	36

A Chronological Table.

The 19 Dynaſtie : *of the* Larthes, 194. See *L.* 2. *C.* 26. §. 4.	3332 2650 137	39	5	17 1 *Zethus*, or *Sethoſis* 55 1	15	9	20	40
	3339 2657 144	46	12	8 8	22	16	27	3 1 *Tros* 60
Tantalus *in* Phrygia.	3347 2665 152	54	20	16 16	30	13 1 *Præ tus* 17	35	9
	3358 2676 163	65	31	27 27	1 *Sicyon* 45	12	46	20
	3360 2678 165	67	23 1 *Soſares* 20	29 29	3	14	48	22
	3363 2681 168	70	4	32 32	6	17	7 1 *Crecops* 2.40	25
Pelops *in* Piſa, *who gave name to* Peloponneſus.	3364 2682 169	71	5	33 33	7	14 1 *Acriſius* 31	2	26
Ion *and* Xuthus *the Sons of* Hellen. See *L.* 2. *C.* 17. §. 6.	3374 2692 179	4 1 *Debora* & *Ba.* 40	15	43 43	17	11	12	36
	3380 2698 185	7	24 1 *Lampares* 30	49 49	23	17	18	42
	3387 2705 192	14	8	18 1 *Ramſes* 66 56	30	24	25	49
After the death of Acriſius, *the kingdom of the* Argives *was divided into many ſmall parts, and overgrown by that of* Mycenæ, *whereof ſome kings deſcended from* Perſeus, *others from* Pelops, *as in the pedigree following.*	3394 2712 199	21	15	8 63	37	31	32	56



A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Exodus.	*Israel*	*Assyria*	*Egypt*	*Sicyon*	*Mycenæ*	*Athens*	*Troy*
	3399 2717 204	26	20	13 68	42		37	4 1 *Ilus* 55
	3402 2720 207	29	23	16 71	45	1 *Euri-stheus* 45	40	4
	3403 2721 208	30	24	17 72	20 1 *Poly-bus* 40	2	8 1 *Pand-thez*, 25	5
	3410 2728 215	37	25 1 *Pannias* 45	24 79	8	9	8	12
	3414 2732 219	5 1 *Gede-on* 40	5	28 83	12	13	12	16
Pandion *chased out of his kingdom, which is recovered by his son* Ægeus, *in few years after. The omission of this interregnum, and reckoning the years in the forty eighth of* Ægeus, *or the numbering them a-part by themselves, breeds answerable difference in the times of the* Athenians *following: as of* Mneitheus, Carops, *and the rest.*	3427 2745 232	14	18	41 96	25	26	25	29
	3432 2750 237	19	23	46 101	30	31	9 1 *Ege-us* 48	34
Oedipus *in* Thebes.	3443 2761 248	30	34	57 112	21 1 *Ina-chus* 42	42	12	45
	3447 2765 252	34	38	61 116	5	1 *Atreus*, & *Thye-stes* 65	16	49
	3453 2771 258	40	44	19 1 *Amenophis* 40 122	11	7	22	55
	3454 2772 259	6 1 *Abime-lech* 3	45	2 123	12	8	23	5 1 *Lao-med.* 36
	3455 2773 260	2	26 1 *Sosarmus* 19	3 124	13	9	24	2
	3457 2775 262	7 1 *Tholas* 23	3	5 126	15	11	26	4
	3474 2792 279	18	27 1 *Mitreus* 27	22 143	32	28	43	21
	3480 2798 285	8 1 *Jair* 22	7	28 149	38	34	10 1 *Thesi-us* 30	27
	3485 2803 290	6	12	33 154	22 1 *Phe-stus* 8	39	6	32
	3490 2808 295	11	17	38 159	6	44	11	6 1 *Pria-mus* 40
	3493 2811 298	14	20	20 1 *Annemenes* 26 162	23 1 *Ad a-stus* 4	47	14	4
	3497 2815 302	18	24	5 166	24 1 *Poly-phides* 31	51	18	8
	3501 2819 306	22	28 1 *Tautanes* 32	9 170	5	55	22	12

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Exodus.	*Iſrael*	*Aſſyria*	*Egypt*	*Sicyon*	*Mycena*	*Athens*	*Troy*
	3502 2820 307	9 1 *Jephta* 6	2	10 171	6	56	23	13
	3508 2826 313	10 1 *Ibzan* 7	8	16 177	12	62	29	19
	3510 2828 315	3	10	18 179	14	64	11 1 *Mneſtheus* 24	21
	3512 2830 317	5	12	20 181	16	1 *Agamemnon* 18	3	23
	3515 2833 320	11 1 *Elon* 10	15	23 184	19	4	6	26
The war at Troy *began this year.*	3519 2837 324	5	19	21 1 *Thuoris* 7 188	23	8	10	30
	3525 2843 330	12 1 *Abdon* 8	25	7 194	29	14	16	36
The twentieth Dynaſty, called of the Diapolitani, *began this year in* Egypt, *and laſted* 178 *years.* See *lib.* 2. *cap.* 26. §. 4.	3526 2844 331	2	26	20 1 *Dynaſty* 178	30	15	17	37
	3528 2846 333	4	28	3	25 1 *Pelaſgus* 20	17	19	39
Troy *taken* 408 *years before the beginnig of the* Olympiads. See *lib.* 2. *cap.* 14. §. 1.	3529 2847 334	5	29	4	2	18	20	40 *Troy taken*
	Julian. World. Exodus.	*From Troy taken*	*Iſrael*	*Aſſyria*	*Egypt*	*Sicyon*	*Mycena*	*Athens*	*The kingdom of the* Latins
	3530 2848 335	1	6	30	5	3	1 *Ægyſthus* 6	21	
	3533 2851 338	4	13 1 *Sampſon* 20	29 1 *Teuteus* 40	8	6	4	24	1 1 *Æneas* 3
	3534 2852 339	5	2	2	9	7	5	12 1 *Demophon* 35	2
	3536 2854 341		4	4	11	9	1 *Oreſtes* 70	3	2 1 *Aſcanius* 38
	3548 2866 353	19	16	16	23	26 1 *Zeuſippus* 32	13	15	13
	3553 2871 358	24	14 1 *Eli* 40	21	28	6	18	20	18
	3567 2885 372	38	15	35	42	20	32	13 1 *Oxyntes* 12	32
	3573 2891 378	44	21	30 1 *Thyneus* 3	48	26	38	7	38
	3574 2892 379	45	22	2	49	27	39	8	3 1 *Syl. Poſthumus* 29

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Exodus.	From Troy taken.	Israel	Assyria	Egypt	Sicyon	Mycena	Athens	The kingdom of the Latines
The Sicyonian *kings ended in* Zeuſippus.	3579 2897 384	50	27	7	54	32	44	14 1 *Aphidas* 1	6
	3580 2898 385	51	28	8	55		45	15 1 *Timætes* 8	7
	3588 2906 393	59	36	16	63		53	16 1 *Melanthus* 3;	15
	3593 2911 398	64	15 1 *Samuel and after him Saul* 40	21	68		58	6	20
	3603 2921 408	74	11	31 1 *Dercilus* 40	78		68	16	4 1 *Sylvius Æneas* 31
	3606 2924 411	77	14	4	81		1 *Tisamenus* 2	19	4
The deſcent of the Heraclidæ *into* Peloponneſus *gave end to the kingdom of* Mycenæ, *and beginning to the kingdom of* Sparta, Corinth, *and* Meſſene, *the kings whereof I forbear to inſert in this table.*	3609 2927 414	80	17	7	84			22	7
	3625 2943 430	96	33	23	100			17 1 *Codr.* 9 21	23

	Julian. World. Exodus.	From Troy taken.	Israel	Assyria	Egypt	Athens	Latines
	3633 2951 438	104	1 *David* 40	31	108	9	31
	3634 2952 439	105	2	32	109	10	5 1 *Syl. Latinus* 50
	3643 2961 448	114	11	32 1 *Eupales* 38	118	19	10
The Medontidæ *ſucceed unto the Athenian kings, after the death of* Codrus. See *l.* 2. *c.* 17. §. 10.	3646 2964 451	117	14	4	121	1 1 *Medon* 20	13
	3666 2984 471	137	34	24	141	2 1 *Agastus* 36	33
Vaphres *reigneth in* Egypt. See *l.* 2. *c.* 26. §. 5.	3673 2991 478	*Temple* 1	144	1 *Salomon* 40	31	148	8	40
Salomon *began to build the temple* 480 *years compleat after the deliverance out of* Egypt.	3676 2994 481	1	147	4	34	151	11	43
	3681 2999	6	152	9	33 1 *Laoſthenes* 45	156	16	48
	3684 3002	9	155	12	4	159	19	6 1 *Syl. Alba* 36
	3692 3010	17	163	20	12	1 *Seſac* 26 167	27	9
	3702 3020	27	173	30	22	11 177	3 1 *Archippus.* 19	19

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World.	*Temple*	*From Troy taken.*	*Israel*	*Assyria*	*Egypt*	*Athens*	*Latines*	
The 21 *Dinasty in* Egypt, *which lasted* 130 *years.*	3704 3022	29	175	32	24	13 1	3	21	
The Ionic *migration after the taking of* Troy 180 *years.* See *l.* 2. *c.* 17. §. 6.	3709 3027	34	180	37	29	18 6	8	26	
	Julian. World. Temple.	*Troy*	*Juda*	*Israel*	*Assyria*	*Egypt*	*Athens*	*Latines*	
	3713 3031 38	184	1 1 *Rehoboam* 17	1 1 *Jeroboam* 22	33	22 10	12	30	
	3718 3036 43	189	6	6	38	1 *Chemmis* 50 15	17	35	
	3721 3039 46	192	9	9	41	4 18	4 1 *Terſippus* 41	38	
	3723 3041 48	194	11	11	43	6 20	3	7 1 *Syl. Atys* 26	
	3726 3044 51	197	14	14	34 1 *Pirithiades* 30	9 23	6	4	
	3730 3048 55	201	2 1 *Abijam* 3	18	5	13 27	10	8	
	3733 3051 58	204	3 1 *Aſa* 41	21	8	16 20	13	11	
	3734 3052 59	205	2	22 2 1 *Nadab* 2	9	17 31	14	12	
	3735 3053 60	206	3	2 3 1 *Baaſha* 24	10	18 32	15	13	
	3749 3067 74	220	17	15	24	32 46	29	8 1 *Syl. Capys* 28	
	3756 3074 81	227	24	22	35 1 *Ophrateus* 20	39 53	36	8	
	3758 3076 83	229	26	24 4 1 *Ela* 2	3	41 55	38	10	
Of theſe Iſraelitiſh *kings.* See *l.* 2. *cap.* 19. §. 5.	3759 3077 84	230	27	2 5 *Zimri* 1 6 *Tibini* 7 *Omri* 12	4	42 56	39	11	
	3762 3080 87	233	30	4	7	45 59	5 1 *Phorbas* 31	14	
	3768 3086 93	239	36	10	13	1 *Cheops* 56 65	7	20	
	3770 3088 95	241	38	12 8 1 *Ahab* 22	15	3 67	9	22	
	3774 3092 99	245	4 1 *Jehoſhaphat* 25	5	19	7 71.	13	26	

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	Julian. World. Temple.	*Troy*	*Juda*	*Israel*	*Assyria*	*Egypt*	*Athens*	*Latines*	
	3776 3098 101	247	3	7	36 1 *Ophratus* 50	9 73	15	28	
	3777 3095 102	248	4	8	2	10 74	16	9 1 *Syl. Capetus* 13	
Of Jehoram *his ſundry beginning to reign.* See *l.* 2. *c.* 20. §. 1 & 2.	3790 3108 115	261	17 5 1 *Jehoram*	21 9 1 *Abazia* 2	15	23 87	29	10 1 *Syl. Tiberinus* 8	
	3791 3109 116	262	18 2	22 2 10 1 *Jehoram* 12	16	24 88	30	2	
	3793 3111 118	264	20 0	3	18	26 90	6 1 *Mezades* 30	4	
	3975 3113 120	266	22 1 *Jehor. again* 8	5	20	28 92	3	6	
Jehoſaphat *dies, and* Jehoram *reigns alone*	3798 3116 123	269	25 4	8	23	31 95	6	11 1 *Syl. Agrippa* 41	
	3802 3120 127	273	8 6 1 *Abazia* 1	12	27	35 99	10	5	
	3803 3121 128	274	7 1 *Athalia* 7	11 1 *Jehu* 28	28	36 100	11	6	
	3809 3127 134	280	7 8 1 *Joas* 40	7	34	42 106	17	12	
Carthage *built. L.* 2. *c.* 22. §. 6.	3819 3137 144	290	11	17	44	52 116	27	22	
	3825 3143 148	294	15	21	48	56 120	7 1 *Diogne-tus* 28	26	
	3824 3142 149	295	16	22	49	1 *Cephrenes* 50 121	2	27	
	3826 3144 151	297	18	24	37 *Ocrazap.* or 1 *Anacyndaraxes* 42	3 123	4	29	
	3831 3149 156	302	23	12 1 *Jehoahaz* 17	6	8 128	9	34	
The end of the 21 *Dynaſty. The Dynaſties following, I omit.*	3833 3151 158	304	25	3	8	10 120	11	36	
	3839 3157 164	310	31	9	14	16	17	12 1 *Syl. Aladius* 19	
Joas *reigned with his father. Lib.* 2. *c.* 22. §. 7.	3845 3163 170	316	37	15 13 1 *Joas*	20	22	23	7	
Joas *reigns alone.*	3847 3165 172	318	39	1 *Joas* 16	22	24	25	9	
	3848 3166 173	319	40 9 1 *Amazia* 2	2	23	25	26	10	

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	Julian. World. Temple.	*Troy*	*Juaa*	*Ifrael*	*Aſſyria*	*Egypt*	*Athens*	*Latines*	
	3851 3169 176	322	4	5	26	28	8 1 *Pheredus* 19	13	
	3858 3176 183	329	11	12	33	35	8	13 1 *Syl. Aventinus* 37	
	3862 3180 187	333	15	16 14 1 *Jeroboam* 41	37	39	12	5	
	3868 3186 193	339	21	7	38 1 *Sardanapalus* 20	45	18	11	
	3870 3188 195	341	23	9	3	47	9 1 *Ariphron* 20	12	
	3874 3192 199	345	27	13	7	1 *Mycerinus* 6	5	16	
	Julian. World. Temple.	*Troy*	*Juda*	*Iſrael*	*Aſſyria*	*Egypt*	*Athens*	*Latines*	*Media*
L. 2. c. 22. §. 11.	3877 3195 202	348	1 *Interregnum eleven years*	16	10	4	8	19	
	3880 3198 205	351	4	19	13	1 *Bocchorus* 44	11	22	
L. 2. c. 22. §. 12.	3887 3205 212	358	11	26	20 *Sardanapalus ſlain*	8	18	29	
L. 2. c. 33. §. 1 & 4.	3888 3206 213	359	10 *Uzzia, or Azaria* 52	27		9	19	30	1 1 *Arbaces* 28
	3890 3208 215	361	3	29		11	10 1 *Theſporus* 27	32	3
L. 2. c. 23. §. 4.	3892 3210 217	363	5	31	1 1 *Beloſus or Phul.* 45	13	3	34	5
	3895 3213 220	366	8	34	4	16	6	14 1 *Syl. Procas* 23	8
L. 2. c. 23. §. 1.	3903 3221 228	374	16	1 *Interregnum 23 years*	12	24	14	9	16
	3916 3234 241	387	29	14	25	37	27	22	2 1 *Soſarmus* 30
	3917 3235 242	388	30	15	26	38	11 1 *Agamneſtor* 20	23	2
	3918 3236 243	389	31	16	27	39	2	15 1 *Syl. Amulius* 44	3
	3924 3242 249	395	37	22	33	1 *Aſychis and after him Anyſis* 6	8	7	9
Zacharia *began at the very end of the year.* *L. 2. c. 23. §. 1.*	3925 3243 250	396	38	23 15 *Zacharia ſix months*	34	2	9	8	10

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	Julian. World. Temple.	Troy			Juda	Israel	Assyria	Egypt	Athens	Latines	Media
	3926 3244 251	397			39	16 *Shallum* 1 *month.* 17 *Menahem* 10	35	3	10	9	11
This year nearly concurs with the first of Menahem.	3927 3245 252	398			40	1	36	4	11	10	12
	3930 3248 255	401			43	4	39	1 *Sabacus the Ethiopian* 50	14	13	15
	3937 3255 262	408	*Iphitus*	*Olympiads*	50	18 1 *Pekahia* 2	46	8	12 1 *Æschylus* 23	20	22
The beginning of the Olympiads. *L.* 2. *c.* 23. §. 5.	3938 3256 263	409	1	1 1	51	2	47	9	2	21	23
	3939 3257 264	410	2	1 2	52	19 1 *Peka Romeliæ* 20	48	10	3	22	24
L. 2. *c.* 23. §. 6.	3940 3258 265	411	3	1 3	11 1 *Jotham* 16	2	2 1 *Tiglah Phul Osmar* 27	11	4	23	25
	Julian. World. Temple.	*Iphitus*	*Olympiads*	*Juda*	*Israel*	*Assyria*	*Egypt*	*Athens*	*Latines*	*Media*	
	3946 3264 271	9	3 1	7	8	7	17	10	29	3 1 *Medidus* 40	
	3955 3273 280	18	5 2	16 12 1 *Ahaz* 16	17	16	26	19	38	10	
	3959 3277 284	22	6 2	5	1 *Interregnum 7 years*	20	30	23	42	14	
	3960 3278 285	23	6 3	6	2	21	31	13 1 *Alcmenon* 2	43	15	
	Julian. World. Temple.	*Rome. Nabon.*	*Iphitus*	*Olympiads*	*Juda*	*Israel*	*Assyria*	*Egypt*	*Athens*	*Romans*	*Media*
Rome *built.* *L.* 2. *c.* 24. §. 5. Carops *the first governing in* Athens *for* 10 *years: after whom succeeded six chosen each after other for the like time; and thence the office became annual.*	3962 3280 287	1	25	7 1	8	4	23	33	1 1 *Carops* 10	1 1 *Romulus* 37	17
	3966 3284 291	5	29	8 1	12	20 1 *Hosea* 9	27	37	5	5	21
The Æra of Nabonassar. *L.* 2. *c.* 25. §. 1.	3967 3285 292	6 1	30	8 2	13	2	3 1 *Salmanassar*, or *Nabonassar* 10	38	6	6	22
Ezekia *began in the very end of this year.* *L.* 2. *c.* 25. §. 1.	3968 3286 293	7 2	31	8 3	14 13 *Ezekia* 29	3	2	39	7	7	23
This year concurs with the first of Ezekia. *Ibid.*	3969 3287 294	8 3	32	8 4	15 1	4	3	40	8	8	24
The beginning of the first Messeni an *war. Whereof see l.* 2. *c.* 27. §. 4. *It lasted* 20 *years.*	3971 3289 296	10 5	34	9 2	3	6	5	42	10	10	26
Samaria besieged by Salmanassar	3972 3290 279	11 6	35	9 3	4	7	6	43		11	27

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The captivity of the ten tribes.	3974 3292 292	13 8	37	10 1	6	9	8	45		13	29
	3976 3294 301	15 10	39	10 3	8		10 4 1 *Senacherib* 7	47		15	31
L. 2. c. 26. §. 7.	3980 3298 305	19 14	43	11 3	12	*Kings of the Chaldeans*	5	1 *Sethon* 32		19	35
Senacherib's army destroyed, and he slain. L. 2. c. 26. §. 2.	3982 3300 307	21 16	45	12 1	14		7	3		21	37
	3983 3301 308	22 17	46	12 2	15	1 *Merodach*, or *Mardocempadus*	5 1 *Asarhaddon* 10	4		22	38
	3986 3304 311	25 20	49	13 1	18	4	4	7		25	4 1 *Cardiceas* 13
Merodach gets the whole empire. This year or in the end of the year foregoing. An eclipse of the moon.	3993 3311 318	32 27	56	14 4	25	1 1 *Merodach* 40	11	14		32	8
	Julian. World. Temple.	*Rome. Nabon.*	*Iphit*	*Olympiads*	*Juda*	*Chaldea*	*Egypt*	*Rome*	*Media*	*Lydia*	
Two eclipses of the moon, in the second year of Mardocempadus.	3994 3312 319	33 28	57	15 1	26	2	15	33	9		
	3997 3319 322	36 31	60	15 4	29	5	18	36	12	1 1 *Gyges* 38	
	3998 3316 323	37 32	61	16 1	14 1 *Manasses* 55	6	19	37	13	2	
	3999 3317 324	38 33	62	16 2	2	7	20	1 *Interregnum* 1 *year*	5 1 *Deioces* 53	3	
	4000 3318 325	39 34	63	16 3	3	8	21	2 1 *Numa Pompilius* 43	2	4	
L. 2. c. 27. §. 2.	4013 3331 338	52 47	76	19 4	16	21	1 *Interregnum* 2	14	15	17	
	4015 3333 340	54 49	78	20 2	18	23	1 12 *Princes* 15	16	17	19	
The beginning of the second Messenian *war; which lasted about* 18 *years. L. 2. c. 27. §. 4.*	4029 3347 354	68 63	92	23 4	32	37	15 1 *Psammiticus* 44	30	31	33	
L. 2. c. 28. §. 3.	4033 3351 358	72 67	96	24 4	36	2 1 *Ben Merodac* 21	5	34	35	37	
	4035 3353 360	74 69	98	25 2	38	3	7	36	37	2 1 *Ardys* 49	
	4043 3361 368	82 77	106	27 2	46	11	15	3 1 *Tullus Hostilius* 22	45	9	
	4052 3370 377	91 86	115	29 3	55	20	24	10	6 1 *Phraortes* 24	18	
	4053 3371 378	92 87	116	29 4	15 1 *Amon* 2	21	25	11	2	19	

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	Julian. World. Temple.	*Rome. Nabon.*	*Iphit*	*Olympiads*	*Juda*	*Chaldea*	*Egypt*	*Rome*	*Media*	*Lydia*	
The expedition of the Scythians. *l. 2. c. 28. §. 3 & 4.*	4054 3372 379	93 88	117	30 1	2	3 1 *Nabulasser* 35	26	12	3	20	
	4055 3373 380	94 89	118	30 2	16 1 *Josias* 31	2	27	13	4	21	
L. 2. c. 28. §. 2.	4073 3391 398	112 107	136	34 4	19	20	1 *Neco* 17	31	22	39	
	4075 3393 400	114 109	138	35 2	21	22	3	4 1 *Ancus Martius* 22	24	41	
	4076 3394 401	115 110	139	35 3	22	23	4	2	7 1 *Cyaxares* 40	42	
	4084 3402 409	123 118	147	37 3	30	31	12	10	9	3 2 *Sadyattes* 12	
L. 2. c. 28. §. 1 & 2.	4085 3403 410	124 119	148	37 4	31 17 *Jehoahas* 3 *mnths*	32	13	11	10	2	
Nabuchodonosor *had reigned one year with his father; which is to be regarded in astronomical observations concerning his time. L. 2. c. 28. §. 6. & c. 25. §. 1.*	4086 3404 411	125 120	149	38 1	18 1 *Jehoiakim* 11	33	14	12	11	3	
	4089 3407 414	128 123	152	38 4	4	4 1 *Nabuchodonosor the Gr.* 44	17	15	14	6	
	4090 3408 415	129 124	153	39 1	5	2	1 *Psalmis* 12	16	15	7	
	4096 3414 421	135 130	159	40 3	11 19 1 *Jechonia* 3 *months* 20 1 *Zedekiah* 11 *years*	8	7	22	21	4 1 *Halyattes* 57	
Zedekiah *his journey to* Babylon. *L. 2. c. 28. §. 6.*	4099 3417 424	138 133	162	41 2	4	11	10	5 1 *L. Tarquinius Priscus* 28	24	4	
	4102 3420 427	141 136	165	42 1	7	14	1 *Aprie*, or *Hophra* 10	4	27	7	
Jerusalem *taken by* Nabuchodonosor; *with whose* 18 *for the more part, and partly with whose* 19 *this year concurs.*	4106 3424 431	145 140	169	43 1	11	18	5	8	31	11	
	Julian. World.	*Rome. Nabon.*	*Iphit*	*Olymp.*	*Captivity*	*Chaldea*	*Egypt*	*Rome*	*Media*	*Lydia*	
Jerusalem *destroyed.*	4107 3425	146 141	170	43 2	1	19	6	9	32	12	
Egypt *conquered by* Nabuchodonosor. *L. 3. c. 1. §. 8 & 9.*	4111 3429	150 145	174	44 2	5	23	10 1 Pharaoh Hophra *slain, and the kingdom of* Egypt *governed 40 years by viceroys.*	13	36	16	
	4116 3434	155 150	179	45 3	10	28	6	18	8 1 *Astyages* 35	21	
Nabuchodonosor *lives wild; and his kingdom is governed by others for him, during seven years L. 3. c. 1. §. 13.*	4125 3443	164 159	188	47 4	19	37 1 *Evilmerodach* 2	15	27	10	30	
	4127 3445	166 161	190	48 2	21	39 1 *Niglisar and Nitocr.* 4	17	29	12	32	

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphitus	Olympiads	Juda	Chaldea	Egypt	Rome	Media	Lydia	
Nebuchadnezzar *recovers his sense and kingdom.*	4131 3449	170 165	194	49 2	25	43 1 *Laborosardach* 9 *m*	21	33	16	36	
L. 3. c. 1. §. 6. *The* 37 *of* Jechonia *his captivity compleat, and h enlarged.*	4133 3451	172 167	196	49 4	27	5 1 *Evilmer.* 26	23	35	18	38	
	4137 3455	176 171	200	50 4	31	5	27	6 1 *Servius Tullus* 44	22	42	
Forty years after the conquest of Egypt *past,* Amasis *began his reign: this being inclusively the* 41*st, and therefore the next year seems concurrent with* Amasis's *first.*	4151 3469	190 185	214	54 2	45	19	*Amasis* 34	15	9 1 *Cyaxares or Darius the Mede* 26	56	
	4153 3471	192 187	216	54 4	47	21	2	17	3	5 1 *Crœsus* 14	
	Julian. World.	*Rome. Nabon.*	*Iphitus*	*Olympiads*	*Persia*	*Chaldea*	*Egypt*	*Rome*	*Media*	*Lydia*	*Jews*
	4154 3472	193 188	217	55 1	1 1 *Cyrus in Pe.* 23	22	3	18	4	2	48
The seven sages in Greece.	4159 3477	198 193	222	56 2	6	6 1 *Balthas.* 17	8	23	9	7	53
Pisistratus *makes himself tyrant in* Athens.	4104 3480	203 198	227	57 3	11	6	13	28	14	12	58
	4160 3484	205 200	229	58 1	13	8	15	30	16	14 *Crœsus taken by Cyrus*	60
The end of the Chaldean *empire.*	4175 3492	214 209	238	60 2	22	17 *Balthasar slain*	24	39	25		69
	4176 3494	215 210	239	60 3	23	1 *Dari. the Mede* 2	25	40	26		70
The beginning of Cyrus's *empire.* *The Edict of liberty to the* Jews.	4177 3495	216 211	240	60 4	1 *Cyrus* 7	2	26	41	*Years from* 1 *Cyrus*		*Zorobabel*
	4181 3499	220 215	244	61 4	5		30	7 *L. Tarquinius Super.* 2	5	*Only* Zorobabel *and* Nehemias *are remembred as governors of the* Jews *unto the* 32 *of* Artaxerxes Mnemon. *But there were many before* Nehemias; *as himself witnesseth. c.* 5. *v.* 15. *so that the story of them, their number, and names, are uncertain.*	
	4184 3502	223 218	247	62 3	2 1 *Cambyses* 7		33	4	8		
The two first years of Psammenitus, *and part of the third, may be added to the years of his father; if it be true that* Cambyses *wan* Egypt *presently upon the death of* Amasis. *L. 2. c. 4. §. 2.*	4186 3504	225 220	249	63 1	3		1 *Psammenitus* 3	6	10		
The conquest of Egypt *by* Cambyses.	4188 3506	227 222	251	63 3	5		3	8	12		
	Julian. World.	*Rome. Nabon*	*Iphitus*	*Olympiads*	*Persia*	*Egypt*	*Rome*	*Greece*	*Jews*	*From Cyrus*	
Cambyses reigned 7 *years and* 5 *months, so as this his last year was filled up by the* Magi, *and (as may seem) a good part of the next. L. 2. c. 4. §. 4*	4191 3509	230 225	254	64 2	8 *The Magi* 1 *year*		11			15	
	4192 3510	231 226	255	64 3	3 1 *Darius Hystaspes* 36		12			16	

A Chronological Table.

	Julian and World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphit.	Olym.	Perſia	Egypt	Rome.	Greece	Jews and from Cyrus.
	4197 3515	236 231	26c	65 4	6		17	Hippias *the ſon of* Piſiſtratus *tyrant in* Athens	21
	4204 3522	243 238	267	67 3	13 Babylon *which had rebelled, taken by* Darius.		24		28
The Tarquines *expelled* Rome. *L.* 4. *c.* 7. §. 1.	4205 3523	244 239	268	67 4	14		25		29
The Carthaginians *firſt league with* Rome. *L.* 5. *c.* 1. §. 2.	4206 3524	245 240	269	68 1	15		*Brutus and Publicola* } *Conſuls*		30
L. 3. *c.* 5. §. 4.	4211 3529	250 245	274	69 2	20 Darius's *expedition againſt the* Scythians.				35
	4212 3530	251 246	275	69 3	21			*The* Athenians *and* Ionians *take* Sardes.	36
	4222 3540	261 256	285	72 1	31		*Sp. Caſſius, Poſth. Cominius, Conſuls.*	*The battle of* Marathon.	46
	4226 3544	265 260	289	73 1	35	Egypt *rebelleth againſt* Darius.			50
	4228 3546	267 262	291	73 3	4 1 *Xerxes* 21				52
The law Agraria *in* Rome *propounded, for diviſion of lands: which bred great commotion.*	4229 3547	268 263	292	73 4	2	Egypt *recovered by* Xerxes.	*Proc. Virginius Sp. Caſſius* } *Conſuls*		53
An eclipſe of the ſun. L. 3. *c.* 6. §. 2.	4233 3551	272 267	296	74 4	6 *The great muſter of* Xerxes's *army at* Sardis.				57
L. 3. *c.* 6. §. 3 & 6.	4234 3552	273 268	297	75 1	7			*The battles at* Thermopylæ, Artemiſium *and* Salamis.	58
L. 3. *c* 6. §. 9, 10 & 11.	4235 3553	274 269	298	75 2	8 Xerxes's *tragical love.*			*The battle of* Platea *and* Mycale.	59
L. 3. *c.* 7. §. 1 & 2	4237 3555	276 271	300	75 4	10			*The* Athenians *rebuild their walls, and lay the foundation of their dominion.*	61
	4244 3562	283 278	307	77 3	17			*The great victories of* Cimon, *at* Eurymedon *and elſewhere.*	68
L. 3. *c.* 7. §. 3.	4248 3566	287 282	311	78 3	21 *The death of* Xerxes *by the treaſon of* Artabanus.				72
	4249 3567	288 283	312	78 4	5 1 *Artaxerxes Longimanus* 40			Themiſtocles *being baniſhed flies to* Artaxer.	73
	4251 3569	290 285	314	79 2	3	Inarus *ſet up as king by the* Egyptians.			75
L. 3. *c.* 7. §. 5 & 7.	4255 3573	294 289	318	80 2	7 *The marriage of* Heſter.	Inarus *vanquiſhed by the* Perſians.			79 Eſdras *comes to* Jeruſalem. 1 Daniel's 70 *weeks or* 490 *years begins.*
	4264 3582	303 298	327	82 3	16		*The* Decemviri *choſen to compound a body of the* Roman *laws.*	Hippocrates *the great phyſician, and* Democritus *the philoſopher flouriſh.*	88 10

A Chronological Table.

The Accompt from the Solution of the captivity is the same with that from Cyrus.	Julian. World.	Rome Nabon	Iphitus	Olympiads	Persia	Egypt	Rome	Greece	Jews; or from Cyrus and Daniel
	4265	304	328	82	17		The Decemviri chosen for a 2d year, tyrannize and usurp the place a 3d year.	Cymon's voyage to Cyprus, in which he died.	89
	3583	299		4					11
Nehemias comes to Jerusalem.	4268	307	331	83	20			A league for 30 years between Athens and Sparta.	92
	3586	302		3					14
	4272	311	335	84	24		Tribuni Militum first chosen instead of consuls, Dionys. Livy placeth them in the 110 year of Rome.		96
	3590	306		3					18
	4273	312	336	84	25			The conquest of Samos by the Athenians under Pericles.	97
	3591	307		4					19
	4278	317	341	86	30			The Athenians aid the Corcyreans against the Corinthians.	102
	3596	312		1					24
The Walls of Jerusalem finished. Nehemias returns to K. Artaxerxes	4280	319	343	86	32				104
	3598	314		3					26
L. 3. c. 8. §. 1.	4283	322	346	87	35			The first year of the Peloponnesian war.	107
	3601	317		2					29
L. 3. c. 9. §. 1. L. 3. c. 8. §. 4.	4289	328	352	88	6 Xerxes 2 months 7 Sogdianus 8 months			The victory of the Athenians at Pilus.	113
	3607	323		4					35
L. 3. c. 9. §. 1.	4290	329	353	89	8 1 Darius Nothus 19				114
	3608	324		1					36
L. 3. c. 8. §. 5 & 6.	4292	331	355	89	3			A vain and troublesome peace between Athens and Sparta.	116
	3610	326		3					38
L. 3. c. 9. §. 1 & c. 8. §. 8.	4301	340	364	91	12 Egypt rebelleth against the Persian, and sets up kings that reign successively till Ochus's reconquest.	1 1 Amyrtæus 6		The Athenian forces in Sicily utterly destroyed.	125
	3619	335		4					47
C. 8. §. 9.	4302	341	365	92	13 Darius enters into confederacy with the Spartans.	2		The government of the 400 in Athens, which was suppressed the year following.	126
	3620	336		1					48
The Carthaginians invade Sicily with an army of 300000 men. L. 5. c. 1. §. 4. † 3	4304	343	367	92	15	4		The Athenians begin to recover strength.	128
	3622	338		3					50
L. 3. c. 8. §. 10.	4306	345	369	93	17	6		Alcibiades after many victories returns from banishment to Athens: is made general, and banished again.	130
	3624	340		1					52
	4307	346	370	93	18	2 1 Nephres 6		The battle at Arginusa.	131
	3625	341		2					53
	4308	347	371	93	19	2		Dionysius the elder usurps tyranny in Syracuse.	132
	3626	342		3					54
L. 3. c. 8. §. 12.	4309	348	372	93	9 1 Artaxerxes Mnemon, 43	3		The battle at Ægos Potamos, &c.	133
	3627	343		4					55
	4311	350	374	94	3	5	The siege of Veii which lasted 10 years.		135
	3629	345		2					57
L. 3. c. 10. §. 1.	4313	352	376	94	5 The expedition of Cyrus against Artaxerxes.	3 1 Acoris 12		Socrates put to death. The thirty tyrants put down in Athens.	137
	3631	347		4					59

A Chronological Table.

	Julian and World.	*Rome. Nabon.*	*Iphit.*	*Olymp.*	*Perſia*	*Egypt*	*Rome*	*Greece*	*Jews From Cyrus and Daniel.*
L. 3. *c.* 11. §. 4	4318 3636	357 352	381	96 1	10	6		Ageſilaus *warreth in* Aſia.	142 64
L. 3. *c.* 11. §. 7.	4320 3638	359 354	383	96 3	12	8		*The victory of* Conon *at* Gnidus, *&c.*	144 66
	4321 3639	360 355	384	96 4	13	9	Veii *taken by* Camillus.	Xenophon *and* Plato *flouriſh.*	145 67
	4325 3643	364 359	388	97 4	17	3 1 Pſammiticus *the ſon of* Inarus, *and after him* Nephres, *that had been expelled, reigned in all about two years.*	*The honourable victory of* Camillus *over the* Faliſci.		149 71
L. 4. *c.* 7. §. 1. *L.* 3. *c.* 11. §. 9.	4326 3644	365 360	389	98 1	18	2	Rome *taken and burnt by the* Gauls.	*The peace of* Antalcidas.	150 72
	4327 3645	376 361	390	98 2	19	4 1 *Nectanebus* 18			151 73
	4332 3650	371 366	395	99 3	24	6	M. Manlius Capitolinus *put to death.*	*The* Lacedemonians *take the citadel of* Thebes *by treaſon.*	156 78
L. 3. *c.* 11. §. 11.	4336 3654	375 370	399	100 3	28	10		*The* Thebans *recover their citadel, and make ſtrong war upon the* Lacedemonians.	160 82
	4340 3658	379 374	403	101 3	32	14	*Tribunes of the people continued 5 years in office, propound popular laws, among which, that one of the conſuls ſhould be ſtill a* Plebeian.		164 86
L. 3. *c.* 12. §. 1.	4343 3661	382 377	406	102 2	35	17		*The famous battle of* Leuctra.	167 89
L. 3. *c.* 12. §. 4.	4345 3663	384 379	408	102 4	37	4 1 Tachus 8. Eulebius *gives only* 2 *years to* Tachus. Reinec. 6; *but the ſtory of him proves more.*	*L.* Sextus *a* Plebeian, *and* L. Æmilius, *conſuls.*	*The haſty growth of the* Theban *eſtate.*	169 91
	4351 3669	390 385	414	104 2	13 *Many provinces rebel againſt* Artaxerxes, *and are ſoon reclaimed.*	7		*The great battle of* Mantinæa. Epaminondas *dies.*	175 97
L. 3. *c.* 12. §. 8.	4352 3670	391 386	415	104 3	10 1 *Ochus* 23	8 Tachus *betrayed by* Ageſilaus 1 Nectanebus 13		*Peace in* Greece. *The* Athenians *weaken themſelves by converting their treaſures to vain uſes.*	176 Jonathan *about this time high* 98 *prieſt.*
	4354 3672	393 388	417	105 1	3	3		1 Philip *king of* Macedon 24 *years, and part of the* 25th.	178 100
L. 4. *c.* 1. §. 4.	4359 3677	398 393	422	106 2	8	8		6 *The* Phocian *war begins*	183 105
	4364 3682	403 398	427	107 3	13 Ochus *reconquers* Egypt.	13 Nectanebus *flies into* Ethiopia.		11	188 110
L. 4. *c.* 1. §. 6.	4368 3686	407 402	431	108 3	17			15 *The end of the* Phocian *war.*	192 114
L. 5. *c.* 1. § 4. †. 4.	4369 3687	408 403	432	108 4	18			16 Timoleon's *voyage into* Sicily.	193 115
	4370 3688	409 404	433	109 1	19	*Nabonaſſar. November the* 17		17 Philip *waſteth* Illyria, *and draws the* Theſſalians *to follow him.*	194 116
After this, the years from Cyrus *and* Daniel, *are too few, by one*	4375 3693	414 409	438	110 2	11 1 *Arſes* 3.			22	199 Jaddus *high* 121 *prieſt.*

A Chronological Table.

	Julian and World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphitus	Olymp.	Persia	Egypt	Rome	Greece	Jews. From Cyrus and Daniel.
	4376 3694	415 410	439	110 3	2			23 *The battle of* Cheronæa. Philip *chosen captain-general of the* Greeks.	2 199 121
	4378 3696	417 412	441	111 1	12 1 Darius 6 *years and somewhat more.*	*Nabon Novem.* 15		25 Philip *slain by* Pausanias 1 Alexander *the great* 12 *years and* 5 *months.*	4 201 123
	4379 3697	418 413	442	111 2	2			2 Thebes *razed by* Alexander.	5 202 124
	4380 3698	419 414	443	111 3	3			3 Alexander *passeth into* Asia.	6 203 125
L. 4. *c.* 2. §. 4.	4381 3699	420 415	444	111 4	4 *The battle of* Issus.			4	7 204 126
L. 4. *c.* 2. §. 5, 6 & 7. & *l.* 5. *c.* 2. §. 8.	4382 3700	421 416	445	112 1	5		*The* Gauls *enter into league with the* Romans.	5 Alexander *wins* Tyre *and* Egypt.	8 Joddus *meeting* 205 Alexander *is reverenced by him.* 127

	Julian. World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphitus	Olymp.	Macedon	Egypt	Rome	Greece	Romans	Jews. Daniel.
An eclipse of the moon.	4583 3701	422 417	446	112 2	6 *The battle of* Arbela			6 Babylon, Susa, *and* Persepolis *won by* Alexand.		9 206 128
L. 4. *c.* 2. §. 13.	4384 3702	423 418	447	112 3	7 Darius *slain by* Bessus			7		10 207 129
	4385 3703	424 419	448	112 4	1 Alexander *changeth conditions: he puts to death* Parmenio *and* Philotas					11 130
	4386 3704	425 420	449	113 1	9 Alexander *passeth into* India: *kills* Clytus *and* Calisthenes.					12 131
Alexander *died* 17 *days before the summer solstice. From* Nabonassar *hitherto are collected* 424 *years: and hence to the reign of* Augustus, 294. *The sum is* 718 *years, which agrees with this account.* Ptolom. Almagest. l. 3. c. 8.	4390 3708	429 424	453	114 1	13 Alexander *dies at* Babylon.	*Nabon. Novemb.* 12.				16 135
	4391 3709	430 425	454	114 2	1 *Arydæus* 6. *and* 4 *months.*	1 1 *Ptolemy Lagi* 39	*L.* 3. *c.* 3. §. 1, 2 & 3.	*The* Lamian *war.*		1 *Onias* 23 136
	4394 3712	433 428	457	115 1	4	4 Perdiccas *slain in* Egypt } *Nab. Nov.* 11	*L.* 4. *c.* 3. §. 8 & 9.	*Victories of* Eumenes.		4 139
	4395 3713	434 429	458	115 2	5 Antigonus *sent against* Eumenes.	5				5 140
Aridæus *slain by* Olympias. Antigonus *beaten by* Eumenes.	4397 3715	436 431	460	115 4	7	7				7 142
Eumenes *betrayed to* Antigonus. Olympias *slain by* Cassander. Antigonus *grows dreadful.*	4398 3716	437 432	461	116 1	1 *Cassander* 19	8		Thebes *re-edified by* Cassander.		8 143
Some place the beginning of Seleucus *in this* 12*th from* Alexander, *by which account he reigned* 32 *years.*	4402 3720	441 436	465	117 1	5	12 *Nabonassar. Novemb.* 9.	Demetrius *beaten at* Gaza, *by* Ptolemy *and* Seleucus.			12 147
Peace between Alexander's *captains: with division of provinces.*	4403 3721	442 437	466	117 2	6	13				13 148

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	Julian and World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphit.	Olym.	Macedon	Egypt	Syria and the kingdom of the Greeks.	Greece	Romans	Jews and Daniel.
The Æra of the kingdom of the Greeks.	4404 3722	443 438	467	117 3	7	14	1 1 *Seleucus* 30 1	*L. 4. c. 5. §. 7*		14 149
Alexander's *captains assume the name of kings.*	4406 3724	445 440	469	118 1	9	16 Ptolemy *overcome by* Demet. *at* Cyprus	3 3	Athens *set free by* Demetrius *the son of* Antigonus.		16 151
L. 4. c. 6. §. 4.	4413 3731	452 447	476	119 4	16	23	10 *The battle of* Ipsus, *wherein* Antigonus *was slain.* 10			23 158
	4414 3732	453 448	477	120 1	17	24	11 Seleucus *makes alliance with* Demetrius. 11			1 *Simon the antient.* 13
	4417 3735	456 451	480	120 4	1 Antipater *and* Alexan. *the son of* Cassander 4	27	14 14			4 162
L. 4. c. 6. §. 7.	4421 3739	460 455	484	121 4	1 *Demetrius* 6	31	18 18			8 166
	Julian World.	*Rome. Nabon.*	*Iphit.*	*Olym*	*Macedon*	*Egypt*	*Syria*	*Greece*	*Rome*	*Jews. Daniel.*
	4427 3745	466 461	490	123 2	1 *Pyrrhus* 7 *months*	37	24 24			1 *Eleaz. h. priest* 19 172
	4428 3746	467 462	491	123 3	1 *Lysimachus* 5	38	25 25			2 173
	4429 3747	468 463	492	123 4	2	39 2 1 *Ptolemy Philadelphus* 38	26 26			3 174
The translation of the Bible by the Septuagint.	4432 3750	471 466	495	124 3	5	4	29 29		*The* Tarentines *raise war in the eastern part of* Italy *and call in* Pyrrhus *against the* Romans.	6 177
L. 4. c. 6. §. 9. & c. 7. §. 2.	4433 3751	472 467	496	124 4	6 Lysimachus *slain.* Seleucus 7 *mon.*	5	30 Seleucus *slain in the end of the* 124 *Olymp.* Polyb. & Justin. 30		Pyrrhus's *victory against the* Romans.	7 178
L. 4. c. 7. §. 3 & 7.	4434 3752	473 468	497	125 1	1 *Ptol. Ceraunus* *Antipater* *Meleager* *Sosthenes*	6 *Nabon. Nov.* 1	2 1 *Antiochus Soter* 19 31	Gauls *do great spoil in* Maced. & Greece *under* Brennus & Belg		8 179
	4436 3754	475 470	499	125 3	1 1 *Antigonus Gonatas* 36	8	3 33		Pyrhus *goes into* Sicily.	10 181
L. 5. c. 2. §. 6.	4438 3756	477 472	501	126 1	3	10 *Nabon. year begins the first of October.*	5 35	*About these times the* Acheans *begun their society.*	Pyrrhus *called out of* Sicily *against the* Rom.	12 183
	4439 3757	478 473	502	126 2	4	11	6 36		Pyrrhus *overthrown by the* Romans.	13 184
L. 4. c. 7. §. 5.	4441 3759	480 475	504	126 4	6	13	8 38	Pyrrhus *slain at* Argos.	*The* Tarentines *crave aid of the* Carthaginians.	15 186
The translation by the Septuagint finished, this 17 *of* Philadelphus.	4445 3763	484 479	508	127 4	10	17	12 42			19 190 *Consuls*
	4446 3764	485 480	509	128 1	11	18 *Nabonassar* Oct. 29	13 43			1 *Manasses h. priest* 27 191
The more ancient Roman *consuls have been often so uncertain, that* Livy *hath doubted whom to name.*	4450 3768	489 484	513	129 1	15	22 *Nabonassar* Oct. 28	17 47	*L. 5. c. 1. §. 3.*	*The beginning of the first* Punic *war.*	5 195 *Ap. Claudius M. Fulvius*

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	Julian and World.	Rome. Nabon	Iphit	Olymp	Macedon	Egypt	Syria and kingdom of the Greeks	Greece	Romans	Jews. Daniel	
	4453	492	516	129	18	25	3			8	L. Valerius
	3771	487		4			1 Antiochus Theus 16			198	L. Otacilius
							50				
L. 5. c. 1. §. 6.	4454	493	517	130	19	26	2		Duilius's victory at sea.	9	C. Duilius
	3772	488		1			51			199	Cn. Cornelius
	4457	496	520	130	22	29	5		Regulus passeth into Africk.	12	M. Atil. Reg.
	3775	491		4			54			202	Cn. Cornelius
L. 5. c. 1. §. 8.	4458	497	521	131	23	30	6	Marcus Carynensis pretor of the Acheans.	Regulus taken prisoner.	13	L. Manlius
	3776	492		1			55			203	Q. Cæditius
	4463	502	526	132	28	35	11	Aratus recovers Sicyon and joins it to the Acheans		18	L. Cæcilius
	3781	497		2			60			208	C. Furius
The Roman consuls beaten at Lilybæum. The beginning of the Parthian kingdom.	4464	503	527	132	29	36	12		Regulus's death.	19	C. Atilius
	3782	498		3			61			209	L. Manlius
	4465	504	528	132	30	37	13		Shipwreck & unhappy fight of the Romans at sea.	20	P. Claudius Pulcher, and
	3783	499		4			62			210	L. Junius
	4467	506	530	133	32	3	15			22	L. Cæcilius
	3785	501		2		1 Ptolemy Euergetes 26	64			212	M. Fabius
Amilcar the Carthaginian in Sicily. L. 5. c. 1. §. 11.	4469	508	532	133	34	3	4			22	M. Fabius
	3787	503		4			1 Seleucus Callinicus 20			214	C. Atilius
							66				
	4472	511	535	134	2	6	4		Luctatius his great victory at Ægatis.	27	C. Luct. Catu
	3790	506		3	1 Demetrius 10		69			217	A. Posthumius
The war of the Mercenaries with the Carthaginians. L. 5. c. 2	4473	512	536	134	2	7	5	Aratus wins Corinth.	Peace granted to Carthage.	Onias 1	Q. Luctatius
	3791	507		4			70			218	A. Manlius
	4474	513	537	135	3	8 Nabon Oct. 22	6			1 Simon the just 28	C. Claudius
	3792	508		1			71			219	M. Semproni.
The war with the Mercenaries ended.	4476	515	539	135	5	10	8		The Romans take Sardinia from the Carthagin.	3	Gracchus
	3794	510		3			73			221	Falco
	4482	521	545	137	3	16	14			9	Lepidus
	3800	516		1	1 Antig. Doson 12		79			227	Marcellus
	4483	522	546	137	2	17	15		A Roman ambassador slain by queen Teuta.	10	M. Æmilius
	3801	517		2			80			228	M. Junius
L. 5. c. 2. §. 7.	4485	524	548	137	4	19	17		Teuta queen of Illyria subdued by the Romans.	12	L. Posthumius
	3803	519		4			82			230	C. Fulvius
L. 5. c. 5. §. 1.	4489	528	552	138	8	23	5			16	L. Æmilius
	3807	523		4			1 Seleucus Ceraunus 3			234	C. Atilius
							86				
Flaminius was also consul this year. See L. 5. c. 2. §. 8.	4492	531	555	139	11	26	5		Marcellus's victory over the Gauls about Milan.	19	C. Cornelius
	3810	526		3			1 Antiochus the Great 36			237	M. Marcellus
							89				
L. 5. c. 5. §. 2.	4493	532	556	139	12	4	2			20	P. Cornelius
	3811	527		4		1 Ptolem Philopator 27	90			238	M. Minutius
	4494	533	557	140	4	2	3			21	L. Veturius
	3812	528		1	1 Philip 42		91			239	C. Luctatius

A Chronological Table.

	Jul. Worl.	*Ro. Na*	*Iph.*	*Oly.*	*Macedon*	*Egypt*	*Syria and kingdom of the Greeks.*	*Greece*	*Rome*	*Jews and Daniel*	*Consuls*
Hannibal *takes* Saguntum.	4495	534	558	140	2	3	4	Demetrius Pharius *chased out of his lordship.*		22	*L. Æmilius*
	3813	529		2			92			240	*M. Livius*
The beginning of the second Punic *war.*	4496	535	559	140	3	4	5	*L.* 5. *c.* 3. § 4.	*The battle of* Ticinus *and* Trebia.	23	*P. Cor. Scipio*
	3814	530		3			93			240	*T. Sempronius*
The occurrences of this year are referred by Polybius *l.* 5. *to the* 3 *of the* 14 Olympiad. *This battle of* Thrasymene *was fought in the spring. The* Olympian *year began at the summer solstice.*	4497	536	560	140	4 *Sun eclips.* Liv. 22. Feb. 11. *reckoning by* Julian *years.*	5 *War in* Syria *between* Antiochus *and* Ptolomy.	6	Philip *and the* Achæans *make peace with the* Ætol.	*The battles of* Thraesymene.	24	*C. Flaminius*
	3815	531		4			94			242	*Cn. Servilius*
	4498	537	561	141	5	6 Nabonassar's *year beg.* Oct. 16	7		*The great battle of* Cannæ.	25	*C. Ter. Varro*
	3816	532		1			95			243	*Æm. Paul.*
Hannibal *and* Marcell. Hiero *K. of* Syracuse *dies.* Hieronymus *succ.*	4499	538	562	141	6	7	8		Posthumius *the* Roman *consul slain by the* Gauls	26	*L. Posthumius*
	3817	533		2			96			244	*Semp. Grac.* *Q. Fabius*
The two Scipio's *slain in* Spain. Hannibal *wins* Tarentum.	4502	541	565	142	9	10	11	Philip *and the* Achæans *have war with the* Ætolians *and* Romans *in* Greece.	Syracuse *won by* Marcellus.	247	*Ap. Claudius*
	3823	536		1			99		Capua *besieged.*	Onias *b. prie. j.* 39	*Q. Fulvius*
Hannibal *at the walls of* Rome.	4503	542	566	142	10	11	12		*Y.* Scipio *sent into* Spain. Capua *won by the* Rom	2	*Cn. Fulvius*
	3821	537		2			100			248	*P. Sulpitius*
	4507	546	570	143	14	15	16		*The battle at* Metaurus.	6	*C. Clau. Nero*
	3825	541		2			104			252	*M. Livius*
	4508	547	571	143	15	16	17		Scipio *drives the* Carthaginians *quite out of* Spain	7	*Q. Cæcilius*
	3826	542		3			105			253	*L. Veturius*
	4510	549	573	144	17	5 *Ptolemy Epiphanes* 24	19		Scipio *invades* Africk	9	*Cethegus*
	3828	544		1			107			255	*P. Sempronius*
	4511	550	574	144	18	2	20		*King* Syphax *taken.*	10	*Servilius* and
	3829	545		2			108			256	*Servilius*
	4512	551	575	144	19	3	21		Hannibal *vanquished by* Scipio	11	*T. Claudius*
	3830	546		3			109			257	*M. Servilius*
The end of the 2*d* Punic *war, and beginning of the* Macedonian *war with* Philip. *This year and the next were* 3 *eclipses of the moon.*	4513	552	576	144	20	4	22		Scipio *triumph. over* Carthage.	12	*Lentulus*
	3831	547		4			110			258	*Pætus*
	4516	555	579	145	23 Philip *overcome at the river* Apsus *by the* Ro	7	25		*L.* 5. *c.* 4. §. 13	15	*T. Q. Flamin.* 9
	3834	550		3			113			261	*Sex. Ælius*
L. 5. *c.* 4. §. 14.	4517	556	580	145	*The battle at Cynoscephalæ.*	8	26			16	*Cethegus*
	3835	551		4	24		114			262	*Q. Minutius*
Hannibal *expelled* Carthage, *l.* 5. *c.* 5. §. 4. *&* 4. §. 15.	4518	557	581	146	25 *Peace between* Philip *and the* Romans.	9	27	*Liberty of Greece proclaim'd by the* Rom.		17	*L. Furius*
	3836	552		1			115			263	*Marcellus*
C. 5. §. 5.	4519	558	582	146	26	10	28	*War upon* Nabis *the tyrant.*		18	*M. Cato*
	3837	553		2			116			264	*L. Valerius*
C. 5. §. 7.	4522	561	585	147	29	13	31 *Antio. at Chalcis* 119			21	*L. Quintius*
	3840	556		1						267	*Cn. Domitius*
	4523	562	586	147	30	14	32 *Ant. vanquished at Thermopylæ.* 120			22	*Acilius Glab.*
	3841	557		2						268	*Nasica*
	4524	563	587	147	31	15	33	*C.* 5. §. 8	*The gr. victory of L. Scipio over Antiochus in Asia which gave beginning to the Roman luxury.*	23	*L. Scipio*
	3842	558		3			121			269	*C. Lælius*

A Chronological Table.

	Julian World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphitus.	Olymp.	Macedon	Egypt	Syria & kingdom of the G.	Greece	Rome	Jews and Daniel.	Consuls
L. 5. c. 5. §. 9.	4527 3845	566 561	590	148 2	34	18	36 124		Scipio *driven to baniſh himſelf from* Rome.	26 272	*Lepidus* *Flaminius*
	4528 3846	563 562	591	148 3	35	19	6 1 *Seleucus Philopat.* 12 125			27 273	*Sp. Poſthumius* *Q. Martius*
L. 5. c. 6. §. 2.	4531 3849	570 565	594	149 2	38	22	4 128		Scipio, Hannibal *and* Philopœmen *die.* Tully *placeth* Scipio's *death* 2 *years earlier.*	30 276	*Marcellus* *Q. Fabius*
L. 5. c. 6. §. 3.	4532 3850	571 566	595	149 3	39 *The tyranny of* Philip. *His ſon* Demetrius *accuſed to him, and ſlain next year.*	23	5			31 277	*Paulus* *Cn. Bæbius*
C. 6. §. 4.	4533 3851	572 567	596	149 4	40	24	6 130	*Callicrates betrays the Achæans and all the Gre*		32 278	*Cethegus* *M. Bæbius*
	4534 3852	573 568	597	150 1	41	1 *Ptolemæus Philometor and his brother Phyſcon.* 35	7 131			33 279	*A. Poſthumius* *Piſo*
	4535 3853	574 569	598	150 2	42 1 *Perſeus* 11, *or* 12 *years.*	2	8 132			34 280	*Piſo* *Manlius*
An eclipſe of the moon the 7th of Philometor 573 *years and* 206 *days from the beginning of* Nabon. *which agrees with this account. It was (by* Julian *years) the laſt of* April, *about one of the clock in the morning.*	4540 3853	579 574	603	151 3	6	7	7 1 *Antiochus Ephan.* 12 137			39 285	*Sp. Poſthumius* *Scævola*
	4541 3859	580 575	604	151 4	7	8	2 138		See *l.* 5. *c.* 6. §. 11.	*Jaſon buys the h. prieſthood and aft. him Menelaus.* 286	*L. Poſthumius* *M. Popilius*
	4543 3861	582 577	606	152 2	9 *The beginning of the war of* Perſeus.	10	4 140		C. 6. §. 6.	288	*P. Licinius* *C. Caſſius*
	4545 3863	584 579	608	152 4	11	12 Egypt *invaded by* Antiochus *under pretence of helping one king againſt the other*	6 142			290	*Martius* *Servilius*
A total eclipſe of the moon, foregoing the overthrow of Perſeus, *in the year of* Nabonaſſar *here noted.*	4546 3864	585 580	609	153 1	12 Perſeus *vanquiſhed and taken.*	13 Antiochus *commanded out of* Egypt *by the* Romans, *ſpoils the the temple.*	7 143	C. 6. §. 8, 9 & 11.	Gentius *king of* Illyria *taken.*	291 *Perſecution in* Jewry *for religion.*	*L. Æm. Paul.* *C. Licinius*
	4547 3865	586 581	610	153 2	Macedon *made a* Roman *province.*	14	8 144	*The captivity of all the beſt among the* Greeks.	*Triumphs in* Rome.	C. 6. §. 10 & 12.	*Pætus* *Junius*
	4549 3867	588 581	612	153 4		16	10 146			1 *Judas Maccabæus*	*Torquatus* *Octavius*

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on 22 February, 2020